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RULING This is a ruling on a notice of preliminary objection filed by the Defendants. In the NPO, which was brought pursuant to Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution, Order 11 Rules 1 and 8 (1) of the rules of the court and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, the Defendants contended that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain and determine this action and they prayed the court to dismiss the suit. The sole ground of the NPO is that the action is statute barred by virtue of Section 2 (a) of POPA. In the written address in support of the NPO, learned counsel for the defendant raised 2 issues for determination. The issues are: 1. Whether by virtue of the provision of Section 2 (a) of Public officers Protection Act, this action is statute barred. 2. Whether this action can be maintained in law. In his arguments on issue one, learned counsel for the Defendants cited Section 2 (a) of POPA and submitted that the suit is statute barred. According to counsel, the Defendants are public officers within the meaning of the Act and the action of the Defendants complained of by the Claimant in the action is an act covered in the provision. It was further submitted that the Claimant’s cause of action arose on 29th September 2017 while she filed this action on 12th January 2018. Learned counsel for the Defendants went on to submit that the Claimant’s suit was not filed within 3 months from the date her cause of action arose in default of limitation period in Section 2 (a) of POPA. Counsel concluded that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred. On issue two, learned counsel for the Defendants submitted that since the suit was not filed within the time limited by statute, it can no longer be maintained. The Claimant has also lost her right of action and right to judicial relief. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the Claimant’s suit. In response to the NPO, the Claimant filed an affidavit and a written address in support. Let me mention here that the Defendants’ NPO is not accompanied by an affidavit. Therefore, there is no fact or evidence led in support of the NPO to warrant the Claimant to rebut by way of a counter affidavit. The NPO of the nature brought by the Defendants is basically on points of law. The facts upon which the NPO is to be determined are the facts contained in the Complaint and on the Claimant’s statement of facts. The affidavit introduced by the Claimant in the absence of any affidavit filed by the Defendants in support of the NPO is not competent. Consequently, the Claimant’s affidavit and the Defendant’s further and better affidavit are hereby struck out. In the written address of the Claimant, it was submitted that the Defendants cannot hide under the protection of POPA to allege that the suit is statute barred. It was submitted that the facts averred by the Claimant in paragraph 43 of her statement of facts show that the termination letter was dated 21st September 2017 but it was served on the Claimant sometime in October 2017. The Claimant has stated in her affidavit filed together with the written address that she was served the termination letter on 16th October 2017. The day the Claimant received the letter is the date that is material. Accordingly, when this suit was filed on 12th January 2018, the Claimant was within the 3 months period. In his alternative arguments, it was submitted by counsel for the Claimant that the Defendants cannot take protection under POPA when they failed to act within their constitutional and statutory powers and did not act in good faith. Counsel submitted that a public officer who acted outside the colour of his office cannot hide under the protection of POPA. It was argued further that the case of the Claimant is founded on wrongful termination of employment and since it is the law that POPA does not apply to breaches of contract, the Claimant’s suit is not caught up by POPA. Counsel for the Claimant urged the court to discountenance the NPO and set the case down for hearing. The Defendants also filed a written address with the further and better affidavit. This written address ought to be a reply on points of law but its content is beyond the requirements for a reply on points of law. It is a re-argument of the application of the Defendants. I will discountenance the said written address. COURT’S DECISION The ground of the defendants NPO is that the Claimant’s action is statute barred by effect of Section 2 (a) of POPA. Therefore, the sole issue to be determined in this ruling NPO is: Whether the Claimant’s suit is statute barred. The said Section 2 (a) of POPA provides as follows: “2. Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provision shall have effect: (a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” The above provision of POPA limits time within which an action must be instituted against a public officer in respect of the acts or default of the public officer on the matters mentioned in the provision. By the said provision, an action against a public officer must be commenced within 3 months from the date the cause of action arose except in the case of continuance of the damage or injury, in which case, the Claimant must institute the action within 3 months after the cessation of the damage or injury. The implication of the provision is that where the suit is not commenced within the prescribed period, the Claimant’s right of action in respect of that cause will be statute barred and the court will not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C, KADUNA STATE (1998) 12 SC 20; EGBE vs. ALHAJI (1990) 3 S.C (Pt.1) 63; PEACEGATE OIL AND GAS LIMITED vs. HYDRIVE (NIG.) LTD. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 391. The Defendants’ contention, as submitted by their counsel, is that the Claimant’s cause of action arose on 29th September 2017 while she filed this suit on 12th January 2018. Learned counsel for the Defendants further submitted that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred by the effect of Section 2 (a) of POPA as it was not filed against the Defendants, who are public officers within the meaning of POPA, within 3 months from the date her cause of action arose. In response, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that the Claimant’s cause of action arose on 16th October 2017 being the date the Claimant was served the termination letter, as such, she filed this suit within time. From the arguments of counsels, it is not in dispute that the Defendants are public officers. There is also no argument that the subject matter of the action has to do with the Defendants’ performance of their public duty. The bone of contention is whether or not the Claimant filed the suit within 3 months from the date her cause of action arose. It is the law that to know whether a suit is statute barred, the court will look at the date the cause of action arose and compare it with the date when the suit was filed. Where the period in between is more than the period limited by the statute under reference, the suit is statute barred. See SULGRAVE HOLDINGS INC. vs. FGN (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) 309. Similarly, to determine whether a suit is statute barred or not, the processes which should be examined to resolve the issue are the Writ and the statement of claim, in this case, the Complaint and the statement of facts. It is from these processes the cause of action, the date cause of action arose and the date the suit was filed can be found. See AMEDE vs. U.B.A (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 469) 479; JSF INVESTMENT LTD. vs. BRAWAL LINE LTD (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 578) 876 at 902. In this case, the Claimant’s cause of action, as disclosed in the reliefs she sought on the Complaint and the facts of her case in the statement of facts, is the termination of her employment. In paragraph 43 of her statement of facts, the Claimant pleaded that she received a letter of termination of her employment dated 21st September 2017 sometime in October 2017. By this averment, although the letter of termination was dated 21st September 2017, the Claimant said she received it in October 2017. Let me say that the Claimant’s cause of action with respect to the termination of her employment did not accrue to her until she received the termination letter. It is trite that a cause of action accrues on that date it can be said or there exist in the person who can sue and another who can be sued, and all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the Claimant to succeed in the action. See BANK OF THE NORTH vs. GANA (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 296) 862 at 881; DAWODU vs. AJOSE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 580) 1334 at 1348. The Claimant’s cause of action accrued on the date she received the termination letter. Because, it is from that day it can be said all the facts have happened which gave her a cause of action to challenge the termination of her employment. The Claimant did not plead the particular day she received the letter but merely mentioned that it was sometime in October 2017. That could mean any date in that month. To rely on the unspecified date of receipt of the termination letter in the Claimant’s pleading to determine this NPO will not accord with equity and justice. In my view, there is the need to take evidence in this case before this issue can be resolved. After hearing evidence of the parties, this court will be in a better position to determine the date the Claimant was served the termination letter. Accordingly, I will allow this matter to proceed to hearing. I will revisit the Defendants’ objection in the final judgment in this case. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge