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JUDGMENT Judgment in this case was to be delivered on 10th July 2018. However, in the course of writing the judgment, the need for me to examine the provisions of the 1st Defendant’s condition of service came up. Even though both parties had placed reliance on the NDIC conditions of service, none of them had exhibited it. I had to request for a copy of the condition of service from the parties. As a result, the judgment was rescheduled to be delivered on 17th July 2018. However, on 10th July 2018 the Claimant filed a motion on notice wherein he sought leave to adduce further and additional evidence in support of the originating summons. For the fact that the motion was already in the record of this matter, this court could not proceed to deliver the judgment on 17th July 2018 without hearing the parties on the motion. It was on that basis the court allowed the motion to be taken. Only the 1st Defendant filed a counter affidavit to oppose the said motion which was heard on 5th November 2018. RULING ON MOTION OF 10/7/2018 The main prayer sought by the Claimant in the motion is for leave to adduce additional evidence in the suit. Exhibited to the affidavit in support of the motion is the further and additional evidence of the Claimant which he seeks the leave of the court to further adduce in his case. Let me observe that there is a limit to filing of processes in Originating Summons proceedings. By the provisions of Order 15 Rules 5 and 6 of the NICN Rules 2017, filing of processes in Originating Summons proceedings closes when the Claimant files a further affidavit. However, in furtherance of the interest of justice and fair hearing, I permitted parties to file additional affidavits. The Claimant alone had earlier filed a total of 4 affidavits in support of his originating summons and he still wants to file more by the fact of the instant motion. I recall my specific order made in my ruling of 20th March 2018 where I foreclosed the parties from filing further processes in respect of this suit. The Claimant’s instant motion does not contain a prayer seeking this court’s order to vacate or set aside that earlier order. The order still subsists. Furthermore, I have taken a look at the additional evidence the Claimant intended to adduce. By the depositions in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the proposed further and better affidavit, the facts the Claimant wants to adduce in evidence happened during the pendency of this case. In fact, most of the facts happened after the date this suit was adjourned for judgement. The additional facts, besides the fact that they cannot be admissible having been made by parties interested in the suit when proceedings were pending, has no relevance or impact on the questions the Claimant submitted for determination in this suit. The said additional facts came up recently, long after the suit had been filed. They were not the basis for the suit and cannot therefore be considered in determining the issues to be resolved in the suit. In my view, the additional evidence is not relevant in this suit. In sum, to allow the Claimant’s application is to open a floodgate for other processes to be filed in the matter. This court will indulge the parties no further. In that wise, I will not waste the time of the court further by examining the details of the motion. In addition to my order of 20th March 2018, I see no merit in the motion. It is dismissed. JUDGMENT IN THE SUBSTANTIVE SUIT I have mentioned in the ruling just delivered that the Claimant’s motion filed on 10th July 2018 was the reason the judgment in this suit was not delivered on 17th July 2018. With the motion out of the way, the judgement will now be delivered. The Claimant instituted this action on 28th December 2016 by way of originating summons wherein he presented the following questions for determination: 1. Whether upon the construction of the provisions of Section 36 (1), (4) and (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as altered, the provisions of the Public Service Rules regulating dismissal, and those of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Conditions of Service, particularly Chapter One, Section 6, relating to determination of appointments and Chapter 2, relating to Staff Discipline, the letter dated 7th September, 2016, purportedly issued by the 2nd Defendant herein, allegedly acting upon a non-existent directive of His Excellency, the President, and upon which directives the 1st Defendant herein, purportedly dismissed the Claimant from the services of the 1st Defendant, vide letter dated 26th September, 2016, are not a nullity, void and contrary to the rules of fair hearing, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. 2. Whether the Central Disciplinary Committee set up by the 1st Defendant was right in assuming jurisdiction to try and find the Claimant guilty of the serious criminal offences of fraud, issuance of bounced cheque, and fraudulently obtaining the sum of N3,500,000.00 from one Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu, and receiving evidence against the Claimant in his absence, without affording him an opportunity to cross-examine his principal accuser, upon which basis the Claimant was purportedly dismissed from the services of the 1st Defendant, are not contrary to the principles of natural justice and doctrine of fair hearing as enshrined in Section 36(1), (4) and (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as altered. 3. Whether having regard to extant provisions of the Civil Service Rules and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as altered, the 1st Defendant was right to have severally refused the directives of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation and that of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, to recall, restore and reinstate the Claimant to his position in the employment of the1st Defendant with all his salaries and entitlements duly paid to him. 4. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought upon the declaration of this Honourable Court that the purported dismissal of the claimant is unlawful in the circumstances of this case. Upon the determination of the above questions submitted for the determination of this court, the Claimant sought the following reliefs: 1. A Declaration that upon the construction of the provisions of Section 36(1), (4) and (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as altered, the provisions of the Public Service Rules regulating dismissal, and those of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Conditions of Service, particularly Chapter One, Section 6, relating to determination of appointments and Chapter 2, relating to Staff Discipline, the letter dated 7th September, 2016, purportedly issued by the 2nd Defendant herein, allegedly acting upon a non-existent directive of His Excellency, the President, and upon which directives the 1st Defendant herein, purportedly dismissed the Claimant from the services of the 1st Defendant, vide letter dated 26th September, 2016, are a nullity, void and contrary to the rules of fair hearing, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. 2. A Declaration that the Central Disciplinary Committee set up by the 1st Defendant was wrong in assuming jurisdiction to try the Claimant over serious criminal offences of fraud, issuance of bounced cheque, and fraudulently obtaining the sum of N3,500,000.00, from one Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu, and receiving evidence against the Claimant in his absence, without affording him an opportunity to cross-examine his principal accuser, are contrary to the principles of natural justice and the doctrine of fair hearing as enshrined in Section 36(1), (4) and (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as altered. 3. A Declaration that having regard to extant Civil Service Rules and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as altered, the 1st Defendant was wrong to have severally refused the instructions of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation (HCSF) and that of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) to restore the Claimant to his position with all his salaries and entitlements duly paid to him. 4. A Declaration that the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought from this Honourable Court, the dismissal of the Claimant being unlawful in the circumstances of this case. 5. An Order setting aside the letter purportedly determining the appointment of the Claimant dated 26th September, 2016, titled, "Re: suspension of the directives of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation to the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation to reinstate Mr. Brian Esema", purportedly acting on the directives of the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice contained in a letter dated 7th September, 2016. 6. An Order directing the immediate reinstatement and reintegration of the Claimant to the services of the 1st Defendant, and further directing a restoration of all his rights and privileges, without loss of seniority, entitlements and restoration to the rank of Deputy Director, being the status presently occupied by his colleagues of the same cadre. 7. An Order directing the full payment of all the Claimant's salaries, emoluments, entitlements, and perquisites of office from the date of his purported suspension being 9th February, 2009, till date, pursuant to the order setting aside the letter purportedly determining the Claimants appointment dated, 26th September, 2016. 8. An Order restraining the Defendants, whether by themselves, their agents, servants and/or privies and/or all officers, servant its and functionaries of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or any other public officer, whatsoever or otherwise howsoever, from giving or continuing to give effect to the letter dated 26th September 2016, purported to have determined the appointment of the Claimant. 9. An Order restraining the Defendants, whether by themselves, their agents, servants, privies and/or all officers, servants and functionaries of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or any other public officer, whatsoever or otherwise howsoever, from obstructing, disturbing, interfering, stopping or preventing the Claimant in any manner whatsoever, from performing the functions of his office as a staff of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Scheme. 10. An Order compelling the Defendants jointly and severally to pay to the Claimant the sum of N1 billion (N1,000,000,000) only as general, aggravated, punitive and exemplary damages for the unlawful, wrongful, illegal, unconstitutional and oppressive dismissal and the attendant humiliation, psychological trauma, mental agony and odium caused the Claimant and his family, by the actions of the Defendants. 11. And for such further or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance of this case. CLAIMANT’S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS The Claimant supported the Originating Summons with an affidavit deposed by him. The Claimant averred therein that he joined the services of the 1st Defendant in 1998 as a Management Assistant and he rose to the level of Principal Manager over the years. He was a Principal Manager in Insurance and Surveillance Department of the 1st Defendant in 2008 when the incidence which resulted to this suit occurred. The 1st Defendant first gave him a query dated 13th January 2009 and thereafter suspended him without pay vide letter dated 9th February 2009. The query and suspension letters are Exhibits BOE 2 and BOE 3. While he was on suspension, he was invited by the 1st Defendant to appear before the Central Disciplinary Committee (CDC) in a letter dated 2nd March 2009 (Exhibit BOE 4). On 3rd March 2009, the Claimant appeared before the CDC to defend himself of the allegations of fraud and issuance of bounced cheque levelled against him by one Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu. The following day being 4th March 2009, his principal accuser, Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu, testified before the CDC in the absence of the Claimant. The Claimant maintained that he was not afforded any opportunity to confront the complainant or to cross examine him concerning the allegations levelled against the Claimant. In its report, the CDC indicted the Claimant for fraud. The Claimant also maintained that he has not even seen a copy of the petition which prompted the disciplinary action against him. Some months later, he petitioned to the Minister, Federal Ministry of Finance and the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vide letters dated 10th June 2009 and 10th April 2012 respectively over his predicament. The letters are Exhibits BOE-5 and BOE-6. During the course of his travails, the said Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu wrote a letter dated 5th November 2014, Exhibit BOE 7, to the 1st Defendant to the effect that the subject matter of his earlier complaint against the Claimant had been resolved. Notwithstanding, the 1st Defendant refused to recall the Claimant. When the issue persisted, the Claimant petitioned to the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation and also to the Secretary to the Government of the Federation. Following these developments, the Claimant averred that he was eventually recalled to the services of the 1st Defendant vide a letter dated 5th April 2016, which is Exhibit BOE 15, after a period of 7 years and 2 months under suspension without pay. This letter for his recall mentioned a dismissal letter which was never served on him. Upon his resumption of duty, he was taken back to the position of Principal Manager which was the same position he was in 2007. His salary and entitlements were not also paid to him contrary to the directives of the HCSF in the letter dated 3rd August 2015 and affirmed by the SGF in his letter dated 30th March 2016. While he was struggling to get his salary and other emoluments paid as directed by the HCSF and affirmed by the SGF, he was served with a letter dated 26th September 2016, that is Exhibit BOE 16, terminating his appointment with the 1st Defendant. This letter was said to have been prompted by a letter dated 7th September 2016, Exhibit BOE-17, which emanated from the office of the 2nd Defendant on the directives of Mr. President, suspending the directives of the SGF to the 1st Defendant to reinstate the Claimant. The Claimant said he believed there was no directive from Mr. President directing the 2nd Defendant to review the matter. The law firm of Mike Ozekhome's Chambers wrote to the 1st Defendant on behalf of the Claimant in a letter dated 25th November 2016 to reinstate the Claimant, but the 1st Defendant refused to reverse the dismissal of the Claimant. In a meeting with his counsel, Chief Mike Ozekhome, SAN, the Claimant was informed by the said Chief Mike Ozekhome, SAN, as follows: the CDC set up by the 1st Defendant to try the case of fraud and other crimes alleged against the Claimant is not vested with such jurisdiction to try the alleged crimes, not being a court of competent jurisdiction established for that purpose; the procedure adopted by the CDC is against the principles of fair hearing; the action of the 1st Defendant severally disobeying and disregarding the instructions and directives of the HCSF is an act of insubordination; there is no letter from the President or any other form of instruction passed to the 2nd Defendant mandating it to write the letter dated 7th September 2016; the said letter of 7th September 2016 is fraught with irregularity and inconsistencies; his office has petitioned to the President, 2nd Defendant and the Vice President about the grave injustice meted out to the Claimant but till date, nothing has been said by these persons or any action taken to address the issue of the Claimant’s wrongful dismissal. The Claimant has been tagged a criminal since the news of his purported dismissal, he has received calls and messages from people who have been embarrassed by the news about the Claimant’s alleged conducts and dismissal. The Claimant and his family have been greatly traumatized by the news of his purported dismissal based on allegations of non-existent offences he knew nothing about. WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS In the accompanying written address, learned counsel for the Claimant argued the issues presented in the Originating Summons for determination by the court. In arguing Issues 1 and 2 together, counsel cited the case of EKEAGWU vs. NIGERIAN ARMY (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1220) 419 at Pg. 429, paras F - G, where his Lordship Onnoghen JSC, on the primary issues for termination in a case of wrongful termination, held thus: "It is important to remind us that in an action for wrongful termination/dismissal/retirement, only two primary issues call for determination. These are (1) Whether the termination/dismissal/retirement of the plaintiff is wrongful, and (2) What is the measure of damages recoverable where the termination/dismissal/retirement is found to be wrongful." Placing reliance on the case of MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR OF BENUE STATE & ORS vs. ULEGEDE & ANOR (2001) LPELR - 3184 (SC) P. 35 para E – C, Counsel argued that the action of the 1st Defendant is illegal, null and void, in that it was wrong and unconstitutional for the CDC set up by the 1st Respondent to assume criminal jurisdiction to try the Claimant on the offences of dud cheques, fraud, and fraudulently obtaining the sum of N3,500,000.00 (Three Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira) from Mr. Ikechukwu. This submission was premised on the provisions of Section 36(1) and (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999 as altered, from which counsel deduced that only Courts or Tribunals established by the Constitution can try criminal offence(s), as judicial authority is vested only in the courts and not administrative tribunals or Disciplinary Committees or Boards. See Section 6(6) (b) of the 1999 CFRN. On the claims made against the Claimant in Exhibit BOE 3, counsel contended that the CDC not being a court or tribunal established by law within the contemplation of Section 36 (1) and (4) of the constitution, should not have assumed jurisdiction to investigate or try the Claimant on the allegations of criminal offences under the Penal Code, Dishonoured Cheques (Offences) Act Cap DII 2004 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act. Therefore, all the actions of the CDC in that regard are null and void. See DENLOYE vs. MEDICAL AND DENTAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE (1968) 1 ANLR 306; DR. O. M ALAKIJA vs. THE MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE (1959) IV FSC, 38. On Issue 4, counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought upon the declaration of the Court that the purported dismissal of the Claimant is unlawful in the circumstances of this. Counsel referred to the case of EX-CAPT CHARLES C. EKEAGWU vs. THE NIGERIAN ARMY AND ANOR (2010) LPELR-1076 (SC) Pg. 10, para E-G and SAIBU vs. KWARA STATE POLYTECHNIC, ILORIN (2008) LPELR-4524 (CA). On the award of exemplary damages, learned counsel for the Claimant, placing reliance on the Court of Appeal’s holding in OBINWA vs. C.O.P (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1045) 911 at 426 para F, submitted that there was a valid cause of action and that there was no basis for the dismissal of the Claimant. See also ALLIED BANK OF NIGERIA LTD vs. AKUBUEZE (1997) LPELR-429 (SC) Pp 48 and 49, para F – B. On award of aggravated damages as claimed by the Claimant, counsel cited the cases of ODIBI & ANOR vs. MUEME (1999) LPELR-2216 (SC) at p. 24, Para G, EFCC vs. INUWA vs. ANOR (2014) LPELR-23597 (CA) and urged the court to hold in favour of the Claimants. 1ST DEFENDANT’S COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT OF 7/3/2017 Upon service of the Originating Summons on the Defendants, only the 1st Defendant filed counter affidavit to oppose the claims of the Claimant. The only process filed by the 2nd Defendant is a motion seeking an order striking out its name from the suit. I will come to that motion in the course of this judgment. The 1st Defendant’s counter affidavit was deposed to by one Kutebyatso Festus Markus, a Principal Manager in the Legal Department of the 1st Defendant. He said he was involved in the investigation of allegations of misconduct levelled against the Claimant which led to his dismissal from service. The deponent stated that on 6th January 2009, one Chijioke Ekechukwu of Bristol Investment Limited forwarded a petition to the 1st Defendant's Managing Director against the Claimant. The petition is Exhibit NDIC 1. The complaint in the petition was that the Claimant, while in the employment of the 1st Defendant, misrepresented himself to the Petitioner as an oil and gas businessman. The Claimant also signed a Memorandum of Understanding 26th May 2008 with the petitioner for the chartering of a vessel in consideration of the sum of N3,500,000.00. The Claimant issued a cheque for this amount to the petitioner which the petitioner presented on the due date but was dishonoured by the Bank. Exhibits NDIC 2 and NDIC 3 are a copy of the said Memorandum of Understanding and the dishonoured Intercontinental Bank Plc cheque. On receipt of the petition, the 1st Defendant issued a query dated 13th January 2009 to the Claimant and the Claimant responded to the query on the 16th January 2009. The query is Exhibit NDIC 4 while the Claimant’s response is Exhibit NDIC 5. In his response, the Claimant did not deny collecting the sum of N3,500,000,00 from the petitioner and he also did not deny issuing a cheque for the same amount to the Petitioner. The Claimant was discovered to be a director of Bodel Blossom International Limited, a private limited liability company whose business was in the provision of marine construction services to companies engaged in off-shore oil and gas production and development, while in the employment of the 1st Defendant. A search report from the Corporate Affairs Commission is Exhibit NDIC 6. The 1st Defendant subsequently set up a Central Disciplinary Committee (CDC) to investigate the allegations against the Claimant. The Claimant was placed on suspension pending the investigation vide Exhibit NDIC 7. The CDC invited the Claimant to appear before it on 3rd March 2009 and the Claimant did appear and testified before the CDC on that day. The proceeding was adjourned to the 4th March 2009 for the Petitioner to testify. The Claimant however failed to be present on the said date for reasons best known to him. At the end of proceedings of the CDC, the CDC did not find the Claimant guilty of the criminal offences of fraud, issuance of bounced cheque and fraudulently obtaining the sum of N3,500,000.00 from Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu. The CDC rather found the Claimant liable for gross misconduct on the following grounds: While in the employment of the 1st Defendant as a public servant, the Claimant was also a Director of a limited liability company; the Claimant paraded himself as an Oil and Gas dealer to Chijioke Ekechukwu and collected the sum of N3,500,000.00 which amounted to gross misconduct; the Claimant issued a post-dated cheque for the sum of N3,500,000 which was dishonoured by the bank upon presentation by the Chijioke Ekechukwu which resulted in financial embarrassment to the 1st Defendant as Supervisor of banks. The 1st Defendant's CDC consequently recommended the termination of the Claimant's employment in its report annexed as Exhibit NDIC 8. The report of the CDC was presented to the 1st Defendant's Executive Committee who, at its meeting held on the 8th and 12th April 2009, considered the report, accepted the findings of the CDC and recommended the dismissal of the Claimant for gross misconduct. An excerpt from the minutes of the 1st Defendant’s Executive Committee meeting is Exhibit NDIC 9. On the 22nd June 2009, the 1st Defendant forwarded the recommendation to the Honourable Minister of Finance, who approved the dismissal of the Claimant from services of the 1st Defendant. Exhibit NDIC 10 is the said approval. The Claimant had full opportunity to cross examine the petitioner if he so desired but failed to utilize the opportunity. The Claimant was availed a copy of the petition written by Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu when he appeared before the CDC on 3rd March 2009. The Claimant was also aware of the contents of the petition as they were contained in the Query issued to him since on 13th January 2009. The Claimant's letter to the Honourable Minister of Finance dated 10th June 2009 was forwarded to the 1st Defendant for its reaction. The 1st Defendant’s reaction to the Honourable Minister of Finance is Exhibit NDIC 11. The letter dated 5th November 2014 written by Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu was received by the 1st Defendant on 6th November 2014 long after the Claimant has been dismissed from the employment on 8th July 2009. Upon receipt of the letter from the Secretary to the Government of the Federation dated 18th January 2016, the 1st Defendant responded via letter dated 26th January 2016. The 1st Defendant’s reply is Exhibit NDIC 14. The 1st Defendant is a statutory corporation which is not subject to the directives and control of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or the Secretary to the Government of the Federation on matters relating to the employment and dismissal of its employees because it's enabling statute confers that power on it. The Claimant was not placed on suspension for over 70months as claimed by him. He was suspended on 9th February 2009 and dismissed from service on 5th July 2009. The dismissal letter dated 8th July 2009 was served on the Claimant through Red Star Express courier services at his known address contained in his records with the 1st Defendant on the same day. The dismissal letter and courier waybill are Exhibits NDIC 15 and NDIC 16 respectively. Pursuant to the irregular recall of the Claimant based on the pressure and directives of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, he was posted to the 1st Defendant's Yola office. The 1st Defendant received a copy of the 2nd Defendant’s letter of 7th September 2016 to the Honourable Minister of Finance requesting the suspension of the directives of the SGF on the reinstatement of the Claimant. The 1st Defendant also received a letter written by the 2nd Defendant addressed to the Federal Ministry of Finance conveying the 2nd Defendant's request for the suspension of the SGF's directives. Upon receipt of the letter from the 2nd Defendant, the 1st Defendant suspended compliance with the directive of the SGF via a letter dated 26th September 2016 to the Claimant. The said letter is Exhibit NDIC 22. That the 1st Defendant is not aware of the Claimant's alleged travails. The deponent averred in conclusion that the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs he sought. 1ST DEFENDANT’S WRITTEN ADDRESS OF 7/3/2017 In the accompanying written address, counsel formulated three issues for determination to wit: a. Whether the Claimant's act of parading himself as an oil dealer and issuing a cheque of N3,500,000.00 which was dishonoured by the Bank upon presentation amongst others, to Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu does not amount to gross misconduct to entitle the 1st Defendant to dismiss him. b. Whether the Claimant's holding of the position of Director in a private Company while in the employment of the 1st Defendant does not amount to a violation of Section 2 (b) of the code of conduct for public officers, fifth schedule, part 1 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. c. Whether an employee must first be found guilty by a Court of competent jurisdiction before he can be dismissed by his employer for gross misconduct which may bother on criminality. On Issue One, learned counsel emphasized that the Central Disciplinary Committee did not at any point assume jurisdiction to try and find the Claimant guilty of criminal offences as canvassed by the Claimant’s counsel. Counsel referred the court to paragraph 20 of the 1st Defendant's counter-affidavit, Exhibits NDIC 2, NDIC 3 and NDIC 6 and letters written by the Claimant particularly Exhibit BOE-5. It was the submission of learned counsel that where an employee is liable of gross misconduct he could be lawfully dismissed summarily, even without notice and wages. Counsel placed reliance on NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL & ORS vs. HON MR. JUSTICE CPN SENLONG & ORS (2010) LPELR-458 (CA). Counsel submitted that the Claimant was present during the 1st Defendant's Central Disciplinary Committee's proceedings of 3rd March 2009 but failed to attend the Committee's proceedings on 4th March 2009 hence the Claimant cannot complain of denial of fair hearing when he had the opportunity of being heard but failed to utilize same. See NAFDAC vs. ONWUKA (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1398) 593. On Issue Two, learned counsel for the 1st Defendant placed reliance on Section 2 (b) of the code of conduct for public officers, fifth schedule, part 1 of the 1999 Constitution and submitted that the Claimant was a public officer in the employment of the 1st Defendant, a statutory corporation, and at the same time held the position of a director in a private company as contained in paragraph 20 (r.) of the 1st Defendant's counter-affidavit, Exhibit NDIC 6 and the Claimant's Exhibit BOE-5. On Issue Three, counsel submitted that the employer can dismiss an employee where the accusation against such employee is of gross misconduct involving dishonesty bordering on criminality and that it is not necessary under Section 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution that the employee is first tried in a court of law. See NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL & ORS vs. HON. MR. JUSTICE CPN SENLONG & ORS (Supra), ARINZE vs. FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA LTD (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 663 at 673; 765, 676 - 677 (SC); FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. LAOYE (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 652; GARBA vs. UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550 and YUSUF vs. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 457) 632. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the argument of the Claimant and resolve this issue in favour of the 1st Defendant. CLAIMANT’S FURTHER AFFIDAVIT OF 7/6/2017 The Claimant filed a further affidavit deposed to by him. However, most of the averments in the Claimant’s further affidavit are arguments are conclusions. I shall disregard the offensive depositions. The factual matters which the further affidavit contains are that he did not dispute the fact that he has been unlawfully dismissed by the 1st Defendant. His contention is whether the dismissal followed due process of law and regulation governing his employment. The 1st Defendant’s Exhibits NDIC 1 and NDIC 4 show that the petition to the 1st Defendant was on a case of fraud and issuance of dud cheque. These are criminal offences which the 1st Defendant has no jurisdiction to entertain, investigate or punish. The unsigned report of the CDC also shows that the Claimant was tried and found liable by the CDC for fraud and issuance of dud cheques, which offences the 1st Defendant or the CDC has no jurisdiction to try. The Claimant was tried and found guilty of criminal offences and not gross misconduct because the query never mentioned that gross misconduct to be the allegation against the Claimant. After the 1st Defendant's Exhibit NDIC 13, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation has written Exhibit BOE 12 dated 18th January 2016 and Exhibit BOE 14 dated 9th February 2016 to the 1st Defendant on the need to obey the directives of the SGF to reinstate the Claimant before the 1st Defendant recalled the Claimant on 5th April 2016 vide Exhibit BOE 15. The letter for the Claimant’s recall was not irregular. The Ministry of Finance is the supervising Ministry of the 1st Defendant and staffs of the 1st Defendant are Public Servants in the public service of the Federation under the Constitution and Rule 010101 of the Public Service Rules. The provision of Rule160101 of the Public Service Rules regulates the conduct of affairs of the 1st Defendant. By the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) Act, there was no board to ratify the decision of the EXCO to dismiss the Claimant at the material time of the dismissal. Also, the NDIC Act did not make the decision of the Exco subject to the approval of the Minister of Finance. From the provision, of the NDIC Act, the Board decision is final. The Act did not direct the 1st Defendant to seek the approval of the Minister of Finance to rectify the decision of the Exco to dismiss the Claimant. No approval was given to the decision of the Exco by anybody, authority or Board. Before Exhibit NDIC 22 was issued by the 1stDefendant, the Claimant was not given a fair hearing by the Defendants nor called upon to react to the petition that prompted his dismissal. All issues pertaining to the petition were brought to an end with the issuance of the letter of recall date 15th April 2016 and his subsequent redeployment Yola branch. The actions of the Defendants are a violation of the Claimant’s constitutional right to fair hearing. CLAIMANT’S WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF FURTHER AFFIDAVIT OF 7/6/2017 Accompanying the said further affidavit which was deposed to by the Claimant, learned counsel for the Claimant filed a written address wherein he raised three issues for determination in line with the 1st Defendant’s formulated issues: On Issue One, counsel submitted that CTC of the CDC’s report that purportedly found the Claimant guilty of alleged criminal conduct, was undated and unsigned, hence it could not have conferred any Power on the EXCO of the 1st Defendant to take the decision to dismiss the Claimant. See FASEHUN & ORS vs. A.G. FEDERATION (2006) LPELR-5567 (CA), UBN PLC vs. TOYINBO (2008) LPELR-5056 (CA), GARUBA vs. KWARA INVESTMENT CO. LTD. & 2 ORS (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 160. Counsel submitted that the proper thing for the court to do is to discountenance such documents and not attach any value to it. See OJO vs. ABT ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED & ANOR (2014) LPELR-22860 (CA). Relying on the case of MBANG vs. GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER LTD. & ANOR (2010) LPELR-11838 (CA), counsel submitted that an unsigned document cannot generate or initiate an action and argued that the alleged document is null and void according to the provisions of Sections 83 (4) & Section 41 of the Evidence Act 2011. Counsel also submitted that subjecting the decision of the EXCO meeting of the 1st Defendant to the Hon. Minister of Finance for approval is illegal, unlawful, ultra vires, null and void. Counsel argued that the NDIC Act did not give such final powers to the EXCO and the Minister of Finance per Section 5(1). Counsel further submitted that the absence of any Board of Directors to approve the decision of the EXCO to dismiss the Claimant or in its absence the Nigeria Management Committee, showed that there was no Board or body to rectify the decision of the EXC0 to act on the unsigned CDC report. On Issue 2, the Claimant counsel submitted that all that transpired from 2009, came to an effective end with the issuance of the letter of recall dated 5th April 2016 (Exhibit BOE-15) to the Claimant. It was the submission of the Claimant counsel that the 1st Defendant was estopped from resurrecting the same allegations by way of Petition and further retrial, especially where the Claimant had no chance of seeing a copy of the said fresh Petition to the HAGF protesting his recall as that would amount to double jeopardy to the Claimant and a violation of his right to fair hearing. See Section 36(1) of the CFRN 1999. On Issue 3, counsel urged the court to hold that there was no directive contained in Exhibit NDIC 20 that bestowed on the 1st Defendant the right to unilaterally issue the Claimant with a 2nd letter of dismissal (Exhibit NDIC 22). Counsel submitted that in the face of the illegal, ultra-vires, unconstitutional and unilateral action carried out by the 1st Defendant, the only thing that meets the justice of this case is to have the NDIC withdraw its letter of 26th September 2016 purportedly dismissing Mr. Brian Esema, recall him to the services of the NDIC and thereafter furnish the office of the HAGF with details of the matter for its (HAGF) further review. See Section 173(1) & (2) of the CFRN 1999. 1ST DEFENDANT’S FURTHER AND BETTER AFFIDAVIT OF 19/12/2017 The 1st Defendant filed a further and better affidavit of Tajudeen Ayeni, Litigation Secretary of J-K Gadzama LLP, the firm representing the 1st Defendant in this suit. The deponent averred that EXHIBIT NDIC 20 contained a directive from the 2nd Defendant that the 1st Defendant should stay further action on the directive of the Secretary of the Government of the Federation for the Claimant's recall. EXHIBIT NDIC 20 was received by the 1st Defendant on 14th September 2016 as endorsed on page I of the said Exhibit. EXHIBIT NDIC 20 was copied to the 1st Defendant by the 2nd Defendant but endorsed for her information and necessary action. The then Honourable Minister of Finance gave approval for the dismissal of the Claimant in Exhibit NDIC 10. The Claimant was present at the CDC's proceedings of 3rd March 2009 where it was adjourned to the 4th day of March 2009 for the Petitioner's testimony. 1ST DEFENDANT’S WRITTEN ADDRESS OF 19/12/2017 In the accompanying written address, learned counsel for the 1st Defendant formulated three issues for determination to wit: a. Whether paragraphs 5, 6(b), 6(c), 6(d), 6(e), 6 (f), 6(g), 6(j), 6(k), 6(n), 6(o), 6(r), 6(s), 6(x), 6(aa), 6(bb), 6(cc), 6(ee), 6(ff), 6(kk), 6(ll), 6(oo), 6(pp), 8 and 9 of the Claimant's further affidavit filed on 7th June 2017 are not liable to be struck out for non-compliance with Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 2011 b. Whether the Claimant has discharged the burden of proof of allegation of breach of fair hearing. c. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in his Originating Summons. On Issue 1, learned counsel for the 1st Defendant submitted that the claims contained in the paragraphs referenced in Issue One are incompetent for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and as such, are liable to be struck out by this Honourable Court as they are extraneous legal arguments. See BAMAIYI vs. STATE (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 715) 276 at 289 Paras C – G. On Issue 2, counsel submitted that the burden of proving the allegation of breach of fair hearing rests squarely on the Claimant. Counsel placed reliance on the case of MAIKYO vs. ITODO (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1034) 443 at 465 and his prior argument that the Claimant was afforded a fair hearing. On Issue 3, it was the contention of counsel that cases are proven on credible, cogent and believable evidence. Citing the case of MAIDARA vs. HALILU (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 257 at 268 Para G counsel urged the Court to discountenance the Claimant's depositions and arguments in respect of the "unsigned" memo attached to Exhibit NDIC 8 as there is nowhere in the NDIC Act or any other law that makes the said memo a condition precedent for the dismissal of the Claimant. Counsel went on that the law is that weight can still be attached to an unsigned document where evidence is given on it. On this point, counsel cited the case of OMEGA BANK (NIG.) PLC vs. O.B.C. LTD (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 547 and urged the court to discountenance the Claimant’s argument on the point. According to counsel, the Claimant clearly misconceived the principle of the doctrine of estoppel as canvassed under issue 2 of his written address. Furthermore, counsel argued that the Claimant had altered the content of various exhibits submitting that Exhibit NDIC 20 which clearly shows that the said exhibit was received by the 1st Defendant on 14th September 2016 as endorsed on page 1 of the said Exhibit, and that Exhibit NDIC 20 was actually copied to the 1st Defendant by the Defendant and endorsed for her information and necessary action as can be seen on page 3 of the said Exhibit NDIC 20. Counsel also referred the court to paragraphs 6(gg) of the Claimant's further affidavit and the case of GOVERNOR OF OGUN STATE vs. MR. ADEGBOYEGA ADEBOLA COKER (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 406) 1900 at 1913; DIVINE IDEAS LIMITED vs. HAJIA MEROUMORU (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 380) 1468 at 1500. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the above mentioned depositions. Further, counsel submitted that the Claimant's bare assertion in paragraph 6(nn) of his further affidavit that a letter was written by the Defendant dated 2nd May, 2014 with Ref No. PEL/S.22/V must be treated as mere ipse dixit and should not be regarded as reliable by this Court because it is a bare assertion resting on the authority of the Claimant who deposed to the said further affidavit. See OKUNADE vs. OLAWALE (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1415) 213 C, EFCC vs. LITTLE CHILD (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1498) P 72. Counsel added that the Claimant's notice to produce issued to the 1st Defendant in paragraph 6(nn) of his further affidavit will not obviate the necessity of substantiating the deposition in the said paragraph because a Notice to Produce allows the opposing party to tender and rely on a copy of a document in the possession of the other party. Counsel emphasized that the further affidavit contained issues of facts that were not pleaded or in anywhere contained in his affidavit in support of the Originating Summons or even his further affidavit filed on 7th June 2017. He urged the court to dismiss the suit. CLAIMANT’S FURTHER AND BETTER AFFIDAVIT OF 2/1/2018 The Claimant also filed a further and better affidavit. The Claimant maintained that he was never afforded adequate opportunity of cross-examining his principal accuser as provided for in the 1st Defendant's Terms and Conditions of Service Handbook. The 2nd Defendant had rescinded its earlier directives contained in Exhibit NDIC 20 by a letter dated 23rd October 2017, annexed as Exhibit BOE 24. The 1st Defendant has failed to give effect to the directive of the 2nd Defendant after over two months of receiving Exhibit BOE 24. From the provisions of the NDIC Act and the 1st Defendant’s Terms and Conditions of Service, the decisions of its Exco are not subject to the Minister's approval, which was not obtained in the first place. It is only the Board of the 1st Defendant that can give effect to any decision reached by the Exco. CLAIMANT’S WRITTEN ADDRESS OF 2/1/2018 In the accompanying written address, counsel for the Claimant addressed the issues as raised by the 1st Defendant in its written address. On Issue 1, counsel submitted that the case of BAMAIYI vs. STATE cited by the 1st Defendant is not relevant to the instant case. It was the submission of learned counsel for the Claimant that the 1st Defendant’s argument that the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 6 of the Claimant's Further Affidavit offend the provisions of the Section 115 Evidence Act is erroneous. Counsel urged the court to hold that there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of the evidence act in the Claimant's Further Affidavit. On Issue Two, learned counsel for the Claimant made reference to the provisions of Chapter 2, Section 13, of the 1st Defendant's Terms and Conditions of Service which regulates disciplinary committee procedure and argued that the breach of the above provision was a breach of fair hearing against the Claimant. Counsel urged the court to hold that all issues that took place, prior to, and that surrounds the issuance of the letter or recall, Exhibit BOE-15 were brought to a finality, when the 1st Defendant issued the Claimant with the said Exhibit BOE-15. Counsel also contended that the 1st Defendant failed to react to the facts surrounding the issuance of Exhibits NDIC 20 and NDIC 22. Counsel further submitted that the averments that he was not accorded fair hearing prior to their issuance, as contained in paragraphs 6(t), (u), (hh), (ii), (jj), (kk), 7, 8, and 12 of the Claimant's further affidavit were not contradicted by the 1st Defendant in any material particular and Counsel urged the court to deem those uncontroverted deposition as having been admitted. See UZODINMA vs. IZUNASO & ORS (2011) LPELR-5083 (CA), ONDO STATE vs. A.G. EKITI STATE (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 748) Pg. 706 at 749-750; F.B.N. PLC vs. NDARAKE & SONS NIG LTD. (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1164) Pg. 406 at 414 to 415; EX-PARTE ADESINA (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 42) Pg. 254 at 261-262 and OGOEJEOFO vs. OGOEJEOFO (2006) LPELR-2308 (SC). On Issue 3, counsel for the Claimant referenced a plethora of cases on unsigned documents whilst reiterating on prior argument. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimant has made a case to be entitled to the reliefs sought in this case. 1ST DEFENDANT’S FURTHER AND BETTER COUNTER AFFIDAVIT FILED ON 27/3/2018 PURSUANT TO LEAVE OF COURT The 1st Defendant, by leave of this court, filed a further and better counter affidavit. This affidavit was deposed by Amina P. Kwon, Deputy Manager in the Legal Department of 1st Defendant. It was averred that the irregular recall of the Claimant vide Exhibit BOE 15 dated 5th April 2016 was without prejudice to the 1st Defendant's objection and consistent position that the Claimant was duly dismissed as a staff of the 1st Defendant. The 2nd Defendant's letter dated 7th September, Exhibit NDIC 20, sought to be rescinded in paragraph 6 of Exhibit BOE-24, was pursuant to the directives of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the investigation and holistic appraisal of the facts of the matter. The essence of the directive of the President to the 2nd Defendant for review of the matter was for a determination of the legality or otherwise of the Claimant's dismissal by the 1st Defendant in the light of the earlier directive of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation for the Claimant's reinstatement. The 2nd Defendant did not undertake any holistic appraisal of the facts of the matter, neither did he investigate the matter as directed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria before issuing Exhibit BOE-24. The 2nd Defendant advised the reinstatement of the Claimant on the primary reason that the 1st Defendant purportedly withheld information that it had withdrawn its letter of dismissal and reinstated the Claimant. The decision of the 2nd Defendant to advise reinstatement of the Claimant did not address the directives of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which was for the 2nd Defendant to undertake a holistic appraisal of the matter as stated in paragraph 4 of Exhibit NDIC 20. Exhibit BOE-24 was not in existence at the time of institution of the instant suit by the Claimant and it was not addressed to the 1st Defendant but rather, it was addressed to the Honourable Minister of Finance. Exhibit BOE-24 required the Honourable Minister of Finance to direct the 1st Defendant to forward evidence of compliance with the reinstatement of the Claimant to the 2nd Defendant. One of the reasons why the 1st Defendant did not consider the advice of the 2nd Defendant as contained in Exhibit BOE-24 is because the subject matter of same is already a subject of litigation in this suit before this Honourable Court. COURT’S DECISION By a motion on notice filed on 19th March 2018, the 2nd Defendant sought an order of this court striking out its name from this suit. The Claimant and the 1st Defendant opposed the application for the reasons stated in their various counter affidavits. I will not waste time dwelling on the depositions in the affidavits of the parties save to say that I agree with the Claimant and the 1st Defendant that the 2nd Defendant is a necessary party in this case. Especially in view of the reliefs sought by the Claimant in this suit and the facts deposed in the affidavits filed in this case, the 2nd Defendant played some roles in the matter leading to this suit. The action of the 2nd Defendant is one of the causes of the Claimant’s action in this sit. Therefore, the 2nd Defendant is a necessary party to this case. I see no reason to grant the prayer sought in the motion. The motion is dismissed. In determining this case, I shall adopt the questions the Claimant sought to be answered in the Originating Summons as the issues for determination in this judgment. The issues are these: 1. Whether upon the construction of the provisions of Section 36 (1), (4) and (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as altered, the provisions of the Public Service Rules regulating dismissal, and those of the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Conditions of Service, particularly Chapter One, Section 6, relating to determination of appointments and Chapter 2, relating to Staff Discipline, the letter dated 7th September, 2016, purportedly issued by the 2nd Defendant herein, allegedly acting upon a non-existent directive of His Excellency, the President, and upon which directives the 1st Defendant herein, purportedly dismissed the Claimant from the services of the 1st Defendant, vide letter dated 26th September, 2016, are not a nullity, void and contrary to the rules of fair hearing, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. 2. Whether the Central Disciplinary Committee set up by the 1st Defendant was right in assuming jurisdiction to try and find the Claimant guilty of the serious criminal offences of fraud, issuance of bounced cheque, and fraudulently obtaining the sum of N3,500,000.00, from one Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu, and receiving evidence against the Claimant in his absence, without affording him an opportunity to cross-examine his principal accuser, upon which basis the claimant was purportedly dismissed from the services of the 1st Defendant, are not contrary to the principles of natural justice and doctrine of fair hearing as enshrined in Section 36(1), (4) and (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as altered. 3. Whether having regard to extant provisions of the Civil Service Rules and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as altered, the 1st Defendant was right to have severally refused the directives of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation and that of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, to recall, restore and reinstate the Claimant to his position in the employment of the1st Defendant with all his salaries and entitlements duly paid to him. 4. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought upon the declaration of this Honourable Court that the purported dismissal of the Claimant is unlawful in the circumstances of this case. Before I proceed to determine these issues, it is necessary at this stage to first of all determine the nature of the Claimant’s employment and the condition of service which regulates his employment with the 1st Defendant. The finding on this point will simplify the resolution of the issues involved in this case. The Claimant said in his further affidavit that employees of the 1st Defendant are public servants in the Public Service of the Federation under the Constitution and the Public Service Rules. He also averred that the provisions of the Public Service Rules regulate employment in the 1st Defendant. Going by the facts deposed by the Claimant, it is his case that his employment is regulated by the PSR. In effect, he claims that his employment enjoys statutory flavour, perhaps, that was why he sought some reliefs in this action which are grantable only to employment governed by Statute. In the counter affidavit of the 1st Defendant to the originating summons, it was stated that the 1st Defendant is a statutory corporation which is not subject to the directives and control of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or the Secretary to the Government of the Federation on matters relating to the employment and dismissal of its employees because it's enabling statute confers that power on it. The position of the 1st Defendant is that employment in the 1st Defendant is regulated by the 1st Defendant and not subject to external control. The Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant in December 1989. The Claimant’s employment letter is Exhibit BOE 1. The 1st Defendant is established in Section 1 of the NDIC Act, Cap N102, LFN 2006. In Section 5 of the Act, a Board was composed for the 1st Defendant with powers, among others, to: “(f) to appoint officers who in the opinion of the Board are required for carrying out the functions of the Corporation including the examination of insured institutions; (g) to fix terms and conditions of service including remuneration of the employees of the Corporation”. See Section 7 of the Act. Further in Section 9 (2) and (3) of the Act, the Board of the 1st Defendant has the power to: “(2) The Board shall appoint such number of officer and staff as may appear of the Secretary and other staff of the Corporation, expedient and necessary to the Board for the proper and efficient conduct of the business and functions of the Corporation. (3) The terms and conditions of service (including remuneration, allowances and pension benefits in accordance with the Pension Reforms Act), of the Secretary and other staff of the Corporation shall be as may be determined by the Board”. By the above provisions of the NDIC Act, the Board of the 1st Defendant has the power to employ staff of the 1st Defendant and to also make condition of service to regulate the employment. The Claimant, in his first question for determination and in his affidavit in support of the originating summons, mentioned the condition of service of the 1st Defendant which contains provisions for staff discipline and termination of employment. The Claimant’s averments clearly disclose that there is a condition of service in the 1st Defendant employment which contains provisions regulating the employment of its staff. This fact is more clearly demonstrated by the terms of the Claimant’s employment contained in his letter of employment. The employment letter contains the terms that the Claimant’s employment is pensionable and can be terminated by either party giving one month’s notice of termination or payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice and that the Claimant may be dismissed by the 1st Defendant for gross misconduct. It further clearly provides thus: “Your service with Corporation will be governed by the Corporation’s conditions of service in force from time to time.” These terms of the Claimant’s employment and the provisions of the NDIC Act reveal that the condition of service regulating the employment is that made by the 1st Defendant’s Board. The NDIC Act authorized the Board to make such regulation to govern the appointment and discipline of officers and staff. The 1st Defendant’s condition of service was made pursuant to the powers conferred on the Board of the 1st Defendant in the NDIC Act. The Claimant’s employment letter and the NDIC Act did not make the Claimant’s service in the 1st Defendant subject to the PSR. I have examined the provisions of the PSR itself and I find this provision in Rule 160501 of the PSR: “The power to exercise disciplinary control over officers in parastatals is vested in the supervisory Boards/Councils in accordance with their respective conditions of service”. That is to say the PSR recognises the responsibility of the 1st Defendant to regulate the condition of service of its staff including matters of discipline. Therefore, employment of the Claimant in the 1st Defendant has statutory flavour and is regulated by the terms of the employment contained in the employment letter and the conditions of service made by the Board of the 1st Defendant. I will now consider the issues for determination. ISSUE 1: My interpretation of the first question the Claimant sought to be answered by this court reveals that the point being raised by the Claimant is that the 1st Defendant dismissed him through the letter dated 26th September 2016 based on the letter from the 2nd Defendant dated 7th September 2016. This appears to be correct in view of the facts stated by the Claimant that while he was struggling to get his salary and other emoluments paid as directed by the HCSF and affirmed by the SGF, he was served with a letter dated 26th September 2016 terminating his appointment with the 1st Defendant. The Claimant also said this letter was prompted by a letter dated 7th September 2016 from the office of the 2nd Defendant on the directives of Mr. President, suspending the directives of the SGF to the 1st Defendant to reinstate the Claimant. The Claimant consequently wants this court to determine whether the directive of the 2nd Defendant in the letter of 7th September 2016 upon which he was dismissed vide letter dated 26th September 2016 is not null and void. The letter dated 7th September,2016 is a letter from the 2nd Defendant to the Minister of Finance advising the Minister to direct the 1st Defendant to stay further action on the directive of the Secretary to the Government of Federation (SGF) for the Claimant’s recall pending conclusion of a review of the matter to be conducted by the 2nd Defendant. This letter is Exhibit BOE 16 of the Claimant’s affidavit in support of the Originating summons. Pursuant to Exhibit BOE 16, the 1st Defendant wrote the letter dated 29th September 2016 to the Claimant informing the Claimant that the directive of the SGF for the re-instatement of the Claimant has been suspended with effect from 26/9/2016 by instruction from the 2nd Defendant. This letter is Exhibit BOE 15. In Exhibit BOE 15, the 1st Defendant only informed the Claimant that the directive of the SGF that the Claimant be re-instated has been suspended. Simply put, the effect of Exhibit BOE 15 was that the re-instatement of the Claimant was suspended by the 1st Defendant. The contents of Exhibit BOE 15 and BOE 16 disclose that the Claimant had been dismissed from the 1st Defendant’s employment before the date of these letters. From the affidavit evidence in this matter and the documents exhibited by the parties, the 1st Defendant’s letter to the Claimant dated 29th September 2016 was not the Claimant’s dismissal letter. In the 1st Defendant’s counter affidavit, it was stated that the Claimant was dismissed from the 1st Defendant’s employment on 8th July 2009 and the dismissal letter dated 8th July, 2009 was served on the Claimant through courier service. The dismissal letter and courier waybill are Exhibits NDIC 15 and NDIC 16 of the 1st Defendant’s counter affidavit. The Claimant, in his further affidavit agreed that he has been dismissed but contends that the dismissal was unlawful. The Claimant went further to point out several defects affecting his dismissal. It is therefore not in dispute that the Claimant was dismissed from the 1st Defendant’s employment. Whether the Claimant’s dismissal was lawful or not is another matter for later consideration. The fact is clear that the Claimant was dismissed from the employment by the 1st Defendant since on 8th July 2009, long before Exhibits BOE 15 and BOE 16 came into existence. The facts of the case show that the Claimant was re-instated by the 1st Defendant on the directive of SGF. It was this directive of the SGF reinstating the Claimant that was suspended in both Exhibits BOE 15 and BOE 16. I found therefore that Exhibit BOE 16 from the AGF was not the basis or reason for the Claimant’s dismissal. Also, Exhibit BOE 15, dated 26th September 2016, is not the Claimant’s dismissal letter. These letters did not play any role in the Claimant’s dismissal which happened since July 2009 neither can they be considered in relation to whether or not the Claimant’s dismissal was null and void. In the issue under consideration, the Claimant sought the court to consider the provisions of Section 36 (1), (4) and (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, the Public Service Rules and the 1st Defendant’s conditions of service to find that his dismissal vide Exhibit BOE 15, as instigated by Exhibit BOE 16, was a nullity, void and contrary to the rules of fair hearing. The provisions of the Constitution, the PSR and the 1st Defendant’s condition of service referred to have to do with the procedure for dismissal or termination of employment and fair hearing. The fact that the letters mentioned here were not the basis of the Claimant’s dismissal from the employment of the Claimant in the first place, the provisions of the Constitution, the PSR and the 1st Defendant’s condition of service referred to do not call for interpretation in this issue. Consequently, I resolve this issue against the Claimant. ISSUE 2: In the Claimant’s second question for determination, his complaints against his dismissal are that he was not given fair hearing before he was dismissed and that the allegations for which he was dismissed are criminal offences which the 1st Defendant or its Central Disciplinary Committee (CDC) have no power to try. The Claimant consequently sought this court to determine whether his dismissal was right in the face of the alleged anomalies. In his affidavit evidence, the Claimant said on 13th January 2009, the 1st Defendant gave him a query and later suspended him. While he was on suspension, he was invited to appear before the 1st Defendant’s Central Disciplinary Committee (CDC). On 3rd March 2009, the Claimant appeared before the CDC to defend himself of the allegations of fraud and issuance of bounced cheque levelled against him by one Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu. The following day, being 4th March 2009, the said Chijioke Ekechukwu who complained against him, testified before the CDC but the Claimant was not given the opportunity to confront the complainant or to cross examine him concerning the allegations levelled against the Claimant. The Claimant said he was denied fair hearing. The Claimant also said the petition to the 1st Defendant was on a case of fraud and issuance of dud cheque. These are criminal offences which the 1st Defendant has no jurisdiction to entertain, investigate or punish. Since the allegations against him were criminal in nature and the report of the CDC indicted him for fraud, the CDC of the 1st Defendant who tried the Claimant on the criminal allegation is not vested with jurisdiction to try the alleged crimes because it is not a court of competent jurisdiction. The Claimant also alleged that he was tried and found guilty of criminal offences and not gross misconduct since the query never mentioned gross misconduct as the allegation against him. In the affidavits filed by the 1st Defendant, it was averred that a petition was received from Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu against the Claimant alleging that the Claimant, while in the employment of the 1st Defendant, misrepresented himself to the Petitioner as an oil and gas businessman. The Claimant also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 26th May 2008 with the petitioner for the chartering of a vessel in consideration of the sum of N3,500,000.00. The Claimant issued a cheque for this amount to the petitioner which the petitioner presented on the due date but was dishonoured by the Bank. On receipt of the petition, the 1st Defendant issued a query to the Claimant and the Claimant responded to the query. The 1st Defendant subsequently set up a Central Disciplinary Committee (CDC) to investigate the allegations against the Claimant. The Claimant was placed on suspension pending the investigation. The CDC invited the Claimant to appear before it on 3rd March 2009 and the Claimant did appear and testified before the CDC on that day. The proceeding was adjourned to the 4th March 2009 for the Petitioner to testify. The Claimant however failed to be present on the said date. At the end the proceedings of the CDC, the CDC found the Claimant liable for gross misconduct (but not for criminal offences of fraud, issuance of bounced cheque and fraudulently obtaining the sum of N3,500,000.00). The facts of this case show that the disciplinary process against the Claimant was initiated by the complaint made by Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu against the Claimant. The complaint is Exhibit NDIC 1 of the 1st Defendant’s counter affidavit. It is dated 6/1/2009. The allegations made against the Claimant in the complaint are these: fraudulent swindle of the sum of N3,500,000 from the complainant on the guise of being an oil dealer without disclosing that he was a staff of the 1st Defendant; using the 1st Defendant as a cover for fraudulent activities. Upon receiving this complaint, the 1st Defendant gave the Claimant a query dated 12/1/2009, which is Exhibit BOE 2. The allegations laid against the Claimant in the query are as follows: “1. Parading yourself falsely as an oil dealer while in the service of the corporation. 2. Involvement in fraudulent activities and thereby defrauding Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu of the sum of N3,500,000.00. 3. Issuance of a dud cheque to Mr. Ekechukwu and thus involving yourself in financial embarrassment. 4. Bringing the name of the Corporation to disrepute by engaging yourself in fraudulent activities.” These were the allegations upon which the CDC was set up and the Claimant was tried before the CDC. While the Claimant said these allegations are criminal offences and the CDC does not have jurisdiction to try him on the offences, the 1st Defendant contended that the allegations amounted to gross misconduct and the 1st Defendant has the power to dismiss the Claimant in respect thereof without necessarily first subjecting him to criminal trial in court. To resolve this issue, it has to be determined whether the CDC tried the Claimant on criminal allegations or for gross misconduct. In the report of the CDC, which is Exhibit NDIC 8 of the 1st Defendant’s counter affidavit, the CDC found the Claimant liable for “gross misconduct as stated in Section 8 (a) ii) of the condition of service which is punishable by summary dismissal”. The Claimant’s dismissal letter is Exhibit NDIC 15. Paragraph 2 of the letter states as follows: “The CDC investigation established a case of gross misconduct against you which is punishable with dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 (a) (ii) of the staff condition of service”. None of the parties in this case exhibited the 1st Defendant’s condition of service to their affidavits despite the fact that they relied on it. When I was writing the judgment in this case, the need to examine the provision of the condition of service in resolving this issue became crucial. In Section 43 of the NIC Act 2006, Order 38 Rule 18 and Order 44 Rule 1 of the NICN Rules 2017, this court has the power to order any of the parties in this case to produce any document which will aid in the just determination of the case. In exercise of this power, I directed the parties to forward copies of the 1st Defendant’s condition of service to the court, especially as reliance had been placed on it by both parties. The 1st Defendant’s condition of service was produced, and I have examined its content. In Section 8 (a) of the condition of service, the 1st Defendant is permitted to dismiss any of its employees for acts, among which is, gross misconduct. The condition of service however did not define the acts which will amount to gross misconduct. Gross misconduct has been defined to include conducts that are of grave and weighty character as to undermine the confidence which should exist between an employer and employee or where an employer losses confidence in an employee or the employee commits an act which is injurious to the business of his employer and is incompatible with the faithful discharge of his duties. See NWOBOSI vs. A.C.B LTD (1995) LPELR – 2121. In the case of YUSUF vs. NATIONAL TEACHERS INSTITUTE (2002) FWLR (Pt. 129) 1509 at 1526, it was held that- “There are no fixed rules of law defining degree of misconduct which would justify a dismissal. It is enough that the conduct of the servant is of grave and weighty character as to undermine the confidence which would exist between him and his master. Working against the deep interest of the employer clearly amounts to gross misconduct entitling the employer to peremptorily dismiss the employee irrespective of the condition of service”. In ARINZE vs. FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 663 AT 673, it was held that in statutory employment as well as in private employment, the employer can dismiss in all cases of gross misconduct. From the report of the CDC and the content of the dismissal letter, the Claimant faced the CDC on the allegations made against him in the query and he was found guilty of gross misconduct under the 1st Defendant’s condition of service. That is to say, the disciplinary process was brought against the Claimant pursuant to the condition of service and he was found guilty of acts of gross misconduct under the condition of service. It is not in doubt that the allegations laid against the Claimant in the query come within criminal offences of fraud and issuing of dud cheque punishable under the various penal enactments, however, where a criminal act committed by an employee also amounts to act of gross misconduct, the master can dismiss without waiting for the employee to be tried in a law court for the criminal offence. This is to say it is not the law that once a crime is detected, the employer cannot dismiss an employee for gross misconduct unless he is tried and convicted first for the criminal aspect. In YUSUF vs. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 457) 632, the Supreme Court held thus: “It is not necessary, nor is it a requirement under section 33 of the 1979 Constitution that before an employer summarily dismisses his employee from his services under the common law, the employee must be tried before a court of law where the accusation against the employee is for gross misconduct involving dishonesty bordering on criminality.” Also, the Supreme Court held in OLAREWAJU vs. AFRIBANK PLC (2001) FWLR (Pt.72) 2008 at 2025 as follows: “Where therefore an employee has been found guilty by a disciplinary committee of any of the gross misconduct, the master has a choice either to exercise his or her discretion in favour of prosecuting the erring servant or dismissing him summarily. In other words, prosecution before a court of law, in the circumstance, is not a sin qua non for summary dismissal.” In EZE vs. SPRING BANK (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 609) 1076 at 1093, the Supreme Court also held: “It is no longer the law that where an employee commits acts of gross misconduct against his employer which act also disclose criminal offences under any law, the employer has to wait for the outcome of prosecution of the employee to discipline the employee under the contract of service or employment.” Once the 1st Defendant considers the acts of the Claimant to amount to gross misconduct under its condition of service, the law permits the 1st Defendant to take disciplinary actions against the Claimant but in accordance with the procedure laid down in the condition of service. From the facts, I find that the 1st Defendant or the CDC did not try the Claimant on or find him guilty of criminal offences. He was tried for acts the 1st Defendant considered to be gross misconduct under the 1st Defendant’s condition of service. Now, to the Claimant’s allegation that he was denied fair hearing by the 1st Defendant’s CDC. From the facts of this case, it is not in dispute that the Claimant was given a query and he responded to the query. It is also not in dispute that the Claimant was invited to appear before the 1st Defendant’s CDC and he did on 3rd March 2009 where he defended himself of the allegations against him. The Claimant’s complaint about the proceedings of the CDC is that he was not invited to the proceedings where the person who made the complaint against him, Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu, testified. The Claimant said he was not given opportunity to confront or cross examine the complainant. It is on this basis the Claimant alleged that he was denied fair hearing. The 1st Defendant did not deny the fact that the Claimant was not present in the CDC proceedings of 4th March 2009 when the complainant testified before the CDC. The 1st Defendant’s case is that the Claimant was aware that the proceedings were going to hold on 4th March 2009 for the evidence of the complainant, but he failed to turn up. The procedure of the 1st Defendant’s disciplinary committee is contained in Section 13 of the condition of service. It provides that the Disciplinary Committee shall allow the staff member facing disciplinary action to defend himself in person and given opportunity to call witnesses and also to cross examine the opposing witnesses. This provision of the condition of service mandates the 1st Defendant to ensure that the Claimant facing disciplinary proceedings is given fair hearing. One of the opportunities the Claimant must be given in defence of himself of the allegations is to be allowed to cross examine the witnesses called to testify against him. In this case, the Claimant’s accuser was Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu. It was as a result of his petition that the Claimant was made to face the disciplinary committee and eventually dismissed from the employment. Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu appeared before the CDC on 4th March 2009 to substantiate his allegations against the Claimant but on that day, the Claimant was not in those proceedings. Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu gave his evidence in the absence of the Claimant. The Claimant has now alleged that he was not invited to those proceedings. The 1st Defendant’s explanation for the absence of the Claimant from the proceedings of 4th March 2009 is that the Claimant was aware of the proceedings of 4th March 2009 where Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu was expected to give evidence but the Claimant decided not to attend. From the evidence, the Claimant was invited specifically to appear before the CDC on 3rd March 2009. He appeared on that day and he was discharged after being examined. The 1st Defendant did not present any evidence to show that the Claimant was invited to the proceedings of the following day. By merely saying that the proceedings were adjourned to the following day in the presence of the Claimant is not an invitation to the Claimant to be present the following day. The 1st Defendant did not depose to any fact showing that the CDC made efforts to invite the Claimant on that day when he was not seen before allowing Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu to proceed to give his evidence in the absence of the Claimant. From the evidence of the 1st Defendant, I cannot find that its CDC invited the Claimant to the proceedings of 4/3/2009 or made any efforts to have the Claimant present in the proceedings of 4/3/2009. The effect is that the Claimant was not given the opportunity to be present in the proceedings of 4/3/2009 to enable him cross-examine his principal accuser. The 1st Defendant breached a mandatory requirement in its own condition of service in the proceedings, resulting to the dismissal of the Claimant from service. In FOLURUNSHO vs. WAEC (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 556) 422 at 480-481 it was held that- “Where an employer dismisses or terminates the appointment of an employee on grounds of misconduct, all the employer needs establish to justify his action is to show that the allegation was disclosed to the employee and he was given fair hearing, that is to say, that the rules of natural justice were not breached and that the disciplinary panel followed the laid down procedure, if any, and accepted that he committed that act after its investigation”. Also, in OLORUNTOBA-OJU vs. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 497) at 46 to 47, the Supreme Court held- “When an office or employment has a statutory flavour in the sense that its condition of service are provided for by the statute or regulations made there under, any person in that office or employment enjoy a special status over and above the ordinary master and servant relationship. In the matter of discipline of such an employee, the procedure laid down by such statute must be fully complied with. If not, any decision affecting the right or reputation or tenure of office of that employee will be declared null and void. When a statute has conferred on anybody the power to make decisions affecting individual, the court will not only require the procedure prescribed by the statue to be followed, but will readily imply so much and no more to be introduced by way of additional procedural safeguards as will ensure the attainment of fairness. Where contract of service enjoys statutory protection, the latter can only be terminated in the manner prescribed by the governing statutory provisions, a breach of which renders the act ultra vires and void. The contract cannot be discharged on the agreement of the parties without compliance with the enabling statutory provisions. There is a presumption that when the legislature confers a power on an authority to make a determination, it intends that the power shall be exercised judicially in accordance with the rules of natural justice.” The authorities are to the effect that compliance with the procedure laid down for the termination of an employment with statutory backing and observance of the principle of fair hearing are sacrosanct in the termination of the servant’s employment. From the facts, it is clear that the 1st Defendant’s CDC did not give the Claimant fair hearing before it arrived at the conclusion that the Claimant was guilty of the allegations and should be dismissed from service. This singular default of the CDC renders the entire disciplinary proceedings and the consequential dismissal of the Claimant null and void. In the counter affidavit of the 1st Defendant, the facts were averred that after the 1st Defendant's Executive Committee considered the CDC report and recommended the dismissal of the Claimant for gross misconduct, the 1st Defendant forwarded the recommendation to the Honourable Minister of Finance, who approved the dismissal of the Claimant from the services of the 1st Defendant. The Claimant, in his further affidavit contended that the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) Act did not make the decision of the EXCO subject to the approval of the Minister of Finance. The Claimant further stated that the decision of the Board is final under the Act but there was no Board of the 1st Defendant to ratify the decision of the EXCO to dismiss the Claimant at the time of the dismissal. The 1st Defendant averred that the decision to dismiss the Claimant was taken by EXCO but it was forwarded to the Minister of Finance for approval. The document annexed by the 1st Defendant as Exhibit NDIC 10 is said to be the approval of the Minister to dismiss the Claimant. I have examined this document. It is a letter dated 13th May 2009 from the 1st Defendant to the Minister of Finance seeking approval to dismiss the Claimant. There is no indication in the letter that the Minister gave his approval. There is also no other document exhibited by the 1st Defendant which contains the Minister’s approval for the Claimant’s dismissal. I have also examined the dismissal letter, Exhibit NDIC 15, but I cannot find anywhere it states that the dismissal of the Claimant was approved by the Minister of Finance. There is no such approval of the Minister shown to this court. The result is that the Claimant’s dismissal was not done with the approval of the Minister. There is also the question of who dismissed the Claimant. While the 1st Defendant said the decision was taken by the Executive Committee (EXCO), the Claimant stated that as at the time of his dismissal, there was no Board of the 1st Defendant to ratify the decision of the EXCO. The effect of the Claimant’s contention is that his dismissal is invalid, not having been ratified by the Board. Exhibit NDIC 9 shows that the Claimant’s dismissal was decided by the EXCO of the 1st Defendant in a meeting held on 8th and 12th May 2009. The Claimant was subsequently informed by the 1st Defendant in Exhibit NDIC 15, dated 8th July 2009, that he has been dismissed from service. Section 6 of the NDIC Act provides that whenever the Board of the 1st Defendant is dissolved, the Minister of Finance shall, in consultation with the Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), constitute a Management Committee for the 1st Defendant to perform the functions of the Board until a new Board is constituted. In effect, in the place of the Board, a Management Committee is to be constituted to carry out the functions of the Board. From the facts, it is clear that at the time the Claimant was dismissed, there was no Board of the 1st Defendant. There is also no evidence from the 1st Defendant showing that there was a Management Committee constituted by the Minister in place when the Claimant was dismissed. From the case of the 1st Defendant, the body who took the decision to dismiss the Claimant is said to be the Executive Committee (EXCO) of the 1st Defendant. However, there is no evidence from the 1st Defendant to show that the said Executive Committee is the same as Management Committee required to be constituted by the Minister by virtue of Section 6 of the Act. In the absence of proof that the EXCO is the same as the Management Committee or was constituted by the Minister, it implies that the Claimant’s dismissal was taken by a body not authorised or empowered by the NDIC Act to do so. I also find that the dismissal of the Claimant was also invalid on this ground. I find that the dismissal of the Claimant did not follow the procedure for dismissal as laid down in the 1st Defendant’s condition of service and the NDIC Act. The result is that the dismissal of the Claimant from the 1st Defendant’s employment is unlawful, null and void and ought to be set aside. Issue 2 is resolved in favour of the Claimant. ISSUE 3: In his affidavit evidence, the Claimant said during the period of his suspension, he wrote separate petitions to the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation and to the Secretary to the Government of the Federation. These officers directed the 1st Defendant to reinstate him but the 1st Defendant has continued to disobey and disregard the instructions and directives of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation and that of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation which is an act of insubordination. The Claimant consequently wants this court, in the 3rd question for determination, to determine whether the 1st Defendant was right to refuse the directives of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation and that of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation to recall and reinstate the Claimant. The 1st Defendant has contended in paragraph 35 of its counter-affidavit that being a statutory corporation, it is not subject to the directives and control of the Head of Service or the Secretary to the Government of the Federation on matters relating to employment and dismissal of its employees since its enabling statute confers that power on it. The Claimant has however failed to point this court to any law or regulation or rule which mandates the 1st Defendant, a statutory establishment, to take directives from the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or the Secretary to the Government of the Federation with regard to the discipline of staff of the 1st Defendant. The Claimant’s averments in paragraph 6 (ll) of his further affidavit and the submissions of his counsel appears to have even negated this issue raised by the Claimant. In the said paragraph of his further affidavit, the Claimant stated that by the provision of the NDIC Act, the Board is the decision maker for the 1st Defendant and there is nothing in the Act that subjects the 1st Defendant to external directives. Then, in paragraph 3.0 of the written address of the learned counsel for the Claimant in support of the further affidavit, it was submitted that “the Board is the final authority on matters relating to staff discipline”. Having said this much, acknowledging the fact that the 1st Defendant is not subject to any other authority in respect of the discipline of its staff, I have not been shown on what basis the Claimant wants this court to determine that the 1st Defendant was wrong when it refused the directives of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation and that of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation to recall and reinstate the Claimant. I have found in this judgment that the 1st Defendant is the Claimant’s employer and by the provisions of the NDIC Act, the Board of the 1st Defendant is the one with power to employ staff of the 1st Defendant and to take decision on the discipline of the staff. There is no provision in the Act which makes the 1st Defendant subject to the directives or dictates of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or the Secretary to the Government of the Federation in matters of discipline of its staff. I will also mention that the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation and the Secretary to the Government of the Federation are not the Civil Service Commission who has the power of control and discipline of Civil Servants in the Public Service of the Federation. I agree entirely with the 1st Defendant’s deposition in the counter affidavit where it was deposed that the 1st Defendant is a statutory corporation which is not subject to the directives and control of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or the Secretary to the Government of the Federation on matters relating to the employment and dismissal of its employees. The power to take any decision on staff discipline rests with the Board of the 1st Defendant. This power and responsibility of the Board of the 1st Defendant is recognised even in the Public Service Rules. Rule 160501 of the PSR provides thus: “The power to exercise disciplinary control over officers in parastatals is vested in the supervisory Boards/Councils in accordance with their respective conditions of service”. Therefore, the issue of dismissal or recall or reinstatement of staff of the 1st Defendant is within the powers of the 1st Defendant’s Board and not subject to the directives of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation or the Secretary to the Government of the Federation in matters of discipline, especially as they are not parties to the contract of employment between the 1st Defendant and the Claimant. The Head of Service and the Secretary to the Government of the Federation have no role to play in matters of discipline of a staff of the Corporation. Their intervention may at best be considered as persuasive. In view of the foregoing, I resolve issue 3 against the Claimant. ISSUE 4: The Claimant’s 4th question for determination in this suit is whether he is entitled to the reliefs sought upon the declaration of this Court that his dismissal is unlawful. The Claimant sought several reliefs in this suit which I have set out at the beginning of this judgment. I see no need to reproduce them again. I have observed that the reliefs sought by the Claimant flow from the questions he wants this court to determine in his action. The 1st and 3rd questions for determination have been resolved against the Claimant. Consequently, reliefs 1, 3, 5 and 8 which he sought on the basis of his 1st and 3rd issue for determination cannot be granted. I have mentioned it in this judgment that the Claimant’s employment is protected by statute. The findings of this court in issue 2 of this judgement are to the effect that the dismissal of the Claimant from the employment of the 1st Defendant was unlawful, wrongful, null and void. Where there is an improper removal of an employee from an employment protected by statute, the consequence is that the employee has not been removed from office. In such a situation, the court has the power to set aside the dismissal and order the reinstatement of the employee. See KWARA POLYTECHNIC ILORIN vs. OYEBANJI (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 447) 141 at 199; OMIDIORA vs. FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 415) 1807; OLORUNTOBA-OJU vs. ABDUL-RAHEEM (supra). In the circumstance of this case where it is found that the contract of employment is guided by statute, the Claimant is entitled to a consequential relief of reinstatement and payment of his outstanding entitlements from the time he was unlawfully and wrongfully dismissed from the employment. In relief 10, the Claimant sought the sum of N1,000,000,000.00 (One Billion Naira) as general, aggravated, punitive and exemplary damages. The Claimant claimed this sum from the Defendants jointly and severally. The Claimant has not made out any case against the 2nd Defendant in this case to warrant the 2nd Defendant to be liable for this claim. The 2nd Defendant’s letter of 7th September 2016, upon which the Claimant brought the 2nd Defendant into this case, has nothing to do with the Claimant’s dismissal from the employment of the 1stDefendant. The Claimant had been dismissed from the 1st Defendant’s employment since July 2009. I have found in this judgment that the 2nd Defendant’s said letter did not activate the Claimant’s dismissal, contrary to the allegation of the Claimant. Therefore, the 2nd Defendant cannot be liable to pay damages to the Claimant on account of his dismissal. The consequence of the setting aside of the Claimant’s dismissal is that he will be reinstated to the employment and paid all outstanding salaries from the date of his dismissal. I cannot award any other monetary damages in addition. To do so would amount to double compensation. See CCB (NIG.) LTD vs. OKONKWO [2001] 15 NWLR (Pt. 735) 114 CA. I hold that the Claimant is not entitled to relief 10. Other than reliefs 1, 3, 5, 8 and 10, I see no reason why the Claimant should not be granted all other reliefs he sought in this case. I resolve this issue partly in favour of the Claimant. In conclusion of this judgment, I find that the Claimant has succeeded in his case. Save for questions 1 and 3, all other questions went in his favour. Accordingly, this court hereby makes the following orders: 1. It is declared that the 1st Defendant’s Central Disciplinary Committee was wrong to receive evidence against the Claimant in his absence and without affording him an opportunity to cross-examine his principal accuser, Mr. Chijioke Ekechukwu, which action is contrary to the procedure for dismissal as laid down in the 1st Defendant’s condition of service and the NDIC Act and the principles of natural justice and fair hearing. 2. The dismissal of the Claimant from the employment of the 1st Defendant is set aside and an order is made directing the immediate reinstatement of the Claimant to the services of the 1st Defendant. 3. The 1st Defendant is ordered to restore all the rights and privileges of the Claimant, without loss of seniority or entitlements, and to place the Claimant in the appropriate rank which he ought to be in the employment as at today if he had not been unlawfully removed. 4. The 1st Defendant is also ordered to pay the Claimant's salaries, emoluments, allowances and entitlements from the date of his dismissal in July 2009 to date. 5. The 1st Defendant is further restrained from obstructing, disturbing, interfering or preventing the Claimant from performing the functions of his office as a staff of the 1st Defendant without due recourse to the provisions of the NDIC Act and Conditions of Service. 6. Cost of N500,000.00 is awarded against the 1st Defendant, in favour of the Claimant. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge