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JUDGMENT. The Claimants commenced this suit via Originating Summons seeking for the following reliefs: a. A DECLARATION that the termination of the employment of the Claimants by the Defendants was done without due compliance with the extant provisions of the law regulating the Claimants employment herein. b. A DECLARATION that the termination of the Claimants' employment by the Defendants relying on the provision of the Public Service Rules 020801 is illegal, null and void and was done without due compliance with the extant provisions of the law regulating the Claimants' employment with the Defendants. c. AN ORDER setting aside the termination of the Claimants' employment by the Defendants via letters dated 30th March 2017. d. AN ORDER directing the Defendants to reinstate the Claimants into the 1st Defendant, and integrate the Claimants' names into the Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) of the Defendants and pay the Claimants all the outstanding salaries and allowances due to the Claimants as ordered by HON. JUSTICE E.D. E ISELE of the National Industrial Court Abuja made in SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/11/2014 BETWEEN FEYITA FRIDAY & ORS VS. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION & ANOR. e. AN ORDER directing the Defendants to issue the Claimants letters of confirmation of appointments forthwith. f. AN ORDER directing the Defendants to comply with the advice of the Head of Service of the Federation contained in a letter dated, 1st June 2017 with REF NO: HCSF/LU/CORR/SGF/833/111 directing the Defendants to comply with the judgment of HON. JUSTICE E.D. EISELE of the National Industrial Court Abuja made in SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/11/2014 BETWEEN FEYITA FRIDAY & ORS VS. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION & ANOR forthwith. g. AN ORDER OF PEPERTUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants their Agents or any other body or institution acting on their behalf from further stopping the payment of the Claimants monthly salaries, allowances and all entitlements due to the Claimants or restraining the Claimants from performing their duty as Staff of the 1st Defendant. This suit was filed on 30th June 2017, at the Registry of this Court in Abuja Judicial Division. According to the record of the Court the Originating Court Processes commencing this suit together with its accompanying documents were served on the Defendants on the 12/07/2017. Consequently, the case came up before this Court on 30th October 2017, for the first time for mention. The Claimants were represented by Samuel Ogala, Esq; while the Defendants were absent and not represented in Court despite being served with hearing notices. Consequently, the Court ordered that the Defendants be served with another hearing notice of the next adjourned date. On 13/11/17, when this matter came up for hearing the Claimants were represented by Femi Adedeji, Esq; while the Defendants were absent and not represented by Counsel. The Defendants did not explained their absence. It is to be noted that the Defendants have failed, neglected or refused to enter appearance nor file defence to this suit despite being served with the Originating Court Processes commencing this suit, as well as hearing notices.. In arguing the Originating Summons, Mr. Femi Adedeji, Counsel for the Claimants informed the Court that the Originating Summons dated 29/6/17 and filed on 30/6/17, is seeking for reliefs as contained in the Summons. The Originating Summons is supported by a 41 paragraphs affidavit, sworn to by the 1st Claimant. The affidavit has 26 exhibits attached and marked as exhibits PSC 1-26. Counsel relied on all the paragraphs of the affidavit and the accompanying exhibits. Counsel also adopted the written address filed in support of the Originating Summons as his argument. In the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons the Claimants stated that they were employed by the 1st Defendant on 8th April 2013 on Administrative officers’ cadre on different grade levels. The copies of the letters of appointment were attached to the affidavit in support and marked as exhibits PSC – PSC 10. The Claimants also stated that their employments is regulated by the by the Police Service Conditions of Service and other extant Rules and Regulations as may be approved by the Federal Government. The Claimants also stated that as Staff of the Commission they are entitled to be paid remuneration and allowances in accordance to what is applicable to other officers of equivalent rank in the Civil Service of the Federation. Including payment of monthly salaries and allowances and payment of 1st 28 days allowance. The Claimants further stated that since they resumed duty with the 1st Defendant in April 2013 and subsequently deployed to various departments of the Commission, none of the 95 Staff employed by the 1st Defendant have been paid their first 28 days allowance, monthly salaries and allowances as provided by law till date. The Claimants stated that all efforts made by us herein to claim our first 28 days allowance and salaries and other allowances did not yield any positive result as the 1st and 2nd Defendants refused to pay them. The failure of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to pay the Claimants their salaries and entitlements led to institution of SUIT NO: NIC/ABJ/11/14, BETWEEN FEYITA FRIDAY & 42 ORS V. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION & ANOR before the National Industrial Court Abuja. That HON. JUSTICE E.D. EISELE on the 7th of October 2016 entered judgment in favour of the Claimants herein, wherein the Court among other reliefs granted the Claimants AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendants from further refusing to pay the Claimants their salaries and allowances, promoting the Claimants or harassing, intimidating, threatening the employment of the Claimants, suspending or terminating the Claimants' employment without due compliance with the extant provisions of the law regulating the Claimants employment herein. It was stated that Counsel to the Claimants wrote a letter to the Defendants demanding that they comply with the judgment of this Honourable Court and the Defendants in response in a letter dated 19th January 2017 recalled the Claimants back to their duties in compliance with the judgment in SUIT NO: NIC/ABJ/11/14 delivered on the 7th October 2016 by HON. JUSTICE E.D. E. ISELE. The Claimants stated that they all resumed duty with the Defendants waiting for payment of their salaries and allowances only for the Defendants to issue all of them with letters of termination of appointment dated 30th March 2017 with Reference NO: PSC/L/PET/239/VOL.II. the copies of the letters were attached as EXHIBITS PSC14-23• the Claimants stated that the Defendants relied on the provision of the Public Service Rules regulation 020801 which regulates termination of employment under probation to terminate their employment with the 1st Defendant. The Claimants avers that they were employed on the 30th of April 2013 by the Defendants and have spent about 4 years in the service of the Defendants. While under the Defendants condition of service which regulates the Claimants employment, the probation period for all staff is two years from the date of employment. The Claimants probation period commenced in April 2013 and expired in April 2015 without being extended by the Defendants. The Claimants avers that they have spent more than two years in the employment of the Defendants and are no longer under probation. The Claimants also stated that the Defendants did not organized any prescribed examination for them before terminating their employment or extended their probation period within the two years of the probation in the office. The Claimants aver that the Defendant did not issue letters of confirmation to them nor integrated them into pay system for payment of their salaries and other entitlements. In the written address Counsel submitted two issues for determination of the Originating Summons, to wit: 1. WHETHER the termination of the employment of the Claimants by the Defendants relying on the provision of the Public Service Rules 020801 was done in compliance with the extant provisions of the law regulating the Claimants' employment with the Defendant. 2. WHETHER having regard to the provisions of Section 10 (3) (b) of the Police Service Commission Act, 2001, Chapter 1 of the Police Service Commission condition of service at paragraph 1.9.1 the Claimants being staff of the 1st Defendant are not entitled to have their names enrolled in the Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IRPIS) to enable them receive their monthly salaries and their employment confirmed by the Defendants. In arguing issue one Counsel for the Claimants submitted that it is explicit from the affidavit evidence placed before this Honorable Court that the Claimants are all staff of the 1st Defendant duly employed by the Defendants and deployed to various departments of the 1st Defendant. This fact is supported by Exhibits PSC1-PSC10 being copies of their employment letters and deployment letters as issued to them by the 1st Defendant. (The 1st Defendant has been placed on notice to produce the original copies which they tactically withdrew from the Claimants). Counsel submitted that the Police Service Commission condition of service makes it mandatory that all fresh staff of the Commission are on probation and by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1 of the Police Service Commission at paragraph 1.6 it provides as follows:- "Officers on probation shall serve for 2 years before being confirmed in the service. This period may however be reduced to not less than 6 Months by deduction of any period of Public Service rendered satisfactorily in post of cognate status involving similar duties." Counsel submitted that the Claimants probationary period commenced in April 2013 and terminated in April 2015. Counsel submitted that it is within the period of probation from April 2013 to April 2015 that the Defendants can terminate the employment of the Claimants relying on Regulation 020801 of the Public Service Rules which provides as follows:- ‘’if within his probationary period it is established to the satisfaction of the authority empowered to appoint an officer that he is not qualified for efficient service, his appointment may be terminated by the authority at any time without any further compensation than free transport to the place to which he was engaged and such free transport will be granted only if his conduct has been good. Provided the termination is not due to misconduct on the officer’s part, it will be effected by means of a month’s notice and, subject to the same proviso, if the officer is eligible for vacation leave in respect of his/her service to date, such leave may be granted together with (if the officer so desire) normal vacation leave transport grant in lieu of the free transport mentioned above. Such leave, if any, shall be so arranged as to take place within the period of notice and, if possible, to expire on the same day as the notice. The position regarding the refund of the cost of any training given the officer is governed by the bond relating to that training’’. It is submitted by Counsel that the probationary period of the Claimants herein is two years certain except, it is extended by the Defendants as provided for under the Public Service Rules. Counsel continued his submission that the evidence before this Honourable Court is that the Defendants did not extend the probationary period for the Claimants. It is the contention of Counsel that the implication is that the Claimants are no longer on probation, the Claimants are entitled to be confirmed by the Defendants and the termination of their employment in 2017 outside the probationary period provided by law is illegal null and void and should be declared by this Honourable Court as being in violation of the order of Perpetual Injunction made by Honourable Justice E. D. E. Isele of this Court in suit No. NICN/ABJ/11/2014 between Feyita Friday & Ors. V Police Service Commission & Anr. Restraining the Defendants from further refusing to pay the Claimants their salaries and allowance, promoting the Claimants or harassing, intimidating, threatening the employment of the Claimants, suspending or terminating the Claimants employment without due compliance with extant provisions of the law regulating the Claimants employment herein. Counsel referred to regulation 020303 of the Public Service Rules and submitted that organizing an examination for staff on probation is not compulsory; this justifies the reason why the Defendants did not organize an examination for the Claimants. It is contended that the Defendants having not terminated the employment of the Claimants within two years probationary periods nor extend the probationary period of the Claimants are duty bound to confirm the Claimants. Counsel submitted that the Defendants cannot rely on Regulation 020801 to terminate the employment of the Claimants for having spent about four years in the service of the Defendants. Counsel also submitted that the provisions of the law cited above are express and the 1st Defendant has no legal justification to terminate the Claimants employment. Counsel referred to the Supreme Court case in AG, ONDO STATE V. AG, EKITI STATE (2001) 17 NWLR (pt.743) 706; 2001 FWLR 1431, @ pages 1472 & 1473, Karibi-Whyte, JSC most cherishingly held, inter alia: ‘‘lt is a well-established and cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that where the ordinary meaning of the words used in a provision are clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to the words without resorting to any extrinsic aid. See Awolowo v. Shagari (2001) FWLR (pt.73) 53; (1976) 6-9 S.C 51, LawaI v. G.B. Ollivant (1972) 3 S.C 124. The solemn and sacred duty of the Court is to interpret the words used in the section by the legislator and give to them their intended meaning and effect". See Adeyemo v. Gov. Lagos State (1972) 2 S.C 45; (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 207. Counsel further submitted that in OBUSEZ V. OBUSEZ (2007) 10' NWLR Pt. 1043 at P.446, the Apex Court held thus: ‘‘The specific, clear and unambiguous provisions of the constitution and a statute must be accorded their ordinary grammatical meanings which alone speak and disclose the intentions of the lawmakers". Counsel contended that the judgment of this Honourable Court made by HON. JUSTICE E.D. E ISELE of the National Industrial Court Abuja in SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/11/2014, BETWEEN FEYITA FRIDAY & ORS VS. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION & ANR. restraining the Defendants from further refusing to pay the Claimants their salaries and allowances, promoting the Claimants or harassing, intimidating, threatening the employment of the Claimants, suspending or terminating the Claimant's employment without due compliance with the extant provisions of the law regulating the Claimants employment herein is mandatory and must be complied with by the Defendants whom did not appeal same. Counsel contended that the Claimants case herein is based on the facts that the Defendants are in violation of this judgment which contains a perpetual injunction. The position of the law is that judgments of Courts unless set aside by superior courts must be obeyed. Counsel referred to the case of KAYODE A. & ANOR v. ABDULFATAI & ORS. (2012) LPELR-7874(CA} where the court of appeal held thus: "It is now firmly settled that a court order must be obeyed even if such order is perverse, until such a time that the order is set aside by a competent court'. See also Aladeghami v. Fasanmade (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt.81) 131." Per MBABA, J.C.A. (P. 35, paras. F-G). It is the contention of Counsel that the Defendants having not appealed against the judgment of HON. JUSTICE E.D. EISELE of the National Industrial Court Abuja in SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/11/2014 BETWEEN FEYITA FRIDAY & ORS VS. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION & ANOR. cannot disobey same by terminating the employment of the Claimants without complying with the provisions of the law. Counsel submitted that the consequences of the Defendants action are as stated by the Court of Appeal in the case of ODU V. JOLAOSO ORS. (2002) LPELR-6008(CA} wherein the court held that "Disobedience of court order is a very serious offence which every court should• not allow to go unpunished. This is because treating such act with levity could lead to total destruction of the entire judicial system and all that administration of justice stands for. The law will by that be rendered incapable of commanding any respect. Such a situation will no doubt portend a very bad omen for not only the administration of justice, but could constitute a great danger to the existence of the nation. This is the main reason why the onus is on every judicial officer, including counsel, to ensure that instances of contempt of order of court should never be treated with levity: see Odogwu v. Odogwu (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt.22S) 539; and Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Assan (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt.412) 129. uPer AKINTAN, J.C.A. (Pp. 17-18, Paras. F-C Counsel place reliance on the judicial authorities cited herein and submitted that this Honourable Court should declare the termination of the Claimants employment by the Defendants as null and void and violation of the Order of PERPETUAL INJUNCTION made by HON. JUSTICE E.D. EISELE of the National Industrial Court Abuja made in SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/11/2014 BETWEEN FEYITA FRIDAY & ORS VS. POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION & ANOR restraining the Defendants from further refusing to pay the Claimants their salaries and allowance, promoting the Claimants or harassing, intimidating, threatening the employment of the Claimants, suspending or terminating the Claimant's employment without due compliance with the extant provisions of the law regulating the Claimants employment herein. Counsel submitted in view of the foregoing submission this Honourable Court to the quote of the legendary jurist, legal thinker and sage, Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls (of blessed memory) in the celebrated case of MACFOY V. UAC (1962) A.C. 152, thus: ‘‘if an act is void, then it is in law, a nullity. It is not only bad, but also incurably bad. There is no need for an order to set it aside. It is automatically null and void without much ado, though it is sometime convenient to have it declared to be so and every proceeding, which is founded on it, it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there it will collapse’’. Counsel submitted that this principle was affirmed in the case of AYISA V AKANJI (1995) 7 NWLR (PT.405) 129. Counsel urged the Court to resolve issue one in favour of the Claimants. ISSUE TWO WHETHER having regard to the provisions of Section 10 (3) (b) of the Police Service Commission Act, 2001, Chapter 1 of the Police Service Commission condition of service at paragraph 1.9.1 the Claimants being staff of the 1st Defendant are not entitled to have their names enrolled in the Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) to enable them receive their monthly salaries and their employment confirmed by the Defendants. Counsel for the Claimants contended that as staff of the commission are entitled to be paid their monthly salaries and allowances by the Commission. The Claimants can only receive this monthly salaries and allowance from the Defendants if their names are captured in the Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) of the Defendants. It is in evidence before this Honourable Court that Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) is a platform created by the Federal Government of Nigeria through which salaries and allowances of all staff of the Federal Civil Service of the Federation are paid monthly. Counsel submitted that the failure of the Defendants to capture the Claimants names into the said Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) of the Defendants is a violation of the provisions of the Section 10 (3) (b) of the Police Service Commission Act, 2001 which provides that the Defendants shall pay to persons so employed such remuneration (including allowances) as are applicable to other officers of equivalent rank in the Civil Service of the Federation. Counsel submitted that payment of salaries and emolument is a right of the Claimants and that the Defendants have no justification to abuse such right as long as the Claimants are in the employment of the Defendants. If this Honourable Court rules in favour of the Claimants on issues 1 above, the Claimants herein are entitled to have their names captured in the Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) of the Defendants to enable the Claimants receive all their salaries and allowances due to them from the date of their employment till when they leave the services of the 1st Defendant in accordance with the provisions of the law regulating the Claimant's employment with the 1st Defendant. Counsel contended that the Claimant's employment is regulated by statute; that is, the Police Service Commission Act 2001, the Public Service Rules 2008 and the Conditions of Service in the Police Service Commission and by virtue of these laws the employment of the Claimants is clothed with statutory flavour and as such the Defendants cannot unilaterally on their own refuse to confirm the employment of the Claimants whom are not on probation and have spent more than two years in the service of the Defendants. Counsel submitted that the position of the law was explained quite succinctly by the Supreme court per Belgore J.S.c. (as he then was) in UNION BANK QF NIGERIA LTD V. OGBOH (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt.380) 647 at 664 where it was held, thus: "With greatest respect, this is not the law. Except in employment governed by statute wherein the procedure for employment and discipline (including dismissal) of an employee are clearly spelt out, ... Employment with statutory backing must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by that statute and any other manner of termination inconsistent with the relevant statute is null and void and of no effect."Per GALADIMA, J.C.A.(Pp. 18-19, paras. C-A) In the same vein, In Balogun vs. University of Abuja (2003) 13 NWLR Part 783 P.42, it was held that in contracts with statutory flavor, unless the contract of employment is properly determined in the manner envisaged by the contract of employment, an order of specific performance or reinstatement will normally be made by the court, meaning that once a finding is made by a trial court that an employment has statutory flavour. Counsel pray this Honourable Court to order the Defendants to confirm the employment of the Claimants and integrate their names into the Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) of the Defendants. DECISION I have carefully and painstakingly examined the entire processes filed in this suit. I heard oral submissions of Counsel for the Claimants in support of the Originating Summons. However, before dealing with the two issues for determination. I wish to first and foremost state that this suit is being decided based on the evidence adduced by the Claimants in support of their position. This is because the Defendants have failed, neglected or refused to enter formal appearances and file defence to the Claimants action, despite having been served with the Originating processes commencing this suit, as well as having been notified with the hearing dates. The Defendants have by the way they treated the processes commencing this suit shown disdain to the Court and the administration of justice. The conduct of the Defendants showed that they are not interested in defending this action. This suit was commenced via originating summons supported by affidavit. It is trite law that affidavit is evidence, as viva voce evidence given by a witness in prove of averments in pleading in case commenced by a writ of summons. See NWOSU Vs. IMO STATE EVIRONMENTAL SANITATION AUTHORITY (1990) 2 NWLR (pt.135) 688. The rules governing affidavit evidence and, in fact, any pleading, is that when a fact(s), asserted, is not denied or controverted by the adverse party. Who has a duty to do so, the same is deemed to be admitted by him (adverse party), and the court would be justified to rely on the fact and use it to settle the issue in controversy, if the asserted fact(s) is plausible. The deponent of an affidavit is witness see section 115(1) Evidence Act, the depositions stands as sworn evidence of the witness. see BAMAIYI V THE STATE (2001) 4 SC (pt.1) 18. However, it must be noted that the purpose of affidavit is not to contain legal arguments, conclusions, objections or prayers, but adduce oral evidence and documentary evidence to support the reliefs claimed on the motion paper. In the present case the claim of the Claimant has not been contradicted or controverted or challenged, due to absence of counter-affidavit from the Respondents to contradict it, therefore, it stands as undisputed facts. It is trite that in an affidavit evidence a party is deemed to have admitted the facts contained therein, if he fails to challenge or controvert same in a counter-affidavit. Thus, uncontroverted affidavit evidence is to be admitted and believed by a court except there are other legal reasons to refuse same. See BUHARI V OBASANJO (2003) 17 NWLR (PT850) 587. In the present situation the Defendants did not file counter-affidavit, to challenge, controvert or contradict the averments in the supporting affidavit before the court. Therefore, the facts deposed to in the supporting affidavit must be deemed admitted to be true, correct and admitted. In other words where there is no counter affidavit to an affidavit, the depositions are deemed to be admitted in law and they therefore form the agreed facts of the case between the parties. See AKWA V C. O. P. (2003) 4 NWLR (PT.811) 461. However, affidavit evidence is not sacrosanct; it is not above the evaluation of the courts. Like oral evidence court of law is entitled to evaluate affidavit evidence in order to ensure its veracity and or authenticity. While un-contradicted affidavit evidence should be used by the court, there are instances when such affidavit evidence clearly tell a lie and the courts cannot be blind to such a lie. See OKOYE V CPMB (2008) 15 NWLR (PT.1110) 335. Having stated the guiding principles in considering this suit. I shall now deal with the issues for determination. On issue one, the Counsel for the Claimants submitted that by affidavit evidence the Claimants are all staff of the 1st Defendant duly employed by the Defendants and deployed to various departments of the 1st Defendant. Exhibits PSC 1-10 are relied upon on this submission. It is the contention of Counsel that being fresh employees the Claimants they are employed on probation for two years in line with the provisions of Chapter 1 of the Police Service Commission at paragraph 1.6. Counsel also submitted that the period of probation may however be reduced to not less than 6 Months by deduction of any period of Public Service rendered satisfactorily in post of cognate status involving similar duties. It is contended that the Claimants probationary period commenced in April 2013 and terminated in April 2015. Counsel submitted that it is only within the period of probation that the Defendants employment can be terminated relying on Regulation 020801 of the Public Service Rules. Counsel also submitted that the period of probation has not been extended. It is the contention of Counsel that the implication is that the Claimants are no longer on probation, the Claimants are entitled to be confirmed by the Defendants and the termination of their employment in 2017 outside the probationary period provided by law is illegal null and void and should be declared by this Honourable Court as being in violation of the order of Perpetual Injunction made by Honourable Justice E. D. E. Isele of this Court in suit No. NICN/ABJ/11/2014 between Feyita Friday & Ors. V Police Service Commission & Anr. Restraining the Defendants from further refusing to pay the Claimants their salaries and allowance, promoting the Claimants or harassing, intimidating, threatening the employment of the Claimants, suspending or terminating the Claimants employment without due compliance with extant provisions of the law regulating the Claimants employment herein. In an action challenging termination of employment, the Claimant is required to establish that:- I. He is employed by the Defendants II. The terms and condition of his employment and III. The way and manner by which he can be removed. See AL-BISHAK V NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY CENTRW & ANR. (2015) LPELR-24659(CA). In the case at hand paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons have clearly established that the Claimants in this suit were employed by the 1st Defendant in April 2013 and they were deployed to various Departments of the 1st Defendant and have been working without being paid. The combined effect of the averments contained in paragraphs 6 – 16 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons clearly shows that the terms and conditions regulating the employment of the Claimants is the Conditions of Service, of Police Service Commission and other extant regulations as may be approved by the Federal Government. However, it is to be noted that the Police Service Commission is one of the Federal Executive Bodies established under section 153 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). The powers and functions of the Commissions are as set out in the Third Scheduled to the Constitution and also in the Police Service Commission Act 2001. The Conditions of Service were made by the Police Service Commission pursuant to section 25 of the Act. From the foregoing, it will be seen that terms and condition of service of the Claimants in this suit are as provided for in the Condition of Service of the Police Service Commission. It is to be noted that the letters of employment issued to the Claimants by the Defendants clearly stated that the employment of the Claimants will be governed and regulated by the Condition of Service of the Police Service Commission and extant regulation as may be approved by the Federal Government. See Exhibts PSC 1-10. These letters are the contractual agreement between the Claimants and the Defendants. Parties are bound by the terms of their contractual agreement which courts are enjoined to give effect to. In the case at hand the letters of appointments Exhibits PSC 1-10, is the contract of employment. This means that the letters of employment being the contract between the parties must be followed. It is clear from the content of the letters of appointment that the employment is governed and regulated by the provisions of condition of service of police service commission which is exhibit PSC 11 attached to the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons filed by the Claimants before the court. In view of the findings above, the way and manner in which the Claimants in this suit can be removed from office is as provided for in the Conditions of Service of the Police Service Commission and public service. I have combed the whole of the police Service Commission Act 2001 as well as studied the provisions of section 153 of the 1999 Constitution as amended and the Third Schedule of the Constitution, I am unable to find where it was stated that the provisions of the Public Service Regulations should govern employment of the employees of the 1st Defendant. In the absence of such provisions, I am fortified in my humble view that the Condition of Service of the Police Service Commission will regulate the services of the employees of the 1st Defendant. In the circumstance for the letters of termination of appointment issued to the Claimants in this suit which were attached to the affidavit in support of the originating summons as exhibits PSC 13 – 23, to be valid must conform to the letters and dictate of the Conditions of Service of the Police Service Commission. I have perused the contents of exhibits PSC 13 – 23, it is clear that the termination of the Claimants employment was based on their service no longer required and the provision of section 020801 of the public Service Rules. The provision of this Rule has been set out earlier in this judgment. Since I have indicated that the terms and conditions of service of the Claimants is regulated by the provisions of Condition of Service of the Police Service Commission, the purported termination of the Claimants appointment using Rule 020801 of the Public Service Rules is therefore invalid, it cannot stand in the eyes of the law. If the intention of the Defendants is to disengage the Claimants from service is because they are on probation is to resort to Rule 1.6 of Chapter 1 of the Conditions of service of the Police Service Commission. The regulation has been quoted earlier in this Judgment. The period of probation as contained in the regulation is two years or not less than six months for an officer that has served in the public service satisfactorily. However, in the present case the Claimants were engaged in April 2013 and the purported letter of termination was issued to them on 30th day of March 2017. If it is calculated from April 2013 to 30th day of March 2017 it is a period of almost four years with less few days. However, it should be noted that the Rule 1.5 (a) and (b) of the Condition of Service of Police Service Commission categorically stated that officers on probation may ha be placed on permanent and pensionable post subject to satisfactory completion of their probation. There is no evidence in the affidavit in support to show that the Claimants have satisfactorily completed their probation. The confirmation of appointment is not automatic. Learned counsel has strenuously argued that the Claimants having spent almost four years in service are entitled to confirmation, counsel relied heavily on the provisions of Public Service Rules, which I have held not applicable to this case going by the letters of appointment. See AL-BISHAK V NATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY CENTRE (Supra). ALHASSAN V ABU ZARIA 2011 11 NWLR PT.1259 417. In the circumstances and in the absence of cogent and compelling evidence I am unable to hold that the Claimants’ employment has been confirmed by the Defendants, since there is no such proof before the Court. ISSUE TWO On issue two, the Counsel for the Claimants contended that as staff of the commission, Claimants are entitled to be paid their monthly salaries and allowances by the Commission. The Claimants can only receive this monthly salaries and allowance from the Defendants if their names are captured in the Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) of the Defendants. It is in evidence before this Honourable Court that Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) is a platform created by the Federal Government of Nigeria through which salaries and allowances of all staff of the Federal Civil Service of the Federation are paid monthly. Counsel submitted that the failure of the Defendants to capture the Claimants names into the said Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) of the Defendants is a violation of the provisions of the Section 10 (3) (b) of the Police Service Commission Act, 2001, which provides that the Defendants shall pay to persons so employed such remuneration (including allowances) as are applicable to other officers of equivalent rank in the Civil Service of the Federation. Counsel submitted that payment of salaries and emolument is a right of the Claimants and that the Defendants have no justification to abuse such right as long as the Claimants are in the employment of the Defendants. If this Honourable Court rules in favor of the Claimants on issues 1 above, the Claimants herein are entitled to have their names captured in the Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) of the Defendants to enable the Claimants receive all their salaries and allowances due to them from the date of their employment till when they leave the services of the 1st Defendant in accordance with the provisions of the law regulating the Claimant's employment with the 1st Defendant. The issue of payment of salaries has been decided by this Court in the judgment of 7th of October 2016, coram Honourable Justice E. D, E. Isele. The issue as far as this Court this concerned is a dead issue it has no life it has been decided what the Claimants should do is enforce the said judgment. All the submissions of Counsel regarding issue of payment of salaries cannot hold water. Incidentally, there was no appeal against the said judgment of 7/10/16 which means that it is still subsisting and remains valid and binding until it is set aside on appeal. SEE SUBERU V ACB ORS 2002 LPELR 12207. I have no power or jurisdiction to review or revisit the judgment of my learned brother. see LIASU VS SALAY 2011 LPELR 3919 EGBUCH V EGBUCHE 2013 LPELR 22512. This court is functus officio to review judgment of 7/10/16. It is also to be noted that the submission of Counsel in his written address to the effect that it is in evidence before this Honourable Court that Integrated Personal Payroll Information System (IPPIS) is a platform created by the Federal Government of Nigeria through which salaries and allowances of all staff of the Federal Civil Service of the Federation are paid monthly, has no bases as there was no evidence in the affidavit to support this position. Written address though being integral part of a case, it can never take the place of evidence of the party. It must be remembered that address of counsel is meant to assist and aid the court in analyzing the issues of laws raised in a matter and arrive at a just conclusion of the case, but they are not substitute for cogent and credible evidence proffered by the parties on issues propounded by them for determination. Counsel is not allowed to give evidence in his address, it is not part of his duty to do that. In view of the reasons given above and for avoidance of doubt the order of this Court in respect of this case is as follows:- a. IT IS HEREBY DECLARED that the termination of the employment of the Claimants by the Defendants was done without due compliance with the extant provisions of the law regulating the Claimants employment herein. b. A DECLARATION that the termination of the Claimants' employment by the Defendants relying on the provision of the Public Service Rules 020801 is illegal, null and void and was done without due compliance with the extant provisions of the law regulating the Claimants' employment with the Defendants. c. AN ORDER setting aside the termination of the Claimants' employment by the Defendants via letters dated 30th March 2017, Exhibits PSC 13-23, attached to the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons. Judgment is entered accordingly. I award no cost in this case. Sanusi Kado, Judge.