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JUDGMENT 1. Introduction & Claims The Claimant approached this Court on 17/5/13 by his General Form of Complaint and by his amended statement of facts dated 19/6/15 sought from this Court the following reliefs - 1. A declaration that the letter dated 16th November 2012 captioned PROBATIONARY PERIOD RAPHAEL OBASOGIE delivered to the Claimant by the 2nd Defendant is functionless and ineffectual as a letter of termination of the Claimant’s employment as General Manager, Human Resources of the 1st Defendant. 2. A declaration that by the cumulative effect of Sections 8 and 9 of the Petroleum Act, Regulations 15A of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969, as amended by the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) (Amendment) Regulations 1988, Clause 13.8 of the Production Sharing Contract on OPLs 98/118 dated 6th May 1998 and signed between the Defendant and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the letter dated November 16, 2012 whereby the Defendant purported to remove, or disengage the Claimant from his employment as the General Manager, Human Resources of the 1st defendant without the prior written approval of the Minister of Petroleum Resources, is unlawful ineffectual and void. 3. A declaration that by the effect of Article 4 of Convention 158 of the International Labour Organisation 1982, applicable as Treaty obligation of Nigeria, clauses 16 and 17 of the Principle Statement of Employment made part of the Claimant’s conditions of employment as the General Manager, Human Resources is ineffectual, contrary to international best practice and public policy, and pro tanto void. 4. A declaration that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant vide the Claimant’s letter of employment dated April 13, 2012 subsists, and the Claimant is entitled to all his rights and benefits under the same, until the Claimant’s employment is otherwise duly determined as required by law. 5. An order setting aside the said letter of Termination dated November 16, 2012 and directing the Defendants to reinstate the Claimant to his position as General Manager, Human Resources of the 1st Defendant until the Claimant’s employment is otherwise duly determined as required by law. 6. An order directing the Defendants to pay to the Claimant, all arrears of his salaries, emoluments and allowances including the bonuses and honorariums from December 2012 until the Claimant’s employment is otherwise duly determined as required by law. 7. An order for the sum of =N=500 Million as general damages for negligence. The Clamant filed along with his amended processes all the requisite frontloaded documents including the statement of facts, witness statement on oath, list of witness as well as list and copies of all documents to be relied on at trial. The Defendant reacted by entering an appearance and filing their statement of defence along with all such documents as required by the Rules of this Court. 2. Case of the Claimant The Claimant opened his case on 16/2/16, adopted his witness statement on oath dated 19/6/15 as his evidence in chief and tendered 16 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exh. RO1 - Exh. RO16.An additional document was tendered through the Claimant by the Defendants during cross examination. It was admitted and marked as Exh. RO17. The Claimant brought this suit alleging unlawful termination of his employment, breach of statutory precondition, unfair labour practice, and breach of international best practices in labour, employment and industrial relation, against the Defendants. The case of the Claimant as seen from the pleadings is that he is a Nigerian national while the 1st Defendant is a Limited Liability Company incorporated in Nigeria and carries on a business in Nigeria as an Oil and Gas Company and as license under a Production Sharing Contract with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; that the 1st Defendant as licensee, is the operator of (Oil Prospecting License) OPL’s 98/118 granted under Section 2 of the Petroleum Acts, 1969 by the Minister of Petroleum Resources; that within 7 months of the employment of the Claimant, the Defendant lavished commendations on the Claimant; that surprisingly, within the same 7 months, and by letter dated November 16th 2012, (Exhibit RO9), the Defendants purported to terminate abruptly the employment of the Claimant without giving any reason whatsoever for their union; that by virtue of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) (Amendments) Regulations 1988, made pursuant to Section 8 of the Petroleum Act 1969, the 1st Defendant, as the holder of an Oil Mining Lese, or License, or Permit, issued under the Petroleum Act 1969, or under Regulations made thereunder, shall not remove any worker including the Claimant from his employment except in accordance with guidelines that may be specified, from time to time by the Minister; that this Statutory precondition, also applies to any other person registered to provide any services in relation to an Oil Mining Lease, License or Permit and that the statutory prohibition is mandatory and a breach of it is sanctionable as an offence which upon conviction is punishable with a term of imprisonment. The Claimants averred further that pursuant to Exhibit RO1, the Minister of Petroleum Resources issued Exhibit RO2 to all Oil Producing Companies, Oil Marketing Companies and Oil Service Companies, including the 1st Defendant; that this instrument expressly provided that all companies operating in the petroleum industry should apply for official approval of the Honourable Minister before releasing any Nigerian staff from their employment stipulates that the name, appointment, length of service nature of work and reasons fully documented for the discharge of the worker(s) as well as terminal benefits according or to be paid to the employee should be included in any such application for approval to discharge the services of the Nigerian staff; that this is a declaration of policy by the Government of Nigeria; that in purporting to remove the Claimant from his employment, the 1st Defendant did not obtain the approval of the Minister and that by purporting to remove him from his employment, 7 months after engaging him, within which period the Defendants lavished commendations on him, and without showing any reason whatsoever for their abrupt and irrational conduct, the Defendants had failed to comply or meet the standard of International best practice relating to labour and employment. Under cross examination CW1 stated that he had about 10 years left with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation; that the Principle Statement of Employment, PSE, came with his offer of employment; that he could not remember the date on it; that he conditionally rejected the offer contained in Exh. RO5; that he worked at Nestle Plc before joining Shell Petroleum Development Corporation(SPDC); that he joined SPDC voluntarily from Nestle Plc; that he knows Mr. Sunday Otabor and that he exchanged several correspondences with him; that he did not inform Mr. Otabor that my joining Defendant was a personal decision. The witness testified further that notwithstanding the content of Exh. RO17 1-5 he insists that he was induced by Defendant to join it; that he negotiated the Principle Statement of Employment with Defendants; that some of his suggestions were accepted during negotiation; that he signed Exh.RO5 during negotiation; that the 2nd Defendant signed Exh. RO4 on behalf of 1st Defendant; that he did not question the authority of the 2nd Defendant to sign same; that the terms negotiated did not have provision for confirmation of appointment; that he resumed at Defendant 3/8/12 and that the Notice of Probationary Period was dated 16/11/12. 3. Case of the Defendants The Defendants opened their defence on 14/12/16. They called one Adeidunu Uba as their lone witness. DW1 adopted her witness written statement on oath as her evidence in chief and tendered 4 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exh. AU1 - Exh. AU4. The case of the Defendant as revealed from the pleadings filed is that the 1st Defendant (and not the 2nd Defendant) offered the Claimant employment as General Manager Human Resources via an offer of employment dated 13/4/12; that the employment was regulated by the provisions of the Principle Statement of Employment (PSE) executed by the Claimant and the 1st Defendant; that the PSE provided that the Claimant's employment shall be subject to a compulsory probationary period of 6 (six) months after which the 1st Defendant shall elect to confirm or refuse to confirm the Claimant’s employment; that the PSE also expressly provided that both parties reserved the right, during this probationary period, to terminate the contract at any time and without any obligation to give reasons for such termination; that the 1st Defendant did not induce the Claimant to leave his previous employment at Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) but the Claimant after weighing his options as an adult of full consenting age and capacity made an independent decision to leave his previous employment and accept the 1st Defendant’s offer of employment; that both parties merely negotiated the terms of employment as is customary in the initiation of any business relationship and that the decision of the Claimant to leave his previous employment was ultimately his personal decision and that the Claimant’s employment did not come with any special status. It is the case of the Defendant that there were no assurances (whether express or implied) in the Claimant’s Letter of Employment dated 13/4/12 over and above those contained in the PSE; that the Claimant’s employment was not confirmed and hence the PSC or the other regulations sought to be relied upon by the Claimant do not apply to his employment; that the PSC sought to be relied upon by the Claimant was entered into between the 1st Defendant and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (“NNPC’); that the Claimant is not a party to the agreement and cannot therefore place reliance on the terms therein; that the 1st Defendant, being an Oil and Gas Company operates within standards and international best practices but that these best practices are not requirements of law but are mere non-binding objectives (without the force of law) which all companies including the 1st Defendant are enjoined to aspire to; that it does not lie in the mouth of the Claimant to say that the 2nd Defendant acted without the authority of the 1st Defendant when he communicated the decision to terminate the Claimant’s employment; that for the avoidance of doubt that the 1st Defendant has since affirmed that the 2nd Defendant clearly acted within its instructions when he communicated its decision to terminate the employment of the Claimant and that although the Claimant’s contract was terminated during probation, the 1st Defendant nevertheless wrote off unamortised lump-sum payments made to the Claimant as an ex gratia payments. Under cross examination, witness testified that in hiring staff 1st Defendant adheres to international best practices respecting contract of employment; that this also applies to obeying the laws of the host countries relating to employment; that it includes complying with contracts entered into with the government of Nigeria on behalf of Nigerians; that 1st Defendant is also under obligation to comply with statutes relating to Oil exploration in Nigeria when 1st Defendant made offer to the Claimant; that the Claimant made a counter offer by way of comment to the 1st Defendant; that based on these 1st Defendant made some concessions; that he confirms paragraph 16 of his statement on Oath; that he confirms that Exh. RO3 is worthless; that he confirms paragraph 21 of his Oath; that he is aware that the Claimant was paid the Home Ownership Grant; that the Claimant also enjoyed leave days not necessarily granted to confirmed staff; that Exh. AU2 is the only document he is aware the Claimant executed; that Exh. AU1 is signed on each page and that it is not correct that the Defendants acted wrongly in terminating the employment of the Claimant. At the conclusion of trial and pursuant to the direction of the Court, learned Counsel on either filed their final written addresses 4. Submissions on Behalf of the Defendant The final written of the Defendant was filed on 2/5/17. In it learned Counsel for the Defendants set down a lone issue for determination as follows - 1. Whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant has established its entitlements to the reliefs sought against the 2nd Defendant in this case. 2. Whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant has established its claim against the 1st Defendant in this case. 3. Whether the Claimant's employment was subject to the Petroleum Act, the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) (Amendment) Regulations 1988 and the Production Sharing Contract between the 1st Defendant and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. 4. Whether the ILO Convention 158 and International Best Practices are justiciable and/or applicable to the Claimant's employment. 5. Whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant has established its entitlements to the reliefs sought in this case. On issue 1, learned Counsel submitted that there is no cause of action against the 2nd Defendant; that from reading of the processes filed by the Claimant his case is hinged on the termination of his employment with the 1st Defendant; that all the reliefs sought are against the 1st Defendant and that if the case of the Claimant were to succeed it would be against the 1st Defendant only. In addition, learned Counsel submitted that the 2nd Defendant is not a necessary or even a desirable party to this suit citing Bello v. INEC (2010)8 NWLR (Pt. 1196) 342. Counsel submitted further that even if the Court is to find any action of the 2nd Defendant which rendered answerable to the Claimant's case, that the 2nd Defendant merely acted as an agent of the 1st Defendant and that as agent of a disclosed principal the 2nd Defendant is not liable for his acts within the limit of his authority citing Section 283(2), Companies and Allied Maters Act, Cap. C20, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 & Ogbaji v. Arewa Textiles Plc. (2000)11 NWLR (Pt. 678) 322. Counsel prayed the Court to hold that all communications and exchange of correspondence between the 2nd Defendant and the Claimant the 2nd Defendant acted as the agent of the 1st Defendant; that joinder of the 2nd Defendant is aimed to harass the 2nd Defendant and nothing more. Learned Counsel prayed the Court to dismiss the case against the 2nd Defendant with cost. The second issue for determination is whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant has established its claim against the 1st Defendant in this case. Learned Counsel submitted that the burden of proof lies on the Claimant citing Sections 131 & 132, Evidence Act, 2011 and Okoye v. Nwankwo (2014)15 NWLR (Pt. 1429) 93. Counsel submitted that from the documentary evidence and the testimonies of witnesses, the sum total of the Claimant's case is that the probationary period under the Principal Statement of Employment did not apply to his employment and that the termination is wrongful while the Defendants maintained that the Claimant was under probation and that the 1st Defendant was entitled to terminate his employment without reason especially since the employment was not one with statutory flavor. Counsel submitted that parties are bound by Exh. RO5 which stipulated the terms and conditions of employment of the Claimant citing Etso (Nig.) Limited v. G & T Investment Limited (2011)3 NWLR (Pt. 1234) 302. Learned Counsel argued further that the employment of the Claimant was not one with statutory flavor contrary to the position canvassed by the Claimant citing Fakuade v. OAUTH (1993)5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47 & Institute of Health Ahmadu Bello University Hospital Management Board v. Mrs. R.I. Anyip (2011) LPELR-1517(SC). Counsel argued that by paragraph 2 of his Amended Statement of Facts, the Claimant had averred that the 1st Defendant is a private limited incorporated company under the Companies and Allied Matters Act; that the 1st Defendant is not a creation of a statute and that the employment of the Claimant was not one with statutory flavor. On whether the probationary period clause in the Principal Statement of Employment is applicable to the Claimant, learned Counsel submitted that Exh. RO5 which regulated the employment of the Claimant was the end product of a negotiated of which the Claimant was very active and that by signing same, the Claimant evinced an intention to be bound by same; that where the terms of an agreement are reduced in writing they can only be varied by another agreement also in writing citing CBN v. Igwillo (2007)14 NWLR (Pt. 1054) 393. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. On whether or not the 1st Defendant was entitled to lawfully terminate the employment of the Claimant and/or not to confirm his appointment, Counsel submitted that the probationary period under Exh. RO5 was applicable to the Claimant's employment; that Claimant's employment was without statutory flavor and that the 1st Defendant acted within its right in electing not to confirm the Claimant's employment and to terminate same citing Ihezukwu v. University of Jos (1990) NWLR (Pt. 146) 598 & 609 & Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Limited (2008)10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. Respecting issue 3, learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant cannot place reliance on the Production Sharing Contract between the 1st Defendant and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation; that it is a universal principle that a contract cannot bind third parties and third parties cannot take benefit or accept liabilities under a contract for which they are not parties citing Ogundare v. Ogunlowo (1997)6 NWLR (Pt. 509) 360 and that the Claimant being an employee of the 1st Defendant and not being a confirmed staff cannot take benefit under the PSC. Counsel prayed the Court to resolve this issue in favor of the Defendants. On issue 4, learned Counsel submitted that there is nothing in Article 4 of International Labour Organisation ('ILO') Convetion 158 of 1982 and indeed the entire Convention that detracts from the party autonomy granted by the law to the 1st Defendant and the Claimant to enter into Exh. R05 (Principal Statement of Employment); that international treaties do not become applicable until domesticated as part of national laws citing The Reg. Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria & Ors. v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & Ors. 1 S.C (Pt. 111) 1 and that international best practices are not justiciable in Nigeria and are mere expressions of the desires of state actors international fora to abide by certain codes of conducts and cannot trump the provisions of the parties' agreements or national laws citing Abacha v. Fawehinmi (2000)6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228. Learned Counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue against the Claimant. On issue 5, learned Counsel submitted that having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case the Claimant has failed to establish his entitlement to the reliefs sought. Respecting the first 2 reliefs sought, Counsel adopted his earlier submissions and added that assuming without conceding that the Hon Minister of Petroleum Resources was empowered in law to regulate the engagement or disengagement of workers, staff or employee within the meaning of Exh. RO1 & Exh. RO2, the Claimant is not qualified to benefit under it not being a confirmed staff of the 1st Defendant. On the 3rd relief, Counsel submitted that by reason of Section 12(1), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, Convention 158 of the ILO 1982 having not been domesticated as part of the Nigerian law has no binding effect and cannot override the express provisions of Exh. RO5. With respect to the 4th and 5th reliefs learned Counsel submitted that the decision not to confirm the Claimant's employment upon completion of his probationary period was merely an expression of the 1st Defendant's rights under Exh. RO5; that the highest relief an erstwhile employee would be entitled to even in the event of unlawful termination of employment especially in contracts that lack statutory flavor is the relief of damages; that there is evidence before the Court that the Claimant had been paid money due to him and even received ex gratia payment and that in any event the law is trite that a Court cannot foist an employee on an employer citing Osuma v. Edo Broadcasting Service (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 253) 773 at 789. Counsel added that the Claimant is not entitled to the payment of salaries, emoluments and allowances including bonuses and honorariums from December, 2012 till date and that on judicial authorities the Claimant is not entitled to damages as claimed for negligence same not having been proved citing U.T.B v. Ozoemena (2007)3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 448. Finally, learned Counsel prayed the Court to dismiss this case in its entirety. 5. Submissions on Behalf of the Claimant Learned Counsel to the Claimant filed his final written address on 25/5/17. In it, Counsel set down the following four issues for determination - 1. Whether by the combined effect of Sections 8 and 9 of the Petroleum Act, Regulations 15A and 60B of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 1969 as amended by the Petroleum (Drilling and production) (Amendments) Regulations 1988 and Clause 13.8 of the Production Sharing Contract on OPLs 98/118 dated 6/5/98, the Defendants purported removal or disengagement of the Claimant without the prior written approval of the Minister of Petroleum Resources is not unlawful, ultra vires the Defendants and void. 2. Whether upon due appraisal of this case in the light of Convention 158 of the International Labour Organization 1982, Article 15 of the African Charter on Human and People's Right, and Section 254C(1)(f) of the 1999 Constitution, the purported removal of the Claimant from his employment by means of Exh. RO9 is justifiable as fair labour practice or international best practice in labour and employment matters. 3. Whether Exh. RO9, letter dated 15/11/12 captioned PROBATIONARY PERIOD RAPHAEL OBASOGIE whereby the Defendants purported to terminate the Claimant's employment is not altogether functionless and ineffectual having regard to Exh. RO1, RO2, RO3, RO4, RO5, RO6, RO7 & RO10. 4. Whether having regard to all the circumstances of this case, the Claimant is entitled to any or all the reliefs claimed by him against the Defendants. On the first issue, learned Counsel submitted that by virtue of Sections 8 & 9, Petroleum Act, the Minister in charge of petroleum has both the power and duty to exercise general supervision over all operations under license and leases granted under the Act; that the Minister in exercise of this power made Exh. RO2 which has the force of law as a subsidiary legislation citing Section 318, 1999 Constitution as amended & Mustafa v. Governor of Lagos State (1987)2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 539 and that the Claimant is qualified as an employee under Exh. RO2; that Clauses 15A & 60B of Exh. RO1 cloak the employment of the Claimant with a statutory flavor and that the 1st Defendant cannot found any right including the right to terminate the Claimant's protected employment upon a deliberate breach of the statutory precondition stipulated in Exh. RO1 citing Geidam v. NEPA (2001)2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 45 at 55; UNTHM v. Nnoli (1994)8 NWLR (Pt. 363) 376 & Fakuade v. OAUDH (1995)5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47. Learned Counsel prayed the Court to hold that failure to obtain the approval of the Hon Minister in compliance with Clause 15A of Exh. RO1 renders Exh. RO9 the purported letter of termination of the Claimant's employment ultra vires and void. On issue 2, learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant's employment was regulated not only by the letter of employment - Exh. RO4 but also by other terms and conditions imposed by Exh. RO1, Exh. RO2 & Exh. RO3; that Nigeria having become a member of the ILO in 1960 by the ILO Constitutions undertook to implement ILO Conventions including the Termination of Employment Convention 158 0f 1982; that in alternative that the express requirement in Exh. RO2 that reasons for termination should be given, documented and submitted to the Minister is an indication that Nigeria accepts the concept of international best practice laid down in ILO Treaties and Conventions even if specific Conventions had not been ratified; that the Convention when read in conjunction with the stipulation against termination without reason stated in Exh. RO2 and embedded in Exh. RO3 and in further conjunction with Art. 15 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights shows without doubt that the common law principle which permits an employer to terminate a contract of employment for reason or for no reason is no longer considered to be a best practice in labour and employment matters citing Section 254C(1)(f), 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended and that Exh. RO1, RO2, RO3 & RO10 have set the guidelines or rules to be followed by the Defendants when dealing with matters pertaining to the employment of the Claimant; that a practice by the Defendants deliberately designed to commit a criminal offence by avoiding statutory duty and obligation under the Nigerian Law cannot be described as best practice and that the stipulation that written approval of the Minister of Petroleum Resources is mandatory before a Nigerian employed in the petroleum industry can be removed from his employment is a statement of national policy of Nigeria. Learned Counsel urged the Court to so hold. Issue 3 deals with whether Exh. RO9 dated 15/11/12 purporting to terminate the Claimant's employment is not altogether functionless and ineffectual having regard to Exhs. RO1, RO2, RO3, RO4, RO5, RO6, RO7 & Exh. RO10. On this learned Counsel submitted that negotiation between the parties proceeded on the basis of exchange of documents and urge the Court to take into cognizance the comprehensive and unequivocal wordings of the series of agreements between the parties; that upon receipt of Exh. RO4 & Exh. RO5, the Claimant made a counter offer by Exh. RO6 which the Defendants accepted by Exh. RO7 but that the Defendants did not intend to honour the promise made in Exh. RO7. Learned Counsel prayed the Court to resolve this issue in favor of the Claimant and hold that Exh. RO9 is ineffectual having regard to Exhibits RO1-RO7 & Exh. RO10. The final issue set down for determination by the Claimant is whether having regard to all the circumstances of this case, the Claimant is entitled to any or all of the reliefs claimed by him against the Defendants. On ths issue, learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to all the reliefs sought. Counsel submitted that the Defendants acted with malice and gross negligence by purporting to remove the Claimant from his employment without due process and in violation of Sections 8 & 9 of the Petroleum Act, Regulation 15A, Petroleum (Drilling and Production) (Amendment) Regulations 1988, Clause 13.8 of the Production Sharing Contract on OPLs 98/118 dated 6/5/98 and signed between the Defendant and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Art. 4, Convention 158 of the ILO 1982 and Art. 15 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and that the Claimant has suffered gross injury and loss. Counsel prayed the Court to so hold and grant to the Claimant all the reliefs sought. On 29/6/17, the Defendants filed a 12-page reply Address. I read same with understanding. 6. Decision It is imperative that I make one or two preliminary comments on certain aspects of this case before I proceed to the Judgment in the main. Learned Counsel to the Defendants filed a reply address in this case. It is of 12 pages. What learned Counsel did and the method adopted by him was to react to each of the issues set down for determination and argued by the learned Counsel to the Claimant. The bottom line of that address is simply to again restate the fact that the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought. What the learned Counsel did was to reargue his case. In other words, he simply took a second bite at the cherry. Unfortunately that is not the essence of a reply address. See Ojomo & Ors. v. Frozen Foods Nigeria Limited & Ors. (2009) LPELR-8926 (CA). A reply address is expected to be strictly a reply to fresh issues of law raised by the opposing Counsel and as the name connotes it is to be a reply on points of law only. Not a reply on point of fact. It is never an opportunity to rehash, reargue or panel beat argument earlier canvassed. See Olafisoye v. FRN (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 864) 580 & E.I.I.A Limited v. C.I.E Limited (2006)4 NWLR (Pt. 969) 114. See also Saraki v. FRN (2016) LPELR-(SC). I find the ''Defendants' Reply Address'' dated and filed 29/6/17 nothing other than a re-argument of the case of the Defendants as earlier canvassed. It is time wasting, irrelevant, unhelpful and outside the established scope of a reply address. I have no hesitation to discountenance same and I so do. See Nwude v. FRN & Ors. (2015) LPELR-24647 (CA). Secondly, I found fundamental issues raised concerning some of the exhibits tendered and admitted in this case at trial. Exh. RO1 is the Petroleum (Drilling and Production)(Amendment) Regulation, 1988. This is a subsidiary legislation. It has the force of law. Subsidiary legislation are regarded just as legislation are regarded. Legislation are to be cited in Court. They are not to be tendered as exhibits. The Court is deemed to be seised of the existence of legislation and subsidiary legislation in its jurisdiction. Indeed the Court is bound to take judicial notice of the existence of some facts under the Evidence Act. In this respect, Section 122(1)(a) and (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides thus - ''122(1). The court shall take judicial notice of the following facts: (a) all laws or enactments and any subsidiary legislation made there under having the force of law now or heretofore in force, or hereafter to be in force, in any part of Nigeria; (i) all general customs, rules and principles which have been held to have the force of law in or by any of the superior courts of law or equity in England, the Supreme Court of Nigeria or the Court of Appeal or by the High Court of the State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja or by the Federal High Court and all customs which have been duly certified to and recorded in any such Court''. See also Eagle Super Pack (Nigeria) Limited v. African Continental Bank Plc (2006) LPELR-980 (SC); Eagle Super Pack (Nigeria) Ltd. v. ACB Plc. (2006) 19 NWLR (Pt.1013) 20. It is however open to a Court or a Judge to request a learned Counsel to furnish it or him with a copy of a particular legislation, subsidiary legislation or even case cited before it. Therefore, until such a request is made, it is abnormal for a legislation or a subsidiary legislation to be tendered in evidence at trial. The same position is applicable with respect to Exh. RO7. That exhibit is ILO Convention 158, Termination of Employment Convention, 1982. They are to be cited and not to be tendered as exhibits. I discountenance these exhibits as such. In this Judgment where the need arises I shall make reference to the applicable provisions of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production)(Amendment) Regulation, 1988 and Termination of Employment Convention No. 158 of 1982 and any applicable regulations and subsidiary legislation. These are not admissible documents. They are documents the contents of which the Court takes judicial notice and hence their tendering and admission is superfluous. The law is trite and properly restated by the Court of Appeal in Anifowose v. Wema Bank Plc. (2015)LPELR-24811 that where a piece of evidence which is inadmissible at all in law is wrongly admitted in evidence, the proper thing for the trial Court to do is to discountenance it completely when writing its judgment even if admitted by consent. See also Hyppolite v. Agharevba (1998) 11 NWLR (Pt.575) 598 & Agbi v. Ogbeh (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt.990) 67. Now, Exh. RO10 & Exh. RO13 were tendered and admitted at trial. They were both headed Adax Petroleum Development (Nigeria) Limited (APDNL) Principle Statement of Employment & Raphael Obasogie: Some High-Level Contributions to Addax Within a Short Period of Three Months 9 August-Sept 2012) respectively. Both exhibits bear no author. They have no signature. They also have no dates. Not having been signed and dated they amount to nothing but a worthless piece of paper. They carry no evidential value. They cannot assist the Court in arriving at the justice of this case or any case for that matter. See Wema Bank Plc & Anor. v. Alaran Frozen Foods Agency Nigeria Limited & Anor. (2015) LPELR-25980 (CA). See also G.S. & D. Ind. Ltd. v. NAFDAC (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1294) 511 at 538, Amizu v. Nzeribe (1989) 4 NWLR?32 (Pt. 118) 755 and Tsalibawa v. Habiba (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 174) 461. Being worthless piece of papers with no evidential value therefore, I discountenance both Exh. RO10 & Exh. RO13 and expunge them from this proceedings. Now, coming to this Judgment in the main, I have read all the processes filed by either side. I listened attentively to the testimonies of the witnesses called at trial, watched their demeanor and carefully evaluated all the exhibits tendered and admitted in this case. I also patiently listened to the brilliant submissions by the learned Senior Advocate of Nigeria for the Claimant and the learned Counsel to the Defendants. Having done all this and having also reviewed the facts along with the evidence led, I narrow the issues for the just determination of this case to the following - 1. Whether the employment of the Claimant was one with statutory flavor or protected by a statute. 2. Whether the Claimant is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought. The case of the Claimant, in brief, from the pleadings filed and evidence led is that he was employed by the 1st Defendant as a senior Management staff; that at the time of negotiation, it was agreed that the period of probation would be waived for him; that the final agreement executed did not reflect that part of the agreement; that there was a statutory requirement of the approval of the Minister of Petroleum Resources before the 1st Defendant would be able to disengage him and that his employment was terminated by the 1st Defendant without seeking and obtaining the requisite approval. A major plank of the argument of the Claimant is that his employment was protected by a statute which the 1st Defendant did not comply with before terminating his employment. Specifically on page 9 of his final written address, learned senior Counsel to the Claimant had submitted that '' Clauses 15A and 60B of Petroleum Exhibit RO1, cloaks(sic) the Claimant's employment with a statutory flavor''. Now, is the employment of the Claimant in this case one with statutory flavor? When is an employment said to have statutory flavor? With respect to employment with statutory flavour Adekeye JSC in Dr. Taiwo Oloruntoba-Oju & Ors. v. Prof. Shuaibu O. Abdul-Raheem & Ors. (2009) LPELR-2596 (SC) put the position of the law as follows - '... where the terms and conditions of a contract of employment or service are specifically provided for by statute or regulations made there under - it is said to be a contract protected by statute or in other words an employment with statutory flavour''. His lordship went further to state that the question of whether a contract of employment is governed by statute or not depends on the construction of the contract itself or the relevant statute and that the duty to construe the contract or the relevant statute is the exclusive preserve of the Courts. Without much ado, it is trite to state, perhaps for clarity, that for an employment to be one with statutory flavour, it must meet one of two conditions. One, the terms and conditions applicable to that particular employment must have been specifically provided for by a particular statute. Or in the alternative, the regulation which contains the applicable terms and conditions of the particular employment must have been made pursuant to or in the exercise of power conferred by a statute. It is also correct to add that it is not just sufficient that a statute confers power to make such regulations and the regulations are made. The making of such regulations must certainly be expressed to be in pursuance of the power so conferred to make same. It was the argument of the Claimant that the 1st Defendant being a player in the oil industry in Nigeria it is subject to any regulations and guidelines made by the Minister of Petroleum Resources in the exercise of his power under sections 8 & 9, Petroleum Act, and that Section 15A of Petroleum (Drilling and Production)(Amendment) Regulations, 1988 makes specific provision in this regard. that section provides as follows - ''15A. The holder of an oil mining licence or permit issued under the Petroleum Act, 1969 or under regulations made thereunder or any other person registered to provide any services in relation thereto, shall not remove any worker from his employment except in accordance with guidelines that may be specified from time to time by the Minister''. Failure to comply with this regulation amounts to an offence under Section 60B of which a person - ''... shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred naira or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both such fine and imprisonment, and in addition any permit, licence or lease granted to the offender under these Regulations or under any regulations made pursuant to the Petroleum Act 1969 may be cancelled''. Pursuant to the Petroleum (Drilling and Production)(Amendment) Regulations, 1988 the Ministry of Petroleum Resources on 6/2/97 issued Exh. RO2. It was directed to All Oil producing Companies, All Oil marketing Companies and All Oil Service Companies. The heading states thus - Release of Nigerian Workers From Employment in the Petroleum Industry and Utilisation of Expatriate Quota. The first paragraph of that exhibit is of relevance to the case of the Claimant. After stating that the document was issued in the exercise of the powers conferred on the Hon. Minister of Petroleum Resources by the provisions of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Decree, 1969 and that all companies operating in the petroleum industry are formally notified of the new guidelines with respect to release of Nigerian workers in their employment and their engagement of expatriate workers states thus - (i). All companies operating in the petroleum industry should apply for official approval of the Honourable Minister before releasing any Nigerian staff from their employment. The name; appointment; length of service; nature of work and reasons fully documented for the discharge of the worker(s) as well as terminal benefits accruing or to be paid to the employee should be included in any such application for approval to discharge the services of Nigerian staff''. From the facts of this case as briefly stated and the regulatory provisions and guidelines quoted above can it be said that the employment of the Claimant with the 1st Defendant was one with statutory flavor or protected by the statute? I am constrained to ask some pertinent questions here. Is the employment of the Claimant within the parameters set out by Adekeye JSC in Dr. Taiwo Oloruntoba-Oju & Ors. v. Prof. Shuaibu O. Abdul-Raheem & Ors. (2009) LPELR-2596 (SC)? Is the 1st Defendant a creation of the statute? I answer in the negative. Was the employment of the Claimant made pursuant to a statutory provision or regulation made pursuant to a statute? I again answer in the negative. Is there any contract document between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant? I answer in the affirmative. See Exh. RO5. Did the contract document contain all the terms and conditions of engagement? I say Yes. Finally, did the contract document make any reference to any statute or regulation made pursuant to a statute? From my finding in this case the answer to this last question must be in the negative. The 1st Defendant who was the employer of the Claimant is not a public body or agency of the government. It is not a creation of any statute. Indeed, the Claimant in paragraph 2 of his amended statement of facts averred to the fact that the 1st Defendant is a limited liability company incorporated in Nigeria with a corporate office at 32, Ozumba Mbadiwe Avenue, Victoria Island, Lagos. It is my finding that the employment of the Claimant was not made pursuant to any statute or any statutory provisions. Exh. RO4 which is the Offer of Employment made to the Claimant did not make any reference to any statute. In much the same vein, the terms and conditions of employment of the Claimant as contained in Exh. RO4 & Exh. RO5 made no allusion to any statute in whatever form or manner. Cognizance of the foregoing, I resolve this issue against the Claimant and in favor of the Defendants and hold that the employment of the Claimant with the 1st Defendant was not one with statutory flavor. The second issue for determination is whether the Claimant has proved all or some of the reliefs sought to be entitled to same. In our system of adjudication as inherited from the British, the burden of proof of a case is always on the party who approaches the Court positive judicial intervention in a cause or matter. That is aptly expressed in aphorism that he who asserts must prove. See Section 131(1) & (2), Evidence Act, 2011 & Elegushi v. Oseni (2005)14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 348. By proof is meant to convince the Court as to the basis for any award in his favor. The proof expected must be cogent, credible and admissible evidence. The imperative of proof is however dispensed with in the face of clear and unambiguous admission. For, it is trite that facts admitted need no further proof. Therefore, in consonance with the established and generally accepted age-long principle of law, the Claimant in this case is under an obligation to adduce sufficiently cogent, credible and admissible evidence in support of his case. The first relief sought by the Claimant as per his amended statement of facts dated 19/6/15 is for a declaration that the letter of 10/11/12 captioned Probationary Period Raphael Obasogie delivered to the Claimant by the 2nd Defendant is functionless and ineffectual as a letter of termination of the Claimant's employment as General Manager, Human Resources of the 1st Defendant. My finding is that the relationship between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant was simply that of employer/employee. I also found that that relationship which is essentially contractual in nature is regulated by Exh. RO5-Defendant's Principle Statement of Employment. That exhibit was executed on behalf of the 1st Defendant on 13/4/12 while the Claimant executed same on 20/4/12. In paragraph 34 of that exhibit, the Claimant had stated before appending his signature to the same that ''I confirm that I have read, understood and accept the terms of this contract''. Again on page 8 of this exhibit under the heading Declaration and Acknowledgement the Claimant restated and reiterated his earlier confirmation thus - '' I acknowledge receipt of this agreement and confirm that I have read, understood and accept(sic) all the terms and conditions of the employment and the remuneration & benefit package outlined in both the Principal Statement of Employment and its Appendix A. I confirm that these two documents amount to a total of eight (8) pages and that number includes Declaration and Acknowledgment page''. The law is trite that parties to a contract are bound by the express terms and conditions as clearly stated in voluntarily entered agreement unless there is established evidence that a party was led into an agreement fraudulently or deceitfully. See Chidoka v. First Finance Co. Ltd (2012) LPELR-9343 (SC); (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1346) 144. In event of disputes and controversies, the duty of the Court is to give meaning to the terms and conditions of such agreement. It is not the duty of the Court to make agreement for the parties. See Prince Oil Limited v. GT Bank Plc (2016) LPELR(CA) &Union Bank Plc v. Innoson (Nig.) Limited (2017) LPELR (CA). It is also trite that the content of written document or agreement can only be varied by another written document rather than a parole evidence. See Nekpenekpen v. Egbemhonkhaye (2014) LPELR-22335(CA). Now, in the instant case, the 1st Defendant by Exh. RO6 terminated the employment of the Claimant by invoking Probationary Period Clause in Exh. RO5. Part of the argument of the Claimant is that there was an oral agreement during negotiation that the probationary period would be waived for him. In support of this position, senior Counsel to the Claimant relied on Exh. RO9 & Exh. RO11. Both exhibits were e-mail correspondences dated 3/4/12 & 5/4/12 respectively. I carefully and patiently read these 2 exhibits. I find no reference made to issue of probationary period in either of them. Even if such was mentioned (which I still insist was not) both exhibits predated Exh. RO5 which contained the clause on probationary period and which the Claimant confirmed that he read, understood and accepted all the terms and conditions contained therein. Now, Clause 16 of Exh. RO5 states thus - ''After, but not before successful completion of a six (6) month probationary period, you will become eligible to be an officially confirmed employee of Addax Petroleum with all the benefits attached thereto. The company reserves the right to extend the period of probation for a further six (6) months, or until satisfactory performance is achieved. Either party to this contract may terminate the Principle Statement of Employment at any time during the probationary period, and is under no obligation to give reasons for such termination'' Claimant was employed by Exh. RO4 on 13/4/12. Claimant was to be on probation for a period of 6 months pursuant to Clause 16 of Exh. RO5. 1st Defendant has the right to extend the period of probation. Claimant's employment was terminated by Exh. RO6 16/11/12 with a 7-day notice from that day. In all the Claimant worked for the 1st Defendant for a period of about 8 months before the termination of his employment. Period of probation was 6 months which may be extended. Did the 1st Defendant extend the period of probation in this case? There is no evidence of such extension before me. The purpose of probation period is well stated to be to give the employer an assurance that the employee is a fit and proper person to be placed on permanent appointment. Probationary period is a period of observation by the employer. It therefore follows that once the condition laid down for the termination of appointment during the probationary period is satisfied or complied with an employee cannot justifiably complain. See Ihezukwu v. University of Jos [1990] 7 S.C. (Pt.1) 18; Olayinka Kusamotu v. Wemabd Estate Limited (1976) 11 S.C. 279 and Al-Bishak v. National Productivity Centre & Anor (2015) LPELR-24659(CA). An employer who is desirous of terminating the employment of an employee who is on probation must act timeously and not give the impression to the employee that his employment is confirmed. Thus where an employee on probation has completed the required probationary period without termination or confirmation, the issue of confirmation of the employee is implied. See Iwuji v. Federal Commissioner for Establishment (1985)1 NSCC (1985)1 NSCC 580.This is the principle of ''deemed confirmation of appointment'' applied by the Court of Appeal in OAU v. Onabanjo and reaffirmed by the same Court in Raji v. OAU (2014) LPELR-22088 (CA). I find that the Claimant completed his 6 months' period of probation; that the 1st Defendant did not extend the period of probation of the Claimant and that the Claimant is deemed to be a confirmed employee of the 1st Defendant. I further find and hold that being a deemed confirmed employee, the Claimant is entitled to a 30-day notice of termination as provided in Clause 17 of Exh. RO5 instead of the 7 days notice given and that the termination of the employment of the Claimant by Exh. RO6 is wrongful but not functionless and ineffectual. For, to declare it functionless and ineffectual will tantamount to questioning the power of the 1st Defendant to exercise the right conferred on it under a contract. The consequences that will follow such a declaration will no doubt be too extreme and critical. The second relief sought is for a declaration that by the cumulative effect of Sections 8 & 9, Petroleum Act, Regulations 15A of the Petroleum (Drilling & Production) Regulations 1969, as amended by the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) (Amendment) Regulations 1988, Clause 13.8 of the Production Sharing Contract on OPLs 98/118 dated 6/5/98 and signed between the Defendant and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the letter dated 16/11/12 whereby the Defendant purported to remove or disengage the Claimant from his employment as General Manager, Human Resources of the 1st Defendant without prior written approval of the Minister of Petroleum Resources, is unlawful, ineffectual and void. Section 9 of Petroleum Act, Cap. P10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 provides that the Minister may make regulations prescribing anything requiring to be prescribed for the purposes of the Act. The ambit of this power to make regulation is quite wide and enormous. I hold that there is nothing unconstitutional respecting the power to make regulations as conferred on the Minister. I also hold that the various regulations made by the Minister pursuant to the provisions of the Petroleum Act and cited in this case were duly made. It is in the exercise of this power that the Minister made the Petroleum (Drilling & Production)Regulations1969, as amended by the Petroleum (Drilling and Production)(Amendment)Regulations 1988 Regulations. Section 15A of this Regulations states that - ''The holder of an oil mining licence or permit issued under the Petroleum Act, 1969 or under regulations made thereunder or any other person registered to provide any services in relation thereto, shall not remove any worker from his employment except in accordance with guidelines that may be specified from time to time by the Minister''. The provision of Clause 13.8 of the Production Sharing Contract on OPLs 98/118 dated 6/5/98 (Exh. RO3) is to the effect that - ''No Nigerian employed under this Contract shall be disengaged without the prior written approval by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources; as may be required by applicable laws and regulations. Request for such approval shall be made through the CORPORATION''. It is in evidence in this case that the 1st Defendant did not seek and obtain the requsite approval of the Minister before terminating the appointment of the Claimant. There is no sanction or penalty for failure to seek and obtain approval of the Minister under Exh. RO3 that is Clause 13.8 of the Production Sharing Contract on OPLs 98/118 dated 6/5/98. However under Section 60B (1), Petroleum (Drilling and Production)(Amendment)Regulations 1988 - (1). Any person who - (a). commits a breach of any of the provisions of these Regulations; or (b). fails to comply with any provisions of these Regulations or any directives thereunder of any condition of any permit or licence issued thereunder; or (c). fails to permit any inspection required under these Regulations; or (d). makes a false declaration required by the Director of Petroleum Inspectorate or wilfully furnishes information so required, which is in any respect false or insufficient; commits an offence, and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding six months or to both such fine and imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both such fine and imprisonment and in addition any permit, licence or lease granted to the offender under these Regulations or any regulations made pursuant to the Petroleum Act, 1969 may be cancelled''. The Claimant sought declaration to the effect that failure to comply with these provisions render the letter of termination of the appointment of the Claimant unlawful, ineffectual and void. This Court has earlier found and held that the employment of the Claimant was not one with statutory flavor. No doubt that failure makes the termination wrongful and unlawful. But can the Court also declare same to be ineffectual and void as sought? This Court will not and cannot make such declaration. For to do so will attract far reaching consequences which the position of the law does not support. In a master/servant relationship, same may be terminated by the employer at any time with or without reason provided he has given the necessary one month notice or one month salary in lieu of notice or the requisite length of notice under any applicable agreement between them and thus brings to an end the relationship of master and servant. See Geidam v. NEPA (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 45. See also Nigeria Gas Company Limited v. Dudusola (2005) LPELR-5958(CA). To declare the letter of termination ineffectual and void will amount to the Court compelling the employer to continue to remain in its employment an employee whose services are no longer required. This is beyond the power of this Court. See OPUO v. NNPC (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 734) 552. It is not in doubt that the conduct of the 1st Defendant amounts to crime within the meaning of Section 60B (1), Petroleum (Drilling and Production)(Amendment)Regulations 1988. It is also open to the Claimant to lodge complaints with the appropriate regulatory institutions within the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. I thus declare the letter of termination of employment of the Claimant - Exh. RO6 wrongful but NOT ineffectual and void. It is effectual in that it has effectively brought the employment of the Claimant with the 1st Defendant to an end. The third relief is for a declaration that by the effect of Article 4 of Convention 158 of the International Labour Organisation 1982, applicable as Treaty obligation of Nigeria, Clauses 16 and 17 of the Principle Statement of Employment made part of the Claimant's conditions of employment as the General Manager, Human Resources is ineffectual, contrary to international best practice and public policy and pro tanto void. The expanded jurisdiction of this Court as contained in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Third Alteration) Act, 2010 confers on it exclusive power to apply international best practice in labour and related matters. Such best practices may be as relate to treaty obligations and international Conventions to which Nigeria is a state party. Convention 158 of the International Labour Organization, 1982 is one of such. There must however be evidence that such treaties and conventions have been ratified and domesticated in Nigeria. See JFS Investment Limited v. Brawal Line Limited & Ors. (2010) LPELR-1610(SC). I have no evidence before me to the effect that that ILO Convention has been domesticated in Nigeria to make enforceable as having the force of law in Nigeria. Secondly, the Principle Statement of Employment in this case Exh. RO10 is a voluntarily executed agreement by the Claimant and the 1st Defendant. The Claimant has not contended that he was coerced or forced into signing same. Claimant did not argue before me that he was deceived into signing the document or that there was some element of fraud in the document. Claimant confirmed that he read, confirmed and understood the contents of that exhibit including clauses 16 & 17 of same. It is a trite law and well accepted that parties are bound by the terms and conditions of a valid contract voluntarily entered into. It is settled that Court does not create contract for parties but apply the terms of their agreement, the way it is. When a Court is determining the rights, duties and obligations of the parties to the contract, the Court must respect the sanctity of the contract and not allow a term on which there was no agreement to be read into the contract. See Idufueko v. Pfizer Products Ltd (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt 1420) 96 at 100. See also UBA v. Marcus (2015) LPELR-40397 (CA). Convention 158 of the International Labour Organization apart from its not being part and parcel of the Nigerian law, it does not form part of the terms and conditions of a valid agreement made by the parties. It must therefore not be allowed to negatively affect a binding contract by the parties. I thus refuse and dismiss this head of claim. The fourth relief sought is for a declaration that the Claimant's employment with the Defendant vide the letter of employment dated 13/4/12 subsists, and the Claimant is entitled to all his rights and benefits under the same, until the Claimant's employment is otherwise determined as required by law. This Court has found and held that the letter of termination of employment of the Claimant - Exh. RO6 is effective and not void. In other words, the 1st Defendant has by that exhibit effectively brought the employment of the Claimant to an end. It may be that the method or procedure adopted was wrong or unlawful. A claim for a declaration that the employment subsist is not the proper option available to the Claimant. For, the Court will not foist a willing employee on an unwilling employer. See Godfrey Isiewore v. NEPA (2002) LPELR-1555(SC). I find no basis upon which to grant this head of relief. I thus refuse and dismiss same accordingly. The next relief sought is an order setting aside the said letter of termination dated 16/11/12 and directing the Defendants to reinstate the Claimant to his position as General Manager, Human Resources of the 1st Defendant until the Claimant's employment is otherwise duly determined as required by law. Again this Court has found and held that the letter of termination of employment issued to the Claimant has effectively brought his employment with the 1st Defendant to an end and that this Court does not have the power to foist this willing Claimant on the unwilling 1st Defendant. I have no reason to depart from that finding and holding. The Court has found and held that the employment of the Claimant is not one with statutory protection. It is simply one of master/servant. This is not a proper case for the Claimant to seek reinstatement. It is also not one in which the Court can make an order of reinstatement. To do so will amount to forcing a willing employee on an unwilling employer. Accordingly, I refuse and dismiss this head of relief. The Claimant also sought an order directing the Defendants to pay to the Claimant all arrears of his salaries, emoluments and allowances, the bonuses and honorariums from December 2012 until his employment is otherwise duly determined as required by law. The Claimant's employment was effectively determined in November 2012 by Exh. RO6. From the date of the expiration of the length of notice given in that exhibit the Claimant ceased to be an employee of the 1st Defendant. The employment of the Claimant was not one with statutory flavor. There is also no evidence that the Claimant rendered any service to the 1st Defendant from December 2012 till date. The Court does not and will not order payment of salaries for services not rendered. See Denmark Production Ltd v. Boscobel Productions Ltd (1968) 1 ALL E. R.513 at p. 524. See also Keystone Bank v. Afolabi (2017) LPELR(CA). There being no proof of this head of relief same is refused and dismissed. Finally, the Claimant sought an order for the sum of =N=500 Million Naira as general damages for negligence. The crux of the claims of the Claimant under this head of relief is one founded on negligence. What then is negligence? What does a Claimant need to prove in order to succeed for an award of damages in negligence? In Kabo Air Limited v. Mohammed (2014) LPELR-23614(CA), Abiru JCA took time out to espouse on what is meant by negligence in the following words - '' ... Now, negligence is the omission to do something, which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations that ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It means lack of proper care and attention; careless behavior or conduct; a state of mind which is opposed to intention and the breach of a duty of care imposed by common law and statute resulting in damage to the complainant. Negligence is the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation. It is also any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm - Universal Trust Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Ozoemena (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 448, Okwejiminor v. Gbakeji (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1079) 172 and Diamond Bank Plc v. Partnership Investment Co Ltd (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 67." It is settled law that negligence is a question of fact not law. Therefore each case must be decided in the light of its own facts and circumstances. The burden of proof of negligence falls upon the plaintiff who alleges negligence. This is because negligence is a question of fact, not law, and it is the duty of the person who asserts it to prove it. Failure to prove particulars of negligence pleaded is fatal to the Claimant's case. See Alhaji Otaru and Sons Ltd vs Idris (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt 606) 330. The Court of Appeal in NEPA v. Auwal (2010) LPELR-4577(CA) emphasised the fact that in an action for negligence, for the plaintiff to be awarded damages, he must show (i) the existence of a duty of care by the defendant, (ii) the breach of that duty and (iii) damages suffered as a result of that breach. I should add and this is also settled, that the mere occurrence of an accident, is not proof of negligence. Thus, in order to succeed in a claim of negligence, it is not enough to prove that there was an accident . The Plaintiff must prove that the accident, was as a result of the negligence of the defendant. Therefore, the circumstances, nature and extent of the accident, must be pleaded and evidence adduced thereon. Then, the Court would be able to determine whether partially or wholly, either the plaintiff or the defendant, caused the accident. See Abubakar & Anor. v. Joseph (2008) LPELR-48 (SC). The bottom line therefore is that for this Claimant to be granted the reliefs sought he must adduce cogent, credible and admissible evidence to prove firstly the existence of a duty of care by the Defendant, secondly that that duty was breached by the Defendant and thirdly the damages suffered as a result of that breach. The fact that the Claimant was an employee of the Defendant was not disputed by either side. These unchallenged facts go to establish the simple fact of existence of employer/employee relationship between the parties. The existence of employment relationship, even at Common Law, imposes a duty of care on the employer respecting his employees. The Court of Appeal in Kabo Air Limited v. Mohammed (2014)LPELR-23614(CA) reiterated the position thus - "...it is settled law that it is the duty of an employer, acting personally or through his servants or agents, to take reasonable care for the safety of his workmen and other employees in the course of their employment. This duty extends in particular to the safety of the place of work, the plant and machinery and the method and conduct of work''. The Court, while noting that the duty of care of an employer to the employee is not restricted to the matters stated, further approved Judgment of Lord Wright in Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co. Ltd v. English (1938) AC 57 at 84 that - "The whole course of authority consistently recognizes a duty which rests on the employer, and which is personal to the employer, to take reasonable care of the safety of his workmen, whether the employer be an individual, a firm or a company, and whether or not the employer takes any share in the conduct of the operations." It suffices for me, on the basis of the existence of employment relationship between the parties,(See Exh. RO4), to hold that the Defendant owed a duty of care to the Claimant as its employee. I so do. Now, has the Defendant breached that duty of care? For, it is not sufficient that there exists a duty of care to be entitled to award of damages. The Claimant in this case is under an obligation to prove to the Court that indeed the Defendant breached that duty of care. It is important to also state that the mere occurrence of an accident without linking the accident to the fault or failings of the Defendant will not entitle the Claimant to award of damages. See Avon Crown Caps & Containers Nig. Ltd v. Bamigboye (2005) 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 275. The simple fact of this case is one of termination of employment in which the Claimant also contended failure of the 1st Defendant to seek and obtain allegedly imperative approval of the Minister of Petroleum Resources. In a claim for damages for negligence as in this case the Claimant must adduce cogent evidence in proof of the 3 elements of negligence. I have found evidence of existence of duty of care flowing from the 1st Defendant to the Claimant by virtue of the employment relationship between them. However, there is no evidence before me respecting the breach of that duty of care. For, under the contractual agreement between the 1st Defendant and the Claimant the latter is empowered to terminate the agreement. See Clauses 16 & 17 of Exh. RO10. The Claimant also led no evidence in proof of any injury resulting to him by the 1st Defendant exercising its right and power to exit an employment relationship. There is no proof of this head of relief. It is therefore refused and dismissed for lack of cogent, credible and admissible evidence in support of same. Finally, for the avoidance of doubt and for all the reasons as contained in this Judgment, the case of the Claimant is dismissed in its entirety. I make no order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. ____________________ Hon. Justice J. D. Peters Presiding Judge