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RULING 1. The claimant filed this action on 9th February 2016 vide a General Form of Complaint accompanied by the statement of fact, list of witnesses, witness statement on oath, list of documents and copies of the documents. By the statement of fact, the claimant is claiming against the defendant the following reliefs – a) A declaration that by virtue of the conditions of service dated 5th March 2010 between the claimants and Power Holding Company of Nigeria Plc (PHCN), the defendant is bound to comply with the terms of conditions contained in the said conditions of service. b) A declaration that the forcible entry, destruction of the roofing tops and eating away of the claimant’s valuables from the staff quarters occupied by the claimants at PHCN Quarters, Egbin, Ijede, Ikorodu, Lagos by agents of the defendant constitute a breach of the conditions of service of 5th March 2010 between the claimants and PHCN. c) A declaration that the forcible entry, destruction of the roofing tops and carting away of the claimant’s valuables from the staff quarters occupied by the claimants at PHCN Quarters, Egbin, Ijede, Ikorodu, Lagos by agents of the defendant constitutes trespass and a violation of the claimants’ legal and constitutional rights to peaceable possession of the various apartments contained in the said Staff Quarters. d) An order of this Honourable Court compelling the defendant to pay to the claimants the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) each, being general damages for trespass and invasion of the staff quarters occupied by the claimants at PHCN Quarters, Egbin, Ijede, Ikorodu, Lagos. e) An order for the payment of the under listed sum of money being special damages due and payable to each of the claimants…[a specific sum is then mentioned against each claimant as special damages]. f) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant by itself, its agents, privies or servants from carrying out any further act of trespass on the staff quarters at PHCN Quarters, Egbin, Ijede, Ikorodu, Lagos during the subsistence of the claimants’ lawful occupation of same without due process of law. g) An order of this Honourable Court compelling the defendant to pay to the claimants the sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) each, being cost incurred by the claimants for the prosecution of this suit. 2. The defendant entered formal appearance and then filed a preliminary objection praying that the suit be struck out and/or dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The grounds upon which the preliminary objection is premised are that the cause of action relates to trespass and damage to properties, which fall within the civil jurisdiction of the State High Court; and the suit is an abuse of court process. In support of the preliminary objection is an affidavit, a further affidavit, a written address and a reply on points of law. In opposition, the claimants filed a counter-affidavit and a written address. 3. The defendant formulated two issues for the determination of the Court, namely: 1) Whether this Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the respondents’ suit which cause of action relates to trespass and damage to properties, which falls within the civil jurisdiction of the State High Court by virtue of section 272(1) of the 1999 Constitution. 2) Whether the respondents’ suit as constituted is an abuse of court process. 4. On issue 1), the defendant submitted that it is the claim of the claimant that determines jurisdiction of the trial court, citing Emeka v. Okadigbo [2012] 18 MWLR (Pt. 1331) 55 at 89. That a look at the reliefs claimed and the statement of facts, this case is one mainly challenging the alleged acts of trespass by the defendant on 2nd October 2015 and damages arising thereon, referring to paragraphs 7 to 42 of the statement of facts. That the claims relating to the conditions of service are ancillary; and this Court cannot hear and determine them when it has no jurisdiction over the main claims on trespass, citing Kakih v. PDP [2014] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374 at 415. That the purported acts of trespass is not in any way derivable from the conditions of service; and that there is no where in the 1999 Constitution is it provided that this Court can entertain an action for trespass to landed property. 5. Regarding issue 2), the defendant contended that the claimants filed an application dated 5th January 2016 in Engr S. O. Ojo, Mr E. B. Omonijo & ors v. Engr Mike Uzoigwe & Egbin Power Plc Suit No. IKD/82/14 whose reliefs are similar to those in the instant suit. That the instant suit is accordingly an abuse of court process on the basis of multiplicity of suits, citing Umeh v. Iwu [2008] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1089) 225 at 261 and Unity Bank Plc v. Olatunji [2013] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1378) 503 at 533. To the defendant, the concept of abuse of court process has been extended to include the institution of different actions between same parties simultaneously in different courts even though on different grounds, where the two similar processes are uses in respect of the exercise of the same right, referring to Agwasim v. Ojiechie [2004] 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 613 at 622 and Hon. Commissioner for education & ors v. Amade [2013] LPELR-19907(SC). Citing Dangyadi v. INEC [2011] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 347 at 393, the defendant urged the Court to hold that this suit an abuse of court process and thereby dismiss it. 6. In response to the defendant’s submissions, the claimants formulated one issue for the determination of the Court, to wit: whether this Court ought to uphold the defendant’s notice of preliminary objection. As a preliminary point, the claimants submitted that Exhibits EPP1 and EPP2 being court processes in Suit No. IKD/82/14 ought to have been certified, citing sections 89 and 90(1)(c) of the Evidence Act 2011 as well as Fawehinmi v. IGP [2000] NWLR (Pt. 665) 481 at 525 and Nwaogu v. Atuma [2013] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1364) 117 at 137. The claimants then urged the Court not to discountenance the said exhibits. 7. On the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court over this suit, the claimants submitted that this Court has jurisdiction over the suit, referring to section 254C(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, which held this Court to have jurisdiction over causes and matters relating to or connected with the conditions of service and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith. The claimants then reiterated that it is the originating processes that the Court will have to look in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction or not, citing Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83 at 126. That from the originating processes, it will be discerned that the principal claims of the claimants relate to the defendant’s blatant violation of the conditions of service, upon which the claimants are seeking compensatory reliefs, referring to reliefs a) and b) which touch on the sanctity of the conditions of service. That the conditions of service are the fulcrum upon which the claimants occupy the staff quarters, citing clause 8.1.5.5 of the conditions of service, which provides as follows: Having been paid his entitlement, if a retiree fails to vacate his quarters after the expiration of the grace period of ninety (90) days, recovery process shall be commenced against him. That from this provision, the eviction of the claimants has to be by the appropriate authority and by due process, all of which were not the case in the instant suit. That the forcible entry of the defendant touches directly on the rights of the claimants as guaranteed under the conditions of service. The claimants went on that even if reliefs a) and b) were ancillary reliefs touching on the conditions of service, this Court still has jurisdiction as it can hear matters incidental to conditions of service under section 254C of the 1999 Constitution. For the definition of the word, “incidental”, the claimants cited Akapo v. Hakeem-Habbeb [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt. 247) 266 at 297. That none of the claims of the claimants in this suit can be severed from the conditions of service as the claimants’ occupation of the staff quarters is not at large but tired to the conditions of service. 8. In respect of the issue of abuse of court process, the claimants submitted that the defendants’ argument is flawed. For the definition of the term “abuse of court process”, the claimants referred to Unity Bank Plc v. Olatunji [2013] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1378) 503 at 533 and Salvador v. INEC [2012] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1300) 417 at 449 - 450. To the claimants, from these authorities, for a matter to be an abuse of court process, the processes must be the same, the parties must be the same, the subject matter and issues must be same and the reliefs claimed must be the same. That the instant suit did not satisfy all these requirements; as such it cannot be said to be an abuse of court process. The claimants concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection. 9. In reacting on pints of law, the defendant preliminarily remarked that paragraph 9 of the claimants’ counter-affidavit contains legal arguments and conclusions contrary to section 115(2) of the Evidence Act 2011 as well as AG, Anambra State v. AG Federation [2007] LPELR-24343(SC). The defendant then urged the Court to strike out the said paragraph 9. On the issue of not certifying the documents attached to the preliminary objection, the defendant responded that it filed a further affidavit wherein it attached the certified true copies of the documents; as such the claimants’ preliminary issue should be discountenanced. The defendant proceeded to reiterate its earlier argument as to the main cause of action of the claimants being trespass and damage done to roofs as well as the fact that this case is an abuse of court process. The defendant concluded by urging the Court to discountenance the arguments of the claimants and grant the reliefs it seeks in the preliminary objection. COURT’S DECISION 10. Two issues present themselves before the Court for determination. The first is whether this Court has jurisdiction over this suit; and the second is whether this suit is an abuse of court process. It is in determining the second issue that the claimants raised the preliminary point that the Court processes relating to Suit No. IKD/82/14 attached to the supporting affidavit of the defendant’s preliminary objection, being public documents and so not certified, cannot be used by this Court regarding the matter at hand. At this Court’s sitting of 31st January 2017, the defendant regularized its further affidavit wherein it filed the certified true copies of the said court processes. The argument of the claimant against the reliance on the said court processes is accordingly overtaken by events and discountenanced. I so hold. 11. The question whether this Court has jurisdiction over this case cannot be answered unless it is known what the actual cause of action of the claimants is. In determining the competence of a suit, WAEC v. Akinola Oladipo Akinkunmi [2008] LPELR-3468(SC); [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1091) 151 SC; [2008] 4 SC 1 held that the determining factor is the plaintiff’s claim. However, it is not the manner in which the claim is couched, nor the categorization given to the claim by the defendant, that matters; what matters is that the Court has the duty to carefully examine the reliefs claimed to ascertain what the claim is all about. And by Alhaji Tsoho Dan Amale v. Sokoto Local Government & ors [2012] LPELR-7842(SC), referring to Adeyemi v. Opeyori [1996] 10 SC 31, “the appellant’s claim should determine the nature of the suit and a fortiori its competence” See also Otunba Gabriel Oladipo Abijo v. Promasidor (Nigeria) Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/602/2014 the ruling of which was delivered on 17th January 2017. The reliefs claimed by the claimant have earlier been enumerated. Reliefs b), c), d) and f) deal with forcible entry into and destruction of landed property (trespass) for which the monetary remedies in reliefs d) and e) are sought. The fact that the claimants claim that the acts of trespass are a breach of the conditions of service do not take them away from being trespass in the first place. A look at paragraphs 5 and 7 - 15 of the statement of facts are all averments as to trespass, while paragraphs 18 - 42 give the particulars of the damage caused by the alleged defendant’s trespass. It is worthy of note that in all these paragraphs (18 - 42), each paragraph dealing with a specified claimant starting with the 1st claimant and ending with the 25th claimant, is prefaced by the phrase, “The [1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc] claimant states that as a result of the defendant’s trespass on the staff quarters occupied by…” I accordingly have no doubt in my mind that the claimants’ cause of action is the alleged trespass of the defendant. 12. Having to situate this case in the garb of conditions of service is but a clever stratagem to bring the action within the jurisdiction of this Court. But even at this, the claimants did not take account of existing case law authorities. In Mr. Oyebanji Julius Odeniyi & 11 ors v. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/648/2013, the ruling of which was delivered on 2nd July 2015, this Court rejected jurisdiction (even under the matters incidental to labour or employment argument) where the claimants prayed for orders proclaiming them owners of the houses they occupy, refund of excess money paid in respect of the houses, declaration that the attempted sale of the houses by the defendant contrary to the Federal Government Housing Scheme 1977 is illegal, refund of part-payment deposited in respect of the houses and payment of retained severance benefits, which were retained in relation to the said houses. Two grounds (amongst others) upon which this Court rejected jurisdiction were that these orders sought for by the claimants were not shown to be resolvable under employment or labour law; and in describing themselves as retirees, the claimants did not show to the Court that what they claim appropriately come within their post-employment rights. A more direct authority is Mr. Ojeka John Ashibene v. Access Group of Schools & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/CA/18/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 8th March 2016. Her Ladyship Agbakoba J of this Court refused to accommodate claims relating to tenancy issues. The claims in the case were for declarations as to the legality of the defendant’s act of forcefully ejecting the claimant; the defendants sealing and locking up the claimant’s apartment for 3 years; and an order for the payment of sum of Ten Million Naira for trespass and unlawful seizure and sealing of properties. In declining jurisdiction, Nwana v. FCDA [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 128 SC was relied on and applied. The Supreme Court in Nwana v. FCDA held that where an agent or servant is allowed to occupy premises belonging to his principal for the more convenient performance of his duties, he acquires no estate therein; he is merely a licensee and has no right to continue to remain in the property on cessation of his employment, and consequently cannot maintain an action in trespass against his employer in the event of his eviction. Given the authority of Nwana v. FCDA, the issue is not even so much the case of jurisdiction but whether the claimants even have a cause of action in trespass, assuming that is that they are in the right Court. 13. The claimants relied vehemently on clause 8.1.5.5 of the conditions of service, which provides as follows: “Having been paid his entitlement, if a retiree fails to vacate his quarters after the expiration of the grace period of ninety (90) days, recovery process shall be commenced against him”. The argument of the claimants is that their right to stay in the premises that were trespassed on by the defendant inures in virtue of this clause; as such they have the right to enforce the clause as per this suit, hence their prayer as per relief a), which is for a declaration that by virtue of the conditions of service dated 5th March 2010 between the claimants and Power Holding Company of Nigeria Plc (PHCN), the defendant is bound to comply with the terms of conditions contained in the said conditions of service. This is a remedy at large, which even if granted as couched means nothing. A declaration by this Court that the defendant is bound to comply with the conditions of service without specifying which aspect of the conditions of service that should be complied with signifies nothing. In any event, clause 8.1.5.5 does not take away the sting of Nwana v. FCDA wherein the Supreme Court held an employee given accommodation in virtue of his employment to be a licensee and so cannot maintain an action in trespass. As it is, it is my finding and holding that the claimants’ case in this suit is one of trespass over which this Court has no jurisdiction; and even if this Court had jurisdiction, the claimants being retirees cannot be recompensed under trespass. 14. The second issue is whether this case is an abuse of court process. I read through the court processes in Suit No. IKD/82/14. In that suit, the claimants/applicants sued for themselves and on behalf of other tenants occupying PHCN Staff Quarters Egbin except Mike Uzoigwe (who is the 1st defendant) and those who have surrendered the keys of their premises to the 2nd defendant (Egbin Power Plc). The claimants in the instant case described themselves in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the statement of facts as retirees of PHCN, the Predecessor-in-title of the defendant who occupied the staff quarters of PHCN situate at Egbin, Ijede, Ikorodu, Lagos, which staff quarters they occupy in retirement. What this means is that the parties in the instant case are subsumed/coincide and so are the same with those in Suit No. IKD/82/14. The reliefs prayed for in Suit No. IKD/82/14 are declarations that Egbin Power Plc is not the owner of the staff quarters at Egbin, has no power to issue quit notice and did not purchase the staff quarters; as well as orders restraining the defendants from ejecting, forcibly removing the claimants from their houses and appurtenances situate at Egbin staff quarters and disturbing the peaceful enjoyment of the of the claimants’ possession or denying them of the basic amenities in their premises. In addition to these reliefs, the claimants filed a motion on notice praying for the defendants to be restrained from damaging the roofs of the houses of the claimants and to repair same and restore electricity. All these are acts of trespass, the very issue before this Court in the instant case. The statement of claim in paragraphs 1 and 2 in Suit No. IKD/82/14 describes both the claimants and 1st defendant in that case as former staff of PHCN. In paragraph 5, it describes the relationship between the claimants and PHCN as both of employees/employer and tenant/landlord. Contrary to the submission of the claimants, I am satisfied that requirements of the processes being same, the parties being the same, the subject matter and issues being the same, and the reliefs claimed being the same have been met regarding the issue whether the instant suit is an abuse of court process. I so find and hold. This being the case, the instant suit is an abuse of court process. The defendant’s preliminary objection has merit. It succeeds. The instant suit is accordingly and hereby dismissed. 15. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD