RULING. The Claimants vide Form 1, General Form of Complaint dated 16/10/17 and filed on 17/10/17, commenced this suit against the Defendants to challenge the termination of their employment. The Defendants upon being served with originating Court processes commencing this suit entered a condition appearance and followed that step with filing of notice of preliminary objection dated 25th day of January 2018 and filed on the same day. The notice of preliminary of objection is seeking for an order of this Court striking out this suit for lack of requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate over this matter. The grounds for the objection are:- 1. The Defendants are not juristic persons recognised by any law. 2. They are not natural persons, neither are they creation of any statute nor artificial persons created by incorporation 3. The Defendants lack the capacity to sue or be sued in any Court. 4. The Court is not empowered to entertain this suit as presently constituted. A written address was filed along with the notice of preliminary objection. Counsel for the Defendants/objectors adopted his written address as his argument on the objection. In the written address lone issue for determination was identified by Counsel for the Defendant, to wit: ‘‘Whether the 1st and 2nd Defendants in this suit are juristic persons that can sue or be sued’’. Dr. Olukayode Ajula, Esq; Counsel for the Defendants in arguing the notice of preliminary objection relied on all the processes filed before the Court and submitted that the Defendants are not juristic persons, they are unknown to law. Counsel went on to submit that only natural or juristic person can sue or be sued. It is the contention of counsel that the claimants and defendants should be juristic persons or natural persons existing and living at the time the action is instituted. It is the submission of counsel that not only must a person against whom an action in Court have been instituted be a natural or juristic person who can sue or be sued, it is also important that a person sued in his private capacity or personal name or a person sued in a representative capacity be seen, in the eye of the law to be competent to defend the action, on this Counsel relied on THE EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF GEN. S. ABACHA (DECEASED) V EKE-SPIFF & ORS (2009) 2-3 SC (PT ii) 93. It is the submission of Counsel that competency or legal capacity is the decideratum in deciding the competency to institute an action being in itself a vital factor in determining the competency of the action itself, on this contention Counsel relied on AJAO V SONOLA (1973) ALL NLR 2nd Edition Volume 1, page 449. It is also the contention of Counsel for the Defendant that whenever there is a challenge in any case by the Defendant as to his legal capacity to defend the onus is on the claimant to establish the legal capacity of the defendants. According to counsel there is no iota of proof in that direction. This can never be waived by any form of participation by such a person in the proceedings. It is the submission of counsel that such a right is fundamental that it is not only for the benefit of a supposed party to a case or suit it is also inures to the benefit of the public, if somebody has not been shown by law to be competent to sue and be sued, to waive such a right will lead to injustice. It is even against public policy to compromise illegality (manifest or latent). Counsel submitted that it is absurd and bizarre to encourage disobedience to the dictates of the law on this counsel cited ARIORI & ORS. V ELEMO & ORS. (1983) 1 SC 13. It is the contention of Counsel that the Defendants herein are not juristic persons, thus they are not competent parties to this suit ab initio. Counsel submitted the names of the Defendants ought to be struck out by the Court, since they are not parties legally known to law. It is the contention of Counsel that the name of a competent party to a suit must be the real name by which he is known in the case of a natural person and its corporate name in case of a non-natural legal personality. Counsel went on to submit that a non-existing person natural or legal personality, cannot institute an action, nor will an action be allowed to be maintained against a party who as sued is not a legal person. It is the contention of counsel that the law is settled that a non-juristic person, generally cannot sue or be sued, on this submission reliance was placed on AGBOMAGBE BANK LTD V GENERAL MANAGER G. B. OLIVANT & ORS. (1961). Counsel submitted that the consequence is that the persons sued as 1st and 2nd Defendants before the court are non-juristic persons. Counsel urged the Court to strike out this suit for being incompetent due absence of legal personality on the Defendants. OPPOSITION TO NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION BY THE CLAIMANTS. In opposition to the notice of preliminary objection, Counsel for the Claimants/Respondents filed a written address on 1/3/18, which was deemed properly filed and served vide order of this Court made on 13/3/18. In the written address adopted by Counsel for the Claimants, the lone issue for determination by the Counsel for the Defendants in his written address was adopted by the Claimants and proceeded to formulate second issue to wit: ‘‘Whether having regard to the subject matter of this suit and the reliefs sought by the Claimants/Respondents this Honourable Court is vested with the unfettered jurisdiction to entertain and determine same in accordance with the dictate and express provisions of section 254C (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) Third Alteration Act’’. ARGUMENT ON ISSUE ONE In arguing issue one, Counsel for the Claimants/Respondents submitted that the submission of learned Counsel for the Defendants to the effect that the 1st and 2nd Defendants in this suit are not juristic personality that can sue or be sued, is misconceived. Counsel submitted that the 1st and 2nd defendants are juristic personalities known to law by virtue of a certificate of incorporation and other incorporation documents duly certified and issued by the corporate Affairs Commission, Abuja in respect of the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Applicants. Counsel submitted that the best evidence to establish existence of any corporate entity is by the production of its certificate of incorporation as issued by the regulating registering agency created by law and in the instant suit, the corporate Affairs Commission Abuja saddled with the statutory and administrative responsibilities of registration of companies and other corporate entities within the shores of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, officially issued a certificate of incorporation upon registration to the 1st Defendant/Applicant in this suit. Counsel submitted by legal implication the certificate of incorporation issued the 1st Defendant is an uncontroverted fact that it is a registered entity known to law, on this submission Counsel relied on the case of REPTICO S. A. GENEVA V AFRI BANK NIGERIA PLC (2013) 14 NWLR 172@ 177. Counsel submitted the Claimants in their statement of facts filed in the registry of this Honourable Court on the 17/10/17 stated at paragraph 15 therein thus ‘‘The Claimants aver that the 1st Defendant was duly registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission as a Public Limited Liability Company. The said certificate is hereby pleaded and marked ad EXHIBIT B’’. Same shall be relied upon and tendered in evidence at the trial by the Claimants in this suit. Counsel urged the Court to take a look at the originating process filed by the Claimants in this suit. Counsel cited JUKOK INTERNATIONAL LTD AND ANOTHER V DIAMOND BANK PLC (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt.1507) 55 @ 77 in support of the contention that court can take judicial notice of process before the court. Counsel also submitted that it is laughable and indeed unbelievable that learned Counsel for the Defendants/Applicants to argue in the face of glaring documentary evidence and pleaded fact that the Defendants/Applicants are not juristic personalities. Counsel submitted that the certificate of incorporation marked as Exhibit B has been duly attached to the originating processes filed by the Claimants/Respondents in this suit. Counsel submitted that vide section 36(6) of Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990, provides that the Certificate of incorporation shall be prima facie evidence of compliance with requirements of registration of a company under the Act. Counsel also submitted that exhibit C herein attached to the Claimants/Respondents originating processes confirms unequivocally that the 1st Defendant/Respondent herein is duly registered corporate entity. Counsel contended that the learned counsel for the Defendant/Applicant may have been labouring under a misconception as to the identity of the 1st Defendant/Applicant as reflected on its certificate of incorporation marked Exhibit ‘B’ wherein the abbreviation of the first Defendant/Applicant on the certificate of incorporation appear as NIRSAL PLC, counsel submitted that the abbreviation is acronym so as to say has been properly explained in the document marked Exhibit E attached to the Claimants originating process which is the MEMORANDUM AND ARTICLE OF ASSOCIATION of the 1st Defendant/Applicant wherein at page 8 paragraph g of the said Exhibit E which has been duly certified at the Corporate Affairs Commission on the 11/10/17, the acronym NIRSAL was defined thus ‘‘means Nigerian Incentive-based Risk Sharing System For Agricultural Lending’’. Counsel also submitted that further confirmatory documents frontloaded before this Honourable Court as attached to the Claimants/Respondents originating process attest to the indisputable fact that the 1st Defendant/Applicant in this suit has the acronym NIRSAL and its meaning appears on each documents filed by the Defendant/Applicants at the corporate Affairs Commission, on this submission Counsel referred to exhibit G which is Form CAC 7A wherein NIRSAL was described as the Nigerian Incentive-based risk Sharing System For Agricultural Lending, counsel referred to exhibit H which is resolution of General meeting appointing Additional Directors of the Nigerian Incentive-based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending. counsel further submitted that all the letters of appointment as well as letters of termination issued to the Claimants/Respondents herein by the Defendants/Applicants as attached to the originating process filed in the Registry of this Court described the abbreviation NISAL on the letter head thus ‘the Nigerian Incentive-based Risk sharing System for Agricultural Lending (NISAL) Plc. Counsel also referred to exhibit K and submitted that it is a letter from the law firm of the learned counsel representing the Defendants/Applicants which is a letter dated 15th September 2017 and addressed to the Claimants/Respondents wherein the Defendants/Applicants herein described the Defendants/Applicants as Nigerian Incentives-based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending Plc (hereinafter referred to as ‘’NIRSAL’’). Counsel submitted by exhibit ‘‘K’’ the learned Counsel for the Defendants/Applicants acknowledge in writing and even by conduct that the 1st Defendant/Applicant, his client is being duly registered as Nigerian Incentive-based Risk Sharing System For Agricultural Lending plc(known as NIRSAL). According to Counsel this act is an unequivocal admission that the 1st Defendant/Applicant has been duly incorporated under the name as reflected on the face of the Claimant Counsel submitted that learned counsel cannot blow hot and cold at the same time. On the 2nd Defendant/applicant, Counsel submitted that the submission of Counsel for the Defendants/Applicants is misleading. Counsel contended that the 2nd Defendant/Applicant is a personality known to law exhibit ‘’G’1’’ with the heading NIRSAL NIGERIAL INCENTIVE-BASED RISK SHARING SYSTEM FOR AGRICULTURAL LENDING FORM CAC 7A appropriately captured an individual adult in serial number 3 as the Managing Director/CEO of the 1st Defendant/Applicant. Counsel also referred to Exhibit ‘‘H’’ attached to the Claimants/Respondent process is a certified true copy of the 1st Defendant/Applicant document titled Resolution of General Meeting Appointing Additional Directors of Nigerian Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) Plc originating process wherein in serial number 3 was identified as in Exhibit ‘’G!’’ as the Managing Director/CEO, NIRSAL Plc. Counsel submitted 2nd Defendant/Applicant is duly recognised by law. Counsel submitted the 2nd Defendant/Applicant is member of the Board of directors of the 1st Defendant/Applicant. Counsel also submitted all the letters of appointment and termination were signed by the 2nd Defendant/Applicant. Counsel submitted the case of AGBOMAGBE BANK LTD (Supra) is not applicable in this case as it is distinguishable. Counsel submitted that the Corporate Affairs Commission has registered the Defendants/Applicants as a corporate entity and has issued a certificate of incorporation as well as various documents dully certified with the name of the Defendants/Applicants. ISSUE TWO Counsel submitted that the submission of Counsel for the Defendants/Applicants to the effect that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit is preposterous. Counsel referred to section 254C (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, (as amended). Counsel submitted that vide this provision the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court to hear and determine cases and matters relating to or connected to any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from work place, the conditions of service including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith. Counsel submitted that the reliefs as contained in the claimants claims have conferred jurisdiction on this Court to adjudicate upon to support his submission Counsel cited MARK V EKE (2004) 16 WRN 56 @ 66. Counsel urged the court to assume jurisdiction on this matter. In concluding his submission Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection of the Defendants/Applicants with punitive cost of N250,000.00. REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW In his reply on points of law to issue one, Counsel for the Defendants/Applicants submitted that the case of REPTICO S.A. GENEVA V AFRIBANK NIGERIA PLC (Supra) was inappropriately cited by the Claimants/Respondents. On section 36 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, Counsel agreed that Certificate of incorporation is prima facie evidence of incorporation, but disagreed that the memorandum and Article of Association of the 1st Defendant/Applicant, page 8 paragraph g defined the acronym NIRSAL as Nigeria Incentive-based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending. Counsel submitted that vide section 41 (1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act provides that memorandum when registered shall have the effect of a contract under seal between the corporate Affairs Commission and the Company. While the Article of Associations between the company, its members and officers. Counsel maintained that proof of incorporation is the certificate of incorporation and not the memorandum or Article of Association which are pre-incorporation documents. Counsel submitted that in the recent case of J & J. TECHNO LTD & ANOR. V YUBAH H. QUALITY SERVICES LTD & ORS. (2015) 8 NWLR (Pt.1460) 9, it was held for an act to be maintained against any corporate entity, it must be in its registered name and the exact name of a company registered under the companies and Allied Matter Act, should be used if it is suing or being sued. For a company must be sued in its registered name and the exact name registered under the company and Allied matters Act. Counsel submitted the complaint taken out was in the name of the Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending. While the name on the certificate of incorporation as issued by the Corporate Affairs Commission pleaded and Marked as Exhibit ‘B’ is bearing NIRSAL PLc. It is the contention of Counsel NIRSAL is known to law and is the juristic person in question and not any name whatsoever. On the submission of Claimant Counsel on issue of juristic personality of 2nd Defendant, Counsel submitted that it is preposterous and lack of consummate understanding of the concept of corporate personality. Counsel submitted the concept of corporate personality postulates that an incorporated company is as a matter of law a separate legal entity distinct from its shareholders and directors who are in control of its operations. The company is a body corporate distinct from the persons acting on its behalf. On this submission Counsel relied on SALMON V SALMON (1897) AC 22. TSOKWA OIL V UTC NIG) PLC (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt782) 437. Section 37 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act. Counsel submitted it is definitely not in doubt that the Managing Director of a company as the company is distinct from its manager of the Company. Consequently, a certified true copy of resolution of general meeting appointing additional director of Nigerian Incentive-based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) PLc does not confer legal personality. On issue two, Counsel submitted that issue of court’s jurisdiction under section 254C (1) was never in issue in contest or raised as the ground in the preliminary objection. COURT’S DECISION I have very carefully read the originating Court process commencing this suit, as well as all the processes that accompanied it. I have equally have a hard look at the notice of preliminary objection filed by the Defendants and the submissions and authorities cited by counsel on both sides. In my humble view the only question presented for resolution by this objection is one that calls for the determination of the legal personality/standing of the Defendants. Jurisdiction of Court is threshold matter, as a Court must possess jurisdiction before it can determine any matter. Jurisdiction is activated when certain conditions are present. One of the constituents of jurisdiction is competent parties, see the case of CBN V SAP (NIG,) LTD (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt.911) 152 where the Court held as follows: ‘‘In the case of MADUKOLO V NKENDLIM (1962) All NLR, it has been stated that for a court to have jurisdiction, the following conditions must be present: 1. The proper parties are before the court; 2. The subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of the court; 3. The composition of the court as to members and qualifications, and 4. The suit is commenced by due process of law and upon fulfilment of any conditions precedent to assumption of jurisdiction’’. From the above, it is clear that competence of parties is very crucial to determination of matter before the Court. Competence of parties is fundamental element and parties coming before the court must be human being or juristic persons in terms of having a legal capacity or having been bestowed by law with legal capacity to sue. There are no dearth of case law on description of who can sue or be sued as a party in a suit. As a general rule no action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural person or persons unless such a party has been given by statute expressly or impliedly, or by the common law, a legal personality under the name by which it may sue or be sued or a right to sue or be sued by that name, for example partnership, trade unions, friendly societies and foreign institutions authorised by their law to sue and be sued. See SHITTU V LIGALI (1941) 16 NLR 23, FAWEHINMI V NBA (NO. 2) (1989) 2 NWLR (PT.105) 558; THE ADMINISTRATORS/EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF GENERAL SANI ABACHA (DECEASED) V EKPE-SPIFF (2009) 7 NWLR (pt.1139) 97 @ 136; LION OF AFRICA INSURANCE CO. LTD V ESAN (1999) 8 NWLR (PT.614) 197. This is the law because the suit is in essence the determination of legal right and obligations in any given situation. Therefore, only such natural/juristic persons in whom the right and obligations can be vested are capable of being proper parties to law suits before Courts of law. It is therefore, correct to say where either of the parties is not a legal person capable of exercising legal right and obligations under the law, the other party may raise this fact as a preliminary objection which if upheld, normally leads in the action being struck out for being incompetent due non-presence of competent parties. See SHITTU V LIGALI (Supra); OLU OF WARRI V ESI AND ANOR. (1958) 3 FSC 94; AGBOMAGBE BANK V GENERAL MANAGER G. B. OLIVANT LTD & ANOR. (1961) ALL NLR 116. It is settled that natural persons, that is to say human beings and juristic or artificial persons such as bodies corporate are competent to sue and be sued before any law court. In other words no action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural person or persons unless such a party has been given by the statute expressly or impliedly or by common law either a legal personality under the name by which it is sued or it sued or a right to sue by that name. In order to determine whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on this matter the Defendants must fit into one of the categories of persons stated in the cases cited above. If it is established that the Defendants are natural or juristic or artificial persons then the jurisdiction of this Court is activated to have the claim before the Court determine. Obviously without any fear of contradiction the Defendants in the case at hand are not human beings. So they come under those bestowed with legal capacity to sue or be sued. The contention of the Defendants is that they are not juristic personality capable of being sued in any court of law. While the Claimants insisted that the Defendants are legal persons capable of being sued. The claimants heavily relied on the originating process filed before the Court and the processes attached to the complaint more particularly the documents pleaded to be relied on at the trial of this suit. To determine whether the Defendants have juristic personality as being claimed by the Claimants, I painstakingly and critically examined the originating process filed before the court and the processes attached therein. It is manifestly clear and indisputable from exhibit ‘B’ pleaded by the Claimants to rely on at the trial which is the purported certificate of incorporation of the 1st Defendant. It is manifestly clear that the name of the corporate personality which the certificate exhibit ‘B’ bore witness of having been duly registered and incorporated is ‘‘NIRSAL PLC’’. Therefore, in my humble view the name of entity disclosed by exhibit ‘B’ is quite different from the 1st Defendant. The certificate of incorporation which the Claimants pleaded to be relied on at the trial is not the certificate of incorporation of the 1st Defendant. Having failed to produce the certificate of incorporation of the 1st Defendant, any talk or argument about the 1st Defendant being a body corporate or incorporated is to my mind hollow and baseless. It is to be remembered that the law is quite settled that the certificate of registration or incorporation of a company is a prima facie evidence of its incorporation. See section 36 (6) of the Companied and Allied Matters Act. This position was agreed by the parties in their respective submissions before the Court. The position of the law is that he who assert must prove his assertion otherwise his position will be rejected for lack of proof. In this case since the Claimants were positively asserting the legal personality of the Defendants they have the onus of proving their positive assertion by producing the certificate of incorporation bearing the name of the 1st Defendant as stated on the complaint from the Corporate Affairs Commission the body charged with responsibility of registration and incorporation of companies and other corporate bodies. See ABAKALIKI LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL V ABAKALIKI RICE MILLS OWNERS ENTERPRISESOF NIGERIA 1990 6 NWLR PT.155 182. In this case the failure of the claimant to produce the certificate of incorporation in the name of the 1st Defendant implies the non-incorporation of the 1st Defendant and its existence has therefore not been proved. The argument by the Claimants to the effect that since the Defendants have prior to the suit held themselves out in their letter head and other documents to be known and called ‘‘The Incentive-Based Risk Sharing For Agricultural Lending’ is evidence of incorporation is a clear misconception of what incorporation meant. The submission that the name of 1st Defendant given on the complaint as ‘‘The Incentive-Based Risk Sharing for Agricultural Lending’’ as a full description of the abbreviation ‘‘NIRSAL PLC’’ seems to me very illogical and untenable in the face of clear and unambiguous provisions of section 36(6) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act. The mere fact that an incorporated company chooses to go by a name suggestive that it is incorporated does not in law amount to incorporation to confer on it legal personality or status of incorporation. In the absence of proof of incorporation the 1st Defendant is not incorporated under the law to confer on it perpetual succession with right to sue and be sued eo nomine. It is settled law that a non-juristic person cannot sue or be sued in a court of law. See AGBOMAGBE BANK LTD V GENERAL MANAGER OLIVANT (supra) and ABAKALIKI LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL V ABAKALIKI RICE MILLS OWNERS ASSOCIATION ON NIGERIA (Supra). It is to be noted that a name whether of natural or artificial person is a distinctive characterization in words by which one is known and distinguished it from others. A description or abbreviation is not the equivalent of a legally given name. In this case the description ‘‘The Incentive-Based Risk Sharing For Agricultural Lending’’ is not the same with the incorporated name ‘‘NIRSAL PLC’’ which exhibit ‘B’ clearly depicted. See OYEJOLA V AGBOOLA (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt.411) 88. Arising from the foregoing, the next question to ask is what occurred a mere matter of mis-description/misnomer or a case of mistaken identity. To the Defendant this is not a misnomer that can be corrected by amendment it is a fundamental mistake of identity that cannot be cured by amendment. It is to be noted that in some of the documents pleaded such as the letters of appointment and the letters of termination as well as the resolution passed at a meeting in exhibit ‘H’ the name of the 1st Defendant shown on the complaint appeared under NIRSAL PLC’ in those document which were probably meant to describe the name on Exhibit ‘B’ the certificate of incorporation. To my mind 1st Defendant as stated on the complaint clearly shows that it was a miswritten name intended to be the 1st Defendant. There is nothing to show real misgiving as to the identity of the person sued. The reason being that where are correspondences between the parties prior to the action containing the name as stated to be the 1st Defendant. In A B MANU & CO. LTD V COASTAIN (WEST AFRICA) LTD (1994) 9 NWLR (PT.360)112, the abbreviation of West Africa as WA did not mislead. Same will be the case here the full description of NIRSAL PLC as stated to be 1st Defendant is a misnomer that is capable of amendment upon appropriate application to that effect. Alas that is not the case here the Claimants did not brought any application for such amendment. It is unfortunate that this court does not have power suo motu to effect such kind of amendment in this case. In view of non-presentation of request for amendment of the name of the 1st Defendant by the Claimants, the name of the 1st Defendant must be struck out for lack of legal standing in law to be sued. I so hold. This situation would have been avoided if counsel has taken steps to correct the misnomer. Regarding the 2nd Defendant, the Claimants have made copious submissions making reference to the pre-incorporation documents filed at the corporate affairs Commission to contend that since the name of the 2nd Defendant appeared in the memorandum and Article of Association, as well as in the resolution passed at a meeting and the act of signing of letters of appointment and termination of appointment of the Claimants, the 2nd Defendant has acquired legal personality to be sued as was done in this case. The Defendants in reply submitted that the appearance of the name of the 2nd Defendant in the pre-incorporation document cannot confer on the party legal personality to make the party have legal capacity to sue or be sued. The contention of Counsel for the Claimants seems to have negated the distinctiveness of a company duly incorporated under the Companies and Allied matters Act. It is elementary that once a company is incorporated and a certificate of incorporation issued to it, it becomes a matured legal entity capable of suing and being sued in its corporate name as depicted in its certificate of incorporation. See section 37 of the Companies And Allied Matters Act. This section clearly shows that a company becomes adult of full capacity upon incorporation. As soon as a company is issued with a certificate of incorporation it has become master on to itself in respect of its affairs. Albeit, its employee/staff are to carry out the objects of the company. The officers of the company only carry out their function, their action or act are attributable as acts of the company itself and not those of the employees or staffers. It will therefore be wrong to join a Managing Director in a suit against a company no matter what he did. The reason being that the acts were done for and on behalf of the company. All the acts of the Managing Director are acts of agent of a disclosed principle and being agent of a disclosed principal it is the principal that is the appropriate party to be sued for any breach as a result of those acts of the Managing Director. Like in this case the acts of signing of letters of appointment and letters of termination of appointment of the Claimants are acts of the Company on whose behalf it was done. It will therefore be inappropriate to sue a Managing Director in a suit against a Company. See OWOEYE V WEMA BANK PLTD 2001 9 NWLR PT.717 1; AMADIUME V IBOK 2006 6 NWLR PT.975 158 BAYERO V MAINASARA & SONS 2006 8 NWLR PT982 391; AJAYI OBE V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FAMILY PLANNING COUNCIL OF NIGERIA 1975 1 ALL NLR PT1 90, IKEDIFE V OBIENU 1975 5 UILR PT1 51. It is also to be noted that the position of a Managing Director is an administrative position meant for smooth running of the day to day activities of a company. The position is not clothed with legal personality to sue or be sued in that name. see COP ONDO V OBOLO (1992), AGBOMAGBE BANK LTD (Supra) In view of the foregoing, the Defendants objection is meritorious it is hereby upheld. This suit is hereby struck out due to lack of legal capacity on part of the Defendants to be sued. Sanusi Kado, Judge.