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trauma caused the Claimant by the 1st Defendant’s unlawful termination of Claimant’s employment and sudden stoppage of his salaries. The Claimant filed an affidavit and a further affidavit in support of the originating summons. The Defendants filed their counter affidavit to the originating summons and also filed a notice of preliminary objection. The notice of objection of the Defendants and the Claimant’s suit were heard together on 22/1/2018 with the aim to deliver decision of the court on them today. The Defendants’ objection touches on the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the Claimant’s suit. Therefore, I shall consider and determine it first. In the Defendants’ Notice of Preliminary Objection, they prayed for an order striking out the suit for want of jurisdiction. The grounds of the objection are as follows: i. The suit is not justiciable and robs the court of jurisdiction to entertain the suit, ii. The suit discloses no cause of action against the 2nd Defendant, iii. The 2nd Defendant is not a juristic person, and iv. The suit is incompetent. The Notice of Preliminary Objection was supported by the written address of the Defendants’ counsel, Mr. D.O. Nosike. Learned Counsel formulated 2 issues for determination in the NPO. They are: Whether the suit is justiciable and whether the 2nd Defendant is a juristic person. On the 1st issue, learned counsel for the Defendants submitted that an action is justiciable when it can properly be examined by the courts or subject to action in the court. Counsel also submitted that the domestic affairs of voluntary organizations like churches and political parties fall outside the perimeters within which the court can interfere. On these points, counsel cited the cases of IBRAHIM vs. GAYE (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt. 784) 247; CHIMWO vs. OWHONDA (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1074) 341. Counsel went further to argue that the Claimant’s case is that he was ordained a priest of the 2nd Defendant vide Exhibits A and A1. In Exhibit C, the Claimant was informed that the licenses and permissions granted him in Exhibits A and A1 had expired and will not be renewed by the 2nd Defendant. The grouse of the Claimant is based on Section 38 of Chapter Twenty Two of the Principles, Regulations and Constitution of the Diocese of Owerri Church of Nigeria (Anglican Communion). To the Claimant, he cannot be retired until he attains the age of 65 years. Counsel for the Defendant submitted further that the substance of this suit is the decision of the 2nd Defendant not to renew Exhibits A and A1. The grant or renewal or refusal of licenses and permissions is the domestic or internal affairs of the 2nd Defendant, a voluntary association, and it is not justiciable. The Defendants’ counsel argued further that the Claimant who professed to be an employee of the 2nd Defendant did not exhibit his letter of appointment or evidence of how much he was paid as salary. On the 2nd issue, counsel submitted that the 2nd Defendant is not a juristic person and cannot sue or be sued. According to counsel, the correct name of the 2nd Defendant is “The Registered Trustees of the Diocese of Owerri, Church of Nigeria”. Counsel referred the court to the case of GENERAL MANAGER, GB OLIVANT LTD. vs. AGBOMAGBE BANK LTD (1961) 1 All NLR 116 and urged the court to strike out the name of the 2nd Defendant. In his reply to the Notice of Preliminary Objection of the Defendants, counsel for the Claimant, Mr. M. C. Ottih, adopted the two issues raised by the Defendants’ counsel for determination in the NPO. With regard issue one, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that a case is justiciable when it is properly brought before a court of justice and capable of being disposed of judicially. The facts of the Claimant’s case as stated in the affidavit in support of the originating summons show that the Claimant’s complaint is about the unlawful termination of his employment by the arbitrary acts of the 1st Defendant. The facts also disclose labour related cause of action. Such cause of action is purely within the jurisdictional competence of this court. The case of CHINWO vs. OWHONDA cited by the Defendants’ counsel is not applicable to this case. The nature of the Claimant’s employment with the 2nd Defendant does not fall into category of matters that can be treated as domestic affairs of voluntary organizations. Counsel for the Claimant submitted further that the Claimant’s employment with the 2nd Defendant is regulated by the Principles, Regulations and Constitution of the Diocese of Owerri Church of Nigeria (Anglican Communion) which fixed the retirement age of the Claimant at 65 years of age; but in breach of that provision, the 1st Defendant forced the Claimant out of his employment. Counsel argued that whenever an injustice is done to a person whether in the church, political party or voluntary organization, the court is seised with powers to address such an injustice. It was further submitted by counsel for the Claimant that the Claimant has deposed to facts in his affidavit of his appointment to various positions, and his postings to different places to work within his employer’s establishment. The law is that where one party employs another, appoints him to various positions in its establishment, pay him salary and allowances, these acts constitute sufficient facts from which a contract of employment can be inferred. Counsel cited NIGERIA AIRWAYS vs. GBAJUMO (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 244) 735 and stated that the Claimant is a worker within the meaning of Section 91 of the Labour Act 1990, which status confers this court with jurisdiction to entertain the case. On issue 2, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that the name of the 2nd Defendant is the name it was incorporated and which name is written on official documents of the church. The 2nd Defendant is therefore a juristic person capable of suing and be sued. Counsel submitted that assuming that the correct name of the 2nd Defendant is the “Registered Trustees of the Diocese of Owerri”, that is a mere misnomer which cannot go to the root of the suit. The Defendants’ counsel mentioned, in his submissions in respect of issue 2 of his written address in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection, that the party who ought to be sued as the 2nd Defendant is the Registered Trustees of the Diocese of Owerri, Church of Nigeria. This indicates that the correct name of the party sued as the 2nd Defendant is Registered Trustees of the Diocese of Owerri, Church of Nigeria. The Claimant subsequently filed a motion seeking leave to amend the name of the 2nd Defendant on the originating summons to read The Registered Trustees of the Diocese of Owerri, Church of Nigeria (Anglican Communion). Leave was granted accordingly and the originating summons was amended to reflect the correct name of the 2nd Defendant. In view of the amendment in the name of the 2nd Defendant to its correct registered name, the ground of the Notice of Preliminary Objection about non juristic status of the 2nd Defendant has been overtaken and is no longer of any moment. This court is left with only the issue of justiciability of the Claimant’s suit to consider. The 1st ground of the Defendants’ Notice of Preliminary Objection is that the Claimant’s suit is not justiciable and this court consequently lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Having heard the submissions of counsels on the Notice of Preliminary Objection and having read through the facts deposed in the affidavit of the Claimant in support of the originating summons, there is need to resolve the issue whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this case. The Defendants’ counsel did argue that the Claimant’s cause of action is the decision contained in Exhibit C not to renew the Claimant’s Licenses and Permissions granted to him in Exhibits A and A1 as a priest of the 2nd Defendant. The Defendants’ counsel also argued that the 2nd Defendant is a voluntary association whose decision to grant or renew or refusal to grant licenses and permissions is its domestic or internal affairs and thus not justiciable. This ground of the Defendants’ objection relates materially to the issue of the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the suit in the first place. The Defendants’ counsel mentioned the point that the Claimant did not exhibit his letter of employment to establish his claim that he was an employee of the 2nd Defendant. In effect, the Defendants have raised the issue whether there was employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendants. In response to this point, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that the Claimant has shown that he was appointed into various positions and posted to different places to work; therefore, a contract of employment can be inferred from these facts. The Claimant’s counsel also submitted that the Claimant is a worker in the 2nd Defendant; a fact which discloses a labour relationship conferring jurisdiction on this court to entertain the case. The jurisdiction of this court is spelt out in Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Among the several matters on which the court may exercise jurisdiction in the Section 254C, I will examine the portion relevant to the determination of the issue at hand. Section 254C-(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides- “Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters- (a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the condition of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith” It is clear from this provision that before this suit can be entertained by this court, it has to be shown to have come within a labour or employment matter. Therefore, the fact that there is a contract of employment between the Claimant and the Defendants is the basis on which this court can exercise jurisdiction in the case. It is trite law that the question whether the court has jurisdiction in a matter is determined by the Claimants claims and the facts of his case. That is to say, the court has to examine the originating process in order to ascertain whether the suit comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the court. See ADEYEMI vs. OPEYORI (1976) 9-10 SC 31 at 51; ERHUEH vs. INEC (2003) WRN 95 at 111. I have earlier in this judgment set out the reliefs sought by the Claimant in his amended originating summons. I see no need to repeat them at this point. In the Claimant’s affidavit in support of the originating summons, he explained the relationship between him and the 2nd Defendant particularly in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons. The Claimant averred in these paragraphs that he was ordained a Deacon of the 2nd Defendant on 3/7/1994 and later on as a Priest on 17/12/1995. The Claimant’s ordination licenses as a priest of the 2nd Defendant are annexed to the affidavit as Exhibits A and A1. Since his ordination, he has been discharging his priestly duties and has been posted to several parishes and institutions to serve or minister. Since his ordination as a priest of the 2nd Defendant, he has also been faithful to God and the Church in proclaiming the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ which he was called to preach. He received a letter dated 30/1/2013 from the 1st Defendant informing him of his retirement effective from 31st March 2014. This is Exhibit C. From the depositions of the Claimant in his affidavit, the Claimant was ordained a priest in the 2nd Defendant and as a result, he was posted by the Defendants to various parishes to minister the word of God. This occurred by virtue of his calling and ordination as a priest in the church. Exhibit A and A1 are the certificates of the Claimant’s ordination as priest and grant of License and Authority to perform the office of priest in the 2nd Defendant. They are not appointment letters. I do find from the facts of the Claimant’s case that he was not appointed or employed by the 2nd Defendant. As an ordained priest of the church, the Claimant was into a voluntary service as a priest. Exhibits A and A1 are not appointment letters. They only show that the Claimant was granted License and Authority to perform the functions of a Priest in the 2nd Defendant’s Church. The Claimant’s counsel submitted that the acts of appointing the Claimant into various positions in the church and paying him salary and allowances constitute sufficient facts from which a contract of employment can be inferred. With due respect to the Claimant’s counsel, a contract of service cannot be presumed. It is a fact which must be proved by evidence. The fact that a person was being paid salary and allowance by another is not proof of contract of service between them. See ANIKE vs. SPDC NIG. LTD (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 638) 975 at 989. Also, his postings by the Defendants to other parishes of the church cannot by themselves create any service contract between him and the Defendants. To bring this suit within the jurisdiction of this court, it must be shown to have arisen as a labour or employment dispute. I am unable to find any such dispute in this case. The dispute in this suit arose from Exhibit C communicating the decision of the Defendants not to renew the License granted to the Claimant as a priest in the 2nd Defendant church. It is not a labor issue but a dispute arising from the internal administration of the 2nd Defendant’s church. I quite agree with the arguments of counsel for the Defendants that the case of the Claimant comes within the domestic or internal affairs of the 2nd Defendant and it is thus not justiciable. See CHINWO vs. OWHONDA (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1074) 341. When faced with a similar scenario in the case of REV. DR. V. C. IWU vs. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES ASSEMBLIES OF GOD NIGERIA, SUIT NO. NICN/OW/41/2014, this court in it’s ruling/judgment delivered on the February 12, 2015 held as follows: Since the subject matter of this suit is not covered in Section 254C (1) of the 1999 constitution, it will amount to probing into the internal affairs of the church should this court proceed with this matter. This court will definitely be going outside its bounds or undertaking a futile exercise if it refuses to decline jurisdiction at this point. Therefore, in the absence of a master and servant relationship between the parties, this court cannot entertain this matter. The court will be probing into the internal affairs of the church should the court proceed with this matter. I hold that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain and determine the Claimant’s suit. Having declined jurisdiction, any further attempt to delve into the substantive suit will amount to an exercise in futility. The suit is accordingly struck out. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge