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JUDGMENT. This judgment was slated to be delivered on 22nd day of February 2019. However, due to the declaration of that day as a public holiday by the Federal Government to enable people who are residing outside the place where they are to vote at the election of 23rd day of February 2019, to travel to their places of voting, to exercise their civic duties. Thus, why this judgment come up today 26/2/19. The claimant approached this court via originating summons filed on 29/11/17. However, on 29/1/18, the court ordered the conversion of the originating summons to complainant for the matter to be tried on the pleadings. In compliance with the order of the court, the claimant on 2/2/18, filed his complaint and supporting processes. The defendant also complied and filed her statement of defence and accompanying processes on 1/3/18. The defendant also filed an amended statement of defence dated 7/6/18 and filed on 8/6/18. The claimant is vide his complaint claiming the reliefs stated hereunder:- 1. A declaration that the whole process of exercising disciplinary procedure over the claimant by the acting executive chairman of the defendant beginning with the letter of query dated 22nd December 2015, the notification of suspension dated 29th December 2015 and the letter of reinstatement dated 15th December 2015 is invalid, null and void and of no effect. 2. A declaration that the whole process exercising disciplinary procedure over the claimant by the acting executive chairman of the defendant beginning with the letter of query dated 22nd December 2015, the notification of suspension dated 29th December 2015 and the letter of reinstatement dated 15th December 2015 is ultra vires the powers of the acting executive chairman of the defendant and therefore null and void and of no effect. 3. A declaration that the purported letter of reinstatement date 15th November 2017 conditionally reinstating the claimant to his job, downgrading the claimant from grade level 17 to grade level 16/7 and forefeiting the entitlement of the claimant during the two years period of his suspension is null and void. 4. A declaration that the defendant’s staff Regulations Handbook titled ‘’Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Staff Regulations Handbook 2007 is invalid having not been approved by the commission, as required section 9 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act. 5. A declaration that the reliance on the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Staff Regulations Handbook by the defendant and the whole disciplinary procedure adopted by the defendant in this case is null and void. 6. A declaration that the applicable Rules or Regulations in disciplinary cases affecting the staff or officers of the defendant is the public service Rules and not the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Staff Regulations Handbook; the latter having not been approved by the Commission as required by section 9(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004. 7. An order setting aside the letter of reinstatement dated 15th November 2017 conditionally reinstating the claimant to his job with the defendant on the ground that it is invalid, null and void. 8. An order setting aside the letter of query dated 22nd December 2015 and the notification of suspension dated 29th December, 2015 for being invalid. 9. An order of the court unconditionally restoring the claimant to his post and office as the commandant of the defendant’s academy or his grade level 17 and to all rights and privileges attaching thereto. 10. An order of this Honourable Court for the payment of all the salaries and entitlements of the claimant from 29th December 2015 until this case is determined. 11. An injunction retraining the defendant, its servants and/or agents from preventing the claimant from performing the functions and duties of the office of Commandant of the Defendant’s academy or his grade level 17 or from interfering with his enjoyment of the rights, privileges and benefits attached to the said office. 12. An order setting aside any further step or direction or order of the defendant which seeks to interfere with or violates the claimant’s right to his position as the commandant of the defendant’s academy or his grade level 17. 13. And for such further consequential order or orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. The case of the claimant. The claimant testified for himself as CW1. He stated that he is a staff of the defendant and head of its training academy at Karu. He averred that the defendant is a statutory body established to coordinate the various institutions involved in the fight against money laundering and enforcement of all laws dealing with Economic and Financial Crimes in Nigeria. The claimant vide exhibits CW1A1-3 and CW1B1-3, joined the services of the defendant on 4/4/2005, as head of training on grade level 16 step 1. Vide exhibit CW1E, the claimant was on 28/2/12, appointed the commandant of the defendant’s academy. See exhibits CW1C and CW1D, vide exhibit CW1F, the claimant was on 29/8/13, promoted to the rank of Detective Commander after passing promotion examination. Prior to joining the defendant, the claimant had worked with National Drugs Law Enforcement agency for a period of fifteen years without any blemish. Sometime in November 2015, the Federal Government effected change of leadership of the defendant with the appointment of Mr. Ibrahim Magu, as the acting Chairman of the defendant. On 19/11/15, the claimant was summoned by the acting chairman of the defendant where he was accused and confronted with allegations of being behind some online publications in respect of the activities of the defendant and the person of the acting chairman of the defendant. But, he vehemently denied the allegations and stated affirmatively that he knew nothing about the online publication. The claimant continued with his story that he was taken to the statement room on the directive of the acting chairman he was made to write ten pages statement under caution like a suspect and in the absence of his lawyers despite the fact that he was a management staff on grade level 17. In the course of interrogation he was shown copies of online publications. They were tendered as exhibits CW1G1-6, CW1H1-4, CW1I1-4, CW1J1-5 and CW1K1-4, before the court. He stated that three other young officers viz Mohamnedd Jidda, Adeolu Haastrup Moses and Mustapha Suleiman were also interrogated in respect of the same allegation, with Mustapha Suleiman even arrested and detained for ten days and was asked to implicate the claimant but he maintained that the claimant knew nothing about the publication. The claimant stated that on the directive of the acting chairman his office top table computer, two mobile phones with MTN and GLo lines were seized. The claimant office was also thoroughly searched by a team of detectives and policemen without anything linking the claimant with the publications found and the office sealed up. The claimant was denied access to his computer and, phones and personal effects till date. The official car of the claimant was also withdrawn. The claimant also stated that a forensic investigation on his electronic devices, including his bank account and his e-mail addresses were conducted on the directive of the acting chairman and nothing incriminating was found. The inquiry was extended to the former office of the claimant. Vide exhibit DW2A, while investigation was on going the acting chairman, demoted the claimant and ordered his redeployment from EFCC Academy to his office. On 20/11/15, the claimant received another memo redeploying him to the office of acting chairman with a directive to hand over to the most senior officer at the academy. See exhibit CW1O. On 22/12/15, vide exhibit CW1P1-2, the claimant was issued with a query on ‘‘offences against discipline’’ for contravening certain provisions of the staff Regulations Handbook. Vide exhibits CW1Q1-3 and CW1R1-3, the claimant on 23/12/15, replied the query issued to him of offence against discipline, wherein the claimant denied all the allegations and he went further to state that when he saw some of the online publications, he reported it at the management meetings of the defendant and the matter was dismissed as inconsequential by the then chairman of the defendant (Lamorde). The claimant stated that on 29/12/15, the day he submitted his response to the query given to him, he received exhibit CW1S, slamming him with indefinite suspension without pay under Article 030406 of the Public Service Rules, even though his query was on Staff Regulations Handbook. The suspension was made pending the outcome of the investigation. For two years now he had been without salary which has made it difficult for him to meet up with his obligations including payment of school fees and mortgage loan. Letter of demand from Stallion Mortgage Bankers is admitted in evidence as exhibit CW1T. The claimant stated that since his suspension he has not been invited to appear before any panel nor was there any communication to him until receipt of exhibit CW1U, which is a letter dated 15/11/17, reinstating him, on conditions that he is demoted and forfeit all his salary for the period of suspension. In the letter of suspension it was stated that the claimant was found guilty of a case of ‘breach of confidence’ by the Senior Staff, Promotions, and Disciplinary Committee of the defendant on 26/9/17, when he was not at any time confronted by the defendant of any allegation of ‘breach of confidence’. He was never invited by the committee to defend himself of any allegation of ‘breach of confidence’ or any other misconduct. The claimant stated that Senior Staff, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee only exercise disciplinary power over senior staff and not management staff to which the claimant as grade level 17 belonged. The claimant also stated that the staff Regulations 2007 under which he was queried, demoted and asked to forfeit his salaries and entitlements and purportedly reinstated has not been approved by the Commission of the defendant and therefore inapplicable. A copy of the staff Regulations Handbook is admitted in evidence as exhibit CW1X1-112. According to the claimant, the defendant’s Commission has not been constituted since May 2015. The claimant challenged the defendant to produce the minute of meeting of the Commission approving the Regulations. The claimant stated in the absence of approved Regulations the Public Service Rules applies to all officers of the Commission. The claimant stated that under the Public Service Rules it is only the Commission/Board that can discipline any officer of the commission above grade level 13 and not the acting chairman of the defendant. The acting chairman took over powers of the commission in querying, suspending and demoting the claimant. The claimant vide exhibits CW1W1-3 and CW1V, letter dated 22/11/17, the claimant rejected the conditional reinstatement. The claimant stated that investigation must be concluded within 60 days, but his case took two years. The acting chairman was the accuser, investigator and judge. A staff on suspension is entitled to half pay and if reinstated is paid his other half of his salaries. EVIDENCE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION: I am a director and Commandant EFCC, Academy. I am in court because of demotion by the defendant. That he got letter of redeployment while being investigated. To the best of my knowledge I am a director and commandant of EFCC Academy. I am in court because I was not found guilty by the defendant. The defendant has not communicated to me that I am guilty of any offence, I got letter of downgrading and rejected it. I am not occupying office of director and commandant because I have been on suspension for two years. I was employed on GL 16 in year 2005. I am a member of the committee that drafted exhibit CW1X1-112, the EFCC staff Regulations. Ibrahim Audu is a member of the committee he worked with me. The committee stopped at the point of drafting the Regulations. I served NDLEA for fifteen years. I was part of the committee that drafted NDLEA Regulations. The committee was formed by Nuhu Ribadu and he asked that I should be included because of my experience. The work of the committee ended at drafting. The committee was set up to help draft EFCC Regulations. The Committee could not have submitted draft to chairman for approval because, the Chairman cannot approve the Regulations. The Regulations needed to have been approved by the EFCC Board. When the Committee finished its work because we have director organizational support with us who was the secretariat of the committee, his job was to submit it to EFCC Secretary who is a member of the Board. We did not submit the draft to the Board but to the director support for onward transmission. I do not know whether the director submitted the report or he did not. I don’t know the meaning of inforce. It has been in circulation. The reason why the Regulations have been in draft, is because the requirement of the law is that it be approved by Board of EFCC, after approval is to be circulated among staff it has been in circulation but never approved by Board. The document has been without signature and date, the reason why it has not been approved is because the one in circulation has not been signed. Officers under the academy have been undergoing training, promotion of staff conducted on the Regulations. I have no knowledge that first employee spent 3 years on probation. It is true that new employees write exam for confirmation. They are confirmed upon passing exam and interview. I did not write confirmation exam because I did it 27 years ago when I joined NDLEA in year 1990. The EFCC in 2004 withdraw my service from NDLEA and transferred my service. Vide exhibit CW1A1-3, my appointment was not fresh. I wrote promotion exam at Public Service Institute. It is correct I spent 4 years before writing promotion examination. It is not correct officer spend certain number of years before promotion in particular level. I told the court that I was promoted to detective commander GL 17. I do not know if the promotion is done in line with Regulations. It is correct to say staff Regulations is not valid. I have been part of Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee where senior staff were disciplined. The proceeding of committee I participated were conducted in line with EFCC staff Regulations. It is correct that erring staff were disciplined in line with EFCC staff Regulations which I partook in. for all these years we have been using the document. We have been using the document to dismiss staff. Before coming of EFCC Regulations it is Public Service Regulations we use. It is correct I was given query and replied the query. THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE. The defendant called four witnesses that testified in the defence and tendered exhibits. DW1, (Bawa Usman Kaltungo) was called as first defence witness. He testified that he is a Principal Detective Officer attached to Directorate of Internal Affairs (DIA) in the Abuja office of the defendant. He was part of the investigation team that investigated a case of wrongful online publications involving the claimant and other co-suspects. Following allegation of crime made to the defendant through intelligence report concerning some staff of the defendant including the claim an investigation team was constituted headed by the head of Economic Governance Unit of the Operations Department. The investigation centres of defamatory online publications titled (1) why the appointment of the next EFCC Chairman must not be sentiment based. By MM Firdausi, published in abusidiq.com in November 2015 (2) last minute corruption and looting by The Ibrahim Lamorde’s (EFCC), by MM Firdausi published in abusidiqu.com on 12 October 2015, (3) why EFCC management must be investigated and prosecuted now. By MM Firdausi published inabusidiq.com July 21, 2015 (4) The hidden corrupt chameleon in EFCC By MM Firdausi, published in abusidiq.com 8th June 2015 (5) the decay and rot in EFCC, By MM Firdausi, published in abusidiq.com May 25, 2015 (6) Rejuvenating and overhauling of EFCC, an open letter to the president elect, Muhammadu Buhari, published by MM Firdausi in abusidiq.com, April 15, 2015. The witness tendered statements made by the claimant and Muhammed Suleiman in evidence and were marked as exhibits DW1A1-10, DW1B1-26. Exhibit DW1C1-7 is interim report and case file transmitted to legal department for vetting and legal advice. The legal advice was tendered and admitted as exhibit DW1D1-18, both claimant and Suleiman stated they went to Alhaji Dembos house on 18/11/15 to solicit for appointment for Ayo. That Mustapha confessed to be the author of the said online publication. CROSS EXAMINATION They made statement on oath. The allegation of crime is against Mustapha Suleiman and not against the claimant. The nature of the crime has to do malicious publications against some senior management staff of the defendant, the then executive chairman and the present acting chairman of the Commission. I don’t know the law under which investigation was conducted. I am not a lawyer. The committee was set up based on allegation of crime. The allegation was against Mustapha and not the claimant. The committee was set up by the management. I am a member of the committee I don’t know whether the committee was set up verbally or in writing. The committee is competent to investigate the claimant because in the cause of investigation there was a link. Exhibit DW1D1-7 was prepared by Bello Yahaya Head of the committee I was asked to sign for him because he was absent. The tradition is that if a report was ready and the head was not around the next senior officer will sign. The interim report was basis of legal advice. I would not know whether it was based on interim report that the claimant was tried and other staff. He also told us Mustapha took him to one Dembo and submitted CV looking for appointment to head EFCC or NDLEA. Mustapha was the author of the online publication. Mustapha did not tell anybody that it was claimant who wrote for him. The publisher is Abu Sidiqu blogger. I did not interview Abu Sidiqu. From exhibits DW1A1-10, DW1B1-2, there was nothing to show that it was the claimant that authored or published those online documents. As at the time the committee was set up there was no acting chairman. The committee was set up either 2015 or 2016, I cannot remember the exact time. Exhibit CW1K1-4i did not know whether it was written against the current Ag; chairman. EVIDENCE OF DW2. Mr. Femi Gbarufu, testified as DW2. He stated that he is a Chief Detective Superintendent and head of Human Resources in the Abuja office of the defendant. He is a member of the management and attends management meeting. He is also a member of appointment, promotion and disciplinary committee for both junior and senior staff of the defendant. He stated exhibit CW1X1-112, the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook was made pursuant to section 9(2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Act, 2004, it was approved by the Commission and it applies to all staff of the commission it contains provisions on appointment, promotion, discipline of staff and other provisions on condition of service. Exhibit CW1X1-112, was made in 2007 and upon approval it was made available to all the staff of the commission. The claimant was employed by the defendant in 2005 and posted to the defendant’s academy as head of training. He was posted from the defendant’s academy as head of training to special control unit on money laundering where he served as head of the unit. In March 2012, vide exhibit CW1C, the claimant was posted back to the academy as Commandant of the academy. On 19/11/15, vide exhibit DW2A, DW2, and the claimant were both redeployed to the office of the acting chairman of the defendant and vide exhibit CW1O, claimant was further redeployed from the academy to the office of the acting chairman. On 7/6/16, DW2 was redeployed from the academy to head of general service and subsequently in February 2017 redeployed to Head Human Resources. Vide exhibit CW1P1-2, the claimant was on 22/12/15 served with a query for offence against discipline and vide exhibit CW1Q1-3, dated 23/12/15, the claimant replied the query. Vide exhibit CW1S, the claimant was in December 2015, placed on suspension and vide exhibit CW1U, letter dated 15/12/17, the claimant was reinstated and the punishment meted on him spelt out therein. Vide exhibit CW1W1-3 and CW1V, the claimant responded to the letter of reinstatement. The defendant has two committees for appointment, promotion and disciplinary committee, one for junior staff and the other for senior staff. The junior staff committee deals with appointment, promotion and discipline of members of staff on grade level 1-7. While the senior staff committee deals with appointment, promotion and discipline of officers on grade level 8-17. The EFCC staff Regulations does not have provision relating to suspension of staff facing disciplinary action under investigation. The acting chairman of the defendant is not a member of either junior or senior staff committee on appointment, promotion and discipline of staff. The chairman of the commission neither takes part in investigation nor in the rendering of legal advice. Where there is no provisions in the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook 2007, resource is had to Public Service Rules 2008. The redeployment of the claimant as the commandant of the defendant’s academy was in the course of ordinary routine transfers, postings and redeployment of staff. The claimant had participated in disciplinary proceedings of some members of staff carried out under the EFCC Regulations 2007 and has enjoyed certain benefits under the said Regulations. The promotion of the claimant to detective commander was under the EFCC Regulations 2007. That the 6th Senior Staff appointments, promotions and disciplinary committee, in its inquiry and after examining the query, the written representation in response to the query made by the claimant, the interim investigation report and the legal advice on the case submitted to the committee by the director of operations and the director of legal and prosecution department found the claimant and other suspects (Mustapha Suleiman, and Mohammed Jidda) guilty of offence against discipline and recommended appropriate punishment to the acting chairman for approval see exhibit. DW1C1-7 and DW1D1-18. EVIDENCE UNDER CROSS EXAMINATION: The claimant was commandant EFCC Academy before his suspension. The claimant was queried in respect of offence against discipline regarding online publication. I am not aware that the claimant was invited by the acting chairman in respect of the publication. I am not aware the publication is in respect of the acting chairman. Vide CW1N claimant was redeployed to office of the chairman. Redeployment is a routine exercise. The EFCC Staff Regulations was approved in 2007 and immediately it was approved copies were circulated to members’ staff. I am not a member of the Board Exhibit CW1X was brought to Court by me on subpoena. The signature column and secretary has not been signed because it was taken to publishers. There is no how I can lay my hand on the approval. This one is for circulation among members of staff. The category we have are GL 1-6, Junior, GL 7-17. Some GL 15-17 are management staff. The claimant is on GL 17, he is a management staff. The person who signed the query, Mr. Bolaji is coordinating Director. All Directors who are Head of Department report to Secretary. Mr. Bolaji is head of Department heading his Department and is not senior to the claimant. As at the time of issue of query, Bolaji is coordinating Director. If there is no provision in the rules we resort to Public Service Rules. Before the coming into effect of EFCC Regulations we use Public Service Rules. The claimant was suspended via CW1S. He was on suspension for about 2 years. It was the acting chairman that says claimant should be investigated. It was the acting chairman that give directive to query claimant. The claimant was redeployed and investigation commenced. The claimant was suspended under public service rules, because there is no provision for suspension in the EFCC Regulations. There is a Board on ground. There are only 4 members approved but could not sit. For the telephones and laptop they may be keeping them as exhibits. There is report on the disciplinary action but is not here. DW3 Mr. Benjamin Mark, testified as DW3, third defendant’s witness. DW3, stated that he is an operative attached to the Cybercrime Unit of the defendant in Abuja. He was a member of the team that investigated a case of defamatory online publication involving the claimant and other co-suspects. Based on allegation of crime made to the defendant through intelligence report, concerning some staff of the defendant and others, including the claimant, an investigation team was constituted which was headed by the head of the Economic Governance unit of the operation department of the defendant. In the course of the investigation I witness the statement made by Usman Abubakar Sadiq dated 08/08/16, 09/08/16 and 10/08/16, copies of the statement were admitted in evidence as exhibits DW3A1-12. In the statement Usman Abubakar Sadiq stated that the online publications were published by him in his website abusidiq.com and that the articles were sent to him by Mustapha Suleiman. EVIDENCE UNDER CRSS EXAMINATION: I am a member of the investigation team of the online publication. The investigation conducted is for criminal offence. The publications 5 of them were published by one Abubakar Usman Sadiq, the publisher mentioned that it was one Mustapha Suleiman that sent them to him and Mr. Ayo has cordial relationship. EVIDENCE OF DW4 Sambo Muazu Mayana, testified as DW4. He stated that he is a Senior Detective Superintendent with the defendant. He was a member of the team of investigation that investigated defamatory online publication involving the claimant and other co-suspects. In the course of the investigation of the defendant. I participated in the interview of one Umar Dembo who later submitted his written representation The written submission dated 20/4/16, was admitted in evidence and marked as exhibit DW4A1-2. In the written representation Umar Dembo stated that Mr. Ayo Olowonihi, the (Claimant and Mustapha Suleiman) came to his house to solicit for his assistance to get a top job in EFCC or NDLEA, for the claimant. EVIDENCE ON CROSS EXAMINATION There was allegation of crime which we investigated. The allegation is on conspiracy by some staff with some bloggers to make defamatory publication against a senior staff of EFCC and some members of the defendant. I will not be able to give section of the law. One of such bloggers is Abu Sadiq we met him. He did not say is claimant that make the publication. We interviewed Umar Dembo the maker of DW4A at his residence. He did not say claimant is behind the publication. He did not also tell me the claimant is responsible for the online publication. The telephones of the claimant were seized in the course of investigation. I am not sure of seizure of computer. I am aware of forensic analysis of his phones, but computer not sure. The forensic analysis shows a link through which each of the publication was forwarded to him by a staff Mustapha Suleiman. I am not aware whether he has not been paid. I am not aware his phones have not been returned to him. I will be surprise if he is still on suspension. The head of investigation was Funke Adetayo. SUBMISSION OF THE DEFENDANT. The counsel for the defendant submitted single issue for determination, to wit: ‘’Whether by the quantum of evidence adduced by the Defendant and the exhibits tendered before this Court, it can be said that the Claimant has made out a good case to entitle him to the reliefs sought’’. However, counsel argued the lone issue under four sub issues, as follows: I. Whether the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Staff Regulations Handbook 2007, made pursuant to Section 9 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004 is valid and whether its provisions apply to all employees or staff of the Commission, including the claimant. II. Whether the procedures on discipline of Senior Officers contained in the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook were duly followed in the treatment of the claimant's case and whether the claimant was given fair hearing. III. Whether the defendant can lawfully suspend the claimant from work pending the completion of an inquiry or investigation of allegation of crime or misconduct against him. IV. Whether the defendant was right in the punishments it meted to the claimant ARGUMENT: Issue 1 Ibrahim Audu, Esq; counsel for the defendant in arguing this issue submitted that the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook made pursuant to Section 9 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004 is valid and applies to all employees, officers or staff of the Commission, including the claimant. The said Section provides in Section 1, subsections 1 and 2, thus: "(1) The Commission may, subject to the provisions of this Act, make staff Regulations relating generally to the conditions of service of the employees of the Commission and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the Regulations may provide for a) The appointment, promotion and disciplinary control (including dismissal) of employees of the Commission; and b) Appeals by such employees against dismissal or other disciplinary measures, and until the Regulations are made, any instrument relating to the conditions of services of officers in the Civil Service of the Federation shall be applicable, with such modifications as may be necessary, to the employees of the Commission. 2) Staff Regulations made under subsection (1) of this section shall not have effect until approved by the Commission, and when so approved the Regulations may not be published in the Gazette but the Commission shall cause them to be brought to the notice of all affected persons in such manner as it may, from time to time, determine." Counsel argued that Part 1, Section 3 (a) (ix) of the EFCC Staff Regulations Hand book (exhibit CW1X 1-112) provides that Employee, Staff or Officer means any person in the employ of the Commission on a full time basis. There is no doubt that the claimant is an employee, staff or officer of the Commission on a full time basis as can be gleaned from his employment letter (exhibit CW1A 1- 3). DW2, Femi Gbarufu, in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of his statement on oath deposed to the fact that the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook made in 2007 pursuant to Section 9 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, was approved by the Commission and that it came into force immediately in 2007 after it was approved. In fact, in the said paragraphs 8 and 9 of his statement on oath he averred as follows: "That I know as a fact that after the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook was made in 2007 it was immediately presented to the Chairman of the Commission for approval" “That upon approval of the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook in 2007 by the Commission, the Chairman directed the Human Resources Department to bring the EFCC Staff Regulations to the notice of all staff and to produce copies of the Regulations for all staff of the Commission" These pieces of evidence were not controverted under cross examination as the witness maintained, under cross examination, that the Staff Regulations was approved by the Commission. In response to claimant’s submission that EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook 2007 is invalid, counsel submitted that claimant has not produced any evidence before this court to show that the draft copy of the Staff Regulations submitted for approval of the Commission was not actually approved by the Commission. Counsel contended that the law is trite that he who asserts must prove. See Sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011. See the cases of IYERE V. BFFM LTD (2001) FWLR (Pt. 37) 166 and ALAO V. KURE (2000) FWLR (Pt.6) 889. The burden is therefore on the claimant to prove that the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook has not been approved by the Commission or that the draft copy which was submitted to the Chairman for approval was actually not approved by the Chairman of the Commission. Counsel submitted that the mere fact that the circulated copies of the Regulations were not signed is not enough to contend that the Regulations was not approved or is invalid. It is further submitted that by the provisions of Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, this Court is empowered to presume that the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook 2007 was approved by the Commission and thus validly made. See also the case of ONDO STATE UNIVERSITY V. FOLAYAN (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 354) 1. It is further argued that DW2, in the said paragraphs 8 and 9 of his statement on oath, averred that it was the Chairman of the Commission that approved the Staff Regulations in 2007 and upon his instructions the Staff Regulations was brought to the notice of all staff and copies were produced for all staff. It is not in contention that it is the Chairman of the Commission who approved the Staff Regulations in 2007. The Chairman is the Chief Executive and the Accounting Officer of the Commission. See Section 2(1 )(a) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004. At any rate, the requirement under Section 9(2) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004, is that the Staff Regulations shall not have effect until approved by the Commission. There is no requirement that the Staff Regulations shall be approved by the Board. By the evidence before the Court, it is the Chairman of the Commission who is also the Chief Executive and the Accounting Officer of the Commission that approved the Staff Regulations in 2007. Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the submissions and the evidence of CW1 and to hold that EFCC Staff Regulations (exhibit CW1X 1 - 112) is valid. Counsel contended that by the evidence before this Court, it is clear that the EFCC Staff Regulations has been in force since 2007 that it was made, as the activities of the Commission concerning appointments, promotions and discipline of staff are being regulated by the provisions of the Staff Regulations. The claimant himself admitted, under cross examination, that he wrote promotion examination and passed before he was promoted to the rank of Detective Commander on grade level 17 after he had spent more than four years in his former rank. All these are requirements contained in the Staff Regulations. The claimant equally admitted, under cross examination, that he had participated in the Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee were decisions were taken and punishments awarded by the Committee to erring members of staff pursuant to the provisions of the Staff Regulations. Yet, the claimant wants this Honourable Court to hold that the Staff Regulations is not valid, simply because he is now a victim of the Regulations. He has enjoyed some advantage under the Regulations, but now that he stands to suffer some detriments under the Regulations, he wants to cajole this court to hold that the Staff Regulations is invalid. This Honourable Court is a court of justice and will not allow itself to be so used or hoodwinked. Counsel urged the court to discountenance this limb of argument or submissions of the claimant. As to whether the Staff Regulations apply to all staff, we submit that from the community reading of Section 9 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004, pursuant to which the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook was made, the clear intention of the Act is that the Staff Regulations Handbook would govern all employees, officers or staff of the Commission in matters relating to appointments, promotions and discipline and other conditions of service. The said section also convey an intention that once the Staff Regulations has been made, the Commission will cease to rely on Public Service Rules or any other rule in dealing with its staff on matters relating to appointments, promotions and discipline and other conditions of service. The said section also manifest an intention that notwithstanding that the Staff Regulations has been made, the Commission may have recourse to the provisions of the Public Service Rules of the Federation only in respect of subject matter not provided for in the Staff Regulations. This is the import of the provisions of the said Section 9 of the Act. It is forcefully argued that the provisions of the EFCC Staff Regulations on discipline of Senior Officers and the procedure for doing same, apply to staff on grade level 15 to 17 or Management Staff, because to posit otherwise, would not only be inconsistent with the true intent of Section 9 of the defendant's Act but would also lead to hardship in the realization of the defendant's objective in making the Staff Regulations, which it made with the intention that the Regulations would govern all its employees, officers or staff. Counsel urged the Court to resolve issue 1 in favour of the defendant and to hold that the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook, 2007, is valid and that its provisions apply to all employees or staff of the Commission. Issue 2 In arguing Issue 2 Counsel submitted that the defendant duly followed the provisions of the Staff Regulations on procedures for discipline of Senior Officers, which we submit apply to the claimant. See Part VIII, Section 37 of the Staff Regulations (exhibit CW1X1 - 112). It has been established before this Court that the claimant was issued query (exhibit CW1P) by his supervising officer alleging an offence against discipline against the claimant, he was served with the said query and he made a written representation in answer to the query. See exhibit CW1Q. See also paragraph 13 of the defendant's statement of defence and paragraph 27 of the claimant's statement of claim. A Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee was constituted by the Chairman of the defendant to inquire into the case against the claimant which examined the query and the written representation made by the claimant, and on conclusion of its inquiry imposed punishment against the claimant and recommended same to the Chairman of the defendant for approval. In his evidence DW2, Femi Gbarufu, in paragraph 31 of his statement on oath averred that the Director of Organizational Support is the supervising officer of all the Heads of Department and Heads of Units. This piece of evidence was not challenged or controverted under cross examination and should be taken as the truth. Under cross examination he stated that Bolaji Salami who was the Director of Organizational Support at the time and who issued the query (exhibit CW1P) to the claimant was a Director on grade level 17 but that he was a co-ordinating director in the hierarchy of directors. It is submitted that the query issued to the claimant by Bolaji Salami was rightly issued to him by his supervising officer as required under Part VIII, Articles 37 of the Staff Regulations. The Committee also, in its inquiry, examined the investigation report on the case prepared by the investigating team and the legal advice on the case preferred by the Legal and Prosecution Department, before arriving at its decision. DW2, Femi Gbarufu, averred in paragraph 44 of his statement on oath that the 6th Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee, in its inquiry, examined the query, the written representation made by the claimant in response to the query, the Interim Investigation Report (exhibit DW1C1 - 7) and the Legal Advice on the case (exhibit DW1D1 - 18) and found the claimant and other co-suspects guilty of offence against discipline and recommended appropriate punishments to the Acting Chairman of the Commission for approval. This piece of evidence was not challenged or controverted under cross examination and as such should be taken as the truth. It is submitted that the defendant duly followed the disciplinary procedures laid down in the Staff Regulations in the treatment of the claimant's case. As to whether the claimant was given fair hearing, the claimant averred in paragraphs 36, 37, 38, 39 and 51 of his statement on oath that no allegation of Breach of Confidence was levied against him by the defendant and that he was not invited by the Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee. These omissions, he claimed, amounted to an infraction on his right to fair hearing. It is submitted that the claimant was queried for Breach of Confidence and that his claim that no allegation of Breach of Confidence was levied against him is not true. He was queried, among other things, for breaching Article 36(b)(iii) of EFCC Staff Regulations which bothers on the offence of Breach of Confidence. Counsel refers the court to Part VIII, Article 36(b)(iii) of the Staff Regulations (exhibit CW1X1- 112) it is also submitted that by the provisions of Part VIII, Article 37(h) of the Staff Regulations it is not mandatory that the claimant must appear before the disciplinary committee before the committee can take decision and award punishment against the claimant or any defaulting or erring staff. For avoidance of doubt the said Part VIII, Article 37(h) of the Staff Regulations provides as follows: "In its deliberations over matters of indiscipline, the SSC (sic) may invite the defaulter and other witnesses to appear before it so as to give further explanation on any aspects of the matter being investigated" By this provision, the Staff Regulations has expressly or by necessary implication excluded the mandatory application of the principle of audi alteram partem to the proceedings of the Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee (also known as the Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee) by the use of the words "may invite" in its provisions cited above. The Staff Regulations also made provisions for administrative appeals against the decision of the Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary' Committee in Part VIII, Article 37(k) by providing that the Board of the Commission shall be the reviewing authority of decisions of Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of NJC & ORS v. SENLONG & ORS (2010) LPELR-4582 (CA). Therefore, on the authority of the provisions of Part VIII, Article 37(h) and Part VIII, Article 37(k) of the Staff Regulations, and NJC & ORS v. SENLONG & ORS (supra), we urge the Honourable Court to hold that it is not mandatory that the claimant must appear before the Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee before the Committee can make its decision, and as such the claimant's right to fair hearing, to wit: audi alteram partem, has not been breached. The law is also trite that it is not in all cases that a party indicted of wrong doing must appear before an administrative panel of enquiry. The administrative panel can dispense with the appearance of the party if by the evidence before the tribunal it is of the opinion that the matter can be adequately dealt with without the appearance of the party or parties. On this submission counsel relied on the case of OBONGANWAN MARY NTEWO V. UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING HOSPITAL & ANOR (2013) LPELR - 20332 (CA). In response to claimant submission that the acting chairman was the accuser and judge in this case. Counsel for the defendant contended that the acting chairman was not the accuser and judge. The reason being that the query was not issued by the acting chairman and he did not participate in the investigation. Counsel urged the Court to resolve issue 2 in favour of the defendant and to hold that the defendant duly followed the disciplinary procedures for Senior Officers laid down by the Staff Regulations in the treatment of the claimant's case and to also hold that the defendant did not breach the claimant's right to fair hearing. Issue 3 It is the submission of counsel that the defendant can lawfully suspend the claimant from work pending the completion of an enquiry or investigation of allegation of crime or misconduct against him. DW2 - Femi Gbarufu, averred in paragraphs 25, 26 and 30 of his statement on oath to the effect that the Staff Regulations did not make provisions for suspension of staff facing disciplinary action and that the provisions on suspension of staff facing disciplinary action or under investigation is contained in the Public Service Rules of the Federation. He also averred that where there is no provision in respect of a particular subject matter in the EFCC Staff Regulations, recourse is had to the Public Service rules of the Federation. This piece of evidence was not challenged or controverted under cross examination by the claimant and as such should be taken as the truth. In the absence of provision in staff Regulations the defendant was right to have adopted Public Service Rules. Section 9(1)(b) of the Staff Regulations, the defendant was right in placing the claimant on suspension pursuant to Article 4, Rule 030406 of the Public Service Rules of the Federation, 2008. It is also submitted that the right to suspend an employee facing disciplinary action or under investigation is a right that is inherent in the powers of an employer. On this counsel relied on the case of MIAPHEN v. UNIJOS CONSULTANCY LTD (2013) LPELR-21904 (CA). The claimant has further submitted that his suspension for two years was unlawful as the defendant was under obligation to commence and conclude its investigation of the claimant within six months. He also submitted that under the Public Service Rules, a staff on suspension is placed on half salary. It is submitted that the suspension of the claimant was done pursuant to Section 4, Rule 030406 of the Federal Government Public Service Rules, 2008. Under this Rule a staff on suspension will continue to remain on suspension indefinitely until investigation into his case is completed. In support of this contention counsel cited the case of UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING HOSPITAL & ANOR V. JULIET KOKO BASSEY (2008) LPELR-8553 (CA) the Court of Appeal, in examining the provisions of Section 4, Rule 030406 of the Federal Government Public Service Rules, 2006, which is in pari materia with Section 4, Rule 030406 of the Federal Government Public Service Rules, 2008, held that suspension is allowed where there is a prima facie case, the nature of which is serious, has been established against an officer and it is considered necessary in public interest that he/she should forthwith be prohibited from carrying out his/her duties, pending investigation into the misconduct. The claimant was under investigation by the defendant for criminal offence connected with defamatory online publications. On conclusion of investigation, a prima facie case of the offence of conspiracy to commit criminal defamation was established against the claimant which resulted in disciplinary measures against the claimant. Therefore, the defendant acted within the law in placing the claimant on suspension indefinitely pending the completion of investigation. It is also the submission of counsel that the defendant or the Chairman of the defendant does not need to be delegated the power to suspend the claimant by any other authority before it can suspend the claimant as Section 9(1)(b) of the EFCC Staff Regulations empowers the defendant or the Chairman of the defendant, as the case may be, to apply the Public Service Rules of the Federation with such modifications, as may be necessary, to the employees of the Commission. It is submitted that since the right to suspend an employee is inherent in the powers of an employer or is concomitant to the said power, the defendant or the chairman of the defendant do not need further authorization by any other authority before it can suspend an employee, and we urge this Honourable Court to so hold. Counsel urged the court to resolve issue 3 in favour of the defendant and to hold that the defendant can lawfully suspend the claimant from work pending the completion of an inquiry or investigation of allegation of crime or misconduct against him, and has acted lawfully by so doing. Issue 4 It is the contention of counsel that the defendant was right in the punishment it meted to the claimant. The defendant led evidence, through DW2-Femi Gbarufu, to establish that the Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee, in its inquiry conducted in respect of the claimant's case, examined the query, the written representation in response to the query made by the claimant, the Interim Investigation Report (exhibit DW1C1-7) and the Legal Advice on the case (exhibit DW1D1-18) before arriving at its decision by finding the claimant and other co-suspects (Mustapha Suleiman and Mohammed Jiddah) guilty of offence against discipline and recommended appropriate punishments to the Acting Chairman of the Commission for approval. DW2 also averred in his statement on oath that the Legal Advice established a prima facie case of Conspiracy and Criminal Defamation against the claimant and other co-suspects. Counsel refers to paragraphs 44 and 45 of the statement on oath of DW2. This piece of evidence was not challenged or controverted under cross examination by the claimant and as such we urge the Court to uphold it as the truth. It is also argued that the Interim Investigation Report contain the excerpt of the statement made by Mustapha Suleiman confessing to be the author of the online defamatory publications, and also stating that he took the claimant to Umar Dembo to solicit for appointment for the claimant. The Interim Investigation Report also contain excerpt of the statement made by the claimant in which the claimant admitted that Mustapha Suleiman took him together with his CV to see Umar Dembo to solicit for appointment to a top position either in EFCC or in NDLEA. The Legal Advice opined that the claimant conspired with Mustapha Suleiman to commit Criminal Defamation in respect of the defamatory online publications, and advised that a prima facie case of Conspiracy and Criminal Defamation punishable under the Penal Code, can be sustained against the claimant and the other co-suspects. However, in the Legal Advice an opinion was expressed that instead of instituting criminal proceedings against the claimant and other suspects (Mustapha Suleiman, Mohammed Jiddah, Abubakar Adu and Abubakar Usman Sidiq- the blogger), disciplinary proceedings can be instituted and punishment awarded against the staff of the Commission involved, that is, the claimant, Mustapha Suleiman and Mohammed Jiddah, while the other suspects could be warned. The Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee considered the Interim Investigation Report and the opinion in the Legal Advice before finding the claimant guilty of the offence of Breach of Confidence for which it recommended appropriate punishments against the claimant as approved by the Acting Chairman in exhibit CW1U. It is the argument of counsel that the defendant, acting through its Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee, was right in the punishment it meted to the claimant, and we urge the Court to so hold. It is the contention of counsel that in judicial review of an administrative action, what the Court is concerned with is not whether or not the decision of the administrative tribunal was right, what the court is concerned with is whether legal process was followed before arriving at the decision. In other words, the Court is concerned with whether the procedure laid down in the enabling Act or Regulations was followed before reaching the decision. To support this argument counsel relied on the case of NAGPPE v. PHARMACISTS COUNCIL OF NIGERIA & ORS (2013) LPELR-21834 (CA). Consequently, the court is urged to concern itself with the legality of the act of the defendant and not the merits of the decisions or act of the defendant in the punishment meted to the claimant. It is already established before the Court that the defendant duly followed the disciplinary procedure laid down in the Staff Regulations in the treatment of the claimant's case. Counsel also contended that the defendant has the discretion to award any punishment which is lesser than the highest punishment prescribed for an offence in its Staff Regulations. The highest punishment for Breach of Confidence as prescribed in the Staff Regulations is dismissal. Reference was made to the provisions of Part VIII, Article 39(a) and (b) of the Staff Regulations (exhibit CW1X1-112 and the case of UDEGBUNAM v. FCDA & ORS (2003) LPELR-3291 (SC). An examination of exhibit (CW1U) shows that all the punishments awarded against the claimant by the defendant were lesser than the punishment of dismissal which the defendant is empowered to award in the circumstance. The claimant was by Part VIII, Article 39(a) and (b) due for outright dismissal from the service if not for the magnanimity of the defendant. It is submitted that the defendant was right in the punishment meted to the claimant. Counsel urged the court to resolve issue 4 in favour of the defendant and to hold that the defendant was right in the punishment meted to the claimant. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to upholds the submissions of the defendant and determines Issues 1 to 4 raised above, in favour of the defendant, it therefore means that quantum of evidence adduced by the defendant and the exhibits tendered before the Court, the claimant has not made out a good case to entitle him to the reliefs sought, and we urge the Honourable Court to so hold. On the whole, we urge the Court to dismiss this suit for want of merit. SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT. Professor J. O. Amupitan, SAN, representing the claimant in this suit in his oral submission before the Court adopted the Final written address of the claimant as his argument. The learned Silk, in his final written address submitted three issues for determination, as follows:- 1) Whether the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook 2007 exhibit CW1-X1- 112) was validly made? 2) Whether the disciplinary procedure taken against the Claimant by the Defendant leading to the Letter of Query dated 22nd December 2015 (Exhibits CW1-P1-2), the Notification of Suspension dated 29th December, 2015 (Exhibit CW1-S) and the Letter of Reinstatement dated 15th November 2017 (Exhibits CW1-U) is not contrary to the procedure laid down by law for the discipline of the Claimant? 3) Whether the denial of fair hearing to the Claimant does not render the entire procedure null and void? ARGUMENT ISSUE ONE Whether the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook 2007 (Exhibit CW1-X1-112) was validly made? It is the submission of counsel for the claimant that the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook (Exhibit CW1-X1-112) was not validly made same having not been approved by the Board of the Commission as required under section 9 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004. The powers to discipline any staff of the Defendant is vested on the Commission established under section 1 of the EFCC Act. Under section 8(3) and (4) of the Act, it is the Commission that is vested with the responsibility to appoint the staff of the Commission under such terms and conditions as the Commission, may after due consultation with the Federal Civil Service Commission determine. Section 9(1) of the Act further gave the Commission the responsibility to make staff Regulations relating generally to the condition of service of the employees of the Commission which includes cases of appointment, promotion and discipline. It is the submission of counsel that the following are imperative from the provision of section 9 of the Act: 1. That the responsibility of making the staff Regulations is statutorily vested on the Commission and not on a single individual or the Chairman. 2. That until the Regulations is made by the Commission, any instrument relating to the conditions of service of officers in the Civil Service of the Federation (in this case the Public Service Rules, 2008) shall be applicable with such modifications as may be necessary to the employees of the Commission. 3. That any Staff Regulations made shall not have effect until approved by the Commission. Counsel contended that of particular importance to this case are the very important provisions of section 9(1)(b), Rule 160103, Chapter 16 section 1 of the Public Service Rules, 2008. Counsel submitted that these enactments use the word "shall" in stating that until the Regulations is made, it is the provision of the Public Service Rule that shall apply. The language of the provisions are mandatory because of the use of the word "shall". In the case of TABIK INVESTMENT LTD. & AN0R V. GUARANTY TRUST BANK PLC (2011) 17 NWLR, part 1276, 240, the Supreme Court Per Mukhtar JSC (as she then was) held that the word 'shall' connotes mandatory discharge of a duty or obligation, and when the word is used in respect of a provision of the law that requirement must be obeyed. It is argued that the provision of section 9 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, empowered the commission to make and approve Regulations and not Chairman of the Commission. Section 9 is so clear and plain and it states that "The Commission may, subject to the provisions of this Act, make staff Regulations...". The section did not say that the Chairman may make such Regulations. It is submitted that section 1(2) clearly states that the Commission shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. Section 2(1) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act clearly spell out the composition of the Commission. It is glaring that it is the Commission consisting of eminent and experienced Nigerians and technocrats that is saddled with the responsibility of making the Staff Regulations for the Defendant; the Chairman cannot usurp the powers of the Commission which is a body corporate. Therefore, as claimed by the Defendant, if it was the Chairman that approved the Staff Regulations, such an act is ultra vires, null and void. On the other hand, the Claimant's case is that there was no approval at all. If the Chairman had approved, the written approval ought to have been produced? And if the Commission had approved, also no written approval was produced at the trial? Counsel urged the Court to discountenance and reject the evidence of DW2 on this issue of approval of EFCC Staff Regulations (Exhibit CW1-X1-112). It is the contention of counsel that the legal burden rests upon a party whether plaintiff or defendant who substantially assert the affirmatives of the issue. It therefore means that whoever asserts the affirmative or the positive of a fact/issue is the one with the legal burden to prove that issue. This is based on the latin phrase- Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit non qui negat, cum per naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit which means the proof lies upon him who affirms, not upon him who denies, since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any fact. On this contention reliance was placed on the cases of ELEMO V OMOLADE (1968) NMLR 359. Also in TORNO INTERNAZIONALE NIG LTD & ANOR V FSB INT'L BANK PLC (2013) LPELR- 22775(CA), IMONIKE V UNITY BANK PLC (2011) 5 SCNJ, ABUBAKAR L. ABDULLAHI & ANOR V. HON. YAHAYA SADAUKI & ORS APPEAL (2008) LPELR-3557(CA), AFOLAYAN V ARIYO & ANOR (2014) LPELR-22775(CA), ABDULSALAM (2017) LPELR-41875(CA), PDP V ALI & ORS (2015) LPELR-40370(CA), ABDULGANIYU V ADEKEYE (2012) LPELR-9250(CA) AND HABU V ISA (2012) LPELR-15189(CA). It is also the contention of counsel for the claimant that the contention of counsel for the defendant that the Regulations has been in circulation means there is approval is based on misconceptions. Likewise the submission that non-signing of Regulations is not enough to assume that the Regulations has not been approved is also based on misconception, because the law is trite that an unsigned document has no evidential value. The Claimant had issued a subpoena duces tecum on DW2 to produce about 8 documents which included a certified copies of the EFCC Staff Regulations. On the 15th March, 2018, DW2, in obedience to the subpoena by the court produced and submitted the certified true copies of the documents requested for including EFCC Staff Regulations. Interestingly, it was the certified true copy of the EFCC Staff Regulations that DW2 produced from custody that was tendered by the Claimant as Exhibit CW1X1-112. This document produced by the Defendant from custody was not signed at all. A certify copy is a certification of the state of the original document. It means from this evidence that the original Staff Regulations was not signed. Thankfully, the Defendant did not controvert or contradict the evidence of the Claimant that the Regulations was not signed. See section 83(4) of the Evidence Act. On this point, counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in OMEGA BANK (NIG) PLC V O.B.C LTD (2005) 8 NWLR. Ft.928. 547. Tobi JSC of the blessed memory held that '"A document which is not signed does not have any efficacy in law. As held in the cases examined, the document is worthless and a worthless document cannot be efficacious". Moreover, in FINE BONG & ANOR V El) EM & ORS (2016) LPELR- 41190(CA), Oyewole JCA held that an unsigned document is totally worthless and incapable of conferring any title. In the more recent case of RAJ1 V UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN & ORS (2018) LPELR-44692(SC) an unsigned notice of appeal was held to be defective and invalid and rendered the appeal to be incompetent. Also in UZOKWELU V PDP & ORS (2018) LPELR-43767(CA). it was held that an unsigned document is a worthless paper. It is inadmissible and where admitted, it cannot be relied upon by the court to resolve any controversy between the parties as no weight or probative value can be attached to an unsigned document. Shuaibu JCA also held in ALHAJ1 UMAR ALIYU TECHNICAL V FBN & ANOR (2018) LPELR-44663(CA) that a document which is not signed does not exist in the eyes of the law. In effect, il is worthless and can neither be admitted nor be enforced. Section 168( 1) of the Evidence Act does not avail the Defendant because the document is not "substantial!) Regular" and no presumption can be made in favour of unsigned, unapproved and worthless document. Counsel contended that the EFCC Staff Regulations (Exhibit CW1-X1-112) having not been signed and unapproved by the Commission is worthless and has no weight. It cannot be relied upon and cannot be enforced. It was only tendered by the Claimant to support his case that it was not approved. ISSUE TWO Whether the disciplinary procedure taken against the Claimant by the Defendant leading to the Letter of Query dated 22ml December 2015 (Exhibits CW1P1-2), the Notification of Suspension dated 29,h December, 2015 (Exhibits CW1-S) and the Letter of Reinstatement dated 15th November 2017 (Exhibit CW1U) is not contrary to the procedure laid down by law for the discipline of the Claimant? It is the contention of counsel that the disciplinary procedure adopted by the Defendant against the Claimant, as brought out in the evidence of CW1 and Exhibits CW1P1-2, CW1Rl-3, CW1S and CW1U) in this case is a mixture of the Rules contained in the Public Service Rules and the provision of "Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Staff Regulations Handbook". For instance while the query dated 22nd December. 2015 (Exhibits CW1-P1-2) was issued pursuant to the "Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Staff Regulations Handbook", the Notification of Suspension dated 29th December, 2015 (Exhibit CW1S) was issued pursuant to the provisions of Rule 030406 of the Public Service Rules and the purported Letter of Reinstatement dated 15lh November 2017 (Exhibit CW1U) was issued under the "Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Staff Regulations Handbook This in itself is confusing and a proven case of uncertainty on the part of the Defendant. At any rate, it admits the fact that the Public Service Rules is applicable in the circumstance. It is submitted that Rule 160501. Chapter 16 section 4 which vests the powers to exercise disciplinary control over staff of Parastatals or extra Ministerial Departments or Agencies on the Boards/Councils and not on Chief Executives of those parastatals as erroneously assumed in this case by the acting Chairman of the defendant. In addition. Rule 160502 states clearly that for Parastatal or Extra Ministerial Agencies, sections 2-6 in Chapter 3 of Public Service Rules are the applicable disciplinary procedures for officers of those Agencies. It states: "The provisions of sections 2 to 6 in Chapter 3 of Public Service Rules shall guide all Parastatals in addressing disciplinary matters provided that where reference to Federal Civil Service Commission, Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or the Permanent Secretary, the Board/Councils shall perform such functions". Rule 030102 vests the powers of discipline of public officers generally on the Federal Civil Service Commission. It states: "The power to dismiss and to exercise disciplinary control over officers in the Federal Public Service is vested in the Federal Civil Service Commission. This power may be delegated to any member of the Commission or any officer in the Federal Civil Service". It is the argument of counsel that from this provision that it is only the Federal Civil Service Commission that is vested with the powers to discipline public servants in Nigeria including those employed by Federal Government Ministries as well as Extra Ministerial Agencies such as the Defendant. However, the Federal Civil Service Commission has. in respect of officers on salary Grade Level 13 and below, delegated its disciplinary powers to Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Extra Ministerial Agencies except the powers to dismiss a staff which delegation is only in respect to Grade level 06 and below. This is provided for in Rule 030103 which states: "The Federal Civil Service Commission has delegated full disciplinary powers to Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Extra-Ministerial Offices in respect of officers on Salary G.L. 13 and below with the exception of the power of dismissal which has been delegated only from G.L. 06 and below". From above, it is apparent that Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Extra Ministerial Agencies do not have the power and cannot exercise disciplinary powers over officers of, Grade Level 13 and above. In this case, the Claimant is an officer of Grade Level 17 and a management staff of the Defendant. The discipline of the Claimant is therefore the responsibility of the Commission and not that of the acting Chairman as he purports to exercise in this case. It is the submission of counsel that the acting Executive Chairman by the combined effect of Rules 160501 and 160502 does not even have disciplinary powers over any staff. By above Rules Disciplinary Powers of Extra Ministerial Agencies are vested on their respective supervisory Boards and Council; in this case, the Commission. The Claimant (CW1) has given evidence that the Commission is not present in place and the letter of Reinstatement did not leave any one in doubt that it was the acting Chairman of the Defendant that "graciously approved" the demotion of the Claimant in the name of a reinstatement. The disciplinary procedure of an Extra Ministerial Agencies is as contained in sections 2- 6 in Chapter 3 of the Public Service Rules. Rule 030302, Rule 030304 It is the submission of counsel that the steps provided in the above quoted Public Service Rules are mere preliminary steps. At this stage, the trial of the officer alleged to have committed a misconduct has not yet commenced and no punishment can be meted to him/her until he/she is tried and heard by the Federal Civil Service Commission or the Board/Councils or Commissions that have the actual disciplinary powers. The Permanent Secretary or the Head of Extra Ministerial Agencies is only allowed to initiate disciplinary action and not to adjudicate and punish. It is only after being afforded an opportunity of being heard that the Federal Civil Service Commission or the Board/Councils or Commissions may mete out punishment which may include demotion. The Permanent Secretary or the Head of Extra Ministerial Agency that referred the case for discipline cannot and does not have the powers to mete out any punishment because at this stage, the Permanent Secretary or the Head of Extra Ministerial Agency is the accuser. This procedure is apparent from Rule 030305 titled "Disciplinary Procedure for Misconduct and Serious Misconduct". It is the contention of counsel that in fashioning out the disciplinary procedures in sections 2-6 in Chapter 3 of the Public Service Rules, the makers of the Public Service Rules ensured that the twin requirements of the principles of natural Justice are met. Consequently, a disciplinary procedure commences in accordance with Rule 030302 with a query from the superior officer of the officer who is alleged to have been involved in misconduct. If the response to the query is found to be satisfactory, the matter ends there. If the response is found to be unsatisfactory; then two things may happen. First, if the superior officer is of the view that the officer has not completely exculpated himself but the matter is not of a nature as to deserve punishment, then the superior officer may issue a letter of advice to the officer and the matter ends there. The second scenario is where the superior officer is of the view that the officer has not exculpated himself or herself and the matter deserves punishment, then the superior officer should forward the matter to the Permanent Secretary or the Head of Extra Ministerial Agencies, who shall forward the case to the appropriate body responsible for discipline. That in the case of Government Ministry to the Federal Civil Service Commission while in the case of Extra Ministerial Agencies to the Board or Council or Commission of that agency. Any step contrary to above will offend the principle of natural justice because no one can be a judge in his own cause. Regrettably, in this case, the Defendant contravened this procedure when the acting Chairman assumed the power to discipline and mete out punishment to the Claimant when he is the accuser. To support this argument counsel relied on the case of LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE v. CHIEF GANI FAWEHINMI (1985) LPELR-1776(SC) or (1.985) NWLR (Pt.7) 300. Counsel contended that what played out on Thursday 19th November, 2015, is the reflection of what happened in the above quoted case. Counsel argued that on 19/11/15, the Claimant was summoned by the acting Chairman of the Defendant Mr Ibrahim Magu into his office where he accused the Claimant of being responsible for the publication of the online publications in (Exhibits CW1G1-6, CW1Hl-4, CW1I1-4, CW1J1-5 and CW1K1-4). Despite Claimant explanations exculpating himself, on the directive of the same acting Chairman, Mr Ibrahim Magu. Claimant was taken to the Statement Room asked to write a ten page statement under caution like a suspect. Thereafter, on the order of the acting Chairman Claimant's official table top computer was taken away and his official car and two personal phones MTN (08033485511) and GLO (08055066583) were confiscated till date despite a search report exculpating him- See Exhibit CW1M. He was rendered incommunicado for months because he had no access to all the contacts on his phones. His office was also searched on the order of the Chairman by a team of detectives and police men and sealed up. The acting Chairman further directed him to be redeployed from his office as a Commandant of the training Institute of the Defendant and posted to the office of the acting Chairman without any portfolio or schedule of duty; which was a form of demotion. He was queried by the Director Organization support on 22nd December 2015 for "Offence against Discipline" (Exhibits CW1P1-2) and suspended on 29th December. 2015 by the acting Chairman acting through the Director Organization support- Exhibits CW1S. He was suspended, on the orders of the acting Chairman indefinitely without pay. The final straw was the letter by the acting Chairman dated 15th November 2017 purportedly reinstating the Claimant, demoting him and requesting him to write a letter of apology and forfeiture of his emoluments. The letter was signed on behalf of the acting Chairman by the Secretary to the Commission where in it was stated that that "Following the review of Breach of Confidence against you at the 6lh Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee held on 26lh September 2017. The Ag. Executive Chairman has graciously approved your reinstatement into the Commission on the following terms and conditions..."- see Exhibits CW1U. The hurry to punish the Claimant was such that he was found guilty of a case of "Breach of Confidence" which he was being mentioned for the first time. He was earlier accused of "Offence Against Discipline". This is all together strange. According to counsel it is glaring that the acting Chairman Mr Ibrahim Magu is the accuser, the initiator of the discipline, the author of the suspension and also the Judge who pronounced the Judgment. In pronouncing his judgment, he found the Claimant guilty of what he was never accused of or queried apart from the fact that the Commission had no say in the disciplinary action and the Claimant was not given the opportunity to appear before any panel to hear him out. It is submitted that the whole disciplinary procedure is bereft of natural Justice and to use the language of Aniogolu, JSC in LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE v. CHIEF GANI FAWEHINMI (Supra) "Such a proceeding would obviously have been null and void on that score as being an infringement of the principle nemo judex in causa sua". Counsel argued that it was to avoid this type of situation that Public Service Rules separated the accuser from the Judge. Thus, when a misconduct is alleged to have been committed by a public servant, the accuser is the Ministry or Extra Ministerial Agency (in this case EFCC) who is allowed to query the staff and investigate to be sure that there is a prima facia case and if it is found that there is a prima facia case, the Ministry or Extra Ministerial Agency must then hand over the matter to Federal Civil Service Commission or supervisory Boards and Council; in this case, the Commission to commence the trial and discipline of the officer involved. Any attempt by the Ministry or Extra Ministerial Agency to try and punish the officer will fail the test of natural justice and no court will sanction such a gross error. The Disciplinary procedure to be followed in the discipline of public servants under the Public Service Rules so as not to run foul of the principle of natural justice was explained for the benefit of all Head of Ministries and Extra Ministerial Agencies by the Supreme Court in FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS V. LAOYE (1989) 2 NWLR (PT.106) 652, where the Respondent was queried by the Ministry of External Affairs on the allegations made against him and that the Respondent answered the queries. However it was not the duty of the Ministry to discipline the officer. It was the duty of the Civil Service Commission, the 1st appellant, to do so as provided under the Civil Service Rules of 1974 (which is in pari materia with the Public Service Rules of 1988). The 1974 Rule provide for the submission of serious allegation of misconduct concerning senior public officers to the Civil Service Commission. Preliminary investigations made by the Ministries should only be forwarded to the Civil Service Commission which shall conduct disciplinary proceedings in the manner of a mini trial of the allegation made against an individual public officer, li was held by the Supreme Court that the Appellant (Civil Service Commission) had abdicated its responsibility by failing to investigate the allegations made by the Federal Ministry of External Affairs against the Respondent. Instead, the Appellant (Civil Service Commission) only relied on the accuser's (Federal Ministry of External Affairs) report and without calling upon the Respondent to explain his defence and dismissed him from the service. The procedure followed by the Civil Service Commission was held to be a clear violation of the principle of natural justice. The Supreme Court further held in this case that the ultimate power of discipline belonged to the Civil Service Commission or Public Service Commission and not to Head of Ministry or extra ministerial Agencies like the Defendant in this case. The Ministries are regarded as the accusers and they may inquire into an allegation of misconduct against their staff depending on the category of the officer concerned but they lacked the power to discipline without recourse to the Civil Service Commission except in properly delegated cases. It is argued by counsel that assuming but not conceding that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Staff Regulations 2007 (Exhibits CW1-X1-12) was validly made, which we contend was not. Counsel contended that contrary to the contention of the Defendant, that there is no provision in it for the discipline of the Claimant who is a Management Staff. The disciplinary procedure provided in Part VII1 especially sections 37 and 38 of the Regulations apply only to Senior Staff and Junior Staff respectively. Section 3 which is the interpretation section of the Regulations states "Senior Staff means staff on GL 08 to GL 14". "Junior Staff means staff on GL 01 to GL 07" and "Management staff means staff on GL 15 and above". Therefore, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Staff Regulations 2007 does not apply to the Claimant because from Exhibits CW1-A1-3, CW1-C and CW1-E and Claimant's evidence (see paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of his written statement on oath) he is a GL 17 officer and therefore a Management Staff In absence of any provision for the discipline of Management Staff under that Regulations, the provisions of Public Service Rules (a Regulations made pursuant to the Constitution) enumerated above applied by virtue of Rule 160103 of Public Service Rules. The acting Chairman does not therefore have the power he purportedly exercised in querying, suspending, demoting and disciplining the Claimant under the Regulations. The learned defence counsel in his written address urged this Honourable Court to hold that the Senior Staff Appointment Promotion and Disciplinary Committee established under section 37 of the EFCC Staff Regulations (Exhibit CW1-X1-112) can exercise, jurisdiction over management staff when it is expressly provided that it has powers to try only senior staff. He contended further that the EFCC Staff Regulations (Exhibit CW1- Xl-112) in restricting discipline of staff by Senior Staff Appointment Promotion and Disciplinary Committee only to senior staff is inconsistent with the provision of section 9 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act. He further urged the court to extend the disciplinary powers of the Senior Staff Appointment Promotion and Disciplinary Committee to Management staff. In response to this, we submit that the provisions and intendment of EFCC Staff Regulations (Exhibit CW1-X1-112) was to take matters of discipline of management staff, including for instance the Chairman of the Commission, outside the powers of the Senior Staff Appointment Promotion and Disciplinary Committee and vests the powers as is done under the Public Service Rules on the Commission. The Defence counsel conceded the fact that where there is lacuna in the Staff Regulations, the provision of the Public Service Rules applies based on section 9(l)(b) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act- see pages 12, paragraph 5.1.11 and 19, paragraph 5.3.3. The provision of the EFCC Staff Regulations (Exhibit CW1-X1-112) is clear on who is a management staff and the attempt by the Defendant to extend the clear provision of the Regulations to Management Staff is not tenable. Where the words of a statute are clear, they must be accorded their simple grammatical meaning. In the case of DANGANA & ANOR V USMAN & ORS (2013) 6 NWLR (PT.1349) 50. the Supreme Court held that where the words of a statute are clear, unambiguous and unequivocal express the intention of the lawmakers, effect must be given to them irrespective of whether that produces a harsh or inconvenient result and the provisions must be accorded their simple grammatical meaning. The evidence of DW2 that senior staff extends to management staff given the express provision of the Regulations goes to no issue. It is argued that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the Staff Regulations limiting the powers of the Senior Staff Appointment Promotion and Disciplinary Committee to senior staff and section 9 of the Act as contended by the Defendant. If there is no provision for the discipline of the Management Staff under the EFCC Staff Relation on then the provision of the Public Service Act is resorted to rather than alleging that the Regulations is inconsistent with section 9 of the Act. It is submitted that the Claimant had no business with the Senior Staff Appointment Promotion and Disciplinary Committee which purportedly reviewed his case as stated in Exhibit CW1U because the Committee does not have power over him. Even if he was subject to that Committee, which we contend strongly he was not. The claimant was not given fair hearing and the ultimate Judge the acting Chairman was the accuser as one of the online publication was even against him. The Claimant was not at any time invited by the Committee to appear before it before finding him guilty contrary to section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. Reiterating the need for the appropriate organ vested with the power to discipline a staff to be the one exercising that function, the Supreme Court held in E. P. IDERIMA V. RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2005) LPELR-1420(SC) or (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt.951) 378 that the power to discipline the Appellant was vested on the Civil Service commission of Rivers State and that the purported query and investigation conducted by the Accountant-General of Rivers State which indicted the Appellant although which report was later passed to the Civil Service Commission who did not conduct its own separate investigation before dismissing the Appellant was a nullity. It is submitted that the contention by the defence counsel that the Claimant was queried through Exhibit CW1P1-2 by the Director of Organizational support- Mr Bolaji Salami and that Mr Bolaji Salami is the coordinating director of all the Heads of Department is misleading. In the first place. Mr Bolaji Salami merely signed the query letter on behalf of the acting Chairman; so he was not the one that issued the query but the acting Chairman. Secondly and as admitted under cross-examination by DW2, all Heads of Department reports to the Commission Secretary who is the Head of Administration under section 2(1)(n). Therefore, the purported query was not even issued by the Head of Department of the Claimant or supervising officer as required by section 37 of EFCC Staff Regulations (Exhibit CW1X1-112). The contention of the learned Defence counsel that the Claimant was given fair hearing in that he was queried and he answered the query (Exhibit CW1Q1-3) and that the Senior Staff Appointment Promotion and Disciplinary Committee examined the query, the Claimant's response to the query, the interim Investigation Report (Exhibit DW1C1-7) and the legal advice (Exhibit DW1D1-I8) before finding the Claimant guilty of offence against discipline and recommended appropriate punishment to the acting Chairman of the Commission for approval also demonstrated a complete failure of justice in this case. In the first place, the EFCC Staff Regulations (Exhibit CW1X1-112) under which the Senior Staff Appointment Promotion and Disciplinary Committee took the decision is invalid. Secondly, assuming it was even valid, the Committee had no powers to try a management staff. Thirdly, assuming it had powers to try management staff, it ought to have invited the Claimant to appear before it or at least make a written representation to it before coming to a decision instead of relying on Claimant's response ' to query (Exhibit CW1Q1-3) during his investigation. If the Senior Staff Appointment Promotion and Disciplinary Committee is truly the trying body and not an investigation body, it must accord everyone appearing before it the opportunity of being heard and where it fails to do so. The proceeding is a nullity being contrary to section 36 of the Constitution of Nigeria. 1999 as amended. The contention of the Defendant that DW2 evidence on this was not controverted is untrue as the Claimant clearly gave evidence of the travesty of justice in his investigation and the lack of trial in his statement of Defence and written statement on oath. The Defendant had at page 16, paragraph 5.2.11 of its written address admitted the failure of fair hearing even by the said Committee but he rationalized it on the fact that "... the Staff Regulations has expressly or by necessary implication excluded the mandatory application of the principle audi alteram partem to the proceedings of the Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee (also known as Senior Staff Appointment Promotion and Disciplinary Committee)". On the contrary, it is submitted that no Staff Regulations or even a law made by the National Assembly can exclude the requirement of fair hearing under the Constitution. Such law will be declared null and void under section 1(1) of the Constitution and the proceedings there at set aside. The case of NJC & ORS V SENLONG & ORS (2010) LPELR-4582(CA) is not apt as the Claimant had in paragraph 43 of his evidence testified that the Commission had not been constituted since 2015 to date. We have cited Supreme Court's decision to the contrary. Counsel submitted that the legal advice (Exhibit DW1D1-18) which the Senior Staff Appointment Promotion and Disciplinary Committee relied upon is a documentary hearsay and not admissible because the maker who was available was not called as a witness. Hearsay evidence under sections 37 and 38 of the Evidence Act are not admissible under any condition. Assuming they were properly admitted, we submit, just like the Interim Report- Exhibit DW1C1-7, has no evidential value and no weight is to be attached to it. It is to be remembered that DW1 who tendered the interim report Exhibit DW1C1-7 admitted under cross-examination that he was not the one that made the document, that it was written by someone else and he was only asked to append his signature which he did. It is further submitted that the procedure adopted and the attitude of the acting Chairman portrays a dangerous dimension to the effect that the Claimant holds his employment at the pleasure of the acting Chairman. This impression is completely misleading. The Claimant's employment is not a common law master/servant employment but he is an employee with statutory flavour vide his letter of employment Exhibits CW1A1-A3 and sections 7 and 8 of the EFCC Act. He therefore did not hold his employment at the pleasure of the acting Chairman and ought not to be humiliated the way he was humiliated. It is now generally acceptable that there are three types of employments viz common law or master /servant employment. Pleasured employment and statutory employment. This point was echoed by KATSINA-ALU. J.S.C. (as he then was) in OLANREWAJU V. AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC (2001) 13 NWLR (PT.731) 691 that "Generally employments ' fall into three categories, viz: (a) master and servant; (b) A servant holds an office at pleasure; (c) employment that is governed by statute". It has long been firmly established by the Courts that public servants are employees with statutory flavour; as such they do not hold their employment at the pleasure of the employing ministries or Extra Ministerial Agencies but their employment can only be affected or determined strictly in line with the provisions of statutes and their conditions of service. In support of this contention counsel cited the case of HART VS. MILITARY (GOVERNOR OF RIVERS STATE (1976) N.S.C.C. (VOL. 10) 222, U.B.N (NIG.) LTD VS. OGBOH (1995) 2 NWLR (PT. 360) 647 AT 669, N.B.T.E. VS. ANYANWU (2005) (PT.256) 1266, BAMGBOYE V. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (1999) 6 SCNJ 295, MISS YETUNDE ZAINAB TOLANI V. KWARA STATE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS (2009) LPELR-8375(CA), OLAN1YAN -VS- UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS, (1985) ALL NLR 363. It is also submitted that the indefinite suspension of the Claimant for a period almost two years is, to use the language of the Court in SUNDAY EMEJE v. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (2010) LPELR-8986(CA) "a terrible thing". It is argued that the suspension of the Claimant for this indefinite period without pay is contrary to the provisions of the Public Service Rules, Rule 030307. To support this view counsel relied on the case of BAMISILE V NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL & ORS (2012) LPELR-8381(CA). It is submitted that there is nothing in the letter suspending the Claimant indefinitely (Exhibit CW1-S) that states as one of the terms of his suspension the denial of his salary: yet his name was removed from the payroll on the instructions of the acting Chairman of the Defendant. This is regrettable even before the Claimant was found guilty of misconduct. What a show of bias! It is submitted that the therefore submit that the disciplinary procedure taken against the Claimant is contrary to the procedure for the discipline of a staff provided for by law and ought to be annulled. ISSUE THREE Whether the denial of fair hearing to the Claimant does not render the entire procedure null and void? Counsel submitted that they have shown clearly that the procedure adopted in disciplining the Claimant failed to meet the requirement of natural justice and fair hearing under section 36 of the Constitution of Nigeria. 1999. The acting Chairman Mr Ibrahim Magu is the accuser, the investigator and the Judge. It is also respectfully submitted that the finding of the Claimant guilty of breach of confidence by the Defendant without a trial is a breach of natural justice. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS V. LAOYE (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.106) 652. It is submitted that disciplinary bodies, in exercising their disciplinary powers, must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and that the Civil Service Commission is a creation of the Constitution and can never override the Constitution. Further that when it has to carry out its quasi-judicial function of deciding the fate of a Federal Civil Servant under the Federal Civil Service Rules, it is bound to observe the principles of fair hearing as enshrined in the Constitution. PATRICK ZIIDEEH V. RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2007) LPELR-3544(SC) or (2007) 3 NWLR (Ft. 1022) 554. It is submitted that there was a total failure of justice in the trial of the Claimant by the acting Chairman as he was not given fair hearing. His purported suspension and reinstatement through demotion and forfeiture is therefore invalid null and void on the basis of cases cited above. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to resolve all the issues in favour of the Claimant and grant all the reliefs sought in the Complaint, reinstate the Claimant back to his job and set aside the Letter of Query dated 22nd December 2015, the Notification of Suspension dated 29n December, 2015 and the Letter of Reinstatement dated 15th November 2017. The Claimant should also be paid his emoluments for the years he was wrongly suspended. REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW BY THE DEFENDANT. Issues raised by the claimant to which the defendant replies on point of law Issue 1 The first issues raised by the claimant in his Final Written Address are that the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook 2007 is not valid because it was not approved by the Commission (the defendant). The claimant based his argument on the ground that the Staff Regulations was not signed by the Commission. The claimant also contended that, for the Staff Regulations to be valid, it must have to be made and signed by the Commission, and according to the claimant, the Commission consists of all the members as provided for in Section 2(1) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004. In other words, the claimant's contention is that the EFCC Staff Regulations must not only be made by all the members consisting the Commission (19 members), it must also be signed by the said members. The claimant further submitted that the Chairman of the Commission cannot alone approve the Staff Regulations on behalf of the Commission, and that in the instant case, the chairman of the Commission did not sign the Staff Regulations and so the Staff Regulations is not valid. With utmost respect to the learned silk, the counsel to the claimant, I find this argument very curious. It has been established before this Court that a committee was constituted by the defendant in 2007 to draft the defendant's Staff Regulations. In fact the claimant himself admitted before the Court that he was a member of that committee and that he literally drafted the Regulations singlehandedly. It has also been established before the court by the uncontroverted evidence of DW2- Femi Gbarufu that the Staff Regulations, after it was drafted, was submitted to the Commission (the defendant) or the chairman of the Commission for approval. Therefore, since it is the Commission that constituted the Committee that drafted the Staff Regulations and it is the same Commission that approved the Staff Regulations, the Staff Regulations can therefore be said to have been made by the Commission. Section 9 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004, provides that it is the Commission that may make and approve the Staff Regulations. It is therefore erroneous to contend that it must be the members that constitute the Commission that must personally make the Staff Regulations for it to be valid. The Commission is a legal fiction, it is an artificial or a juristic person without the soul and mind of its own. See the case of FUT MINNA & GRS V. OKOLI (2011) LPELR-9053(CA). Per Garba JCA (P. 38, paras. C-F). The Commission therefore acts through the Chairman of the Commission who is its Chief Executive and the Accounting Officer. As far as the Commission is concerned, every other member of the Commission is under the chairman who is the Chief Executive and the Accounting Officer of the Commission. The Commission can act through its chairman who is the Chief Executive and the Accounting Officer and can also act through its officers. Therefore, it is not a contradiction to say that the Staff Regulations was approved by the Commission or by the chairman of the Commission. It is not a requirement under Section 9(2) of the EFCC Act that the Staff Regulations must be signed as evidence of approval. Any evidence showing that the Staff Regulations was approved is enough to establish that the Regulations is valid, and not necessarily evidence showing that the Regulations was signed. Issue 2 The second issues raised by the claimant are that the disciplinary procedure taken against the claimant by the defendant leading to the letter of Query, the Notification of Suspension and the letter of Re-instatement are contrary to the provisions laid down by law for the discipline of the claimant on the ground that the disciplinary procedure was taken pursuant to the provisions of the invalid and unapproved EFCC Staff Regulations. The claimant also contended that the disciplinary procedure in the Staff Regulations do not apply to the claimant who is a Management Staff and further argued that the applicable disciplinary procedure is the Public Service Rules. The Counsel to the claimant also contended that the defendant was wrong in placing the claimant on suspension for two years without salary as no law authorises the defendant to so do and cited several authorities in support of his contention. It is pertinent to state here that the defendant has adequately responded to these issues in its Written Address. However, on the issue of the suspension of the claimant without salary, we urge the court to discountenance the submissions of the Counsel to the claimant that there is no law authorising the defendant to do so. The claimant was suspended pursuant to the provisions of Section 4, Rule 030406 of the Public Service Rules, 2008. From the above provisions, it is clear that the claimant cannot only be suspended from the exercise of the powers and functions of his office but can also be suspended from the enjoyment of his emolument. The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus (American Edition) defines emolument in page 469 to mean " a salary, fee or profit from employment or office". Issue 3 The third issues raised by the claimant are that the entire procedure should be rendered null and void because he was denied fair hearing. The claimant cited various legal authorities in support of his submission. Unfortunately, the facts in these authorities cited are not the same with the instant case of the claimant. In FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS v. LAOYE cited by the claimant, the Federal Civil Service Commission which exercised disciplinary control on the respondent did not comply strictly with the Rules it made governing the dismissal of its staff, unlike in the case of the claimant where the defendant complied strictly with the disciplinary procedure in the EFCC Staff Regulations. Also, in the Federal Civil Service case, the Federal Civil Service Commission that meted the punishment of dismissal on the respondent was not the one that investigated the respondent as the respondent was investigated by his accuser - the Ministry of External Affairs. This is unlike the instant case of the claimant where the defendant was the one that investigated the claimant and meted punishment, strictly following the provisions of the EFCC Staff Regulations. It has been established by evidence before the Court that it was the defendant that issued query to the claimant and received the written representation made by the claimant in response to the query. The defendant's Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee conducted administrative inquiry into the case and meted punishment to the claimant and recommended same for approval of the acting chairman of the defendant. In all these, there was strict compliance with the disciplinary procedure for senior officers contained in the EFCC Staff Regulations. Ibrahim Magu (the acting chairman of the defendant) did not take part in the investigation of the criminal case involving the claimant, neither was he a member of the Senior Staff Appointment, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee. It has also been established by evidence before the Court that the defendant's Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee, in its inquiry, examined the Query, the written representation made by the claimant in response to the query, the Interim Investigation Report and the Legal Advice on the case, before arriving at it decision against the claimant. Therefore we submit that the claimant's right to fair hearing was not breached. The claimant also contended that his right to fair hearing was breached because he was not given opportunity of been heard before decision was taken against him and cited the case of MR. ISAH A. SAIBU v. KWARA STATE POLYTECHNIC, ILORIN. We submit that, unlike the case of MR. ISAH where the Appellant was not given any opportunity to be heard, in the instant case, the claimant was given opportunity to be heard and was indeed heard before the decision was taken against him. Hearing can be orally or in writing. See the case of FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS v. OLAOYE cited by the claimant. In the query issued to the claimant the charge against the claimant was well spelt out and he was given opportunity to respond to the query. The claimant was equally heard on the charge against him by his written representation made in response to the query which was submitted to the defendant. We therefore urge the Court to discountenance the submissions of the learned Counsel to the claimant together with all the legal authorities cited as same are irrelevant to the case at hand and thus inapplicable as the facts in the cases cited are not the same and are distinguishable from the instant case of the claimant. On the whole, counsel urged the Court to dismiss this suit for want of merit. COURT DECISION: I have carefully considered all the processes filed in this suit and the submissions of the parties. There are three issues that the various position taken by each of the parties in this suit has taken that calls for resolution. The first question which is germane to the case of both parties is the validity of exhibit CW1X1-112, i.e the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Staff Regulations 2007. The second question to be resolved borders on which of the conditions of service between the EFCC Regulations 2007 and the Public Service Rules 2008, is the appropriate applicable rules governing disciplinary action against members of staff of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. The third issue is whether given the facts disclosed in this case the claimant is entitled to the reliefs being sought in his claims. Before delving into determination of the three issues posed for determination of this dispute. It behooves on me to comment on the objection raised by the counsel for the claimant to paragraph 2.0 of the defendant’s final written address. It is contended that the said paragraph of the address was not borne out of evidence adduced at the trial. For instance paragraph 2.1 where it was stated that the publications were done with the aim of removing the chairman and director of operation and also discredit police officers on secondment to the commission with a view to having them posted back to the police force so as to facilitate the appointment of some persons named in the publication to the office of the Executive chairman and or director of operation. It is trite law that evidence not supported by pleadings goes to no issue. If a party at address stage attempt to import facts into his case which have no support from the pleadings of the party, the court is entitled not to accord those new facts having no support from the pleadings as non-existence. It must always be remembered that in every trial, pleadings and the evidence adduced in support determine the outcome of the trial. This is because parties are legally bound by the case they put up before the court. Thus, why it is not allowed for counsel to introduce at address stage fresh evidence that was not led during oral testimony. If such happened, that piece of evidence must therefore be disregarded. It is trite that counsel’s address and argument cannot take the place of evidence on record. Both the court and the parties are bound by the record. In this respect all the facts in the address of counsel not supported by the pleading are hereby discountenanced. This is because the address is meant to assist the court in deciding the matter before it, but not for introduction of fresh evidence not supported by pleading of the party. To the first question for resolution, which is on the validity of exhibit CW1X1-112. The claimant in his statement of facts, witness statement on oath as well as under cross-examination insisted that exhibit CW1X1-112, was not validly made same having not been approved by the board of the commission as required under section 9 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, (Establishment) Act. The Learned Silk representing the claimant contended that the responsibility of making Regulations is statutorily vested in the commission and not on the chairman of the commission. That any Regulations made shall not have effect until approved by the commission. Counsel in support of his position made reference to paragraphs 39, 40, 42 and 44 of the defendant’s witness statement on oath. Counsel also submitted that the refusal of the defendant to produce minute of proceedings of the defendant showing the date when it was approved means that if it is produced it will be unfavourabe to the defendant. Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 was relied upon on this contention. The defendant on the other hand maintained that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Staff Regulations Handbook, 2007, exhibit CW1X1-112, was made pursuant to section 9 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, (Establishment) Act, it was approved by the commission and it applies to all staff of the commission. See paragraphs 7 and 8 of DW2’s witness statement on oath. Counsel also argued that a committee was constituted by the defendant in 2007 to draft the defendant’s staff Regulations and the claimant was a member of the committee that drafted the Regulations, after which it was submitted to defendant or chairman of the commission for approval. Since it is the commission that set up the committee that drafted the Regulations, it is the same commission that approved of the staff Regulations. The questioning of the validity of exhibit CW1X1-112, raises the issue of who has the power of making or approving staff Regulations of the defendant. It is trite law that the exercise of legislative powers to make law or bylaw, under administrative law, as the case may be is subject to the jurisdiction of court. The courts in Nigeria have jurisdiction to ensure compliance with due process in making law, from the time the process of law making was set in motion to the time when it is concluded. This means that the entire legislative or law making process is subject to exercise of jurisdiction of courts in Nigeria. See AG BENDEL V AG OF THE FEDERATION & ORS. (1981) ALL NLR 85, (1981) 10 SC 1. The duty of court in this regard is to ensure checks and balances i.e the legislature performs its function in accordance with the law. Therefore, this means that once there is a or suspected infraction of the legislative process an aggrieved party having requisite locus can approach the court for redress. The court has a duty to see to correct exercise of legislative powers. And that only laws dully enacted or made are allowed to be in operation. The defendant in this case was established by section 1(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment Act) as a body corporate with perpetual succession and may sue and be sued in its corporate name. The composition of the defendant is as provided in section 2(1) of the Act establishing the defendant. Section 8(3) and (4) confers power on the defendant to appoint members of staff of the defendant. The staff of the defendant appointed under subsection (3) of this section, shall be appointed upon such terms and conditions as the defendant may, after consultation with the Federal Civil Service Commission, determine. The staff of the defendant appointed under subsection (3) of this section, shall be appointed upon such terms and conditions as the Commission may, after consultation with the Federal Civil Service Commission, determine. However, vide section 9 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, the defendant was empowered to make Regulations relating generally to the conditions of service. The section provides: 9. Staff Regulations (1) The Commission may, subject to the provisions of this Act, make staff Regulations relating generally to the conditions of service of the employees of the Commission and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the Regulations may provide for— (a) the appointment, promotion and disciplinary control (including dismissal) of employees of the Commission; and (b) appeals by such employees against dismissal or other disciplinary measures, and until the Regulations are made, any instrument relating to the conditions of service of officers in the Civil Service of the Federation shall be applicable, with such modifications as may be necessary, to the employees of the Commission. (2) Staff Regulations made under subsection (1) of this section shall not have effect until approved by the Commission, and when so approved the Regulations may not be published in the Gazette but the Commission shall cause them to be brought to the notice of all affected persons in such manner as it may, from time to time, determine.. The Black’s law Dictionary, Tenth Edition, page1475, defined Regulations to mean: ‘’control over something by rule or restriction. Byelaw, corporate Regulations. An official rule or order, having legal force, usually issued by an administrative agency, agency Regulations, subordinate legislation, delegated legislation’’. In the context of section 9 Regulations to be made or made are byelaw, that is to say, a body of rules having legal force. In administrative law parlance, regulates is referred to as ‘subsidiary legislation’. That is to a body of rules having legal force made in pursuance of or under delegated powers conferred by a parent or substantive legislation. Therefore they have force of law. They are however, subject and subordinate to the legislation from where they derived their force. See ATIKASE OTITO V KUNLE ODIDI & ORS (2010) LPELR-9070(CA)BEST NJOKU & ORS. V CHIEF MIKE IHENATU & ORS. (2008) LPRLR-3871(CA), DIN V AG FEDERATION (1988) 4 NWLR, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF CUSTOM & ORS. V GUSAU (2017) LPELR-42081(SC). From the foregoing, it is clear that for any Regulations to be made under section 9 it must conform to the tenor of the provisions of the section before it can have force of law. There is no doubt that from the evidence before the Court the defendant sometime in year 2007, set up a Committee to draft Staff Regulations. The Committee at the end of its work came out with exhibit CW1X1-112. It is interesting to note that the claimant in this suit who is now challenging the validity of Exhibit CW1X1-112, was a member of the drafting committee. It is also not in dispute that exhibit CW1X1-112, has been in use since year 2007. The claimant has also gotten some benefits under the Regulations. The claimant has also served as a member of Appointment, Promotion and Disciplinary Committee of the defendant where some erring members of staff of the defendant were tried for infraction of the Regulations and sanctioned accordingly. It is the view of counsel for the defendant that the claimant having at one time or the other benefitted from exhibit CW1X1-112 and having served as a member of the Appointment, Promotion and Disciplinary Committee established pursuant to exhibit CW1X1-112, ca. thus, the claimant urged the court to not now turn around and seek for invalidation of exhibit CW1X1-112. It has also been argued by the counsel for the defendant that section 9 of the EFFC (Establishment) Act, does not require signing of the Regulations (exhibit CW1X1-112), therefore the claimant cannot use non-appearance of signature as a ground for voiding the Regulations. The counsel for the claimant on the other hand has argued that the claimant has challenged the defendant despite the challenge and notice to produce given to that effect. The claimant in the circumstance urged the court to invoke provision of section 167 of the Evidence to hold that the failure to comply with notice to produce means that the document exhibit CW1X1-112, was never approved by the defendant. It is to be noted that the existence of this document (exhibit CW!X1-112), was admitted by the defendant in the pleadings and testimony before the Court, which was not produce. I have given a careful consideration of this issue, in the case of LAWAL V MAGAJI & ORS [2009] LPELR-4427(CA), where Sankey, JCA held that a party who is in possession of a document but fails to produce it after notice to produce has been issued and served on him may be giving room for the invocation of the presumption; however, it is to be noted that the trend of judicial opinion is that there is a need to exercise caution in making presumptions unless such a presumption is irresistible and overwhelming. For section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 to apply, the evidence sought to be presumed must be identifiable, clear and known to the Court; as the courts are cautioned to be careful in applying section 167(d). See Egwu v. Egwu [2007] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1014) 71 at 92 CA, Olufosoye v. Fakorede [1993] 1 NWLR (Pt. 272) 752, Lawal v. Magaji & ors [2009] LPELR-4427(CA), The People of Lagos State v. Umaru [2014] LPELR-22466(SC), Eboh v. Progressive Insurance Co. Ltd Anyiam [1961] All NLR 508; Akinfe v. The State [1988] 7 SCNJ 236, Aremu v. Adetoro [2007] 16 NWLR (Pt. 29) 471, Awosike v. Sotunbo [1989] 3 NWLR (Part 29) 471 and Adederan v. Alao [2001] 18 NWLR [245] 408. I make bold to say that the facts as disclosed in the pleadings of parties and the witness statements on oath support the finding that this is a case where the provisions of section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act 2011should apply. Therefore, I am in agreement with the Learned Silk that since the defendant has positively asserted that the Commission has approved exhibit CW1X1-112, in line with section 9 of Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, (Establishment) Act, the defendant is duty bound to produce before the court the said approval. The defendant having admitted the existence of the approval in the pleading and evidence before the court, but failed to produce it. This court is entitled to use the presumption under section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011, against the defendant. The effect of this is that the failure to produce the approval given by the commission in respect of exhibit CW1X1-112, means that it is either not in existence or it will not be in favour of the defendant if it is produced. The defendant in an attempt to justify refusal to produce exhibit CW1X1-112, has argued that he who assert must prove. This is a true statement of law. But it must be pointed out here that burden of proof is not static it shift with discharge of burden of proof. The claimant has denied and even challeges the defendant to produce the relevant approval. The general position of the law regarding the standard of proof in civil proceedings is that the claimant must succeed upon preponderence of evidenceor on the balance of probability. The burden of proof in civil procceedings lies on he who will fail if no evidence were adduced on either sides. However, where a party upon whom the burden lies adduces sufficient evidence to satisfy the court of the existence of certain facts, the burden shifts to the adverse party to disprove those facts and so on untill all the issues in contention between the parties have been dealt with. In otherwards burden of proof of particular facts shifts from side to side throughout the proceedings. See setions 131, 132, 133 and 134 of the Evidence, Act, 20 AKINYEMI V BINUYO & ORS. (2010) LPER9150(CA). One other important factor to be considered is the fact that in the case at hand what is in issue is validity of a subsidiary legislation, which is a piece of legislation, a documentary evidence in a class of its own. Being a piece of legislation it is not an ordinary document that the court would expect the claimant to have a copy of it to entitle him to tender secondary evidence of it. In fact it is a document that the Court under the Evidence Act, is bound to take judicial notice of. Since the validity of the law is in issue the court has no choice than to inquire into its validity. Albeit, the defendant has in their evidence and argument opined that the claimant having taken benefits and having participated in disciplinary proceedings where some members of staff of the Commission were disciplined using the provisions of exhibit CW1X1-112, is estopped from questioning or challenging the validity of exhibit CW1X1-112. This argument seems to be very attractive, but, on a careful consideration, it will manifestly turn out to be based on erroneous misconception of law. The argument is preposterous. The reason being that the defendant has a statutory duty to ensure that exhibit CW1X1-112, is validly made in conformity with section 9 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act. If the court is to close its eyes to issue of legality and validity and refuse to inquire into it, it will be abdicating its responsibility. Such act will be encouraging belligerence to due process of law making. It is pertinent to refer to the Apex Court decision in AG BENDEL STATE V AG OF THE FEDERATION & ORS (supra), where the court in approving the dictum of Justice Bradley in the case of OTTAWA V PERKING 94 U. S. 134 @ 157, stated that there could be no estoppel in the way of ascertaining the existence of law that which purport to be a law or is a law or it is not a law. It is apparently clear that no challenge to constitutionality or legality of any legislation could ever be ignored because of defence of estoppel. To tread on such path will amount to destroying or annihilating the well cherished doctrine of ultra vires. No estoppel could operate to diminish or negate the power of court to inquire into validity of a piece of legislation or to allow a party to hide under the cover of burden of proof to refuse to produce vital evidence that is very critical to the determination of an issue before the court. From a careful perusal of exhibit CW1X1-112, it is noticeable that it was not signed. Being a piece legislation to which Court is entitled to take judicial notice of signature may not be of much consequence once, it is shown that it has been validly approved by the approving authority in this case the ‘Commission’. It is also interesting to note that exhibit CW1X1-112, clearly does not have commencement date, therefore, absence of commencement date clearly heightened suspicion of its approval. The only way this court or any other Court can ascertain the authenticity of a piece legislation, be it substantive or subsidiary, is if it is availed of the minute and proceedings showing the approval. This should not be taken as that all the members of the Commission must sign the document, all that is required is to have evidence showing that there was a meeting of the Commission where the draft Regulations was considered and same approved by the Commission. The claimant has challenged the defendant to produce evidence of the approval of exhibit CW1X1-112, but failed to do so and choose to rely on hearsay evidence of DW2, who is not a member of the Commission and has not told the Court that he was present at the meeting where the Regulations was approved. In fact the evidence before the Court which was supported by the argument of counsel for the defendant, unequivocally shows that the Regulations was approved by the Chairman of the Commission. The counsel for the defendant seems to have equated the Chairman of the Commission as the Commission itself, this clearly is against the spirit of the law, as shown in the earlier part of this judgment the defendant is a legal entity established by law with perpetual succession. While the Chairman of the Commission is also a legal entity different from the defendant. The case of AG BENDEL STATE V AG OF THE FEDERATION & ORS. (supra), supported the position that minutes of meeting where the draft EFCC Regulations was considered and same approved by the Commission is a vital piece of evidence to assist in determining legality or otherwise of exhibit CW1X1-112. The Apex Court in that case hold that vote and proceedings of National Assembly are part of the pieces of evidence to be looked into in determining validity of a legislation. The provisions of section 9 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, clearly assigned the function of approval of Regulations on the Commission and not the Chairman. If the legislature had wanted the power of approval to reside in the Chairman the lawmakers would have said so in the Act. It is an elementary rule of statutory interpretation that the express and unambiguous mention of one thing in a statutory provision, automatically excludes any other which otherwise would have applied by implication with regard to the same issue. It is a total exclusion of those not mentioned, this is expressed in Latin Maxim as ‘expressio unis exclusion alterius’’. See AG BENDEL STATE V ADEYAN (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt.118) 646, OLARENWAJU COMMERCIAL SERVICES LTD V SOGAOLU & ANOR (2014) LPELR-24086(CA). I find it difficult to accept the contention that approval by the Chairman is approval by the Commission. The reason being that a court is not entitled to read into statute words which are excluded expressly or impliedly from it. The sacred duty of court is to interpret the words used in the legislation and give them their intended meaning and effect without more. See BUHARI V INEC (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt.1120) 246. It will be absurd to act against the well-entrenched principles of interpretation of statutory provisions. In view of the foregoing, it is my view that approval of the draft Regulations by the Chairman of the Commission does not constitute or amount to approval by the Commission, as the Chairman and the Commission are two different legal entities in law. In the circumstance I have no choice than to void exhibit CW1X1-112, for not having been approved in line with section 9(2) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act. ISSUE TWO The second issue for resolution revolves around which, between the EFCC Regulations Handbook 2007 and the Public Service Rules 2008 is the appropriate Rules or Regulations that should guide disciplinary proceedings of the defendant. The counsel for the defendant has submitted that exhibit CW1X1-112, made pursuant to section 9 of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, is valid and applies to all employees, officers or staff of the defendant, including the claimant. The defendant has also through DW2 given evidence to the effect that exhibit CW1X1-112, was validly made and applies to all the staffers of the defendant including the claimant. Counsel argued that community reading of section 9 will show that with the coming into fore of the EFCC Regulations Handbook 2007, it applies and govern all employees of the defendant in matters relating to appointment, promotion and discipline. It is also argued that in the absence of provision on any given issue the provisions of the Public Service Rules is resorted to for guidance. The claimant on his part argued that the EFCC Staff Regulations Handbook 2007, having not been validity approved by the Commission cannot govern his case and the applicable rules to his case should be the Public Service Rules 2008. In order to resolve this issue it is apt to refer to section 9(2) (b) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act. The sub-section read: (b) …, and until the Regulations are made, any instrument relating to the conditions of service of officers in the civil service of the federation shall be applicable with such modifications as may be necessary to the employees of the commission’’. The correct interpretation of the above quoted provisions of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, is that where there is no approved Regulations by the Commission, the public Service Rules shall be the appropriate rules to be invoked in the running of the affairs of the defendant in so far as it relates to issues of appointment, promotion and discipline of members of staff of the Commission. The provision of this sub-section is very clear and unambiguous and should be given their ordinary meaning. Since this court has earlier held that exhibit CW1X1-112 was not validly approved by the Commission. The Chairman having not been synonymous with the Commission, therefore, the approval given by the chairman is ultra vires to the powers of the chairman. The Regulations are therefore void. This finding will lead to irresistible holding that the applicable rules to govern appointment, promotions and discipline of erring members of staff of the Commission including the claimant in this suit shall by virtue of the provision of section 9(1)(b) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, be the Public Service Rules, 2008 and I so hold. ISSUE THREE. The third issue for determination is whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought from the court as per his complaint and statement of facts. The counsel for the defendant has argued that the disciplinary action taken against the claimant that led to issuance of exhibit CW1U, was in line with extant rules and Regulations. However, for the claimant the procedure of a mixture of EFCC Regulations and Public Service Rules adopted by the defendant was improper and violate his right to fair hearing. The defendant in this case is the employer of the claimant, is a creature of statute clothe with legal personality to sue and be sued. However, it has been settled law beyond peradventure that the fact that an organization or authority which is an employer is a statutory body does not mean that the condition of service of its employees must be of a special character ruling out the incidence of a mere master and servant relationship. The court must confine itself to the terms of the contract of service between the parties. See FAKUADE V O. A. U. T. H. (1993) 5 NWLR (pt.291) 47. The character of an appointment and the status of an employee in respect thereof is determined by the legal character of the contract of employment. Hence where the contract of employment is determinable by the parties’ simpliciter, there is no question of the contract having statutory flavor. The fact that the other contracting party is a statutory creation does not make any difference. The defendant has made copious submission contending that the claimant’s contract of employment is one with statutory flavour to place it above the ordinary master and servant relationship. However, the defendant has not deemed it necessary to reply this argument. This means that the defendant has no contrary argument to offer and that it has accepted the position canvassed by the claimant in this respect. There is no doubt that the defendant in this case is a creature of statute see section 1 of the Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act. The law establishing the defendant confers power on it of appointments and making Regulations to govern, appointment, promotion and discipline of members of Staff (Employees) of the defendant. See sections 8(3), (4) and 9 of the Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act. In the absence of Regulations made by the defendant, section 9(1) (b) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, has made recourse to the provisions of the public service Rules mandatory on issues relating to appointment, promotion and discipline of members of staff of the defendant. Therefore, it is beyond any doubt that employees of the defendant have their contract of service protected by statute. It enjoys what in labour law jurisprudence is termed as contract with statutory flavor. The status of the contract has made strict compliance with the rules governing discipline of employees of the defendant compulsory. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF CUSTOMS & ORS. V GUSAU (supra). The determination of whether the claimant in the case at hand is entitled to the reliefs being sought before the court will depend on whether there is or there is no compliance with the extant Public Service Rules in exercising disciplinary power over the claimant by the defendant. The claimant has averred in both his statement of facts and the witness statement on oath that on Thursday 19lh November, 2015, the Claimant, was summoned by the acting Chairman of the Defendant Mr. Ibrahim Magu, into his office where the claimant was accused of being responsible for the publication of the online publications in (Exhibits CW1G1-6, CW1H1-4, CW1I-4, CW1J1-5 and CW1K1-4). Despite claimant explanations exculpating himself. The Acting Chairman of the defendant directed that the claimant should be taken to the Statement Room and the claimant was made to write a ten-page statement under caution like a suspect, without the presence of his Lawyer. Thereafter, on the order of the acting Chairman, Claimant's official table top computer was taken away and his official car and two personal phones MTN (08033485511) and GLO (08055066583) were confiscated from the Claimant till date. The Claimant was rendered incommunicado for months because he had no access to all the contacts on his phones. His office was also searched on the order of the acting Chairman by a team of detectives and police men and sealed up. The acting Chairman further directed that the Claimant be redeployed as Commandant of the Training Institute of the Defendant and posted to the office of the acting Chairman without any portfolio or schedule of duty or a chair or table; which was a form of demotion. See Exhibits CW1N and CWlO. The Claimant was queried through the Director Organization support on 22nd December 2015 for "Offence against Discipline" (Exhibits CW1P1-2) and suspended indefinitely without pay on 29th December, 2015, vide Exhibit CW1S. The claimant was vide exhibit CW1U, letter dated 15th November 2017 (after two years of suspension without pay) reinstated on conditions that he is demoted from GL17 to GL. 16/7, to write a letter of apology and forfeiture of his salaries for the period of his suspension. See exhibit CW1U, the letter of reinstatement was signed on behalf of the acting Chairman by the Secretary to the Commission wherein it was stated thus: ''Following the review of Breach of Confidence against you at the 6th Senior Staff Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee held on 26th September 2017, the Ag. Executive Chairman has graciously approved your reinstatement into the Commission on the following terms and conditions...". According to the claimant he was found guilty of a case of "Breach of Confidence" which he was never accused of in the first place. He was queried for "Offence against Discipline"- (see Exhibits CW1P12) and not Breach of Confidence. The claimant vide exhibit CW1V, rejected the conditional reinstatement. The defendant by its amended statement of defence and witness statement on oath of DW1, DW2, DW3 and DW4, stated that the defendant through intelligence reports, received a complaint about defamatory online publications involving its staff and other members of the public. The defendant on receipt of the report constituted an investigation team which carried out discreet investigation of the report. The team of investigators recorded the statement of the claimant and others involved. In the course of the investigation the team prepared an interim report. The interim report and the case file were forwarded to the legal and prosecution department of the defendant for vetting and legal advice. The claimant was queried and later suspended. A Disciplinary Committee was also constituted by the defendant which inquired into the case and found Ayo Olowonihi (the claimant), Mustapha Suleiman and Jiddah Mohammed guilty of offence against discipline and appropriate punishments were awarded against them. The foregoing narration depicted what transpired between the claimant and the defendant that culminated into the initiation of this suit by the claimant. The claimant insisted that the defendant did not give him fair hearing before issuing letter of purported conditional reinstatement exhibit CW1Q1-3 and that the acting Chairman was the accuser and judge at the same time. Counsel for the claimant argued that the entire procedure adopted to discipline the claimant violated the claimant’s right to fair hearing. The claimant was never invited by the committee to appear before it, before finding him guilty. The defendant on the other hand maintained that the claimant was accorded fair hearing because he was queried and responded to the query exhibits CW1P1-2 and CW1Q1-3 and that senior staff appointment promotion and disciplinary committee examined the query, the claimant’s response to the query, the interim report and legal advice exhibits DW1C1-7 and DW1D1-18, before finding the claimant guilty of offence against discipline and recommended appropriate punishment to the acting Chairman which he approved and exhibit CW1U was issued to the claimant conditionally reinstating him back to his job. The provisions of section 8(3) and (4) of the Act, has vested the defendant with the responsibility to appoint the staff of the Commission under such terms and conditions as the Commission, may after due consultation with the Federal Civil Service Commission determine. Going by my earlier finding that Public Service Rules 2008, governed exercise of disciplinary control over members of staff of the defendant including the claimant, I shall refer to some provisions of the Public Service Rules to see whether there has been compliance or not in respect of the disciplinary proceedings of the defendant that culminated in the issuance of exhibit CW1U. Rule 160501 of the Public Service Rules states: "The powers to exercise disciplinary control over officers in Parastatals is vested in the supervisory Boards/Councils in accordance with their respective condition of service". In addition. Rule 160502 states clearly that for Parastatal or Extra Ministerial Agencies, sections 2-6 in Chapter 3 of Public Service Rules are the applicable disciplinary procedures for officers of those Agencies. It states: "The provisions of sections 2 to 6 in Chapter 3 of Public Service Rules shall guide all Parastatals in addressing disciplinary matters provided that where reference to Federal Civil Service Commission, Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or the Permanent Secretary, the Board/Councils shall perform such functions". A combine reading of the provisions of Rules 160502 and that of 160502, means that taking of disciplinary action against an officer in the service of the defendant from Grade Level 14 and above resides with the Commission and not with the Chairman of the Commission. It is clear from these provisions that it is only the Federal Civil Service Commission, (in this case the Commission established pursuant to section 1(2) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act), that is vested with the powers to discipline officers of the defendant. It is patently clear that the provisions of paragraph 160501. Chapter 16 of Public Service Rules which vests the powers to exercise disciplinary control over staff of Parastatals or extra Ministerial Departments or Agencies on the Boards/Councils and not on Chief Executives of those parastatals. In the case at hand exercise of power of disciplinary control is vested on the Commission established under section 1(2) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act. In addition. Rule 160502, states clearly that for Parastatal or Extra Ministerial Agencies, sections 2-6 in Chapter 3 of Public Service Rules are the applicable disciplinary procedures for officers of those Agencies. It states: "The provisions of sections 2 to 6 in Chapter 3 of Public Service Rules shall guide all Parastatals in addressing disciplinary matters provided that where reference to Federal Civil Service Commission, Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or the Permanent Secretary, the Board/Councils shall perform such functions". The disciplinary procedure of an Extra Ministerial Agencies is as contained in sections 2- 6 in Chapter 3 of the Public Service Rules. Rule 030302, for instance, states: "As soon as a superior officer becomes dissatisfied with the behaviour of any officer subordinate to him/her, it shall be his/her duty so to inform the officer in writing giving details of unsatisfactory behavior and to call upon him/her to submit within a specific time such written representation as he/she may wish to make to exculpate himself/herself from disciplinary action. After considering such written representations as the officer may make within the specified time the superior officer shall decide whether: a) the officer has exculpated himself/herself in which case, he/she shall be so informed in writing and no further action shall be necessary or b) the officer has not exculpated himself/herself but it is considered that he/she should not be punished in which case the appropriate formal letter of advice shall be issued to him/her and he/she shall be required to acknowledge its receipt in writing, or c) the officer has not exculpated himself/herself and deserves some punishment, in which case Rule 030304 shall apply". Rule 030304, provides: "(a) It shall be the duty of every officer to report any case of misconduct that comes to his/her notice to an officer superior to the officer involved, (b) When an officer's misconduct is brought to the notice of his/her superior officer, it shall be the duty of that superior officer to report it to the Permanent Secretary/Head of Extra-Ministerial Office without delay. If he/she considers it necessary that the officer should be interdicted, such recommendations shall be made in the report. (c) On receiving the report, the Permanent Secretary/Head of Extra-Ministerial Office shall take action in accordance with Rule 030306 (sic) as appropriate and. if necessary, shall interdict the officer. (d) At the appropriate point in the investigation, the officer may be suspended in accordance with Rule 030405". It is patently clear from the above provisions of the Public Service Rules that whenever a superior officer is dissatisfied with the behaviour of his subordinate. It shall be the duty of the superior officer to notify the subordinate officer in writing of his dissatisfaction of his conduct and request him to within specific time to make representations in exculpation. However, if after receipt of the representations the superior officer is not satisfied with the explanation and is of the view that the officer deserves some punishment, a report should be made to the Permanent Secretary (in this case Secretary of the Commission). Upon receipt of report of misconduct the Permanent Secretary (Secretary of the Commission), he will consider the report and recommend to the chairman of the Commission whether to interdict or suspend the officer pending determination of his case by the Commission. It is here that the chairman of the Commission, will report to the Commission and if the Commission does not consider the alleged misconduct serious enough to warrant proceedings for dismissal it may cause an investigation to be made into the matter as it considers proper and the officer shall be entitled to know the whole case made against him/her, and shall have adequate opportunity of making his/her defence. If as a result, the commission decides that the allegation is proved, it may inflict any other punishment upon the officer such as reduction in rank, withholding or deferment of increment or otherwise. In the case at hand from the evidence of the defendant as adduced through DW1, DW2, DW3 and DW4, the claimant was queried, upon receipt of his response he was suspended from work without pay. An investigation team was set up to conduct investigation into the alleged defamatory online publications. The team of investigators commenced work in earnest. The claimant together with other suspects were interrogated by the investigators. Their statements were recorded. See exhibits DW1A1-10, DW1B1-26, DW2A1-12. The case file and the interim investigation report were sent to the legal and Prosecution department for vetting and legal advice. See exhibits DW1C1-7 and DW1D1-18. The Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee was constituted to investigate. The Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee after examining the query issued to the claimant, his response, interim investigation report and the legal advice on the criminal investigation came up with recommendations to the Acting Chairman of the Commission who approved the recommendations of the Senior staff Disciplinary Committee with the issuance of exhibit CW1U, which the claimant out rightly rejected. It is without any doubt that the whole procedure adopted in exercising disciplinary action against the claimant was shrouded in secrecy. This is because apart from the initial query given to the claimant, the Senior Staff disciplinary Committee that made recommendations of his demotion, writing of apology and forfeiture of salaries for the period of two years while he was in suspension did not invite the claimant to the proceedings where his fate was decided. The documents examined by the Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee were never made available to the claimant for him to defend himself. To make things worse the Committee did not even confront the claimant with the interim investigation report and the legal advice for him to defend himself. The law has long been settled that in exercising disciplinary action, the person undergoing the process shall have the right to be informed of all the allegations against him and be given adequate opportunity of being heard before action is taken. It is also clear that the acting Chairman did not confront the claimant with the recommendations of the Senior Disciplinary Committee before giving his approval. The non-invitation of the claimant to appear before the Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee to be heard in his defence has made exhibit CW1U a nullity. See LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE v. CHIEF CANI FAWEHINMI (1985) LPELR-1776(SC) or (1.985) NWLR (Pt.7) 300. A careful of perusal of the provisions of sections 2-6 of Chapter Three of the Public Service Rules 2008, which governed disciplinary procedure for the defendant in respect of discipline members of staff of the defendant, glaringly made it abundantly clear that the chairman of the Commission does not have the vires and cannot exercise disciplinary powers over officers of, Grade Level 13 and above. Therefore, the discipline of the claimant is therefore the responsibility of the Commission and not that of the Chairman. The role of Chairman or Secretary of the Commission comes into play in initiation of disciplinary action and not to adjudicate and punish. It is only after being afforded an opportunity of being heard that the Commission may impose appropriate sanctions if the officer being tried has not exculpated himself from blame or allegations of misconduct levelled against him. The punishment that can be imposed may include demotion, termination or outright dismissal from service. The Chairman in initiating a disciplinary action is an accuser and cannot at the same time be the judge in the case. This procedure is apparent from Rule 030305 titled "Disciplinary Procedure for Misconduct and Serious Misconduct". From the evidence before the court it is without any doubt that the claimant though queried and answered the query, was never given opportunity to appear before the Commission to exculpate himself. From the evidence before the court it is the query, exhibit CW1S, his reply exhibit CW1Q1-3, the interim report exhibit DW1C1-7 and the legal advice DW1D1-18, that were considered by the ad hoc committee of the defendant in making their recommendations to the acting Chairman of the Committee which he eventually approved and directed the issuance of conditional re-instatement of the claimant, as shown in exhibit CW!U. however, the claimant promptly vide exhibit CW1V rejected the conditional reinstatement. It is my view that the appropriate thing to do was to have invited the claimant and confront him with the findings of the ad hoc committee and afford him adequate opportunity to defend himself. If that had been done the requirement of ‘audi alterem partern would have been complied with and any finding from such hearing would have been unassailable. Alas, the denial of the claimant opportunity of being heard by the committee that found him wanting based on the examination of query, interim report and legal advice, has rendered the entire exercise a nullity, as it has no foundation based on which the recommendations and acceptance of the recommendations by the Acting chairman and directing issuance of exhibit CW1U, can be justified. Since the requirement of the law is that person against whom an allegation was made must be heard before he can be found to be at fault by the administrative panel saddled with responsibility of deciding the matter, the denial of heating has rendered the work of the Committee or panel nugatory, because there is violation of the provision of natural justice, twin pillars of justice ‘audi alterem parten’ and ‘nemo judex in causa sua’. See HART V MILITARY GOVERNOR CROSS RIVER STATE (1976) 11 SC 211, SOKWO V KPONGBO (2003) 2 NWLR (PT.803) 111, IBORI V OGBORU (2005) 6 NWLR (PT.920) 102, BABA V NCATC (1991) 5 NWLR (PR.192) 388, LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE v. CHIEF CANI FAWEHINMI (1985) LPELR-1776(SC) or (1.985) NWLR (Pt.7) 300, FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS V. LAOYE (1989) 2 NWLR (PT.106) 652, E. P. IDERIMA V. RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2005) LPELR-1420(SC) or (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt.951) 378. It is apparent from the facts and case law that the issuance of exhibit CW1U is ultra vires the powers of the Chairman of the Commission. This renders the order or directive for conditional reinstatement of the claimant a nullity. This is because the claimant’s employment is with statutory flavour, it can only be tempered with in strict compliance with the provision of the Public Service Rules, which is the appropriate Rules to discipline members of staff of the defendant. See U.B.N (NIG.) LTD VS. OGBOH (1995) 2 NWLR (PT. 360) 647 AT 669: BAMGBOYE V. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (1999) 6 SCNJ 295, MISS YETUNDE ZAINAB TOLANI V. KWARA STATE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS (2009) LPELR-8375(CA), SUNDAY EMEJE v. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (2010) LPELR-8986(CA). On issue of suspension it is the view of this court that an employer has the right to suspend an employee. Suspension is not the same with demotion or removal from service. It is a temporary suspension of employee from performance of his ordinary routine duties assigned to him by virtue of his employment. See LONGE V FIRST BANK OF NIG. PLC (2010) 2-3 SC (Pt.iii) 61. See also SYLVANUS EZE V UNIVERSITY OF JOS (2012) LPELR-20072(CA), where length of period of suspension was considered to be inconsequential to nullify suspension. An employer can suspend for any length of time. Period of suspension cannot affect disciplinary proceedings. In view of the foregoing, the finding that exhibit CW1U was issued in contravention of the law the said letter of conditional reinstatement is hereby nullified and same set aside. The claims of the claimant succeeds, but only in terms of the following orders:- A declaration is hereby granted that the purported letter of reinstatement (exhibit CW1U) dated 15/11/17, conditionally reinstating the claimant to his job, degrading the claimant from Grade Level 17 to grade Level 16/7 and forfeiting the entitlement of the claimant during the two years period of his suspension is null and void. A declaration is hereby granted that the defendant’s staff Regulations Handbook 2007, is invalid having not been approved by the Commission, i.e Economic and Financial Crimes Commission as required by the provision of section 9(1)(b) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, (Establishment) Act. A declaration is hereby granted that the applicable Rules or Regulations in disciplinary cases affecting staff of the defendant is the Public Service Rules 2008 and not the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Staff Regulations Handbook 2007. An order is hereby granted setting aside the letter of reinstatement (exhibit CW1U) dated 15/11/17 conditionally reinstating the claimant to his job with defendant on the ground that it is invalid, null and void. An order is hereby granted restoring the claimant to his post as Detective Commandant, GL. 17, with all the rights and privileges attached to the Grade Level. The order for restoration of the claimant back to the office as the Commandant of the defendant’s academy is hereby refused, as such an order will interfere with the unfettered discretionary power of the defendant of postings of members of staff of the defendant to appropriate place of service. The relief seeking for payment of all salaries and entitlements of the claimant from 29/12/15is hereby refused due to lack of proof and uncertainty. It is settled that a claim for salaries, allowances and entitlement are in the specie of claim for special damages which must be specifically pleaded and proved. The claimant did not specifically plead the quantum of money referred to as salaries and entitlements. The absence of particularisation of this claim has rendered the relief vague and uncertain. This claim on the authority of NITEL V OSHODIN (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt.616) 528 and UNIVERSITY OF JOS V DR. M. C. IKEGWUOHA (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt/1360) 478, is not grantable as the claim was unsubstantiated. It is hereby refused. In view of the foregoing, the claimant is entitled to reinstated on the authority of ADEDEJI V POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION (1967) ALL NLR 721, OLANIYAN V UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.9) 599, IDERIMA V RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ((supra), OLORUNTOBA OJO V NISER (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt.1157) 83, F.C.S.C. V LAOYE (1989) 2 NWLR (PT.106) 652. Judgment entered accordingly. Sanusi Kado, Judge.