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JUDGMENT 1. Introduction & Claims By his originating processes dated and filed on 22/7/15, the Claimant sought the following reliefs against the Defendant - 1. An order for the payment of the claimant’s terminal benefit being =N=4,052,016.45 by the defendant company. 2. Interest on the terminal benefit from the date of judgment at the rate of 25% per annum until final liquidation. 3. A declaration that the Toyota Corolla LQ 211 AAA is the bona fide property of the claimant; Mr. Ebenezer Oduwole to the exclusion of all others. 4. Costs in this matter in the sum of =N=850,000.00 5. General damages of =N=10,000,000.00 The Defendant reacted as appropriate by filing its statement of defence along with requisite frontloaded processes. 2. Case of the Claimant The Claimant opened his case on 24/4/17 when he testified as CW1. Claimant adopted his witness depositions dated 22/7/15, 5/2/16 and 4/11/16 as his evidence in chief and tendered 15 documents as exhibits. Admissibility of 6 of the documents were successfully objected to. The remaining 9 documents tendered were admitted in evidence and marked as Exh. C1-Exh. C9 respectively. The case of the Claimant in brief as revealed from his pleadings and evidence in chief is that he was employed by the Defendant from the 15/3/05 to 2/8/10; that he was forced to resign from the Defendant company following a meeting with the Defendant’s Finance Director, one Mr. Adeola Omosebi, pursuant to a change of the core ownership of the Defendant; that upon acceptance of his letter of resignation the defendant agreed to pay him the sum of =N=483,396.99 as his salary up to and including his last day at work, his one month gross salary in lieu of notice; that he contested the sum calculated for him as his terminal benefit; that he calculated and demanded the sum =N=4,052,016.45 as his terminal benefit; that the Defendant failed, neglected and or refused to pay the claimant neither the sum of =N=483,396.89, which the Defendant alleged to be the claimant’s terminal payment nor the amount of =N=4,052,016:45 claimed as terminal benefit by the claimant despite repeated pleas; that instead the Defendant harassed, intimated and physically assaulted him through agents and privies to surrender his Toyota Corolla car registration number LQ 211 AAA which he acquired through a lease facility with First Bank Plc (FBN) and paid for when he was employed by the Defendant; that the Defendant now alleged ownership of the car; that the defendant went to the extent of writing to his new employer, Messrs Vono Products Plc through their Solicitors; that the said letter led to the soaring of his relationship with his new employer, Vono Products Plc and had to leave the employment and was thus hounded into self-employment by the Defendant at great pecuniary inconvenience to the claimant and his family’s welfare and wellbeing. Under cross examination the witness stated that the letter of employment given to him contains the terms and conditions but there is still the Defendant staff Handbook; that the Defendant gives incentive to those deserving workers at the end of every year; that the ex gratia given to him was executive gratification in recognition of his contribution to the Defendant; that the new Management of Defendant came on board in 2010 specifically February 2010; that he tendered his pay slips to prove that car lease was being deducted from his salary and that his transport allowance not paid; that it also shows that his salary & allowances were reduced; that he worked for the Defendant for about 5 yrs and some months and that the calculation is incorrect. 3. Case of the Defendant The Defendant opened its defence on 18/7/17 and called one Akeem Oyinloye as its lone witness. The witness having adopted his witness deposition dated 27/3/17 as his evidence in chief tendered 8 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exh. D1-Exh. D8 respectively. It is the case of the Defendant that it employed the Claimant as its Financial Accounts Manager; that upon employment, the Defendant gave the Claimant a letter of employment dated 10/3/05 and also issued with a Staff Handbook, which contains regulations guiding the relationship between the Defendant Company and its employees; that the Claimant having worked for the Defendant for 5 years, resigned his employment of his own volition and was never coerced by the Management of the Defendant; that based on the Staff Handbook and considering the number of years the Claimant worked with it, the Claimant is entitled to gratuity under its gratuity scheme prevailing as at when he resigned; that it calculated the Claimant’s gratuity based on his basic salary as stipulated in its Staff Handbook and that the Claimant’s total entitlement as at the date of his resignation is =N=483,396.89 (Four Hundred and Eighty-Three Thousand, Three Hundred and Ninety-Six Naira, Ninety-Nine Kobo). It is also the case of the Defendant that during the course of the Claimant’s employment, the Claimant was allocated a car under its Car Ownership Scheme with an agreement that the Defendant will be making deductions from the Claimant’s monthly emoluments in accordance with the car Ownership Scheme Policy and Car Lien Agreement which both parties executed voluntarily; that the Claimant failed or neglected to repay the balance outstanding on the loan as at the time of his resignation; that by the terms of the Car Lien Agreement, it is entitled to recover possession of the car as the car in question remains its property until the final liquidation of the car loan; that the original cost of the vehicle was =N=3,433.500(Three Million, Four Hundred and Thirty-|Three Thousand and Five Hundred Naira); that none of its staff enjoys a direct lease facility with the Lessor Bank (First Bank Plc) and that the lease was between First Bank Plc and itself. Under cross examination, the witness stated that the Claimant was not forced out of the Defendant; that the Claimant resigned; that the monthly payment for the car in issue was deducted from Claimant’s salary; that First Bank is the Lessor and the money paid to First Bank as Lessor; that the Vehicle stated in Exh. C5 is the vehicle in issue in this case; that he is aware of the Nigeria Account Standard Board as issued by the Board; that he is aware of Defendant capitalization strategy; that the Defendant does not need to boost its assets before going to Capital Market to raise fund; that the Defendant is not predisposed top deceiving its staff; that the Claimant has 2 signatures and both appeared on Exh. D2 - the shorter one while the long one appeared on Exh. D4 and that he is not aware that the Claimant in leaving the Defendant took up an appointment with Vono Plc. 4. Submissions on Behalf of the Defendant At the close of trial and pursuant to the direction of the Court, learned Counsel to the Defendant filed a final written address on 8/12/17. In it Counsel set down 2 main issues for determination as follows - 1. Whether in the circumstances of this case, the Claimant has sufficiently proved its case against the Defendant. 2. Whether reliefs (i) and (v) sought by the Claimant in the amended Statement of Facts are such that can be granted by this Honorable Court in the overall circumstances of this case. Arguing these issues, learned Counsel submitted that the letter of employment, the Car Ownership Scheme Policy, Car Lien Agreement and the Staff Handbook of the Defendant constitute a binding contract between the parties citing Leyland Nigeria Limited v. Dizengoff W.A (1990)2 NWLR (Pt. 134) 610; that the Claimant applied for a Car loan and that one of the requirements for the loan was the execution of a Car Lien Agreement by both parties and that parties are bound by the agreement entered into. Secondly, it was submitted by Counsel that the Claimant was not forced to resign from his employment but that he voluntarily wrote his letter of resignation; that the lease agreement was between the Defendant and the Bank rather than with the Claimant and that the Claimant had not fully paid the loan. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. Learned Counsel added that the Claimant was wrong to have calculated his terminal benefit based on total emolument not having served the Defendant for a period of up to 10 years. Learned Counsel prayed the Court to hold that the Claimant has failed to adduce cogent and credible evidence in proof of his case and further urged the Court to dismiss same. 5. Submissions on Behalf of the Claimant Counsel to the Claimant filed his final written address on 30/1/18 and set down the following issues for determination - 1. Whether the Claimant was constructively forced to resign from the Defendant company. 2. Whether the claimant is entitled to a post judgment interest on the said terminal benefit of=N=4,052,016:45 at the rate of 25% per annum until final liquid 3. Whether the claimant is entitled to a post judgment interest in the said terminal benefit of =N=4,05,016:45 at the rate of 25% per annum until final liquidation. 4. Whether the claimant is entitled to ownership of the Toyota Corolla car with registration number LLLQ 211 AAA. 5. Whether the claimant is entitled to general damages of =N=10,000,000.00. Arguing these issues, learned Counsel submitted that Exh. D2 & Exh. D8 that is the Car lien agreement and the car ownership scheme were not part of the contract of employment between the parties contending that the two exhibits never formed the basis of the employment contract between them; that only the letter of employment and the staff Handbook Exh. C1 & Exh. C2 formed the basis of the employment contract between them and that the Court will not allow extraneous matters to be read into a written contract citing Ifueko v. Pfizer Products Limited (2004)12 NWLR (Pt. 1420) 96; that the Defendant failed to deny the averments of the Claimant that he was forced to resign from his employment; that indeed the Defendant paid the Claimant a month salary in lieu of notice of termination which ordinarily ought to have been paid by the Claimant to the Defendant. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the Claimant was forced to resign from his employment. Learned Counsel added that the Defendant was either mischievous or ignorant in applying the provisions of Staff Handbook which applies to weekly paid workers in calculating the gratuity benefits of the Claimant and that the applicable provision is found in Clauses 12 & 21 of Exh. C1. Counsel prayed the Court to so hold. Learned Counsel further submitted that on the basis of the available evidence Exh. C5 & Exh. C6 the Toyota Salon car in dispute actually belonged to him since he has finished paying the lease to First Bank Plc the Lessor submitting that the evidence remains unchallenged and uncontroverted and that the Court is bound to accept same citing Afribank Nigeria Limited v. M. Ent. Limited (2008)12 NWLR (Pt. 1098) 223. On his claim for damages, learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant having left the employment of the Defendant took up an employment with Vono Products Plc but that by Exh. C8 written by Solicitors to the Defendant to Vono Products Plc, the Claimant had to leave the said employment. Counsel pray the Court to award damages consequent upon the wrong committed by the Defendant citing Esabunor v. Fayewa (2008)12 NWLR (Pt. 1102). Counsel urged the Court to enter Judgment in favor of the Claimant and grant post judgment interest as well. 6. Decision I have carefully read the processes filed by both learned Counsel in this case. I have a clear understanding of all the issues involved and the argument canvassed. I had the opportunity to hear and did hear the oral testimonies of the witnesses called by both parties as well as watched their demeanor. This is in addition to listening with rapt attention to the oral submissions of learned Counsel in this matter. Having done all this and having carefully evaluated all the exhibits tendered and admitted, I here narrow the issues for the just determination of this case down to the following - 1. Whether the Claimant was forced by the Defendant to resign from his employment. 2. Whether the Claimant has proved his case to be entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought in this case. The first issue for determination is whether the Claimant was forced by the Defendant to resign from his employment. The Claimant had testified under oath that subsequent upon hostile takeover of the Defendant, he was forced to resign his appointment. DW1 while testifying in chief had also stated that '' ... the Claimant resigned his employment of his own volition and was in no way coerced by the management of the Defendant Company''. I have in evidence Exh. D1 being Claimant's letter of resignation of appointment. It was dated 2/8/10. It was accepted on the same 2/8/10 by Exh. C9. I patiently perused and evaluated the 3 paragraph letter of resignation. I find the first paragraph rather instructive. In it the Claimant had said - ''The above subject matter refers; and as a follow up to the discussion held today I hereby resigned my appointment with the company''. That letter was addressed to the Manager, Human Resources. That letter did not contain any effective date for the resignation. Rather the Defendant by Exh. C9 accepted ''...your resignation with effect from 2nd August, 2010''. Now, under Exh. C1 & Exh. C2, either party may terminate the employment relationship by giving a month notice in writing or payment of a month salary in lieu of notice. I however find it rather curious and amazing that the Defendant who ought to be paid a month salary in lieu of notice indeed voluntarily offered to pay the Claimant a month salary in lieu of notice. There is no explanation as to why the Defendant elected to pay rather than to be paid a month salary in lieu of notice. From the whole circumstances of this case, considering the events leading to the change of management at the Defendant, the undisclosed discussion which the Claimant had with the Human Resources Manager of the Defendant, the speed at which the said letter of resignation was accepted coupled with the offer of the Defendant to pay a month salary in lieu of notice to the Claimant I have no hesitation in holding that the Claimant was forced to resign from his employment with the Defendant. I so find and so hold. The second issue for determination is whether the Claimant has proved his case to be entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought. The reliefs sought by the Claimant are mainly 5 in number. The first is for an order for the payment of the Claimant’s terminal benefit being =N=4,052,016.45 by the Defendant company. In his evidence in chief Claimant testified that he contested the final entitlement/benefits which the Defendant claimed he was entitled to. The sum claimed by the Claimant as his due in the sum of =N=4,052.016.45 is a sum certain, a sum specific, See Ngilari v. Mothercat Limited (1999) LPELR-1988 & Julius Berger Nigeria Plc & Anor v. Ugo (2015) LPELR-24408(CA). It is akin to a claim for special damages. The law is trite that special damages must be specially pleaded and strictly proved. See Agunwa v. Onnkwue (1962) 1 All NLR 537; (1962) 2 SCNLR 275 and Basil v. Fajebe (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 155) 172. Special damages are items of loss which a Claimant has to particularize in his pleadings to enable him to give evidence thereto and to recover thereon. See Attorney-General, Oyo State v. Fairlakes Hotels (No 2) (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 121) 255. In paragraph 11 of his statement on oath dated 22/7/15, the Claimant itemised the various heads of his claims as follows -i. Gratuity (Total annual emolument x 5.4ys x 5weeks - =N=1,504,668.46; ii. Payment in lieu of notice (6 months) - =N=1,300,000.00; iii. Terminal Salary - =N=11,039.70; iv. Commutation of outstanding leave (17.5 weeks) - =N=1,185,846.69; v. 2010 outstanding leave allowance (Annual basic at 12% = =N=932,880x12%) - =N=111,945.60 & Deductions (upfront allowance & retired cheque) - =N=61,484.00. Now it is not sufficient for the Claimant to have made these averments. Averments in pleadings are nothing short of mere assertions. The law requires that averments be backed up by credible and cogent evidence to attract positive judicial dispositions. For a pleading s or averments in proof of which no evidence is offered, virtually, serves no useful purpose. See Insurance Brokers v. Atlantic Textile [1996] 9 10 SCNJ 171, 183; Housing Corporation v. Enekwe [1996] 1 SCNJ 98, 133.This is the rationale for the long line of authorities that averments in pleadings, which are unsupported by evidence, are unavailing to the pleader as they go to no issue, and so must be discountenanced. See Odutola v. Papersack Nig Ltd [2006] 18 NWLR (pt 1012) 470 & Avinash Chander Malhotra v. Bank of Singapore Limited (2014) LPELR-22442(CA). The explanation is very simple. An averment in a pleading is not evidence and cannot be substituted for evidence. Such an averment does not, therefore, amount to proof unless it is admitted. See Aake and Anor v. Akun [2003] 14 NWLR (Pt.840) 311; (2003) LPELR -72 (SC) 9; Ajuwon v. Akanni and Ors [1993] 9 NWLR (Pt.316) 182, 200 and Magnusson v. Koiki and Ors [1993] 9 NWLR (Pt.317) 287. Aside from items i & ii, I find no evidence in reference to any of the other items of claim. It is thus sufficient for me to refuse and dismiss these heads of claim without much ado and I so do. Now respecting item i, Claimant drew my attention to Exh. C1. That exhibit is the DN Meyer Plc Staff Handbook. Paragraph 21.2 of that exhibit deals with Gratuity. By his own admission, Claimant served the Defendant for a period under 10 years. Specifically, Claimant worked for the Defendant for a period of 5 years and 4 months. By his own calculation which according to him was based on the provision of Exh. C1, Claimant had calculated his gratuity entitlement on the basis of 5weeks for each year of service. However by paragraph 21.2 of Exh. C1 Claimant ought to have calculated his entitlement on the basis of 4 1/2 weeks for each year of service. There is no basis in Exh. C1 for the Claimant to have calculated his entitlement on the basis of 5 weeks for every year spent with the Defendant. I find that evidence is not led in proof of the sum claimed by the Claimant under this head of relief. Same is therefore refused and dismissed. The Claimant also sought to be paid the sum of =N=1,300,000.00 being 6 months' salary in lieu of notice of termination of employment. The argument canvassed by the Claimant is that he was forced to resign which amounts to constructive termination of his employment without notice. Learned Counsel to the Claimant had submitted that the actual intention of the Defendant was betrayed by Exh. C9 in which the Defendant indicated payment of a month salary in lieu of notice to the Claimant. Learned Counsel also drew my attention to paragraph 20.2 of Exh. C1. That paragraph deals with Resignation and provides as follows - ''An employee can resign his/her employment contract by giving one month's notice in writing or one month's total gross salary (basic, housing and transport allowances) in lieu of notice. The Company can also terminate the employment contract of an employee by giving one month's notice or one month's total gross salary in lieu of notice. Whenever an employee is resigning his/her appointment or if the Company is terminating his/her appointment, any unused leave will be taken into consideration in the payment of the final entitlement. The leave shall be calculated on pro-rata basis''. There is nothing in that exhibit which entitles the Claimant to be paid 6 months' salary in lieu of notice of termination by the Defendant. Even by Exh. C2 - Claimant's Offer of Employment either party is only expected to give a month notice in writing or payment in lieu. The basis for this head of relief is faulty. There is no available evidence in support or proof of same. I therefore refuse and dismiss this relief accordingly. The bottom line is that the Claimant has failed to adduce cogent evidence in proof of the sum of =N=4,052.016.45 claimed as his terminal entitlement. It is thus refused and dismissed. The second relief is for payment of interest on the terminal benefit from the date of judgment at the rate of 25% per annum until final liquidation. The claim of the Claimant for payment of the sum of =N=4,052.016.45 as terminal benefit has been refused and dismissed. There is therefore no basis either legal or factual to award payment of interest on non-existing terminal benefit. I accordingly refuse and dismiss this relief for absence of proof as required. The 3rd relief sought by the Claimant is for a declaration that the Toyota Corolla LQ 211 AAA is his bona fide property to the exclusion of all others. Can this Court make this declaration as sought? What are the evidence led in support of this relief? The evidence in chief of the Claimant is partly to the effect that First Bank of Nigeria Plc financed his purchase of the vehicle via a lease agreement; that the Defendant was making monthly deductions from his salary and remitting same to the Lessor First Bank Plc and that he has finished paying for the lease. Firstly, I have no evidence of any lease agreement between the Claimant and First Bank Plc before me. Secondly, I have no evidence of the Claimant having finished paying to First Bank Plc for the vehicle to make it easy respecting the declaration sought. But I have at least 2 exhibits tendered by the Claimant supporting or establishing the ownership of the vehicle. These are Exh. C5 & Exh. C6 - Lagos State Vehicle License Private Car and Certificate of Insurance. While in the former, Owner's Name is stated to be FBN/Oduwole E.F, in the latter, the same FBN/Oduwole E.F was described as Name of Policy holder. Both exhibits are documentary evidence. The law is trite and generally accepted that documentary evidence are the best form of evidence. See Mlya v. Mshelizah (2004) 14 WRN 128, Ngige v. Obi (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 999) 1 at 233, In Ogbeide vs. Osifo (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 423 at 441, Documentary evidence is the yard stick or hanger by which to assess the veracity of oral testimony or its credibility. See Babatunde vs. Model Industries Nig. Ltd (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt. 879) 614 at 627 It is also trite that the Court will not permit a parole evidence to vary, add to or remove from the contents of a document. See Durosimi v. Adeniyi & Anor. (2017) LPELR (CA), Agbakoba v. INEC (2008)18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 489 & UBN v. Ozigi (1994)3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385, The available evidence before the Court only points to the fact the vehicle in question is jointly owned by FBN/Oduwole E. F. I so find and so hold. The Claimant urged the Court to award to him the sum of =N=10,000,000.00 as general damages. The law regarding to general damages presumes damages as flowing from the wrong complained of by the victim. Such damages in law need not be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. In other words, general damages are compensatory damages for harm resulting from the tort for which the party has sued. See the cases of UBN Plc. v. Ajabule (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1278) 152 SC; Husseni v. Mohammed (2015) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1445) 100. See also Afolabi v. Ola (2016) LPELR-(CA). What then are the wrongs complained off by the Claimant which the Court ought to compensate him with award of damages? Claimant had alleged that he was forced to resign from his employment by the Defendant. Aside from this, it is also the case and complain of the Claimant that the Solicitors to the Defendant had written a letter on behalf of the defendant to Vono Products Plc his new employer; that he was queried on the basis of the said letter and that subsequent to the said Defendant's Solicitors letter of 22/8/12 couple with hounding by the Defendant he had to leave he had to leave his employment to enter into a self-employment at a great pecuniary inconvenience to himself and his family. The response of the Defendant in the evidence in chief of its lone witness is that - '' ... the Defendant Company only wrote to the Claimant's former employer to assist the Defendant in retrieving its Car in custody of the Claimant since the Claimant had refused to release the car despite all entreaties and repeated demands in writing in that regard''. Now Exh. C8 is the letter written to the Managing Director of Vono Products Plc. I carefully evaluated the contents of that exhibit. I paid attention in particular to the mannerism of and the message intended to be conveyed by same. I asked what the real intention behind the facade of the reason offered by the Defendant. My finding and conclusion is that that letter Exh. C8 was written in bad faith. It is apparent from the face of same especially its paragraphs 4 & 6 that the letter was meant to portray the Claimant in bad light in the presence and estimation of his new employer. The letter concluded with an ultimatum and a threat of Court action in event of failing to play ball. I must add that the Defendant needed not cause such a letter to be written to the employer of its former staff. For, the new employer was never part of whatever agreement or dealings between the Defendant and any of its staff. Again, the Defendant needed not inform Vono Products Plc that it would take a legal action against any of its employs. I hold that it was an action taken by the Defendant to achieve a hidden intention. It was therefore no surprising that the Claimant had to exit the employment of Vono Products Plc for his peace of mind as claimed. I have no doubt in holding that the Claimant was wronged by that letter written on the instruction of the Defendant. That is a wrong which the Court must not hesitate to remedy. The law is trite that where there is a wrong there must be a remedy. See Onyekwelu & Ors. v. The Chief Registrar Kano State High Court & Ors. (2014) LPELR-23626(CA) & Oku-Pevi v. Soyinka & Anor. (2017) LPELR (CA). The wrong in the instant case can only be remedied in the award of damages. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=3,000,000.00 as general damages. Before I draw a curtain on this Judgment, let me reiterate two obvious facts. One, that there is no controversy respecting whether or not the Claimant was entitled to terminal benefits. The only controversy was the basis of calculation and the quantum of same. The second is that there is no evidence before me to the effect that the Claimant was paid any sum as his terminal benefits. Now, while testifying in chief in this case, the lone witness called by the Defendant, Akeem Adeyinka had stated in his witness statement on oath dated 18/9/15 that - '' I am aware that based on the Staff Handbook, the Claimant's total entitlement as at the date of his disengagement from the Defendant's service was N483,396.89 (Four Hundred and Eighty Three Thousand, Three Hundred and Ninety Six Naira, Ninety Kobo)''. I repeat that there is no evidence that this sum or any sum was paid over to the Claimant. The evidence of this defence witness is a clear and unambiguous admission which dispenses with any need to prove same. See Ekaete v. UBN Plc (2014) LPELR-23111(CA), Andon v. Ayi II & Ors. (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 227) 444 at 482 and Elendu vs. Ekwoaba (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 386) 704 at 747. The Defendant is here ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=483,396.89 being the sum admitted the terminal entitlement of the Claimant. The Defendant is also ordered to pay the cost of these proceedings assessed at =N=100,000.00 to the Claimant. Finally, for the avoidance of doubt and for all the reasons as stated in this Judgment, the case of the Claimant succeeds in part as follows, 1. I declare that the Claimant was forced by the Defendant to resign from his employment. 2. I declare that the available evidence before the Court only points to the fact the vehicle in question is jointly owned by FBN/Oduwole E. F. I so find and so hold. 3. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=3,000,000.00 as general damages. 4. The Defendant is here ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=483,396.89 being the sum admitted the terminal entitlement of the Claimant as admitted by the Defendant. 5. The Defendant is also to pay the cost of these proceedings assessed at =N=100,000.00 to the Claimant. 6. All the sums due under and by virtue of this Judgment, except cost, shall attract 15% interest per annum from today until final liquidation. All the terms of this Judgment are to be complied with within 30 days from today. Judgment is entered accordingly. ____________________ Hon. Justice J. D. Peters Presiding Judge