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RULING This deals with notice of preliminary objection dated 30th day of January 2018 and filed on the same day, wherein the Defendants in this suit through their Counsel are raising issue of jurisdiction of this to entertain this suit. The grounds for the objection are: 1. That the applicant did not serve the mandatory pre-action notice on the police service commission as required by section 20 (2) (3) & (4) of the police service commission (Establishment) Act 2001. 2. That by virtue of section 6(2) of the Police service (establishment) Act, 2001, this court does not have the jurisdiction to give direction on any matter bothering on the performance of the function of the 2nd Respondent as prescribed by the Act. 3. That the Claimant did not seek and obtained the approval of Government before instituting this suit as provided under section 367 of the police Regulation. 4. That this suit constitute an abuse of Court process. The notice of the preliminary objection was accompanied with a written address. Simon Lough, Esq; Counsel for the Defendants in oral adumbration adopted the written address as his argument. In the written, Counsel submitted two issues for determination, as follows: 1. ‘‘Whether this suit is incompetent in view of the non-compliance by the Claimant with the mandatory provisions of Section 6 (2) and 20 (2), (3) and (4) of the Police Service (Establishment) Act 2001 and section 367 of the Police Regulations’’. 2. ‘‘Whether this suit constitute abuse of the Court process of this Honourable Court.’’ In arguing issue one Counsel submitted that this suit is non-competent in view of the provisions of Sections 6 (2) and 20 (2), (3) and (4) of the Police Service (Establishment) Act 2001 and section 367 of the Police Regulations. Counsel submitted that compliance with above provisions of the law is mandatory before an applicant can commence an action against the police service commission. This suit having been commenced without complying with the above requirements is incompetent and thus bound to fail. On this submission Counsel relied on NDC LTD V ASWB & ORS. (2008) 34 NSCQR, part 1 page 226, where the Supreme Court held on compliance with statutory notice as a condition precedent to instituting an action. ‘‘in my respectful view, the said provision is a condition precedent as far as suit against the 1st defendant/respondent are concerned. Therefore, the failure of the appellant to comply with it clearly makes the suit incompetent. Contrary to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, the provision does not seek to oust forever, the jurisdiction of the court but only temporarily. It just provides that unless the condition precedent is complied with a complainant or plaintiff cannot sue or initiate any action against the 1st Defendant period’’. It is submitted by counsel that by virtue of the provision of section 367 of the police regulation the claimant ought to seek and obtained approval from government before instituting this action. Counsel submitted that the matters for which the claimant institute this action arose from the performance of his public duties as an investigator. Counsel referred the court to paragraphs 6-15, 21-22 of the claimant’s statement of facts and paragraphs 4-14, 18-30 of the claimants witness statement on oath. It is the contention of Counsel that since the matter based on which this suit was instituted arose from performance of his public duties, he requires the approval of government as provided in section 367 of the police regulations before instituting this suit. Counsel submitted that the failure of the claimant to comply with section 20 (2) (3) & (4) of the police service commission (establishment) Act 2001 and section 367 of the Police Regulation rendered the suit of the Claimant incompetent and same bound to fail before this Honourable Court. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this suit for incompetence. ISSUE TWO On issue two, Counsel begun his submission with the definition of the term abuse of court as defined by the Supreme Court in the case of AFICAN RENAISANCE CORP. V JDP CONTRUCTION LTD (2003) 13 NSCQR 226. ‘‘Abuse of court process is term generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bona fide and is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. Abuse of process can also mean abuse of legal procedure or improper use of legal process as in this case. And abuse always involves some bias, malice, some deliberateness, some desire to misuse or pervert the system. There is said to be an abuse of the process of court when a party improperly use the issue of the judicial process to irritation and annoyance of his opponent, such as instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues, as in the instant case. Where a court comes to the conclusion that its process is abused, the proper order is that of dismissal of the process’’. It is the submission of counsel that the facts as contained in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the statement of facts and paragraph 15 and 16 of the witness statement on oath, the Claimant has a pending suit before this court on the same subject matter against the same parties on the same issues. This clearly, constitute abuse of the process of this Court and Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the claimant’s suit as same constitute abuse of process. OPPOSITION In opposition to the Defendants’ notice of preliminary objection, the Claimant filed a written address in opposition to the notice of preliminary objection dated and filed on 30th day January 2018. Ugochukwu Ezekiel, Esq; Counsel for the Claimant in his oral argument adopted the written address as his argument. In the written address Counsel submitted four issues for determination to wit: 1. ‘‘whether the police service commission (establishment) Act provides for service of pre-action notice of the 2nd Defendant’’. 2. ‘‘Whether this Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to determine matters bothering on the Claimant’s employment and whether section 367 of the police regulation oust the jurisdiction of the court. 3. ‘‘Whether the present action suit constitute an abuse of Court process in view of suit number NICN/ABJ/316/2017. 4. ‘‘Whether the notice of preliminary objection does not amount to demurer’’. Arguing issue one, Counsel submitted that section 20(3) of the police service Commission (Establishment Act 2001, provide for service of pre-action notice on the police service commission when sued as a corporate legal entity but only when the suit is against its agents like a member of the commission, the secretary, officer or employee. From the section pre-action notice is to be served on the commission where the intending plaintiff seeks to sue either a member of the commission, the secretary to the commission, officer or employee of the commission not the police service commission as corporate legal entity like in the instant case. Counsel submitted that where the provision of an enactment is simple and unambiguous, the court interpreting the said statute should apply its normal and ordinary meaning. UJAM V I M T 2007 2 NWLR PT.1091 470, where the court held that it is not what the court thinks reasonable that matters in construing an Act of parliament, but rather the words and sentences used in a statute must be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning. Counsel also relied on AG FEDERATION V ABUBAKAR (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt.1041) 1, ODUA INVESTMENT LTD V. TALABI (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt.523) 1, TOTAL NIG. PLC V AKINPELU (2004) 17 NWLR (PT.903) 509. Pre-action notice is only when officer is involved and not when commission. Counsel submitted that police service commission is creation of constitution by section 153(1) (m) 1999 constitution. The commission is body corporate capable of suing and is different from members or staff. Section 318 of constitution defined public officer as ‘member or staff of any commission or authority established for the federation by the constitution or by an act of the National Assembly. It is the contention of Counsel that it is settled that corporate organizations are different from its employees, members or directors. On this Counsel relied on the case of SALOMON V. SALOMON AND CO. LTD (1897) AC 22; C.B.N V. NJEMANZE (2015) 4 NWLR (PT. 1449) 276 AT 287 PARAS C-D. In concluding submission Counsel contended that Section 20(3) of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act does not impose a duty on the Claimant to serve a pre - action notice on the 2nd Defendant if the suit is against the 2nd Defendant alone. It would have been different if any of the officers were sued. Counsel urged the Court to determine this issue in favour of the Claimant. ISSUE TWO WHETHER THIS HONOURABLE COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE MATTERS BOTHERING ON THE CLAIMANT'S EMPLOYMENT AND WHETHER SECTION 367 OF THE POLICE REGULATION OUSTS THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT. On this issue, it is the submission of Counsel that Section 6 of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act and Section 367 of the Police Regulation do not bar this Court from entertaining this suit. It is the contention of Counsel that the jurisdiction of this Court is created by virtue of the third alteration Act under Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). By this provisions, this Court is clearly empowered by the Constitution to hear and determine causes and matters that bothers on employment and therefore is sufficiently clothed with the jurisdiction to determine the present suit. It is submitted for the Claimant that the provisions of Section 6 (2) of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act does not apply in the instant case. This is because the direction, control or supervision mentioned in the said provision pertains to the administrative control and supervision of the 2nd Defendant not the judicial powers of this Court as enshrined in the Constitution. In any case, the law is that where any provision of an Act of the National Assembly is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, that provision to the extent of its inconsistency is void. In other words, the provisions of Section 6 (2) of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act to the extent that it seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the Court as provided for in the constitution are void. See Section 3 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) On Section 367 (1), we humbly submit that the law is that where a statute seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court must interpret the said provisions narrowly and strictly too. See the case of BARCLAYS BANK V. C.B.N (1976) 1 ALL NLR 409 My Lord, Section 367(1) provides as follows: ‘‘Except with the prior approval of government, no police office shall institute any legal proceedings in his own personal interest in connection with matters arising out of his public duties.’’ It is the submission of Counsel that from the provisions reproduced above, it is clear that for the provision to be applicable the cause of action must be in connection with matters arising out of his public duties. The case before my Lord is a claim of wrongful suspension from service without affording the claimant the opportunity to be heard. According to Counsel the essence of Section 367 of the Police Regulation is to curtail Police individual actions against private citizens for injuries sustained while performing their public functions. It does not preclude officers from challenging wrongful termination of their employment or suspension. We equally urge the Court resolve this issue in favour of the Claimant. ISSUE THREE WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS IN VIEW OF SUIT NUMBER NICN/ABJ/316/2017. It is the contention of Counsel that the term "abuse of court process" connotes absolutely groundless and vexatious use of the judicial powers of the Court to annoy or irritate the other party or the Court. One of the instances, which to our mind mirror the first leg of the objection of the Defendants/Applicants is where a party files several suits against the same party in respect of the same subject matter in different courts. To support this contention Counsel relied on the case of FIDELITY BANK PLC V. MBACHU (2012) 1 NWLR (PT.1281) 260 @ 282 PARAS A-C, where the court captured the above stated principle thus: "The term "abuse of the process of Court" connotes vexatious or frivolous, a claim or defence not pleaded in good faith or honestly, a claim that is absolutely groundless, or the institution of multiple actions between the same parties over the same subject matter in different Courts. An action cannot be an abuse of process when the Plaintiff has locus standi and the statement of claim discloses a cause of action. In other words, a party who is exercising a Constitutional right cannot be said to be abusing the process of Court. In the instant case, the Respondents claim was not premised on frivolity or recklessness". It is the submission of Counsel that from the foregoing submissions, it could be deduced that for a suit to be said to be an abuse of Court process in respect of another pending matter, the following need be established: a. That there are more than one suit in two different courts between the same parties. b. That the cause of action and reliefs sought are the same. According to Counsel, the law is that the above stated situations must exist before a suit can be declared to be an abuse of the process of Court. We commend to my Lord the case of Ogoejeofo v. Ogoejeofo (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt.966) 205 at 222-223. In the case of Plateau State v. A.G Federation (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt.967) 346 at 393 paras F-G, the Supreme Court captured this trite principle of law as follows: "The institution of two suits will not amount to an abuse of court process where the parties in the two suits are different and the reliefs claimed are also not the same. Counsel submitted that taking a look at the suit before this Honourable Court and the suit mentioned in the complaint before this Court (which the Defendants did not exhibit to prove abuse), it is clear that the parties are not the same, the subject matter is not the same and the cause of action not the same. The two suits are separate suits filed against different persons on their own merits. Counsel urged the Court to so hold and resolve this issue in favour of the Claimant/Respondent. ISSUE FOUR WHETHER THE NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A DEMURRER AND THEREFORE INCOMPETENT. On this issue Counsel submitted that the law is settled that the practice of filing a notice of preliminary objection without filing a defence, otherwise known as demurrer is no longer allowed in our legal jurisprudence. Where a defendant intends to object to the jurisdiction of the Court, especially on issues that bother on abuse of Court process he must file a defence for such objection to be competent. On this submission Counsel cited the case of DISU V. AJILOWURA (2006) 14 NWLR (PT.1000) 783. It is also contended that where a Defendant alleges that there is an abuse of Court process is in the realm of estoppels per rem judicata, he ought to file and raise such objection in his defence. In the case of 001 V. IDALA (8 NWLR (PT. 875) 293, Niki Tobi, JSC held that the law is that estoppels per rem judicata is a special defence available to the defendant which must be specifically pleaded in the statement of defence. See also the case of PETKEV NIGERIA LIMITED & ANOR V. ELDER OBUMANYI OGBOGU & ANOR. (2016) LPELR - 400 (CA). Counsel contended that though the rules of this Honourable Court does not specifically provide for filing of a defence alongside a notice of preliminary objection, the Court was asked to invoke the provisions of Order 23 Rule 2(1) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 and apply Order 22 Rules 1 and 2 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules). Order 23 Rule 2 (1) provides thus: "Where no provision is made in these rules as a practice and procedure or where the provisions in these rules are inadequate with respect to any aspect of procedure or proceedings, any party to the proceedings may apply for leave of the Court to apply the rules of procedure of any High Court in Nigeria that will in the opinion of the Court do substantial justice to the parties in the particular circumstance. Counsel urged the Court to hold that failure to file a defence together with notice of preliminary objection makes the objection incompetent and therefore dismiss the objection. In concluding his submission Counsel submitted that the objection of the Defendants is misconceived and incompetent, and should be dismissed. REPLY ON POINS OF LAW ISSUE ONE. On issue one the Claimant contended that the suit is against the commission and not against its members or staff hence there is no need for pre-action notice as provided in section 20(2) (3) (4) of the police service Commission (Establishment) Act 2001. Our reply on issue one is that, the police service commission is a corporate entity hence it acts through its members and staff. Thus section 2 of the Act provide: "The management of the commission shall vest in the following members whose appointment shall be in line with the Federal character provision of the constitution; a. A chairman who shall be the chief executive officer of the commission. b. A retired Justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal. c. A retired police officer not below the rank of commissioner of police. d. One representatives each of: (i) Women interest (ii) The Nigeria press (iii) Non-Governmental/human right Organization in Nigeria (iv) Organised private sector (v) The secretary of the commission." It is submitted that from the above provisions, the commission can only act through its members and staff and since no suit shall lie against the actions of its staff and members unless pre-action notice is given, it invariably means that suits cannot lie against the commission without the pre-action notice first given. Counsel contended that the action of the commission which formed the basis of the claimant's suit was carried out by its chairman or members and staff. It is also the contention of Counsel that the petition the claimant deposed in paragraph 16 of his witness statement on oath that he wrote to the commission but was ignored was address to the chairman of the commission. Hence his complaint against the commission is predicted on the inaction of the chairman of the commission and thus requires the service of pre-action notice on the commission as provided in section 20 (3) of the commission's Establishment Act 2001. The section provides thus: ‘‘No suit shall be commenced against a member of the Commission, the secretary, officer or employee of the commission before the expiration of the period of one month after the written notice of the intention to commence the suit shall have been served upon the commission by the intending plaintiff or his agent. It is further submitted that the commission being an abstract entity cannot therefore act without its members and staff. Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the applicant's arguments that the suit is against the commission and not its members or staff hence it is not necessary for service of pre-action notice. The Court was also urged by Counsel to discountenance all the authorities cited in support thereof on this issue as those authorities are distinguishable from the instant suit. Issue two On whether this Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to determine matters bothering on the claimant's employment and whether section 367 of the police Regulation oust the jurisdiction of this court, the claimant contended that section 6(2) of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act and section 367 of the police Act and Regulation oust the jurisdiction of this court hence in conflict with section 254c of the 1999 constitution and thus void. On this contention, Counsel replied that sections 6(2) of the police service commission (Establishment) Act and section 367 of police Regulation did not oust the jurisdiction of this court. The two sections only provided conditions precedent which an applicant has to comply with before initiating an action against the commission of the 1st defendant. A statute providing condition precedent before instituting an action has been held not to amount to ouster of court's jurisdiction. Counsel referred to the case of NDC LTD. VS ASWB & ORS (2008)34 NSCQR Part 1 page 226 at 243 where the Supreme Court held on compliance with statutory notice as a condition precedent to instituting an action. "In my respectful view, the said provision is a condition precedent as far as suits against the 1st defendant/respondent are concerned. Therefore, the failure of the appellant to comply with it clearly makes the suit incompetent. Contrary to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, the provision does not seek to oust forever, the jurisdiction of the court but only temporarily. It just provides that unless the condition precedent is complied with a complainant or plaintiff cannot sue or initiate any action against the 1st defendant period. " Counsel also submitted that in the case of Ugwuanyi Vs NICON (2013) 53 NSCQR page 1 at 708 the Supreme Court Per C.M Chukwuma Eneh JSC held: ‘‘Flowing naturally from that reasoning is the fact that a pre-action notice is required by section 26(2) of the National Insurance Corporation Of Nigeria Act to be served on the respondents here and which section I have also found above forms part of the Appellant condition of appointment and that no pre-action notice has been duly served on the respondents in order to render the suit competently initiated." See also the case of Adejola Vs Bolarinwa (2011) 12 NWLR part 1261 pages 380 at 392-396. Counsel submitted that the provisions of sections 6(2) of the police service Commission (Establishment) Act and section 367 of police Regulation did not in any way oust the jurisdiction of this court as the claimant contended and his reliance on the case Barclays Bank Vs CBN (1976)1 ALL NLR 409 does not avail him and should be discountenance. Issue three. On whether the claimant suit constitutes, abuse of the process of this court, the claimant contended that the parties in this suit are not the same, the subject matter is not the same and the cause of action is not the same. On this contention of the claimant, Counsel replied that the parties are the same, the subject matter is the same and the cause of action is the same. In suit No. NICN/ABJ/361/2017, the parties are -DCP ABDULYARI S. VS IGP AND POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION and the subject matter is the suspension and conduct of disciplinary proceedings against the claimant. Similarly, in suit No. NICN/ABJ/316/2017, the parties are DCP ABDULYARI S. LAFIA VS IGP. The subject matter is the setting up of disciplinary panel to conduct disciplinary proceeding against the claimant. These two suits are pending before this court and Counsel urged this Court under section 122 of the Evidence Act 2011 to take judicial notice of his own records. The removal of Police service Commission in the first suit leaving the IGP does not affect the parties. This is because the reliefs of the claimant are targeted on the IGP in both suits. It is submitted further that a closer look at the two suits will revealed that, the reliefs are the same. In both suits the claimant is praying for declarations against the conduct of the defendants and an injunction to restrain the defendants. This is a clear case of abuse of court process. Counsel refer to the case of African Reinsurance Corp. Vs JDP Cons. Ltd (2003) 13 NSCQR page 226 at 248 per Niki Tobi JSC, where he held: ''Abuse of process of court is a term generally applied to a proceedings which is wanting in bona fide and is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. Abuse of process can also mean abuse of legal procedure or improper use of legal process as in this case. Abuse of process always involves some bias, malice, some deliberateness, some desire to misuse or pervert the system. There is said to be an abuse of the process of court when a party improperly uses the issue of the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent, such as instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues as in the instant case. Where the court comes to the conclusion that its process is abused, the proper order is the dismissal of the process. Counsel submitted that the argument of the claimant's counsel that the parties and subject matter are not the same is erroneous and we urged the Court to discountenance same. The claimant suits are meant to harass and annoy the defendants and nothing more. Issue four On whether the defendant’s notice of preliminary objection does not amount to a demurrer, we submit that the defendant preliminary objection does not amount to demurrer. Counsel submitted that the rules of this Honourable court did not make it mandatory for a statement of defence to be filed along with the preliminary objection of any defendant. And we believe the wisdom behind that is to avoid a situation where defendants are made to expend resources in filing defence only for the suit to be struck out for want of jurisdiction. It is our further submission that this Honourable court has its rules of procedure hence it is not bound to adopt the rules of the High Court as requested by a party of a party's counsel, especially where it considered that the overall interest of justice, equity and convenience of parties will not be achieved. And that no party will be overreached and that such adoption will not lead to miscarriage of justice or create any undue advantage. See the proviso to order 23 rules 2(2) of the Rules of this court. Counsel also submitted that the preliminary objection of the defendants is not predicated only on abuse of court process but also on the ground that the suit of the claimant is incompetent for non-compliance with conditions precedent to initiation of this suit and thus rob this court of the jurisdiction to try same. The argument of the claimant's counsel that the preliminary objection is only on abuse of court process is erroneous. His reliance on the cases of Disu Vs Ajilowura 2006 14 NWLR part 1000 page 783, Odi Vs Idala NWLR part 875 page 293 and PETKEV Nig. Ltd & Anor Vs Elder Obumanyi Ogbogu & Anor 2016 LPELR -400 (CA) is also erroneous as those cases are distinguishable from the instant case. Counsel urged the Court to countenance them. In concluding his argument Counsel urged the Court to uphold the defendants' preliminary objection and dismiss the claimant's suit No. NICN/ABJ/361/2017, filed on the iz" December, 2017 when the claimant suit No.NICN/ABJ/316/2017, filed on the 3rd COURT’S DECISION I have considered all the processes filed in this suit, as well as the oral and written submission of Counsel for both parties. In my view the issues calling for resolution as per this notice of preliminary objection are: 1. ‘‘Whether the provisions of section 20 (2), (3) and (4), section 6(2) of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) ACT, and section 367 of the Police Regulations have laydown conditions precedents to be fulfilled before instituting an action before a Court of Law’’. 2. ‘‘Whether having regards to suit NICN/ABJ/316/2017 this suit is an abuse of the process of this Court’’. By way of an objection the Claimant in opposing the notice of preliminary objection raised the issue of demurer. According to the Claimant the notice of preliminary objection is against the rule of demurer. According to Counsel the issues raised in the notice of preliminary objection are issues that ought to be raised in defence to this action and not before defence has been filed. Counsel relied on Order 23 of the Rules of this Court and submitted that the said order has allowed this Court to resort to other Court Rules in determining issues brought before the Court. Counsel then urged this Court to rely of Order 22 of the Federal Capital Territory High Court and apply doctrine of demurer in this case and refused the notice of preliminary objection. In response to this submission Counsel for the Defendants/Applicants submitted that the notice of preliminary objection was in order it is allowed by the rules of this. Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the Claimant’s submission on this issue. The rules of this Court in orders 17 and 18 has made ample provisions for raising preliminary objection before filing of defence. The rules are sufficient and adequate to carter for hearing and determining of objection. There is therefore no need to resort to other Courts rules in dealing with this issue. Even the provisions of Order 23 of the rules of this Court has made resorting to other rules of Courts to be only in situations where there are no provisions in the rules of this Court on an issue or where the rules of this Court are in adequate to deal with situation that arises. None of the situation that may allow resorting to other Courts rules has arisen in this case. I therefore decline to resort to the rules of the High Court of the Federal Capita; Territory Abuja in dealing with this application. It is also to be noted that issue that the present notice of preliminary objection presented for determination borders of issue of jurisdiction, and it is trite law that issue of jurisdiction being the lifeblood of an action once raised must be determined by the Court before proceeding with the matter. The reason being that any proceeding conducted without jurisdiction is a nullity no matter how well conducted. Thus why, the issue can be raised at any time even for the first time at the Supreme Court. SAUDE V ABDULLAHI (1989) 4 NWLR (PT.116) 387, OBIAKOR V STATE (2003) 10 NWLR (PT.776) 612, UCHWGBU V THE SHELL DEV. CO. LTD (2009) LPELR-8891(CA). Given the position of the law I hold that the notice of preliminary objection is properly before the Court. Having dealt with the preliminary issue, I shall now, proceed to determine the issues for resolution. Issue one. It is the position of the Defendants/Applicants that the provisions of section 20 (2) (3) and (4) and section 6(2) of the Police Service Commission Act, and section 367 of the Police Regulation have made provisions for conditions precedent to be fulfilled before an action can be commenced. It is the case of the Defendants that it is mandatory to serve the 2nd Defendant with pre-action notice and that failure to give pre-action notice is fatal to the Claimant’s action. The Claimant on his part has argued through his Counsel that the provisions of the law being relied upon by the Defendants on pre-action notice is not applicable in this case since the present action is against the Commission and not against any of its members, secretary or any other officer or employee of the Commission. It is also part of the objection that this Court cannot in contravention of section 6(2) give directives to the 2nd Defendant. It is also submitted that section 367 of the police regulation has not been complied with, as there is no evidence that the Claimant has obtained approval of Government before rushing to Court to institute this action. In response the Counsel for the Claimant contended that the provision of section 6(2) of the Police Service Commission Act is not applicable in this case. This is because the direction, control or supervision mentioned in the said provision pertains to the administrative control and supervision of the 2nd Defendant not the judicial powers of this Court as enshrined in the Constitution. In any case, the law is that where any provision of an Act of the National Assembly is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, that provision to the extent of its inconsistency is void. In other words, the provisions of Section 6 (2) of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act, is in conflict with the provisions of section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), as the said law seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the Court as provided for in the constitution. To that extent it is null and void to the extent of its inconsistency as provided by section 3 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). The law as I know it, is that a law which prescribes condition that have to be fulfilled or complied with before a person can commence or institute legal proceedings against anybody or person does not constitute a denial to access to the court by anyone wishing to do so and is not unconstitutional or inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution see Madukolu V Nkendillim (1962) 1 All NLR 587, this case decided that any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction of a Curt must be fulfilled. In other words, where a statute provide for a condition precedent to the commencement of an action, failure or neglect to fulfilled or complied with the condition will deny the court jurisdiction to hear the matter. In Saude V Abdallah (1989) 4 NWLR (pt 116) 387, the supreme court held that proceeding before a court of law will be regarded as a nullity where the case before the court was not initiated by due process of law, or that there is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. The court also held that there is non-compliance with due process of law when the procedural requirements have not been complied with, or the preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction have not been complied with. In such a circumstance, the defect is fatal to the competence of the trial court to entertain the suit. This is because the court will in such a situation not be seized with jurisdiction in respect of the action see Abakaliki Local Government Council V Abakaliki Mils Owners Enterprises of Nigeria (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt 155) 182 @ 190. The University of Ife V Fawehinmi Construction Co Ltd (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt 201) 26 @ 37 and 38, Nigerian Cement Company V Nigeria Railway Corporation &Anr. (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt. 220) 747 @761, Anambra State Government V Nwankwo & Ors.(1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 418) 245 @ 256 and 257. It is lucid from the foregoing authorities that for a court of law to be competent to exercise jurisdiction over a matter all conditions precedents to exercise of jurisdiction must be fulfilled. This has not been disputed by the parties in this case. The only area of dispute is that, to the Defendants/Applicants the provision of section 20 (2), (3) and (4) section 6(2) of the Police Service Commission Act and section 367 of the Police Regulation have mandatorily imposed conditions precedent to be fulfilled before an action can be commenced by the Claimant. While the Claimant/Respondent on his part is contending that the so called conditions precedent are not applicable to him as Claimant. For proper appreciation of the position of law, it is pertinent at this juncture to consider the proper meaning of the word condition and the words condition precedent. In Orakul Resources Ltd V N. C. C. (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1060) 270 @ 307, the Court of Appeal define ‘’condition’’ to mean ‘’ a provision which makes the existence of a right dependent on the happening of an event; the right is then conditional as opposed to an absolute right. A true condition is where the event on which the existence of the right depend is in the future and uncertain’’. In the same case condition precedent was defined as ‘’one on which delays the vesting of a right until the happening of an event’’. In order to ascertain whether the provisions being relied upon by the Defendants/Applicants to raise this objection applies to this suit, the relevant provisions will be examined. They are, as follows: Section 20 (2), (3) & (4) Provides: ‘‘Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or enactment, no suit shall lie against any member of the Commission, the secretary or any other officer or employee of the commission for any Act done in pursuance or any public duty or authority in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act or such law or enactment, duty or authority shall lie or be instituted in any court unless. (a) It is commenced within three months next after the act neglect or default complained of or, (b) In case of a continuation of damage or injury within six months next after the ceasing thereof, (3) No suit shall be commenced against a member of the commission, the secretary, officer or employee of the commission before the expiration of the period on one month after the written notice of the intention to commence the suit shall have been served upon the commission by the intending plaintiff or his agent. (4) The notice referred to in subsection (3) of this section shall clearly and explicitly state the cause of action, the particulars of the claim, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claim. Section 6(2) provides: ‘‘The Commission shall not be subject to the direction, control or supervision of any authority or person or performance of its functions other than as is provided in this Act. Section 367(1) provides: ‘‘except with the prior approval of government, no police officer shall institute any legal proceedings in his own personal interest in connection with matters arising out of his public duties’’. The resolution of the issue depends on proper construction of the above quoted provisions of the law. It is to be noted at the onset that the objective of any interpretation is to discover the intention of the makers of the document or law to be interpreted. The duty of the court is to interpret and give adequate and as close as possible accurate and ordinary meaning to the words used in the document, unless this would lead to absurdity or be in conflict with other provisions of the document. This means a clause in a document should be construed as a whole and should be given an interpretation consistent with the object and general context of the entire document. CHIEF D. O. IFEAZU V LIVINUS MBADIGHA & ANOR 1984 5 SC 79, ALHAJI IBRAHIM V GALADIMA BARDE AND ORS. 1996 9 NWLR PT.474 513, Ardo V Nyako (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1416) 591 @b 628, PWTH AG V. CEDDI CORP LTD (2012) 2 NWLR (pt 1285) 465 @ 489. Ekeagu V Aliri (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 179) 258 @ 377. Ministry of Education Anambra state (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt 1427) 351 @ 377. In interpretation, Court is enjoined to read every word or clause in the document and construe them not in isolation but with reference to the context and other clauses in the document so as to get the real intention of the parties. Amaechi V INEC (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt1040) 504 @ 536. It is equally important to point out here that the obscurity or doubt of any particular word or words in a document may be removed by reference to associated words, and the meaning of a term may be enlarged or restricted by referring to the object of the whole clause in which it is used, see Ekpo V Calabar Local Government (1993)3 NWLR (Pt. 281) 324 @341. Before embarking on interpretation of the provisions of the law under consideration, it is right to bear in mind that the well-established principle of law is that, the safer and more correct approach in dealing with question of interpretation is to take the words of the document or statute themselves and arrive, if possible at their meaning without, in the first instance, resorting to other aids. The provisions of section 20 (3), section 6(2) of the Police service Commission (Establishment) Act, and section 367 of the Police regulation should under the cardinal principles of interpretation and construction of statue be given their plain, ordinary natural grammatical and literal meaning and the court of law is without power to input into the meaning of a word, clause or section or sub-section of a statute something that they did not say. BRONIK MOTORS LTD ANOR V WEMA BANK LTD (1983) 6 SC 158, BOARD OF CUSTOM EXERCIS V BARAU (1982) 10 SC 48. A careful perusal of the provision of section 20 (3) of the Police Service Commission, (Establishment) Act will revealed that the sub-section make provisions for giving pre-action notice to the 2nd Defendant in situations where a member of the 2nd Defendant, Secretary, an officer or employee of the 2nd Defendant is to be made a party to a suit before a Court of law. It is to be noted that the law says in plain and unambiguous terms that no suit shall be commenced against a member of the commission, the secretary, officer or employee of the commission before the expiration of the period on one month after the written notice of the intention to commence the suit shall have been served upon the commission by the intending plaintiff or his agent. This did not capture situations where it is the Commission that is to be sue or made party to an action. This interpretation is in consonance with the settled principle of law on agency and juristic personality. The 2nd Defendant as per section 1(2) (b) of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act clothe with legal personality to sue or be sued. And in any event the acts of the 2nd Defendant cannot be acts of a member, secretary, officer or employee of the 2nd Defendant the reason being that the 2nd defendant is principal to the members, secretary and employees of the 2nd Defendant. I therefore hold that the 2nd Defendant in this suit is not entitled to be served with a pre-action notice since none of the members or secretary or employee of the 2nd Defendant is to be sued or was a party before the court. On section 6(2) of the Police service Commission (Establishment) Act, it provides that the 2nd Defendant shall not be subject to the direction, control or supervision of any authority or person or performance of its functions other than as is provided in this Act, the provision says what it says. Without stretching the law too far, it is manifest from the wordings of the law that the direction control or supervision being referred to is in respect of the provisions of the Act in carrying out executive function. This section does not and cannot be interpreted to include direction, control or supervision by a court of law. If the section is interpreted to exclude judicial direction, control. Or supervision then the sub-section is in conflict with doctrine of separation of power enshrined in the Constitution and will be in conflict with the Court judicial powers under section 6 of the Constitution as amendment and the section will be null and void to the extent of its inconsistency. See section 1(3) of the Constitution as amended. In view of this I hold that section 6(2) of the Police Service Commission (Establishment) Act does not lay any condition precedent to be fulfilled and is not relevant to the proceedings before the Court. On section 367 of the Police Regulation that require obtaining Government approval before instituting this action, it should be noted that all the case laws dealing with condition precedent were talking of constitution or statutory provisions. Police regulation is not a statute in the strict sense. The tenor of this provision is to restrict access of court by officers aggrieved and wishing to ventilate their grievance before a Court of law. If approval is sought and denied then the person seeking the approval is deprived of the exercise of his constitutional right of access to court. To this extent the regulation is not a condition precedent to be fulfilled before accessing Court of law. The second issue is that of abuse of process to the Defendant the existence of suit No. NICN/ABJ/316/2017 has rendered the current suit an abuse of process of court. While to the Claimant the said suit is not same with the case at hand. Such a manner as to interfere with the administration of justice. These principles have been enunciated in several decisions of the Supreme Court and court of appeal. OKAFOR V ATTORNEY GENERAL ANAMBRA STATE 1991 6 NWLT PT 659 SARAKI V KOTOE 1992 9 NWLR 156 188. In NV SCHEEP V MV S ARUZ 2000 12 SC SCNJ 61, karibi-whte as he then was says ‘‘an abuse of the judicial process means that the process of the court has not been used bona fide and properly. See also FRN V ABIOLA 1997 10 NWLR 444. Applying the above principle of law regarding abuse of process, a careful perusal of the claim in both NICN/ABJ/316/2017 and NICN/ABUJA/361/2017, it will be seen that claims before the Court are similar to each other on the same issue i.e disciplinary action or procedure taken against the Claimant. However, there are difference in terms of parties in the two cases in the suit instituted earlier on 3/11/17 NICN/ABJ/316/2017 there are two parties Applicant and Respondent. The Applicant in that case is the Claimant in this case and the Respondent in that case is the 1st Defendant in this case. While the 2nd Defendant in this case did not feature in this earlier case. From the finding it is without doubt that the Claimant in this suit has sued the 1st Defendant twice on same issue this is a clear use of the process of the Court to harass and intimidate the 1st Claimant in the circumstance, the name of the 1st Defendant is hereby struck out from this suit on ground of multiplicity of action against him on same issue. In the whole based on finding of the Court as enumerated above the orders of the Court is as stated below: 1. The provisions of section 20 (2), (3) and (4) of the Police Service Commission (establishment) Act is not applicable to this suit. 2. The provision of section 6(2) in so far as it attempt to circumscribe the judicial powers of this Court as enshrined in the Constitution is null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 3. The provision of section 367 of Police Regulation not relevant to this suit. 4. The name of 1st Defendant in this suit is hereby struck out due multiplicity of action on same issue Sanusi Kado, Judge