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JUDGMENT On 30th September 2015, this action was instituted by the Claimant who sought the following reliefs: 1. N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) as general damages to the Claimant for the Defendant Company’s negligence in installation of faulty machinery and employment of non-committed staff leading to the Claimant’s injury. 2. N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) general damages for the permanent damage of the right hand resulting in persistent claw fingers and inability to flex or extend the middle, ring and little fingers of the right hand and loss of life expectancy. 3. N4,000,000.00 (Four Million Naira) general damages/compensation for the shock, pain, and suffering of the claimant arising from the injuries and the continued medical attention required by the Claimant. The complaint was filed along with the Statement of Facts establishing the cause of action, Claimant’s written deposition on oath, Claimant’s List of Witnesses, Claimant’s List of Documents and Copies of Documents to be relied on. These originating processes were served on the Defendant. The Defendant on 15th February 2016 vide a motion for extension of time, entered appearance and filed a Statement of Defence and other accompanying processes. These were duly regularised on 16th February 2016. The Claimant filed a Reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence on 6th April 2016. Hearing commenced on 14th April 2016. The Claimant testified for himself as CW1. Mr. Augustine Eharegbemi Akpiri, a staff of the Defendant testified for the Defendant as DW1. Hearing was concluded on 27th May 2016, and parties were ordered to file their final written addresses in accordance with the rules of this court. The Defendants’ Final Address was filed on the 17th day of June 2016. The Claimant’s Final Address was filed on the 8th day of September 2016. The Defendants filed a Reply on Points of Law on 5th October 2016. Parties’ adopted their respective final addresses on the 10th day of October 2016. In the Defendant’s final address, two issues were formulated for determination, to wit: 1. Whether the Claimant by his pleadings and evidence before the court proved that the injuries he sustained on the 20th October 2010 was due to the negligence of the Defendant. 2. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the various amounts claimed as damages against the Defendant. On issue one; counsel contended that having regard to the evidence adduced at the trial of this suit, the Claimant has failed to prove his allegation of negligence against the Defendant. Rather, what was proved was the Claimant’s negligence in his duties by abandoning all safety procedures in carrying out the repair on the baffle mechanism. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant in paragraphs 7-12 of his statement of facts distorted the facts that occurred on the 20th October 2010 in the Defendant’s premises. Also, counsel submitted that under cross-examination, the Claimant admitted that he did not work as an operator in the production department but as a technician when there is a breakdown in the production department. It is counsel’s submission that the Claimant’s “particulars of negligence” in the statement of facts do not sufficiently discharge the burden to establish negligence on the part of the Defendant. Counsel referred to the decision of the Apex court in ROYAL ADE NIGERIA LIMITED vs. N.O.C.M. CO. PLC (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt. 874) 206 at 225, where it was held that: “In an action based on the tort of negligence, a plaintiff to succeed must in addition to pleading and establishing particulars of negligence relied on, state and establish the duty of care owed by the defendant, the facts on which this duty is founded and the breach of that duty. The issue whether or not he had conducted himself negligently is a question of fact and the evidence led and not a matter of law. Neither the judge nor the parties are permitted to go outside the pleadings relied upon by the parties.” Again, counsel posited that the law on proof of negligence is well settled and before liability to pay damages for the tort of negligence can be established; three ingredients must be proved as follows: a. That the defendant owed the claimant a duty to exercise due care b. That the defendant failed to exercise due care, c. That the defendant’s failure was the cause of the injury in the proper sense of that term. See ROYAL ADE NIGERIA LIMITED vs. N.O.C.M. CO. PLC (supra). Similarly, counsel argued that the Claimant in this suit has not shown how the Defendant in the extant suit breached the duty it owed him and how the breach of duty resulted in the injury of the Claimant. More so, counsel submitted that the Claimant admitted under cross-examination that he had repaired the Baffle Mechanism previously and the Defendant provided all the safety gadgets or wears to be used. Counsel concluded that the provision of these safety measures showed that the Defendant had discharged the burden of ensuring that the Claimant was safe while carrying out his duties. In the same vein, counsel submitted that in paragraph 5(L), (M) and (N) and Paragraph 9 of the Statement on Oath, it was pleaded that one of the safety procedures when undertaking a repair on the baffle mechanism is to switch off the pilot air, the machine will be put off and would not be in motion when repairs are going on. It is counsel’s submission that these facts were also admitted by the Claimant under cross-examination, and need no proof. In light of the foregoing admission, counsel submitted that the Claimant was untruthful in stating that the baffle mechanism injured him when it was not in motion. It is counsel’s argument that the Claimant has failed to show to this court, the duty owed to him by the Defendant, and how the breach of that duty resulted in his injury. See IFEANYI vs. SOLEH BONEH LTD (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 650) 322. The argument of counsel is that the evidence in this case fleshes out the facts that the Claimant did not follow the safety procedures, and incurred his injury by his own negligence. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the Claimant has not proved his case. He urged the court to dismiss this action. Regarding issue two, it is counsel’s submission that the Claimant has not proved by evidence that he is entitled to any of his claims because the damages claimed was not pleaded. Counsel argued that evidence led on facts not pleaded go to no issue. See LAWAL vs. UTC NIGERIA PLC (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 601 at 621 and CIVIL DESIGN LTD vs. SCOA (2007) NSCQR 1298. Furthermore, counsel argued that the concluding part of the Statement of Claim, usually starting with “wherefore or whereof the Claimant claims” does not form part of the pleadings but are claims which constitute the reliefs, not pleaded facts; and no valid order can be made as it is not supported by pleaded facts. ADEBANJO vs. BROWN (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 141) 661. Counsel drew the court’s attention to the case of ISHOLA vs. UBN (2005) 6 MJSC 34 at 49-50; where it was held thus: “The opening words of paragraph 29 of the Amended Statement of Claim of the appellant at trial reads: “Wherefore the plaintiff claims as follows against the Defendant” The claims are then set out from (i)-(ix) in separate paragraphs. These are not facts pleaded but claims which constitute the reliefs which the appellant is praying the court for at the end of the trial…the whole paragraph 29 is not and cannot constitute any pleading at all as no valid order can be made under it without any facts contained in the pleadings in support of it and upon which evidence can be led.” At this point, counsel urged the court to follow the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the immediately preceding decision and hold that the Claimant did not plead facts in support of the reliefs sought in paragraph 20 of the statement of facts. It is counsel’s further submission that in the event that the court considers paragraph 20 of the statement of facts, counsel submitted that that it is trite law that he who asserts must prove; and the burden of proof lies on the party that will fail if no evidence at all was given on the other side. See Section 133(1) of the Evidence Act. Again, counsel submitted that the Claimant confirmed under cross-examination that he did make his deposition before the Commissioner for Oaths in accordance with Section 13 of the Oaths Act, but in his lawyer’s office in Aba. Counsel further argued that any such deposition not sworn in the presence of a Commissioner for Oaths renders the deposition inadmissible. See Section 112 of the Evidence Act. It is counsel’s contention that the effect of the Claimant’s admission is that there is no evidence before the court to support the Claimant’s case. Counsel urged the court to uphold the foregoing arguments and dismiss the Claimant’s case. In the Claimant’s written address, counsel adopted the issues identified by the learned defence counsel. On the first issue, Counsel argued that by virtue of Exhibit A, there is a service relationship between the parties in this case as employer and employee. It is counsel’s submission that from the averments in the statement of facts which were not contradicted but rather affirmed by DW1 under cross-examination; the Claimant was a fitter technician in the Defendant, when his injuries occurred. It is counsel’s further submission that the law in this regard is that where there exists a service relationship between employer and employee, the former is under a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of the latter in all circumstance of the case so as not to expose him to an unnecessary risk. See IYERE vs. BENDEL FEEDS & FLOUR MILLS LTD (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 453) 1217. Similarly, it is the argument of counsel that the Defendant did not discharge its duty of reasonable care to the Claimant because the Defendant assigned the Claimant, the lowest ranked technician, not professionally trained to cover a specialized machine with ten sections expected at all times to be in good condition, without the assistance of other senior staff. Counsel argued that there was a duty on the Defendant to provide a safe system of working with efficient supervision, which was not discharged in respect of the Claimant. Counsel cited the English case of WILSON vs. CLYDE COAL CO vs. ENGLISH (1938) AC 57, where it was expressed that under the common law duty of care, an employer under the tort of negligence, may be liable for the breach of his personal duty of care which he owes every employee and he may also be vicariously liable for breach of one employee, of the duty of care which that employee owes to his fellow employee. At common law every employer has a duty to provide: a. Competent staff of men b. Adequate plant and equipment c. A safe place of work d. Safe system of working with efficient supervision. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Defendant breached the duty of care owed to the Claimant by failing to provide competent staff of men and a safe system of working with efficient supervision. Also, counsel submitted that the Claimant pleaded and established the particulars of negligence relied upon; and established the duty of care the Defendant owed in paragraph 7 of the statement of facts, which was not controverted by the Defendant. In this regard, counsel submitted that admission made need no further proof, than which is voluntarily owned up by an adversary. See OJUKWU vs. ONWUDIWE (1984) 2 SC 15 at 38. Furthermore, it is the submission of counsel that the facts upon which the duty of care is founded and the breach of the said duty, were pleaded in paragraph 8 of the statement of facts. Counsel submitted further that the averment in this said paragraph that “the machines was (sic) intermittently breaking down and in need of repairs to the knowledge of management staff and workers” was not specifically denied by the Defendant. Counsel contended that it is an established rule of pleadings that the Defendant’s denial of a material fact in the statement of claim must be specific and not evasive because any allegation of fact not specifically denied is taken as established at hearing. See OLATUNJI vs. ADISA (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 376) 131 at 185. More so, counsel argued that Exhibits D, E and F, which are the log books for years 2009, 2010 and 2013 showing the intermittent breakdown of the Defendant’s machines, were admitted in evidence without objection from the Defendant. Counsel further argued that the effect of the Defendant’s admission to the fact of installation of faulty baffle machinery leading to the breakdown of the machine, refusal to effect adequate repairs and employment of nonchalant senior staff establish the breach of duty leading to this suit. Again, counsel submitted that negligence in the context of this suit, goes beyond careless conduct, whether in omission or commission but connotes the complex concept of duty, breach and damage suffered by the person to whom the duty is owed. See OKWEJIMINOR vs GBAKEJI (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 409) 405 at 442-3. Similarly, counsel submitted that contrary to DW1’s admission under cross-examination that the machine with which the Claimant had an accident was replaced in 2016, the facts in Exhibits D, E, and F speak for themselves and are tied to the establishment of the breach of the duty of care, pleaded in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14 of the statement of facts. Further, counsel asserted that the facts cannot be denied by the Defendant that the Claimant who was the most junior staff was left to oversee the running of 10 units of an industrialized machine without any supervision; and other staff who were supposed to be on duty alongside the Claimant were absent without any replacements. Further, counsel submitted that the argument of the defence counsel that the Claimant was negligent because he failed to comply with the safety guidelines in operating the equipment is non sequitur and misconceived. On this note, counsel submitted further that the pivot of the particulars of negligence in the extant case is the installation of faulty baffle machinery which was intermittently breaking down. Counsel argued that the facts pleaded by the Claimant regarding the negligence of the Defendant were not successfully debunked by the Defendant. It is counsel’s argument that these evidences not controverted or challenged by the Defendant remain credible and the court can rely on it. See S.C.C. LTD vs. ELEMADU (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 923) 28 at 62. Again, it is the opinion of counsel that from the failure of the Defendant to field the production manager as a witness in this case, who reported the said incident of 20/10/2010, the court may presume that the evidence the said production manager would have produced would be unfavourable to the Defendant. Similarly, counsel argued that from DW1’s admission of the existence of an investigation report and an insurance policy for the Claimant, both of which were not tendered by the Defendant; the court should invoke Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act and presume that those documents, if produced would have been unfavourable to the Defendant. It is the contention of learned counsel for the Claimant that it is a principle of negligence that a person owes a duty of care to his neighbor, a person closely and directly affected by one’s act that one ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being affected when one is directing his mind to the acts or omissions in question. See UTB vs. OZOEMENA (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 488. Counsel submitted that the Claimant has led sufficient reliable evidence that qualifies him as a neighbor, and the Defendant’s acts in installing faulty machinery and employing non-challant staff are reasonably foreseen to likely injure and did infact injure him. Counsel further contended that although the owner of a machinery is not in law liable for every latent defect in it, the occurrence of the accident casts on the Defendant the duty to account for it which, may be discharged by showing that the explanation into how the accident occurred is the correct one. See SCC NIG LTD vs. ELEMADU (Supra). Also, counsel argued that a perusal of the Defendant’s pleadings and admission of its sole witness under cross-examination show contradictions that render the Defendant’s case inconsistent. Counsel submitted that while the defence in the statement of defence and DW1’s Written deposition respectively, averred that the Claimant embarked on the repair of the faulty machine without informing his immediate superior (as he was supposed to) because he wanted to earn overtime money; DW1 admitted in cross-examination, that it was only the Claimant who was assigned by the Defendant’s management to work overtime. Counsel urged the court to disregard DW1’s evidence because where there is conflict in the testimonies of a party’s witnesses; the court cannot pick and choose which testimonies to believe. See NWOGA vs. BENJAMIN (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1133) 152 at 169. Similarly, counsel contended that the implication of Section 20, Page 14 of Exhibit C (the Defendant’s conditions of service for junior staff), which provides that an employee incapacitated from an injury in discharge of his official duties is entitled to his full salary until the end of his sick leave or if he is permanently invalidated; provided the incapacitation was not due to his negligence; is that the Claimant was not negligent. Counsel contended further that it was admitted by both parties that the Claimant was paid his full salary, throughout the period of hospitalization and the Defendant took responsibility for his care. Counsel submitted further that from the preceding submission, the court is entitled to presume, relying on Section 145(3) and 167 of the Evidence Act, that the Claimant was not negligent in his duties on 20/10/2010. Also, counsel argued that the defence’s averment that the Claimant always lingered after closing hours waiting for overtime work, (constituted malingering, an offence for which a staff of the Defendant may be dismissed) was false because no query was issued to the Claimant for such conduct. Further, counsel submitted that the Claimant followed the proper safety steps in repairing the machinery as averred in paragraph 1 of the Reply to the Statement of Defence, and maintained by the Claimant under cross-examination. Counsel further argued that the Defendant presented different safety procedures to the court in examination-in-chief and under cross-examination, making his case inconsistent. In this regard, counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimant had proved his case because it is not the court’s domain to scrounge for explanations for the contradictions in the testimony of a party. See R.T.M.M.H.C vs. ADEAGBO (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 226) 690 at 705. With respect to issue two, counsel submitted that it is trite law that the expert evidence of a medical doctor is unnecessary to prove the effect of pain and suffering in a person, in which the consequences of the injury can be visually observed by the court and the parties to the case. See IGHOSEWE vs. DELTA STEEL LTD (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 410) 741 at 763. In the extant case, counsel submitted further that the court saw the Claimant’s injured hand and Exhibits D1-24 attest to the injury. Thus, it is not in doubt that the Claimant sustained the injuries pleaded, and is entitled to damages. Counsel contended that the Claimant pleaded and led evidence to the facts entitling him to the said reliefs because it is only facts that ought to be pleaded, which if proved entitles the Claimant to the reliefs sought. More so, counsel argued that the reliefs sought by the Claimant cannot be categorized as facts but must be incorporated in the statement of facts, otherwise the reliefs would be deemed abandoned. See UBA PLC vs. GODM SHOES LTD (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1250) 590 and STOWE vs. BENSTOWE (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1306) 450 at 474. Counsel submitted that only special damages need be specifically pleaded and strictly proved and owing to the fact that the Claimant did not seek special damages, the Defence counsel argument in this regard go to no issue. Regarding the Defendant counsel’s argument that the Claimant witness’ deposition is inadmissible; counsel contended that unlike an affidavit, a written deposition does not qualify as evidence until adopted on oath before the court. Counsel referred the court to the case of UDEAGHA vs. OMEGHARA (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1204) 168 at 195, where it was held thus: “statement of witnesses which are adopted during oral evidence on oath are different from mere affidavit evidence which stand on their own without oral backup and which are not subject to cross-examination…where a witness is in court to say he/she is adopting an irregular written deposition, the implication is that the witness is re-asserting on oath what is contained in the irregular deposition and as I opined earlier such adoption on oath makes all the evidence in the written deposition admissible.” See also ASHIRU vs. ASHIRU (2014) 18 WRN 113 at 133. Again, counsel urged the court to consider the preceding decided cases and Order 12(2) of the National Industrial Court Act and discountenance the Defendant’s counsel’s arguments that there being no objection to the Claimant’s deposition being received in evidence. Also, counsel relying on the case of DONGRI vs. SA’ANUU (2014) 19 WRN 149 at 175-6, which enjoins courts to shun technical justice; counsel urged the court to do substantial justice in the extant case and grant the Claimant’s reliefs. Finally, counsel urged the court to award punitive costs in addition to the general damages sought by the Claimant. Counsel argued that once a Claimant successfully shows that he had suffered personal injury as a result of the breach of duty owed him by the Defendant, the claim for pain and suffering, a recognized head in award of damages, must be considered. See C & C CONSTRUCTION CO. vs. OKHAI (2003) 16 NSCQR 328. Counsel further contended that in awarding damages for personal injury, the court ought to make allowance for increases in the rate of earnings, inflation, the possibility of early retirement and the possibility of a rise in wages. Counsel urged the court to take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing power of the naira in awarding damages. See ASESA vs. EKWENEM (2001) 10 NWLR (Pt. 720) 97. In conclusion, counsel submitted that the Claimant has proved his case and urged the court to grant all the reliefs sought. In the Defendant counsel’s Reply Address, counsel referred the court to the case of MAKWE vs. NWUKO (2000) WRN 1 at 12-3, where the Supreme Court summarized the elements of actionable negligence for which the Defendant should be held negligent as follows: a. The existence of a duty to take care owed to the complainant by the defendant b. Failure to attain the standard of care prescribed by the law c. Damage suffered by the complainant which must be connected with the breach of duty of care. Counsel submitted that the standard of care in the extant case is imposed by Sections 23 and 28 of the Factories Act, Cap F1 Laws of the Federation 2004; which provide for training and supervision of inexperienced workers, safe means of access and safe place of employment. It is counsel’s submission that from the facts before this Court, the Defendant attained and surpassed the standard of care prescribed by the Factories Act by the provision of the following acts: i. Training its employees on safety procedures and even published manuals on safety procedure accessible to its employees including the claimant. ii. Maintains a safe working environment iii. Provides safety gears for its employees and maintain same is worn in appropriate situations. Similarly, counsel argued that since the Claimant is not the maker of Exhibits D, E and F but tendered same into evidence, no probative value should be given to the same exhibits. See Section 83 of the Evidence Act. It is counsel’s argument that the position of the law is that no weight should be attached to a document tendered and admitted if it was not tendered by the maker. See 7UP BOTTLING COMPANY PLC vs. EMMANUEL (2013) LPELR 21104 (CA). Counsel urged the court to disregard Exhibits D, E and F. Again, counsel submitted that paragraph 8 of the statement of facts, where it was averred that the “machines was intermittently breaking down and in need of repairs to the knowledge of the management staff and workers”, was debunked in the heat of cross-examination, where the Claimant gave evidence that he did not work as an operator but serves machineries as an IS maintenance staff. Counsel contended that the Defendant joined issues with the Claimant on the allegations in the paragraph and the court should not countenance any submission made by the Claimant from the said paragraph 8. Counsel is of the opinion that the crux of the matter before the court is whether the Claimant followed the safety procedure in undertaking the machine. On this note, counsel repeated the argument in his initial address that the Claimant willfully abandoned these safety procedures and bears the burden of the negligent party. Also, counsel submitted that the cases cited by the Claimant’s counsel are distinguishable from those in the instant case. In the same vein, counsel submitted that in the case of S.C.C. (NIG) LTD vs. ELEMADU (supra), the plaintiff was ordered to drive a faulty crane and was not serviced to the knowledge of the instructor, which caused the injury of the plaintiff. It is counsel’s submission that the record of facts before the court supports that IS Maintenance section of the Defendant is created to regularly service the Defendant’s machines and it has satisfied this court of the good working condition of its machines. Furthermore, counsel submitted that the Claimant ought not to benefit from the wrong of his negligence. It is counsel’s contention that the record of proceedings show that the Claimant’s salaries has been paid, and that the Claimant is not a witness of truth, therefore his evidence should be disregarded. Counsel submitted that the Evidence Act is applicable to the National Industrial Court and urged the court to enter judgment for the Defendant. COURT’s DECISION The instant suit is a claim by the Claimant for damages on his allegation that the Defendant’s negligence caused him to suffer injury and permanent disability while in the Defendant’s employment. The issue which I think arises for determination is whether the Claimant has sufficiently proved his case to entitle him to the reliefs he sought against the Defendant in this case. In resolving this issue, the facts and evidence adduced in the case must first be reviewed. The Claimant made two depositions, which he adopted as his evidence in this matter. When he was being cross-examined by the Defendant’s counsel on 27/5/2016, the Claimant said “I signed these written statements on oath. I signed it in my lawyer’s office”. The Defendant’s counsel has now urged this court, in his written address, to dismiss the Claimant’s case because there is no evidence to support the Claimant’s case. Counsel’s contention is based on this statement made by the Claimant that he signed his depositions in his lawyer’s office and the provisions of Sections 13 of the Oaths Act and Section 112 of the Evidence Act. I will not belabour this issue. The implication of Section 112 Evidence Act is that an affidavit which is sworn before the deponent or before his legal practitioner, or before a partner or clerk of his legal practitioner shall not be admitted by the court. The question arising from this provision is this: before whom was the Claimant’s deposition sworn? I have taken a look at the Claimant’s depositions and I observe that they were both sworn in this court before the Commissioner for oath whose name is stated as Rita Okafor. What the Claimant said under cross examination was that he signed his depositions in his lawyer’s office. He didn’t say his depositions were sworn before his lawyer. The piece of evidence by the Claimant cannot therefore be interpreted, as the Defendant’s counsel appears to have done, to mean that his depositions were sworn in his lawyer’s office. The Claimant’s depositions have not offended any law. In the evidence of the Claimant, when he testified as CW1, he told this court that the Defendant Company is involved in the production of glass bottles and he is a junior staff in the Defendant’s employment. His employment was with effect from 1st July 2009. Before his employment, he was first a casual staff of the Defendant during which period he went through the Defendant’s in-house training as I.S. Maintenance Fitter Trainee. It was after the Defendant had assessed his training to be satisfactory that he was employed as junior staff with the position of I.S. Maintenance Fitter Trainee in the I.S. maintenance unit of the Defendant. He was later promoted to the position of I.S. Maintenance Fitter 2. The Claimant stated that it was the duty of the Defendant to take reasonable care for his safety while he works in the maintenance unit of the Defendant. The Defendant was also to provide adequate and suitable machines and appliances to enable him carry out his work in safety. The Defendant ought not to expose him to injury or damages. On 20/10/2010 he was on duty in the section where the molten sand already converted to glass flows into the Baffle. He was retained to man the Baffle. The Defendant and its senior technical staff were aware that this machine has been breaking down and needs replacement. He was working under the supervision of the head of section, Mr. Gabriel Shaba, and his assistant, Mr. Augustine Agbim. They are supposed to supervise maintenance activities within the Batch and Baffle machines. Mr. Shaba left his duty post without any reason and Agbim prevailed on the Claimant to stay behind on duty after closing hours contrary to company policy. The Claimant said closing time is 5pm. At about 8.40 pm of that day, the Baffle in Section 10 developed a problem. He lodged a complaint to the supervisor and the production manager. The production manager noted the complaint but directed him to carry out the repairs. Ordinarily, the repairs should be done by his supervisor but the production manager insisted the Claimant carry out the repairs. When he attempted repairing the machine, the Baffle refused to clamp so he reported to the supervisor and the production manager who insisted that he goes back to check whether there was air leakage in the Baffle. He obeyed the supervisor and production manager. The Baffle was stopped but while he put his right hand under the mould to check if there was air leakage, the Baffle depressurised due to its faulty nature and his right hand was clamped on the red hot moulding machine. His hand was damaged as a result. He was taken to New-Era Hospital Aba where he was under treatment for 8 months until 5th July 2011 when he was discharged. He has suffered permanent injuries and disfigurement to his forearm, middle, ring and little fingers. He also now suffers from persistent clawed fingers and inability to flex the fingers. This disability was a consequence of the negligence of the Defendant and the malfunctioning of its machines. According to the Claimant, his injury was a result of Defendant’s negligence and he stated particulars of the Defendant’s negligence as the installation of faulty baffle machine which intermittently breaks down; refusal or failure to effect comprehensive repairs of the baffle despite being aware of intermittent breakdown and employment of senior technical staff who are not committed in their attitude to work by leaving their work place before close of work and not being in the work station as at when due. The Claimant said he can no longer use the hand effectively in carrying out his daily activities and he is under constant pain for which he has been taking pain killers. The Defendant still retained him in the I.S. Maintenance department without compensation. He has made request for compensation to his immediate supervisor, head of department, Human Resources managers and plant manager but his request has been ignored. The Human Resources manager has threatened to take disciplinary action against the Claimant or the Claimant resigns as alternative. The Claimant said further that he is entitled to compensation under the Junior Staff Handbook and he is in need of further medical treatment due to the excruciating pain but the Defendant refused to provide same. Since his educational qualification qualifies him to do only menial jobs and being right handed, he can no longer do such jobs because of his disability. He is also not likely to get another job should he lose his present employment with the Defendant. In the Claimant’s additional evidence, which he adduced in support of the facts contained in his Reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence, the Claimant stated that other than the Defendant’s policy, which requires that employees may be required to do over time without notice, he does not have the attitude of staying beyond official work hours to do overtime. Afternoon shift ends at 9pm and when he is on afternoon shift, he stays till 9pm. On 20/10/2010, he was on duty till 8.30pm when the accident happened. He has never been negligent or careless in the performance of his duties as a technician, he did not ignore safety procedure on 20/10/2010 and he complied with the Defendant’s policy in his attempt to rectify the fault. Throughout his employment in the Defendant, repair is carried out with the Baffle arm in place. He is not aware the Baffle arm has ever been removed to effect repair. The machines are usually shut down to repair the baffle arm machinery, counter flow valve electro-side and invert arm machinery among others. Most of the Defendant’s machine are not always in good working condition and are always breaking down and on the day of the accident, no shift technician was around nor resumed duty. The Claimant further testified under cross examination that he works in the I.S maintenance department as I.S. maintenance technician and it is the unit which services or repairs the machines in the production department. He is an experienced technician. When repairing a baffle machine which has the problem of cessation of clamping, the safety measures are to wear helmet, goggle, hand gloves, overall and hand protector but the main safety measure is to switch of the pilot air when repairing the baffle machine. Pilot air has to be switched off before going into the machine as the machine stops working when the pilot air is switched off. He complied with these procedures on 20/10/2010 when the incidence happened. When the incident happened, the Defendant took care of his treatment at New Era hospital and also paid his salaries. The Defendant never queried him for being negligent and when he returned from hospital, he resumed his work in the Defendant. He still works with the Defendant who still pays him salary till date. He is aware there is insurance policy for all staff of Defendant and such policy is for accidents. He is not aware the Defendant is following up on his compensation from the insurance company. He made formal request for compensation but does not have nor can he produce a copy of the letter. He is still doing the same kind of work he was doing before the accident. The Defendant has not issued him query for taking it to court and has been paying him his salary as at when due. The Defendant’s own side of the case, as narrated to this court by DW1, Mr. Augustine Akpiri, who described himself as the current head of I.S. maintenance section of the Defendant but was the assistant head of the I.S. Maintenance section at the time of the accident on 20/10/2010, is that the Claimant is a junior staff of the Defendant in the I.S. Maintenance section. This section is responsible for carrying out regular maintenance of the machines and equipment in the production or other sections of the Defendant Company. The Defendant ensures that all her machines are in good condition for regular glass production hence the duty of the I.S. Maintenance section is to carry out regular routine maintenance of the machines. All staffs in the I.S. maintenance unit, including the Claimant, received proper training and are aware of the safety procedure which all staff were expected to adhere to. DW1 stated that the Defendant has adequate machines and conducive work environment for all her staff. Although official closing time is 5pm, the Claimant has the attitude of staying behind so as to do overtime work that may arise. On 20/10/2010, the Claimant closed at 5pm but refused to go home waiting for overtime work to do. At about 8.30 pm of that day, the production manager of the production department reported to the maintenance unit that one of the Baffle machines in section 10 developed the problem of cessation of clamping. The Claimant was asked to inform the shift technician, who had just resumed his night duty, about the problem. The Claimant is a junior staff and he is directly responsible to the shift technician but rather than inform his immediate superior on duty, the Claimant proceeded on his own to do the repairs because he wanted to earn the money for overtime. When conducting the repairs, the Claimant completely ignored all safety precautions. He failed to shut off the valve before operating the machine and failed to remove the baffle arm. Failing to observe these precautions, the Claimant inserted his hands into the machine to get out the pistol which controls air direction. Because the air control valve was not shut off/locked before the Claimant commenced the work, the air pressure from the pistol compressed the Claimant’s hands resulting in the injury. The Claimant, as a technician, knows the safety procedure, which if he had observed them, the accident would not have happened. When the accident occurred, staffs of the Defendant who were present took the Claimant to the staff clinic and later to New Era hospital. The Claimant stayed in the hospital for 8 months and throughout the period, he was being paid his full salaries. The Defendant also took responsibility for the payment of the Claimant’s hospital bills and other necessaries. When the Claimant resumed work, he was absorbed by the Defendant, and the Defendant has commenced the process of getting the Claimant’s compensation from the insurance company. The Defendant is expecting the final computation from the insurers. The Defendant was not negligent in any way because the machines are in good conditions and the maintenance unit was specifically set up to routinely maintain the machines; the Defendant took proper medical care of the Claimant; it was the Claimant who was negligent for ignoring safety procedure; Notwithstanding the Claimant’s negligence, the Defendant still retained the Claimant in its employment. The Claimant does not work in the production department nor was he working on the machines when it developed problem. Rather, the problem was reported to the maintenance unit where the Claimant works and he proceeded to repair it without instruction. The production manager never directed the Claimant to undertake the repairs. It was the Claimant who decided to undertake the repairs without consulting the shift technician who was his immediate boss. Mr. Shaba, the Claimant’s supervisor, did not abandon his duty post on that day. As at 8.30 pm when the incident happened, Mr. Shaba had closed from work since 5pm and the shift technician had taken over duty. When DW1 was cross-examined by the Claimant’s counsel, he further told this court that he was assistant head of the maintenance section at the time the incident happened. The section runs 3 shifts of morning, afternoon and night. The shifts run from 7am – 2pm, 2pm – 9pm and 9pm – 7am. The accident happened between 8pm and 8.30pm. Alex, a shift technician, was to be on duty in the afternoon shift but he took permission to be off. The then HOS assigned the Claimant to cover the remaining afternoon shift of Alex from 5pm to 9pm. The Claimant was doing overtime in this period and he was paid for it. It was only the Claimant that was I.S maintenance staff on duty at the time of the accident. No other person was assigned by the Defendant to oversee the section on that day. The Claimant was assigned to be on ground to cover any duty the maintenance section may be called upon to do. On that day, the HOS closed by 5pm after he assigned the Claimant to cover Alex’s shift. The Claimant was doing the work he was assigned to do on that day. In repairing the Baffle machine, the first thing to do is to open the blank mode, move the Baffle arm and shut of the pilot air. The technician can then go in to fix the problem. But if the pilot air is not shut off, an accident will occur. The principal safety measure is to shut off the pilot air and others are to put on the personal protective equipment such as helmet, ear plugs, safety glasses, hand gloves, and safety boots. Hand covers are not provided for technicians because it is for operators but they can use it depending on the intensity of the heat or where they are working. The Claimant was brought back to work despite the accident. The Claimant’s case borders on claim in personal injury in the course of employment and he has attributed the injury to the Defendant’s negligence. The principle has since been settled in law that in a service relationship between an employer and an employee, the employer owes a duty of care to its employees. The employer is always under a duty to take reasonable care for the safety and health of the employee and where an employer fails or was negligent in its duty of care to the employee resulting in injury to the person of the employee, the employer will be liable in damages to the affected employee. This level of this duty is the same as the duty of care in law of negligence under the common law. Accordingly, to succeed in a claim for damages in personal injury by an employee, the employee has the burden to prove these important facts: (1) the employer owes him a duty of care (2) the employee was injured while in the employment (3) the injury resulted from the negligent act or omission of the employer. See IYERE vs. BENDEL FEED AND FLOUR MILL LTD (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 453) 1217 at 1244; IGHOSEWE vs. DELTA STEEL COMPANY LTD (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 410) 741 at 757. From the evidence adduced by the parties, the fact that the Claimant was an employee of the Defendant at the date of the accident was not denied by the Defendant. The existence of an employment relationship between the parties is not in dispute. Therefore, the relationship between the Defendant and the Claimant imposes on the Defendant a duty of care to the Claimant. The fact that the Claimant sustained injury from an accident which occurred in the course of his duties to the Defendant is also not in dispute. Interestingly however, the Defendant contended in its defence of the claim that it was the Claimant who was instrumental to the cause of the accident of 20/10/2010. The Defendant averred that the Claimant remained after close of work at his own volition to do over time work on the day of the accident and that the Claimant went to do the repairs on his own without informing his shift supervisor. According to DW1, the Claimant closed from work on 20/10/2010 at 5pm but he remained behind to do overtime work. At about 8.30 pm of that day, the production manager of the production department reported to the maintenance unit that one of the Baffle machines in section 10 developed the problem of cessation of clamping. The Claimant was asked to inform the night shift technician about the problem but the Claimant refused to inform the shift technician, who is the Claimant’s immediate superior on duty, and went ahead on his own to do the repairs so as to earn the money for overtime. It appears the Defendant’s case is that the Claimant was on a frolic of his own when he met with the accident. Under cross-examination however, DW1 told the court that the accident happened between 8pm and 8.30pm. One Alex, a shift technician, was to be on duty in the afternoon shift but he took permission to be off. The then Head of Section (HOS) assigned the Claimant to cover the remaining afternoon shift of Alex from 5pm to 9pm. Only the Claimant was the I.S maintenance staff on duty at the time of the accident and no other person was assigned by the Defendant to oversee the section on that day. DW1 further said the Claimant was assigned to be on ground to cover any duty the maintenance section may be called upon to do. On that day, the HOS closed by 5pm after he assigned the Claimant to cover Alex’s shift. DW1 concluded that the Claimant was doing the work he was assigned to do on that day. The Claimant had pleaded that he was on duty on 20/10/2010 till 8.30pm when the accident happened and that on that day of the accident, no shift technician was around. The evidence of DW1 under cross-examination corroborates the Claimant’s averments. It is clear to me that the Claimant was on duty at the time of the accident at the instance of the Defendant and he was in fact the only maintenance technician on duty that night. It seems to me that a problem with one of the machines having been reported to the maintenance section, it was the duty of the Claimant to respond to it. I find as a fact that the Claimant was performing his duties legitimately and on behalf of and at the instance of the Defendant on the day and at the time of the accident. The crucial duty of this court in this matter is to determine whether the Claimant’s injury resulted from the Defendant’s breach of its duty of care to the Claimant. It is the law that in personal injury cases, the Claimant alleging negligence has the burden to prove to the satisfaction of the court the acts or omissions of the Defendant constituting the alleged negligence which resulted in the injury. The Claimant has the onus to give the particulars of the negligence and lead credible evidence to establish them. See IYERE vs. BENDEL FEED AND FLOUR MILL LTD (supra); ROYAL ADE NIGERIA LIMITED vs. N.O.C.M. CO. PLC (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt. 874) 206. Therefore, the question whether the Claimant is entitled to his claims in this suit depends on whether he was able to establish negligence on the part of the Defendant, which led to the occurrence of the accident. In attributing his injury to the Defendant’s negligence, the Claimant stated that the duty of care owed him by the Defendant included the provision of adequate and suitable machines and appliances and in paragraph 19 of the statement of facts, the Claimant pleaded the particulars of negligence as follows: “The defendant company failed in its duty of care to the claimant by failing to provide safe properly working equipment and competent staff to manage its plant. PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE: a) Installation of faulty Baffle machinery in its plant leading to intermittent breakdown of the machine a) Refusal or failure to effect comprehensive adequate repairs of the Baffle despite being aware of the intermittent break down of the machine b) Employment of senior technical staff who are none-challant and not committed in their attitude to work by leaving their work place before close of work and/or not being at their work station as and when due. Has the Claimant shown that these acts or omissions alleged against the Defendant were the cause of the accident of 20/10/2010? The Claimant told this court how the accident happened in his evidence. He was on duty on 20/10/2010 when the Baffle in section 10 developed problem at about 8.40pm and he was instructed by the production manager and his supervisor to repair it. The Defendant and its senior technical staff were aware that this machine has been breaking down and needs replacement. In effecting the repair, he put his right hand under the mould, after the Baffle was stopped, to check if there was air leakage. While on this, the faulty nature of the Baffle made it to depressurise and his right hand was clamped on the hot moulding machine damaging his hands in the process. The Claimant also said that the repair ought to have been carried out by his supervisor but his supervisor, Mr. Gabriel Shaba, left his duty post without any reason. The Claimant said his injury was a result of the Defendant’s negligence in the sense that the Defendant installed faulty baffle machine which intermittently breaks down; the Defendant’s refusal or failure to effect comprehensive repairs of the baffle despite being aware of intermittent breakdown and employment of senior technical staff who are not committed in their attitude to work by leaving their work place before close of work and not being in the work station as and when due. But the Defendant contended that it has adequate machines and conducive work environment for all her staff and ensures that all her machines are in good condition. That was why it was the I.S. maintenance section whose duty is to carry out regular routine maintenance of the machines. In addition, the Defendant has properly trained staffs in the I.S. maintenance unit who are aware of the safety procedure when repairing the machines. When the Claimant was carrying out the repairs on 20/10/2010, he completely ignored all safety precautions. He failed to shut off the valve before operating the machine and failed to remove the baffle arm. Failing to observe these precautions, the Claimant inserted his hands into the machine to get out the pistol, which controls air direction. Because the air control valve was not shut off before the Claimant commenced the work, the air pressure from the pistol compressed the Claimant’s hands resulting in the injury. In the Claimant’s additional evidence, he further stated that he has never been negligent or careless in the performance of his duties as a technician, he did not ignore safety procedure on 20/10/2010 and he complied with the Defendant policy in his attempt to rectify the fault. Throughout his employment in the Defendant, repair is carried out with the Baffle arm in place. He is not aware the Baffle arm has ever been removed to effect repair. The machines are usually shut down to repair the baffle arm machinery, counter flow valve electro-side and invert arm machinery among others. Most of the Defendant’s machine are not always in good working condition and are always breaking down. From the alleged particulars of negligence and the evidence adduced by the Claimant, one of the reasons the Claimant wants the Defendant held responsible for the accident is that the Defendant installed faulty Baffle machine, which causes the machine to break down intermittently. It appears this allegation of the Claimant is that the Baffle machine was faulty right from the time of installation as the reason they break down intermittently. The Defendant denied this allegation and averred in paragraph 11 of its statement of defence that its machines are in good condition. A burden is placed on the Claimant to prove his allegation. The Claimant has to supply cogent evidence showing that the Baffle machine was faulty at the time of installation and the Defendant, knowing this fact, went ahead to install them. I cannot find any such evidence to support the allegation. The Claimant did not say he was there at the time of installation nor did he submit any evidence showing the state of the machines at the time of installation. I cannot believe the Claimant’s allegation that the Defendant installed a faulty Baffle machine. Similarly, there is no evidence to believe the allegation that the machine breaks down intermittently because it was faulty right from installation. With this lack of proof, the mere allegation that the Defendant installed faulty machine is not sufficient to hold the Defendant responsible for the Claimant’s accident. The Claimant has also alleged the refusal or failure of the Defendant to carry out comprehensive or adequate repairs of the Baffle machine despite being aware of the intermittent break down of the machine as another reason the Defendant should be liable for his injury. But the Claimant told this court in his evidence that the Defendant has a maintenance section and he is a staff in that section. He also told the court that the responsibility of the section is to carry out maintenance activities and repair of the Defendant’s machines. Under cross examination, the Claimant said that he works in the I.S. maintenance department which services or repairs the machines in the production department. He works in the production department only when a machine breaks down and the maintenance department is required to repair it. The Claimant also said that he is a trained and experienced technician. It is also in the evidence of DW1 that the Defendant’s I.S. Maintenance section was created specifically for the purpose of carrying out regular maintenance of the machines and equipment in the production or other sections of the Defendant Company. The Defendant ensures that all her machines are in good condition for regular glass production and it is the duty of the I.S. maintenance section to carry out regular routine maintenance of the machines. Available evidence has shown that the Defendant has a maintenance department which carries out maintenance of the machines or repairs of any faulty machine. In my view, the responsibility of the Defendant in the maintenance of its machines is no more than to have a system in place to ensure the regular maintenance and repairs of its machines. From the Claimant’s evidence, the maintenance section has been carrying out its function of maintenance of the Defendant’s machines since the time of employment. In fact, the Claimant was carrying out a repair duty when the accident happened. The Claimant has also continued to allege that the Defendant’s machines have been breaking down constantly and this was the cause of his accident. But he admitted he returned to the same job and in the same department. If his allegation is true, I would not think he would risk a further accident by remaining in the employment or performing the same duty. The Claimant’s allegation that the Defendant failed to carry out comprehensive or adequate repairs of the Baffle machine cannot be believed. Equally, I do not find anything in this allegation with which to hold the Defendant liable for the accident which happened to the Claimant on 20/10/2010. The Claimant has also alleged in his particulars of negligence that the Defendant employed senior technical staff who are non-challant and uncommitted in their attitude to work by leaving their work place before close of work and/or not being at their work station as and when due. It appears to me what the Claimant is contending in this instance is that employment of such character of staff by the Defendant was responsible for his accident. This allegation and the part of the Claimant’s evidence touching on it are quite ambiguous. It has left me to wonder who are these “senior technical staff” employed by the Defendant but who are non-challant and uncommitted to work? He only mentioned that his supervisor, Mr. Gabriel Shaba, left his duty post without any reason on the day of the accident. In his evidence, the Claimant said his supervisor and the production manager were on duty that day and they were the ones who instructed him to do the repairs. The Defendant did aver that Mr. Shaba, the Claimant’s supervisor, did not abandon his duty post on that day. As at 8.30 pm when the incident happened, Mr. Shaba had closed from work since 5pm. The Claimant had not shown any evidence to this court that the said Mr. Shaba’s closing time on that day was not 5pm. The Claimant did not substantiate his allegation that the Defendant employed senior technical staffs who are uncommitted to work. The Claimant has also stated that the repairs should ordinarily have been done by his supervisor but he was instructed to do it. It is however his evidence that he is an employee of the Defendant in the maintenance section and he was on duty on the date and at the time. He was also trained to do the work. The Claimant never said he protested when he was instructed to carry out the repairs. That is to say he undertook the repair willingly in the course of his duty. I find, in the result, that the Claimant is unable to show that the Defendant employed uncommitted staff or how the accident was caused by the alleged employment of uncommitted staff. The particulars of negligence alleged by the Claimant cannot sustain his allegation that the accident occurred as a result of the acts or omissions of the Defendant. In his evidence, the Claimant narrated how the accident happened. He said that in effecting the repairs of the Baffle, he put his right hand under the mould, after the Baffle was stopped, to check if there was air leakage. While on this, the faulty nature of the Baffle made it to depressurise and his right hand was clamped on the hot moulding machine damaging his hands in the process. From this narration, can it be said that the accident happened as a result of any fault of the Defendant? In its defence, the Defendant averred that all staff in the I.S. maintenance unit, including the Claimant, was properly trained and is aware of the safety procedure. The Claimant failed to shut off the valve before operating the machine but if he had observed the safety precautions, the accident would not have happened. Under cross examination, DW1 said that in repairing the Baffle machine, the first thing to do is to open the blank mode, move the Baffle arm and shut off the pilot air. But if the pilot air is not shut off, an accident will occur. The principal safety measure is to shut off the pilot air. The Claimant too had stated in his additional evidence that the machines are usually shut down to repair the baffle and under cross examination, the Claimant stated that when repairing a baffle machine which has the problem of cessation of clamping, the main safety measure is to switch of the pilot air. Pilot air has to be switched off before going into the machine. He also stated that the Baffle machine stops working when the pilot air is switched off. Evidence from both parties is agreed on the point that the procedure when repairing the Baffle machine is to switch off the pilot air. I also understand from the evidence that the Baffle machine stops working when the pilot air is switched off. Now, did the Claimant switch off the pilot air when he was repairing the Baffle machine on 20/10/2010? In his evidence, the Claimant said that the Baffle was stopped before he put in his hands. He also said in his additional evidence that he complied with the procedure. Even under cross examination, the Claimant maintained that he complied with the procedure on 20/10/2010 when the incidence happened. In effect, it is the Claimant’s case that the Baffle machine was shut off before he proceeded to repair it. From the evidence, it is clear to me that Baffle machine cannot function if switched off. In my view also, a machine that is switched off cannot function. That is to say the fact that the Baffle machine depressurized after it was switched off or stopped was purely an accidental occurrence. The Claimant did allege that the depressurization occurred because the machine was faulty. It must be mentioned that the owner of machinery is not in law liable for every latent defect in it. To be liable, it must be shown that the defect or fault was caused by the owner. The Claimant is unable to establish this or attribute the fault in the Baffle machine to any act of the Defendant. I have examined all the facts of this case but I cannot find the Defendant liable for the Claimant’s accident or the injury he sustained from it. On the other hand, I think the Defendant had done what it is expected to do to keep the Claimant safe. It trained the Claimant as a technician, provided him with safety gadgets and taught him the safety precautions when repairing the machines. The Claimant said he complied with these precautions on that day. Then, the only possible explanation for the occurrence of the accident is that it was purely a fortuitous occurrence without any fault from the Defendant. I am also of the view that the Defendant acted quite commendably towards the Claimant since the happening of the accident. The Defendant has shown that it immediately rushed the Claimant to hospital where he was admitted for 8 months. Throughout the period, he was being paid his full salaries. The Defendant also took responsibility for the payment of the Claimant’s hospital bills and other necessaries and when the Claimant left hospital, he resumed work with the Defendant and the Defendant is in the process of getting the Claimant to be paid compensation. The Claimant did not deny these facts. In addition, he admitted under cross examination that when the incidence happened, the Defendant took care of his treatment at New Era hospital and also paid his salaries. The Defendant never queried him for being negligent and when he returned from hospital, he resumed his work in the Defendant. He still works with the Defendant who still pays him salary till date. These evidences show clearly that the Defendant provided the Claimant with medical care, paid the medical bills, continued to pay the Claimant’s salary all the while he was in hospital, did not terminate his employment but reabsorbed him after his discharge and is also preparing his compensation. The Claimant is still in the defendant’s employment till date. I have heard the Claimant say he can no longer do such jobs he is qualified to do because of his disability. But he has also told this court that the Defendant still keeps him in its employment where he still does the same work in the maintenance department. That is to say notwithstanding his disability, the Defendant still retained him in its employment. These are very appropriate and commendable conducts the Defendant has exhibited towards the Claimant since the time of his injury. Although the Claimant had the belief that the Defendant was liable for the injury, one would think that in view of the manner the Defendant had treated him and the existing service relationship, the Claimant ought not to have toppled the cart by this suit. The claims of the Claimant in this case are all claims for general damages. A person injured by another’s wrong is entitled to general damages as compensation for non-pecuniary loss such as pain, suffering and loss of amenity and enjoyment of life suffered by the injured party. For the Claimant to be entitled to general damages in this case, the injury or damage must have been shown to have resulted from the negligent act or wrong of the Defendant. I am not convinced the Defendant had anything to do with the accident sustained by the Claimant. I cannot therefore find the Defendant liable for the accident nor can I attribute any wrongdoing to the Defendant in respect of injury sustained by the Claimant. The Claimant has sought particularly in his 2nd relief, general damages for permanent disability and loss of life expectancy. Although this claim is tied to finding of liability to the Defendant, which is however lacking, there is an interesting aspect to this relief. The Claimant has alleged that he suffered permanent disability and can no longer work. Since his educational qualification qualifies him to do only menial jobs and being right handed, he can no longer do such jobs because of his disability. He is also not likely to get another job should he lose his present employment with the Defendant. But evidence before me points to the fact that he is still working since 2011 after his discharge from the hospital and he has not been sacked or queried for inability to carry out his duties. It thus means that he is carrying out his duties till date. These facts indicate that the Claimant is not permanently disabled as to rule him out of working or being employed. His fear of not securing another employment is speculative because he is still working and gainfully employed. I find that the Claimant could not prove his claim for general damages. Consequently, the Claimant’s claims against the Defendants fail. However, the Claimant has complained that he needs further medical treatment due to the excruciating pain he still feels as a result of the injury. Since the Claimant is still in the Defendant’s employment, the Defendant is ordered to attend to this complaint and to any further medical need of the Claimant as it relates to the injury. Again, the Defendant told this court that it has commenced the process of getting the Claimant’s compensation paid to him but I wonder how long that will take bearing in mind that the accident happened in 2010 while this suit was instituted in 2015. Up to the time of this suit, the compensation had not been processed and paid to the Claimant. The Claimant is entitled to this compensation both under the Defendant’s Condition of Service and the Employee Compensation Act. The Defendant is hereby ordered to double efforts on the Claimant’s compensation and see to it that he is paid as soon as possible. Finally, in view of the Claimant’s injured right hand, I tend to agree with him that he may find it difficult to secure another job outside his present employment. I have commented earlier in this judgment that the Defendant has acted quite commendably towards the Claimant by retaining him in its employment notwithstanding the injury. The Defendant is urged to keep the Claimant so employed. No order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge