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1. This suit was commenced via general form of complaint filed on 29/7/17. However, by order of court dated 8/2/18, the claimants were grated leave to amend their general form of complaint as per the amended complaint filed before the court on 26/1/18. The claimants vide their amended general form of complaint accompanied with statement of facts, witness statements on oath, list of document to be relied upon are seeking for the reliefs stated hereunder as follows:- 1. A DECLARATION that the letter titled NOTIFICATION OF DISENGAGEMENT AS CHAIRMAN OF CODE OF CONDUCT BUREAU with reference number SGF.19/S.24/C.S/VOL/192 dated 14th June, 2017 purportedly removing the Claimants as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau is unconstitutional, illegal and of no effect. 2. A DECLARATION that by the provisions of Section 157(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) the Claimants may only be removed from office by the President, acting on an address supported by two-thirds majority of the Senate, praying that they be removed for inability to discharge the functions of office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or for misconduct 3. A DECLARATION that the purported disengagement of Claimants as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau without an address supported by two-thirds majority of the Senate and without any proof of confirmation of their inability to discharge the functions of office or any misconduct whatsoever is irregular, unlawful, unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect. 4. A DECLARATION that all steps taken by the 1st Defendant in appointing the 4th - 13th Defendants as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau are void in the absence of any vacancy (from the zones of the claimants) as provided by the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). 5. A DECLARATION that all steps taken by the 2nd Defendant in the screening and confirmation of the 4th - 13th Defendants as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau are void in the absence of any vacancy (from the zones of the claimants) as provided by the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). 6. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court: i) reinstating the 1st Claimant as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau, to remain in office or exit on 28th August 2024 when he shall attain the age of 70 years as provided in the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). ii) On the 1st & 3rd Defendants, to pay to the 1st Claimant all his salaries, imprests, furniture allowances and other entitlements as provided under the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc) Amendment Act 2008 with effect from 14th June 2017 (when the 1st Claimant was purportedly removed as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau) to the date when he is reinstated or allowed to resume his duties as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau. iii) reinstating the 2nd Claimant as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau, to remain in office or exit on 23rd June 2027 when he shall attain the age of 70 years as provided in the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). iv) On the 1st & 3rd Defendants, to pay to the 2nd Claimant all his salaries, imprests, furniture allowances and other entitlements as provided under the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc) Amendment Act 2008 with effect from 14th June 2017 (when the 2nd Claimant was purportedly removed as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau) to the date when he is reinstated or allowed to resume his duties as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau. v) reinstating the 3rd Claimant as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau, to remain in office or exit on 13th November 2028 when she shall attain the age of 70 years as provided in the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). vi) On the 1st & 3rd Defendants, to pay to the 3rd Claimant all her salaries, imprests, furniture allowances and other entitlements as provided under the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc) Amendment Act 2008 with effect from 14th June 2017 (when the 3rd Claimant was purportedly removed as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau) to the date when he is reinstated allowed to resume his duties as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau. to remain in office or exit on 3rd May 2025 when he shall attain the age of 70 years as provided in the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). vii) On the 1st & 3rd Defendants, to pay to the 4th Claimant all his salaries, imprests, furniture allowances and other entitlements as provide under the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc) Amendment Act 2008 with effect from 14th June 2017 (when the 4th Claimant was purportedly removed as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau) to the date when he is reinstated or allowed to resume his duties as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau. ix) reinstating the 5th Claimant as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau, to remain in office or exit on 10th August when he shall attain the age of 70 years as provided in the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). X) On the 1st & 3rd Defendants, to pay to the 5th Claimant all his salaries, imprests, furniture allowances and other entitlements as provided under the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc) Amendment Act 2008 with effect from 14th June 2017 (when the Code of Conduct Bureau) to the date when he is reinstated or allowed to resume his duties as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau. 7. AN ORDER of perpetual Injunction to restrain the 3rd Defendant from confirming the 4th - 13th Defendants or any other persons as Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Bureau, unless for the purpose of filing available vacancies or the Claimants are removed from office in the way and manner prescribed by law. In the alternative, should the Honourable Court find that it will be impossible at the time of the Judgment of the Court to order the reinstatement of the Claimants as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau. 8. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court on the 1st & 3rd Defendants: i) to pay the 1st Claimant all his salaries, imprest, furniture allowances, severance allowances and other entitlements as provided under the 'Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc.) Amendment Act, 2008 with effect from 14th June 2017, until the pt Claimant is officially supposed to exit office on 28th August 2024 when he shall attain the age of 70 years as provided in the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) all amounting to N123,965,775.90 (One Hundred and Twenty Three Million Nine Hundred and Sixty Five Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy Five Thousand (sic) Naira Ninety Kobo) ii) to pay the 2nd Claimant all his salaries, imprest, furniture allowances, severance allowances and other entitlements provided under the 'Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc.) Amendment Act, 2008 with effect from 14th June 2017, until the 2nd Claimant is officially supposed to exit office on 23rd June 2027 when he shall attain the age of 70 years as provided in the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) all amounting to N165,035,797.00 (One Hundred and Sixty Five Million and (sic) Thirty Five Thousand Seven Hundred and Ninety Seven Naira) iii) to pay the 3rd Claimant all her salaries, imprest, furniture allowances, severance allowances and other entitlements as provided under the 'Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc.) Amendment Act, 2008 with effect from 14th June 2017, until the 3rd Claimant is officially supposed to exit office on 13th November 2028 when she shall attain the age of 70 years as provided in the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) all amounting to N181,906,898.36 (One Hundred and Eighty One Million Nine Hundred and Six Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety Eight Thousand (sic) Naira Thirty Six Kobo) iii) to pay the 4th Claimant all his salaries, imprest, furniture allowances, severance allowances and other entitlements as provided under the 'Certain Political, Public and Judicial Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc.) Amendment Act, 2008 with effect from 14th June 2017, until the 4th Claimant is officially supposed to exit office on 3rd May 2025 when he shall attain the age of 70 years as provided in the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) all amounting to N129,526,288.00 (One Hundred and Twenty Nine Million Five Hundred and Twenty Six Thousand Two Hundred and Eighty Eight Naira. iv) to pay the 5th Claimant all his salaries, imprest, furniture allowances, severance allowances and other entitlements as provided under the 'Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc.) Amendment Act, 2008 with effect from 14th June 2017, until the 5th Claimant is officially supposed to exit office on 10th May 2025 when he shall attain the age of 70 years as provided in the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) all amounting to N129,526,288.00 (One Hundred and Twenty Nine Million Five Hundred and Twenty Six Thousand Two Hundred and Eighty Eight Naira) 9. AN ORDER of Court on the 1st & 3rd Defendants, to the sum of N1 Billion (One Billion Naira) as general damages to each of the Claimants, for unlawful disengagement of their employment with constitutional statutory flavour. 2. The 1st and 3rd defendants did not file statement defence to the claimants’ statement of facts. The 2nd defendant filed statement of defence with leave of court granted on 11/1/18. The 4th to 13th defendants did not enter appearance and file defence until after the claimants and 2nd defendant have closed their respective cases and the matter was adjourned for adoption of final written addresses. 3. At the trial the claimants testified for themselves as CW1, CW2, CW3, CW4 and CW5. The 2nd defendant called one witness Mr. Kalu Ogbonnaya a staff in office of the Senate President who testified as DW and tender no exhibit. The 4th to 13 defendants also called one witness by name Elder Ubolo Itodo Okpanachi who testified as DW1. He is the 8th defendant and tendered one exhibit. 4. The claimants opened their case on 24/4/18, with Dr. Ademola Adebo, testifying as CW1 and tendered three exhibits marked as CW1A to CW1C. CW1 informed the court that he was born on 28th August 1954 as shown in exhibit CW1B, statutory declaration of age. The witness stated in his witness statement on oath that all the claimants in this suit are members of the Code of Conduct Bureau of the Federation as established by Section 153(1)(a)of the 1999, constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 5. CW1 testified that he is the first claimant. He adopted his Witness Statement on oath and stated that he was appointed alongside one Mr. Sam Saba and the other Claimants herein as Chairman and Members of the Code of Conduct Bureau on 30th April, 2010 respectively by the 1st Defendant following the confirmation of their appointment by the 2nd Defendant. he tendered his letter of appointment dated 10th July, 2014 which was admitted in evidence as exhibit CW1 A. He stated that his appointment and that of his colleagues would terminate on attaining the age of 70 years. He tendered his Statutory Declaration of Age admitted as exhibit CW1 B to show that he was not yet 70 years old as a 14th July, 2018 when exhibit CW1C, a Letter of Disengagement addressed to Mr. Sam Saba, Chairman, Code of Conduct Bureau was issued. He stated that the 1st Defendant was wrong to assume that their appointment was for a 5 year tenure. That even at that, their second term would still be running until 30th April, 2020. In support of his contention, he relied on exhibit CW1 D, the letter from the 1st Defendant to the Chairman, Code of Conduct Bureau requesting for information on vacancies therein and the response that 4 vacancies existed. He stated that the 4th - 13th Defendants were wrongly appointed by the 1st Defendant to replace the Claimants in the Bureau even when no vacancies existed. In conclusion, he prayed that all their prayers be granted by the Court. 6. CW1 also stated that on 12th June, 2017, a press statement was issued and signed by one Mr. Mohammed Nakorji, Assistant Director Press, Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), informing the General public through Electronic and Print Media that the Acting President, Prof. Yemi Osibanjo, has approved the appointment of the 4th – 13th defendants as Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB). According to the statement, both the Chairman and Members designate will serve for the first term of five (5) years, when their appointment is eventually confirmed by the Senate. 7. CW1 also stated that his employment and those of other Claimants' employment have statutory flavor. They are protected by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in order to avoid or forestall the damages caused by the unilateral, arbitrary and unconstitutional action of removing the claimants in the way and manner done by the first defendant in this case. It will be in the interest of justice for this Honourable Court to order his reinstatement as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau to remain in office and exit when he attain the age of 70 years as stated in the Third Schedule Part 1 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria It will also be in the interest of Justice for this Honourable Court to grant an order of perfetual injunction restraining the 2nd defendant from confirming 4th to 13th defendants as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau, unless for the purpose of filing available vacancies. 8. In the alternative, should this Honourable Court find that it will be impossible to order my reinstatement as a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau, it is in the interest of justice for the Court to make an Order directing the first and third defendants to pay all my salaries, irnprest, furniture allowance, severance allowance and my other entitlements as provided under Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders etc) Amendment Act 2008 with effect from 14th June 2017 until he is reinstated or until he exit office at 70 years, the total amount payable to him on exit being the sum of N123,965,775.90 (One Hundred and Twenty Three Million Nine Hundred and Sixty Five Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy Five Thousand Ninety Kobo. CW1 stated that he had suffered damages by the illegal, unlawful and unconstitutional removal from office done by the 1st defendant. 9. CW1 testified under cross-examination that he knows the procedure for appointment of members of Code of Conduct Bureau. The Senate cannot confirm person not nominated by the President that he is not aware of any communication from president to senate for his removal. In 2010 before he was confirmed he was invited by the senate. That he never received any query or invitation to appear before the senate. 10. TESTIMONY OF CW2. Prince Okechukwu Nwadinobi, testified as CW2. He told the court that vide exhibit CW2 A, he was born on 23rd June 1957. He stated that vide exhibit CW2 B, a letter dated 10th July 2014, he was appointed a member of Code of Conduct Bureau. He also stated that his appointment was made by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, with the approval of the Senate. He stated that the other claimants in this suit were similarly appointed in the manner he was appointed. He stated that suddenly and without recourse to his letter of appointment and the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria (as amended), the President directed the issuance of exhibit CW1 C, a letter titled NOTIFICATION OF DISENGAGEMENT AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CONDUCT BUREAU with reference number SGF.19/24/C3/VOL/192 dated 14/6/17, wherein the claimants were disengaged as members of Code of Conduct Bureau. CW2 prays for reinstatement or payment of his emolument and allowances as provided for under Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances etc) (Amendment Act), with effect from 14th June 2017 till he attain age of 70 years. The total amount payable to him being the sum of N165,035,797.00 (One Hundred and Sixty Five Million Thirty Five Thousand Seven Hundred and Ninety Seven Naira). 9. Under cross-examination by the counsel for the 2nd defendant, CW2 stated that the process of appointment is that the president nominate candidates and sent to senate for confirmation. That candidates goes through screening by the senate, SSS and Police. The senate cannot confirm person not nominated by the president. That the claimants were nominated by President Umar Yaradua, but he took ill before sending the names to senate. The Ag: President sent the names to senate for confirmation. A document shown to the witness by the counsel for the 2nd defendant was identified by CW2 as the nomination and his name was in the list the certified true copy votes and proceeding of 23rd February 2010 of the 2nd defendant was tendered and admitted in evidence through CW2 as exhibit CW2 F1-8. Exhibit CW2 F1-8 another votes and proceedings of 2nd defendant of 20/4/2010 of 20/4/2010 was also tendered in evidence through CW2. He stated that he never received letter from senate for misconduct. 10. Under cross-examination CW2 stated that he is well versed in the procedure for appointment as member of Code of Conduct Bureau. He stated that it commenced with nomination by 1st defendant to 2nd defendants for confirmation after screening of candidate by security agents and the senate. 11. EVIDENCE OF CW3. Dr. Christiana Okwori Ekoja, the 3rd claimant testified as CW3. She stated that vide exhibit CW3 B, she was born on 13th November 1958. That vide exhibit CW3 A, she was appointed as a member of Code of Conduct Bureau together with the other claimants in this suit pursuant to section 154 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. The appointment was made by the president with the confirmation by the Senate. Suddenly vide exhibit CW1 C, without recourse to letters of appointment and the constitution the claimants were disengaged. CW3, pray for her reinstatement or payment of her salaries and allowances till she reached the age of 70 years. The total amount payable to her is N184,906,898.36 (One Hundred and Eighty Four Million, Nine Hundred and Nine Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety Eight Naira, Thirty six Kobo). 12. Under cross-examination by the counsel for the 2nd defendant, CW3 stated that the process of appointment of members of Code of Conduct Bureau is that the president nominate candidates sent to the Senate for confirmation. She stated that her nomination and the other claimant was made by President Yaradua. That they were screened by DSs and the police. She was never invited by the Senate for any investigation. 13. EVIDENCE OF CW4 Chief Stephen Beckeflu, he testified as CW4, he stated that vide exhibit CW4A he was appointed member of code of Conduct Bureau since his appointment he has been performing his function and never received any query or invitation for misconduct until when exhibit CW1 C was received disengaging him and the other claimants from the Code of Conduct Bureau. He prays for reinstatement or payment of salary and allowance till reaching age of 70 years. The total amount payable being the sum of N129,526,288.00 (One Hundred and Twenty Nine Million Five Hundred and Twenty Six Thousand Two Hundred and Eighty Eight Naira). 13. Under cross-examination by counsel for the 2nd defendant, CW4 stated that the appointment as member of Code of Conduct Bureau is done by president after confirmation on nominees of the president. No person can be confirmed by the Senate if his name was not nominated by the president. 14. EVIDENCE OF CW5. Alhaji Ibrahim Manzo testified as CW5, he stated that vide exhibit CW5 B, he was born on 10th May 1955. Vide exhibit CW5 A, he was appointed member Code of Conduct Bureau together with the other claimants in this suit. However, vide exhibit CW1 C, he was disengaged on the directive of the President. He was never queried or invited by the Senate for misconduct. That his disengagement was contrary to the letter of his appointment and the Constitution. He pray for his reinstatement or payment of his salaries and allowances from 14/6/17 till he attain age of 70 years. The total amount payable is the sum of N129,526,288.00(One Hundred and Twenty Nine Million Five Hundred and Twenty Six Thousand Two Hundred and Eighty Eight Naira). 15. Under cross-examination by counsel for the 2nd defendant, CW4 stated he is aware of the procedure for appointment it starts with nomination and sending of names to senate for confirmation senate cannot confirm person not nominated by the president. 16. CASE FOR THE 2ND DEFENDANT. One Kalu Ogbonnaya, testified as DW for the 2nd defendant. He stated that he is a staff in the office of the senate president. The 2nd defendant has the duty to conform the appointment of and removal of chairman and numbers of Code of conduct Bureau of the Federation. The 2nd defendant as a constitutional body has a duty to screen, if found worthy to clear and confirm the appointment of nominees into certain constitutional institutions including the Code of Conduct Bureau. The 2nd defendant is not privy to salaries, allowances and other entitlement of the claimants as it is not within its responsibilities. 17. Under cross-examination by the claimant, DW1 state Senate has statutory duty to screen nominees. That exhibit CW2 E 1-5 and CWF 1-8 CTC of votes and proceedings of the Senate. He stated that he is not aware of any communications on unfitness of the claimants. 18. EVIDENCE OF DW2. On 22/11/18, Elder Ubolo Okpanachi, testified as DW2 for and on behalf of the 4th to 13th defendants. He testified that he is 8th defendant in this case. He stated that the claimants were former members of the Code of Conduct Bureau of the Federation established by Section 153(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) who were appointed in April 2010 for a 5 year tenure which expired in 2015. That the letters of appointment to each of the Claimants dated 10th July, 2014 were not issued based on any confirmation of the appointments by the Senate (2nd Defendant). That the President (1st Defendant) did not at any time write the 2nd Defendant to confirm the purported appointments conveyed by the said letters dated 10th July, 2014. DW1 challenge the Claimants to produce the letter written by the President to the 2nd Defendant asking for confirmation of these purported appointments. That contrary to the false assertions of the Claimants, the 1st Defendant on 19th February, 2010 wrote a letter to the 2nd Defendant praying for confirmation of the Claimants as persons to be appointed as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau in line with the provisions of Section 154(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). That on 23rd February, 2010 the 2nd Defendant considered the 1st Defendant's letter and referred the nominations of the Claimants to its Committee on Ethics, Code of Conduct and Public Petitions for screening and on the 20th April, 2010, the Report of the Committee on the exercise was considered by the 2nd Defendant and the nominations of the Claimants were confirmed. The Votes and Proceedings of the 2nd Defendant on 20th April, 2010 confirming the nominations of the Claimants and that of 23rd February, 2010 bear him out. That upon the confirmation of their nominations by the 2nd Defendant, the 1st Defendant appointed the Claimants as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau on 30th April, 2010 for a five (5) year term as provided for by Section 155(1)(C) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). This fact was duly conveyed to each of the Claimants in the letter which that of 10th July, 2014 purports to replace. That prior to the appointment of the Claimants, one Barr Y. M. Tukur was on the 10th July, 2006 appointed as a Member of the Code of Conduct Bureau and he served alongside the Claimants until 10th July, 2011 when his 5 year term of office lapsed and he left the services of the Bureau. This fact is contained in the letter from the Ag Secretary, Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) dated 25th May, 2016 to the Secretary of the Government of the Federation. That when the Claimants' term of 5 years expired at the end of April, 2015, the 1st Defendant refused to re-nominate them for another term and consequently did not send their names to the 2nd Defendant for confirmation. That following the refusal of the Claimants to vacate their offices after the expiration of their 5 year constitutionally stipulated term of office, a SUIT NO. FHC/ABJ/CS/411/2017: INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF KINGDOM HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION INTERNATIONAL & ANOR V PRESIDENT FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & 2 ORS. was filed at the Federal High Court, Abuja Division seeking declaration that the chairman terms of office expired and the chairman represented the parties in the suit. The Chairman Code of Conduct Bureau who was the 3rd defendant therein and the defence put up by the defendants was that their appointment was determinable only upon their reaching the age of 70 years except where removed for act(s) of misconduct or infirmity of the mind or body by the 1st Defendant upon an address supported by two-thirds majority of the 2nd Defendant. That the Federal High Court Coram Nyako, J. heard the suit and on 28th April, 2017 delivered judgment and declared that the tenure of office of the Claimants was five (5) years in line with the provisions of Section 155(1) (c) of the 1999 Constitution and rejected the argument by the 3rd Defendant (a representee of the Claimants herein) that they were to stay in office until they attained the age of 70 years just as contained in the letters dated 10th July, 2014. That the Federal High Court further held that the appointment of the Claimants by the 1st Defendant in April 2010 was for a 5 year term and had lapsed in April, 2015. The witness identified CTC of the judgment and it was tendered through in evidence and marked as exhibit DW1 A. The judgment of the Federal High Court emphatically restated the position of the Nigerian Constitution limiting the tenure of the Claimants and their Chairman to 5 years and was never appealed by the Claimants or any other person or party. The claimants are political appointees and are not employees of the 1st defendant or any of the defendants. The 4th – 13th defendants are not employees of the claimants or any of the 1st to 3rd defendants. That rather than file an appeal to the Court of Appeal against the judgment of the Federal High Court which declared their tenure as 5 years in line with the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Claimants have instituted the present suit in this Court which is of coordinate jurisdiction to the Federal High Court to re-litigate what the Federal High Court had already decided. That in deference to the above decision of the Federal High Court, the 1st Defendant recognized the cessation of the membership of the Claimants on the Code of Conduct Bureau and the vacancy that arose therefrom. That subsequent to the vacation of office by the Claimants by effluxion of their tenure since April, 2015, and the non-renewal of their appointment for another 5 year term by the 1st Defendant and the judgment of the Federal High Court, the 1st Defendant on the 12th June, 2017 (which is a period of over 2 (two) years after the Claimants' tenure had lapsed) duly appointed the 4th to 13th Defendants as Chairman and Members respectively of the Code of Conduct Bureau for a 5year term subject to confirmation by the 2nd Defendant That the confirmation of the appointment of the 4th to 13th Defendants by the 2nd Defendant has been deliberately frustrated by the Claimants herein resort to the irritating and unjust misuse of the process of this Court. The purported letters of appointment of 10th July 2014 relied upon by the claimant is an after-thought contrived in a failed attempt to subvert the authentic advice of the 3rd defendant given on 5/3/2012 on the tenure of the claimants, which clearly stated tenure of the claimants to be 5 years. For claimants to enjoy their tenure they must not be less than 50 years old or more than 70 years old. 19. Under cross-examination, by the counsel for the claimants, DW2 testified that he became member of Code of Conduct Bureau on 7/11/18. That when he deposed to witness statement on oath he was not a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau. I deposed to witness statement on oath because I am one of the defendants in this suit. The claimants started their appointment February 2010 and ended 30/4/10. I have seen the letter of appointment of the claimants CW1 A, it was shown to witness after reading he said it was not the letter he was refereeing to for 2010. He did not come to court with 2010 letters. He was not a member of Code of Conduct Bureau in 2010, 2014 and 2015. Exhibits CW1B, CW2A, CW3A, CW4A and CW15A, letters dated 10/7/17 are not letters he is referring to. He deposed to witness statement on oath on 14/9/18. In his statement he referred to their appointment dating back to 2010. But he did not attach any letter of appointment dated 2010. He has not brought any letter of appointment of 2010 to the court. All what he said was not what he was told when he came to the Code of Conduct Bureau. He does not have any letter concerning the appointment in court. Each of the claimants have separate letters of appointment. If he was to bring letters of 2010 they would be separate letters of appointment. He represent North Central Geo-Political Zone. He does not know the Geo-Political Zone of 4th Claimant. The 5th claimant represent South-South. He does not know if it was same zone with 4th claimant. He does not know the Geo-Political Zone of 7th defendant, 9th defendant is from North Central Geo-Political Zone, he does not know the 10th defendant Geo-Political Zone, 12th defendant from North-East, 13th defendant does not know his Geo-Political Zone. He does not have letters of 2010 appointment. He is not a party to exhibit DW1 A1-31. The 4th defendant is the chairman of code of Conduct Bureau. The claimant and 9 others. 20. SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL FOR THE 2ND DEFENDANT The 2nd Defendant has formulated a sole issue for the determination of this Honourable Court: "Whether the Claimants have been able to establish any wrong committed by the 2nd Defendant against them to justify the grant of any relief against them by the Honourable Court?" 21. ARGUMENT OF SOLE ISSUE Kehinde Pele, Esq; counsel for the 2nd defendant in his submission before the court after adopting the final written address argued that from a careful consideration of the totality of evidence adduced at the trial of this suit and the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As Amended), the 2nd defendant never participated in the removal of the Claimants and had not breached any of the provisions of the constitution. The provisions regulating the appointment and removal of the Claimants are Section 154 and 157 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. For ease of reference in arguing our point the provisions of section 154 of the constitution under consideration is herein reproduced: "154. (1) Except in the case of ex officio members or where other provisions are made in this Constitution, the Chairman and members of any of the bodies so established shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, be appointed by the President and the appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Senate. (2) In exercising his powers to appoint a person as Chairman or member of the Council of State or the National Defence Councilor the National Security Council, the President shall not be required to obtain the confirmation of the Senate. (3) In exercising his powers to appoint a person as Chairman or member of the Independent National Electoral Commission, National Judicial Council, the Federal Judicial Service Commission, National Population Commission, the president shall consult the National Council of State. 22. It is submitted that from the evidence elicited under cross-examination from the claimants witnesses there is nowhere any of the witnesses showed or gave evidence that the 2nd defendant flouted the above provisions of Section 154 of the Constitution in the process leading to the appointment of the Claimants. Counsel submitted that the position of the 2nd defendant is further solidified with the tendering of Exhibit CW2 E 1-5 & CW2 F 1-8, which are the Votes and Proceedings of the 2nd defendant tendered by the 2nd defendant in the course of cross-examination of the CW2, a witness of the of the Claimants. The Exhibit CW2 E 1-5, which is a certified true copy (CTC) of the 2nd defendant's Votes and Proceedings of 23rd February, 2010 wherein the 1st defendant's letter nominated the Claimants to be confirmed as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau as required by the provisions of Section 154(1) of the constitution. The 2nd defendant in due compliance with the above cited provisions went ahead to confirm the Claimants. This is evidenced by Exhibit CW2 F 1-8 which is the Votes and Proceedings of the 2nd Defendant of 20th April, 2010. It is submitted that these two documents tendered before the Court in the course of trial were not challenged either orally or by way of tendering documents which seeks to put to nullity the content of these two documents. Under cross-examination, CW2 testified that the 2nd defendant dully confirmed the Claimants in accordance with the requirement of the law. It is the contention of counsel that the evidence adduced rightly complied with the provisions of the law in the confirmation of the appointment of the Claimants. In support of this contention counsel placed reliance in the case of CBN V. OKOJIE (2015) 14 NWLR (PT.1479) 231 AT 258 c-o where the Supreme Court held that evidence that has not been challenged or discredited should be accepted and relied on if such evidence is adduced to prove such relevant fact’’. See INCAR NIG. LTD V ADEBOYE (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.8) 523. 22. It is the contention of counsel that the above pronouncement of court rightly supports the case of the 2nd Defendant in respect to the confirmation of the Claimants by the 2nd Defendant. Counsel also placed reliance on the case of IGP V. IKPILA (2016) 9 NWLR (PT.1517) 236B AT 282. Counsel submitted that the 2nd Defendant rightly confirmed that Claimants and by so doing had not breached the provisions of the constitution. On whether the 2nd Defendant had breached any law in respect to the alleged removal of the Claimants, counsel referred to the provisions of Section 157 of the Constitution, which read: ‘‘157. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, a person holding any of the offices to which this section applies may only be removed from that office by the President acting on an address supported by two-thirds majority of the Senate praying that he be so removed for inability to discharge the functions of the office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or for misconduct. (2) This section applies to the offices of the Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Bureau, the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Independent National Electoral Commission, the National Judicial Council, the Federal Judicial Service Commission, the Federal Character Commission, the Nigeria Police Council, the National Population Commission, the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission and the police service commission. (3) All the members of the National Population Commission shall ceased to be members if the president declare a National Census Report as unreliable and the result is rejected in accordance with section 213 of this Constitution’’. 23. The above provision of the constitution the 1st Defendant believes any of the Claimants is not fit to continue in office by virtue of the above section, the 1st Defendant is under the obligation to address the 2nd Defendant in respect to the removal of the Claimants and the 2nd Defendant is duty bound to confirm such a request for removal through a two-third majority vote. In the present case no address was ever presented by the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant therefore had no cause to conduct any proceedings to consider the removal of the Claimants. The DW who is the witness of the 2nd Defendant testified to the effect that the 2nd Defendant never received any address from the 1st Defendant nor did the 2nd Defendant conduct any proceedings wherein the removal of the Claimants was debated or ever considered. This being the case and the content of the averments in the statement of claim of the Claimants also did not at any point allege a contravention of the provisions of the constitution by the 2nd Defendant, it is our position that the 2nd Defendant never participated in the removal of the Claimants. The content of the statement of the 2nd Defendant was not challenged also in the reply of the Claimants to the statement of claim. In fact the Reply of the Claimants was majorly a reiteration of the statement of Claim of the Claimants. 24. It is submitted that the 1st defendant did not put any machinery in motion that could have enable the 2nd Defendant to remove the Claimants from office and having not done so the 2nd Defendant had no cause to remove the Claimants. This was the position of the Claimants and the 2nd Defendants in all their averments. This position was equally supported by the evidence adduced by the witnesses of the Claimants and the 2nd Defendant. CW1-5 and DW1 all testified that the 2nd Defendant never conducted any proceedings wherein the Claimants were considered for removal or were ever removed. There was equally no documentary evidence before the Court by any of the parties alleging that the 2nd Defendant took any step as required by law in respect of the alleged removal of the Claimants. 25. The law is trite that where averments that are not contradicted by the adverse party are deemed admitted. In the instant case the Claimants throughout their statement of claim never alleged a case of non-compliance with the provisions of the constitution in respect of the alleged removal of the Claimants and the 2nd Defendant on its part via its Statement of defence did not challenge the averment of the Claimant, that being the case, the content of the Claimants' statement of claim stands. On this point, counsel relied on the case of BATURE V. N.D.I.C (2016) 11 NWLR (PT.1523) 287 AT 299. See also the case of ADEFARASIN V. DAYEKH (2007) ALL FWLR (PT. 348) PAGES 929. Counsel urged the court to hold that the 2nd Defendant complied with the provisions of the constitution in the appointment of the Claimants and having not participated in the alleged removal of the Claimants cannot be said to have breached any provisions of the constitution on its own part. It is submitted that the Claimants having not demonstrated any wrongdoing or constitutional violation by the 2nd Defendant, they are not entitled to any relief against the 2nd Defendant. 26. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to hold that the claimants’ removal is illegal and contravened the provision of the law. 27. THE SUBMISSION OF 4TH TO 13TH DEFENDANTS. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION Ismaila Alasan, Esq; counsel for the 4th to 13h defendants submitted 4 issues for determination as follows:- 1. Whether by the provisions of Sections 153, 155(1)(c), 157 and the Third Schedule, Part 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 the Claimants membership of the Code of Conduct Bureau is for a term of 5 years or it is until they are 70 years old, if found fit and without misconduct? 2. Whether considering the provisions of Sections 153, 154(1) and 155(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and the evidence of the parties, the letters dated 14th July, 2014 and issued to the Claimants by the 1st Defendant are not void ab initio? 3. Whether in view of the extant judgment of the Federal High Court in Suit No. FHCjABJjCSj411j2017: KINGDOM HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION INTERNATIONAL & ANOR V. PRESIDENT FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & 2 ORS delivered on 28th April, 2017 the Claimants had not been deemed to have mandatorily vacated office and rendered the letter of the 1st Defendant entitled NOTIFICATION OF DISENGAGEMENT AS CHAIRMAN CODE OF CONDUCT BUREAU a mere surplusage and unnecessary? 4. Whether the Claimants are entitled to any of the reliefs being claimed? 28. ARGUMENT ON THE ISSUES ISSUE 1 "Whether by the provisions of Sections 153, 155(1)(c)/ 157 and the Third Schedule/ Part 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria/ 1999 the Claimants membership of the Code of Conduct Bureau is for a term of 5years or it is until they are 70 years old, if found fit and without mtscondact?" 29. In arguing issue one counsel submitted that the Code of Conduct Bureau is one of the executive bodies established for the Federation of Nigeria by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Nigerian Constitution provides as follows: SECTION 153 (1) "There shall be established for the Federation the following bodies, namely: a) Code of Conduct Bureau ... (2) The composition and powers of each body established by subsection (1) of this section are as contained in Part 1 of the Third Schedule to this Constitution’’. 30. As could be seen from the above, while Section 153(1) (a) established the Code of Conduct Bureau, Section 153(2) provides that its composition and powers are contained in Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution. Before looking at the import of Section 153(2) from which the Third Schedule can be said to derive its constitutionality, a perusal of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution reveals thus; THIRD SCHEDULE PART 1 FEDERAL EXECUTIVEBODIES (ESTABLISHED BY SECTION 153) A - Code of Conduct Bureau, 1. The Code of Conduct Bureau shall comprise the following members: (a) Chairman; and (b) Nine other members, each of whom, at the time of appointment, shall not be less than fifty years and subject to section 157 of this Constitution shall vacate his office on attaining the age of seventy years’’. 31. Since the paragraph 1, Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution made reference to Section 157 of the Constitution, it will be good to have a look at its provisions. The SECTION 157 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides as follows: "(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, a person holding any of the offices to which this section applies may only be removed from that office by the President acting on an address supported by two-thirds majority of the Senate praying that he be so removed for inability to discharge the functions of the office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or by misconduct. (2) This section applies to the offices of Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Bureau, ..’’. 32. In the interpretation of the Constitution, it has to be done holistically. See the case of PETER OBI V INEC (2007) 31 NSCQR 734 @ 819 per Oguntade, JSC where he stated that: ‘’In interpreting Section 285(1)(b), it must be borne in mind that the guiding principle in such a duty is to read together the related provisions of the Constitution. In other words, the provisions of the Constitution ought to be interpreted as one whole scheme. In Obanyuwana v Governor (1982) 12 SC 147 at 211/ the Court per Nnamani JSC observed: ‘’lt is an accepted principle of the interpretation of Constitutions (or indeed any statutes) that the provisions should be taken as a whole. It cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect. " 33. It is submitted that this means that the Sections or paragraphs that deal with a particular subject matter will have to be considered together in order to properly construe the legislative intent of the provisions. This is because the duty of the court is to ascertain what the law makers' intention is. In G. E. C. LTD V DONALD DUKE (2007) 31 NSCQR 180 @ 201 per Onnoqhen, JSC (as he then was), the Supreme Court held thus: "In the area of construction the primary concern of the courts is the ascertainment of the intention of the legislature or law makers. From this function the court may not resile however ambiguous or difficult of application the words of the law or Act may be/ the court is bound to place some meaning upon them. If the language is clear and explicit; the court must give effect to lt. for in that case the words of the statute speaks the intention of the legislature. Its function is jus dicere not jus dare. The words of a statute must not be overruled by the judges. Per OBASEK~ JSC in Ojokolobo vs Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (pt 61) 317 @ 201" 34. According to counsel the principles to guide the court in the interpretation or construction of the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution were enumerated by the Supreme Court in the case of AG OF BENDEL STATE V. AG OF THE FEDERATION & ORS (1981) 9 SC (REPRINT) 1 @ 78 – 79. Of note is that the primary rule to be employed in the interpretation of any piece of legislation including the Constitution is the literal rule. By this, it is the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used that is preferred. See ABUBAKAR V INEC (2012) 49.2 NSCQR 786 @ 844. 35. It is submitted that a perusal of Sections 153(1) & (2), 157(1) & (3) and Paragraph 1, Part 1 of Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 show that the words contained therein are very clear, plain and without ambiguity. It follows that in their interpretation, they must be given their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning in order to correctly determine the intention of the legislature as enjoined by the Supreme Court in AG OF BENDEL STATE V AG OF THE FEDERATION & ORS (SUPRA), ABUBAKAR V INEC (SUPRA) and G.E.C. LTD V DONALD DUKE (SUPRA). 36. Secondly, being "an organic scheme of government", the provisions of the Constitution are to be construed communally and given effect as a whole in order not to defeat the "evident purpose". See AG OF BENDEL V AG OF THE FEDERATION (SUPRA), OBANYUWANA V GOVERNOR (SUPRA) and PETER OBI V INEC (SUPRA). 37. As earlier on stated, Section 153(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution established the Code of Conduct Bureau has one of the executive bodies of the Federation of Nigeria. It is therefore a statutory body whose organization, powers and operations are as provided by law. The composition and powers of the Code of Conduct Bureau are incorporated into the Constitution by virtue of its Section 153 (2) which provides that: "The composition and powers of each body established by subsection (1) of this section are as contained in Part 1 of the Third Schedule to this Constitution. 38. It is the submission of counsel that Section 153(2) of the Constitution is very CLEAR, PLAIN, SUCCINT, UNAMBIGUOS and EXHAUSTIVE as to what it has donated to or conferred on Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution. Further, the Part 1, Third Schedule to the Constitution being an Appendix which derives its existence and constitutional flavor to the grace given to it by Section 153(2) (supra), it is subordinated not only to Section 153(2) but to every other provision contained in the main body of the 1999 Constitution. Put differently, the Third Schedule is a subsidiary legislative instrument to the Constitution and the provisions of the Constitution override whatever is contained in the Third Schedule. It is important to state that being an Appendix to Section 153(2) of the 1999 Constitution, the Part 1 of Third Schedule to the Constitution cannot validly contain or deal on any subject or matter which the said section has not expressly given to it or allowed. This is so because if the framers of Section 153(2) of the Constitution intended that Part 1, Third Schedule to the Constitution should provide for the tenure of members of the Code of Conduct Bureau, they would have enumerated it as one of the items along with composition and powers contained in the said Schedule. It is the submission of counsel that in construing or interpreting the contents of Part 1, Third Schedule (supra), the subject of duration of tenure of members of the Code of Conduct Bureau must be excluded. In EHUWA V INEC (2006) 28 NSCQR 545 @ 565 per Ogbuagu, JSC the Supreme Court held thus; ‘’It is now firmly established that in the construction of statutory provision, where a statute mentions specific things persons, the intention is that those not mentioned are not intended to be included. The latin maxim is "Expressio unius est exclusion alterius" i.e. the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other. It is also termed ''Inclusion unius est exclusion eltetius" or "enumeratio unius exclusion alterius ... In other words, the express mention of one thing in a statutory provision automatically, excludes any other which otherwise would have applied by implication with regard to the issue’’. 39. it is the submission of counsel that Section 153(2) of the 1999 Constitution, the Paragraph 1 of Part 1, Third Schedule provides for the composition of the Code of Conduct Bureau while Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 thereof contains its powers. The word "composition" is a noun which means the act or act of composing or forming of whole or integral, by placing together and uniting different things, parts or ingredients. As used in Section 153(2) of the Constitution, the word means the persons who comprise the Code of Conduct Bureau or its membership. 40. The above meaning is lend credence to by Paragraph 1 of Part 1. Third Schedule to the Constitution when it provides as follows: "1. The Code of Conduct Bureau shall comprise the following members: a. a Chairman' and b. nine other members, each of whom at the time of appointment shall not be less than fifty years of age and subject to section 157 of this Constitution shall vacate his office on attaining the age of seventy years. " counsel argued that it is glaringly clear that what Paragraph 1 of Part 1, Third Schedule is concerned with, is the membership of the Code of Conduct Bureau and nothing more. The Paragraph merely gave the mandatory qualification or disqualification from becoming or remaining a Chairman or a member of the Code of Conduct Bureau by clearly stating that it shall be made of a Chairman plus nine members; each of whom at the time of appointment shall not be less than fifty years of age and subject to section 157 of this Constitution shall vacate his office on attaining the age of seventy years’’. 41. Simply put, the Paragraph (supra) has compulsorily stipulated a minimum age (50 years) to be a Chairman or member of the Code of Conduct Bureau and the maximum age (70 years) at which the person can remain in either office provided that the person did not fall foul of section 157 of the Constitution. 42. However, neither Paragraph 1 (supra) nor any other Paragraph of Part 1, Third Schedule to the Constitution talks of or is connected with or deals with the subject of the TERM or TENURE or DURATION in office of the Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Bureau. This is understandably so because that would take the contents of the Third Schedule beyond what the enabling Section 153(2) of the Constitution allows it and therefore void. 43. It is further argued that to give such interpretation would have brought the Third Schedule into direct conflict with SECTION 155(1)(c) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution which specifically provides for the tenure or duration or term of office of the Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Bureau as follows: SECTION: 155 (1) A person who is a member of any of the bodies established as aforesaid shall subject to the provisions of this Part remain a member thereof- c) in the case of a person who is a member otherwise than ex officio member or otherwise than by virtue of his having previously held an office/ for a period of five years from the date of his appointment (2) A member of any of the bodies shall cease to be member if any circumstance arise that if he were not a member of the body, would cause him to be disqualified for appointment as a member. " 44. it is the contention of counsel that the Constitution did not leave the issue of the duration in office of the Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Bureau at large. It fixed the term as five (5) years from the date of the person's appointment as seen in its Section 155(1)( c)(supra). Since the 5 year term is stipulated in the body of the Constitution under Section 155(1)(c), it is submitted that assuming though not conceding, there was a provision in Part 1, Third Schedule to the Constitution which states otherwise, that provision will be rendered void for being inconsistent with the principal enactment. The truth however, is there is no inconsistency whatsoever due to the fact that the Third Schedule is not concerned at all with the duration of the tenure of members of the Code of Conduct Bureau. 45. counsel argued that the only reasonable construction and interpretation that can result from a community reading of Sections 153(1) & (2), 155(1), 157(1) of the 1999 Constitution and Part 1, Third Schedule to the Constitution is that the Code of Conduct members are persons who, at all times, must be at least fifty years old but below seventy years old and whose appointment is for a fixed term of five years in office provided they remain mentally and physically fit and do not misconduct themselves during the five year period they are in office. Thus, the Claimants who were admittedly appointed to office on the 30th April, 2010, see for instance Exhibit CW1 A, had a term of 5 years from that date and this lapsed on 30th April, 2015. This position manifested in the Code of Conduct before the Claimants thought and began to act otherwise. In the letter written by the Ag Secretary, Code of Conduct Bureau to the Secretary of the Government of the Federation, Exhibit CW1 D 1 - 2, one Barrister Y. M. Tukur was appointed a member on 10th July, 2006 and left on 10th July, 2011 at the "End of Tenure". Of interest is that he served part of his 5 year term in office along with the Claimants herein! This exhibit tendered by the Claimants is an admission by them that their appointment is for a 5 year term and not until they are 70 years old as they are now claiming. 46. counsel also submitted that the above interpretation already has judicial blessing as captured in the judgment of the Federal High Court when it was called upon to interpret the provisions of Sections 155(1), 157(1) of t~e Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 and Part 1 of Third Schedule to the said Constitution in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/411/17: INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF KINGDOM HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION INTER ATIONAL & ANOR V. PRESIDENT FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & 2 ORS (unreported) judgment delivered on 28th April, 2017 per Nyako, J. which was admitted as EXHIBIT DW1 A, herein 47. In the last paragraph on page 26 of EXHIBIT DW1 A, the Federal High Court stated; "We are all agreed that what calls for interpretation are Section (sic) 15~ 157 and Paragraph 1 of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution as it relates to the tenure of office of Chairman and member of the Code of Conduct Bureau" 48. The Federal High Court proceeded to interpret the said constitutional provisions and came to the following conclusion on pages 30 - 31, last - second paragraphs, of EXHIBIT DWl as follows: "The tenure of a Chairman and member of the Code of Conduct Bureau is 5 years if appointed by virtue of Section 155(c) (sic) provided that he is not below 50 years of age at the time of his appointment and irrespective of whether his 5 years is spent or not. The tenure will lapse once he attains the age of 70 years. As an example if he is appointed at age 67 he will seize to be a member once he turns 70 years even though he would have only served for 3 years. Consequently, the tenure of members of the Code of Conduct Bureau and any person appointed as a Chairman or member of any of the bodies created by Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution pursuant to Section 155(1)(c) is 5 years. So any Chairman or member appointed by virtue of Section 155(l)(c) of the 1999 Constitution in April, 2010 has a 5 year tenure that should end in April, 2015." 49. According to counsel the decision above is of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction to this Honourable Court. It has not been appealed against or set aside till date. The decision is valid and subsisting. Since it deals with the substantive issue in this suit (duration of Claimants' tenure), we implore Your Lordship to be favourably persuaded by it in the determination of this issue. This will allow for certainty in the judicial process and save the judiciary from the anarchy the Claimants action may foist on it. More so, in the face of the Supreme Court decision in LSBPC V PURIFICATION TECH LTD (2012) 52 NSCQR (PT 1) 274 @ 310 per M. D. Muhammad, JSC thus; ‘’It is trite that no judge is entitled to reverse, vary or alter the decision of another judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction in the absence of statutory authority except where such is arrived at without jurisdiction. " 50. It is submitted that the only lawful or constitutional way for the members of the Code of Conduct Bureau to remain after 5 years is if they are re-nominated, re-confirmed and re-appointed by the President and Senate respectively for a further term of 5 years pursuant to Section 156(3) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 51. Counsel urged the court to hold that each member of the Code of Conduct Bureau is for a term of 5 years provided the member is at least 50 years old and not up to 70 years old during the term. Each member is to enjoy the full term of 5 years unless he attains the age of 70 years old during the term or he ceases to be in office as provided for in Sections 155(2) and 156 of the Constitution or he is removed from office in accordance with Section 157 of the Constitution. Consequently, this court should hold that the Claimants appointment as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau was for a period of 5 years and not until they are 70 years of age. 52. ISSUE TWO: In arguing this issue counsel submitted that an examination of the amended complaint of the claimants herein would show that this suit is founded on alleged breach of the provisions of section 157(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended and Part 1, Third Schedule to the Constitution (supra) by the 1st and 3rd defendants to the detriment of the of the claimants. Each claimant gave evidence at the hearing and tendered various exhibits in support of his or her case. 53. The contention of each of the claimants is that the 1st defendant wrongly exercised administrative or executive powers when he disengaged them from membership of the Code of Conduct Bureau on 14/6/17 despite the fact that they had not involved themselves in any act of misconduct or suffer any form of disability whether of the body or mind that would make them liable to be disengaged from service. If they are to be removed it has to be based on address of two thirds majority of the senate in line with section 157(1) of the Constitution. They also stated that they are by part 1 of Third Schedule they are to remain on office from date of appointment till they attain age of 70 years. Therefore, the appointment of 4th to 13th defendants is wrongful and should be voided as there was no vacancy to fill. However the 4th to 13th defendants through their counsel argued per contra. It was argued that the term of office of the claimants was five years and had expired for over two years before the 1st defendant made them to vacate offices. On this submission reliance was placed on exhibit DW1 A, a CTC of Federal High Court Judgment. 54. The witness of the 4th to 13th defendants testifies to the effect that exhibits CW1A, CW2B, CW3A, CW4A and CW5A, were not original. They were conceived to replace the original letters. According to counsel procedure for re-appointment has not been followed. It is submitted the Code of Conduct was established vide section 153(1) of the Constitution. By section 154(10 the members are appointed subject to confirmation by Senate. Under section 155(1) (c) of the Constitution as amended any person appointed either as chairman or member of Code of Conduct Bureau shall remain in office for five years from the date of his appointment. 55. In the case at hand all the parties are agreed that the 1st defendant in exercise of his constitutional powers pursuant to section 154 of the constitution on 19/2/10 nominated the claimants among others to be appointed by him as members of code of conduct bureau and sent their names to the 2nd defendant for confirmation in line with section 154 of the constitution as amended. On 23/2/10, the 20th April the 2nd defendant confirmed the nomination of claimants as members of Code of Conduct Bureau. Exhibits CW2E1-5 and CW2F1-8. Under cross-examination DW1 testified that upon the confirmation the claimants by the 2nd defendant they were appointed members of Code of Conduc6t Bureau with effect from 30/4/10. The letters of appointment were issued in 2010. 56. It is the submission of counsel the appointment of the claimants took effect from 30/4/10. By 10/7/14 when Anyim Pius Anyim issued letters to the claimants their five year tenure was still on not elapsed. It was not possible to renew those appointments having not elapsed. If they have to be re-appointed by the 1st defendant their names sent to 2nd defendant for confirmation, before such reappointment can be done. In any event, exhibits before the court did not state that it was a renewal or a further term that the claimants were being offered. Rather, they purport to supersede the earlier letters of appointment given to the claimants. 57. It is submitted that there was no power for altering procedure for appointment it is provided in sections 1153 and 154 of the constitution as amended. Therefore, exhibits dated 10th July, 2014 could not have been founded on the confirmation of the Claimants appointment done by the 2nd Defendant on 20th April, 2010. The reasons are simple. First each of the Exhibits admit the existence of a prior letter which IS the original letter of appointment. Secondly the votes and proceedings of the senate of 23rd February, 2010 and 20th April, 2010 -Exhibits CW 2E 1-5 and CW 2F 1-8 respectively, show that the whole process of nomination to confirmation of the appointments of the Claimants took place when Nigeria had an Acting President. Third, the Claimants appointment took effect from 30th April, 2010 at which time the appointor was still in acting capacity. Fourth, it is a matter of general public knowledge which requires no proof that Anyim Pius Anyim became Secretary to the Government of the Federation at the end of May, 2011 when President Jonathan was sworn for his own first term in office. Fifth, it is a matter of general knowledge for which the court is mandated to take judicial notice that Acting President Jonathan, GCON as at 30th April, 2010 when he swore in the Claimants became President Jonathan, GCFR on 6th May, 2010 when he succeeded his principal, President Yar'adua (deceased). Sixth, the Claimants were already in office and enjoyed their tenure for over 4 years as can be deduced from Exhibit CW2 D 1-2 before the letters of 10th July, 2014 were written. Seventh, on Exhibit CW2 D 1-2, it is stated that one of the members with whom the Claimants served, who incidentally is a Legal Practitioner, left after completing his 5 year tenure in office. It is the submission of counsel that the exhibits dated 10/7/14 were without any competence to do so, they are invalid unconstitutional and therefore null and void. 58. ISSUE 3: in arguing this issue counsel submitted that exhibit DW1A has not been appealed against. The judgment remain valid and binding on all parties to it. LSBPC V PURIFFICAION TECHNOLOGY LTD (2012) 52 NSCQR (Pt.1) 274..’ Counsel submitted exhibit DW1A is judgment in rem against the whole world binding on parties. 59. ISSIE 4: This question depend on success of the claim for declaration that the claimants’ tenure of office had not lapsed and subsists. However, it has been demonstrated that they were lawfully disengaged from their unlawful occupation of their offices, they are not entitled to any relief whatsoever 60. CLAIMANTS SUBMISSION 61. The claimants submitted four issues for determination: (1) WHETHER THE CLAIMANTS PROVED THEIR CASE BEFORE THIS HONOURABLE COURT AND ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS SOUGHT? (2) WHETHER THE APPOINTMENTS OF THE CLAIMANTS AS MEMBERS OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT BUREAU HAVE STATUTORY FLAVOUR (3) CONSIDERING THE CONDITIONS OF APPOINTMENT OF THE CLAIMANTS CONTAINED IN THEIR VARIOUS LETTERS OF APPOINTMENTS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THECONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1999 (AS AMENDED) AND STATUTE GOVERNING THEIR APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVAL AS MEMBERS OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT BUREAU, WHEHTER THE LETTER TITLED 'NOTIFICATION OF DISENGAGEMENT AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT BUREAU' PURPORTEDLY DISENGAGING THE CLAIMANTS AS MEMBERS OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT BUREAU IS, AS RELATING TO THE CLAIMANTS, ILLEGAL, NULL AND VOID? AND (4) CONSIDERING THE PARTIES AND RELIEFS IN SUIT NO. FHC/ABJ/CS/411/2017: KINGDOM HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATIO INTERNATIONAL & ANOR V PRESIDENT FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & 2 DRS WHETHER THE CLAIMANTS ARE BOUND BY THE SAID JUDGMENT AND CAN BE SAID TO HAVE VACATED THEIR OFFICES AS MEMBERS OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT BUREAU BASED ON THE SAID JUDGMENT AS ALLEGED BY THE 4TH - 13TH DEFENDANTS? {ENCAPULATING ISSUE 3 AS RAIS~O BY THE 4TH•13TH DEFENDANTS]. 62. ARGUMENT ON ISSUE 1 AS RAISED BY THE CLAIMANTS: WHETHER THE CLAIMANTS PROVED THEIR CASE BEFORE THIS HONOURABLE COURT AND ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS SOUGHT? 63. J. U. K. Igwe, SAN, in arguing issue one contended that the claimants have proved their case against the defendants in the exhibits CW1A, CW2B, CW3B, CW4B, and CW5D being original letters of their appointment. It is argued that none of these documents were contradicted or controverted. The defendants have also tendered no document to controvert or challenge the above documents duly tendered and admitted in evidence in favour of the claimants. In support of this view reliance was placed on the case of Military Governor of Lagos State & 4 Ors V Adeyuga & 6 Ors (2012) 2 S.C (pt 1) 68, 123- 124, where the Supreme Court held, where evidence was unchallenged the defendant pleadings are abandoned. Also cited and relied is the case of Okechukwu V Okafor (1961) 2 SCNLR 369. 64. It is the submission of counsel that the claimants have proved non-attainment of 70 years of age were the witnesses gave their date of birth and tendered proof to that effect vide exhibits CW1B Exhibit CW1 'B' CW2'A', CW3'B', CW4'B', and CW5'B'. it is submitted that none of the exhibits had been contradicted. The law is well settled that unchallenged evidence is deemed admitted. To support this submission reliance was placed on the cases of Nigerian Bottling Company PIc V Ubani (2013) 10-12 S.C 95, 155 lines 19 and 19, The Nigerian Army V Warrant Officer Yakubu (2013) 2 S.C (pt 1) 117, where the Supreme Court held at pp.130-131 that, 'it is basic that unchallenged evidence stands. The court should accept same. 65. The Learned Silk, also contended that the claimants have proved absence of vacancy in the Code of Conduct Bureau. In paragraph 15 of his witness statement on oath, the first claimant averred that the office of the Secretary to the Federal Government wrote to the Code of Conduct Bureau requesting for information on available vacancies in the membership of the Code of Conduct Bureau and that the Bureau supplied the information on the available vacancies. A similar averment is contained at paragraphs 12 of second, third, fourth and fifth claimants' witness statements on oath all sworn on 26th January 2018. The CTC of Exhibit CW2'C' - the certified true copy of a letter by the Secretary to the Government of the Federation received by the Code of Conduct Bureau on 23rd May 2016 but dated 23rd May 2016 titled, 'Request For Existing Vacancies In The Code of Conduct Bureau.' The second claimant also tendered Exhibit CW2'D' a certified true copy of the response by the Code of Conduct Bureau to the enquiry by the Secretary to the Federal Government signed by Kolawole, A.F (Mrs) Ag. Secretary. Read together, Exhibits CW2'C' and CW2'D' proved that the first, second, third, fourth and fifth claimants were and are still active members of the Code of Conduct Bureau since their seats were not vacant. Nothing from any of the Defendants challenged or controverted Exhibits CW2'C' and CW2'D'. Neither the first nor the third Defendants, the principal Defendants/originators of exhibit CW2'C' denied Exhibit CW2'C' and the authority of Exhibit CW2'D'/response restating the constitutional requirement on vacancies in the Bureau. Exhibits CW2'C' and CW2'D' are thus, deemed as admitted by the Defendant, particularly, by the first and third Defendants. This Honourable Court ought, respectfully, to act on it in favour of the claimants. On this contention reliance was placed on the cases of N.B.C PIc V Ubani (2013) 10-12 S.C. 95, 155 and Nigerian Army V Warrant Officer Yakibu (2013) 2 S.C (pt 1) 117, 130-131. 66. Accordingly, it is argued that Exhibit CW1 C, titled, 'Notification of Disengagement as Chairman of the Code of Conduct Bureau issued to the Chairman, Code of Conduct Bureau and as purportedly affecting the claimants mentioning erroneously that 'the six (6) members whose tenure also expired are also disengaged is in conflict with the unchallenged exhibit CW2 'D'. It is also in conflict with section 153(2), Part 1 Third Schedule to the Constitution and section 157(1) and (2) of the constitution. It is therefore void. 67. it is also argued by the Learned Silk, that the 1st and 3rd defendants failure to file defence means admission of the entire claimants claims before the court. It is submitted that the claimants appointment was made pursuant to section 154(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended. This means they do not hold office at the pleasure of the 1st defendant. It is submitted since the 1st and 3rd defendant did file defence, filing of written address cannot take place of pleadings. As counsel address no matter how well written or articulated or no matter how elegant is incapable of taking the place of pleadings, and evidence in the matter. Accordingly, the address of the learned counsel to the first and third Defendants filed on 8th August 2018 ought to be discountenanced in its entirety. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of Omisore & Anor V Aregbeso/a & 2 Ors (2015) 5-6 S.C (pt 11/) 1, 119 lines 13-15. 68. it is also the contention of Learned Silk, that the 2nd defendant has admitted unconstitutionality of exhibit CW1 C. in that it is incapable of removing the claimants from office without an address supported by two-thirds of the Senate. It is also argued that the 2nd defendant has admitted that the claimants appointment was confirmed by it as per exhibits CW2 E1-5 and CW2 F1-8. It is submitted by the 2nd defendant’s admission exhibit CW1 C, is unconstitutional. 69. counsel also argued that the evidence of DW1 the 8th defendant who testified for and on behalf of the 4th – 13th defendants, is hearsay evidence and inadmissible in law and has no probative value. It ought to be rejected. In support of this argument reliance was placed on the case of Onovo & 3 Ors V Mba & 3 Ors (2014) 5•6 S.C (pt iv) 147, 175, the Supreme Court held: "Without much ado, the witnesses evidence at page 48 supra, is hearsay evidence since he was narrating that which he was told from history. That aspect of evidence is of no probative value with the trite nature of law that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The nature of the witnesses' evidence however affirms that he is a controversial witness". 70. it was submitted that paragraph 21 of the witness statement of DW1 deposed to by him on 14th September 2018 contains an allegation of criminal misconduct against the claimants. DW1 alleged in the said paragraph that, 'The purported letters of appointment dated 10th July 2014 relied upon by the claimants is an after-thought contrived in a failed attempt to subvert the authentic letters issued by the claimants in April, 2010 and the original advice of the 3rd Defendant given on 5th March 2017 on the tenure of the claimants which clearly stated the claimant's tenure to be 5 years. It submitted that paragraph 21 of the 4th - 13th Defendants' statement of defence ought to be supported with detailed particulars of the contrivance and subversion of public documents alleged by the 4th - 13th Defendants. It is submitted that paragraph 21 of the 4th - 13th defendants statement of defence breached Order 30 Rule 4 National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure Rules, 2017) and ought to be struck out. The Rules mandatorily provide: 'In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence and in all other cases, in which particulars may be necessary (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleadings.' 71. Secondly, the allegation of contrivance of letters of appointment to public offices and subversion of authentic letters of appointment to public offices levied by DW1 at paragraph 21 of his witness statement on oath and at paragraph 21 of the 4th - 13th Defendants' statement of defence filed 14th September 2018 are very serious allegations of criminal misconducts and breaches contained in these civil proceedings before this Honourable Court. They must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the 4th - 13th Defendants as required by section 135( 1) and (2) Evidence Act 2011. Respectfully, in Anyanwu & 5 Ors V Uzoawuaka (2009) 6-7 S.C (pt.I) 44, the Supreme Court held: ' ... The plaintiffs alleged malicious damages of some of the properties ... Thus, this is a civil suit in which the commission of crime is alleged. The settled principle of law is that where the commission of crime is alleged in a civil proceeding, the person alleging (in this case the plaintiffs) must prove same beyond reasonable doubt. In support ofthis principle, see: H.M.S. Ltd V First Bank (1991) 1 S.C (pt /I) 26, (1991) 1 NWLR (pt 167) 290 at 302; Ikoku V Ori (1962) 1 SCNLR 307; Famuroti V Agbeke (1991) 5 S.c. 1; (1991) 5 NWLR (pt 189) 1 at 13. The Plaintiffs/Appellants had a duty to prove beyond reasonable doubt the damages on or theft of their properties alleged in the statement of claim. This they failed to do. For these reasons, I hold that they were rightly refused by the Trial Court. ' Leading Judgment of F.F. Tabai, JSC at p.16-32. See also, Okechukwu V INEC & 2 Ors [2014] 17 NWLR (pt 1436) 255, 290 (S.C). See further, Nwobodo V Onoh (1984) All NLR 1, Judgment of Sowemimo JSC at p.33 and Bello, JSC at pp.16, 17, 19 and 21. 72. Counsel urged the court to dismissed paragraph 21 of the statement of defence and paragraph 21 of the witness statement on oath of the DW1 for being bereft of particulars and bereft of proof beyond reasonable doubt having alleged breaches amounting to offences. Furthermore the allegation are laced with hearsay. It is also argued that the pleadings of the 4th to 13th defendant must be deemed to have been abandoned due to lack of proof. To buttress this submission counsel cited and relied on the Supreme Court in Military Governor, Lagos State & 2 Ors V Adeyiga & 6 Ors (2012) 2 S.C (pt 1) 68, 124, where it was stated: 'In the absence of evidence to support the statement of defence, the pleadings of the Defendants/Appellants were abandoned. The defence is deemed abandoned for all time. See Okechukwu V Okafor (1961) 2 SC NLR 369.' Reliance was further placed on the case of Emegokwe V Okadigbo (1973) All NLR 314, 318 (SC) and R.C. Omeaku & Sons Ltd V Rainbownet Limited & 3 Ors [2014J 5 NWLR (pt 1401) 516, 542. 73. Counsel submitted that applying the cases cited paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the statement of defence filed on 14 September 2018 by the 4th - 13th Defendants are deemed abandoned in the absence of evidence to support same. Also, the evidence of DW1 (sole witness) being hearsay lacks probative value. 74. It is further submitted that this Honourable Court ought to presume that had the 4th - 13th defendants tendered the documents showing the purported appointment for a 5 year term as alleged in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of their statement of defence (reproduced at paragraph 8 of DW1 's witness statement on oath), the documents would have been detrimental to their case (if they exist). Thus, the presumption in section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 must be applied against the 4th - 13th Defendants. The Supreme Court decisions in Gundiri V Nyako [2014) 2 NWLR (pt 139) 211 (lines f-h) and Kakih V P.D.P. [2014J 15 NWLR (pt 1430) 374, 418-419 are apt and ought, respectfully, be applied against the 4th - 13th Defendants. 75. It is further submitted that same presumption ought to be attributed to allegations made in paragraphs 9 ('on a term of 5 years which expires at the end of April 2015), 11 (on alleged representation of the claimants herein in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/411/2017 as no evidence of such representation was or instructions by claimants to represent them in the Suit was placed before this court by the 4th - 13th Defendants). Same applies to the allegation of 'vacation of office by the claimants' and non-renewal of their appointment for another 5 year term made by the 4th - 13th Defendants in paragraph 17 of their statement of claim. The 4th - 13th Defendants placed no evidence before this court to either show that the claimants vacated their offices as alleged nor any document to show the terms of offices expired by effluxion of time or any document or letter written by the first Defendant to each of the claimants herein. Same applies to paragraph 19 which alleged the claimants are political appointees. The 4th - 13th Defendants placed no document before this court to so show or at least to show that the claimants hold their positions at the pleasure of the President rather than the constitution. More fundamentally, the 4th - 13th Defendants at paragraph 21 of the statement of defence (reproduced at paragraph 21 of DW1 's witness statement on oath) referred to a certain document - a legal advise purportedly made by the third Defendant on 5th March 2012 on the tenure of the claimants but failed to produce such a purported legal advice in court. Same presumption applies against paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 11, 17, 18, 20 and 21 of the witness statement on oath of Dw1. 76. In concluding argument on issue one learned Silk urged the Court to resolve Issue 1 in favour of the claimant and hold that the claimants proved their case and entitled to the reliefs sought in this case. 77. ISSUES 2, in arguing issue two counsel submitted that exhibits CW1 A, CW2B, CW2C, CW3A, and CW5A are the respective letters of appointment of the claimants as members of Code of Conduct Bureau. The letters were similarly warded addressed to each of the claimants. It is argued that the letters of appointment incorporated Third Schedule Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution as governing law of the contract of employment/appointment of the claimants as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau. The letters recognized claimants appointments at ages 60, 57, 56, 59, and 59 respectively shall remain in office until they attain the age 70 years. It is contended 2nd defendant has admitted. The 2nd defendant had admitted that appointment of claimant was to be confirmed by 2nd defendant likewise removal has to be approved by 2nd defendant. Indeed 2nd defendant approved appointment of the claimants. 78. On issue 3, it is the argument of counsel that vide letters of appointment that adopted the Third Schedule Part 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended as the specific governing law of the contract of the claimants, by the provision of Third schedule Part 1 and section 157 of the Constitution removal of claimants can only be effected by the president acting on address supported by two-third s majority of the senate praying that they be removed for inability to discharge the functions of their office. SALAH V ABAH & 2 ORS. (2017) 12 NWLR (pt.1578)100,159. It is argued in removing claimants the 1st defendant did not complied with provisions of section 157(1) of the constitution. It is submitted in democratic regime everyone including the president must act consistent with the rule of law and Constitution. In support of this contention counsel relied on the cases of AG LAGOS STATE V AG FEDERATION (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt.904), GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER V AG OF THE FEDERATION (1994) 3 NWLR (PT.453) 34, KOJO V ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT.1025) 423. 79. It is submitted that defendants did not adduce evidence to establish that the appointment of claimant is for 5 year tenure. The assertion of 4th -13th defendants is based on hearsay. Section 155(1) (c) being relied upon is general provisions. While the Third Schedule Part1 (1) and 157 of the Constitution is specific provisions on the appointment, holding office and removal from office of the claimants section 157 is also a later provision than section 155. In case of conflict section 157 prevail. On this proposition counsel placed reliance on the cases of NOBIS-ELENDU V INEC & 2 ORS (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt.1485) 197, CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION V GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE INDUSTRIAL TRAINING FUND & ANOR. (2015) 1 NWLR (Pt.1439) 114. It is the contention of counsel that when appointed members remain in office till reach age 70. In support of this submission counsel relied on the cases of JAMES V INEC & ORS (2015) 2-3 SC 99, ONOCHIE V ODOGWU (20086) 2 SC (pt.ii) 153. 80. It is also the submission of counsel that that section 155(1) (c) said to be limiting the term of members of Code of Conduct Bureau should not be read in isolation of the Third Schedule Part 1 (1) which requires subject section 157 of the constitution as amended, members of the Bureau should not be less than 50 years of age at the time of appointment and shall remain in office until the age of seventy years. Further, a narrow effect ought not be given to section 155 (1) (c) in isolation of the letters of section 157 which provide for specific procedure for removal of the members of the Code of Conduct Bureau. This court has a duty to construe the entire provisions in a manner not to defeat the obvious ends of the Constitution and the object of the law on which the code of conduct bureau was created. 81. It is also argued that the constitution, the enabling statute and terms of employment of the claimant ought to be construed within the factual situation or case before this Honourable court. The core case before the court is whether the purported disengagement of the claimants was unlawful? The speculation of a term of 5 years raised by the learned counsel for the 4th – 13th defendants, not supported by evidence is not before this Honourable court. The combine effect of section 157 and Third Schedule Part 1 is that the recognized mode by which the claimants appointment can be terminated are attainment of the age of seventy years, inability to discharge the function of the office (infirmity ) of mind or body or any cause; misconduct and death. In the present situation none of these occurred and the claimants were disengaged by letter of 14/6/17 it is unlawful ab initio. It is also stated the grounds of disengagement of the claimants as stated in the letter is unconstitutional, null and void and of no legal effect. Accordingly the purported disengagement is liable to be set aside. This is because there is non-fulfillment of condition precedent. To buttress the point made counsel relied on the case of CORPORATE IDEAL INSURANCE LTD V AJAOKUTA STEEL COMPANY LTD & 2 ORS. (2014) 2 Sc (Pt.1) 50 where Supreme court adopted its earlier decision in ADESANOYE V ADEWOLE (2006) 7 SC (Pt.iii) 19, where it was emphatically stated that: where a statute clearly provides for a particular act to be perform, failure to perform that act will not only be interpreted as a delinquent conduct but will be interpreted as not complying with the statutory provision. In such situation the consequences of non-compliance follow, notwithstanding that the statute does not specifically provide for a sanction’’. It is submitted that the conditions laid down in section 157 of the constitution cannot be waived but must strictly complied with. EZE V OKECHUKWU (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt.548) 43. 82. The counsel for the claimants placed reliance on the cases of MAGBERE V INEC (2014) 46 NLLR (PT.149) 421, CBN V IGWILO (2007) 4-5 SC 154, OLARUNTO BA-OJU & 4 ORS. V ABDULRAHEEM & 3 ORS (2009) 5-6 SC (PTII) 57 and urged the court to reinstate the claimants as members of the Code of Conduct Bureau as they were removed illegally by a flagrant breach of the constitution by the 1st defendant. Further reliance was placed on UNTH MB V NNOLI (1994) 8 NWLR (pt.363), THE COUNCIL FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC MUBI V YUSUF (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.165) 81, OLANIYAN V UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (supra) ; FAKUADE V OAUTH (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt.291) 47, SHITTA_BAY V FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION (1981) 1 SC 40. Counsel urged the court to order reinstatement of the claimants and payment of their salaries and allowances in accordance with Certain Political, Public Judicial Office Holders (Salaries & Allowances etc) Amendment Act 2008 with effect from 14/6/17 when they were purportedly removed members of the Code of Conduct Bureau to the date when they are reinstated or allowed to resume their duties. 83. In the alternative the claimants claim payment of their all salaries imprst, furniture allowances, severance allowances and other entitlements as provided under the Certain Political, Public, and Judicial Office Holders (salaries & Allowances etc) Amendment Act 2008 with effect from 14/6/17 until they are officially supposed to exit office. It is argued that these claims were admitted and unchallenged by 1st and 3rd defendants. In support of their claim the case of OSAGBEMEH V AKOKO_ADO LOCAL GOVERNMENT, EDO STATE (2014) 45 NLLR (pt.143) 229, SHENA SECUTRITY CO. V AFROFAK NIG. LTD (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt.1118) 77. The claimants also claim payment of one billion naira to each of the claimants as general damages for unlawful disengagement of their employment with constitutional statutory flavor. ZENITH BANK PLC V ELERUEWEN (2012) 4 NWLR (Pt.1290) 218. 84. ISSUE 4, it is the contention of counsel that same issue was raised and argued in the notice of preliminary objection to raise same issue here is an abuse of process of court. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of AFRICA INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC V IKECHUKWU & 2 ORS. (2011) 1-2 SC (Pt.ii) 67-69. It is the submission of counsel that the 4th to 13th defendant have abandoned their averment on this issue with their witness stating that all he told the court was what he was told when he resumed at Code of Conduct Bureau and no document to back up his claim. The address of counsel cannot take place of evidence. It is the submission of counsel that no evidence to show claimants were parties before the Federal High Court. The Federal High Court could not have exercise jurisdiction over them who were not parties before it. LEBIE V THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES CHERUBIAN and SERAPHIN CHURCH OF ZION NIGERIA & 2 ORS. (2001) 5 SC (Pt.1) 25. Contrary to submission of defendants, parties who did not ventilate their grievances could not be made bound by outcome of decision NDIC V UBN PLC (2015) 12 NWLR (Pt.1473) 246, CBN V AHMED (2001) 5 SC (pt.iii) 146, OKAFOR V AG ANAMBRA STAYE (1991) 6 NWLR (PT.200) 699. It is also argued that the reliefs in this case are different. It is also argued that the claimants vide their letters of appointment their contract of employment is personal to them. They have personal interest affecting their livelihood. To support this contention counsel relied on the case of CCOPERATIVE BANK PLC V ROSE (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt.544) 37 thus, every decision that purports to decide these personal particular interests Of the claimants is a judgment in persona, not in rem. SOSAN & 2 ORS V ADEMUYIWA (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt.27) 241 is cited as authority for this submission. The claims here and in the Federal High Court are different. DIKE & 2 ORS V NZEKA 11 & ORS (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.34) 144. 85. In concluding his submission learned silk argued the court to grant the claimants reliefs as claimed. SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL FOR THE 1ST AND 3RD DEFENDANTS. 86. D. N. Lamari, Esq; counsel for the 1st and 3rd defendants adopted his written address as answer to the claimants’ claims. In the final address counsel maintained that the 1st defendant has the power under the executive powers of the government and under section 157 to disengaged the claimants and relieve them of their appointment as was done. Counsel urged the court to hold that the disengagement of the claimants was in accordance with the law. REPLY TO 1ST AND 3RD DEFENDANTS FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS. 87. In reaction to the final written address of the 1st and 3rd defendant, the claimants filed a reply to the said address wherein it was argued that the 1st and 3rd defendants have by their t and neglect to file defence to the claimants’ action admitted the entire case of the claimants. The 1st and 3rd defendans cannot therefore be heard to argue that the disengagement of the claimants was valid since there is no evidence to that effect from them. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the 1st and 3rd defendants address. NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION BY THE 4TH TO 13TH DEFENDANTS. 88. The 4th – 13th defendant filed a notice of preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the court to entertain this suit. On the grounds that the reliefs are not within the jurisdiction of the court. None disclosure of cause of action. Abuse o court process and the issues have been determined by the Federal High Court and the claimants have not appeal the judgment given and this court has no power of review of the judgment of Federal High Curt which is a court of coordinate jurisdiction. A written address was fled along with the notice of preliminary objection, which was adopted by counsel as his argument on the objection. 89. The claimants in reaction filed a reply to the submission on the preliminary objection. Wherein it was argued by counsel that this court has jurisdiction under the provisions of section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended to hear and determine this suit as it is presently constituted. Counsel also argued that there is no abuse of court process in that the parties, issues or reliefs are not same in the two suits. It is further argues that the claimants cannot be bound by exhibit DW1A, as they are not parties to that action. They are therefore not bound by it and its outcome. Details argument on the argument canvassed in respect of the notice of preliminary have been captured in the main argument of counsel. COURT’S DECISION: 90. I have carefully and painstakingly perused the content of the amended complaint and its accompanying processes, all the responses filed by the defendants as well as the notice of preliminary objection filed by the 4th – 13th defendants. 91. Before proceeding to determine whether the claimants are entitled to the reliefs being sought. It behooves on me to first and foremost dispose of the preliminary objection of the 4th – 13th defendants. The 4th – 13th defendants raised the issue of jurisdiction arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case as it is not an employment issue. The action is an abuse of process. The 4th -13th defendants have argued that this court is of limited jurisdiction pursuant to section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. It is also argued that the jurisdiction of this court is limited to trying matters connected with or relating to employment and labour between employers and employees, workplace, industrial relations and other incidental matters. I must state straight away here that once a matter comes within the purview of section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, section 251 of same Constitution is subordinated. This is because section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution bestows on this Court exclusive jurisdiction over ALL and ANY labour/employment matter and matters connected with or incidental thereto. See Coca-Cola Nigeria Limited & ors v. Mrs Titilayo Akisanya [2013] 18 NWLR (Pt.1386) 255; [2013] 1 ACELR 28; [2013] 36 NLLR (Pt. 109) 338 CA; affirmed by the Supreme Court in [2017] 17 NWLR (Pt.1593) 75. Before addressing the specific issue whether or not this Court has jurisdiction over the case at hand, I need to clarify certain submissions made by the claimants. 92. As indicated earlier that section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution bestows on this Court exclusive jurisdiction over ALL and ANY labour/employment matter and matters connected with or incidental thereto. It is to be noted that in labour relations, labour rights inure at three levels: pre-employment rights i.e. those rights that arise prior to the start of an employment e.g. rights inuring to job applicants; employment rights i.e. rights arising during the pendency of an employment; and post-employment rights i.e. rights inuring at the end of the employment such as pension rights. See Mr. Ahmed Ishola Akande v. Lilygate Nigeria Ltd (The Lilygate) unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/209/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th November 2017 and Kefre Ekpo Inyang v. Alphabeta Consulting LLP unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/550/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 4th June 2018. 93. In the case at hand from the reliefs being sought the claimants are seeking of reinstatement back to the Code of Conduct Bureau as members. They are also seeking for payment of their salaries and allowances as stipulated in Certain Political, Public, Judicial Office Holders (Salaries & Allowances etc) Amendment Act 2008. This clearly has brought the claimants within the purview of the provisions of section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended and the provisions of section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act. On this score the objection on lack of jurisdiction lacks merit. 94. Another ground of the objection is that the claimants’ action is an abuse of process in that judgment of Federal High Court attached to the affidavit in support as exhibit 1 has already interpreted the provisions of the Constitution the claimants are asking this court to interpret. It was argued that the interest of the claimants was taken care of in exhibit 1 and they did not appeal the decision. But, rather approach this court to attempt sacrilege. It is also argued that this court is one of coordinate jurisdiction with Federal High Court, being a court of superior record this court cannot review the decision of Federal High Court in exhibit 1 this court cannot entertain this suit being on same subject matter and involving same parties. It was further argued that the 4th to 13th defendants were wrongly joined in this suit as they are neither employer nor employee of the claimants. 95. The counsel for the claimants in response argued that the present action and the suit in exhibit 1 are not on all fours. The reliefs, parties and issues are not same. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the object. 96. It has long been settled that a common feature of abuse of court process centers on improper use of judicial process by a party in litigation aimed or targeting on interference with due administration of justice. Some of the features of abuse of court process includes; filing of multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponents on the issues or numerous actions on the matter between the same parties even when there is in existence, a right to commence the action. It equally involve institution of different actions between the same parties simultaneously in different courts even though on different grounds. See OKOROCHA V PDP (2014) 7 NWLR (PT. 4406) 213, SARAKI V KOTOYE (1992) NWLR (PT204) 156, OGOEJEOFOR V OGOJEOFOR (2006) 3 NWLR (PT.996) 206, ALLANAH & ORS V KPOLOKWU & ORS (2016) LPELR-40724(SC). Looking at the facts and circumstances presented by this suit, I must say none of the features of abuse of process has manifested itself. I do not share the sentiment of counsel for the 4th – 13th defendants on this point. 97. On exhibit 1, the question to answer is can exhibit 1 estopped or prevent or preclude the claimants from pursuing this suit. It a cardinal principle of public policy that there must be an end to litigation and court should not encourage litigating an issue already decided by a court of competent jurisdiction between the same parties on the matter or cause or an issue in the course of a previous proceedings. See ITO & ORS V EKPE & ORS. (2000) LPELR-1561(SC). The parties in this suit and the parties in exhibit 1 are not same. The reliefs being sought in this suit and the reliefs in exhibit 1 are totally different. The claimants are seeking the reliefs contained in their claim for their own benefit they are asserting their right to their personal interest. All these goes to show that there is a world of difference between the present action and the action as per exhibit 1. In the circumstances I am inclined to agree with the counsel for the claimants that this suit is not an abuse of process nor can exhibit 1 operate as estoppel to estop the claimants from pursuing this suit as it is presently constituted. 98. It is apparent from the statement of facts that the 4th – to 13th defendants though not being employers or employees of the claimants, that their participation in this proceedings is very necessary in that the reliefs being sought by the claimants are such that may have consequence on their rights. In the circumstance I am of the view that the 4th – 13th defendants are necessary parties. There is also the need for them to be in this suit so as to be bound by the outcome this litigation. See PEENOOK INVESTMENTS LTD V HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD ((1982) 12 SC (Reprint) 1., (1982) LPELR-2908(SC). 99. From the foregoing, the preliminary objection is not well taken, it has failed and is hereby refused. 100. Having resolved the preliminary objection. I shall now turn to the substantive suit. The claimants are vide their amended complaints and the accompanying processes seeking for the reliefs reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. 101. The case of the claimants revolves around exhibit CW1C, a letter dated 14th June 2017, which is a notification of disengagement of Dr. Sam Saba, from the Chairman of Code of Conduct Bureau for expiration of his tenure as at 30th April 2017 and the six members whose tenure also expired after the statutory two terms. The claimants have relied on exhibits CW1A, CW2B,CW3A, CW4A and CW5A, these exhibits are letters of appointment of the claimants as members, of Code of conduct Bureau, the letters were all dated 10th July 2014, addressed to the claimants and signed by Anyim Pius Anyim, GCON, Secretary to the Government of the Federation. According to the claimants vide these exhibits they were appointed by the 1st defendant in line with Third Schedule, Part 1, of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, to serve until attainment of age of 70 years. The appointment of the claimants according to the exhibits took effect from 30th April 2010. According to the claimants they have been performing their function diligently when suddenly vide exhibit CW1C, they were disengaged from service without recourse to the provisions of section 157 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended which required their removal from office to be based on address of two thirds majority of the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is the case of the claimants that the failure to go through the Senate to remove them, the 1st defendant has breached the laid down procedure of their removal. Consequently, they are seeking for this court to declare exhibit CW1C, unconstitutional, illegal and of no effect. They are also seeking for declaration that by provision of section 157(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended the claimants may only be removed from office by the president, acting on an address by two thirds majority of the Senate, praying that they be removed for inability to discharge the functions of their offices arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other. It is interesting to note that the 1st and 2nd defendant did not file any defence. However, in the written address filed on their behalf by their counsel it was argued that the claimants were validly removed from office by the president as provided by the Constitution. Counsel also submitted that exhibit CW1C has equally placed uncontroverted evidence before the court hat the claimants were duly disengaged from their official duties due to expiration of their tenure as both the chairman and members of the code of conduct Bureau respectively. It is also argued by counsel that the 1st and 2nd defendants followed due process regarding appointment of 4th – 13th defendants. The counsel for the claimants in response to the counsel for the 1st and 3rd defendants expressed surprise that the 1st and 3rd defendants that have shown no interest in defending this matter due to lack of defence will file written address to argue that the action of 1st defendant in removing claimants from their office was properly done in line with the provisions of the Constitution. The 2nd defendant through its witness has given evidence to the effect that vide exhibits CW2E1-5 and CW2F1-8, the 1st defendant nominated the claimants for appointment as members of Code of Conduct Bureau and the nomination was confirmed by the 2nd defendant as required by the Constitution. However, there was nothing that was sent to the 2nd defendant regarding removal of the claimants and that the 2nd defendant never passed any address by two-thirds majority for removal of the claimants from office. The counsel for the 2nd defendant therefore argued that exhibit CW1C cannot properly remove the claimants from office without an address of two-thirds majority of the Senate. The 4th – 13th defendants called sole witness that testified in their defence and tendered one exhibit. The crux of the evidence of the 4th -13th defendants is that the claimants do not have any claim against them. That there was no wrong doing attributable the 4th – 13th defendant in respect of the claimants claim. The witness testified that the claimants were appointed for a tenure of 5 years by the Acting president on confirmation by the Senate and that their letter of appointment were given to them individually. However, when exhibits CW1A, CW2B, CW3B, CW4A and CW5A were shown to the witness under cross examination he stated that those are not the letters he was referring to. From the facts as disclosed by the parties in their pleadings and witnesses statement on oath they are straight forward. There seems to be some consensus on most of the facts. The area of disagreement between the parties is in the interpretation of the applicable provisions of the Constitution that regulates the appointment of the claimants. It is all agreed that the claimants were nominated for appointment by the Acting President of the federal Republic of Nigeria vide exhibit CW2E1-5, which is votes and proceeding of Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Containing the nomination. The Senate in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by the provisions of Section 154(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria considered the nomination of the claimants and did confirm it on 20th April 2010. It is also agreed by parties that the appointment of the claimants which received the blessing of Senate vide exhibit CW2F1-8, took effect from 30th April 2010. See exhibits CW1C, CW1A, CW2B, CW3A, CW4A and CW5A. The area of disagreement between the parties is on exhibit CW1C whether this exhibit can validly remove the claimants from office. To the claimants exhibit CW1C is unconstitutional null and void for having been issued without an address of two-thirds majority of the Senate. This position was also taken by the 2nd defendant. However, the 4th – 13 defendants are of the view that exhibit CW1C has effectively removed the claimants from office as a result of expiration of their 5 years tenure provided by section 155(1) (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. The position taken by the 1st and 3rd defendants was that the removal of the claimants was in line with the executive powers of the 1st defendant and in line with section 157 of the Constitution. Before resolving the quagmire between the parties in this suit, let me take the liberty to state that the claimants final written address and the reply address to the final written address of the 1st and 3rd defendants were replete with the assertions that the absence of pleadings by the 1st and 3rd defendants means admission of the claims of the claimants. Likewise the evidence given by the 8th defendant for himself and on behalf of the other defendants was hearsay and inadmissible and that there was no evidence to support the pleadings of the 4th – 13th defendants. Now the rule is that it is the claimant who claims that must prove; and in labour relations, an employee can only claim if he/she shows an entitlement. An entitlement is shown by reference to the law that gives it, or the conditions of service governing the relationship of the employee and his/her employer. And by Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd [2008] LPELR-591(SC); [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399; [2008] 5 - 6 SC (Pt. II) 47, a claim is circumscribed by the reliefs claimed; and the duty of a claimant, therefore, is to plead only such facts and materials as are necessary to sustain the reliefs and adduce evidence to prove same. Now, a look at all the reliefs claimed by the claimants will show that they are hinged on exhibit CW1C and exhibits CW1A, CW2B, CW3A, CW4A and CW5A, letters of appointments. From the reliefs sought five are for declaration, one for an order for reinstatement of the claimants there is the seventh relief which is on injunction. There is also an alternative prayer and the last is for damages. The law, as I know it, is that a claimant seeking for declaratory reliefs must prove his case on the strength of his evidence, not on the weakness of the defence of the defendant. See OKEREKE V UMAHI & ORS [2016] LPELR-40035(SC), NYESOM V PETERSIDE & ORS. [2016] LPELR-40036(SC) and DUMEZ NIG. LTD V NWAKHABA & 3 ORS [2008] 2 SC (Pt. III) 142 at 152 paras 10 to 25, relying on BELLO V EWEKA [1981] 1 SC 101 and MOTUNWASE V SORUNGBE [1988] 12 SC 1, throws more light in insisting that the claimant praying for a declaratory relief proves his case on his own evidence and not the evidence of the defendant. This means that the claimants in this suit succeeds or fails on the strength of their evidence. For them to be entitled to declaratory reliefs they must prove their case with cogent, sufficient and compelling evidence and not rely on weakness or absence of defence or admission. The reliefs being claims do not permit proof by admission. As pointed out earlier the area in which the parties in this suit are at variance is regarding whether the claimants appointment is a tenure based as per section 155(1) (c) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended or is to be until attainment of age of 70 years as contained in Part 1 of Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. Another related question associated to all this debacle is whether despite the provision of section 155(1) (c), the claimants can only be removed from office in line with provisions of section 157(1) of the Constitution. The counsel for the 4th – 13th defendants has forcefully argued that the claimants’ appointment was for a tenure of five year as per section 155(1) (c) of the Constitution as amended. Likewise counsel for the 1st and 3rd defendants in his written address also allude to the fact that the appointment is for five years term this is in view of counsel’s submission that the removal of claimants via exhibit CW1C is valid in line with Constitution. While the counsel for the claimants and the counsel for the 2nd defendant is of the firmed view that the claimants can only be removed from office by virtue of section 157(1) or upon attainment of age of 70 years. For proper appreciation it is apt at this juncture to reproduce the relevant Constitutional provisions regarding the appointment of the claimants as members of Code of Conduct Bureau. They are: Section 153 (1) There shall be established for the Federation the following bodies, namely; (a) Code of Conduct Bureau, (b) …………………………… (c) ……………………………. (d) …………………………… (e) ……………………………. Third Schedule Part 1 1. The Code of Conduct Bureau shall comprise the following:- (a) A chairman; and (b) Nine other members, each of whom, at the time of appointment, shall not be less than fifty years and subject to section 157 of this Constitution shall vacate his office on attaining the age of seventy years. Section 155(1) (c) provides (1) A person who is a member of any of the bodies established as aforesaid shall, subject to the provisions of this part, remain a member thereof- (c) In the case of a person who is a member otherwise than as ex officio member or otherwise than by virtue of his having previously held an office, for a period of five years from the date of his appointment. Section 157 provides as follows: "(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) of this section, a person holding any of the offices to which this section applies may only be removed from that office by the President acting on an address supported by two-thirds majority of the Senate praying that he be so removed for inability to discharge the functions of the office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) or by misconduct. (2) This section applies to the offices of Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Bureau, ..’’. I wish to state here that the of appointment of chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Bureau is regulated by the Constitution of the Federal Republic Of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). The process of appointment and tenure of office or duration of appointment and removal is governed by the Constitution as amended. This clearly exclude any other document or terms and conditions not provided for under the Constitution (as amended). This also means that the appointment, tenure and removal must be strictly done in line with Constitution (as amended), any deviation will be fatal to the process. It has been accepted by all our courts that a broad and liberal spirit should prevail in interpreting the provisions of our constitution although one has constantly to bear in mind the object, which such provisions were intended to serve. In Nafiu Rabiu V THE STATE (1980) 8-11 SC 130 @ 148, Sir Udo Udoma, JSC, (of blessed memory) has this to say: ‘‘My Lords, it is my view that the approach of this court to the construction of the constitution should be and so it has been, one of liberalism, probably a variation of the theme of the general maxim ut res magis valeat quam perea. I do not conceive it to be the duty of court so to construe any of the provisions of the Constitution as to defeat the obvious ends the constitution was designed to serve where another construction equally in accordance and consistent with the words and sense of such provisions will serve to enforce and protect such ends.’’ In BRONIK MOTORS LTD LTD & ANOR. V WEMA BANK LTD (1983) ALL NLR 272, LPELR-808(SC), the apex court Per Nnamani, JSC (of blessed memory) stated thus: ‘‘A Constitution is a living document (not just a statute) providing a framework for the governance of a country not only for now but for generations yet unborn. In construing it. Undue regard must not be paid to merely technical rules for otherwise the objects of its provisions as well as intention of the framers of the constitution would be frustrated. As was stated in Minister of Home Affairs V Fisher (1979) 2 W.L.R. 899; 1980 AC 319 at 328 a Constitutional instrument should not necessarily be construed in a manner and according to rules which apply to Acts of Parliament. Although the manner of interpretation of a Constitutional instrument should give effect to the language used, recognition should also be given to the character and origins of the instrument. Such an instrument should be treated as sui generis calling for such principles of interpretation of its own suitable to its character without necessary acceptance of all the presumptions that are relevant to legislation of private law.’’ It is patently clear from the foregoing passages that in interpreting constitutional provision, a court of law is enjoined to give the provisions global consideration. That is to say by construing the entire provisions holistically and interpreting them to be in accord with the intention of the law makers of the provisions. It is settled beyond per adventure that the cardinal rule in the interpretation of the Constitution, it has to be done holistically. This position was reiterated by the Supreme Court in LADOJA V INEC (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt.1047) 115, OGUNTADE, JSC (as he then was), has this to say:- ‘‘in interpreting provision of a constitution, the primary function of the court is to search for the intention of the lawmaker. Where a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous. The court must give the words their ordinary meaning unless it will lead to absurdity and inconsistency with the provision of the constitution as a whole. The true meaning of the words used and the intention of the legislature in a constitution can best be properly understood if the constitution is considered as a whole. It is a single document and every part of it must be considered as per as relevant in order to get the true meaning and intent of any particular portion of the enactment. Also a constitution must be interpreted and applied liberally. It must always be construed in such a way that it protects what it sets out to protect or guide what it sets out to guide. By necessity a constitutional provision must be interpreted broadly. See OKOGIE V AG LAGOS STATE (1981) 2 NCLR 337, GARBA V FCSC (1988) 1 NWLR (PT.71) 449, PDP V INED (1999) 11 NWLR (PT.626) 200, EGOLUM V OBASANJO (1999) 7 NWLR (PT.611) 423, ARAKA V EGBUE (2003) 17 NWLR (PT.848) 1 AND AWUSE V ODILI (2003) 18 NWLR (PT.851) 116. It is clear from the above quoted decisions of the apex court that constitutional provision must be interpreted holistically taking into consideration all the relevant sections of the constitution in the context of the provisions. Any interpretation that disregard or jetitioned the context in which the provisions are used in the constitution will be destroying the sacred document. The object of provisions is also an important consideration in construing constitutional provisions. Having at the back of my mind the above decisions of the Supreme Court, it is not my understanding that the claimants in the case at hand cannot be removed from office except under the provisions of section 157(1) of the Constitution. My understanding of the community reading of the provisions of sections 153(1), 155(1)(c), 157 and Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended is that in the context in which these sections are used, the claimants in this case can be removed from office upon completion of 5 years tenure begging from the date of their appointment or they can be removed from office upon attainment of age of 70 years irrespective of number of years served or they can be removed based on an address of two thirds majority of the Senate under section 157 (1) of the Constitution as amended. To hold otherwise will do great violence to the Constitution and intention and intendment of makers of the Constitution. The objects set to be achieved by these provisions are well made manifest with the marginal notes. I am fortified in this view taking into consideration the law is now well settled that no provision of a section of the constitution shall derogate from the other. One section of the Constitution cannot derogate from or override the provision of another section of the constitution. The Supremacy of the Constitution in section 1 thereof is shared and enjoyed by all the sections including the amended sections, of the Constitution. See OPARA & ANOR V AMADI & ANOR (2013) LPELR 20747(SC). Therefore, in interpreting provisions of the constitution care must be taken not to render any other section redundant or impotent. There has also been argument and counter argument on the provisions of the schedule my take is that the law is home book that a schedule to a statute or constitution is as much a part of an or constitution as any other. It may be used in construing provisions in the statute of constitution. Similarly provision in the schedule will be construed in the light of what is enacted in the sections of the Constitution. See SAMAMO V ANKA (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt.640) 283, PETER DAVID V (1999) 5 NWLR (pt.603) 486. In view of the foregoing it is my view that there is no conflict between the provisions of the Constitution making provision for composition of Code of Conduct, the provisions on Tenure and provisions of removal. The applicability of each of the provisions will defend on the facts and circumstance of a given case. It is now to determine whether the claimants have by cogent, compelling evidence prove their entitlement to the declaratory reliefs being sought. In employment matters, the burden is on the claimant to prove that the defendant has violated or breached the condition of service regulating the employment of a claimant in disengaging, terminating or dismissal of an employee. The claimants relied heavily on unconstitutionality of exhibit CW1C to assert that their removal from service was illegal and that thy can only be removed if the provisions of section 157(1) are complied with. Exhibit CW1C is clearly addressed to Mr. Saba Sabo and six members who have served their two terms. There is no doubt that Mr. Saba was appointed as Chairman of the Code of Conduct Bureau at the same time with the claimants as members. See exhibits CW2E1-5 and exhibit CW2F1-8. There is also no doubt that the terms and condition of service are the same. They are all appointed pursuant to section 154(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended. This fact is supported by exhibits CW2E and CW2F. it is therefore clear that though the claimants were not specifically mentioned in exhibit CW1C as having their tenure expired like Mr. Sam Saba, their tenure never the less has elapsed in the same way of that of Mr. Sam Saba, the Chairman of the Code of Conduct Bureau. This is so by operation of the provisions of section 155(1) (c) of the Constitution, (as amended). Therefore, it will be right to say that the claimants have served out their terms of office by virtue of the fact that they were appointed as per exhibit CW2E and CW2F. Their terms of five year have expired by effluxion of time. This finding is based on the fact that by virtue of section 155(1) (c) the claimants can only be appointed for a period of five years, save there is renewal which has not been established in this case. The privisions of Third Schedule Part 1 of the Constitution (as amended) is not meant to provide tenure but to be used for removal under section 157(10 of the Constitution. The claimants have insisted that their appointment is based on exhibits CW1A, CW2B, CW3A, CW4A and CW5A, these exhibits were letters written to the claimants conveying their appointments. The letters were written in year 2014 when the claimants have served for more than four years. It is curious to note that these exhibits purports to supersede the earlier letters issued to the claimants. But, the claimants have deliberately refused or neglected to avail the court the opportunity of seeing those letters to which the current exhibits are claiming to supersede. By keeping the court in the dark regarding the letters issued to the claimants before the current letters of appointment issued in 2014, speaks volume of their intention. This also goes to show that if those letters are produced they would be unfavourable to the case of the claimants. See section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011. The letters of the claimants appointments have been put in issue with the claimant’s contesting the validity of exhibit CW1C, which talk about tenure of office. See JALICO LIMITED V OWONIBOYS TECHNICAL SERVICES LTD (1995) 4 NWLR (PT.391) 534, BUHARI V OBASANJO (2003) 17 NWLR (PT.850) 587. It is to be noted that the letters the claimants refused to produce were the letters of their appointments as at 2010 when the Senate after considering their nomination confirmed their appointment and those letters issued to them for their appointment which took effect from 30th April 2010. The refusal of the claimants to produce the said letters has deprived the court of having the entire facts of the case. This has also soiled their hands in dirty waters, he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. I do not know what the claimants are hiding from the court in the said letters issued to them before the letters of 10/7/14. From the clear provisions of the constitution in section 154(1) and exhibits CW2E and CW2F, the appointment of the claimants is made pursuant to section 154(1) and not in line with Third Schedule, Part 1 of the 1999 Constitution as stated in exhibits. CW1A, CW2B, CW3A, CW4A and CW5A. It is my view that the provisions of these exhibits cannot change or vary the provisions of the Constitution. When the constitution has provided way of doing things that way alone can be followed for anything to be done legally. The letters of appointment issued pursuant to Third schedule Part 1 of the Constitution having been issue in violation of clear and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution are of no effect whatsoever. It was also argued that exhibits CW2C and CW2D shows that that the claimants are active members and there are no vacancy concerning their posts. This submission can only be valid if and only if the claimants establish that after the expiration of the terms of five years of their first appointment made by exhibits CW2E1-5 and CW2F1-8, that their appointment were renewed. However, there is nothing before the court to establish that their tenure was renewed after the expiration of five years of their first appointment in year 2015 by operation of law. The constitution as per section 155(1) (c) is very clear and unambiguous regarding tenure of office of the claimants. In view of my finding , it is my view that the claimant do not have any term left to serve their appointment as per exhibit CW2E and CW2F was for five years and having served for more than five years without a renewal cannot maintain any claim against the defendants in this case. It should be remembered that in law a contract of employment can be determined either, by serving the terms in case fixed terms, by retirement, by dismissal or via termination. In the case at hand the claimants by the provisions of the Constitution have to serve for five years in the first instant and if renewed to serve for another period of five years. From the date of the appointments i.e 30th April 2010 their first five years tenure elapsed on 30th April 2015. For them to claim to continue to be in active service must show that their appointments have been renewed having failed to establish renewal they are not in active service as at 14/6/17 when exhibit CW1C was issued. Exhibit CW1C having not been issued in violation of any law was validly issued and subsists. In the end the claimants have failed to prove their claims by cogent, sufficient and compelling evidence to deserve the exercise of court’s discretion to grant declaratory reliefs sought in their amended originating processes commencing this suit. The claimants’ suit lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. Sanusi Kado, Judge.