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JUDGMENT The Claimant, by way of complaint filed on the 5th day of August 2014, instituted this action against the Defendant claiming the following reliefs; 1. The sum of N2,199,969.20 (Two Million, One Hundred and Ninety-Nine Thousand, Nine Hundred and Sixty-Nine Naira, Twenty Kobo) being the outstanding balance of the entitlement of the Claimant as his gratuity upon resignation and/or terminal benefits on the 6th December 2013 which said gratuity totals N9,028,458.50 less the sum of N6,828,489.30 being the total indebtedness of the Claimant from outstanding loan facilities granted to him while in the Defendant’s employment as at the terminal date of retirement. 2. A declaration that the Claimant is not indebted to the Defendant to the tune of N3,926,247.93 (Three Million, Nine Hundred and Twenty-Six Thousand, Two Hundred and Forty-Seven Naira, Ninety Three Kobo) or at all, upon his resignation from the Defendant’s employment on the 6th December 2016. 3. The sum of N30,725,000.00 (Thirty Million, Seven Hundred and Twenty Five Thousand Naira) being general damages for loss of profits accruable to the Claimant, for wrongful detention of the said outstanding entitlements of the Claimant which he had intended to use and/or plough into his distributorship business upon retirement from the Defendant, and the money had been held over without lawful cause or excuse. The complaint was filed with other accompanying processes such as the: Statement of Facts establishing the cause of action, Sworn Deposition of Claimant’s witness, Claimant’s List of Witnesses, Claimant’s List of Documents and Copies of Documents to be relied on. These originating processes were served on the Defendants. The Defendant entered appearance and filed a Joint Statement of Defence and other accompanying processes on 25th February 2015 vide a motion for extension of time, which was granted by this court on 11th May 2015. The Claimant filed a Reply to the Statement of Defence on 27th June 2016. Hearing commenced on 1st July 2015. The Claimant testified for himself as CW1 and Onyibo Onyema Uchey testified for the Defendant as DW1. Hearing ended on 11/7/2016 and both parties were ordered to file their Final Written Addresses. The Defendant’s final address was filed on the 19th day of August 2016 while the Claimant’s address was filed on the 8th day of September 2016. The Defendant filed a Reply on Points of Law on 5th October 2016. These were duly regularised and adopted on the 5th day of October 2016. In the Defendant’s final address, four issues were formulated for determination, to wit: 1. Whether Exhibits G and H are admissible in evidence. 2. Whether the Claimant is entitled to gratuity or terminal benefits as computed by him. 3. Whether the Claimant breached the procedure for fair hearing obtainable in the Defendant. 4. Whether the Defendant is entitled to her counter-claim. Regarding the first issue, Counsel recalled that this court granted leave to the Defendant to raise the issue of admissibility of Exhibits G and H in the final address. Counsel submitted that Exhibits G and H are both unsigned and undated, and an unsigned document is worthless, void, carries no judicial value or validity, and has no probative value. See IKELI & ANOR vs. AGBER (2014) LPELR- 22653 and GARUBA vs. K.I.C. LTD (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 160. It is counsel’s argument that Exhibits G and H, though admitted are worthless documents which the court is enjoined to ascribe no weight to them. See also OJO vs. ABT ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED & ANOR (2014) LPELR- 22860. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the said exhibits as they are worthless pieces of paper. With respect to issue two, counsel relying on Section 122 of the Evidence Act, urged the Court to take judicial notice of the Pension Reform Act 2004; which applies to public and private sectors’ employees. Counsel submitted that the Claimant does not belong to the exception provided for in Section 8 of the Pension Reform Act 2004, which reads thus: “(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1(2) of this Act, any employee who at the commencement of this Act is entitled to retirement benefits under any pension scheme existing before the commencement of this Act but has three or less years to retire, shall be exempted from the scheme. (2) The categories of person mentioned in Section 291 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 shall be exempted from the scheme.” Counsel argued that Section 291 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 relates to judicial officers and the Claimant is not one. Counsel argued further that the Pension Reform Act 2004 supersedes Exhibit F, the Defendant’s Leaving Service Benefits (Explanatory Booklet) November 2002. Thus, Exhibit F became ineffective with the commencement of the Pension Reform Act 2004 on 25th June, 2004. Similarly, counsel submitted further that Exhibit Q, Review of Compensation Strategy and Policy: Gratuity was made by the Defendant in conformity with the Pension Reform Act 2004; and the Claimant’s gratuity was made pursuant to the Pension Reform Act 2004. Counsel asserted that Exhibit Q is the proper document upon which the Claimant’s terminal benefits should be calculated, and was calculated. On issue three, counsel contended that Exhibit T, the Defendant’s Employee Handbook stated the grievance procedure laid down in the Defendant before approaching the court. The handbook on Page 48, paragraph 13 stated the fair hearing procedure which was not followed by the Claimant before he commenced this suit. It is counsel’s opinion that this action is premature as the conditions precedent to its institution, were not met by the Claimant. On issue four, counsel submitted that Exhibits O and U, a letter dated 10th January 2014 and the Claimant’s statement of account respectively show that the Claimant is indebted to the Defendant in the sum of N3,926,247.93 (interest not inclusive) as at the time of his exit from the Defendant. Counsel stated further that at that same time, the Claimant was entitled to gratuity which comprised of his annual basic salary, transport, housing and lunch multiplied by 145% (being the percentage of gratuity benefits accruable to his length of service. Also, counsel asserted that the Claimant’s total benefits was N3,123,883.19 being his gratuity for (12) twelve years of service with the Defendant; and that the Claimant had taken a loan of N7,050,131.17 from the Defendant, which remained unpaid at the point of the Claimant’s exit. Further, counsel submitted that subtracting the Claimant’s total terminal benefits from the loan, left the sum of N3,926,247.93 as the net indebtedness of the Claimant to the Defendant. More so, counsel submitted further that the Claimant did not produce any credible evidence to controvert the fact that his net indebtedness at the time of his exit was N7,050,131.17. Counsel referred the court to the cross-examination of the Claimant on 11th July 2016, where he admitted taking loans from the Defendant. At this point, counsel argued that the Claimant’s reply that “…by the bank’s policy, any outstanding loans should be deducted from terminal benefits” amounts to an admission; and a contradiction of his earlier evidence. It is counsel’s further argument that the law is settled that facts admitted or not denied need no further proof and is deemed admitted. Counsel drew the court’s attention to the case of TAIWO vs. ADEGBENRO (2011) 5 SCNJ 125, where it was held as follows: “Judicial admissions are conclusive. That is to say that where a party agrees to a fact in issue, it is no longer necessary to prove that fact. In effect, after an admission, no further dispute on the fact admitted should be entertained in court.” See also the cases of CPC vs. LADO (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1266) 40 at 91 and BALOGUN vs. UBA (1992) NWLR (Pt. 247) 336. Also, counsel urged the court to consider the demeanour of the Claimant under cross-examination, and hold that the Claimant has admitted the kernel of the defence and counter-claim, which is the sum of N3,926,247.93. See AGBI vs. OGBEH (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 65. Counsel argued further that Exhibit L relied upon by the Claimant was made on the 12th May 2013 before the Claimant exited the Defendant on 6th December 2013. Therefore, it is counsel’s assertion that Exhibit L does not represent the Claimant’s total indebtedness at the time of the Claimant’s exit. From the foregoing, counsel urged the court to hold that the Defendant has proved that the total amount of loan the Claimant took from the Defendant is N7,050,131.97, and upon subtracting his terminal benefits from this sum; the Claimant remains indebted to the Defendant in the sum of N3,926,247.93 (Three Million, Nine Hundred and Twenty-Six Thousand, Two Hundred and Forty-Seven Naira, Ninety Three Kobo). Counsel urged the court to dismiss the Claimant’s claim and grant the counter-claim. Learned Counsel for the Claimant in his final written address formulated five issues for determination by court to wit: 1. Whether Exhibits G and H tendered by the Claimant and Exhibit U tendered by the Defendant are admissible in evidence. 2. Whether from the pleadings and evidence led, the Claimant proved that his terminal benefits were to be calculated based on the 2002 Leaving Service Benefits Scheme and not the 2013 December 31st Policy. (Whether the claimant is entitled to gratuity or terminal benefits as computed by him). 3. Whether the Claimant breached the procedure for fair hearing obtainable in the Defendant bank. 4. Whether the Defendant’s counter-claim is incompetent and whether it is entitled to the reliefs sought in the counter-claim. 5. Whether on the preponderance of evidence the Claimant is entitled to all the reliefs sought in the claim. On issue one; counsel submitted that there are generally three criteria that govern admissibility namely; whether the document is pleaded, relevant and admissible. See PROGRESSIVE ACTION CONGRESS vs. INEC (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 478) 260 at 334. At this juncture, counsel urged the court to hold that all other exhibits are admitted without objection because the defence counsel restricted himself only to Exhibits G and H. It is the opinion of Learned Counsel that the objections raised by the Learned defence counsel only goes to the weight to be attached to the said exhibits and do not relate to the admissibility criteria mentioned earlier. Counsel went further to state that Exhibits G and H were pleaded in paragraph 6 of the statement of facts, both exhibits were frontloaded, both exhibits are relevant and have satisfied the evidential conditions for admissibility. Counsel asserted that while Exhibit G is the original document prepared by the Claimant, who sought to tender it after laying proper foundation; Exhibit H is a computer printout of the Defendant’s salaries & wages template, accompanied by the certificate under Section 84(4) of the Evidence Act. Counsel urged the court to hold that Exhibits G and H have satisfied the criteria of admissibility, and discountenance the defence counsel’s objections. Further, counsel submitted that it is not in all cases that an unsigned or undated document is rendered inadmissible in evidence, the rule applies to documents that are ordinarily in the course of life, or by law, supposed to be signed or initialed; documents such as computer printout, emails are not normally signed and are admissible in evidence without proof of signature. See the following cases of: a. AREWA TEXTILES PLC vs. FINETEX LTD (2003) FWLR (Pt. 162) 1985 b. IDAKWO vs. NIGERIAN ARMY (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt. 857) 249 c. YESUFU vs. ACB LTD (1976) 4 SC 1 at 16 Similarly, counsel contended that the fact a statement is required to be in writing does not mean it must be dated, or the absence of a date vitiates it. See UHUNMWAGHO vs. OKOJIE (1982) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 263. It is counsel’s contention that Exhibits G and H falls outside the category of documents that are ordinarily in the course of life, and by law not required to be signed or dated. Regarding Claimant counsel’s objection to the Defendant’s Exhibit U, counsel submitted that Exhibit U was not frontloaded or pleaded, what was pleaded in Paragraph 5(c) of the Statement of Defence was “the Claimant’s Statement of Account” and not the computer generated sheet made in contemplation of this suit, which was eventually tendered. Counsel’s submission is hinged on the fact that Exhibit U does not contain the essential features of a Statement of Account, such as: account number, type of account, withdrawals and deposits made by the claimant. Also, counsel submitted that the law is trite that documents made by a party to a litigation or person otherwise interested when proceedings are pending or anticipated are inadmissible. See the cases of UTC vs. LAWAL (2014) 5 WRN 1 at 5 and OLOMO vs. APE (2014) 12 WRN 110 at 122-3. On this point, counsel further contended that Exhibit U is a computer generated document which ought to have been followed by the certificate as envisaged under Section 84(4) of the Evidence Act. See KUBUR vs. DICKSON (2012) 52 NSCQR (Pt. 2) 508. It is counsel’s opinion that Exhibit U is not a certified true copy as captured under Section 87(a) and 90(e) of the Evidence Act, thus it is inadmissible, and the court will be right to expunge evidence that has been admitted but is inadmissible. See ADEGEBO vs. OWOKALU (2014) 1 WRN 171 at 187-8. Counsel referred the court to the case of SHITTU vs. FASHAWE (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 946) 671 at 690, where it was held that “where a court wrongly admits inadmissible evidence, it ought as a duty to disregard the inadmissible evidence in the consideration of the judgment in the matter. The court was urged by counsel to consider the foregoing and disregard Exhibit U and expunge it from the records. With respect to issue two, Counsel argued that it is trite law that facts admitted needs no proof; and that the Defendant admitted (in the statement of defence) that the Claimant was its employee. In addition, counsel submitted that the Claimant tendered documents proving that an employer-employee relationship existed between the parties, and where there is documentary evidence supporting, oral testimony becomes more credible because documentary evidence “serves as a hanger from which to assess oral testimony”. See INEC vs. OSHIOMOLE (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1132) 607 at 671 and ODUTOLA vs. MABOGUNJE (2013) NSCQR (Pt. 1) 31 at 57. It is Counsel’s submission that the next question to be answered in the affirmative is whether the relationship between the parties was determined by the Claimant’s voluntary resignation. In the same vein, counsel argued that the Defendant admitted Paragraphs 4, 5, 16 and 17 of the Statement of Facts to the effect that the Claimant’s employment was governed by the Defendant’s terms and conditions applicable to permanent staff, including the terminal benefits entrenched in Section 5 of its Leaving Service Benefits Scheme, 2002 and was reviewed effective from 31st December 2013, after the Claimant has resigned. Counsel argued further that this new policy could not have been used to calculate the claimant’s gratuity, owing to the position of the law that a party is entitled to rely on his opponent’s admission as an admission against interest to defeat his opponent’s claim. See INEC vs. OSHIOMOLE (supra). Counsel asserted that Exhibit F was tendered by the Claimant in proof of the 2002 scheme, and Exhibit T (the Defendant’s Handbook 2007) relied on by the Defendant, cannot exclude the operation of Exhibit F. It is counsel’s argument that Exhibits F and T complement each other, while Exhibit F gave the specifics of the benefits accruable to staff whose employment have ceased; Exhibit T gives the specific procedural steps for cessation of employment. Counsel urged the court to hold the 2002 Leaving Service Benefits Scheme Exhibit F was in existence at the time of the Claimant’s voluntary resignation. Also, counsel contended that the Claimant’s voluntary resignation was in tandem with Paragraph 8.10(A) of Exhibit T, and the Defendant did not invoke its right to refuse the Claimant’s resignation. Therefore, it is counsel’s opinion that it may be validly presumed that none of the circumstances under paragraph 8.10(B) of Exhibit T was applicable to the Claimant because the court will presume the existence of a fact from the existence of one or more proved fact if such a presumption is irresistible or that there is no other reasonable presumption which fits the proved or admitted facts. See ANYANWU vs. UZOWUARA (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 499) 441. Counsel urged the court to invoke Section 145(1) and 167(c) of the Evidence Act and presume that the Defendant did not refuse the Claimant’s resignation because the Claimant was not suspected of any internal/police investigation, was not on suspension, did not have a pending case before the Banks Disciplinary Committee and did not have an outstanding commitment net of terminal benefits. Similarly, counsel submitted that the Claimant pleaded in paragraph 6 of the Statement of Facts and led evidence of his base pay, quarterly cash allowance, annual cash allowance, short term incentives and benefits for medical and professional membership. In addition, counsel submitted further that that the Claimant tendered Exhibits G and H showing how the computation of the Claimant’s entitlements and the Defendant did not proffer any evidence contradicting the Claimant’s evidence. Counsel is of the opinion that the Claimant’s evidence is deemed admitted and proved because the Defendant did not challenge the Claimant’s evidence in this regard by cross-examination, the court was urged by counsel to hold that the Claimant has proved that his terminal benefits stood at N9,028,458.50 as gratuity. See IGHOSEWE vs. DSC LTD (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 410) 741 at 763. Further, counsel contended that though the Defendant denied the computation of the Claimant’s terminal benefits, the Defendant failed to plead any other computation formula in pleadings, and that the evidence in Paragraph 4 of DW1’s Written Deposition that the Claimant’s gratuity at his exit was the additions of annual basic salary, transport, housing and lunch multiplied by 145%; goes to no issue because parties are bound by their pleadings and evidence on facts not pleaded goes to no issue. See OHIAERI vs. AKABEZE (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 221) 1 at 28. Again, counsel’s contention is that the deposition of the Defendant did not refer to any computation formula or the scheme/policy under which the computation was made. More so, counsel contended further that the court must act only on materials placed before it, it will also not make a case for a party and as such the court cannot speculate on the source of the defendant’s computation. See the cases of PDP vs. INEC (2012) 18 WRN 128 at 145 and SALIMAN vs. KWARA STATE POLY (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 974) 477 at 488. Also, counsel submitted that the Paragraph 6 of the Statement of Defence admitted Paragraph 12 of the Statement of Facts, which showed the indebtedness of the Claimant to the Defendant as N6,828,489.30 (as per Exhibits L and L1-a document prepared by the Defendant). It is counsel’s further submission that this piece of evidence was admitted without the objection of the Defendant, yet the Defendant pleaded in Paragraph 5(b) of the Amended Statement of Defence that the Claimant had an unpaid loan of N7,050,151.17 at the time of his exit. Counsel argued that the law is trite that a party cannot by his complete state of mind make an admission and later decide to change it by an amendment. See AKANIWO vs. NSIRIM (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 410) 610 at 663. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimant never pleaded that he was on pension hence the Defendant was wrong to base his gratuity entitlement using the Pension Fund table of benefits that was not pleaded, tendered or relied on, in the course of proceedings. Counsel urged the court to resolve this issue in the Claimant’s favour, grant all the reliefs and dismiss the counter-claim that is not supported by evidence, because pleadings do not constitute evidence. See EZEANAH vs. ATTAH (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 873) 468. It is the contention of counsel that the Defendant did not plead or show evidence of how the Pension Reform Act (which the Defence counsel argued superseded Exhibit F), affected Exhibit F. Counsel argued that the defence did not plead or prove that Exhibit F became ineffective after the Pension Reform Act; or that the Claimant’s gratuity was calculated in accordance with Exhibit Q. It is the argument of counsel that cases are fought and won on pleadings and address of counsel, no matter how well prepared or delivered cannot take place of evidence. See ANYAFULU vs. MEKA (2014) 16 WRN 53 at 81 and UBA PLC vs. ACB LTD (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 939) 232. Counsel urged the court not to accept the request of the Defence counsel in relation to the Pension Reform Act and that Section 122 of the Evidence Act is not applicable to the facts of this case as pleaded in the amended Statement of Defence. Counsel in stressing this issue, submitted that the Pension Reform Act is inapplicable to the Claimant’s case that it is hinged on payment of gratuity not pension, and the defence counsel’s argument that the Defendant’s computation is based on Exhibit Q, which is made pursuant to the Pension Reform Act, is non sequitur. Again, counsel argued that Exhibit Q has no retroactive effect and the Claimant’s resignation took effect from 6th December 2013 before the coming into effect of Exhibit Q. Counsel urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the Claimant. With respect to issue three, counsel argued that the fair hearing procedure referred to by the defendant is limited to conflicts arising in the workplace involving the Bank’s employee/group of employees, which does not apply to the Claimant, who was no longer a staff of the Defendant at the time Exhibit O was written. In the same vein, counsel submitted that paragraph 13 at page 48 of exhibit T is clear and unambiguous and the Court is bound to interpret it literally, consider it in totality with the whole document and not in isolation so as to ascertain the intention of the parties. See MOHAMMED vs. MOHAMMED (2012) 18 WRN 64 at 90-1. Counsel also asserted that Exhibit T, being a document that governs the employer-employee relationship in the Defendant and has no bearing to this suit as he is no longer a staff of the Defendant. More so, counsel contended that the Claimant pleaded that he was the one that initiated several correspondences with the Defendant, and that the Defendant failed to tender evidence of, or give notice of demand of the various letters of demand claimed to have been written to the Claimant, (as averred in paragraph 5(d), and 6 of the amended statement of defence and counter-claim respectively). Thus, it is counsel’s submission that such averments are deemed abandoned because they are not supported by evidence. See NEWBREED LTD vs. ERHOMOSELE (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 974) 499. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimant did not breach the Defendant’s fair hearing procedure. In arguing issue four, counsel asserted that a counter-claim is an independent action, that should be instituted in accordance with the Rules of Court. Counsel cited Order 9(1)(a) of the National Industrial Court Rules, which reads thus: “Where a party is served with a compliant and the accompanying documents as stipulated in Order 3 of these Rules, intends to defend and/or counterclaim in the action, the party shall not later than 14 days or at any other time prescribed for defence in the compliant file a statement of defence and counterclaim(if any).” Counsel argued that this Rule is mandatory, and that the Defendant failed to comply with it by filing a counterclaim alongside the amended statement of defence, without first seeking an extension to file the counterclaim filed outside time. It is the further submission of counsel that the counter-claim is separate from the main claim and non-compliance makes it incompetent, it is a process that could not been filed by way of an amendment to the statement of defence. The case of OGAR vs. JAMES (2001) FWLR (Pt. 67) 930 was cited by counsel to buttress the principle that any process filed outside time limited for the purpose will be null and void. See also OGIAFO vs. ISESELE (2014) 20 WRN 55 at 111. Counsel urged the court to hold that the counterclaim is incompetent for being in contravention with Order 9(1)(a) of the Court Rules and strike out same, especially as the issue of the counterclaim’s competency was raised in the Claimant’s Reply to the Statement of Defence. Furthermore, counsel is of the opinion that Exhibits O and U, on which the defence counsel argued proved the counterclaim, were not pleaded and DW1 did not lead evidence on them. Counsel reiterated his earlier submission that parties are bound by their pleadings, and evidence on facts not pleaded goes to no issue. See NWAVU vs. OKOYE (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 451) 815 at 853. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Defendant did not discharge the evidential burden of proving the counterclaim, and dismiss same on the preponderance of evidence. It is counsel’s further argument that the defence counsel’s argument on the Claimant’s admission that the Defendant was to deduct the loans from his benefits; is not a contradiction of earlier evidence not pointed out by defence counsel. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the arguments of the defence counsel in this regard because the court is not permitted to go on an expedition to unearth the said contradiction. Again, counsel is of the view that it was the duty of the Defendant’s counsel, in addition to refuting that Exhibit L did not represent the Claimant’s indebtedness, to plead any further debt incurred by the Claimant from 12th May 2013 to 6th December 2013. Counsel hinged his view on the principle that a party against whom a document has been admitted wishes that the court should not rely, should at the trial challenge its contents. See ORDIA vs. PIEDMONT NIG. LTD. (1995) 2 SCNJ 175 at 183. On this same line, counsel submitted that where documentary evidence has been admitted in evidence, demeanour plays an insignificant role in assessing oral testimony. See also IZEIYAMU vs. ALONGE (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 371) 1570. Counsel urged the court to resolve issue four in the Claimant’s favour. Counsel began arguing issue five by adopting his earlier arguments and urged the court to hold that the Claimant correctly computed his terminal benefits based on Exhibit F and the Claimant is not indebted to the Defendant, rather the Defendant is holding onto the balance of Claimant’s gratuity assessed at N2,199,960.20. As regards the Claimant’s reliefs, counsel referred to paragraphs 18, 19 and 20(c) of the Statement of Facts and CW1’s Deposition on Oath and Exhibits R and S and submitted that the Claimant pleaded and led evidence to the effect that he incurred losses from the Defendant’s refusal to pay his outstanding gratuity. It is also counsel’s argument that the Defendant did not join issues with the Claimant on these facts but rather averred in Paragraph 8 of the Amended Statement of Defence that the Defendant is not in a position to confirm or deny. Counsel argued that the averment that the Defendant is not in a position to admit and deny certain paragraphs of the Statement of Claim without making specific response to those paragraphs do not constitute sufficient denial and have been held to amount to admission. See DIKWA vs. MODU (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 280) 170 and SANUSI vs. MAKINDE (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 343) 214. Counsel contended that general damages are not quantifiable as a matter of fact but it is at the discretion of the court. See FRAMO NIG LTD vs. DAODU (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 281) 372. Counsel urged the Court to take judicial notice of the declining value of the naira and economic recession in making the award of damages. In conclusion, counsel urged the court to answer all five issues formulated by counsel in favour of the Claimant. In the Defendant counsel’s Reply on points of law, counsel considered four issues worthy for consideration from the Claimant counsel’s final address, which are: 1. Whether Exhibit U tendered by the defendant is admissible in evidence. 2. What is the effect of Paragraph 8.10 (Page 25) of exhibit T? 3. Whether a statute must be pleaded. 4. Whether the Defendant’s counter-claim is incompetent. With respect to the first issue, counsel argued that Exhibit U was pleaded by the Defendant in paragraph 5(c) of the Amended Statement of Defence. It is submitted further that once a document is pleaded and is relevant, same is admissible in evidence because what determines admissibility is relevancy. See ABUBAKAR v CHUKS (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 386 at 402. Similarly, counsel submitted that there is nothing in Exhibit B that suggests that it was made in contemplation of this suit. Regarding issue two, counsel contended that contrary to the Claimant counsel’s argument that the acceptance of the Claimant’s resignation was an indication that there was no outstanding commitment; Exhibit T, paragraph 8.10(B) shows that the bank in its discretion may accept staff resignation when the staff has outstanding commitment net his terminal benefits. On issue three, it is counsel’s submission that Section 122 of the Evidence Act which makes provision for courts to judicially notice Acts of the National Assembly, did not state that such statutes have to be pleaded and evidence led in proof. Counsel referred to Section 122(1) of the Evidence Act which reads: “no fact of which the court shall take judicial notice under this section needs to be proved”, and cited the case of OKOEBOR vs. POLICE COUNCIL (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 834) 444, where it was held that: “It is not the law of pleadings that laws must be pleaded before a party can rely on them. While the law of pleadings require that some specific laws should be pleaded (e.g statutory defence like the Limitation Statute), it is not the province of the law of pleadings that any law relied upon by the party must be pleaded.” Counsel submitted that from the preceding authorities, it is clear that the Defendant does not need to plead or lead evidence in proof of the Pension Reform Act 2004 because the court has the power to take judicial notice of same, even suo motu. It is the further submission of counsel that the Pension Reform Act 2004 deals with retirement benefits which includes gratuity and pension. Counsel referred the court to Section 2 of the Pension Reform Act 2004, which reads as follows: “The objectives of the scheme shall be to: a. Ensure that every person who worked in either the public service of the Federation, Federal Capital Territory or private sector receives his retirement benefits as and when due; b. Assist improvident individuals by ensuring that they save in order to cater for their livelihood during old age; and c. Establish a uniform set of rules, regulations, and standards for the administration and payments of retirement benefits for the public service of the Federation, Federal Capital Territory and the private sector.” On issue four, counsel argued that on 11th July 2016, the court granted the Defendant’s application to amend the Statement of Defence to include a counter-claim without any objection from the counsel for the Claimant, whose request for cost was refused. It is counsel’s further argument that having filed a reply to the Amended Statement of Defence and Defence to Counter-Claim, it is too late in the day for the Claimant to complain, having waived the right to do so. More so, counsel submitted that Order 5(1) of the Court Rules allows the court to treat any non-compliance with the Rules as an irregularity, Order 5(3) allows the court to depart from the Rules in the interest of justice. Counsel submitted further that any application to set aside any irregularity may be allowed if done at a reasonable time and before the party applying has taken any fresh step after being aware of the irregularity. Therefore, counsel is of the opinion that the claimant’s counsel cannot object to the Counter-Claim in his final address because he had taken fresh steps by filing a reply to the Counter-Claim, and the objection was not made within a reasonable time. In conclusion, counsel urged the court to dismiss the claimant’s claim and grant the counter-claim. COURT’s DECISION There are a few issues which have been raised by counsels to the parties in their final written addresses. Let me quickly comment on these issues before going ahead to determine this case. One of such issues is the submission of the Claimant’s counsel challenging the competence of the Defendant’s counter claim. Citing Order 9(1)(a) of the Rules of this court, the Claimant’s counsel argued that the counter claim was filed out of time and no order of court extending time was sought and obtained before it was filed. The court was urged to strike out the counter claim for being incompetent. By my record, the Defendant filed a Statement of Defence to the Claimant’s suit on the 26th day of February 2015, but the Statement of Defence did not incorporate a counter claim, neither was any counter claim filed separately. However, by a motion filed on 14th June 2016, the Defendant applied to amend the Statement of Defence to, among other purposes, incorporate “a counter claim over the sum of N3,926,247.93”. The Defendant also filed an amended statement of defence and counter claim separately to which the Claimant filed a Reply and Defence to counter claim on 27/6/2016. That motion for amendment was heard on 11/7/2016 and the Claimant’s counsel did not oppose the motion. The motion was granted, wherein the court pronounced that the Amended Statement of Defence and Counter Claim were properly filed and served. I must say that, in view of these developments and the steps taken by the Claimant since the time of the Defendant’s application to amend, it is quite a surprise to see counsel turn around to challenge the competence of the Counter Claim. I agree with the counsel to the Defendant when he submitted that the Claimant, having taken steps with respect to the counter claim and having kept quiet until final address to raise the objection, should be deemed to have waived his right to complain. In my view, and as have been provided in the rules of this court, any such objection touching on an irregular step taken in a proceeding ought to be brought timeously and before the party raising same has taken any fresh step in the matter after becoming aware of the irregularity. See Order 5 Rule 2 of the Rules. The complaint of Claimant’s counsel has even been taken care of in Rules 1 and 3 of the Order. The Rules permit the court to treat any non-compliance with the Rules as an irregularity and to depart from the Rules in the interest of justice. Therefore, the fact that the Defendant did not seek extension of time to file the Counter Claim will amount to irregularity only which cannot render the counter claim incompetent. In any case, there is an order of this court permitting an amendment of the statement of defence to include counter claim. The Claimant’s counsel, by his submissions, appears to be challenging that order or asking the court to review the order. This court does not have jurisdiction to do so. I overrule the Claimant’s counsel on his objection. I hold that the counter claim is not incompetent. During the hearing of this matter, the Defendant’s counsel objected to the admissibility of the documents I have marked as Exhibits E, F, G, H, K, R and S while the Claimant’s counsel indicated that he shall object to the admissibility of the document marked Exhibit U. I granted leave to counsels to reserve their objection till final address. In his final address however, the Defendant’s counsel argued his objection on the admissibility of Exhibits G and H only. It appears these are the only ones counsel has problem with. Since the intended objection to Exhibits E, F, K, R and S was no longer raised, the Exhibits are therefore affirmed to be properly in evidence as marked. The Exhibits whose admissibility is now in contention are those marked G, H and U. The ground of the Defendant’s counsel’s objection to the admissibility of Exhibits G and H is that the documents are not signed and dated. Counsel argued that an unsigned document is worthless and has no probative value. Reliance was placed on the case of IKELI vs. AGBER and GARUBA vs. K.I.C. LTD among others. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the exhibits. Let me mention that the fact that a document is unsigned has nothing to do with its admissibility. As submitted by the defendant’s counsel and as held in the cases he cited, the effect of unsigned document is that it goes to the weight or probative value to be attached to the document only. As rightly observed by the Claimant’s counsel, the criteria for admissibility are whether the document is pleaded, relevant and admissible. See PROGRESSIVE ACTION CONGRESS vs. INEC (2009) All FWLR (Pt.478) 260 at 334. Exhibits G and H were pleaded in paragraph 6 of the statement of facts, they are relevant to the purpose for which pleaded and the Claimant has satisfied the condition under the Evidence Act for the admissibility of the documents. Being unsigned however, I will decide on the weight to place on them during the evaluation of evidence. I hold that the documents are admissible and have been properly admitted in evidence as marked. This order also applies to the objection of the Claimant’s counsel to Exhibit U. The document was pleaded, even though referred to as statement of account. There is also no evidence or any feature in the document suggesting that it was made during the pendency of this suit. The document is revenant to the case and I accordingly admit it in evidence as already marked. The case of the Claimant, as explained in his evidence, is that he was employed by the Defendant on 1st November 2001 and he resigned voluntarily and properly from the employment on 6th December 2013. The resignation was accepted by the Defendant. While in the employment, he rose to the position of Assistant Manager (Notch 1) which position he occupied until his resignation. His employment and terminal benefits were regulated by the terms and conditions of service applicable to permanent staff. The terminal benefits he was entitled to upon leaving the employment were as provided in section 5 of the defendant’s “Leaving Service Benefit Scheme” which came into effect on 1st April 2001. The Claimant stated that he shall rely on an Explanatory Booklet of the scheme dated November 2002 which was in operation at the time of his exit from the employment. At the time of his resignation, his total annual pay was the sum of N8,966.218.00 and using the formula in the said scheme, he calculated his terminal benefit and he arrived at the sum of N9,028,458.50. Before his resignation, the Defendant had notified him that his loan limit calculator showed that he was indebted to the Defendant to the tune of N6,828,489.30 from loans he took from the Defendant. The Claimant stated that when this debt is removed from his terminal benefits, a balance of N2,199.969.20 is left to be paid to him. After his resignation, the Defendant wrote to him to inform him that his outstanding indebtedness to the Defendant was the sum of N3,926,247.93. According to the Claimant, what the Defendant did was to put his entitlement at N3,123,883.19 and his indebtedness at N7,050,131.12. The Claimant contended that he was not indebted to the Defendant to any sum. He is however aware that after his resignation, the Defendant reviewed its compensation policy as regards gratuity. The reviewed policy became effective from 31st December 2013. This reviewed policy, issued after his resignation, cannot be used to calculate his gratuity. After he left the Defendant’s employment, he secured a distributorship appointment for which he rented a warehouse. He had the hope of investing the balance of his benefits from the Defendant into the business. However, he had to sell his valuables to support his family and the business. He suffered losses which he itemised and calculated to be over the sum of N30,725,000.00. The Claimant made a further deposition on oath on 27th June 2016 which was adopted as evidence on 11/7/2016 upon his recall for that purpose. In his further evidence, the Claimant reiterated some of the evidence he has given before and said further that the Defendant is bound by its computation of the Claimant’s indebtedness as contained in the loan limit calculated dated 12/5/2013. Onyibor Uchey, who gave evidence in support of the Defendant’s case, told this court that he is a senior staff in the Defendant’s Business, Support, Human Capital Management and Development Unit. On 24/5/2016, he adopted his deposition made on 27/1/2016 and he was cross examined on it. Later on, DW1 was recalled on 11/7/2016 with leave of the court to adopt an additional statement on oath he deposed to on 9th June 2016. In his initial evidence, DW1 told the court that the Defendant had a policy of leaving service benefit scheme for staff but the scheme was no longer in use at the time the Claimant left the Defendant’s employment. The said scheme came into effect in April 2001 but there were other policies released after it which applied to the Claimant. DW1 also said that the Claimant’s total pay at the time of his exit was the sum of N7,576,941.00 and not the sum of N8,8,996,218.00 alleged by the Claimant. In the additional evidence of DW1, he stated that the Claimant spent 12 years in the Defendant’s service and he was accordingly entitled to gratuity at exit. At the time of the exit, gratuity comprised the addition of annual basic salary, transport, housing and lunch multiplied by 145%. Using this formula, the Claimant’s total terminal benefit was N3,123,883.19 being his gratuity for 12 years of service. The Claimant took a loan of N7,050,131.17 from the Defendant which he failed to repay before he left the employment. The Defendant used the Claimant’s terminal benefit to offset part of the loan which left the sum of N3,926,246.93 as the Claimant’s outstanding indebtedness to the Defendant. DW1 went further to say that he withdraws the evidence he led on 24th May 2016 because it varies from his additional evidence. He urged the court to accept this additional evidence in replacement of his deposition of 27/1/2016. Let me mention it here that there is no formal application from the Defendant or its counsel seeking to have evidence of DW1 given on 24/3/2016 expunged. DW1, a mere witness, cannot decide to withdraw evidence properly given, or dictate to this court which of his evidence to expunge or retain. The mere fact that the facts he testified to earlier were not the correct facts is not sufficient to ask the court to substitute it. The evidence was properly received and it remains on record. The parties have agreed on some points in this suit regarding the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant, his voluntary resignation from the employment on 6th December 2013, his entitlement to terminal benefits and the facts that there was an outstanding loan to settle with the Defendant at the time of his exit. Since those facts are not in dispute, I will focus only on the substance of this suit. The dispute in this matter, as disclosed in the facts of the case, is that while the Claimant contends that he is entitled to the sum of N2,199.969.20 from the Defendant as balance of his terminal benefit, the Defendant claims that the Claimant’s outstanding indebtedness to it is the sum of N3,926,247.93. These sums constitute the basis of the claim and counter claim in this suit. According to the Claimant, he was entitled to terminal benefits on leaving the Defendant’s employment based on the Defendant’s “Leaving Service Benefit Scheme” which came into effect on 1st April 2001. The Claimant said that based on the provision of the Scheme, he calculated his terminal benefit by himself and he arrived at the sum of N9,028,458.50. He owed the Defendant the sum of N6,828,489.30, which sum, when deducted from his benefit, leaves him with a balance of N2,199.969.20 payable to him by the Defendant. But the Defendant put his entitlement at N3,123,883.19 and his indebtedness at N7,050,131.12 and informed him that he is still indebted to the tune of N3,926,247.93. The Defendant’s case is that the Claimant’s total terminal benefit was N3,123,883.19 for the 12 years he spent in the Defendant’s employment. This sum was arrived at by using the Defendant’s formula for computing gratuity. The Claimant had an unpaid loan of N7,050,131.17. The Defendant used the Claimant’s terminal benefit to offset part of the loan which left the sum of N3,926,246.93 as the Claimant’s outstanding indebtedness to the Defendant. In his evidence, DW1 relied on the Claimant’s statement of account with the Defendant and the Defendant’s letter of demand already in evidence as Exhibit O to buttress these facts. The said statement of account is Exhibit U. To be able to determine the claims of the parties, it is important to know: 1. What the Claimant’s actual terminal benefit should be. 2. What was the amount of his indebtedness at the time of his resignation. It is the Claimant’s case, as pleaded in Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the statement of facts, that at the time of his resignation, he was entitled to terminal benefits as contained in the Defendant’s Leaving Service Benefit Scheme which came into effect on 1st April 2001. The Claimant stated that he shall rely on an Explanatory Booklet of the Scheme dated November 2002 and he put specific reliance on Paragraph 5 of the booklet. This document was admitted as Exhibit F. He also said that based on the provision of the Scheme, he calculated his terminal benefit and he arrived at the sum of N9,028,458.50 taking into account his total annual pay of N8,966.218.00 at the time of his exit. From these facts, the Claimant has said that the basis for calculating his entitlement is as contained in Exhibit F. But the Defendant, in paragraph 7 of its amended statement of defence, denied the facts averred by the Claimant in paragraph 10 of the statement of facts. That is to say the Defendant contends that calculation of Claimant’s exit benefits was not based on Exhibit F. In his evidence however, DW1 said that the Defendant had a policy of leaving service benefit scheme for staff but the scheme was no longer in use at the time the Claimant left the Defendant’s employment. DW1 said the said scheme came into effect in April 2001 but there were other policies released after it, which applied to the Claimant. DW1 further said that at the time of the Claimant’s exit, gratuity comprised the addition of annual basic salary, transport, housing and lunch allowances multiplied by 145%. Using this formula, the Claimant’s total terminal benefit was N3,123,883.19 for his 12 years of service. When DW1 said that the leaving service scheme relied on by the Claimant was no longer in use at the time of the Claimant’s exit, I expected him to tell the court what scheme or condition of service or policy for computing exit benefit was in use at the time the Claimant left the employment. DW1 did not mention any. DW1 merely said that the Claimant’s gratuity comprised annual basic salary, transport, housing and lunch allowances multiplied by 145% without mentioning the condition of service of the Defendant where it is so provided. Under cross examination, DW1 said the 2002 policy ceased to exist in 2007 and a staff handbook came into existence in March 2007 which contains the totality of all the bank’s policies. The court suo motu asked the Defendant’s counsel for this document and it was admitted in evidence as Exhibit T. I have looked at this handbook but there is no provision in it for gratuity or how to calculate it. In paragraph 6 of the amended statement of defence, the Defendant admitted the averments in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Claimant’s statement of facts. In these paragraphs admitted by the Defendant, the Claimant had averred that after his resignation, the Defendant reviewed its compensation policy as regards gratuity. The reviewed policy became effective from 31st December 2013 and the policy, issued after his resignation, does not apply to him and cannot be used to calculate his gratuity. In effect, the Defendant has admitted that the said reviewed policy, which is in evidence as Exhibit Q, does not apply to the Claimant. Then, what was the basis used by the Defendant to calculate the Claimant’s gratuity? The Defendant did not tell this court. In his written address, the defendant’s counsel submitted that Exhibit Q is the proper document upon which the Claimant’s terminal benefits should be calculated and that was what the Defendant used to calculate the Claimant’s terminal benefits. I have mentioned earlier in this judgment that the Defendant, in paragraph 6 of the amended statement of defence, admitted the averment of the Claimant in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the statement of facts where the Claimant averred that the Defendant’s reviewed policy in Exhibit Q does not apply to him. Therefore, this submission is in clear contradiction of the Defendant’s case. In any case, I do not see how Exhibit Q could have been used to calculate the Claimant’s entitlements. The Exhibit is a memo dated 31st December 2013 from office of HCMD to all staff of the Defendant on review of compensation policy with respect to gratuity. It was stated specifically at paragraph 3.0 (10) that the said gratuity payment is applicable only to staff in the employment as at 31st December 2013. The Claimant ceased to be an employee of the Defendant from 6th December 2013. It is my view that Exhibit Q is not the policy the Defendant should have used to calculate the Claimant’s exit benefits. The Claimant who alleged that the scheme in Exhibit F applied to him had the onus to prove it. Besides his evidence, he also produced the Explanatory Booklet of the Scheme in evidence. The booklet is dated November 2002 and it stated at paragraph 1.1 that it is to describe benefits due to staff at end of service. Paragraph 2 states that the scheme took effect from 1st April 2001. No end date was specified. It is in evidence that the Claimant was employed on 1st November 2001 and resigned on 6th December 2013. Section 133 (2) of Evidence Act 2011 provides that when the person who alleges has adduced evidence to satisfy the court, the onus of disproving the evidence shifts to the person against whom the evidence was given. The Defendant has not offered any evidence to disprove the Claimant’s averment that his exit benefits ought to be calculated using the provision of Exhibit F. I find that Exhibit F was applicable to the Claimant’s employment at the time of his resignation and the calculation of his benefits should have been as stated in the document. The Defendant’s counsel appears very uncomfortable with using Exhibit F to calculate the claimant’s gratuity. Counsel raised yet another issue. He argued that the Pension Reform Act 2004 applies to public and private sectors and the Claimant does not fall into persons exempted from the Scheme in Section 8 (2) of the Act. Counsel submitted that the Act supersedes Exhibit F and that Exhibit F became ineffective with the commencement of the Act on 25th June, 2004. This submission of counsel appears very vague and baffling. Vague in the sense that when counsel said the Act supersedes Exhibit F or that Exhibit F is ineffective by the coming into force of the Act, he failed to explain or substantiate what he meant by that. I am not going to try to pretend that I understand his argument. What baffles me is my discovery at this stage that the Defendant’s counsel does not have a proper understanding of the Claimant’s case. The Claimant’s case is not about pension. None of the parties have mentioned pension in this case nor is there any claim for payment of pension in this case. The Claimant’s case is about his exit benefit which he specifically said is his gratuity. This is different from pension which is regulated by the Pension Act. With the facts of this case, I am certain that the Pension Reform Act has no use in this suit. It is the claimant’s case that he calculated his terminal benefits by himself using the provision of Exhibit F and he arrived at the sum of N9,028,458.50. He relied on his computation which he tendered in evidence as Exhibit G. The document is the Claimant’s personal computation of his gratuity and a list or breakdown of his annual pay at exit. The Claimant stated his total annual pay as N8,966,218.00 and calculated his total gratuity at N9,028,458.50. At paragraph 5 of page 7 of Exhibit F, gratuity is calculated thus: annual pay at exit date multiplied by the number of years of service with the result divided by 12. It further provides that fractions of a year in service will be included in the calculation. There is no dispute that the Claimant was in the Defendant’s employment from 1st November 2001 to 6th December 2013. This is a period of 12 years and 1 month. At paragraph 6 of his statement of facts, the Claimant pleaded that his total annual pay at exit was the sum of N8,966,218.00. I have examined the Claimant’s evidence and his computation in Exhibit G and I see that he based the computation of his gratuity on the total amount of the said annual pay. Exhibit F, in its appendix, has set out a detailed explanation on how benefits, including gratuity, are calculated and on what basis. Going by the illustration at pages 12 to 14 of Exhibit F, annual total emolument was used in the example given of calculating gratuity. Total emolument was defined at paragraph 3.4 at Page 5 as the addition of annual basic salary, housing allowance, transport allowance and lunch allowance. The Claimant must have misconstrued the phrase “annual pay” in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F to mean the entire items which constitute his annual emolument. Having carefully examined the content of Exhibit F, particularly the appendix thereto, it is clear to me that the intendment of the Defendant was to limit the calculation of gratuity to annual total emolument which includes annual basic salary, housing allowance, transport allowance and lunch allowance. In paragraph 6 of the statement of facts and in his evidence, the Claimant lumped the items constituting his annual pay together. It is difficult to know the amount of his annual basic salary, housing allowance, transport allowance and lunch allowance from his pleading or evidence. However, in the table of his annual pay attached to Exhibit G, the Claimant stated his annual basic salary as N932,064.00; transport allowance as N480,693.00; housing allowance as N509,695.00 and lunch allowance as N205,920.00. Exhibit O, a letter dated 10/1/2014, was tendered by the Claimant. It is a letter to the Claimant from the Defendant after his resignation, demanding outstanding debt from the Claimant. In the attachment to the exhibit where the Defendant did a calculation of the Claimant’s gratuity and indebtedness, I observe that the figures stated by the Defendant as the Claimant’s annual basic salary, transport housing and lunch allowances corroborates the Claimant’s figures in Exhibit G. It is thus clear to me that the Claimant’s annual basic salary, transport allowance; housing allowance as and lunch allowance are the sums of N932,064.00, N480,693.00, N509,695.00 and N205,920.00 respectively. Therefore, the Claimant’s annual total emolument at exit was the sum of N2,128,372.00. Using the formula in Exhibit F to calculate the Claimant’s gratuity, the result of N2,142,561.00 is hereby returned as the Claimant’s gratuity for 12 years and 1 month of service. The fact that the Claimant was indebted to the Defendant at the time he left the employment on 6th December 2013 is not in dispute. The dispute however is with regards to the amount of the Claimant’s debt to the Defendant at the time of his exit. The Claimant said before his resignation, the Defendant notified him by e-mail that his loan limit calculator showed that he was indebted to the Defendant to the tune of N6,828,489.30. The e-mail was admitted in evidence as Exhibit L. After his resignation however, the Defendant wrote to him vide Exhibit O to inform him that his outstanding indebtedness to the Defendant was the sum of N3,926,247.93. According to the Claimant, the Defendant put his debt at N7,050,131.12 and when it deducted his terminal benefit, which the Defendant assessed at N3,123,883.19, from the debt, the sum of N3,926,247.93 was left as what the Defendant demanded from him. According to the Defendant, the Claimant took a loan of N7,050,131.17 from the Defendant which he failed to repay before he left the employment. The Defendant used the Claimant’s terminal benefit of N3,123,883.19 to offset part of the loan which left the sum of N3,926,246.93 as the Claimant’s outstanding indebtedness to the Defendant. The Defendant relied on Exhibit U, which DW1 explained under cross examination to have been derived from the Claimant’s statement of account, and the Defendant’s letter already in evidence as Exhibit O. Exhibit L is an email headed “Loan Limit Calculator” carrying the date 12/5/2013. It contains various loans and their status in the name of the Claimant. Under the column “outstanding balance” for total loans in the 5th row, it shows the sum of N6,828,489.30 as outstanding for all the loans. On the other hand, Exhibit O is a demand letter to the Claimant dated 10th January 2014. The Defendant attached to it a statement detailing the Claimant’s debt and his benefits. This statement is the same as Exhibit U tendered by DW1. The total debt of the Claimant was put at N7,050,131.17. In his insistence that his debt was N6,828,489.30 and not the sum alleged by the Defendant, the Claimant relied on Exhibit L. As I have observed above, that Exhibit was dated 12/5/2013. That is about 7 months before the Claimant left the employment. The content of the Exhibit could not have represented the correct status of the debt at the time of his exit from the employment. The Claimant, other than the said Exhibit L, did not show any other document or evidence showing the position of the loans at the date of his resignation. In view of the date Exhibit O was made, it appears to me that the statement was intended to inform or convey to the Claimant the status of his debt as at the date of his exit. In the statement, the Defendant itemised the balances of each of the loan and put the total debt at N7,050,131.17. Having looked at all the facts, I am inclined to believe that the entries in the attachment to Exhibit O reflect the Claimant’s debt at the date of his exit from the employment. Having found the answers to the 2 questions I have raised earlier in this judgment, I can now determine the claims of the parties in this suit. The Claimant sought three reliefs. They are a claim for the sum of N2,199,969.20 as the outstanding balance of his gratuity, a declaration that he is not indebted to the Defendant to the tune of N3,926, 247.93 and a claim for N30,725,000.00 as general damages. It is clear from my analysis above that these claims cannot be granted. The Claimant’s gratuity is the sum of N2,142,561.00 while his debt is the sum of N7,050,131.17. The Claimant cannot be entitled to any outstanding balance of his gratuity. He had shot himself in the foot in this suit when he vigorously relied on Exhibit F for the computation of his gratuity. He had the misconceived impression that the formula for calculation will involve his total salary package. That was why his calculation, on which basis he brought the Defendant to court, turned out to be wrong. The 2nd relief sought by the Claimant appears to be in order but not in the way he expects it. Of course, he is not indebted to the Defendant to the tune of N3,926,247.93. His debt, as it now appears, is far more than that. In the result, I find no merit in the claims of the claimant. His case is dismissed. In its amended statement of defence and counter claim, the defendant counter claimed from the Claimant the sum of N3,926,246.93 being the Claimant’s outstanding indebtedness to the Defendant. The Defendant had deducted the amount of the Claimant’s gratuity from his debt to arrive at the sum it claims from the Claimant. The Defendant has been able to show that the Claimant’s debt as at the time of his resignation stood at N7,050,131.17. By the Defendant’s own computation, the Claimant’s gratuity was the sum of N3,123,883.19 calculated on the basis of Exhibit Q, and according to the Defendant, the sum of N3,926,246.93 is the outstanding balance to be paid by the Claimant to the Defendant. I recall that I have held earlier in this judgment that the said Exhibit Q did not apply to the Claimant having left the employment before the Exhibit became effective. I have infact held that the Claimant’s gratuity is the sum of N2,142,561.00 while his debt is the sum of N7,050,131.17. The Claimant has rightly claimed that he is not indebted to the Defendant to the tune of N3,926,247.93. Going by the basis for the dismissal of the Claimant’s case as contained earlier in this judgment, it would appear that the Claimant’s indebtedness is far more than that. However, taking into account the case the Defendant has presented, I will not vary the Defendant’s computation or disturb the outstanding balance the Defendant seeks against the Claimant. In the result, I find that the Defendant has proved its counter claim. The counter claim hereby succeeds and the Claimant is ordered to pay the sum of N3,926,246.93 (Three Million, Nine Hundred and Twenty Six Thousand, Two Hundred and Forty Six Naira, Ninety Three Kobo) to the Defendant. Parties are to bear their costs. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge