RULING/JUDGMENT. The Applicants approach this Court via an Originating Summons dated 1st day of August 2017 and filed on the same day, seeking for the following reliefs:- 1. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court compelling the I" and 2nd Respondents to appear and show cause why their decision/refusal to issue Letters of Promotion to the Applicants who were among the successful candidates in the promotion exercise conducted by them in 2014 should not be reviewed and set aside by this Honourable Court. 2. A DECLARATION that the Applicants, having participated in the promotional examination and oral interview for promotion to the rank of Deputy Controllers- General of Prisons conducted by the 2nd Respondent in 2014 and came out successful, are entitled to be issued their Letters of Promotion. 3. A DECLARAION that the continuous failure and or refusal of the 1st and 2nd Respondents to approve the issuance and issue to the Applicants the said Promotion Letters is unjustified and unlawful. 4. AN ORDER OF MANDAMUS compelling both I" and 2nd Respondents to immediately approve the issuance and issue to the Applicants, their Letters of Promotion having participated in the promotional examination and oral interview for promotion to the rank of Deputy Controllers-General of Prisons conducted by the 2nd Respondent and came out successful. 5. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court compelling the I" and 2nd Respondents to immediately direct the computation and payment to the Applicants the difference in arrears of their salaries and other entitlements from 1 January 2014 when the Applicants' promotion ought to have taken effect to 6 June 2016 and 15 April 2016 when the Applicants respectively retired from the service of the Nigerian Prisons Service. 6. The sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira only) as compensation against I" 2nd Respondents jointly and severally for the unlawful and unjustified refusal and delay in issuing the Applicants' Letters of Promotion to them as at when due as well as the ill treatments and psychological trauma that the Applicants have suffered in the course of waiting for their Letters and Promotion. The Grounds upon which the Application is brought are that: 1. The Applicants were officers of the Nigerian Prisons Service and while serving in that capacity as Assistant Controller-General, participated in the promotional examination and oral interview for promotion to the rank of Deputy Controllers- General of Prisons conducted by the 2nd Respondent in 2014 and came out successful. 2. Notwithstanding their successes in the said promotional examination and oral interview and their names so published, the 151 and 2nd Respondents have refused and or failed and without any justifiable reason, to issue to the Applicants, their Letters of Promotion despite repeated demands for same. 3. Having participated in the promotional examination and oral interview for promotion to the rank of Deputy Controllers-General of Prisons conducted by the 2nd Respondent in 2014 and came out successful, the 151 and 2nd Respondents are legally bound to issue Letters of promotion to the Applicants. 4. That as at the time the Applicants participated in the promotional exercise and their names published by the 2nd Respondent for promotion, there were vacancies to be filled on the rank of Deputy Controller-General in the Nigerian Prisons Service. 5. That all other candidates who participated in the same promotional exercise and found successful by the 2nd Respondent in Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Upon being served with the originating processes commencing this suit, the 1st Respondent/Applicant, vide notice of preliminary objection dated 20/11/17 and filed on the same day, sought for an order of the Court to dismiss this suit for lack of competence to entertain this suit on the ground that the Applicants/Respondents suit as it is presently constituted is statute barred. The notice of the preliminary objection was brought pursuant to section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The application is supported by a written address filed along with the notice of the preliminary objection. In the written address the Applicant identified lone issue for determination, to wit; “Whether by virtue of the provision of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, this action is statute barred”. ARGUMENT Mr. Kabiru Saidu, Counsel for the 1st Defendant/Applicant, while arguing the lone issue for determination relied on all the processes filed in this suit and submitted that the Claimants’ action is statute bar, meaning that the cause of action of the suit is time barred by extant law and thus incompetence thereby robbing the court of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Counsel went on to submit that this position is supported by the decision of the Court of Appeal Abuja Division in the case of MR. M.A.D UKIRI vs FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND ANOR (2011) ALL FWLR PART 577 PAGE 783 at 786 ratio 4, where the Court held that “A cause of action is said to be statute barred if in respect of it, proceedings cannot be brought because the period laid down by the Limitation Act or Law has elapsed”. Counsel also cited the case of FOREST RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NIGERIA vs MR. I. A. ENAIFOGHE GOLD (2007) ALL FWLR PART 380 PAGE 1444 AT 1446 & 1447 RATIOS 1, 5 & 6, where the above position of law was restated by the Supreme Court. Counsel further submitted that the law that renders a cause of action statute barred is section 2 (a) of the Public officers (Protection) Act, which deals with limitation of time within which an action can be commenced by or against a public officer. Counsel cited the case of ALHAJI (DR) ADO IBRHIM Vs. ALHAJI MAIGIDAU LAWAL AND ORS (2015) LPELR – 24736, where the applicability of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act was considered by the Supreme Court. Counsel also relied on EGBE VS. ADEFARASIN & ANR (1987) 1 NWLR PT 471 AT 21 and CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. JACOB OLADELE AMAO & 2 ORS (2011) ALL FWLR PART 558 PAGE 806 AT 812RATIO 3. Counsel contended that in determining whether a case is statute barred or not, recourse must be had to the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the Plaintiff a cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. On this submission Counsel relied on RALEIGH IND. LTD. VS NWAIWU (1994) 4 NWLR (PT.341) 760 at 771-772 and AREMO 11 VS. ADEKANYE (2000) 2 NWLR (PT.644) 25 at 271. Counsel submitted that a careful perusal of the applicant affidavit in support of the originating Motion especially paragraph 8, 9, 10, and 11 shows clearly when the Applicants joined the service and rose to the ranks of Assistant Controller-Generals of Prisons as well as when they retired from the service. Paragraphs 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the said affidavit equally shows when they wrote and passed the said promotion examination and oral interview and when their counterparts in the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigerian Immigration Service and the Nigeria Fire Service were issued their letters of promotion and decorated. It is the submission of Counsel that the cause of action in this suit arose on or about the 6th day of June, 2016 and 15th day of April, 2016, respectively being the effective dates the Applicants retired from the Service, which is clearly stated in their affidavit in support of the originating Motion particularly paragraphs 10, and 11. It is so glaring having instituted this action on the 1st day of August 2017 the suit is caught up by the statute of limitation which prescribed three months period within which such action can be instituted. It is the submission of Counsel that failure by the Applicant to institute this action within three Months after their retirement from service is fatal and detrimental to their case. Counsel also submitted that where a plea of limitation under the Public Officers (Protection) Act is raised, there becomes no basis for prying into the conduct of the Defendants which gave rise to the action. In support of this submission Counsel cited, YUSUF VS EGBE (1987) 2 NWLR (PT.56) 343, EKEOGU VS. ALIRI (1991) 3 NWLR (PT. 179) 258 @ 269-270, EGBE VS. YUSUF (1992) 6 NWLR PT. 245@ 12. Continuing with his submission Counsel contended that the issue of statute bar is a point of law touching on the jurisdiction of the Court. Counsel referred the Court to the case of NASIR VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2010) 2 SCM 105 AT 117-118, where it was held that the issue of limitation goes to the root of an action i.e the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the case. In conclusion Counsel urged the Court to hold that the cause of action in this suit is statute barred and accordingly dismiss same for being incompetent. Mr. Akinola Afolarin, Counsel for the Claimants/Respondents, in opposing this application filed a written address and adopted same during the oral adumbration. Counsel place reliance on section 2 (a) of the Public Officer Protection Act and submitted that on the strength of this section that when there is a continuing wrong or injury, time cannot begin to run until such wrong or injury has ceased. Counsel further submitted that the preponderance of judicial authorities on the matter of limitation law is that there are recognized exceptions to the general coverage or protection allowed to a public officer or authority under Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act. On this argument Counsel relied on the case of NIGERIA STORED PRODUCTS RESEARCH INSTITUTE V. BOARD OF INTERNAL REVENUE, KWARA STATE (2013) LPELR 22073(CA). INEC v. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC) We place reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court on this issue in INEC v. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC) where their Lordships clearly explained that where an injury is a continuing one, the time within which to institute an action does not begin to run until the said injury or wrong has ceased. To this effect, the court held thus: “ I remember that during my sojourn on the Bench of the court of Appeal, I had occasion to examine the meaning of an act which damage or injury is a continuing one. In Alhassan V. Aliyu & Ors (2009) LPELR – 8340 (CA) at pp.31-32 paras F-G, 1 said as follow:- “…Where the injury complained of is a continuing one, time does not begin to run for the purposes of the application of a limitation law until the cessation of the event leading to the cause of action. In other words, “continuance of injury” means the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It does not and cannot be said to mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. In Olaosebikan V. Williams (1996) 5 NWLR (pt.449) 437 at 456, salami, JCA, quoting Dickson J. has this to say:- “The issues is very well illustrated by the dictum of Dickson, J. in Michael Obiefina V. Alexander Okoye (1961) All NCR 357. At pages 360 and 362, Dickso, J. said “Continuance of injury or damage means continuance of the legal injury, and not merely continuance of the injurious effect of a legal injury. The continuance of the injurious effects of an accident is not a continuance of the injury or damage within the meaning of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893: Halsbury (2nd Edition) page 771 … with regard to the construction of those words, I am clearly of opinion that the matter is governed by the decision of the court of Appeal as far back as 1903. In the case of Curey V. Metropolitan Borough of Bermondsey (67 J.P. 447) confirming the judgment of Channel J., in that same case reported in the same volume at page 111. Lord Halsbury, L.C. in giving judgment in the Court of Appeal in that case, affirming the judgment of Channel, J. said:- “ It is manifest that ‘continuance of injury or damage’ means the continuance of the act which caused the damage. It was not unreasonable to provide that, if there was a continuance of an act causing damage, the injured person should have a right to bring an action at any time within three months of the ceasing of the act complained of.” I concur. I have nothing to add. For me, I agree as that is the correct interpretation of that section.” I have had to reproduce part of the judgment in extensor in order to underscore the meaning of the phrase “continuance of damage or injury” as used in Section 2 (a) of the Act. In 1996, the appellant excised and suppressed the respondents’ State Constituency. There was no other act of excision or suppression. It was a completed act. What the respondents and the two courts below relied upon was the “continuance of the injurious effects of legal injury.” Clearly, this is where the mistake came about. It was therefore wrong for the two lower courts to hold that Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Act did not apply to the suit of the respondents.” Per OKORO, J.S.C. (pp. 57-59, paras. C-C)” Counsel contended that in this case there is continuance damage or injury “which has not ceased” with regards to limitation of action, the Court also held in OBOT & ORS, v. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY NIGERIA LTD. (2013) LPELR – 20704(CA) that: “The doctrine of “continuance of damages or injury which has not ceased” was also recognized by the Supreme Court in Attorney- General of River State vs. Attorney – General of Bayelsa State & Anor (2012) 6-7 MJSC (pt. 3) 149 in which the plaintiff (Attorney –General of Rivers State) claimed in the Supreme Court from the defendant (Attorney-General of Bayelsa State and the Attorney – General of the Federation) inter alia all revenue that had accrued from Soku Oil well folds/Oil well however arisen from the defendants on the derivative principle of revenue sharing from July, 2005. The defendant pleaded by way of objection the Public Officers Protection Act on the grounds that the action, having being instituted outside the 3 months prescribed by section 2 (a) of the Act (supra) was statute-barred. Having disclosed in extensor the situations when the Act supra would be held to apply or not, the Supreme Court drew attention to the circumstances when the Act would not apply, Galadima, JSC holding at page 181 paragraphs “A” – “G’ and page 182 paragraphs “A” –“C” as follows: “The Act is intended as much as within the limits of the law to protect a public officer from detraction and unnecessary litigation but never intended to deprive a party of legal capacity to ventilate his grievance on the fact of stark injustice. That is why, where officers or heads of the Agencies of the Federation or State are protected, two most important exceptions are prescribed by the Act, Firstly, in cases of continuance of damage or injury, the Act permits actions to be brought on the cessation thereof outside three months. From the amended statement of claim and as equally deposed to in his counter-affidavit, the plaintiff averred that he continues to be deprived of the allocation he is entitled to every month and the same has not ceased. I am of the respected view that in such a situation of continuance of damage or injury which has not ceased, the defence is not available to the 1st defendant where such allocation of continuing damage or injury has been raised in such a situation, there is need for the trial Court to take evidence before determining the point. In Aremo 11 vs. Adekanye (2004) ALL FWLR (Pt. 224) 2113 at 2132, this Court stated the position of the law as to what constitutes “continuing damage or injury”. It is stated thus: “Admittedly, legal principles are not always inflexible. Sometimes they admit of certain exceotions. The law of limitation of action recognizes some exceptions. Thus, where there has been a continuance of the damage, a frsh cause of action arises from time to time, as often as damage is caused: Battishill v. Reed (1856) 18 CB 696 at 714. For example, if the owner of mines works them and causes damage to the surface more than six years before action, and within six years of action a fresh subsidence causing damage occurs within any fresh working by the owner, an action in respect of the fresh damage is not barred as the action.” I hold the view that plaintiffs action falls squarely within this exception as the damage and injury against it is a continuing one. “ Per TUR. J.C.A. (pp. 30-32, Paras. A-B) Counsel submitted having established the above; the only question to be asked that will determine the fate of the 1st Respondent’s Objection is whether the act of the Respondents especially the 1st and 2nd Respondents are not continuous. Counsel answered this question in the affirmative. Counsel submitted it has been shown copiously in the Affidavit in support of the Applicants’ Motion on Notice that Applicants have been denied and are still being denied their promotion letters as well as their entitlements which have accrued to them since 2014 when their promotion ought to have taken effect. This continuing wrong has caused the Applicants so much grief and discomfort as they have been made to undergo various levels of humiliation particularly as their mates and even those lower in ranks have all been given their promotion letters and in fact fully decorated in their various positions. Counsel submitted that the general provision of Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to the instant case as the Act permits actions to be brought on the cessation thereof outside three months where the act of the public officer is of continuing nature. We submit further that the injury in the present case has not ceased and the action of the Applicants cannot therefore be said to be statute barred. See Per GALADIMA, J.S.C in the case of AG RIVERS STATE v AG BAYELSA STATE & ANOR (2012) LPELR – 9336(SC). Counsel submitted that it is apparent that learned counsel to the Objector with due respect to them, have misunderstood and therefore misapplied the law as the arguments canvassed in their Preliminary Objection to the effect that this matter is statute barred does not find any ground in the decision of the courts of the land. See also RAHAMANIYYA UNITED NIG. LTD. V. MINISTRY FOR FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY & ORS (2008) LPELR-8391 (CA). In concluding his submission Counsel urged the Court to discountenance this objection, the arguments canvassed and legal authorities cited in support thereof and dismiss this Objection for lacking in merit. DECISION: I have carefully and painstakingly perused the originating processes commencing this suit, the notice of preliminary objection as well as the written addresses filed by Counsel for both parties for and against the preliminary objection. I have also listened attentively to oral adumbrations of the written address by Counsel. The preliminary objection was purely based on law, thus, there were no affidavit evidence to be considered in the course of determination of this objection. This means that the Court will only rely on the originating process in determining this object. It is clear from the provisions of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, that the provisions constitute a limitation law, which the legislature designed it to provide protection for public officers corporate or incorporated bodies from detraction in the conduct of their discharge of their official duties or assignment by litigation that might have become otiose or in which witnesses may no longer be available or may not reasonably be gotten to testify due to time lag. see OFFOBOCHE V OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt.739) 458. The object of the provision is therefore to afford protection to public officers in respect of anything done in the discharge or execution or carrying out their duty, the protection comes into play after the expiration of three Months from the date of the Commission of the act or acts, neglect or default which give rise to the cause of action. See YABUGBE V COP (1992) 4 NWLR (pt.234) 152; EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549, EGBE V ALHAJI (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.128) 546, EKEAGU V ALIRI ((1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.179) 258. It is quite clear that the general effect of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, is that where a law provides for the institution of an action in a Court of law within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action accruing to the party entitled to enforce his remedy before the Court, proceedings shall not be brought after the expiration of the period circumscribed by law. The statutes that prescribe such period and regulate the subsistence of causes of action are known as statutes of limitation of period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Where any action is statute barred, a party who might otherwise have had a cause of action loses right to enforce it by judicial process, because the period of time prescribed by the limitation law for instituting such an action has elapsed. See ALHAJI (DR) ADO IBRHIM Vs. ALHAJI MAIGIDAU LAWAL AND ORS (2015) LPELR – 24736, EGBE VS. ADEFARASIN & ANR (1987) 1 NWLR PT 471 AT 21. However it is pertinent to note that the general rule laid down in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, like every other general rule is not without exception. Though, an action against public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or Law or public duty or default on same can only be commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, the situation is not the same in a case of continuance of damage or injury in which the person aggrieved must institute the action within three months next after the cessation of the damage or injury complained of. See the case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. JACOB OLADELE AMAO & 2 ORS (2011) ALL FWLR PART 558 PAGE 806 AT 812RATIO 3. In the case at hand, Counsel for the 1st Respondent/Applicant maintained that the Applicant’s/Respondent’s action is caught by the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. While the position of the Counsel for the Applicants/Respondents is that the act of the Respondents being complained of by the Applicants/Respondents is that of continuance of damage or injury which is yet to abate. This position is contained in paragraph 1.06 of the Applicants/Respondents written address in opposition to this objection. To buttress his argument Counsel for the Applicants/Respondents relied heavily on the decisions in NIGERIA STORED PRODUCTS RESEARCH INSTITUTE V. BOARD OF INTERNAL REVENUE, KWARA STATE (2013) LPELR-22073(CA). INEC v. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC) and that of OBOT & ORS. Vs. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY NIGERIA LTD. (2013) LPELR – 20704(CA). Relying on these cases Counsel for the Claimants maintained that this action falls within the exceptions provided in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. It can be deduced from the submissions of Counsel for the Applicants/Respondents that they have conceded that the present action was not instituted within three Months from the date of the act, neglect, or default complained of (release of letters of promotion and entitlement accruing as a result of the promotion) by the Respondents/Applicants. This has narrowed down the issue for consideration in this objection. The case of the Claimants is that their case is covered by the issue of continuance of damage or injury in which case, the protection or cover provided for public officers can only come within the ambit of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, if the action was brought three Months after the cessation of continuance of damage or injury. In the cases relied on by the Applicants/Respondents in support of the argument to the effect that their action is that of continuous damage or injury, the apex Court of the land has interpreted the phrase ‘“continuance of damage or injury” to means the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It does not and cannot be said to mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. See INEC v. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC), OBOT & ORS, v. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY NIGERIA LTD. (2013) LPELR – 20704(CA), AG. RIVERS STATE V AG. BAYELSA STATE (2012). Having the definition of the phrase ‘‘continuance of damage or injury’’ as provided by the Supreme Court at the back of the mind, the question to be asked is, does the act complained of in this suit of continuous damage or injury? Since this suit was commenced via Originating Motion, to find answer to the question posed, the reliefs as contained on the face of the motion papers, as well as the affidavit in support of the motion on notice will be scrutinized. This is in line with principle of law that in determining issue of statute bar it is the claim and pleadings of the plaintiff (Applicants in this case) that the Court would look into. SEE OLAOSEBIKAN V WILLIAMS & ANR. (1996) 5 NWLR (449) 437. From the reliefs contained in the motion papers, which have been set out in the earlier part of this decision and the affidavit in support of the Originating Motion commencing this suit, it can be gleaned that what triggered this action was the refusal of the Respondents/Applicants to release letters of promotion of the Applicants/Respondents to the rank of Deputy Controller General of Prisons, that is the fulcrum of this suit. See prayers 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the motion on notice. See also paragraphs 10, 11.(iii), 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 35 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Motion, containing deposition showing that the main grouse of the Applicants/Respondents was that they partook in promotion examination and oral interview which they all passed and came out successful. Their letters of promotions were ready, but they were denied and not released to them. The refusal of the Respondents in this suit to release to the Applicants/Respondents their letters of promotion from the rank of Assistant Comptroller Prisons to the rank of Deputy Comptroller of Prisons was the foundation on which this suit stands. According to paragraphs 23 and 26 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, the release of letters of promotions to the Applicants/Respondents was verbally truncated by the exit of the then Minister of Internal Affairs who was to perform the decoration of the Applicants/Respondents with their new ranks and since then the letters have not been released despite several entreaties. The exit of the then Minister took place in May 2015. This clearly established that the act, neglect or default took place sometime in May 2015. The act, neglect or default continued up to the date of the Applicants/Respondents retirement from service on 6th June 2016 and 15th April 2016, respectively. The refusal to release letters of promotion occurred in May 2015. Consequently, time for purposes of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, started running in May 2015. However, the alleged damage or injury as a result of the refusal to release letters of promotion did not continued going by the definition of ‘’continuous damage or injury; as defined by the Supreme Court in the cases cited above. It is to be noted that from May 2015 to 1st August 2017, when this suit was instituted is a period of two years seven Months, this clearly shows that this action was instituted beyond the three Months allowed by the law. My holding that there is no continuance of damage or injury regarding refusal to release letters of promotions to the Applicants/Respondents is predicated on the fact that the Applicants/respondent did not by affidavit evidence showed that they partook in another promotion exam and passed and the Respondents/Applicants refused to release letters of promotion to them. However, it is to be noted that the aspect of the Applicants/Respondents’ claim regarding payment of arrears of their entitlement for their new rank that ought to have taken effect as from January 2014, this being monthly entitlement is the only cause of action that could be said to be continuous in nature to be within the purview of the doctrine of continuance of damage or injury. Even this aspect of the claim ceased with the retirement of the Claimants from service. The date when time will start to count for purposes of payment of entitlement for the promotion was the date of retirement. In view of this finding, for the Respondents not to enjoy the benefit of protection under section 2(a), it must be established that the action was instituted before expiration of three Months after the ceasing of the injury. For the 1st Applicant/Respondent he retired from service on 6th June 2016, from this date to 1st August 2017, when this action was instituted is a period of about fourteen Months. This clearly shows that this suit is statute barred as far the case of the 1st Applicant/Respondent’s case is concerned. With regards to 2nd Applicant/Respondent as far paragraph 11(iii) of the affidavit in support of the Originating Motion he retired from service on 15th April 2016 and this action was commenced on 1st August 2017, from the date of retirement to when this action was commenced is a period of sixteen Months this also is caught by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Act. There is no disputing the fact that the Respondents in this suit are public officers within the context of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. This position is strengthened by the decision in IBRAHIM V JSC KADUNA STATE (Supra), where the Supreme Court held that ‘person’ in section 2(a) of the public officers protection Act, include both natural and artificial persons such as the Respondents/Applicants in this case. It is also clear from the affidavit in support of the Origination Motion and the prayers contained therein that the Respondents/Applicants are public officers performing public duty in respect of the act, neglect or default complained of by the Applicants/Respondents. In view of the reasons given above and the facts that the Respondents being public officers acting in pursuance of execution of public duty and the action against them having not been instituted within the time allotted by the law, is statute barred. Consequently, this suit is hereby dismissed. Sanusi Kado, Judge.