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JUDGMENT. The claimants commenced this action via Originating Summons dated and filed on 20th day of April 2018, seeking for the determination of the following questions, and for the reliefs sought thereof, to wit: 1. Whether having regard to the clear provisions of Section 5(3) of the Labour Act, Cap L1, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2010 and Section 17 of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2010 read together with the provisions of Section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the 2nd and 3rd Defendants or their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions can validly and legally stop deductions of Union dues at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are member(sic) or eligible to be members of the Claimants and remitting the same to the Claimants. 2. Whether having regard to the clear provisions of Section 5(3) of the Labour Act, Cap L1, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2010 and Section 17 of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2010 read together with the provisions of Section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), it is not illegal for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants or their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions to retain Union Dues deducted at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the claimants without remitting the same to the Claimants. In anticipation of favourable determination of the questions posed for determination, the claimants claims the reliefs stated below 1. A DECLARATION that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants or their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions cannot validly and legally stop deductions of Union Dues at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants and remitting same to the Claimants. 2. A DECLARATION that it is illegal for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions to retain Union Dues deducted at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants without remitting same to the Claimants. 3. A DECLARATION that the directive issued by the Kaduna State Executive Council on the 23rd day of January, 2018, stopping forthwith deduction of Union Dues at source is illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 4. A MANDATORY ORDER compelling the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions to commence forthwith deductions of Union Dues at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants and remitting same to the Claimants accordingly. 5. AN ORDER directing the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions to remit to the Claimants forthwith all Union Dues deducted at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants between January and December, 6. A PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants, their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions from further stopping or otherwise interfering in any manner whatsoever with deductions of Union Dues at source from salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are eligible to be members of the Claimants and remittances of the same to the Claimants. 7. N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) as damages against the Defendants for impunities and illegal stoppage of deductions of Union Dues at source and blatant refusal to remit union dues deducted at source to the Claimants all in the Defendants' bid to ground the claimants activities. 8. Cost of this action assessed at N2,OOO,000.00 (TWO Million Naira). The Originating Summons is supported by a 5 paragraphs affidavit, sworn to by one Mukhtar Usman Bunza, Esq; a legal practitioner in the law firm of Abdulazeez Ibrahim & Co. one of the counsel for the claimants. The salient averments in the affidavit in support are to the effect that the claimants are trade unions and financial affiliates of the Nigeria Labour Congress, being the central labour organization. The main objectives of the Claimants are to promote, defend and advance the economic, political and social rights and wellbeing of Nigerian workers and pensioners and to continually enhance the quality of life and improve the income and other working conditions of workers. Consequently, workers who are members or eligible to be members of the claimants and other affiliate unions or eligible to be members of the claimants and other affiliate unions are obliged to pay check off dues to claimants. Vide exhibit E the check-off dues, are to be deducted at source by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and remitted to the claimants being the workers' respective unions. The Claimants run their day to day affairs and discharge their functions towards their members from the collection of Union dues. The Claimants also from the check-off dues in turn pay affiliate dues to the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), the central labour organization with the fundamental aim of inter alia protecting, defending and promoting the rights, wellbeing and the interest of all workers, pensioners, the Trade Unions and the working class in general. It was stated that 2nd and 3rd Claimants on the 23rd day of January, 2018 through the Kaduna State Executive Council vide exhibit A directed that starting from January, 2018 salaries and until further directive otherwise, deduction of Union dues at source are to be stopped forthwith. The 1st defendant has failed in the discharge of his duties to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants by failing to advise them appropriately on deduction of check-off dues having regard to the provisions of extant laws. It was averred that union dues deducted at source by the 2nd and 3rd defendants from salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants between January and December, 2017 have not been remitted to the Claimants. The workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants and other affiliate unions. There is no worker in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who is a member or eligible to be member of any of the Claimants has opted out of the Claimants unions. It was stated that it is the obligation of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants to deduct union dues at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants and remit same to the Claimants. It was averred that the stoppage of deduction of Union dues by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and remittance of the same has left the Claimants in no position to discharge their responsibilities to their Members. In the written address filed along with the Originating Summons, two issues were distilled for determination. They are:- 1. Whether having regard to the clear provisions. of Section 5(3) of the Labour Act, Cap L1, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2010 and Section 17 of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14,Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2010 read together with the provisions of Section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the 2nd and 3rd Defendants or their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions can validly and legally stop deductions of Union dues at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants and remitting the same to the Claimants. 2. Whether having regard to the clear provisions of Section 5(3) of the Labour Act, Cap L1, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2010 and Section 17 of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14,Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2010 read together with the provisions of Section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), it is not illegal for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants or their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions to retain Union Dues deducted at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the claimants without remitting the same to the Claimants. ARGUMENT ISSUE ONE: Abdulaziz Ibrahim, Esq; counsel for the claimants begun his argument by submitting that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants cannot stop deductions of Union dues at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant and remitting same to the workers' union including the Claimants being a statutory duty. Counsel referred to the provisions of Sections 5(3) of the Labour Act, Cap Lt, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2010 and Section 17of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2010 and submitted that the law has places a mandatory obligation on the 2nd and 3rd Defendants to deduct check-off dues in respect of workers who are eligible and remit same to unions of the workers inclusive of the Claimants. It is the contention of counsel that from the above cited sections, it is without any doubt that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are under a statutory duty to make deductions from the salaries of workers and remit same to the Claimants. It is further submitted that the duty of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants to deduct check-off dues is a mandatory duty particularly in view of the use of the word 'shall' in the above sections. In support of this contention counsel placed reliance on the following cases: a) ISIAKA VS. AMOSUN (2016) ALL FWLR (PART.839) 1040 b) AJIGA VS. OLANREWAJU (2016)ALL FWLR (PART832) 1727 c) TABIK INVESTMENT LTD VS. GUARANTY TRUST BANK PLC (2011) ALL FWLR(PART602) 1592. It is further submitted that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not permitted to choose whether or not to deduct check-off dues and remit to unions inclusive of the Claimants. This position has received judicial blessing in a host of decided cases by this Honourable Court. Some of the cases are: a) NATIONAL UNION OF HOTELS AND PERSONAL SERVICE WORKERS (NUHPSW) VS. WHASSAN EUREST (NIGERIA) LIMITED, (UNREPORTED) SUITNO. NIC/14/2001 delivered on the 09/01/2004. b) CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION V. AMALGAMATED UNION PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL AND RECREATIONALEMPLOYEES(2004) 1N.L.L.R. (PT.1) 1 c) MIX AND BAKE FLOUR MILL INDUSTRIESLTD V. NATIONAL UNION OF FOOD, BEVERAGEAND TOBACCO EMPLOYEES (2004) 1N.L.L.R. (PT.4) 247. d) TRANS INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC VS. NATIONAL UNION OF BANKS, INSURANCE AND FINANCE INSTITUTIONS EMPLOYEES (2000) 5 W. R. N. 47. e) MANAGEMENT OF TUYIL NIGERIA LIMITED VS. NATIONAL UNION OF CHEMICAL, FOOTWEAR, RUBBER, LEATHER AND NONMETALLIC PRODUCT EMPLOYEE (UNREPORTED) SUIT. NO NIC/9/2003 delivered on the 23/1/2008. In the case of NATIONAL UNION OF HOTELS AND PERSONAL SERVICE WORKERS (NUHPSW) VS. WHASSAN EUREST (NIGERIA) LIMITED (supra), this Honourable Court coram Hon. Justice B. A. Adejumo, Prof. B. B. Kanyip and Bar. M. B. Dadda while pronouncing on the mandatory duty to deduct check-off dues by an employer held thus: "Recognition of trade union is meaningless unless related to or tied to the deduction of check-off dues. By virtue of section 16A of the trade Unions Act (as amended), regarding workers' union, there is no doubt that the law intends and stipulates for compulsory recognition and deduction of check-off dues in respect of workers who are eligible to be members of a union Where however, the worker no longer wishes to be a member he is free to opt out of the union ••• The duty to deduct check-off dues is mandatory and no employer is permitted to choose whether or not to deduct." In MANAGEMENT OF TUYIL NIGERIA LIMITED VS. NATIONAL UNION OF CHEMICAL, FOOTWEAR, RUBBER, LEATHER AND NON-METALLIC PRODUCT EMPLOYEE(supra), it was held thus: "Recognition of a trade union by an employer is compulsory and automatic by the combined effect of sections 5(7) and 24(1) of the Trade Unions Act, 1990 as amended by Decree NO.1 of 1999 and by Section 5(3) (a) and (b) of the Labour Act, 2004 (which were the law when this action started) ... The duty to deduct check-off dues in mandatory and no employer is permitted to choose whether or not to deduct ... Compulsory recognition and automatic deduction of check-off dues are the norm in the current labour law regime in Nigeria, and the Supreme Court in Osawe VS. Registrar of Trade Union (1985) 1 NWLR (pt. 4) 755 had declared system of restructured and highly compartmentalized Trade Unions as being constitutional." In TRANS INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC VS. NATIONAL UNION OF BANKS, INSURANCE AND FINANCE INSTITUTIONS EMPLOYEES (supra), it was held thus: "The employer is obliged to accord recognition to the union and allow the union to unionize eligible members by making available to the union the names of, for instance, all junior staff within its employment who are deemed to be members of the union. Additionally, the employer is obliged to deduct check-off dues in respect of the eligible staff and pay same to the registered office of the union in question’’. Thus, on the strength of the foregoing judicial authorities, the directive contained in the Internal Memo dated the 23rd January, 2018 on the stoppage of deduction of union dues Exhibit A is illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. Counsel urged the Court to resolve Issue One in favour of the Claimants and hold that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are under a statutory and mandatory duty to deduct union dues at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants and remit same to the Claimants. ISSUE TWO In arguing issue two, counsel for the claimants contended that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants cannot retain union dues deducted at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of 3rd defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants without remitting same to the Claimants. It is the submission of counsel that by the combined effect of Section 5 (3) (b) of the Labour Act and Section 17(b) of the Trade Unions Act, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants have a duty to promptly remit check-off dues deducted from the salaries of workers to the Claimants and failure to remit any such check-off dues deducted by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants amounts to a violation of the extant laws. According to counsel in the instant case, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants deducted check-off dues from the salaries of workers who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants between January and December, 2017. But, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants have refused to remit the said deductions to the Claimants which refusal has left the Claimants in no position to discharge their functions to their members. Counsel urged the court to resolve issue two in favour of the Claimants and hold that the withholding of check-off dues deducted by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants from the salaries of workers who are eligible members of the Claimants is illegal and in violation of the provisions of Section 5 (3) (b) of the Labour Act and Section 17(b) of the Trade Union Act and international labour practice. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to on the strength of the submissions canvassed above, to resolve the two issues posed for determination in favour of the Claimants and grant all the reliefs claimed by the Claimants. In opposition to the Originating Summons, the defendants filed a 7 paragraphs counter-affidavit sworn to by one Peter Paul, an Assistant Director Establishment in the Office of the Head of Service of Kaduna State. In the affidavit it was stated that not all employees of the 3rd Defendant are Members of the Claimants or other trade unions. That the 3rd Defendant's obligation to make deduction of check-off dues from the salaries of its employees is contingent upon the written consent of individual employees of the 3rd Defendant to the 3rd Defendant authorizing the 3rd Defendant to make deduction of check-off dues for the purpose of making the individual employee's voluntary contribution to the Claimants or any trade union at all. That no employee of the 3rd Defendant has issued and served on the 3rd Defendant, any written consent to the deduction of check-off dues from such employees’ salaries for the purpose voluntary contribution to the claimants. It was averred that the 3rd Defendant, headed by the 2nd Defendant, operates upon the ideals of the observance of the fundamental rights and welfare of the 3rd Defendants' employees. The 3rd Defendant respects and observes the terms and conditions of the contract of employment between the 3rd Defendant and its employees. The Defendants support the existence and lawful activities of the Claimants and other trade unions in Kaduna State. That neither the Defendants nor their officials have by any act or omission, demonstrated any act of antagonism to the existence and activities of trade unions in Kaduna State. The 3rd Defendant, headed by the 2nd Defendant, operates upon the ideals of the observance of the fundamental rights and welfare of the 3rd Defendants' employees. In the written address filed along with the counter-affidavit, three issues were identifies for resolution. They are:- 1. Whether having regards to the facts of this case and with Particular reference to the Claimants' Affidavit and Defendants' Counter Affidavit, this suit ought to be heard and determined by way of Originating Summons? 2. Whether the Claimants' affidavit in support is valid in Law? 3. Whether the Claimants' affidavit discloses any cause of action in this suit? ARGUMENT: ISSUE NO.1 "Whether having regards to the facts of this case and with particular reference to the Claimants' Affidavit and Defendants' Counter Affidavit, this suit ought to be heard and determined by way of Originating Summons?" E. K. Bakam, Esq; counsel for the defendants in his oral submission informed the court that in opposing the Originating Summons the defendants have filed a 7 paragraphs counter-affidavit which they are relying on all the depositions contained therein. Counsel also adopted the written address as his argument. It is the contention of counsel that the defendants have denied paragraphs 4(f), 4(I) and 4(m) of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons. Which were to the effect that the 2nd and 3rd defendants are under obligation to deduct check-off dues from the salaries of the members or eligible members of the claimants and remit same to the claimants. And no member of the claimants in the employment of the 3rd defendants have opted out the claimants. It was argued that these and all other material allegations of facts contained in Claimants' Affidavit, the Defendants have traversed specifically. It is the contention of counsel that there is no absolute right to institute a suit in this Honourable Court by way of Originating Summons, since the right so to do must either be found in the Rules of Court or in the provisions of a Statute which permits an approach to the court in this manner. To buttress this contention counsel referred to Odger's Principle of Pleading and Practice in Civil Actions in the High Court of Justice, 15th Ed. at p.345. It is the submission of counsel that while the Claimants are entitled to ventilate their "grievance" before this Honourable Court, Order 3 Rule 1(1) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 is the legal and procedural machinery to so do. The order provides an array of modes of commencing an action before this Honourable Court. It is the submission of counsel that the Claimants' choice of Originating Summons as the vehicle for ventilating their grievance in this suit flies in the face of the Rules of this Honourable Court and a plethora of Judicial authorities. The clear wordings of Order 3 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Honourable Court are these: "Civil proceedings that may be commenced by way of Originating Summons include matters relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment agreement or any other instrument relating to employment, labour and industrial relations in respect of which the court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) or by any Act of Law in force in Nigeria." It is submitted that even though Claimants in the instant suit have couched their questions for determination to look as if their suit borders on interpretation of Statute, which was not. No copies of the statutes mentioned in passing by the Claimants have been annexed to the said Originating summons. Order 3 Rule 17(1) (b) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 the said Rule states: "17.-(1) An Originating Summons shall be accompanied by: (a)…………………………… ; (b) copies of the instrument indicating parts sought to be Construed other than an enactment and other related documents." It is the contention of counsel that the Claimants have failed to satisfy the requirement of Order 3 Rule 17(1) (b) of the Rules of this Honourable Court cited above. It is argued that the failure to so do renders this suit incapable of being heard and determined by way or Originating summons. If however, this court finds to the contrary that there is in this matter, an instrument, the construction of which may be the subject matter of Originating Summons litigation, it will be contended that still the subject matter of this suit is very contentious, emitting the smoke of a serious dispute between the parties and as such, Originating Summons is not only an inappropriate, but dangerous procedure for the commencement of the suit. According to counsel the particulars of contention in this suit abound. Chiefly, at paragraph 4(m) of Claimants' Affidavit, it is stated that ''no worker in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who is a member or eligible member of any of the Claimants has opted out of the Claimants Unions." This averment is to say the least, an arm chair submission that has not in any way been substantiated by the Claimants. Notably, Defendants have countered this deposition, stating that membership of the Claimants' Unions is not automatic and that some "eligible members" of the Claimants Unions have opted out. It is also the Defendants' case that not all of the employees of the 3rd Defendants have given written voluntary consent to their employer, the 3rd Defendant, to make deductions of check-off dues at source from their salaries as required by Section 5(3) of the Labour Act. Respectfully, we posit that this state of affairs being very contentious beclouds justice for any Court which seeks to merely rely on affidavit evidence in the determination of the instant case. It is sure calls for proof beyond affidavit evidence. Parties ought to be given an opportunity in the interest of justice, to prove their respective positions vide exchange of pleadings procedure. It is the contention of counsel that the reading of the Proviso to Order 17(1) (a) (b) (c) of the Rules of this Honourable Court, thus: ''provided that where a suit raises a substantial dispute of facts or is likely to involve substantial dispute of facts, it shall not be commenced by way of Originating Summons, but by Complaint as provided for in Rules 8 and 9 of this Order. To support the above contention counsel placed reliance on the cases of P.D.P. V. ABUBAKAR (2007) 3 N.W.L.R. (PT.1022) 551-552, where the Court of Appeal, per Rhodes-Vivour, J.C.A. (as he then was) put the matter succinctly thus: ‘’In explaining the procedure of originating summons in a simple and straight forward language, the procedure is meant to be invoked in a friendly action between parties who are substantially ad idem on the facts and who without the need for pleadings, merely want for example, a directive of the court on the point of Law involved. The procedure is not meant to be invoked in a hostile action between parties and in which the parties concerned need know before hand, the issues which they are called upon to contend with from pleadings. Ogunsola v. A.P.P. (2003) 39 WRN 115; (2003) 9 N.W.L.R. (Pt 826) page 462’’. On the indicators of the contentious nature of a matter, the Court further held: ‘‘Respondent filed affidavit in support of the originating summons, there was a Counter affidavit filed by the Appellants and a Further Affidavit by the respondent. That alone is an indication of conflicts between the parties. In such instance where a Court is faced with conflicting affidavits on fundamental issues, the court in order to resolve such conflicts should have recourse to oral evidence from the parties and their witnesses. The conflicts in the file between the parties appear to prolong unabated and where contentious issues and questions of facts are to be resolved, it is inappropriate to commence an action by way of originating summons. Akinsete v. Akindutire (1966) 1 ALL NLR147; Nya V Edem (2000) 8 N.W.L.R. (pt.669) page 349. Further reliance was placed on the cases of UNIVERSITY OF LAGOSv. AIGORO (1991) 3 NWLR (PT. 179) P. 376, SC.; OBI & ORS. V. AKANU IBIAM FED. POLY, UWANA & ANOR. (2016) 65 N.L.L.R. (PT. 232) 546 NIC; OBA OYEWUNMI v. OBA OSUNBADE & ORS (2001) FWLR (PT.82) 919 at 1962 C.A.; HABIB BANK NIG. LTD. v. OCHETE (2001) FWLR (PT.54) 384 AT 406-407 C.A. It is also the contention of counsel that on the authority of ELELU-HABEEBv. A.G. FEDERATION (2012) 13 NWLR (PT. 1318)423, that the Claimants having alleged at paragraphs 4(1)(m) and (n), facts which smack of allegations of improper conduct and management of the Claimants' check-off dues, the instant suit is further rendered incapable of being entertained vide an originating summons. It is the contention of counsel that the Claimants having disobeyed the Rule of this Honourable Court on the mode of commencing the instant suit, the court should decline jurisdiction to entertain same. Rules of Court are meant to be obeyed. On this contention reliance was placed on the Supreme Court in NWAOGWUGWU v. PRESIDENT, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2007) ALL F.W.L.R. (PT.389) 1327, where the apex Court held that Rules of Court must be obeyed and no favour should be shown for not obeying them. Disobedience of the Rules in the instant case is fundamental as it affects the competence of the Courts to hear the matter. It is not a mere irregularity. It is submitted that the Claimants' failure to commence this suit in compliance with the Rules of this Honourable Court cited above, defeats the competence of the instant suit and robs the Court of the jurisdiction to entertain this suit. Counsel urged the court on the strength of Order 3 Rule 17 (2) of the Rules of this Court and other authorities cited, to order the conversion of this suit to Complaint and direct parties to file and exchange pleadings and conduct the trial of this case in accordance with the Rules of Court governing trial. ISSUE TWO On issue two counsel submitted that if issue one is not resolved in favour of the defendants, it is further submitted that the claimants’ affidavit in support of the originating summons is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. According to counsel a careful reading of Claimants' affidavit shows that its deponent is one Mukhtar Usman Bunza, Esq; a Legal Practitioner in the Law Firm of Claimants' Counsel. The said deponent deposed to facts which he stated were information he received from one Comrade Chukwuemeka Aguonye at the deponent's office. The address of the office is stated and so is the date and time when he received the information. However, the affidavit does not state the facts and circumstances for the deponent's belief in the information he received from his informant which form his depositions in paragraphs 4(a)-(0) and 5 of Claimants' affidavit. It is contended that it is trite law that "when a person deposes to his belief in any matter of fact, and his belief is derived from any source other than his own personal knowledge, he shall set forth explicitly the facts and circumstances forming the ground of his belief". This is the provision of Section 115(3) Evidence Act, 2011. It is submitted that the above provision is mandatory and must be complied with and in the event of failure to do so the offending paragraphs of the affidavit must be struck out. To support this contention counsel cited the cases of MILITARY GOVERNOR OF LAGOS v. OJUKWU (1986)ANLR 233 at 250, (1986)17 NSCC(PT.l) 304 at 316,(1986)lN.W.L.R. (PT. 18) 621 at 641C; OSIAN v. FLOURMILLS OF NIGERIA LTD. 1968)ANLR 432 at 434; NAHMAN v. WOLOWICZ (1993)3 NWLR (PT.282) 443 at 456, H-C (CA); N.E.C.v. IZUOGU (1993) (incomplete citation). In IZEDONMWEN V. U.S.N. Pic., the Court of Appeal interpreting the above cited provision held that the word 'shall' invokes the effect of mandatory command for compliance and failure leads to the striking out of the offending paragraphs. It is not enough for the deponent to say I verily believe the informant; he must give the facts and circumstances for his belief? Affidavit is evidence and the basis for the court to believe a case before it or to dismiss the same. Evidence must therefore carry with it, probative value to make the Court believe or reject it and so the deponent must satisfy the Court why he the deponent believes it. These are the bases to evaluate the witness' truthfulness and they must be referable to the witness' direct experience. It is submitted that the entire gamut of depositions made by the deponent in the instant suit, consisting of information obtained from another person is inadmissible hearsay evidence and does not have any probative value. Counsel cited in support of this argument the case of ORUNLOLA v. AOEOYE (1995) 6 N.W.L.R. (PT.401)338 at 353CO (CA). Counsel urged the court to decline giving any probative value to the Claimants' affidavit, particularly its paragraphs 4(a)-(o) and 5. It is argued that above point is further concretized by the provision of Section 126 of the Evidence Act, 2011 which requires the deponent in the instant case to give evidence of what he saw or heard or perceived. The mandatory requirement of the said provision emphasizes that this Honourable Court can only accept or rely on direct evidence in proof of facts before it and nothing short of that should suffice. It is even immaterial that the Defendants do not object the admissibility of the affidavit before this Honourable Court. The Law places a duty on the Court to dispense justice by accepting only direct evidence in proof of facts in dispute between the parties. To do less will amount to an abdication of the Court's sacred duty. On this submission counsel relied on the case of COMPARE IWUOHA v. MOBIL PRODUCING NIGERIA UNLTD. (2013) ALL FWLR (664) 144. Counsel urged the court to strike out paragraphs 4(a)-(o) and 5 of Claimants' affidavit for the reason that they offend the afore cited provisions of the Evidence Act. Alternatively, if court does not strike out the said paragraphs, they should not attach any probative value to the said paragraphs of the affidavit as same offend Sections 115(3) and 126 of the Evidence Act, 2011. ISSUE THREE Counsel argued that if issue number two is not resolved in favour of the defendants, it is further submitted that the Claimants' affidavit in support of their originating summons does not disclose any cause of action in this suit. Counsel argued that the submissions on this issue necessarily snowball into a determination of the central question: is the stoppage of deduction of check-off dues valid in Law? No mean issue revolve from an attempt to sufficiently argue this poser. Precisely, this Honourable court is on this note, called upon to determine such questions as whether the stoppage of deduction of check-off dues enures as a cause of action to certain categories of the 3rd Defendant's employees whom the claimants purport to represent in this suit? Flowing from this question is the need to ascertain the position of the Law on whether any of the claimants' purported members or purported eligible members have authorised in the process prescribed by Law, the 3rd defendant as their employer to make deductions of check off dues from their salaries. On the issue of membership, claimants have made depositions suggesting that workers in the employment of the 3rd defendant are members or eligible members of the claimants Unions and other affiliate unions. See Paragraph 4(1) of claimants' affidavit. Counsel for the defendants submitted that on the authority of ONUORAH v. ACCESS BANK PLC. (2015) 55 N.L.L.R. (PT.186) 17 AT PAGES 89-90, PARAS. E-A, that the applicable laws on membership of trade unions in Nigeria does not provide 'for such sweeping band wagon membership mechanism. In Nigeria, senior staff employees are not assumed to be members of a trade union. They have to opt in individually and in writing to join a trade union before a valid membership of the trade union can be said to have been established. Conversely, junior staff are deemed to be members of trade unions, but no Law precludes them from opting out of such trade unions. Counsel further place reliance on CAC v. AUPCTRE (2004) 1 N.L.L.R. (PT.l) 1 NIC; UDOH v. OHMB 4 N.W.L.R. (PT. 142) 52. According to counsel even the Trade Union Act, does not contemplate automatic membership of trade unions in Nigeria. On this contention counsel referred to Section 12, of Trade Union Act. Thus, the import of Section 12(4) of the Trade Union Act is that membership of a Trade Union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member. In support of this submission counsel relied on the case of NUSDE v. SEWUN (2013) 35 N.L.L.R. (PT.106) 606 NIC AT 649 PARAS.A-G It is the contention of counsel that there are in the employment of the 3rd defendant, junior and senior staff. These staff are not all members of claimants' trade Unions or other affiliate trade unions. Can it therefore be said that the stoppage of deductions of check off dues enures as a cause of action to the Claimants? Counsel urged the court to hold in the negative and to find that the instant suit does not disclose any reasonable cause of action. Counsel further posited that the claimants have in their affidavit, failed to establish that any of the claimants' purported members or purported eligible members have authorized in the process prescribed by Law, the 3rd defendant as their employer to make deductions of check off dues from their salaries and to remit same to the claimants or any other trade union. By Section 5(4) of the Labour Act, Cap. L1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, an employer shall not make any deduction of check off dues or any trade union dues whatsoever "except if the person concerned has accepted in writing to make voluntary contribution to the Trade Union." The Law therefore places a responsibility on the claimants in the instant suit who assert that the 3rd defendants' employees are their members or eligible members, to satisfy this Honourable Court that any such member of eligible member has accepted in writing, to make voluntary contributions to the claimants' trade Unions or any trade union at all. This, the claimants have failed to prove. Counsel urged the court to hold on the strength of Section 131 of the Evidence Act, 2011, that the claimants, having failed to prove that the defendants, who have not been authorized by their employees to make deduction of check off dues, have fouled the provision of any Law on the stoppage of the said deduction of check off dues. On the whole, it is submitted that the claimants, have not satisfied the legal requirement for proof in matters for declaratory reliefs (tied to which are the other reliefs claimed by the claimants) which they seek in this suit. The law is that in a suit for declaratory reliefs, claimant must establish that he is entitled to the said reliefs and the admissions of defendant or the weakness of the latter's case will not avail the claimant in this regard. Thus, the Supreme Court held in the case of BELLO V EWEKA (1981}1 SC 101; (1981) NSCC (VOL.12) 48, per Obaseki, JSC (as he then was): “Where a court is called upon to make a declaration of right, it is incumbent on the party claiming to be entitled to the declaration to satisfy the court by evidence/ not by admission in pleadings of the Defendant that he is entitled. The necessity for this arises from the fact that the court has discretion to grant or refuse the declaration and the success of a Claimant in such an action depends entirely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the Defence." Counsel further refers to, NASCOTOWN PLC. v. NWARUEZE (2015) ALL FWLR (PT.780)1209 at P.1397-1398, PARAS.A-B; JOSEPH ODOPA v. A.G.FEDERATION & ORS. (2000) 2 H.R.L.R.A. 82 AT 98; EZEADUKWUA v. MADUKA (1997) 8 NWLR (PT.518) 635 AT 662 PARAS.A-B. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to resolve all the issues in favour of the defendants and dismiss the claimants’ suit for lack of merit. When this matter came up for hearing before the court, it was agreed that the defendants’ preliminary objection to this suit should be heard together with the originating summons. Counsel for the defendants argued in favour of granting of the notice of preliminary objection. The defendants vide the notice of preliminary objection dated 20/4/18 and filed on the same day, is challenging the competency of this suit. Consequently, the defendants prayed this court for an order to strike out this suit or in the least an order for conversion of the instant suit from originating summons to exchange of pleadings proceedings. The grounds for the objection are:- I. The Claimants/Respondents lack the locus standi to institute the instant suit II. The instant suit, commenced by way of originating summons is incompetent and an abuse of Court process. III. The Claimants/Respondents' affidavit in support is invalid in Law. IV. The Claimants/Respondents' affidavit in support of their originating summons does not disclose any cause of action in this suit. V. That based on Grounds 1 to 4 above, this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit against the Defendants/Objectors. In compliance with the rules of this court the notice of preliminary objection was accompanied by a written address, wherein four issues were distilled for determination. They are:- 1. Whether the Claimants/Respondents have the locus standi to Institute the instant suit? 2. Whether having regards to the facts of this case and with particular reference to the Claimants' Affidavit and Defendants' Counter Affidavit, this suit ought to be heard and determined by way of Originating Summons? 3. Whether the Claimants' affidavit in support is valid in Law? 4. Whether the Claimants' affidavit discloses any cause of action in this suit? It is pertinent to point out here that issues 2, 3 and 4, formulated by the defendants in respect of the notice of preliminary objection were the same with the three issues submitted by the defendant in the argument canvassed in opposition to the originating summons. This has obviated the necessity of reproducing arguments in respect of the three issues, which have already been extensively reproduced in this judgment. More so, that the issues and argument canvassed were the same word to word, without change. In the circumstance, I hereto adopt the argument canvassed in respect of the three issues. What is left is the argument in respect of issue one which was not among the issues formulated and argued in opposition to the originating summons. I shall now consider the argument proffered by counsel in respect of issue one. ARGUMENT ON ISSUE ONE E. K. Bakam, Esq; counsel for the defendants in arguing this issue submitted that the claimants/respondents have no locus standi to institute the instant suit. It is the argument of counsel that the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to entertain and determine this suit is inherently tied to a determination of the question whether the claimants have satisfactorily demonstrated that they have the legal right to be heard by this Honourable Court for the redress they seek. This position of the law is accordingly tied to the fact that a party's locus standi to institute and prosecute a suit depends on the satisfaction of any legal condition which must be fulfilled before the institution of such action. Any failure to fulfil such condition, robs a court of the vires to entertain and determine any suit filed by claimant. It is the contention of counsel that the claimants/respondents' suit is one that constitutes a 'trade dispute' which term Section 48 of the Trade Dispute Act, defines as any dispute between Employers and Employees or between workers and workers. Hence, the process prescribed by Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act, Cap. T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, applies to the claimants' suit. According to counsel the provision of the Law requires that the claimants ought to resort first to the Industrial Arbitration Panel before proceeding to institute the instant suit in this Honourable Court. In support of his argument counsel relied on the case of OLUTOMILAYO v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & ANOR. (2015) 62 N.L.L.R. (PT.217) 214 AT 254-256, where this Honourable Court per Honourable Justice B.B. Kanyip, PhD, held that although individuals can come directly to ventilate their grievances, however, once it is a trade dispute, recourse for redress has to be through the processes of Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act. In other words, this Honourable Court does not have original jurisdiction over trade disputes although it has over individual labour disputes. It is the contention of counsel that the instant case is one that falls into the collective labour Dispute categorization. It purports to be a suit filed by the Claimants for themselves and on behalf of their members and eligible members, the 3rd Defendants' employees. It cannot therefore be properly situated within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court for failure to adhere to the processes provided under Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act. This court is urged to find that the Claimants/Respondents lack the locus to institute this suit and to accordingly hold that this Honourable Court is by the same token, robbed of the jurisdiction to entertain Claimants' suit. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to resolve all issues for determination in favour of the defendants and to accordingly dismiss claimants' suit for lack of merit. In reaction to the notice of preliminary objection the claimants filed a reply on point of law in answer to the defendants’ arguments. The claimants in their reply on points of law adopted the four issues formulated and submitted by the defendant for resolution. They are: 1. Whether the claimants/respondents have the locus to institute the instant suit? 2. Whether having regards to the facts of this case and with particular reference to the claimants' affidavit and defendants' counter-affidavit, this suit ought to be heard and determined by way of origination summons? 3. Whether the claimants' affidavit in support is valid in law? 4. Whether the claimants' affidavit discloses any cause of action in this suit? ARGUMENT ISSUE ONE Whether the Claimants/Respondents have the locus to institute the instant suit? It is the submission of counsel for the claimants that the claimants have the requisite locus standi to initiate this action. Locus standi means the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law. In support of this contention counsel referred to cases of ADEKUNLE V. ADLUGBA (2013) ALL FWLR (PT.675) @ 346-347, OJUKWU V. OJUKWU (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 463) @ 1243 and that of ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LAGOS V. EKO HOTELS LTD (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 342) @ 1398, and contended that the term locus standi entails the legal capacity of instituting, initiating or commencing an action in a competent court of law or tribunal without any inhibition or hindrance from anybody or person whatsoever, including the provisions of any law. It is also submitted that the claimants in this suit have by the affidavit evidence shown that they have a legal or justifiable right. They also have shown sufficient or special interest adversely affected as well as a justiciable cause of action. It is the submission of counsel that the question as to the competence of the claimants to institute the instant suit has been articulated in the affidavit evidence of the claimants. The claimants have sufficiently placed the necessary facts before this Honourable Court which sufficiently discloses the cause of action vested in them and the rights, obligations and/or interest which have been violated by the defendants. It is further submitted that a party or person would be said to have an interest in a matter when he has rights, advantages connected with it whether present or future. On this contention counsel relied on the cases of ADETONA V. ZENITH INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD (2009) 3 NWLR (PT. 1129) 577, ADEKUNLE V ADLUGBA (supra). The issue of locus standi is resolve by examining the plaintiff's statement of claim in the case at hand, statement of facts. The statement of claim must be meticulously examined to see if it has disclosed a reasonable cause of action vested in the plaintiff. On this submission counsel cited the case of CHARLES V GOVERNOR ONDO STATE (2013) ALL FWLR (PT.688) @ 996, INAKOJU V. ADELEKE (2007) ALL FWLR (PT. 353) @ 3. It is the submission of counsel that the gamut of the Claimants' suit is whether the defendants have the legal authority to stop deduction of check-up dues. Therefore, this instant suit cannot fall within the meaning of trade dispute as the defendants wrongly argued. Counsel argued that the claimants' complaint is not a trade dispute which will have to comply with the provisions of part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act, Cap T8, LFN, 2004. Within the definition of the Trade Dispute Act, for a complaint to qualify as such, the cause of action must have arisen from the following: 1. A trade dispute as per the Trade Dispute Act. 2. That the trade dispute is between employers and employees or between workers and workers. 3. The subject matter of the cause of action relates to the terms of employment of the workers. In support of this contention counsel placed reliance on the case of OSOH V. UNITY BANK PLC (2013) ALL FWLR (PT.690) @ 1245,1280-1281. It is also the submission of counsel that for the cause of action to be considered a trade dispute, the trade dispute has to come within the parameters of the definition of the Trade Dispute Act as per Section 48(1) supra as construed in the above case. In other words, the above three factors must co-exist to bring the matter within the procedures contemplated under part 1of the Trade Dispute Act. Based on the above submissions counsel urged the court to discountenance the argument of the defendants as being misconceived and resolve this issue in favour of the claimants. ISSUE NO.2 Whether having regards to the facts of this case and with particular reference to the Claimants' Affidavit and Defendants' Counter Affidavit, this suit ought to be heard and determined by way of Origination Summons? In response to the submission of counsel for the defendants on issue two, counsel for the claimant contended that the best and proper mode of instituting and determining this suit is by originating summons. This is because all that the claimants sought or prayed from the Honourable Court is interpretation of the extant laws of the Trade Unions which empowers the unions to generate revenue from its members through the respective employers of the members or eligible to be members who deduct from source for onward remittance to the unions. The claimants' suit centered on the interpretation of the provisions of Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act and the Defendants' circular dated 23rd January, 2018, purporting to stop the deduction of the check-up dues. The provision of Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act, empowered the claimants to collect check-up dues from the union members. The provision of the law mandated the employer of labour to make deductions from the wages of the workers and remit such deductions to the union within a reasonable time. It is the submission of counsel that originating summons is resorted to where the sole principal question or issue is or likely to be one of the construction of a written law or of any instrument made under any written law or of any deed, will, contract or other document or some other question of law; or where there is unlikely to be any substantial dispute of fact. On this contention counsel referred to the case CHARLES V. GOVERNOR ONDO STATE (2013) ALL FWLR (PT.688) @ 1000. It is argued by counsel that the claimants' suit does not in any way contemplate any likelihood of dispute on question of fact. The entire suit of the claimants has no bearing with dispute as to question of fact. According to counsel a careful scrutiny of the claimants' suit will reveal that the sole issue in controversy is whether or not the defendants are under obligation to deduct check-up dues from wages of the workers by virtue of Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act and remit same to the union and the purported circular by the defendants to stop the deductions is ultra vires. It is also argued by counsel that in determining whether or not the facts in support of an originating summons are contentious, it is the nature of the claim and the facts deposed to in the affidavit in support of the claims shall be examined to see if they disclose disputed facts and a hostile nature of the proceedings. The counter affidavit is of no effect as it has not disclosed that the facts are disputed or the proceedings are hostile. To support this contention counsel relied on the case of JIMOH V. ALESHINLOYE II (2015) ALL FWLR (PT. 782) @ 1461, where the court held thus: "In determining whether the facts in support of the originating summons are contentious, it is the nature of the claim and the facts deposed to in the affidavit in support of the claims that shall be examined to see if they disclose disputed facts and a hostile nature of the proceedings. It is not the filing of a counter affidavit to oppose the claims in an originating summons that determine whether the proceeding is hostile in nature." Reliance was also placed on the case of FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA V. ZEBRA ENERGY LTD. (2003) FWLR (PT. 142) @ 154. Counsel contended that the defendants' argument that this suit is not properly constituted as per the mode of initiating it is untenable and lacks foundation in law. On the whole, counsel urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the claimants and discountenance the argument of the defendants ISSUE NO.3. Whether the Claimants' Affidavit in support is valid in law? ARGUMENT In responding to argument on issue three, counsel for the claimants referred to section 115 of the evidence Act and submitted that the claimants' affidavit in support of the originating summons is valid in law. Counsel contended that the affidavit in support has complied with section 115(4) of the evidence Act. The provision is to the effect that a deponent deposing to facts received from another person must state the name of the informant, his particulars, time, place and circumstances of the information. It is contended that the all the above conditions required by the Evidence Act have been complied with. Furthermore, the defendants have conceded in their argument that the name of the informant, his particulars, time and place where the information was received were stated. Counsel insisted that the requirement of the law has been fully satisfied by the claimants this is because the emphasis is on the source of the information. The duty imposed on the deponent is to state the source of his information. A source which can be verified if there is a need to verify it. On this contention reliance was placed on the case of ATAYI FARMS LTD. V. N. A. C. B. LTD (2003) FWLR (PT. 172) @ 1886, where it was held that: "What the deponent is under a duty to show in order to comply with the provisions of sections 88 and 89 of the Evidence Act, is the source of the information. A source which can be verified if there is a need to verify it." According to counsel the argument of the defendants is untenable and unsubstantiated. Thus, counsel urged the court to discountenance with the argument of the defendants and resolve this issue in favour of the claimants. ISSUE N0.4 Whether the claimants' affidavit discloses any cause of action in this suit? In answer to issue 4 counsel contended that the claimants' affidavit has disclosed real cause of action against the defendants. The case of the claimants has been aptly articulated in their affidavit which shows the accrual of the cause of action. A cause of action is a fact or facts which gives a person a right to judicial relief for an infringement. To ascertain a cause of action, the immediate materials the court should look at are the writ of summons and the averments in the statement of claim. To support this argument counsel relied on the case of S.P.D.C. (NIG.) LTD V. ADDICO (2016) ALL FWLR (PT.816) @ 439. It is the submission of counsel that cause of action arises on a date when a breach of any duty or act occurs, which warrants the victim who is adversely affected by such breach to take a court action in assertion or protection of his legal right that has been breached. For this submission counsel placed reliance on the case of KEMMER V. OKOLO (2015) ALL FWLR (PT. 804) @ 2001. According to counsel, the claimants have established a reasonable cause of action against the defendants. The relevant processes to be considered in determining the issue of cause of action are the claimants' processes, in this regard the affidavit in support of the originating summons. The claimants adopt their argument under issue one on issue on locus standi to reiterate that they have disclosed reasonable cause of action against the defendants. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to dismiss the defendants' notice of preliminary objection with substantial cost and resolve the all the issues in favour of the claimants. COURT’S DECISION. I have carefully and painstakingly studied the Originating Summons commencing this suit and all the accompanying processes. I have equally perused the counter-affidavit of the defendants and its accompanying processes filed in opposition to the originating summons. The defendants have also filed a notice of preliminary objection contesting the competency of this suit. The notice of preliminary objection was accompanied by a written address as required by the rules of this court. The claimants have on their own part filed a reply address in opposition to the defendants’ notice of preliminary objection. I shall start with the resolution of the four issues raised in the notice of preliminary objection, before dealing with the two questions raised by the claimants for determination in respect of the originating summons. The reason being that once a challenge is raised to the competency of court to entertain a matter. The issue of jurisdiction is fundamental as it touches on the competence of the court. The issue of jurisdiction has to be resolved before proceeding further to consider anything else. The issues raised in the notice of preliminary objection touches on the jurisdiction of the court and if the court finds that it had no jurisdiction to entertain this suit that will be the end of the matter and there will be no need to go further into making enquiry into the substantive suit. The court has a duty once issue of jurisdiction has been raised to first and foremost resolve that issue before proceeding further. Otherwise any determination no matter how well done, if it was without jurisdiction it will amount to nothing, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. DEREXEL ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LTD V TRANS INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD & ORS. (2008) 18 NWLR (PT.1119) 388 SC, (2009) 15 W.R.N. 1 SC. The first issue raised in the preliminary objection is that of the locus standi of the claimants to institute this action as it is presently constituted. The counsel for the defendants questioned the legal right of the claimant to be heard in respect of the relief being sought from the court. Counsel argued that the claimants’ locus standi to institute and prosecute this suit depend on satisfaction of a legal condition. To that extent counsel referred to section 48 of the Trade Dispute Act and submitted that the section applies to the claimants’ suit. In that the provision of the law requires resort to had, first to the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP), before accessing this court. As for determination of a Trade Dispute, this court does not have original jurisdiction. Counsel argued that this suit falls within the realm of collective labour dispute categorization, as it purport to be a suit filed by the claimants for themselves and on behalf of their members and eligible members of 3rd defendant. Consequently, counsel argued that this suit has to go through the process of part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act. In response, counsel for the claimants argued that the claimants have requisite locus standi to initiate this action. According to counsel locus standi means a party must have sufficient interest in the subject matter of dispute i.e the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law. Counsel submitted that the claimants have legal interest in the subject matter of dispute i.e check-off dues. The interest of the claimants are as stated in the affidavit in support of the originating summons. In law there must be a cause of action before a person can have an enforceable right. The person in whom this enforceable right is vested as his personal right is the person that has locus standi to sue. A person who makes a claim which belongs to someone else has no locus standi before the court. See OLORIODE V OYEBI. It is clear from plethora of authorities that the term ‘locus standi’ denotes legal capacity to institute proceeding in a court of law; and can therefore be referred to as ‘standing’ or ‘title to sue’. The principle of doctrine of Locus standi operate to deprive a party of the right to institute an action on the ground that such intended party lacks connection or sufficient interest in the subject matter of the action. It is therefore of paramount importance, for a prospective litigant to ascertain upon whom the enforceable right in the cause of action is vested, to enable him decide whether he himself can properly sue. In ascertaining whether the claimants in this action have locus standi, it is necessary to examine the statement of claim filed in court, in the case at hand the originating summons and the affidavit in support to see if it discloses a cause of action vested in them. See ADESOKAN V ADEGOROLU (1997) 3 NWLE (PT.493) 261, BOLAJI V BAMGBOSE (1986) 4 NWLR (PT.37) 632. However, it must be stated here that the issue of locus standi does not depend on the success or merit of the case, all that is required is right, interest and obligation in respect of the subject matter of the suit. The determining factor is whether the reliefs being sought would confer some benefit, on the party prosecuting a suit before a court of law. In the case at hand the claimants’ action is seeking for interpretation of certain provisions of the law regarding trade unions entitlement to check-off dues. It is a well-known fact that the check-off dues is one of means by which Trade unions derive revenue for its day to day activities. It is also a right that the law has given to Trade Unions. Therefore, this means that Trade Unions have ample interest in any suit seeking to assert the right of Trade Unions to check-off dues. An action where deductions of check-off dues is in issue will in no doubt clothe the defendants with requisite legal standi or locus standi to institute an action before this court. It must be pointed out here that section 2 of Trade Unions Act, conferred on Trade Unions with legal personality through registration. In the case of NIGERIA NURSES ASSOCIATION AND SS OKEZIE V ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATIONB & 2 ORS. (1981) 11-12 SC 1, OBASEKI (JSC) of blessed memory has this to say on legal status of Trade Unions: ‘‘A registered trade union is a legal person and the birth and death of legal person are determined not by nature but by law. They come into existence at the will of the law and they endure during its pleasure. Their extinction is called dissolution’’. It is lucidly clear from the above dictum that it will not be in contention, that registration of trade union, confers juristic personality on Trade Union such that it can sue and be sued as in this case. In view of the foregoing, it is my view that the claimants being registered Trade Unions, have the requisite locus to institute this action as it is presently constituted they have the right in law to seek for payment of check-off dues, which the law allows they to collect from members for protection of the interest of their members. By virtue of section 5(7) Trade Unions Act, all trade Unions listed in the third schedule to the Trade Union Act, have automatic registration with full powers and duties of Trade Unions accorded to them by law. The claimants having been listed in both part A & B of the Third schedule to the Trade Union Act, they have the requisite locus standi to bring this action before the court. See COMRADE ABDULFATAI BAKARE & ANOR. V CGC NIGERIA LTD (2013) 30 N. L. L. R. (PT.86) 379. In the case of FAWEHINMI V NBA (NO.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (PT.105) 558, the Supreme Court held that a trade union has quasi-corporate status and can sue and be sued en nominee. See also NIGERIA CIVIL SERVICE UNION (WS) V ALLEN (1972) 2 UILR 316. In the second leg of his argument on this issue, the defendants have strenuously argued that this suit deals with Trade Dispute as provided for under section 48 of the Trade Dispute Act. But, the claimant argued per contra. By virtue of section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, on intra and inter Union dispute is appellate and not original. Any suit that is for trade dispute as defined by section 48 of Trade Dispute Act, must undergo the process of part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act. Therefore intervention of this court will depend on exhausting the process of part 1 of Trade Dispute Act. The term trade Dispute has been statutorily defined by section 48 of the Trade Dispute Act, thus: ‘‘trade dispute means any dispute between employers and workers or between workers and workers, which is connected with employment and physical conditions of work of any person’’. The above quoted provisions of the Trade Dispute Act, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in NATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICITY EMPLOYEES & ANOR V BUREAU OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES (2010) 7 NWLR (PT.1194) 538 SC, (2010) LPELR-1966 SC. See also NATIONAL UNION OF ROAD TRANSPORT WORKERS V OGBODO & ORS (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt.537). applying the dictum in the above decisions it can be asserted without any fear of contradiction that a careful perusal of the originating summons commencing this suit and the affidavit in support will revealed that the claimants’ action is not one that is within the purview of section 48 of the Trade Dispute Act, the action is seeking for interpretation of certain provisions of the Trade Unions and Labour Act as they relate to issue of deductions and remittance of check-off dues from members of the claimants. See section 254C (1) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). Therefore, it is clear as day light that the dispute before the court is not one that is caught by the provision of section 48 of the Trade dispute Act which would have made the provision of section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, to become applicable and divest this court of its original jurisdiction. The reason being that it is not a dispute between employer and employees or between workers and workers. It is also not in relation to terms of employment of workers. This also means that the dispute is not one that can be situated within collective labour dispute, as the defendants want this court to hold. In view of the above findings, issue one is resolve in favour of the claimant against the defendant. For avoidance of doubt the claimants being registered Trade Unions have requisite locus standi to bring this action before the court. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO It is the contention of counsel for the defendants that there is no absolute right to institute an action in this court by way of originating summons. The claimants’ choice of originating summons as vehicle for ventilation of their grievances was wrong. According to counsel Order 3 rule 3, provides that action can be commenced by originating summons, if the matter relates to interpretation of any constitution, enactment or any other instrument relating to employment, labour and industrial relation in respect of which the court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of section 254C. It is argued by counsel that though the claimants have couched their questions for determination to look as if their suit borders on interpretation of statute, no copies of the statute mentioned by the claimants have been annexed to the said originating summons. This neglect or failure to attach the law to be interpreted has rendered this incompetent due non fulfilment of the requirement of order 3 rule 17(1) (b) of the National Industrial Court (civil Procedure), Rules, 2017. Counsel urged the court to hold that failure to so do, renders this suit incapable of being heard and determined by way of originating summons. However, if the court finds that there is instrument to interpret. Counsel contended that still the subject matter of this suit is contentious, emitting the smoke of serious dispute between the parties. In which situation originating summons is not only inappropriate but, dangerous procedure for commencement the suit. On this submission counsel refers to paragraph 4(m) where it was averred no worker of the 3rd defendant who is a member or eligible member of any of the claimants has opted out of the claimants unions. Counsel contended this averment has been countered in that membership of the claimants Unions is not automatic and that some eligible members of the claimants have opted out. It was also stated that not all of the employees of 3rd defendants have given written voluntary consent to make deductions of check-off dues at source from their salaries as required by section 5(3) of the Labour Act. Counsel urged the court to decline jurisdiction since the claimants disobeyed rules. Rules of court are meant to be obeyed. Counsel for the claimants in response submitted that the best and proper mode of instituting this suit is by way of originating summons. The reason being that all that the claimants sought and prayed for is interpretation of the extant laws of Trade Dispute which empowers the unions to generate revenue from its members, through the respective employers of the members or eligible to be members, who deduct from source for onward remittance to the unions. Counsel argued that the claimants’ action does not contemplate any likelihood of dispute on question of fact. Counsel argued that in determining whether or not the facts in support of an originating summons are contentious, it is the nature of the claim and facts deposed to in the affidavit in support of the claim that shall be examined to see if it disclose disputed facts and a hostile nature of the proceeding. The counter affidavit is of no effect as it has not disclosed that the facts are disputed or the proceedings are hostile. I wish to reiterate that the principle of law which has been consistently stated time without number regarding use originating summons is that it is unusual procedure or method or mode of commencing proceedings provided by rules of court. It is said to be best suited for cases where there are no substantial dispute of facts, or there is no likelihood of their being in dispute and when the sole, or principal question in issue, is or likely to be one directed at the construction of a written law, constitution, or any enactment, or any instrument, or deed, will, contract, or other document, or other question of law, or circumstances where there is not likely to be dispute as to facts. In FAMFA OIL V ATTORNEY GENERAL OG THE FEDERATION, the apex court per Belgore, JSC, (as he then was) stated, thus: ‘‘The very nature of an originating summons is to make things simpler. It is available to any person claiming interest under a deed, will or other written instrument whereby he will apply by originating summons for determination of any question or construction arising under the instrument for a declaration of his interest. …. It is a procedure where the evidence in the main is by way of documents and there is no serious dispute as to their existence in the dealing of the parties to the suit’’. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that in a suit commenced by originating summons there can be disputed facts which originating summons procedure can cure which are not substantial. It is only where facts are substantially in dispute that originating summons is not suited for, In the case at hand, the core question for determination is whether having regards to section 5(3) of Labour Act, section 17 of Trade Unions Act and section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, (as amended), the 2nd and 3rd defendants can stop deduction of check-off dues. It is submitted that there cannot be substantial dispute in the supporting affidavit of the parties, as the matter is for interpretation of the provisions of certain statutes and constitution. See JIMOH V OLAWOYE (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt.828) 307, OLUMIDE V AJAYI (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt.517) 433 From the above exposition of law, it is my candid view that this suit was properly commenced via originating summons as the issue for resolution is on interpretation of provisions of a written law. See EZEIGWE V NWAWULU & ORS. (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt.1183) 159. Originating summons is appropriate method of commencing action for any person interested in determination of any question of construction arising under an enactment, agreement or any other written instrument. Issue two is also resolved in favour of the claimants against the defendants. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE THREE On issue three counsel for the defendants contended that the claimants’ affidavit in support of the originating summons is invalid in law, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. According to counsel paragraphs of the affidavit in support should be stuck out for violating the provisions of section 115 (3) of the Evidence Act. Counsel also cited section 126 of the Evidence Act and submitted that it requires the deponent to give evidence of what he saw, heard or perceived. For the claimants the affidavit in support of the originating summons did not violate the provision of the evidence Act, as argued by the counsel for the defendants. It is submitted that by virtue of section 115(4) the deponent has stated the name of the person he received the information from his particulars, time, place and circumstances of the information. These information were conceded by the defendants in their argument. I have perused the content of the depositions being objected to it is apparent that the deponent has stated his source of information which he believes to be true and has provided particulars name, time of the information for verifying the facts stated therein. This to my mind has satisfied the requirement of section 115 of the Evidence Act. On section 126 of the Evidence, the said section is not applicable to affidavit evidence it applied to situation where oral evidence is to be given. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE FOUR In arguing the last issue, counsel for the defendants submitted that the affidavit evidence did not disclose any cause of action in this suit. Counsel is of the view that this court is called upon to determine whether stoppage of deduction of check off dues enure as a cause of action to certain categories of the 3rd defendant’s employees whom the claimants purport to represent in this suit. Flowing from this question is the need to ascertain the position of the law on whether any of the claimants; purported members or purported eligible members have authorized in the process prescribed by law, the 3rd defendant as their employer to make deductions of check-off dues from their salaries. It is the contention of counsel that the applicable law on trade unions in Nigeria does not provide for such sweeping band wagon membership mechanism. In Nigeria, senior staff employees are not assumed to be members of a trade union. They have to opt in individually and in writing to join a trade union before a valid membership of the trade union can be said to have been established. Conversely, junior staff are deemed to be members of trade unions, but no law precludes them from opting out of such trade unions. Counsel also contended that even trade union Act does not contemplate automatic membership of trade union in Nigeria. On this counsel cited section 12 of Trade Union Act. Thus, the import of section 12(4) of the Trade Union Act is that membership of a trade union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member. It is argued by counsel that there are in the employment of the 3rd defendant, junior and senior staff. These staff are not all members of claimant’s trade unions. Therefore, stoppage of check-off deductions cannot enures as a cause of action to the claimants. It is also contended that the affidavit evidence fails to establish that any of the claimants purported members or purported eligible members have authorised in the process prescribed by the law, the 3rd defendant as their employer to make deductions of check off dues from their salaries and to remit same to the claimants or any other trade union. By section 5(4) of the labour Act an employer shall not make any deductions of check-off dues whatsoever except if the person concerned has accepted in writing to make voluntary contribution to the trade union. The law places responsibility on the claimants in the instant suit who assert that the 3rd defendant employees are their members or eligible members, to satisfy this court that any such member or eligible member has accepted in writing, to make voluntary contributions to the claimants’ trade unions or any trade union at all. The claimants in response to the defendants’ argument submitted that the claimants’ affidavit has disclosed real cause of action against the defendants. It is contended that the claimants have by their originating summons and affidavit in support disclosed reasonable cause of action against the defendants. It is well settled law that a cause of action is made up of an aggregation of facts recognized by law as giving the plaintiff a substantive right to the claim or relief sought. A reasonable cause of action is a cause of action with some chance of success and set out the legal right of the claimant and the obligations of the defendant. See RINCO CONST. CO. V VEEPEE IND. LTD (2005) 9 NWLR (PT.929) 85. IBRAHIM V OSIM (1988) 6 SCNJ 203. All that is required at this stage is for an action to raise some question fit to be decided by a judge or jury, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out. . I have searched the content of the originating summons and the affidavit evidence and I am convinced that there are questions raised fit for consideration by the court. The claimants have stated their right and the obligations of the defendants. In the circumstances, the claimants’ suit as it is presently constituted has establish a reasonable cause of action. This issue is resolve in favour of the claimant and against the defendants. In view of the foregoing, the defendants’ notice of preliminary objection failed for lacking in merit and is hereby refused. Having determined the notice of preliminary objection against the defendants, I shall proceed to consider the originating summons on its merit. I have at the beginning of this judgment reproduced the questions submitted for resolution and the reliefs being sought by the claimants. Consequently there is no need for reproducing them here. RESOLUTION OF QUESTION ONE. In arguing in support of question one, Abdulazeez Ibrahim, Esq; counsel for the claimants submitted that the 2nd and 3rd defendants cannot stop deductions of union dues at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd defendant and remitting same to the workers union including the claimants being a statutory duty. According to counsel the clear provisions of section 5(3) of the Labour Act and section 17 of Trade Union Act, places mandatory obligation on the 2nd and 3rd defendants to deduct check-off dues in respect of workers who are eligible and remit same to unions of the workers inclusive of the claimants. Counsel contended that the duty of the 2nd and 3rd defendants to deduct check off dues is a mandatory duty particularly in view of the use of the word ‘shall’ on the above sections. To buttress his submission counsel placed reliance on: I. ISIAKA V AMOSUN (2016) ALL FWLR (Pt.839) 1040, II. AJIGA V OLARENWAJU (2016) ALL FWLR (pt.832) 1727 and III. TABIK INVESTMENT LTD V GUARANTEE TRUST BANK PLC (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt.602) 1592. It is argued by counsel that the 2nd and 3rd defendant are not permitted to choose whether or not to deduct check-off dues and remit to unions inclusive of the claimants. The directive on stoppage of deductions of union dues contained in exhibit A, internal memo of 23/1/2008, attached to the affidavit in support is illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. In response to the submission of the claimants, E. K. Bakam, Esq; counsel for the defendants contended that the applicable law on trade unions in Nigeria does not provide for such sweeping band wagon membership mechanism. In Nigeria, senior staff employees are not assumed to be members of a trade union. They have to opt in individually and in writing to join a trade union before a valid membership of the trade union can be said to have been established. Conversely, junior staff are deemed to be members of trade unions, but no law precludes them from opting out of such trade unions. Counsel also contended that even trade union Act does not contemplate automatic membership of trade union in Nigeria. On this counsel cited section 12 Trade Union Act. Thus, the import of section 12(4) of the Trade Union Act, is that membership of a trade union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member. It is argued by counsel that there are in the employment of the 3rd defendant, junior and senior staff. These staff are not all members of the claimants’ trade unions. Therefore, stoppage of check-off deductions cannot enures as a cause of action to the claimants. It is also contended that the affidavit evidence fails to establish that any of the claimants purported members or purported eligible members have authorised in the process prescribed by the law, the 3rd defendant as their employer to make deductions of check-off dues from their salaries and to remit same to the claimants or any other trade union. By section 5(4) of the Labour Act, an employer shall not make any deductions of check-off dues whatsoever except if the person concerned has accepted in writing to make voluntary contribution to the trade union. The law places responsibility on the claimants in the instant suit who assert that the 3rd defendant employees are their members or eligible members, to satisfy this court that any such member or eligible member has accepted in writing, to make voluntary contributions to the claimants’ trade unions or any trade union at all. Counsel urged the court on the strength of section 131 of the Evidence Act to hold that the claimants, have failed to prove that the defendants who have not been authorized by their employee to make deduction of check-off dues, have fouled the provision of any law on the stoppage of the said deduction. It is also submitted that the claimants have not satisfied the legal requirement for proof in matters for declaratory reliefs tied to which are the other reliefs claimed. Counsel submitted that in law in a suit for declaratory reliefs, claimants must establish that they are entitled to the said reliefs and the admissions of the defendants or the weakness of the case will not avail the claimant in this regard. Question one of originating summons under consideration calls for interpretation of the provisions of section 5(3) of the Labour Act, section 17 of the Trade Dispute Act and the provisions of section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). It is to be noted that one of the cardinal principles of canon of interpretation of statute is that the duty of a judge is to interpret and not to make law. In the interpretation process, the judge should be liberal and give the natural meaning of the provisions of the statute where the words are clear and unambiguous. The proper approach is to follows them, in their simple, grammatical and ordinary meaning. This means the duty of court is to interpret words in a statute or constitution in their ordinary meaning and literal meaning. Certainly, it is not the duty of court to go outside the words used and import an interpretation which may be or is convenient to it or the parties or one of the parties. See DAPIALONG & ORS V DARIYE & ANOR. (2007) ALL FWLR (PT.373) 81, FAWEHINMI V IGP (2002) FWLR (PT.108) 1355, GAFAR V THE GOVERNMENT OF KWARA STATE (2007) ALL FWLR (PT.360) 1415. Another important and well settled principle of interpretation is that court in interpreting the provisions of a statute or constitution, must read together related provisions of the constitution or statute in order to discover the meaning of the provisions. The court ought to not to interpret related provisions of a statute or constitution in isolation and then destroy in the process the true meaning and effect of particular provisions. See AMAECHI V INEC (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt.1080) 227. In interpreting provisions of a statute or constitution, provisions should not be interpreted in isolation but rather in the context of the constitution or statute as a whole. The whole statute must be read in determining the meaning and effect of words being interpreted. But where the words are plain and unambiguous no interpretation is required, the words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning. In interpreting statute court are enjoined to give the interpretation a global view or what is termed as ‘broad interpretation’. See BUHARI V OBASANJO (2005) 13 NWLR (pt.941) 1, ADESANYA V THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLICOF NIGERIA & ANOR (1981) 5 SC 112. It is in line with the well settled principles of interpretation that the provisions under consideration would be viewed. Section 17 of the Trade Union (amendment) Act, 1999, provides: Upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in in the third schedule of this Act, the employer shall; (a) make deductions from the wages of all workers eligible to be members of the union for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union; and (b) Pay any sum so deducted directly to the registered office of the trade union. The foregoing provisions of the Trade Union (amendment) Act, makes deduction of check-off from workers’ wages compulsory and remitting same to their trade unions as specified in the Third Schedule of the Act and from such eligible workers as identified with the jurisdictional scope of the union. The counsel for the defendant has referred this court to section 12(4) of the Trade Union (Amendment Act 2005 and submitted that membership of trade union is not automatic and that it shall be voluntary, no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member. Counsel further opined that before check-off dues could deducted from an employee’s salary, there must be written authorization by the employee to the employer. The argument of counsel seems to be oblivious of the context in which the said sub-section is to be viewed. The heading of the section which is to the effect that ‘’membership of trade union not to be restricted on discriminatory grounds’’ clearly revealed the fallacy of the argument of counsel on issue of unfettered right of members of staff of the 3rd defendants to join or not to join a trade union. Generally the freedom to organize or associate include an equal a negative right at that freedom not to organize or disassociate. Thus, in the case of CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION V AMALGAMATED UNION OF PUBLIC CORPORATION, CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL AND RECREATIONAL SERVICE EMPLOYEE (2004) 1 NLLR (PT.1) 32, this court held that ‘the freedom to associate under section 40 of the constitution certainly, includes freedom to disassociate or not to associate. In order to ascertain the exact purport of section 12(4) of the Trade Dispute (Amendment) Act 2005, the entire section needs to be examined and construed. This court has the opportunity of construing the provision of section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act. The court after adopted the global approach method in construing the said provision in the case of NUSDE V SEWUN (2013) 35 N.L.L.R. PT.106 606 @ 649, has this to say; ‘‘The problem with argument of the appellant is that it is citing section 12(4) out of context. The provision must be understood within the context of the whole section, which is that it is a provision given under the context of ‘‘membership of trade union not to be restricted on discriminatory grounds’’. It is not a provision that has given an unfettered freedom to workers. In stating that ‘‘membership of a trade union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member’’ section 12(4) merely restate what is already the law. Section 9(6)(a) and (b) of the Labour Act, Cap LI LFN, 2004, provides that – No contract shall- (a) Make it a condition of employment that a worker shall or shall not join a trade union or shall or shall not relinquish membership of a trade union; or (b) Cause the dismissal of, or otherwise prejudice, a worker- (i) By reason of trade union membership or (ii) Because of trade union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours; or (iii) By reason of the fact that he has lost or been deprived of membership of a trade union or has refused or been unable to become, or for any other reason is not, a member of a trade union’’. The position of the law on voluntarism prior to the 2005 amendment was that membership of a trade union was voluntary, incorporating as it were the right to associate or disassociate as the case may be. For junior staff, the rule was that membership was deemed with right to ‘‘opt out’’, while for senior staff they were not deemed to be members and so had to voluntarily ‘‘opt in’’.in other words junior staff could only ‘‘contract out’’ of trade union membership, while senior staff could only ‘‘opt into’’. In line with principles of interpretation the provision of section 12(4) of the Trade Dispute (amendment) Act 2005, has to be construed along with the provisions of section 40 and 45 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). A combine reading of these constitutional and statutory provisions will clearly revealed that the freedom to associate or belong to a trade union is not an absolute right, it is a qualified right that has to be based for protection of workers interest. See SEA TRUCKS (NIG.) LTD V PYNE (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt.607) 514, where it was held that the phrase for protection of interest does not give a citizen unrestricted freedom to join any trade union as a person proposing to join a trade union must show it protects his interest. See also the case of PERESSA V SSACGOC (2009) 14 N.L.L.R. (pt.39) 306, where it was held that trade union Amendment Act 2005 did not repeal, or amend or substitute any of the provisions of the Third Schedule Parts A, B, C of the Trade Dispute Act 2004. The law on voluntarism prior to 2005, remain the law as at today nothing has changed. The right of a worker to decide which union to belong to is not absolute it must be exercised within the limit of the Trade Union Act. The right can only be exercised in respect of unions empowered to operate within a clearly defined jurisdictional scope as contained in the Third Schedule to Trade Union Act. It is clear from the foregoing that a worker cannot use the provision of section 12(4) to contract out of his union to which he is jurisdictionally bound. What is now clear is that all junior staff are deemed to be members of trade unions within their jurisdictional scope as enunciated in the Third Schedule to Trade Union Act. This means that an employer is duty bound to deduct check-off dues from all deemed members and eligible members of trade unions to the benefit of the unions without authorization to do such in writing. It is only senior staff that are not deemed members’ that need to give their written authorization. For the deemed members of trade union, if they wish to opt out or contract out and stop deduction of their check-off dues, they have to do that by notify their employer in writing of such opting out. See BEMIL V NATOONAL UNION OF HOTELS (2009) 16 N.L.L.R. (pt.43) 135, CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION V AUPCTRE (supra), TUYIL NIG, LTD (2009) 14 N.L.L.R. (pt.37) 127. It is trite law that an employer is under an obligation to automatically give recognition to all registered unions and compulsorily deduct check-off dues and remit to the unions concerned. The current position of the labour law in Nigeria is that an employer must recognize all registered trade union automatically without prompting, an employer is as well duty bound to compulsorily deduct check –off dues from all deemed employees for the benefit of the trade unions unionizing the employer’s employees. The only exception is in respect of senior staff who have to opt in and authorize deduction in writing. The argument of counsel for the defendants that the claimants have failed to establish that its members in the employment of the defendants have authorized or permitted deduction of check-off dues is a clear misconception of the law. Any employee that do not want to be members of the claimants can opt out. See CAC V AUPTRE 2004 1 N.L.L.R. PT.1 1, MIX & BAKE V NUFBTE 2004 1 N.L.L.R. PT.2 247, TIB V NUBIFIE 2008 10 N.L.L.R. PT.27 322 AND NESTOIL V NUPENG 2012 29 N.L.L.R 90. The law as I know it is that registration is deemed, recognition automatic and deduction of check-off dues compulsory, being based on mere eligibility to be a member of the union in question. This means that an employer does not have right to stop deduction of check-off dues on the ground that there is written authorization from staff for such deduction. In other words an employer has no right order stoppage of deduction and remittance of check-off dues to trade unions unionizing the employees of the employer. Any stoppage of deduction by employer unilaterally will be in violation of the extant provision of the law. Question Two In arguing question two counsel for the claimants submitted that the 2nd and 3rd defendants cannot retain union dues deducted at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of 3rd defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the claimants without remitting same to the claimants. Counsel submitted that by combine effect of section 5(3)(b) of Labour Act and section 17(b) of the Trade Union Act the 2nd and 3rd defendants have a duty to promptly remit check –off dues deducted from the salaries of workers to the claimants failure to remit amount to violation of the law. It is argued that the check-off dues deducted from salaries of the members of the claimants’ from January 2017 to December 2017, have not been remitted to the claimants. Counsel urged the court to hold that withholding of check-off dues deducted by 2nd and 3rd defendants from the salaries of members of the claimants is illegal and in violation of the provision of section 5(3)(b) of the Labour Act and section 17(b) of the Trade Unions Act. It is to be noted that the defendants did not proffer any argument in opposition to question 2. However, notwithstanding the claimant has a duty to prove his claim by strength of his case and not on admission or weakness of the defence the reason being that the claimants are seeking for declaratory and injunctive reliefs which by law have to be proven by credible evidence. The provisions of section 5(3) (b) of the Labour Act and section 17(d) are very clear and unambiguous they say what they say. The provisions are plain and unambiguous they should be given their ordinary and natural meaning. The two sections have imposed a duty on employer to deduct check-off due from the salary of an employee for the benefit of the trade union concerned. The obligation is mandatory it allows for no discretion. In view of the above resolution of the questions submitted for determination. The court hereby enter judgment in the terms stated hereunder, as follows:- 1. Relief 1 is grated in that A DECLARATION is hereby granted that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants or their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions cannot validly and legally stop deductions of Union Dues at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants and remitting same to the Claimants. 2. Relief two is not granted due lack of credible evidence to establish retention of any union dues deducted at source. 3. relief 3 succeed in that A DECLARATION is hereby granted that the directive issued by the Kaduna State Executive Council on the 23rd day of January, 2018, stopping forthwith deduction of Union Dues at source is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 4. Relief 4 succeed in that A MANDATORY ORDER is hereby grated compelling the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions to commence forthwith deductions of Union Dues at source from the salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are members or eligible to be members of the Claimants and remitting same to the Claimants accordingly. 5. Relief 5 failed and is hereby refused due to lack of proof showing the deduction made from January 2017 to December 2017. 6. Relief 6 is hereby refused A PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants, their agents, servants or privies or anyone acting on their behalf or instructions from further stopping or otherwise interfering in any manner whatsoever with deductions of Union Dues at source from salaries of workers in the employment of the 3rd Defendant who are eligible to be members of the Claimants and remittances of the same to the Claimants. 7. Relief 7 is hereby refused due to lack of proof. There is evidence adduced to establish entitlement to damages. 8. The sum of N200,00.00 cost is awarded against the defendants in favour of the claimants. Sanusi Kado, Judge.