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JUDGMENT The Claimant instituted this action in this court on the 11th day of February 2015. In her amended statement of facts filed on 26th April 2016 by leave of this court granted on 18th April 2016, the Claimant sought the following reliefs against the Defendant. (a) A Declaration that the Claimant’s termination of employment by the Defendant via letter dated 31st July 2014 is wrongful. (b) The sum of N21,427,000.00 (Twenty-One Million, Four Hundred and Twenty-Seven Thousand Naira) only, as special damages put as follows: 1. The sum of N1,340,000.00 (One Million, Three Hundred and Forty Thousand Naira) being payment equal to her two months basic salary in lieu of 45 days’ notice before termination of her employment. 2. The sum of N4,640,000.00 (Four Million, Six Hundred and Forty Thousand Naira) only, being four months gross salary as per the Senior Management Service conditions of the Defendant for the period served by the Claimant. That is gross salary = Basic salary, Housing, Transport, Utility/Security. 3. The sum of N595,000.00 (Five Hundred and Ninety-Five Thousand Naira) being unremitted/unpaid balance of compulsory contributory pension for seventeen months from 14th March 2013 to 31st July 2014. 4. The sum of N3,900,000.00 housing allowance for thirteen months. 5. The sum of N4,550,000.00 Transport allowance for thirteen months. 6. The sum of N520,000.00 security allowance for thirteen months. 7. The sum of N1,950.000.00 utility allowance for thirteen months. 8. The sum of N1,206,000.00 for annual leave allowance. 9. The sum of N670,000.00 furniture grant for one year. 10. The sum of N750,000.00 for annual responsibility allowance. 11. The sum of N450,000.00 for annual child education grant for three children; and 12. The sum of N856,000.00 for Meal allowance for thirteen months. The Defendant filed an amended statement of defence on 26th May 2016 to which the Claimant filed a Reply on 1st June 2016. After close of pleadings, the matter went into hearing wherein the parties called one witness each and tendered a number of documents in evidence. Hearing commenced on the 1st day of June 2016. The Claimant testified for herself as CW1. One Aderinto Idris, an accountant with the Defendant testified on behalf of the Defendant as DW1. Hearing ended on the 28th day of September 2017 and parties were ordered to file Final Written Addresses pursuant to the Rules of Court. The Defendant’s Final Address was filed on the 7th day of November 2017. The Claimant’s Final Address was filed on the 5th day of January 2018. The Defendant had a Reply on Points of Law filed on the 26th day of January 2018. These were duly regularized on the 26th day of January 2018 and the parties proceeded to adopt their respective addresses on the same day. CLAIMANT’S CASE The Claimant testified in person in support of her case. The Claimant’s case is that on 13th March 2013, she was engaged by the Defendant as Human Resources Consultant via a Consultancy Agreement which was erroneously dated 3012. The Consultancy Agreement was prepared by the Defendant and given to the Claimant to sign. The Claimant accepted the offer and signed on all pages of the agreement. The Claimant was on probation for three and half months after which period the Defendant agreed that the Claimant would be given permanent employment and her remuneration reviewed. Pursuant to the Consultancy Agreement, the Claimant was to be paid monthly sum of N670,000.00 for services rendered for the Defendant. From the agreement, either party can terminate the agreement at any time and for any reason during the probation period by giving the other 30 days written notice of intention to terminate. But after the probation period, the condition for termination shall be in line with company standard for management staff as contained in the Consultancy Agreement. After the probation period, the Claimant continued to work for and perform official duties for the Defendant. She did request for regularization of her appointment but the Defendant did not do so. However, the Defendant’s MD had continued to authorize the Claimant to sign documents and perform duties as HR Manager via Gmail correspondences. The Claimant was responsible for staff employment and confirmation of appointment for the Defendant. In that position, she included her letter of regularization along with some letters for the General Manager to sign but hers was returned unsigned. The Defendant’s MD later sent a mail to the Claimant to explain that the GM is not in a position to sign the regularization letter. The claimant worked from 14th March 2013 and on 31st July 2014 she received a letter terminating her contract with the Defendant. On 6th August 2014 she wrote a letter to the Defendant to object to the termination. The Defendant’s solicitor’s reply to the Claimant’s letter is dated 14th August 2014. Having worked beyond the probationary period, the Claimant had become a permanent staff and her remuneration ought to be reviewed in line with company standard for management staff as contained in the agreement. Her terminal conditions too ought to be as provided for in Article 12.00 and 12.01 of the Defendant’s senior management terms and conditions of service. By this condition of service, the Claimant was entitled to 45 days notice or payment of two months basic salary in lieu of notice and 4 months gross salary per year of service. The Defendant is estopped from denying the Claimant that status having made her to work as HR Manager beyond the probationary period. For the 17 and half months the Claimant worked for the Defendant as a consultant, she was paid the sum of N635,000.00 per month instead of N670,000 fixed monthly rate as agreed in the agreement. The total difference not paid to the Claimant for the period is the sum of N595,000. Her terminal benefits also include unpaid allowances from 1st July 2013 to 31st July 2014. The allowances, which include housing, transport, security, utility, annual leave allowance, furniture grant, responsibility allowance, child education grant for 3 children and meal allowance, are contained in the benefits schedule in the senior management terms and condition of service. The total sum which the claimant is entitled to under these allowances is the sum of N14,858,000.00. DEFENDANT’S CASE The Defendant’s witness is one Idris Aderinto. He said he is the Finance and Administration Manager of the Defendant. He told the court that the Claimant was engaged by the Defendant as a Human Resource Consultant vide a letter dated March 13, 2013 and a Consultancy Agreement executed by the parties on 14th March 2013. The agreement, which was initialed by a representative of the Defendant on all pages, regulated the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant during the period of its operation. According to the Defendant, the copy of the Consultant Agreement frontloaded by the Claimant was forged and made for the purpose of this suit. DW1 went further to give instances of the alleged forgery. Under the consultancy agreement executed by the parties, the Defendant was given the discretion of offering the Claimant permanent employment. Among the conditions of the appointment is that the Claimant’s competence and suitability for a permanent employment after period of probation shall be appraised by Defendant after which the Claimant may be offered a permanent employment if the Defendant is satisfied with the performance of the Claimant. Under the Consultancy Agreement, either party was entitled to terminate the agreement by giving 30 days notice. The agreement did not contain any term to the effect that should the Claimant work beyond the probation period, she will be entitled to terminal conditions applicable to management staff. The Defendant did not make any consultancy agreement which assured the Claimant of a permanent employment or terminal conditions in line with the Defendant’s standard for management staff. The Defendant’s MD at no time offered any permanent employment to the Claimant or offered to regularize the Claimant’s employment. The Defendant was not satisfied with the performance of the Claimant and accordingly elected not to offer a permanent employment to the Claimant. Thus, the Claimant continued to work upon the terms of the consultancy agreement of 14th March 2013 after the expiration of the probation period. The terminal benefits claimed by the Claimant are unknown to the contract between the parties and they are not applicable to the Claimant. The Claimant has since received her terminal benefits of one month’s pay in lieu of notice and 2 months pay ex gratia. Counsels for the parties addressed the court after close of the case of the parties. DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSIONS In the Defendant Counsel’s final address filed on 7/11/2017, three issues were proposed for determination as follows: a. Whether in the determination of this suit, it is not imperative for this honourable Court to determine which of the two Consultancy Agreements (Exhibit C2 and Exhibit D2) is the applicable contract between the parties, and consequently whether Exhibit D2 being more probable is not the applicable contract. b. Whether or not, the Claimant has proved that the termination of the Consultancy Agreement by the Defendant was wrongful. c. Whether or not, the Claimant has proved her entitlement to the special damages claimed in this suit. On issue one, counsel submitted that the primary question before this court is to determine which of the two Consultancy Agreements (Exhibits C2 or Exhibit D2), is the applicable contract between the parties. This is because the court would be unable to determine the contract between the parties, unless, there is a finding as to which of the two is the authentic contract executed by the parties. Counsel further that a finding as to which of the two Consultancy Agreements is the applicable contract is crucial, because the present action borders on wrongful termination of employment contract, which requires a clear identification of the terms of the employment contract executed by the parties. Parties have each hinged their arguments on the interpretation of the Consultancy Agreement they have tendered. It is the contention of counsel that where there is a written or documented contract of service, the court will not look outside the terms stipulated there in deciding the right and obligations of the parties. See WESTERN NIGERIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. ABIMBOLA (1966) NSCC 172; and KATTO vs. CBN (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390. It is counsel’s view that the issue of termination of the employment of an employee is based on the contract of service between the parties. The contract of service is the bedrock upon which any aggrieved employee builds a case, succeeds or fails upon the terms, and any termination of employment by the employer cannot be wrongful unless it is in breach of their contract. See CHIEF FUNSO OLOGUNDE vs. CARNAUD METALBOX TOYO GLASS NIGERIA PLC (2002) LPELR-12216. To counsel, the fact that there are two conflicting Agreements (Exhibit C2 and Exhibit D2) leaves this court with no other option than to make a finding as to which of the two, is the applicable contract. This, according to counsel, raises a further sub-issue for determination viz: Whether, given the wordings of the Letter of Offer of Temporary employment through Consultancy (Exhibit C1 or D1) and the totality of the evidence before this Court, the Consultancy Agreement tendered by the Defendant (Exhibit D2) is not more authentic that the Consultancy Agreement (Exhibit C2) tendered by the Claimant. Counsel urged the court to hold that Exhibit D2, tendered by the Defendant is the applicable contract, and referred the court to the particulars fraud pleaded in paragraph 4 of the Amended Statement of Defence, and paragraph 3 of the Defendant's witness Statement on Oath. In addition, counsel, making copious references to the testimony of CW1 which he believes are clear contradictions, asserted that Exhibit C2, tendered by the Claimant was forged, and cannot be the authentic contract executed between the parties. Counsel submitted that the oral evidence of the Claimant are both contradictory and ridiculous and therefore not admissible, and cannot be used to vary or alter the content of the Exhibit. See F.I.B. PLC vs. PEGASUS TRADING (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 863) 369. Further pointing out perceived contradictions apparent on Exhibit C2 and D2, counsel urged the court to make necessary comparisons and find that Exhibit C2 being self-contradictory and possesses disjunctive features, is likely to be a forgery, especially when compared with established company practices and features in other exhibits tendered. Counsel proffered further extensive arguments in support of his reasoning, all to the effect of urging the court not to give effect to Exhibit C2 tendered by the Claimant. Counsel’s extensive arguments are hereby incorporated into this judgment and necessary reference will be made to them at the appropriate time in this judgment. It is the further argument of counsel that Exhibit C2 is an afterthought made by the Claimant, at the time of her termination, when this dispute had already arisen and litigation was being contemplated. Counsel submitted that it is an established company practice, that confirmation of staff is not automatic at the expiration of the initial probation period, and it is the Defendant's prerogative to decline to make an offer of permanent employment to any staff on probation, and can elongate the probation, until it is satisfied of the staff’s suitability for the job. The Defendant could not therefore, have made or executed any contract which is in clear contradiction of this established practice. It was also contended by counsel for the Defendant that throughout the period that the Claimant worked for the Defendant, she was under probation and regarded herself as being under probation, and not a confirmed employee. The letter of confirmation that she prepared for herself, without authorization, was never signed by the Defendant. These facts were admitted by the Claimant in Paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the Claimant's witness Statement on Oath. Similarly, the several Gmail Correspondences emanating from the Claimant show that she was aware that she was on elongated probation hence her request for confirmation. The table in Exhibit C13 at pages 2 and 3 thereof shows that it is company practice for staff to be on probation, irrespective of position, and that the 16 persons listed therein were all on probation. The Exhibit also shows that 13 persons had their employment formally confirmed, with the signing of their confirmation letters by the General Manager, Mr. Perry Silva, after completion of their probation periods or its elongation, which ranged from 7 months to over one year, depending on their performance and the terms of their respective contracts. Counsel proffered further arguments on this point, and urged the court to hold that Exhibit C2 was not the authentic contract executed by the parties, because it is settled that an unconfirmed employee does not enjoy the permanence of employment, and its benefits, which a confirmed employee enjoys. See IHEZUKWU vs. UNIVERSITY OF JOS (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 598 at 612. Counsel urged the Court to make a finding that Exhibit D2 is more probable than Exhibit C2, and hold that Exhibit D2 is the contract that was executed by the parties. Counsel’s contention is that the court is seised of overwhelming credible evidence to make a finding as urged, in light of the fact that the apparent conflicts in the averment of the parties as to which of the Consultancy Agreement is applicable, has been subjected to oral evidence, aimed at resolving the conflict. Witnesses on both sides were cross-examined regarding same. In counsel’s opinion, the Defendant's witness was unshaken and his evidence uncontroverted, whereas the Claimant was incoherent, and shown to be lying. On this basis, counsel urged the court to hold that the evidence of the Defendant's witness is more credible and reliable than that of the Claimant. Further, counsel argued that in addition to calling oral evidence when there is a conflict in affidavit evidence, authentic documentary evidence, may be adduced to support one of the affidavits in conflict with another, which is capable of resolving the conflict and tilting the balance in favour of the affidavit which agrees with it; thereby serving as a yardstick to assess oral testimony. See C.C.C. THRIFT & CREDIT SOCIETY vs. EKPO (2001) 17 NWLR (Pt. 743) 649. Counsel urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the Defendant relying on credible evidence before it, and not assumption or speculations. See UNIVERSAL TRUST BANK OF NIGERIA vs. OZOEMENA (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 448 at 487, and ISAH vs. STATE (2007) NWLR (Pt. 1049) 582 at 614, Paras B-C. Arguing issue two, counsel stated that in an action for wrongful termination, the Claimant must prove that the termination was wrongful and done contrary to the agreement of the parties as contained in the contract of employment; and to prove the manner in which the said terms were breached by the Defendant. Counsel cited the following cases in proof of his argument: a. AKINFE vs. UBA PLC (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 185 at 196 b. MOROHUNFOLA vs. KWARA STATE COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 506 at 525-526; c. KATTO vs. C.B.N (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390 at 405 Counsel relied on his preceding argument that Exhibit D2 is the applicable contract, and submitted that the Claimant has failed to prove that the Defendant breached the Consultancy Agreement, when it terminated the Consultancy Agreement vide Exhibit C14/D3. According to counsel, there is no material evidence placed before this court, upon which this Court can be called upon to stand and make a finding that the termination was wrongful. It is counsel’s submission that the Consultancy Agreement is the only contract entered into by the parties, there is no other employment contract or consultancy contract entered into by the parties. According to counsel, the Claimant had admitted this fact under cross examination. Admitted facts need no further proof. See ALI vs. ALBASHIR (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 415) 1681 at 1727, Paras B-D. In counsel’s view, the termination of the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant was carried out in line with the Consultancy Agreement, and the Claimant cannot claim that her termination was wrongful. The contract between the parties stipulated that each party could terminate the contract by giving each other 30 days’ Notice. The Defendant in terminating the Consultancy Agreement, paid the Claimant one month’s fees in lieu of Notice in accordance with the requirement of the Consultancy Agreement. The Defendant made a further payment of two month's fees as ex gratia payment to the Claimant as shown in Exhibits D4A, Exhibit D4B, and Exhibit D6, ensuring that all the Claimant's entitlements under the Contract have been duly paid to her by the Defendant. The Claimant has not been able to prove otherwise. If perhaps the court is uncertain regarding the actual contract between the parties because of the conflicting provisions of Exhibit C2 and Exhibit D2, all remaining doubts may be resolved by looking at the other documentary evidence before the court, including the conduct of the parties, because it is an established principle of law that a trial court is not bound to determine the issues before it on the basis of one document only; and when the contact is contained in a series of documents or letters or correspondences, the court is under a duty, to consider the whole of what has passed between, and the conduct of the parties, in arriving at its decision. See ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE NIGERIA LIMITED vs. ASWANI TEXTILE IND. LIMITED (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 176) 639; and LEYLAND (NIG.) LTD. vs. DIZENGOFF W.A. (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.134) 610 at 620. Counsel added that in interpreting any contract which involves several documents, the documents must be read together. See AUDU vs. PETROLEUM EQUALIZATION FUND (MANAGEMENT) BOARD & ANOR. (2010) LPELR- 3824 at P.16, paras A-B. The letter of offer of temporary employment (Exhibit C1/D1) also forms part of the contract, and should be read together with the consultancy agreement. Counsel cited the following authorities in support of his contention that the words of the Claimant’s contract of employment ought to be given its ordinary meaning which is to the effect that the employment was for an initial period of probation: AGBAREH vs. MIMRA (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378 at 414-415 JESSICA TRADING CO. LTD vs. BENDEL INSURANCE CO. LTD. (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt. 476) 1 ADEROUNMU vs. ADEROUNMU (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 803) 1 According to counsel, the whole essence of probation period is to give the employer time to assess and appraise the prospective employee's suitability, before making any valid offers of employment to such prospective employee. In buttressing this point, counsel cited the case of IHEZUKWU vs. UNIVERSITY OF JOS (1990) 3 NSCC 80 at 94 where the Supreme Court held that: “The sole purpose of putting an employee on probation is to give the employee an assurance that the employee is a fit and proper person to be placed on permanent appointment. Probationary period is a period of observation by the employer. It therefore follows that once the condition laid down for the termination of appointment during the probationary period is satisfied or complied with, the employee cannot justifiably complain.” Consequently, the consultancy engagement which itself was probationary cannot also deprive the employer, the right to appraise the employee on probation. Exhibit C1/D1, clearly proves that this right of appraisal was reserved for the Defendant, and the conduct of the parties clearly supports this position. According to counsel, the refusal of the Defendant to make any offers of permanent employment to the Claimant is a tacit affirmation that the Claimant was still under appraisal, the Defendant was not yet satisfied with her competence and suitability, and the Defendant was not under any legal obligation to explain to the Claimant why it declined to make any offer of permanent employment to her or to confirm her employment. See HUBLE vs. NIGERIAN MARITIME SERVICES LTD (1971) 1 UILR 231. It is the argument of counsel, that where no offer of permanent employment was made to the Claimant by the Defendant, the probationary consultancy engagement could not have turned into a permanent employment, as claimed in Paragraph 23 of the Claimant's witness Statement on Oath. For a contract, including that of employment to be valid, the five ingredients of offer, acceptance, consideration, intention to create legal relationship and capacity to contract must be present, all five ingredients are autonomous and equal in the sense that a contract cannot be formed if any of them is absent. Counsel urged the court to hold there was no time at which it could be said that the Defendant made the offer of permanent employment to the Claimant, or when the Claimant accepted the offer so made, the terms of the permanent employment for the claimant to be entitled to claim the entitlement due to the company's management staff. See DODO vs. SOLANKE (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 346) 576 at 592-593; B.F.I.G. vs. B.P.E (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt.416) 1915 at 1937. Further arguments on issue two as well as copious illustrations, references to the evidence and pleadings, as well as cited authorities are hereby incorporated into this judgment. References will be made to them where necessary in the course of writing this judgment. With respect to issue three, counsel submitted that the Claimant has not been able to dispel the burden of proving her entitlement to the several special damages claimed in this suit, and that special damages must be pleaded and proved by credible evidence, before the court can award them. See KOPEK CONSTRUCTION LTD vs. EKISOLA (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt. 519) 1035 at 1064. Counsel argued that apart from the claims of N595,000.00 for withholding tax deductions or contributory pensions, the other amounts claimed by the Claimant as special damages, are hinged on Exhibit C17, and there is no other evidence before this court, from which these claims be inferred from, accordingly, the claims for the special damages other than for the sum of N595,000.00, are hinged on Exhibit C17. Exhibit C17 is not admissible as it is an unsigned document, and lacks legal or evidential value. Counsel urged the court to either discard it as inadmissible evidence, or to accord it no probative value. See: NWANCHO vs. ELEM (2004) ALL F. W.L.R. (Pt. 225) 93 at 104 para. D; AIKI vs. IDOWU (2006) ALL F.W.L.R (Pt. 293) 361 at 375. Para. B; SALIBAWA vs. HABILAT (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 174) 461; A.G. KWARA STATE vs. ALAO (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt.671) 84; OMEGA BANK (NIG.) PLC. vs. O.B.C. Ltd. (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 547. Counsel urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the Defendant, and hold that the Claimant has not led any credible evidence to justify the award of the special damages claimed in this suit. In conclusion, counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimant has failed to prove her entitlement to the claims, dismiss this suit, and to enter judgment in favour of the Defendant, because to hold otherwise, or to award the Claimant damages on any other consideration will tantamount to amending the case of the Claimants for them, which is outside the purview of the court to make a case for the Claimant. See ODUNZE vs. NWOSU (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1050) 1 at 49; THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE vs. WING COMMANDER T.I.A. SHEKETE (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 129 at 23; and OLUFEAGBA vs. ABDUR-RAHEEM (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt.5 12) 1034 at 1071. CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSIONS Learned counsel for the Claimant proposed the following two issues in his final written address which was filed on 5th January 2018: 1. Whether the Defendant's paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16 and 17 of Defendant's Amended Statement of Defence are competent. 2. Whether from the state of the pleadings and evidence led, Claimant has made out a case to succeed in any or all her claims. On issue one, counsel referred to paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 10, 14 and 15 of the Statement of Defence filed 7th July, 2015, and paragraphs 4, 7, 8, 13, 16 and 17 of the Defendant's Amended Statement of Defence filed 26th May 2016and contended that the amendments made are not consequential amendments, and the Defendant, having not sought and obtained the leave of this Court, cannot amend the said paragraphs of the Amended Statement of Defence. Counsel proceeded to point out clauses in the amended statement of defence which were entirely new set of facts introduced without leave of court, and which did not arise from the amendment to the statement of facts. It is counsel’s submission, referring the court to the book “CIVIL PROCEDURE IN NIGERIA” FIDELIS NWADIALO, 2ND EDITION (2000) UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS PRESS, Pg. 479, that where a Statement of Claim is amended, the Defendant can without leave, make such amendments that are consequential upon those made in the statement of claim. But to amend the statement of defence generally, leave of Court is necessary. According to counsel, the Defendant went beyond consequential amendment in the above stated paragraphs without the leave of this Court, which makes those averments incompetent. He urged the court to strike out the offending averments or disregard them. See OGUMA vs. I.B.W.A (1988) 3 SC 17; NAGOGO vs. C.F.C. (2013) ALL FWLR (Pt. 685) 272. See also MBANEFO vs. MOLOKWU (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt. 512) 1159 at 1172. Counsel urged the court to resolve this issue in the Claimant’s favour. Regarding issue two, counsel opined that the parties in the present case agree that the Claimant was engaged by the Defendant upon the terms of her Engagement Letter and the Consultancy Agreement and her services were terminated via the Defendant's Termination Letter of 14th July, 2014. It is counsel’s view that the Claimant’s relevant pleadings are paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23 and 25 of the Claimant's Amended Statement of Facts, the corresponding responses of the Defendant are paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Amended Statement of Defence as well as paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Claimant's reply. While the Claimant maintained that her employment was governed by Exhibits C2 and C17, the Defendant averred that only Exhibit D2 was applicable. Counsel urged the court to disregard the evidence of DW1 on the issue of fraud because it is marred with contradictions. See C & C CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD vs. OKAH (2003) 12 SC (Pt. 1) 133 at 139. Counsel argued that the Claimant on the other hand, was not attacked on her particulars of fraud and she was unshaken by the repeated cross examination by the Defendant on its allegation of fraud. The court therefore can rightly infer that Claimant's account on Exhibit C2 was truthful, accurate and complete. See STATE vs. COLLlNS OJO ACKANGBEE &. ANOR (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 548 SC. Counsel urged the court to hold that EXHIBIT C2 is the agreement between the Claimant and the Defendant, and by its item 3, Exhibit C2 expired on the 31st day of June 2013, with the Defendant having the option to retain the Claimant as a permanent employee and her total remuneration reviewed in line with Exhibit C17. By several exhibits, the Claimant notified the Defendant of the expiration of Exhibit C2. The Defendant's assignment of new duties after her probationary period as a staff of the Defendant months after probationary period, is proof of estoppel by conduct as pleaded by the Claimant. Counsel drew the court’s attention to the case of RELIANCE TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIMITED vs. MR. OLAORE OLUFEMI ADEGBOYEGA (2017) 8 CLRN 30, where the Court of Appeal held that with instance of such representations made by an employer, the employment of the staff on probation is deemed confirmed by conduct. See MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF LAGOS STATE. vs. ADEYIGA (2012) LPELR 7836 (SC) where it was held thus: “The Applicant having allowed the Respondent to continue in his employment beyond the three months' probationary period, paying him all his entitlements and further making representation via Exhibit C5 to third parties affirming that the Respondent is its employee several months after the end of the probationary period must be deemed to have waived its rights in insisting on issuance of formal letter of confirmation to the Respondent. In such circumstances as obtained in the instant case. Estoppel by conduct/Representation can readily be invoked. Counsel’s view is that the instant case is apposite to the Reliance Telecommunication case, and the conduct of the Defendant placed the Claimant in the status of a confirmed employee and therefore entitled to the terms in Exhibit C17. The principle of estoppel by conduct is demonstrated thus: “Where a man by his word or conduct wilfully made a representation of a state of facts to another and thereby induced that other to believe that the state of things were as represented by that person and that other took him by his words and acted upon that representation, then that person who made the representation either himself or through his representatives in interest, cannot now turn around to say or behaves as if the state of things were not as he represented them. He is estopped from assisting the contrary. All that is required in such a case is that the facts to be relied upon as estoppel be duly pleaded or brought to the notice of the adjudicating tribunal in some appropriate way.” See ENAHORO vs. O'CERONS LIMITED (2015) ALL FWLR (Pt. 776) 458 at 477 – 478 Paras H-B. Counsel urged the court to hold that by the conduct of the Defendant allowing the Claimant to work several months beyond the probationary period and expanding the Claimant's scope of work, the Defendant is estopped from denying the Claimant a confirmed employment for the purpose of Exhibit C17 that embodied the Claimant's entitlement, upon the Defendant exercising its right of termination against the Claimant. Counsel submitted that a master has full powers to terminate the employment of his servant at any time, for any reason or indeed, for no reason at all; and where an employee proffers reasons as the Defendant has done in its pleadings, there is an onerous duty to prove its allegation, and the Defendant herein has failed to prove its allegations in paragraphs 13 and 14 of its Amended Statement of Defence. See ANAYA vs. U.B.A PLC (2011) ALL FWLR (pt. 600) 1289 at 1301; and OLATUNBOSUN v N.I.S.E.R COUNCIL (1988) NSCC 1025. Arguing further, counsel referred to the case of SHELL PETROLEUM DEV. CO. LTD. vs. OLAREWAJU (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt. 458) 208, where it was held thus: “The guiding principle which had been articulated and applied in many cases including Olatunbosun v. N.I.S.E.R. Council (1988) 1 NSCC 1025, is that an employer is not bound to give reasons for terminating the appointment of his employee. But where, as in this case, he gives a reason or cause for terminating the appointment, the law imposes on him a duty to establish the reason to the satisfaction of the court. In this case, the appellant, having given gross misconduct as its reason for the Respondent's dismissal has the onus to establish that the Respondent was indeed guilty of the alleged misconduct to warrant his dismissal”. It is counsel’s submission that where the court holds that Exhibits C2 and C17 are the documents embodying the parties’ contract, then the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs claimed; and relief (1) having not been denied, the Court can enter judgment in favour of the Claimant. Counsel proffered further arguments, illustrations and statements with a view to dispel the Defendant’s earlier assertions wherein they alleged forgery, especially as the said assertions were not specifically pleaded. According to counsel, they go to no issue. See OFFODILE vs. ONEJEME (2012) ALL FWLR (Pt. 608) 946 at 967, ADDAH vs. UBANDAWAKI (2015) ALL FWLR (Pt. 775) 200 at 215 and APENA vs. AILERU (2015) ALL FWLR (Pt. 790) 1256 at 1271. It is counsel’s further submission that Counsel's written argument or address no matter how brilliantly articulated cannot serve as substitute for either pleadings or evidence. The Court has a duty to limit the scope of the adjudication process to pleadings and credible evidence led in support. See UNITED CEMENT CO. (NIG.) vs. ISIDOR (2016) ALL FWLR (Pt. 844) 2159. Extensive arguments proffered by counsel on the point raised by the Defendant on the possibility of forgery of Exhibit C2, contradictions apparent contradictions of the Claimant’s oral testimony among other arguments and cited authorities, are also incorporated hereto, and will be referred to whenever required in this judgment. DEFENDANT’S REPLY ADDRESS In the Defendant counsel’s reply on points of law filed on 26th January 2018, counsel submitted that the Claimant Counsel’s arguments made in respect of issue one in his final address are wrong, misconceived, a misapplication of the law on the matter of consequential amendments, and the averments made in paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16 and 17 of the Amended Statement of Defence are competent and valid, same being amendments made consequent upon the amendment of the Statement of Fact; and the Claimant was afforded the opportunity to counter the averments with her Reply filed on the 1st June 2016. In counsel’s view, the position of the law set out in MBANEFO vs. MOLOKWU (SUPRA), cited by the Claimant’s counsel does not support the Claimant's assertion or applicable to the Defendant’s case, because the above authority espouses that a party is not allowed to canvas in his final written address, a case that is not in tandem with his pleadings, to do that, an amendment of pleadings must be done; which is different from the present case, where the arguments of the Defendant are in consonance with the pleadings made in its Amended Statement of Defence, which were made consequent upon the amendment of the Statement of Facts by the Claimant. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the submissions of the Claimant’s counsel. Further, counsel submitted that the Claimant having joined issues with the Defendant on the said paragraphs, by filing her Reply to the Consequentially Amended Statement of Defence cannot be allowed to challenge the said paragraphs in counsel’s final address, and if the consequential amendments made in the alleged paragraphs do not have any relationship with the amendments made in the statement of facts, the Claimant prior to the commencement of hearing, replied to the amendments, and such amendments are allowed without leave. Counsel referred the court to the case of CHIEF REUBEN O. OZIGBO vs. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF EZI-OGANIRU SOCIAL CLUB OF NIGERIA (2008) LPELR-8S42 (CA) (2008) 13 S.C.L.R (Pt. 13) 115, where the Court of Appeal held that the general rule is that a party to a suit may amend his pleadings before the close of pleadings without the requirement of any leave by or from the court. See also CHIEF AWOROKIN & ORS vs. APOSTLE TAIYE ADENIRAN (2010) LPELR - 8595 (CA) Counsel urged the court to discountenance all the arguments canvassed by the Claimant’s counsel in support of his issue one, and hold that all the averments pleaded in the amended statement of defence, particularly paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16 and 17 are valid and relevant, In response to Claimant counsel's arguments in support of issue one bordering on estoppel by conduct, counsel submitted that the two cases cited in support are not applicable and distinguishable from the facts of the extant case. In RELIANCE TELECOMMUNICATIONS case, the decision of the court was hinged on the fact of the representations made by the appellant to third parties that the respondent was its staff, hence the holding that the Appellant was estopped from asserting otherwise. A different set of facts is apparent in the present case where the Defendant made no such representation, either to the Claimant or to third parties. See OKONKWO vs. KPAJIE (1992) NWLR (Pt. 266) 633, where estoppel by conduct was described to be: “Where a man by word or conduct wilfully made a representation of a state of facts to another and thereby induced that other to believe that the state of things were as represented by that person and that other took him by his words and acted upon that representation, then that person who made the representation either by himself or his representative in interest cannot now turn around to say or behave as if the state of things were not: as he represented them. He is estopped from asserting the contrary.” Counsel argued that from this decision, it cannot be said from the pleadings and evidence in the present case that the Defendant made any representation to the Claimant as a confirmed employee, and the doctrine of estoppel cannot apply. Counsel urged the court to discountenance all the argument of the Claimant’s counsel, and dismiss the claims of the Claimant in its entirety for being frivolous and lacking in merit. COURT’S DECISION: Having examined the case presented by both parties and having also reviewed the submissions of the counsels to the parties in their final written addresses in the case, I have identified the following issues for determination in this case: 1. Whether the termination of the Claimant’s appointment was wrongful. 2. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs she sought in this case. ISSUE 1: The case of the parties is agreed on the fact that the Claimant was appointed by the Defendant as Human Resources Consultant effective 14th March 2013 vide an offer letter dated 13th March 2013 and a Consultancy Agreement executed on 14th March 2013. It is further not in dispute that the appointment had a probationary period of 3 and ½ months. It is also not in dispute that the Claimant remained in the employment beyond the probationary period and worked for the Defendant up to 31st July 2014 when her appointment was terminated by the Defendant in a letter dated 31st July 2014. I also observe that the parties agree that the Claimant’s appointment was not regularized or confirmed after the probation period until the time the appointment was terminated. The Claimant’s contention in this case is that having worked beyond the probationary period, she had become a permanent staff and, since the Consultancy Agreement included a term that after the probation period, the condition for termination shall be in line with company standard for management staff, her terminal conditions ought to be as provided for in Article 12.00 and 12.01 of the Defendant’s senior management terms and conditions of service which are that the Claimant was entitled to 45 days notice or payment of two months basic salary in lieu of notice and 4 months gross salary per year of service. From the case of the Claimant, her appointment was terminated in line with what is applicable to termination during period of probation as contained in the consultancy agreement but since she worked beyond probation period, she had become a permanent employee and her termination ought to be in line with Defendant’s senior management terms and conditions of service. It was for this reason the Claimant alleged that her employment had been wrongfully terminated. The issue raised by the Claimant concerns which of the condition of service applied to the termination of her appointment. Is it the terms of the agreement at the time of appointment or the senior management terms and conditions of service? To determine this claim of the Claimant, there is need to first examine the terms of the Claimant’s contract with the Defendant. Both parties tendered the letter of offer of appointment and the consultancy agreement between the Claimant and the Defendant. The copies tendered by the claimant are Exhibits C1 and C2 respectively while the Defendant’s copies are Exhibits D1 and D2 respectively. The offer letters are Exhibit C1 and D1. The content is the same and dated 13th March 2013. The content of the offer letter reads as follows: “Offer of temporary employment through consultant. Position: HR consultant With reference to your recent application and interview for work with Cetco Oil Field Services Company Nigeria Limited, we are delighted to offer you temporary employment as Human Resources Consultant. In accordance with company practice and by mutual agreement under this consultancy agreement, you will be expected to fulfill the assignment for a period of 3 ½ months (initial period), which shall be considered as probationary period. We shall further appraise your competency and suitability based on your performance and attainment of set objectives. Following the initial period, you may be given an offer of permanent employment in which case a letter of confirmation of employment shall be given to you. Should you be offered a permanent position, then your total remuneration shall be reviewed in line with the company’s standard for management staff. The initial period serves as contract appointment only and the attached “Consultancy Agreement” outlines the terms and conditions between yourself and the company. Kindly note the details of this contract. A copy will be supplied for your own records. If this offer is acceptable to you, kindly indicate your acceptance and ability to commence work on Thursday March 14, 2013 by signing below. Should you require any further then please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned.” Below the letter, the Claimant signed indicating acceptance of the terms and conditions of the appointment. By the terms of the offer letter, the offer was only a temporary appointment and the Claimant was on probation for a period of 3 months and half. The offer also includes a condition that the Claimant may be given a permanent employment after the probation period by giving her a letter of confirmation of employment. The offer letter also referred to a consultancy agreement to be executed by the parties and it states clearly that the consultancy agreement embodies the terms and conditions of the appointment. The consultancy agreement the Claimant relied on her in case is Exhibit C2. According to the Claimant, the Consultancy Agreement was prepared by the Defendant and given to the Claimant to sign. The Claimant also stated that she accepted the offer and signed on all pages of the agreement. However, in paragraph 4 of the amended statement of defence, the Defendant contended that the copy of the consultancy agreement relied on by the Claimant is forged by her and made for the purpose of this suit. The instances of forgery were stated to include that the Claimant prepared another consultancy agreement but merely inserted the last page of the original agreement; the last page does not bear acknowledgement clause evident in all the pages of the Claimant’s copy of the agreement; the space between the last clause and the execution clause is proof that the last page was merely inserted; the Claimant did not sign on all pages of the original agreement and the Claimant altered provisions of the original agreement. The Claimant, in paragraph 2 of her reply to the amended statement of defence contended that the Defendant’s copy of the consultancy agreement is forged and she gave the particulars of fraud to include that the original agreement was not initialed by any official of the Defendant; documents issued by the Defendant to employees must be signed by employee; vital clauses have been removed by the Defendant; a new paragraph 6.1 was introduced to paragraph 6 and that the Claimant was referred to as contractor in paragraph 12 instead of consultant. In summary, the parties claimed their own copy of the consultancy agreement is authentic while the other party’s is a forgery. I have examined the agreements. Save for some aspects of their content which are different, the agreements appear to be original copies. The executions of the agreements at the last pages are of the same pattern. I have considered the positions taken by the parties with regards to the authenticity of the different copies of the consultancy agreement, but I think it is not the duty of this court to determine which one is authentic and which one is forged. In my view, the issue at hand is quite a simple one. The burden of proof of her case is on the Claimant. She has asserted that the copy she tendered as Exhibit C2 was the copy given to her by the Defendant. Under cross examination, the Claimant stated that she did not forge or scan Exhibit C2 but it was the original copy given to her. Throughout the cross examination, the Claimant was unshaken as to the authenticity of Exhibit C2. It is not enough for the Defendant to merely allege forgery of Exhibit C2. From the evidence of the Claimant, the Defendant must go further to show that Exhibit C2 was not the copy of the agreement given to the Claimant. This proof cannot be discharged by simply tendering a copy whose content is dissimilar in some respect from the copy tendered by the Claimant. In my view, the proof can only come by way of a copy signed by the Claimant acknowledging receipt of a copy of the agreement. The copy tendered by the Defendant, Exhibit D2, did not carry such acknowledgment. Save for the execution page, the Claimant did not sign anywhere else on Exhibit D2. The Defendant has not been able to convince this court that the copy tendered by the Claimant was not the copy given to her after execution by the parties. I also have not seen any reason whatsoever to believe that the copy tendered by the Claimant is not the copy given to her by the Defendant upon execution of the agreement. Consequently, I hold that the Claimant has proved that Exhibit C2 was the consultancy agreement she executed with the Defendant. The provision of Exhibit C2 which is crucial in the determination of the instant issue is contained in article 3 thereof. It reads: “TERMS AND TERMINATION This agreement shall last for a period of three and a half (3.5) months effective from 14th March 2013 to 31st June 2013. This shall be considered as a probationary period only. The company shall further appraise the consultant’s competency and suitability based on her performance and attainment of set objectives. At the end of the initial period i.e. after three and a half (3.5) months, the consultant will be given an offer of permanent employment, in which case a letter of confirmation of employment shall be given to the consultant. The consultant will be offered a permanent position and her total remuneration shall be reviewed in line with company’s standard for management staff. 3.2 The company or the consultant will be entitled to terminate this agreement in writing at any time and for any reason whatsoever, by giving the each other 30 (thirty) days written notice of its intention to terminate this contract. At the expiration of three and half (3.5), the terminal conditions shall be in line with the Company’s standard for management staff.” Going by the above conditions of the appointment, the following is applicable to the Claimant: i. The Claimant was on probation for a period of 3 ½ months from 14th March 2013 to 31st June 2013 ii. After the probation period, the claimant will be given an offer of permanent employment and a letter of confirmation of employment shall be given to her iii. Upon offering her a permanent employment, her total remuneration shall be reviewed in line with defendant’s standard for management staff. iv. Either party is entitled to terminate the agreement by giving the other 30 days written notice but after the probation period, the terminal conditions shall be in line with the defendant’s standard for management staff. The above provisions of the consultancy agreement are what the Claimant relied on to allege that after the period of probation, she ought to be given permanent employment and the condition for termination of her appointment ought be in line with the standard for management staff. The Claimant was appointed on 14th March 2013. The probation period lapsed on 31st June 2013 but the Claimant’s appointment was not confirmed nor was she offered a permanent employment by the Defendant up till 31st July 2014 when her appointment was terminated. From 31st June 2013 when the Claimant’s probation period ended to 31st July 2014 when the appointment was terminated was a period of 13 months. The Claimant explained in her evidence that after the probation period, she continued to work for the Defendant and represent the Defendant in the course of her duties. The Defendant did not deny the fact that the Claimant continued to work for the Defendant after the period of probation until the time her appointment was terminated. The Claimant has also explained the efforts she made to get the Defendant to confirm her appointment but the Defendant refused, choosing rather to keep her in the employment for another period of 13 months, making her work still as HR Consultant and paying her salaries. After the probation period, the Claimant had the belief that since her appointment was not terminated during probation, she will be confirmed and in that belief continued to work for the Defendant while making efforts to make the Defendant confirm her appointment. By the terms of the consultancy agreement, after the probation period, the Defendant ought to confirmed the Claimant’s appointment and offer her a permanent employment. Therefore, having kept the Claimant in the employment beyond the probationary period, the Defendant is deemed to have confirmed her appointment as a permanent staff. This is the position of the law as expressed in the case of OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY vs. ONABANJO (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt.193) 549 at 570 where the Court of Appeal held thus: “The appellant had delayed unnecessarily in making up their minds whether to terminate or confirm the respondent’s probationary appointment. By keeping him in his employment and continuing to pay him for four months after the probationary period of three years had expired, they would be deemed by operation of law to have confirmed his appointment, and the doctrine of “estoppel by conduct” would operate to prevent the appellant from alleging and treating him as if he was still on probation.” Also, the point was made by the Court of Appeal in the case of THE COUNCIL OF FEDERAL POLYTECHNIC, EDE vs. OLOWOOKERE (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 699) 1200 at 1215 as follows: “It was contended strongly by the appellants that the respondent’s appointment was a probationary appointment which could be terminated at any time. The respondent’s probationary appointment commenced on 10 April 2001, the date of appointment letter - exhibit JK02 bearing in mind that he had been on a temporary appointment before then. The respondent was to be on probation for a period of two years “before your appointment is confirmed subject to satisfactory medical and confidential reports on you”. His appointment was terminated on 28 July 2004. The period between 10 April 2001 and 28 July 2004 was more than three years. In the eye of the law, having kept the respondent as an academic staff, using him as a lecturer and paying him salaries and other benefits for about 12 (twelve) months after the period of probation had lapsed, the appellants had by their conduct confirmed the respondent’s appointment.” In this case, by leaving the Claimant in the employment beyond the period of probation and by continuing to give the Claimant work to do and paying her salaries after the probation period had ended, the Defendant is deemed by law to have confirmed the Claimant’s appointment. The Defendant was estopped from treating the Claimant’s appointment as if it was still on probation. The probationary period of the appointment was three and half months. The Claimant’s appointment commenced 14th March 2013. It implies that the probation period ended on 31st June 2013. In view of the terms of the consultancy agreement and the above decisions of the Court of Appeal, I hold that the Claimant’s appointment was no longer probationary from 1st July 2013. The effect is that the Claimant became a confirmed employee of the Defendant from 1st July 2013. Again, by the terms of the consultancy agreement, the condition of service for management staff applied to the Claimant having become a confirmed employee. The Claimant pleaded the Defendant’s senior management terms and conditions of service in paragraph 23 of the amended statement of facts and stated that her terminal conditions ought to be as provided for in Article 12.00 and 12.01 of the Defendant’s senior management terms and conditions of service. The Claimant further stated that by this condition of service, the she was entitled to 45 days notice or payment of two months basic salary in lieu of notice and 4 months gross salary per year of service. In effect, the Claimant contends that the condition of service which applied to her appointment at the time of termination was the Defendant’s senior management terms and conditions of service which she tendered in evidence as Exhibit C17. In the Defendant’s final written address, learned counsel for the Defendant has argued that Exhibit C17 is inadmissible and, being an unsigned document, lacks legal or evidential value. Counsel also argued that Exhibit C17 is not the condition of service for the management staff and that the Claimant has not shown that she was a senior management staff of the Defendant. When the Defendant’s counsel argued that the document is inadmissible, counsel failed however to tell the court in what ways the document is inadmissible. Counsel only made the point that the document was not signed by anybody. The fact that the document is not signed does not make it inadmissible. That fact can only go to the evidential weight to be attached to the document. The document is a condition of service, I do not see any provision for signature on the document. I do not think the absence of signature on the document affects its evidential value. The Claimant pleaded the document. I also find that the document is relevant in the determination of this case. I therefore hold that the document is admissible and has been properly admitted in evidence. The Claimant pleaded that by Exhibit C2, after the probation period, her appointment should be terminated in line with the standard for management staff. Exhibit C2 at article 3 refers to standard for management staff. Which is that standard for management staff? The Claimant said it is the condition of service for management staff and tendered Exhibit C17 in evidence. When the Defendant said exhibit C17 is not the condition of service for the management staff, it has the responsibility to produce the Defendant’s condition of service for management staff but none was produced. On the face of Exhibit C17, it contains the name and logo of the Defendant with the statement “Senior management terms and conditions of service”. The Defendant has not given me any reason to believe that Exhibit C17 is not the Defendant’s condition of service for senior management staff. Similarly, whether the Claimant was a senior management staff or not does not arise in this case. This is because the consultancy agreement expressly entitles the Claimant to benefit under the condition of service for management staff. It appears the Claimant will have attained the status of being a senior management staff after confirmation of her appointment; that was the reason the agreement contains that the standard for management staff will apply to her. Having held that the terms and conditions in Exhibit C17 applied to the Claimant, the task at this point is examine whether the Claimant’s appointment was terminated in accordance with the condition of service. Article 12.01 (d) and (e) provides that termination of appointment is subject to specified terms of notice. In case of employment for a period up to 12 months or more, 45 days notice. The party who fails to give the required notice will be liable to make payment in lieu of notice which shall be equal to 2 months basic salary of the employee. The letter terminating the Claimant’s appointment is Exhibit C14. The copy tendered by the Defendant is Exhibit D3. The letter is dated 31st July 2014 and the content of both letters are the same. The Claimant was informed that her appointment had been terminated with effect from the date of the letter and that she will be paid 1 month’s salary in lieu of notice pursuant to article 3.2 of her contract with the company. It is observed that the Claimant’s appointment was terminated with effect from the date of the letter. It implied that the Claimant was not given the required 45 days notice as stipulated in Exhibit C17. The termination letter however stated that the Claimant will be paid only one month’s salary in lieu of notice. In paragraph 19 of the amended statement of defence, the Defendant pleaded that the Claimant was paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice and two months’ salary ex gratia. What the Defendant has said in effect is that it paid the Claimant a total of 3 months’ salary after termination of the employment, though the salaries were not entirely meant for payment in lieu of notice. The Claimant disputed the Defendant’s claim in paragraph 4 of her reply to the amended statement of defence. The Claimant averred that she did not receive or accept any payment from the Defendant or anybody acting for the Defendant before the filing of this suit. In proof of its assertion that it paid the Claimant salary in lieu of notice, the Defendant’s witness tendered Exhibits D4a and D4b in evidence. These are computer printout of salaries made to the Claimant in the months of July, August, September and October 2014. To resolve the controversy raised by these exhibits when they were tendered in evidence by the Defendant, I ordered the Claimant’s counsel to produce the Claimant’s original statement of account. The point was to find if the said payments were actually made to the Claimant’s account by the Defendant. On 28/9/2017, the Claimant’s statement of account was produced by the Claimant’s counsel and by leave of this court, it was admitted in evidence from the bar. It is Exhibit D6. The statement of account reveals that after the Claimant’s appointment was terminated on 31st July 2014, she received salary payments from the Defendant for the months of August 2014, September 2014 and October 2014. From exhibits D4a, D4b and D6, it is clear that the Defendant paid 3 months’ salary to the Claimant after her appointment had been terminated. Although the Defendant said two of the payments were ex gratia, such payment is not an entitlement of the Claimant. I will therefore take the payments to be part of the payment in lieu of notice. The fact that the Defendant did not give the Claimant the requisite notice entitles the Claimant only to payment of two months’ salary in lieu of notice. This has been paid to the Claimant. This is in addition to the fact that the Defendant has the right under the contract to terminate the appointment. The Defendant has accordingly complied with the condition in Exhibit C17 for termination of the Claimant’s appointment. From the foregoing, I find that the termination of the Claimant’s appointment by the Defendant was not wrongful. I resolve this issue against the Claimant. ISSUE 2: The 2nd relief the Claimant sought in this case is the payment of the total sum of N21,427,000 as special damages arising from the following: i. N1,340,000 being 2 months basic salary in lieu of 45 days notice of termination. ii. N4,640,000 being 4 months gross salary iii. N595,000 being unremitted/unpaid balance of compulsory contributory pension for 17 months iv. Total sum of N14, 858,000 for housing, transport, security, utility, annual leave allowance, furniture grant, responsibility allowance, child education grant for 3 children and meal allowance. In her evidence in proof of these reliefs, the Claimant said her terminal conditions under the Defendant’s senior management terms and conditions of service include 45 days notice or payment of two months basic salary in lieu of notice and 4 months gross salary per year of service. Her salary per month was N670,000.00 but for the 17 and half months she worked for the Defendant, she was paid the sum of N635,000.00 per month less N35,000 per month from her salary. The total difference not paid to the Claimant for the period is the sum of N595,000. The Claimant also said the total sum of N14,858,000.00 was her terminal benefits in terms of unpaid housing, transport, security, utility, annual leave allowance, furniture grant, responsibility allowance, child education grant for 3 children and meal allowance allowances from 1st July 2013 to 31st July 2014. The Claimant also averred that these allowances are provided in the senior management terms and condition of service. The Defendant denied these claims and averred that the terminal benefits claimed by the Claimant are unknown to the contract between the parties and they are not applicable to the Claimant. Relief b (1) is a claim for the sum of N1,340,000.00 being 2 months basic salary in lieu of notice of termination. I did find in issue one of this judgment that the Claimant had been paid two months’ salary in lieu of notice. Therefore, the Claimant is no longer entitled to this claim. Reliefs b (2), (4) to (12) sought by the Claimant in the amended statement of facts are based on the terms and conditions in Exhibit C17. I have stated in this judgment that the condition of service in Exhibit C17 became applicable to the Claimant. However, having gone through the terms and conditions in Exhibit C17, I see that the allowances or benefits provided therein are not as of right or absolute. There are some with qualifications. I cannot find any provision in Exhibit C17 for furniture grant and transport allowance. As for housing allowance, article 5.02.01 of Exhibit C17 provide that the sum of N300,000.00 is payable per month to enable benefiting staff pay for accommodation and the amount for the various categories of staff is at the benefits schedule. I have examined the schedule to see the category of staff entitled to the allowance but find that only the allowance for West African Operations Manager is stated at the appendix. The Claimant was not employed as such neither can she be assumed to have attained that position. For Annual Child Education Assistance, the amount payable was not stated in article 5.02.05 but it was indicated that it was contained in the attached benefits schedule. However, there is no such attached benefits schedule. What I see is an appendix and the position whose benefits are illustrated there is that of West Africa Operations Manager. Leave allowance is contained in article 5.02.09 which is 15% of annual basic salary. That is to say this allowance is calculated on the basis of basic salary. What is the Claimant’s basic salary under Exhibit C17? Article 5.01 provides that basic salary shall be in accordance with the management category to which the staff has been placed and placement is in the absolute discretion of the company. This term of the condition of service gives the Defendant the discretion to place a management staff and determine the basic salary. The fact that the confirmation of the Claimant’s appointment has been deemed by this court, the court cannot however take over the duty of the Defendant and proceed to determine what the basic salary payable under Exhibit C17 should be. In that case, the court cannot grant this allowance to the Claimant. Similarly, the Claimant claims in relief b (2) the sum of N4,640,000.00 being 4 months gross salary as per the senior management staff condition of service. The Claimant founded this claim on Exhibit C17 but she failed to tell the court what her basic salary under Exhibit C17 is, or how she arrived at what constitutes gross salary under Exhibit C17. The failure to explain these details is fatal to the claim. Article 5.02.03 provides for security subsidy of N40,000.00 per month while article 5.02.04 provide for utility subsidy of N150,000.00 per month. Meal allowance is at article 5.02.08 at N3000 per day. The Claimant is entitled to be paid these allowances. Article 5.02.12 provides for responsibility allowance at N750,000.00 to be paid 1st week of July every year. In this case, the Claimant was terminated on 31st July 2014. She was qualified to be paid responsibility allowance. As for relief b (3), the Claimant claims for the sum of N595,000.00 being unremitted/unpaid balance of compulsory contributory pension for 17 months. The Claimant pleaded in paragraph 24 of the statement of facts that the sum of N35,000.00 was being deducted from her monthly fixed pay for 17 months. The accrued total is the sum of N595,000.00 which is now being claimed by the Claimant in relief b (3). It is observed that the monthly pay of N670,000.00 the Claimant still maintains in this claim was the sum prescribed in the consultancy agreement. Although the consultancy agreement provided for review of the remuneration after confirmation of the appointment, it is clear to me that the circumstances of the Claimant’s sojourn in the Defendant’s employment did not allow for the review. The Claimant’s salary throughout the appointment remained the same. Although the Claimant stated in the relief that the deduction represented unremitted balance of the compulsory contributory pension for 17 months, this fact was not pleaded in the statement of facts. The Defendant merely denied the Claimant’s averment in paragraph 24 of the statement of facts but it did not make any averment in specific response to the allegation of the Claimant. Therefore, the fact that the sum of N35,000.00 was deducted on monthly basis from the Claimant’s salary from 14th March 2013 to 31st July 2014 has not been controverted by the Defendant. The Claimant has thus proved that the total sum of N595,000.00 was deducted from her salary up to the date of termination of her employment. This deducted sum, whether or not it is for pension contribution, was the Claimant’s money being part of her salary while she worked for the Defendant. She is entitled to be paid the sum. In the final result of this judgment, I find that the Claimant’s claims succeed in part. I find no merit in reliefs a, b (1), b (2), b (4), b (5), b (8), b (9) and b (11). They fail and are hereby dismissed. Relief b (3), b (6) b (7), b (10) and b (12) are granted. Accordingly, I make the following orders in favour of the Claimant- i. The Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of N595,000.00 to the Claimant being the sum total of monies deducted from the Claimant’s monthly salaries from the period 14th March 2013 to 31st July 2014. ii. The Defendant is ordered to pay the sums of N520,000.00, N1,950,000.00, N750,000.00 and N856,000.00 to the Claimant being security allowance, utility allowance, responsibility allowance and Meal allowance respectively. iii. The sums in (i) and (ii) above, totaling N4,671,000.00 (Four Million, Six Hundred and Seventy One Naira) shall be paid to the Claimant within 30 days from the date of this judgment, failing which it shall attract interest at 10% per annum thereafter. iv. Parties are to each bear their respective costs. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge