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JUDGMENT. This suit was commenced on 30/1/17, at Federal High Court, Umuahia Judicial Division as suit No. FHC/UM/CS/11/2017. However, vide an order made on 7/7/17, this suit was transferred to this Court due to lack of jurisdiction on part of the Federal High Court to hear and determine the suit. On 31/10/17, when this matter came up before the Court for the first time, parties were ordered to refile their processes in conformity with the rules of this Court. The Claimant on 4/12/17, refiled his originating motion on notice, dated 7/2/17 praying for: 1. An Order of Certiorari to remove into the National Industrial Court of Nigeria for the purpose of its being quashed the decision(s) of the 1st Defendant, that the Claimant/Applicant be removed from high judicial office, to wit as a judge of the High Court of Abia State; 2. An Order of Certiorari to remove into the National Industrial Court of Nigeria for the purpose of its being quashed the decision(s) communicated by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant (by letter, Ref No. NJC/S. 19/Ab. HC/27/1/78 dated 21st December 2016) recommending that the 2nd Defendant “…take necessary action to carry out further investigations and report the outcome to the Honourable, thy Chief Justice of Nigeria and Chairman of the National Judicial Council. 3. An Order of Certiorari to remove into the National Industrial Court of Nigeria for the purpose of its being quashed the decision(s) communicated by the 1st Defendant to the Claimant (by letter, Ref No. NJC/S.19AB. HC/27/1/77 dated 16th December 2016) suspending the Claimant from high judicial office to wit as judge of the High Court of Abia State. 4. An Order of Certiorari to remove into the National Industrial Court of Nigeria for the purpose of its being quashed the decision(s) of the 1st Defendant, at its meeting held on the 15th of December, 2016 which recommended to the 3rd Defendant (i.e the Governor of Abia State) “the removal of Hon. Justice U. Ononogbo from office for gross misconduct”. 5. An Order of Prohibiting the 3rd Defendant (i.e the Governor of Abia State) from proceeding with the “the removal of Hon. Justice U. Ononogbo from office for gross misconduct; 6. An Order that this Application shall operate as a stay of the proceedings to which the application relates until the determination of the application or until the judge otherwise orders; and 7. For such further or other Orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The grounds for this application are as follows: 1. That the Defendant’s decision to recommend that the Claimant be removed from the high office of a judge of the High Court of Abia State, “by dismissal for misconduct” to the Governor of Abia State (3rd Defendant) is unwarranted, draconian, high-handed and or irregular, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. That the 1st Defendant’s decision to forward the Claimant’s name to the 2nd Defendant is unwarranted, draconian, high-handed and or irregular, having regard to the findings contained in the “Report of the National Judicial Council Investigation Committee on allegations against the Plaintiff dated 7th of December, 2016. 3. That having regard to the circumstances, it would be inimical and invidious for the 3rd Defendant to take steps to remove the Claimant from high office as a judge of the High Court of Abia State while litigation is pending 4. That having regard to the circumstances, it would be inimical and invidious for the 2nd Defendant to take steps to investigate the Claimant while litigation is pending. 5. The Claimant being aggrieved by the recommendations of Defendant, has brought this application in order to seek redress as allowed by extant law. The motion on notice was brought pursuant to Order 48 Rule 3 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. In support of this application a 35 paragraphs affidavit in support was filed and exhibits attached therein. An 11 paragraphs further and better affidavit was also filed by the Claimant. The crux of the facts as contained in the affidavit in support of the originating motion are that on 22/8/13, the Claimant while serving as vacation judge heard motion on notice and granted same. On 18/9/13, the Claimant vacated the order made on 22/8/13 and granted another order. See exhibits A, B, and C. It was also stated that there was no appeal against the orders made by the Claimant. Vide exhibit D a petition was written to the 1st Defendant against the Claimant. Consequent, upon which the 1st Defendant set up an investigation committee, to investigate the allegations contained in exhibit D. It was averred that in the course of the sitting of the 1st Defendant’s Investigation Committee, neither the parties to suit leading to the orders nor the counsel who appeared on their behalf validated any accusation of wrong doing. It was stated that unless the findings and recommendations of the 1st Defendant are quashed by this Honourable Court, the Claimant will be removed from office by way of dismissal for misconduct by the Governor of Abia State. It was further stated that unless the findings and recommendations of the 1st Defendant are quashed, the Claimant dismissed by the Governor of Abia State, the Claimant shall be subject matter of a police investigation despite the non-existence of any shred of evidence that she partook in the sharing of any money as confirmed by the Investigative Committee of the Defendant in Exhibit J. it was stated that it has now become imperative to seek the reliefs contained in this application. That should the 3rd Defendant act on the recommendation of the 1st Defendant, the Claimant will no longer be able to apply either as a judicial officer or as a legal practitioner and my whole life endeavor (including my service in all cadres of the magistracy) would be forfeited. That since the announcement of the recommendation for removal of the Claimant by the 1st Defendant through various print and electronic media (including the all – pervasive social media) the Claimant has been exposed to ridicule, Odium and scorn and the Claimant has been shunned and avoided and visited with ill will and disaffection. That despite exhibits A, B, C, G, and H tendered the 1st Defendant made recommendations for removal of the Claimant as follows: i. Made a recommendation to the Governor of Abia State (3rd Defendant) for the removal of the Claimant from office by dismissal for misconduct; ii. Addressed a letter to the Claimant dated the 16th of December, 2016, with reference no: NJC/S.19/AB.HC/27/1/77 and titled “SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE”, suspending me from office pending when the Governor of Abia State will Act on its recommendation. (The letter dated the 16th of December, 2016, with reference no: NJC/S.19/AB.HC/27/1/77 is herewith annexed and marked Exhibit K); and iii. The 1st Defendant also wrote a letter to the 2nd Defendant (Assistant Inspector – General of Police Zone 9 Headquarters) dated the 21st of December, 2016 with ref no: NJC/S.19/AB.HC/27/1/78, directing him to investigate the Claimant, as soon as the Governor of Abia State acts on its recommendation. The aforesaid letter herewith annexed and marked Exhibit L. The Claimant being aggrieved by the recommendations of the 1st Defendant, has brought this application in order to seek prerogative order of certiorari quashing the recommendations and order of prohibition. Ikoro N. Ikoro, Esq: Counsel for the Claimant, in adumbration of the Claimant position relied on all the averments in the affidavit in support of the Originating motion, as well the further and better affidavit in support. Counsel also adopted the written address filed along with the Originating motion and the amended reply on points of law dated 17/5/18. In the written address Counsel distilled single issue for determination to wit: ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION Counsel submitted sole issue below for determination. “Whether the decision and or recommendations made by the 1st Defendant in the circumstances of this case were fair, just and reasonable? ARGUMENT OF SOLE ISSUE The issue which has been nominated for determination is, whether the decisions and or recommendations made by the 1st Defendant in the circumstances of this case were fair, just and reasonable? In arguing this issue, Counsel answer the question posed without hesitation in the negative and submitted that this Honourable Court would have no difficulty in finding that the decisions/recommendations of the 1st Defendant to: i. recommend to the Governor of Abia State (3rd Defendant) the removal of the Plaintiff from office by dismissal for misconduct; ii. suspend the Plaintiff from office pending when the Governor of Abia State will Act on its recommendation. iv. Direct the 2nd Defendant to investigate the Plaintiff, as soon as the Governor of Abia State acts on its recommendation. Were not fair, just and reasonable based on the peculiar circumstances of this case. Counsel refers to the provisions of section 292 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as Amended, and submitted that a careful examination of section 292 (2) reveals in clear terms the devastating and castrating effect of removal from judicial office for any reason whatsoever. What this comes to, is that whether the 1st Defendant’s recommendation is fair, just and reasonable would require this Honourable Court to bear in mind that if a Judicial Officer can be removed on grounds that are not earth shaking, that decision cannot be fair. The inevitable question at this juncture, is whether the processes before this court, which are in the form of relevant exhibits disclose circumstances that ought to be considered as earth shaking. In that connection, the question which absolutely begs an answer, is whether Exhibits A,B,C,G and H tendered by the Claimant to the 1st Defendant’s investigative committee counts for nothing? This question arises because if they indeed counted for something then the investigative committee would not have made the findings and recommendations in exhibit J. Exhibit C unequivocally discloses that on the 22nd day of August, 2013, when the Plaintiff sat over the matter subject matter of the petition and heard the motion dated 15th August, 2013 (Exhibit A), all parties to the suit were represented in court by counsel, all counsel agreed that they had been served with the two motions and that they had no objection to the prayers contained therein. This also was the case on the 18th of September, 2013 when the motion dated 16th September, 2013 (Exhibit B) came up for hearing. The Claimant thereon, on both occasion exercised her judicial discretion in the interest of justice by granting the orders as prayed. It is the contention of Counsel that the principles guiding the exercise of judicial discretion were adhered to by the Claimant, as the orders granted by her were founded upon facts and circumstances presented before the court from which she drew a conclusion which was governed by law. The Claimant exercised her discretion honestly and in the spirit of the law. On this contention Counsel relied on TANKO v. STATE (2009) 4 NWLR Pt. 1131 at Pg 457, paras. E-G. It is the contention of Counsel that the orders granted on the 22nd of August, 2013 and 22nd of September, 2013 were not illegal and unlawful and have not been shown to have fallen outside the ambits of law or statute by anybody including investigative committee of the 1st Defendant. Therefore to label the said orders reckless, as the investigative committee of the 1st Defendant did, is most unfair, unjust and unreasonable as the Claimant exercised the required care and skill required of her in exercising her discretion, when she granted the said orders as evidenced by Exhibit C. Counsel referred to the 1st Defendant’s Investigative Committee’s finding in paragraph vi of page 19 of exhibit J and submitted that this finding, most especially the part which alludes to an abuse of judicial discretion by the Plaintiff, is not only unjust, unfair and unreasonable but also untenable, the finding is sweeping. This is so because the Committee failed to demonstrate fully the ingredients of abuse of judicial discretion which it found against the Plaintiff. On this contention Counsel relied on the case of MR. ANDREW D. EMUEZE & ORS v. GOVERNOR OF DELTA STATE & ORS (2014) LPELR – 23201(CA) (Pp.37-39, paras. F-D). It is the contention of Counsel that the committee did not demonstrate how the Plaintiff failed to take into consideration relevant laws or how the orders granted by the Claimant were arbitrary or an unreasonable departure from precedent and well settled judicial tradition or custom. Counsel also submitted that the Committee in its findings in paragraphs xii and Xiii at page 21 of Exhibit J and submitted by the two findings the Committee came to a clear conclusion that the Claimant did not benefit from the sum N 200,000,000 (Two Hundred Million naira). However, in paragraph 9.4 at page 23 of Exhibit J, the committee went ahead and recommended that the Claimant alongside the Assistant Chief Registrar, Probate Division of Abia State High Court be handed over to appropriate law enforcement agency for further investigation (2nd Defendant). The 1st defendant has since given effect to this recommendation as evidence by Exhibit L. it is submitted that this recommendation is also not just, fair and reasonable, being that was no evidence to substantiate allegations against the Claimant of partaking in the sharing N200,000,000 (Two Hundred Million naira) withdrawn as a result of the second Order made by the Claimant on the 19th September, 2013. Counsel invite the attention of this Honourable Court, to the following facts namely: It is the contention of Counsel that having regard to the fact that the lawyer E.M Ojiako Esq (whose name featured several times in the report of the 1st Defendant’s Investigative Committee) was Counsel on record to late Lord Chief Dike Udensi Ifegwu’s Estate, it seem invidious to hold that the Claimant was reckless in making an Order which was not opposed by counsel on all sides. Notwithstanding, that the records of proceedings of the 1st Defendant’s Investigative Committee shows that N83,000,000 (Eight-Tree Million Naira) out of the N200,000,000 (Two Hundred Million Naira) in question was paid to the Probate Registry, the Investigative Committee still found itself embroiled in chasing the question whether or not the sum of N200,000,000 (Two Hundred Million Naira) was shared. It is submitted that having exculpated the Plaintiff from liability arising from any corrupt practice, is there any further reason to recommend the crushing investigation of the Claimant by an Officer as high as an Assistant Inspector General of Police? We see none It is the submission of Counsel that the totality of the findings and recommendation in Exhibit J are unfair, unjust and unreasonable given the facts and circumstances surrounding the petition investigated by the 1st Defendant’s Investigative Committee, hence the need for this Honourable Court to quash all decisions made by the 1st Defendant as a result of the contents of Exhibit J by way of an order of Certiorari. On this submission Counsel cited the cases of FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT V. GOVERNOR MID-WESTERN STATE & ORS (1973) LPELR-1269(SC) (P.16, paras.D-F) and JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION OF CROSS RIVER STATE & ANOR. V. DR. (MRS). ASARI YOUNG (2013) LPELR-20592(SC) (P. 38-39, paras. E-Z). HEAD OF FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT V. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MID-WEST STATE & ANOR (1974) LPELR-1360(SC) (P.52, paras. A-F). Counsel urged this Honourable Court in the light of all the facts deposed to in the supporting affidavit as well as the exhibits annexed as well as the authorities cited, to decide this issue in favour of the Claimant. In conclusion counsel submitted that in the light of the facts deposed to in the supporting affidavit, this court will be on a strong wicket if it grants the reliefs sought. THE 1ST DEFENDANT’S CASE In opposition to this application, the 1st Defendant filed a 21 paragraphs counter-affidavit deposed by one Florence Bintu-Shik, a Deputy Director (Admin) with the 1st Defendant and Secretary of the 1st Defendant’s investigation Committee. The 1st Defendant also filed amended written address in opposition to this application. Dr. Elijah Oluwatoyin Okebukola, Esq; Counsel for the 1st Defendant in his oral submission before the Court relied on the deposition in the counter-affidavit. Counsel emphasized that paragraph 5 of the Counter-affidavit and submitted that the averment contained facts showing recklessness on part of the Claimant. Counsel also adopted the amended written address as his argument on this application. Counsel also objected to the use of amended reply on points of law. Counsel started his submission with preliminary objection on points of jurisdiction. It is the submission of Counsel that the suit was initially erroneously filed by the Claimant at the Federal High Court, Umuahia, Abia state. The Federal High Court found that the suit relates to the exclusive jurisdictional competence of the National Industrial Court as provided by section 254 C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, and section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. The Federal High Court therefore correctly found that the matter is one to be transferred to the National Industrial Court. However, the Federal High Court mistakenly, inadvertently or erroneously transferred the matter pursuant to Order 29 Rule 5 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 and section 22 (2) of the Federal High Court Act which authorizes transfer from the Federal High Court to the High Court of a State or High Court of the Federal Capital Territory. Counsel urged the Court to hold that Order 29 Rule 5 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 and section 22 (2) of the Federal High Court Act do not empower the Federal High Court to transfer a case to the National Industrial Court. On the contrary, it is submitted that the power to transfer a case from the Federal High Court to the National Industrial Court is provided and granted by section 24 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the matter must be properly commenced for the Court to assume jurisdiction. It is the contention of Counsel that if the Court agrees that section 24 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act is the proper basis for assuming jurisdiction in this matter and not Order 29 Rule 5 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 and section 22 (2) of the Federal High Court Act, the Court should decline to assume jurisdiction on the basis of Order 29 Rule 5 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 and section 22 (2) of the Federal High Court Act. Rather, we urge the Court to assume jurisdiction on the basis of section 24 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION After argument on preliminary objection, Counsel identified lone issue for determination, to wit: ‘‘Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought given the facts and circumstances of this case’’. LEGAL ARGUMENTS ON THE ISSUES. In arguing this issue, Counsel submitted and urges the Honourable Court to hold that the Claimant has not established any reasonable grounds to justify the relief of certiorari sought against the 1st Defendant. Counsel urged the Court to follow the decision of the Court in the case of EZENWA v BESTWAY ELECTRIC MFT CO LTD (1999) 18 NWLR (PT 613) 61 at 82 that laid down the condition for grant of prerogative order of certiorari. Counsel submitted going by the criteria for grant of certiorari, the case of the Claimants does not fall under any of the judicially recognized criteria for the grant of the prerogative order of certiorari Counsel invite the attention of the Court to pages 2 and 4 of Exhibit C and urge the Court to find that the Claimant made two Orders in Exhibit C attached to the Claimant's affidavit in support. The first Order at page 2 of Exhibit C was for "any sum’’ and the second order at page 4 of Exhibit C was for "any money’’ demanded by the Probate Registrar as probate fees on the estate of Late Chief Lord Dike Udensi Ifeagwu to be paid into the personal account of a private legal practitioner and not even the account of the Probate Registry. Counsel urged the Court to find, from paragraph 8.0 of the Claimant's Exhibit J, that as a result of the said orders, N200,OOO,OOO {Two Hundred Million Naira} was drawn from the account of Late Chief Dike Udensi Ifeagwu but only the sum of N83,OOO,OOO {Eighty-Three Million Naira} of the N200,OOO,OOO {Two Hundred Million Naira} drawn as probate fees was actually paid to the Probate Registry as assessed probate fees on estate of Late Chief Lord Udensi Dike Ifeagwu. It is further contended that the Court will find from the same Exhibit J that: but for the Claimant's orders in issue, the sum of N200,OOO,OOO {Two Hundred Million Naira} would not have been paid as probate fees into the account of a private legal practitioner out of which only the sum of N83,OOO,OOO {Eighty-Three Million Naira} was actually paid to the Probate Registry as assessed probate fees. In addition, Counsel urged the Court to find, from paragraph 9.2 of the Claimant's Exhibit J that, after investigating allegations made against the Claimant, the 1st Defendant arrived at the conclusion that the orders were reckless and amount to misconduct on the part of the Claimant. On this premise, the 1st Defendant took disciplinary action against the Claimant. It is the contention of Counsel that the question that now arises is whether the above facts are such that form the grounds for an order of certiorari. In this regard, Counsel urged the Court to consider whether from the available records the 1st defendant has acted ultra vires its jurisdiction in (i) investigating the Claimant, (ii) making factual findings and (iii) recommending the removal of the Claimant as a judicial officer. Counsel urged the Court to follow the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of EKANEM v OBU {2010} LPELR-4084 {CA). To determine whether the 1st Defendant acted ultra vires, Counsel refers the Court to paragraph 21 (d) of item I of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution (as amended), and urged the Court to hold that the cited constitutional provision empowers the 1st Defendant to investigate and recommend the Claimant for removal based on misconduct. On this, Counsel refer to and urge the Court to follow the decision in ELELU-HABEEB & ANOR v A.G FEDERATION (2012) 2. S.C (PT1) 145 at 225-226 paras. 5-20. Counsel submitted applying the principles enunciated in the case of ELELU-HABEEB & ANOR v A.G FEDERATION (supra) to the facts of this suit, the 1st Defendant acted within the scope of its power when it investigated, exercised disciplinary control and recommended the Claimant for removal as a judicial officer. Counsel urged the Court to hold that to prove an error on the face of the records it must be established that the inferior court, tribunal or body misconstrued or gave an incorrect meaning to legal rules which it has been empowered to apply to the facts of the case before it. An error on the face of the record is an error of law. Counsel urged the Honourable Court to hold, that in determining whether there is an error on the face of the record, the Court is not concerned with the finding of fact by the inferior court, tribunal or body but on the proper interpretation and application of the law to the facts. To this extent, the Court is not allowed, in judicial review, to substitute its own decision with that of the inferior court, tribunal or body. On this point, Counsel urged the Court to follow the decision of Supreme Court in A.C.B PLC v NWAIGWE & 2 ORS (2011) LPELR- SC.3S/2001 where the Supreme Court held that in an application for judicial review, "the Court is usually concerned with legality and not with the merit of the proceedings, decisions or acts of the affected inferior court, tribunal or governmental bodies ". Counsel urged the Court to hold that there is nothing legally erroneous in: (i) the investigation of the Claimant by the 1st Defendant; (ii) the procedure adopted by the 1st Defendant; (iii) the decisions of the 1st Defendant. For this purpose, Counsel urged the Court to find that the 1st Defendant acted in accordance with the law when: It set up a committee to investigate the petition against the Claimant; It afforded both the petitioner and the Claimant equal opportunity to present their case. Claimant and the petitioner both called their witnesses, they were allowed to cross examine witnesses from both sides and to address the investigating panel. It based its decisions on the evidence before it that: 1. The Claimant granted orders directing that any money to be charged as probate fees by the Probate Registrar be paid into the personal account of a private legal practitioner 2. As a result, N200,000,000 (Two Hundred Million Naira) was withdrawn as probate fees 3. Only the sum of N83,OOO,OOO (Eighty-Three Million Naira) was paid as assessed probate fees. 4. No Assessment Form from the Probate Registry was placed before the Claimant in granting her orders. 5. No Proof of Hearing Notice on the parties mentioned in the Motion was in the Court's File before the Claimant granted her orders. 6. There were discrepancies in the order in which the parties appeared on the record of proceedings of the Claimant marked as Exhibit C-in the Claimant's motion and the certified copy of the order attached to the petition marked as Exhibit D in the Claimant's motion on notice. Counsel submitted that the Claimant's application and supporting documents do not show any error in the proceedings of the 1st Defendant either by way of misapplication of the law to the Claimant or misconstruction of the provisions of the law with regards the exercise of the powers of the 1st Defendant. Counsel invite the attention of the Court to paragraph 6 of the 1st Defendant's Counter Affidavit and paragraphs 12, 15 and 16 of the Claimant's Affidavit in support of Motion which goes to show complete compliance, by the 1st Defendant, with the National Judicial Council (Judicial Discipline) Regulations 2014 (hereinafter called the "2014 NJC 2014 Regulations'), which at the material time were regulating the exercise of disciplinary powers of the 1st Defendant. Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant acted based on the recommendations of its Investigative Committee pursuant to the Committee's finding of fact. The decision taken by the 1st Defendant against the Claimant is pursuant to its powers under paragraph 21 (d) of item I of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Regulation 16 (2) (d) (i) and (ii) of the 2014 NJC 2014 Regulations. Counsel invite the attention of the Court to paragraph 17 of the 1st Defendant's Counter Affidavit and urge the Court to hold that the Investigative Panel of the 1st Defendant which investigated the Claimant was duly constituted. In particular, Counsel submitted that the Court hold that members of the investigative committee are not required to be judicial officers. In this regard, Counsel refers to Regulation 13 of the 2014 NJC 2014. Counsel submitted that by Regulation13 (1) of the NJC 2014 Regulations, an investigating committee of the 1st Defendant can comprise of members of the 1st Defendant regardless of whether they are judicial officers or not. Counsel submitted that members of the 1st Defendant are provided in paragraph 20 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Counsel further submitted that the cited constitutional provision allows persons who are not judicial officers to be members of the 1st Defendant. Counsel urged the Court to hold that nothing in Regulation 13 (1) of the NJC 2014 Regulations or the 1999 Constitution (as amended) prevents a person who is not a judicial officer from being a member of the investigating committee. In addition, Counsel urge the Court to find that Regulation 13 (3) of the NJC 2014 Regulations does not stipulate that all members of an investigative committee of the NJC must be judicial officers. Counsel further submitted there is nothing in Regulation 13 (3) stipulates that only judicial officers can be members of an investigating committee of the 1st Defendant. Counsel submitted that cumulative reading of Regulation 13 of the NJC 2014 Regulations as a whole, will show that inclusion of a person who is not a judicial officer in the investigating committee in issue does not invalidate the constitution of the committee. Thus, any member of the 1st Defendant who is appointed pursuant to the constitution is qualified for membership of an investigating committee by virtue of the person's membership of the 1st Defendant. Moreover, as evidenced by Exhibit J of the Claimant's Affidavit, all members of the 1st Defendant's Investigative Committee participated in the proceeding leading to the findings against the Claimant. However, assuming without conceding that the said Exhibit J reflects that only the Chairman and one member considered or heard the matter before the committee, it is submitted that pursuant to section 27 of the Interpretation Act; where a body comprises three or more persons, "any act which the body is authorised or required to do may be done in the name of the body by a majority of those persons or of a quorum of them'. Thus, any act done by two out of three members of the committee is valid. Counsel also urged the Court to hold that pursuant to section 28 of the Interpretation Act, the committee consisting of three members can validly carry out its work where the Chairman and one member is present throughout. Thus, even if Exhibit J shows that only the Chairman and a member sat, the sitting remains valid. Counsel urged the Court to hold that pursuant to section 28 of the Interpretation Act, the committee consisting of three members can validly carry out its work where the Chairman and one member is present throughout. Thus, even if Exhibit J shows that only the Chairman and a member sat, the sitting remains valid. Counsel invite the attention of the Honourable Court to page 7 of the Claimant's Exhibit D and urge the Court to find the petitioner's application to the Chairman of the 1st Defendant for extension of time to file petition. The said application for extension of is dated 30/3/16 and the committee that investigated the petition was constituted on 29th sept 2016 (as shown on the face of Claimant's Exhibit J). This indicates that the application for extension of time was granted. Counsel invite the attention of the Court to Regulation 5(1) of the NJC 2014 Regulations and urge the Court to find that nothing in the said Regulation says that the grant of extension of time must be communicated in writing. It is enough for the Chairman of the 1st Defendant to allow the 1st Defendant to act on the petition where the Chairman finds good reason for the application for extension of time. The Chairman of the 1st Defendant is empowered to apply the discretion to extend time for filing or submitting petitions. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the petition against the Claimant was not statute barred. In all events, the 1999 Constitution does not stipulate that there is a limitation period for the investigation of acts of misconduct alleged against a judicial officer. Moreover, the 1st Defendant does not require a petition before it can investigate a judicial officer for misconduct. In all, the Claimant has not suffered any miscarriage of justice as a result of the extension of time to consider the petition against him nor has he suffered any miscarriage of justice as a result of the investigation committee's being formed by a quorum or majority of members. Assuming without conceding there was a failure by the 1st Defendant to observe any rules of the 1st Defendant's procedure during the course of proceedings of its committee investigating the Claimant; it is our humble submission that it will not amount to an illegality or error of law in the face of the record which entitles the Claimant to the relief claim by her. The law is well settled that where a party alleges illegality in any conduct of a proceeding or process, the party must show that the illegality complained of is that of substantive law and not mere procedural considerations or rules. Counsel urged the Court to be bound by the decision of the Supreme Court in A.G. EKITI v DARAMOLA (2003) 11 M.J.S.C 147 at 191 para. G, where the Supreme Court defined the word illegality to mean: "That which is contrary to the principles of law as contradistinguished from mere rules of procedure. " If the Court follow the Cited authority, Counsel urged the Court to hold that no illegality exists on the records available before the Court. Counsel emphasize that the procedure of the 1st Defendant is not a matter of substantive law. It was further submitted that the 1st Defendant is at liberty to determine its procedure including time within which to receive petitions as well as extension of time where it deems fit. In all of this, the 1st Defendant is only required to give a fair hearing to all parties. On the issue of fair hearing, Counsel urged the Court to find that the Claimant was:(i) informed of the allegations of the petitioner; (ii) given an opportunity to put up a defence; (iii) allowed to cross-examine the witnesses for the petition; (iv) allowed to testify and call witnesses; (v) allowed to tender exhibits; (vi) represented by a legal practitioner namely Mr Owen C. Ugoani of A.U Chambers No.13 Ohafia Street, Umuahia, Abia State; (vii) allowed to present a written address. It is submitted that the Claimant was afforded a fair hearing to defend the allegations in issue. Counsel refer the Court to the case of AKPAMGBO-OKADIGBO & ORS v CHIDI & 18 ORS (N01) (2015) 3-4 S.C (PT II) 48 at 72 paras. 5-10 where the Supreme Court held with regard to the principle of fair hearing that; "In the application of the principle/hearing is said to be fair and in compliance with the dictates of the Constitution when inter-alia all the parties to the dispute are given a hearing or an opportunity of a hearing. It is the contention of Counsel that the Claimant having failed to establish the breach of fair hearing by the 1st Defendant against her, she is not entitled to the relief claim on this ground. Counsel urged the Court to hold that it is the duty of the person who alleges that a public institution or body contravened the law in relation to him to proof that allegation. On this submission Counsel relied on the celebrated case of Associated Provincial Pictures Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation (1947) APP.LR 11/10 where the English Court of Appeal held that "It is for those who assert that the local authority has contravened the law to establish that proposition’’. The Claimant has not proved any breach or contravention of the law by the 1st Defendant in relation to her. As the available records before the Court has shown, no breach of the law occurred with respect to the decision of the 1st Defendant against the Claimant. The mere fact that the Claimant is asserting that the decision of the 1st Defendant recommending her removal for judicial misconduct is unwarranted and unreasonable is not enough to entitle her to the relief of certiorari having regards to the facts and circumstances of this case. It is settled law that where an applicant is asserting that a decision of an administrative body is unreasonable, the applicant must prove that the decision complained against is one that no other reasonable body would have made such a decision. On this submission Counsel relied on the decision of the Court on this point to the case of ASSOCIATED PROVINCIAL PICTURES HOUSES LTD v WEDNESBURY CORPORATION (supra), where it was held that; I think Mr. Gallop in the end agreed that his proposition that the decision of the local authority can be upset if it is proved to be unreasonable really meant that it must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense that the court considers it to be a decision that no reasonable body could have come to. It is not what the court considers unreasonable a different thing altogether. It is also the law that an applicant is bound to fail if the alleged unreasonable decision is one within the competence of the administrative body. We refer the Court to ASSOCIATED PROVINCIAL PICTURES HOUSES LTD v WEDNESBURY CORPORATION where the Court went further to hold that: ‘’Here Mr. Gallop did not I think, suggest that the council were directing their mind to a purely extraneous and irrelevant matter, but he based his argument on the word "unreasonable’’ which he treated as an independent ground for attacking the decision of the authority,' but once it is conceded, as it must be conceded in this case that the particular subject-matter dealt with by this condition was one which it was competent for the authority to consider, there in my opinion is an end of the case. Once that is granted, Mr. Gallop is bound to say that the decision of the authority is wrong because it is unreasonable and in saying that he is really saying that the ultimate arbiter of what is and is not reasonable is the court and not the local authority. It is just there it seems to me that the argument breaks down’’. Counsel urged the Court to hold that in determining reasonableness, the Honourable Court is not required to substitute its own notion or idea of reasonableness with that of the 1st Defendant's. Rather, the 1st Defendant can only be held to be unreasonable if it considered matter(s) which ought not to have been taken into account and excluded maters which ought to have been considered. This position was well stated by the English Court of Appeal in ASSOCIATED PROVINCIAL PICTURES HOUSES LTD v WEDNESBURY CORPORATION (supra). Counsel submitted and urged the Court to hold that the 1st Defendant has the power to suspend the Claimant for judicial misconduct. This is in accord with 1999 Constitution which empowers the 1st Defendant under sub-paragraph (d) of Paragraph 21 of the Third Schedule to recommend to the Governors of the States the removal from office of the Chief Judges of the States and other judicial officers of the States and also to exercise disciplinary control over such Chief Judges of the State and other judicial officers of the States. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the 1st Defendant has power to suspend the Claimant and the power to suspend the Claimant is conferred on the 1st Defendant by the 1999 Constitution. Counsel further submit and urge the Court to hold that as the 1st Defendant has exercised the said constitutional power in the matter of the Claimant, this Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own opinion for that of the 1st Defendant or consider whether the decision of the 1st Defendant is wrong or right. The Court may only inquire as to whether the 1st Defendant conformed to certain fundamental principles of law in the exercise of the said power. In this regard, Counsel urged the Court to be bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of HON. JUSTICE GARBA ABDULLAHI v GOVERNOR OF KANO STATE & (2014) LPELR-23079 (CA), where it was held that; "It is crystal clear that the 4th Respondent (NJC) derived it powers to discipline the Appellant and all within his category from the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. The moment it has exercised its constitutional power the only role the Court will play is to ascertain whether the manner in which the power was exercised conformed with fundamental principles of law but not whether the decision was wrong or right as the court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own opinion for that of the 4th Respondent’’ In addition, we urge the Court to follow the decision in the case of NWAOGWUGWU v PRESIDENT F.R.N (2007) ALL FWLR (PT 358) 1327, Paras O-F where it was held that the National Judicial Council is a creation of the Constitution. Its traditional role is as defined by the Constitution and it includes inter alia to make appointments and to exercise disciplinary control over judicial officers. Furthermore, we urge the Honourable Court to follow the decision of the of the Court of Appeal in the case of HON. JUSTICE GARBA ABDULLAHI V GOVERNOR OF KANO STATE (Supra). " The following principles are to be borne in mind by a reviewing court (a) judicial review is not an appeal; (b) the court must not substitute its judgment for that of the public body whose decision is being reviewed; (c) the correct focus is not upon the decision but the manner in which it was reached; (d) what matters is legality and not correctness of the decision and (e) the reviewing court is not concerned with the merits of a target activity. In a judicial review the court must not stray into the realms of appellate jurisdiction for that would involve the court in a wrongful usurpation of power - See R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Brind (1991) 1 AC 696, 7271. " Counsel further submit and urge the Court to hold that in exercising the aforesaid constitutional disciplinary powers, the 1st Defendant is not obliged or required to find the Claimant liable for all allegations brought against the Claimant. It would suffice if one allegation of misconduct is substantiated against the Claimant. Counsel urge the Court to hold that the fact that it was not established that the Claimant shared out of the moneys in issue does not detract from or reduce the fact that the 1st Defendant found the Claimant to have given the orders in issue recklessly. Counsel submit and urge the Court to hold that given the facts and circumstances of this case, the 1st Defendant exercised its constitutional disciplinary power against the Claimant in a manner consistent with law. Counsel urged Court to find that all the other reliefs sought by the Claimant are predicated upon the grant of the certiorari orders against the 1st Defendant. Counsel urged the Court to hold that since the Claimant's prayer(s) for certiorari cannot stand, the other prerogative relief(s) and other relief(s) sought must fail. On the whole, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the Claimants case in its entirety for lacking in merit. On this contention reliance was placed on HON. JUSTICE GARBA ABDULLAHI v GOVERNOR OF KANO STATE (Supra) where the rules governing judicial review in circumstances such as in the instance case were laid down. Counsel urged the Honourable Court to resolve all the issues in favour of the 1st Defendant and dismiss the Claimant's case. REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW The Claimant filed amended reply on points of law dated and filed on 17/5/18, wherein Counsel responded to the submissions of the 1st Defendant. Counsel started by objecting to paragraphs 12, 18, 19 and 20 of the Counter-Affidavit for being incompetent in violating mandatory provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, Cap E.14, 2011. It is trite law that a Competent Court of Law cannot close its eyes to an incompetent process or paragraph of any process. Therefore, the only jurisdiction this Honourable Court will have with regard to the said paragraph will be to strike it out, as this Court cannot act on an incompetent paragraph. Counsel submitted the meaning and effect of "shall" in statutory constructions is trite as held by the Supreme Court in Nwankwo v. Yar'Adua (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 534) 1 at 51 paras. C - D, Per Adekeye JSC (as she then was) that: "The word shall when used in a statutory provision imports that a thing must be done. It is a form of command or mandate. It is not permissive, it is mandatory. The word "shall" in its ordinary meaning is a word of command which is normally given a compulsory meaning as it is intended to denote obligation: Bamaiyi v. Attorney-General, Federation (2001) FWLR (Pt. 64) 344, (2001) 12 NWLR (Pt. 727) 468; Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 1 SCNLR 427; Chukwuka v. Ezulike (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 892; Ngige v. Obi (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 330) 1041, (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 999). It is instructive to note that the implication of "shall" used in Section 115(1 )-(2) of the Evidence Act (Supra), leaves this Honourable Court with no discretion than to strike offending paragraphs. Reply to Paragraph 3 - 3.10 of the 1st Defendants Written Address (Preliminary Point on Jurisdiction) The 1st Defendant argued that the Federal High Court in Umuahia had no jurisdiction to try the case and correctly found same. However, the bizarre argument of the 151 Defendant was that the Honorable Justice of the Federal High Court erroneously transferred the matter pursuant to Order 29 Rule 5 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 (FHC) and Section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act. The first point to note is that there was nowhere in the Ruling of Honourable Judge of the Trial Court that the Judge mentioned that she was transferring the matter under Order 29 Rule 5 of the Rules of the FHC. Therefore, we are unable to respond to this point save to urge this Honourable Court to discountenance same as misconceived. It is not in doubt, that by Section 22(2) of the FHC Act, a Judge of the Federal High Court receives power to transfer to a Court with the appropriate jurisdiction. The 3rd Alteration to the 1999 Constitution amended by implication all Acts of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that mentioned Federal and State High Courts to include the National Industrial Court. According to Counsel, the law is that the -Justice of the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to transfer a matter to the National Industrial, even if she mistakenly mentions a wrong section or wrong provision, it does not nullify the power of the Judge to so do. In fact, the law in relying on wrong provisions in support of applications had already been made clear that the courts will look at the substance of an application and not the technicality of whether the right rule or provision was mentioned on the face of the application. This has been shown even in the case of Leaders & Company Ltd.v, Kusamotu (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 405) 1800 at 1814, paras. G - H (CA). See also ONOKEBHAGBEv. ABUBAKAR (2017) LPELR-42823(CA) (Pp. 2-3, Paras. D-D), Falobi v. Falobi (1976) N. S. C. C. 576 at 581, Egunjobi v. F.R.N. (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt.1342) 534 at 579, Olatunbosun v. State (2013) 34 W.R.N. 1 at 30. It is submitted that a close reading of Section 24(2) &(3) of the National Industrial Court Act shows that the mischief intended to be cured by the provision is to make sure cases are not struck out merely because it was brought to a wrong court. The fact that the Justice of the Federal High Court did not mention or avert his mind to Section 24(3) of the NIC Act does not invalidate the actions done which was concomitant with the said Act. Paragraphs 3 - 3.10 are merely technicalities that does not go to the root of the justice of this case and not jurisdiction and ought to be discountenanced by this Honourable Court. See Olleyv. Tunii(2013) All FWLR (Pt. 687) 625 at 662 - 663 paras D – A. Counsel urge this Honourable Court to discountenance all arguments of Counsel for the 1st Defendant in respect of the issue of transfer as misconceived and as inconsistent with the provisions of Section 24(3) of the NIC Act which has the main purpose of saving jurisdiction on behalf of the National Industrial Court. ON ISSUE(S) FOR DETERMINATION The 1st Defendant in his Amended Written Address has formulated a sole issue for determination thus: ‘‘Whether the Plaintiff has placed before the Court material evidence for the grant of the reliefs sought’’. In arguing the reply on points of law Counsel submitted that they concedes to the authority in Ezenwa v. Bestwav Electric MFT Co Ltd (1999) 18 NWLR (Pt.613) 61 at 82, that for a Court to have jurisdiction in an action anchored on certiorari, one of three limbs of things must occur, namely: "1. Lack or excess of jurisdiction, 2. Error on the face of the record of the inferior court/tribunal 3. Breach of observation of natural justice regarding fair hearing". On this note, paragraph 4.13 of the 1st Defendant's Written Address in opposition to the Originating Motion is not contested. The Plaintiff will also concede to the definition of ultra vires in Ekanem v. Obu (2010) LPELR-4084 (CA) in addition to dictionary definitions to be relied by us hereunder. With regard to paragraph 4.29 of the 1st Defendant's address, may we with respect state that substantive law recognizes that for a panel to sit in a quasi-judicial manner, it must have a proper composition. The ability of the panel to exercise its powers must be subject to whether the panel is properly constituted. On lack or excess of jurisdiction, Counsel refer to the Grounds 1 & 2 of the application and submitted recommendations were "unwarranted", "draconian" or "irregular", "having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Counsel submitted that the word Unwarranted was defined by Collins Dictionary & Thesaurus at page 1312 as, "lacking justification or authorization. " At the same page 1312, Thesaurus section, went further to state words that can be used in place of Unwarranted thus "Unwarranted adj 1 = unnecessary, gratuitous, groundless, indefensible; inexcusable; uncalled-for, unjust, unjustifiable; unprovoked, unreasonable, wrong". One of the Thesaurus words for unwarranted is "unreasonable" which has been defined by The Black's Law Dictionary 10th Ed ition at page 1772 as, "1. Not guided by reason; irrational or capricious. 2. Not supported bv a valid exception to the warrant requirement." All the underlined words, are words that suggest action done without legal authority and therefore illegal. Another word that suggests illegality in the grounds as framed is, "irregular" which is defined by the Black's Law Dictionary, 10th Edition at page 957 as, "Not in accordance with law, method, or usage; not regular." Paragraph 1.70 of the Written Address in support of the Originating motion, clearly raises issues as to the reasonableness of Exhibit "J" sought to be quashed. Paragraph 3.20.2 raises grave issues of breach of rules of natural justice. Counsel also raised issue of limitation regarding the petition. It is submitted that the clear error on the face of the Record is that the Record (Exhibit "J") in no way shows whether there was extension of time. On breach of natural justice Counsel submitted that the Investigative committee made out a case different from the one the Petitioner brought before it. The Committee changed the petition to the mistake being an act of carelessness, recklessness and incompetence. The said paragraph did not allege this fact, therefore, a new case was investigated herein different from the Petition before the 1st Defendant. It has been held that the NJC investigating on a matter not before it or on a ground on which there is no petition is oppressive. See NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL v. HON. JUSTICE IYASO YERIMA & ANOR (2014) LPELR-24208(CA). On paragraph (v), the investigative committee failed or refused to make a finding that as vacation Judge she was not in charge of files and is from another Judicial Division. THE CASE OF THE 3RD DEFENDANT. The 3rd Defendant with leave of Court filed written address on the position taken on this application. Chinedu Amanamba, Senior State Counsel, Ministry of Justice Abia State, representing the 3rd Defendant, in his oral submission adopted the 3rd Defendant’s written address dated 2/1/18 and filed on 9/1/18 as his argument on the application. In the written address Counsel submitted lone issue for determination, to wit: ‘‘Whether there was an error in law on the face of the record’’. Counsel submitted there was an error on the face of the record, exhibit D the petition which contains allegation against the Claimant. Counsel referred to paragraph 20 of the petition and submitted that it was the gravamen of the case against the claimant. Counsel on evidence allegation of conspiracy was not substantiated. Counsel also submitted exhibit J, the committee stated no evidence to substantiate the allegation. Counsel also submitted at page 21 the committee found that N83,000,000.00 was paid to probate registry. While E. M Orjiako claimed that undisclosed sundry expenses were incurred and the balance remaining in his account which he refused to disclose to the committee is a subject of litigation in court. Counsel submitted despite the above finding the committee proceeded to make recommendations which were inconsistence with the unsubstantiated allegations of criminal conspiracy by the subject judge and others. An error of law has therefore been shown on the face of the recommendations made and/or the decision of the 1st defendant based on the report. Counsel urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the Claimant. COURT’S DECISION I have carefully and painstakingly perused the Originating Motion on Notice commencing this suit, the prayers contained therein as well as the grounds upon which this application is based. I have also considered the affidavit evidence in support and in opposition to this application. I have equally given careful consideration to the oral and written submissions of Counsel for all the parties appearing in this matter, as well as the authorities cited by them. In this judgment, I shall restrict my consideration in this matter to the prayers in the application before me in order not to determine issue that are not part of the Claimant’s case. This is because the addresses of Counsel have raised issues which are not part of the applicant’s prayers. The sacred duty of court in determining application brought is to ensure that only the prayers in the application are or are not granted. The court cannot grant orders or reliefs not contained in an applicant’s motion paper or application to do so will amount to being Father Christmas. See EZENWAKA V OKON (2017) 1 NWLR (PT. 1547)386 @422-423, EZOBI V DTN PLC (2013) 17 NWLR (PT. 1382) 200; AGIP PETROLI INT’L V AGIP (NIG.) LTD (2010) 5 NWLR (PT. 1187) 346. It is in reliance on these case laws that I will restrict the consideration of the issues within the application of the Claimant. Albeit, the parties have formulated and argued a number of issues already identified in this judgment, I believe the issues as formulated by both learned counsel are similar in nature even though couched in different tune. I will therefore formulate lone which I feel will adequately deals with the argument canvassed by the parties. The issue formulated is: ‘‘Whether having regards to the facts and circumstances of this suit the Claimant has made out a case for grant of order of certiorari and order of prohibition. Before proceeding to determine the sole issue for determination, it behooves on me to first and foremost dispose of certain preliminary issues arising from the submissions of Counsel. The first preliminary issue is on reply on points of law. This Court has in a plethora of decisions reminded Counsel that reply on points of law just means what it says. It is not an opportunity for Counsel to represent his submissions or embellishing his previous points made in an address or capitalized on the chance given to make amend where there are lapses. This is not aim of a reply on points of law. In the circumstance, this Court will only look at the actual reply on points of law and not repetition of previous submission. The second issue to be trashed out is whether the argument of the 1st Defendant that the order of transfer of this case from federal high court to this court pursuant to Order 29 rule 5 of the Federal High Court (civil procedure) Rules 2009 and section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act is capable of activating this suit before this Court. Counsel for the 1st Defendant has submitted that Order 29 rule 5 of the Federal High Court (civil procedure) Rules 2009 and section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act do not empower the Federal High Court to transfer this case to this Court. Rather it is the provisions of section 24(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 that make provision of transfer from Federal High Court to this Court. Counsel contended that the matter must be properly commenced for the Court to assume jurisdiction. Counsel urged the Court not to assume jurisdiction on basis of Order 29 Rule 5 and section 22 of the Federal High Court Act. The Counsel for the Claimant on the other hand submitted that this submission is based on misconception of law. The reasons being that the judge that ordered transfer of this suit to this Court never stated that the order of transfer is made pursuant to Order 29 Rule 5 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 and that it is immaterial if a wrong rule or law is used in the transfer. It is to be noted that what is paramount in handing down a decision is the rightness or other wise of the decision. A decision reached by a Court of law, but relying on wrong rules or citing wrong law is valid and cannot be upturned even on appeal. The mere fact that in coming to correct decision the court cited or relied on wrong provisions of the law does not matter, it makes no difference to the decision or order made. What is important is that a correct decision was arrived at. See HENRY STEPHEN ENGR. LTD V COMPLETE HOME ENTERPRISE NIG. LTD 1987 1 NWLR PT.47 40, OKONJI NJOKANMA SUPRA, FALOBI V FALOBI 1976 9-10 SC REPRINT 1, SKYPOWER EXPRESS AITWAYS LTD V AJUMA OLIMA & ANOR. 2005 18 NWLR PT.957 224. Since there is a law that make provision for transfer, which the 1st Defendant even admitted, the order of Federal High Court transferring the case to this Court was in order notwithstanding that the judge relied on wrong rules and section of the law. The third preliminary issue that needs to be determined is the objection raised to some paragraphs of the counter affidavit on the grounds that they offends the provisions of section 115 of the Evidence Act. The paragraphs of the affidavit being objected to are paragraphs 12, 18, 19 and 20. By its very nature affidavit is to contain facts and not argument or law. All the facts deposed in an affidavit shall not contain extraneous matter, conclusion, prayers or argument which counsel are in law allowed to canvass before the Court. I agree with the learned Counsel for the Claimant that a careful perusal of the content of paragraph 12. 18, 19 and 20 of the counter-affidavit will clearly show that the content offend the provision of section 115 of the evidence Act. In the circumstances, those paragraph are hereby expunged. It is to be noted that the content of paragraphs 6, 11, 12, and 13 of the counter affidavit filed by the Claimant also violate the provision of evidence Act. Consequently, they are hereby struck out. The fourth issue is the objection raised by the 1st Defendant in his oral adumbration to the amended reply on points of law. Counsel urged the Court to discountenance it on the ground that it was not filed within time. For the Counsel for the Claimant the said objection should have been raised via motion and not at address stage. Counsel also submitted that the Rules of Court referred to are not applicable in this case as they relates to pleadings and not address. I have given the submissions of Counsel deep consideration, I am inclined to agree with the Counsel for the Claimant that the objection to the amended reply address springs surprises. This is because Counsel for the 1st Defendant has been served with the said address before the date fixed for the hearing of the substantive suit. If Counsel has any objection it should have come by way of motion. In any event Counsel having waited till the day for argument of the substantive matter is deemed to have waived his right to object. See EDELSTEIN (NIG.) LTD & ANOR. V ALHAJI MUSA ONUSABA (FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF OHEBE CLAN) APPEAL NO. CA/A/528/2011 (2018) LEGALPEDIA. The objection is hereby discontented as it will overreach the claimant. I shall also mention here that the 2nd Defendant in this suit decided not to depend this suit. The Counsel that appeared for the 2nd Defendant filed notice of preliminary and abandoned it. The said notice of preliminary objection dated 29/1018 and fled on 2/2/18, for having been abandoned is hereby struck out for lack of diligent prosecution. Coming to the main issue for determination. The reliefs being claimed by the Claimant are within the realm of prerogative orders of certiorari and prohibition. These are writs or orders meant essentially to set aside a decision taken by an inferior body that has exercise a quasi-judicial function, and to compel that body, to rescind its decision. Or act in a particular way. The law is well settled that prerogative writ of certiorari is available to empower courts to act as watch dogs over judicial activities of inferior courts or tribunals. The process is meant to keep in check the excesses and arbitrariness of such courts. However, it must be understood that the control is not on appellate capacity but on supervisory capacity. It extends not to only to seeing that the inferior tribunals keep within jurisdiction, but also to seeing that they observe the law. The control is exercised by means of a power to quash any determination. The duty I have to perform here is to determine if the Claimant has sufficiently proved his case to be entitled to the reliefs sought in this suit. The position of the Claimant is that having regard to the exhibits A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H and J the findings of the 1st Defendant’s Investigation Committee are not a true reflection of the facts and circumstances emanating from the orders which the Claimant made in a judicial capacity. It was also stated that there was no appeal against the exercise of discretion with regard to the orders which were made as far back as 2013. It was averred that in the course of the sitting of the NJC Investigation Committee, neither the parties to suit leading to the orders nor the counsel who appeared on their behalf validated any accusation of wrong doing. It was stated that unless the findings and recommendations of the 1st Defendant are quashed by this Honourable Court, the Claimant will be removed from office by way of dismissal for misconduct by the Governor of Abia State. It was further stated that unless the findings and recommendations of the Defendant are quashed and the Claimant dismissed by the Governor of Abia State, the Claimant shall be subject matter of a police investigation despite the non-existence of any shred of evidence that she partook in the sharing of any money as confirmed by the Investigative Committee of the Defendant in Exhibit J. it was stated that it has now become imperative to seek the reliefs contained in this application. That should the 3rd Defendant act on the recommendation of the 1st Defendant, the Claimant will no longer be able to apply either as a judicial officer or as a legal practitioner and my whole life endeavor (including my service in all cadres of the magistracy) would be forfeited. That since the announcement of the recommendation for removal of the Claimant by the 1st Defendant through various print and electronic media (including the all – pervasive social media) the Claimant has been exposed to ridicule, Odium and scorn and the Claimant has been shunned and avoided and visited with ill will and disaffection. In this judgment (any mention of exhibit J is also reference to exhibit J 1, they are one document, exhibit J is a photocopy. While exhibit J 1, is a CTC. Likewise exhibits K & L also means exhibits K 1 and L 1), The position of the Claimant is that the decisions/recommendations of the 1st Defendant to the Governor of Abia State (3rd Defendant) for the removal of the Claimant from office by dismissal for misconduct; suspending the Claimant from office pending when the Governor of Abia State will Act on its recommendation and directing the 2nd Defendant to investigate the Plaintiff, as soon as the Governor of Abia State acts on its recommendation, were not fair, just and reasonable based on the peculiar circumstances of this case. More particularly having regards to exhibits A, B, C, G, and H tendered before the investigation Committee of the 1st Defendant. The recommendations also shows that the exhibits tendered by the Claimant to the Investigation Committee means nothing. If they indeed counted for something then the Investigative Committee would not have made the findings and recommendations which it had made. The Claimant vide exhibit C exercised her discretion honestly and in the spirit of the law. It is the contention of Counsel that the orders granted on the 22nd of August, 2013 and 22nd of September, 2013 were not illegal and unlawful and have not been shown to have fallen outside the ambits of law or statute by anybody including Investigative Committee of the 1st Defendant. Therefore to label the said orders reckless, as the Investigative Committee of the 1st Defendant did, is most unfair, unjust and unreasonable as the Claimant exercised the required care and skill required of her in exercising her discretion, when she granted the said orders as evidenced by Exhibit C. It is the contention of Counsel that the committee did not demonstrate how the Plaintiff failed to take into consideration relevant laws or how the orders granted by the Claimant were arbitrary or an unreasonable departure from precedent and well settled judicial tradition or custom. The 1st Defendant’s position is that the Claimant has not established any reasonable grounds to justify the relief of certiorari sought against the 1st Defendant. It is submitted by the 1st defendant that the case of the claimant does not fall under any of the judicially recognized criteria for grant of order of certiorari or prohibition. Counsel draw the attention of the Court to exhibit C where the claimant made two orders one for any sum and the second order for ‘any money’ demanded by the probate registrar as probate fees on the estate of late Chief Lord Dike Udensi Ifeagu to be paid into the personal account of a private legal practitioner and not even to the account of the probate Registry which is the normal practice. Counsel submitted that as a result of the said order the sum of N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) was drawn from the account of Chief Dike Udensi Ifeagu. But, only the sum of N83,000,000.00 (Eighty Three Million Naira) was paid to Probate Registry. It was the submission of Counsel that from the stated situation, the recommendations of the 1st Defendant were not ultra vires to warrant being quashed by this Court. They were in line with the law. From the authorities dealing with the subject matter of this suit, the grant or refusal by the Court to grant relief of certiorari or prohibition will defend on certain conditions. To succeed in getting prerogative order of certiorari or prohibition, it must be shown that a tribunal, inferior an inferior Court or a body lacks or acted in excess of its jurisdiction. It must also be shown that there is an error on the face of the record of an inferior Court, tribunal or body or that there is breach of the rules of natural justice regarding fair hearing. The 1st Defendant insisted that the case of the Claimant does not fall under any of the judicially recognized criteria for the grant of the prerogative order of certiorari and prohibition. While the Claimant is insisting that he is entitled to the grant of the prerogative orders in this suit. In order to resolve the impasse, the Court will consider the position taken by the parties in line with recognized criteria for grant or refusal of order of certiorari and order of prohibition. Some of the cases that laid down criteria to be considered are; CHIEF CHUKWUDI A. ITEIDU & ORS. V CHUEF EMMANUEL OBI & ORS. (2009) LPELR-8343 CA, IN –RE; LAWAL (2013) LPELR-19981 SC, AGWUEGBO V KAGOMA (2000) 14 NWLR (PT.687) 252, EZENWA V BESTWAY ELECTRONICS COMPANY LIMITED & ORS (1998) NWLR (PT.613) 61, CHIEF M. A OKUPE V FEDERAL BOARD OF INLAND REVENUE (1974) ALL NLR 284. It is in line with laid down principles as enunciated in decided authorities that I shall consider the issue of whether or not the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought before this Court. On the first criteria: lack of or excess of jurisdiction. The Claimant harps on exhibits A, B, C, G and H, as well as regulation 13 of guidelines for discipline of judicial officers and submitted that the recommendations by the 1st Defendants were unfair, unwarranted and draconian. Counsel also submitted that the investigation Committee must be composed of three or five members and that under no circumstances should the committee not have at least three members chaired by a judicial officer of higher rank of the subject of investigation. To the Claimant the investigation Committee that investigated the Claimant was composed of single judicial officer instead of three and a non-legal officer who does not know ‘slip rule’ or appreciate code of conducts of judicial officers. The 1st Defendant on the issue of lack or excess of jurisdiction maintained that the action of the 1st Defendant is within the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Constitution as the overall body charged with discipline of judicial officers. To determine whether the decision of the 1st Defendant as depicted in exhibit ‘J’ was made without or in excess of jurisdiction. It is appropriate to examine the extent of jurisdiction donated to the 1st Defendant by the Constitution. The provisions of the law regarding jurisdiction of the 1st Defendant on discipline of judicial officers are in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, particularly in Paragraph 21 of the Third schedule;- 21. The National Judicial Council shall have power to – (a) ………………………………… (i) …………………………………. (ii) ………………………………… (b) ………………………………… (c) recommend to the Governors from among the list of persons submitted to it by the State Judicial Service Commission persons for appointments to the offices of the Chief Judges of the States and Judges of the High Courts of the States, the Grand Kadis and Kadis of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the States and the Presidents and Judges of the Customary Court of Appeal of the states; (d) recommend to the Governors the removal from office of the judicial officers specified in sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph and to exercise disciplinary control over such officers; Section 158 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) is also relevant in this regard. It insulated the 1st Defendant from being tele guided in performance of its function. The resolution of the issue depends on proper construction of the provision of paragraph 21 of part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). It is to be noted at the onset that the objective of any interpretation is to discover the intention of the makers of the document or law to be interpreted. The duty of the court is to interpret and give adequate and as close as possible accurate and ordinary meaning to the words used in the document, unless this would lead to absurdity or be in conflict with other provisions of the document. This means a clause in a document should be construed as a whole and should be given an interpretation consistent with the object and general context of the entire document. CHIEF D. O. IFEAZU V LIVINUS MBADIGHA & ANOR 1984 5 SC 79, ALHAJI IBRAHIM V GALADIMA BARDE AND ORS. 1996 9 NWLR PT.474 513, Ardo V Nyako (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1416) 591 @b 628, PWTH AG V. CEDDI CORP LTD (2012) 2 NWLR (pt 1285) 465 @ 489. Ekeagu V Aliri (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 179) 258 @ 377. Ministry of Education Anambra state (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt 1427) 351 @ 377. In interpretation, Court is enjoined to read every word or clause in the document and construe them not in isolation but with reference to the context and other clauses in the document so as to get the real intention of the parties. Amaechi V INEC (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt1040) 504 @ 536. It is equally important to point out here that the obscurity or doubt of any particular word or words in a document may be removed by reference to associated words, and the meaning of a term may be enlarged or restricted by referring to the object of the whole clause in which it is used, see Ekpo V Calabar Local Government (1993)3 NWLR (Pt. 281) 324 @341. Before embarking on interpretation of the provisions of the constitution under consideration, it is right to bear in mind that the well-established principle of law is that, the safer and more correct approach in dealing with question of interpretation is to take the words of the document or statute themselves and arrive, if possible at their meaning without, in the first instance, resorting to other aids. This is in accord with the general principle of law governing the interpretation of our Constitution that it should be given an interpretation which would serve the interest of the Constitution and carry out its object and purpose. Its relevant provisions must be read together and not disjointly and where the words of any section are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary meaning unless this would lead to absurdity or be in conflict with other provisions of the Constitution. Effect should be given to every word. See ARARUME V INEC (2007) 9 NWLR (PT.1038) 122, NYAME V FRN (2010) 4 (PT.2) NSCQR 1106. The provisions of paragraph 21(d) of part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), are clear and unambiguous, the cardinal principles of interpretation and construction of constitutional provisions or statue is that they be given their plain, ordinary natural grammatical and literal meaning and the court of law is without power to input into the meaning of a word, clause or section or sub-section of a statute something that they did not say. BRONIK MOTORS LTD ANOR V WEMA BANK LTD (1983) 6 SC 158, BOARD OF CUSTOM EXERCIS V BARAU (1982) 10 SC 48. In the circumstance, I am bound to apply the literal rule of interpretation to construe the provision of paragraph 21(d) of the Constitution. The provisions being without any ambiguity expressly conferred on the 1st Defendant in this suit with power to make recommendation to the Governors for removal of judicial officers and exercise disciplinary control over judicial officers. It is therefore without any doubt that the recommendations as contained in exhibit ‘J’ in this suit were within the purview of paragraph 21(d) of part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution as amended. The issue of lack of or excess of jurisdiction does not arise in this suit. The 1st Defendant is constitutionally imbued with requisite jurisdiction to make the recommendations it made as per exhibit ‘J’. It is to be made clear that in an application of this nature the Claimant is not allowed to contest the reasoning for arriving at the decision which the Claimant is contesting all that the Claimant can do in law is to show lack of jurisdiction or the exercise was in excess of jurisdiction. The Claimant’s assertions that the exhibits tendered did not count due to the decision arrived at by the 1st Defendant cannot find shelter within the law. This is because the doctrine of certiorari deals with issue of lack of or excess of jurisdiction, which is not the cases here. See ZENITH BANK PLC V DR. SOLOMON OMORODION & ORS. (2013) LOELR-20755 (CA). It is therefore clear that the power of the 1st Defendant under paragraph 21(c) of Part I of the Third Schedule to the Constitution is not made contingent on anything. The Apex Court of the land in HON. JUSTICE RALIAT ELELU-HABEEB & ANOR V. THE HON. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & ORS (2012) 2. S.C (PT1) 145 at 225-226 paras. 5-20. SUIT NO: SC.281/2010, the judgment of which was delivered on Friday, the 17th day of February 2012, though in relation to the office of the Chief Judge, the Supreme Court held that any exercise of power to remove a Chief Judge must be based on any of the following grounds: his inability to discharge the functions of office or appointment; the inability to perform the functions of his office, which could arise from infirmity of the mind or of body; for misconduct; or the contravention of the code of conduct. The Supreme Court went on in these words: ‘’All these conditions or basis for the exercise of power to remove a State Chief Judge must be investigated and confirmed by credible evidence…For example the ground of removal for inability to perform the functions of his office or appointment cannot be ascertained and confirmed…in the absence of any input from the National Judicial Council under which supervision the Chief Judge discharges his functions as Judicial Officer and which body also is directly responsible for exercising disciplinary control over the said State Chief Judge. It is not difficult to see that for the effective exercise of the powers of removal of a Chief Judge of a State…the first port of call… shall be the National Judicial Council which is equipped with the personnel and resources to investigate the inability of the Chief Judge to discharge the functions of his office, the subject of disciplinary action of removal through the Committees of the Council…’’ All of this is applicable to a Judge as it is to a Chief Judge. However, it must be noted that the removal of a judge must be investigated. The 1st respondent being a creation of the Constitution under Section 153(1)(j) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), its functions provided for in paragraph 21(b) of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution are public functions in execution of a public duty to investigate infractions by judicial officers amongst others. The 1st Defendant and its committee have the requisite scope and powers to entertain petitions and make recommendations to the Governor as it did in this case. On the issue of error on the face of the record. I do not agree with the Counsel for the Claimant that the recommendations sought to be quashed were not product of consideration of exhibits A, B, C, G and H tendered by the Claimant at the proceedings of the investigation Committee. As earlier pointed out the 1st Defendant and its Investigation Committee that produced exhibit ‘J’ have requisite power to investigate the Claimant and make necessary recommendation as was done in this case. At the risk of sounding repetitive the power is as provided in paragraph 21(d) of part 1 of the Third schedule to the Constitution. This power was complemented by the provision of Regulation 16 d (i) (4) (ii) and (3) of the 1st Defendant’s regulation on Discipline of Judicial officers 2004. The issue of limitation raised by the Claimant is of no moment having regards to the regulations governing the time frame for filing or submission of petition. Though the regulations makes provisions for making or submitting of petition to be six months from the date of the event. The regulation has provided for dismissal of petition submitted beyond the period stipulated by the regulation. It is also clear from the regulations that the Chief Justice of Nigeria can extend time for petitioner. There is also evidence regarding this issue that the Petitioner has an application for extension of time as shown by exhibit D. Since the regulations have provided for dismissal of petition lodged beyond the period of six months and there was no such dismissal, coupled with the application for extension of time, the appropriate view on this issue is that extension of time has been considered and granted appropriately. This position is reinforced by the fact that the petition was referred to investigation Committee and the Committee has investigated the petition and the 1st Defendant exercised power conferred on it by law in making recommendations based on the investigation Committee. It will also be right to say that the requirement of filing within six months being a procedural rule can be waived. The Claimant having fully participated in the investigation cannot now at address stage raise issue statute barred, he is estopped from making such complaint. It is to be noted that exhibit D was given to the Claimant before the setting up of the investigation Committee. The Claimant responded to it as per exhibits E and G, without raising the issue of limitation. It is my humble view that based on the facts as disclosed by the processes filed before the court, the 1st Defendant was never deceived as the Claimant want the court to believe in regarding lapse of time. It is also to be noted that the regulations were made to assist in orderly proceedings of the 1st Defendant in the disciplinary action. Any breach of the regulations will amount to irregularity which can be ignored or waived. As pointed out the claimant has by participating in the proceedings waived the issue of time frame. Therefore, the raising of the issue at address stage is improper. See EDELSTEIN (NIG.) LTD & ANOR VS. ALHAJI MUSA ONUSABA (FOR HIMSELF AND ON BEHALF OF OHEBE CLAN) APPEAL NO: CA/A/528/2011, LEGALPADIA (2018). Furthermore, the regulation being a procedural in nature did not confer jurisdiction on 1st Defendant it is the constitutional provision that confers jurisdiction on the 1st Defendant. The non-compliance with rules cannot deny the 1st Defendant jurisdiction on disciplinary action against a judicial officer. The issue will be relevant if the infraction being alleged is that of any provisions of the Constitution. It is settled law that jurisdiction in the broad and substantive sense cannot be conferred by Rules or regulation. See IWANYANWU & ANOR. (1989) NWLR (Pt.107) 39, (1989) 4 SC Pt. ii, 89, It is patently clear beyond any doubt that NJC Regulations cannot confer jurisdiction, as such a rules or regulations regulates practice of the NJC in the exercise of a derived power from the Constitution. Rules or regulations confer procedural but not substantive jurisdiction on the 1st Defendant. They are meant to ensure that affairs of the 1st Defendant are carried out in an orderly fashion. In further support of the above view, the recent decision in FJSC v. Bode Thomas [2013] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1384) 503. One of the issues that arose from in that case relates to paragraph 030307 of the Public Service Rules, which stipulates a period of 60 days limitation within which disciplinary proceedings against any officer in the public service must be concluded. The trial court found this rule to be a mandatory provision, but which did not indicate any sanction for its breach. A subsequent finding and holding by the trial court that failure to keep to this rule infringes the right to fair hearing was upturned by the Court of Appeal as not being in consonance with the earlier finding of the trial court that no sanction was provided by the rule itself for its breach; as such, failure to observe the 60 days limitation rule did not vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. In like manner, I am strongly of the view that the fact that the petition in the instant case was filed out of time is immaterial since it has been acted upon. The claimant also claimed that the investigation committee made a case different from what the one made by the petitioner in exhibit ‘O’. According to the Claimant the committee changed the petition to carelessness, recklessness and incompetence. I have perused the content of exhibit D the petition investigated by the investigation Committee of the 1st Defendant. There was nothing to show that the investigation Committee made a case different from what was put forward by the petitioner. The fallacy of this submission is glaring from exhibits E and G which were response of the Claimant to the petition exhibit D. In those exhibits the claimant dealt with issue of recklessness and issue on making of order for unascertained sums of money. The findings of the 1st Defendant based on the recommendations of the Investigation Committee has nothing to do with error on the face of the record. For an error to occur it must be shown that there is lack or excess of jurisdiction. The whole aim of order of certiorari and prohibition is to curtail lack of or excesses on part of tribunal of its jurisdiction. Which is not the case here. It has been shown that the 1st Defendant has requisite jurisdiction to act in the way it acted. I agree with the Counsel for the 1st Defendant that the Court is not allowed, in judicial review, to substitute its own decision with that of the inferior court, tribunal or body. See GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE VS. FOLAYAN [1995] 9 SC NJ 50 at 83, where it was held that, 1. a judicial Review is not an appeal, 2. The court must not substitute its judgement for that of the body whose decision is being reviewed, 3. The correct focus is not the decision but the manner in which it is reached. That what matters was the legality and not the correctness of the decision and 5. the reviewing court is not concerned with merits of the target activity. See also A.C.B PLC v NWAIGWE & 2 ORS (2011) LPELR- SC.3S/2001, where the Supreme Court held that in an application for judicial review, "the Court is usually concerned with legality and not with the merit of the proceedings, decisions or acts of the affected inferior court, tribunal or governmental bodies. " The content of exhibits D, F, G, H and J 1, clearly shows that exhibits K 1 and L 1 were as a result of the consideration of the exhibits J 1, by the 1st Defendant and there is nothing erroneous to show infraction of law. The 1st Defendant in arriving at the conclusion it arrives was in accordance with the law. ON BREACH OF OBSERVANCE OF NATURAL JUSTICE REGARDING FAIR HEARING. The Claimant on issue of natural justice is of the view that the recommendations of the 15t Defendant breached rules of natural justice having regard to the meaning of the words, "unwarranted" and "irregular" According to the Claimant exhibits A, B, C, G and H, counted for nothing to the investigation Committee. The Investigative committee in Exhibit "J" directed all parties to file Final Addresses to summarize their arguments, the Respondent filed. While the Petitioner did not. The Investigative Committee decided that it was best to go into its recommendation. According to Counsel for the Claimant the law of fair hearing demands that, the Respondent should have seen the summary made against him so that he would reply on points of law, rather the Investigative Committee made findings that totally refused or neglected to consider any point made by the Respondent in his final address. This clearly shows bias. The rule of nemo judex incausa sua was therefore breached. Even on the one ground that the Investigative committee did not find any evidence against the Respondent, it still recommended her for investigation. This is clearly irregular, unjust, in excess of jurisdiction and therefore ultra vires. This Court has examined the provisions of Regulation 17 in HONOURABLE JUSTICE BASSEY TAMBU EBUTA V. NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL & 3 ORS unreported Suit NO. NICN/ABJ/301/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 13th July 2017, where Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip has this to say: ‘‘Regulation 17, is silent on what the consequence is if no report is given the subject Judge, the claimant in the instant case. Regulation 17(2) simply proceeds to state that upon a consideration of the report, the NJC may decide to do any of the following: decide that the case is unsubstantiated and dismiss it; decide that the case is substantiated wholly or in part but does not require further action and dismiss it; decide that the case is substantiated wholly or in part but should be dealt with informally by the Chief Justice/Chairman of NJC or any person he may nominate; decide that the case is substantiated wholly or in part and exercise one or more disciplinary actions as to reprimand, suspension, putting on ‘watch list’, or prohibit the nomination for promotion of the subject Judge; recommend the removal from office of the subject Judge. Now, beyond Regulation 17(1) mandating that the report of the investigating committee should be given to the subject Judge, nothing is said in the Regulations to suggest that no action under Regulation 17(2) can be taken unless Regulation 17(1) was met or complied with. In other words, the adherence to Regulation 17(2) is not hinged on Regulation 17(1); each is independent of the other. Alternatively put, there is no relationship or nexus between Regulation 17(1) and Regulation 17(2) as the claimant seems to think. The claimant argued that because Regulation 17(1) was not complied with, his right to fair hearing was compromised as he was thereby denied any further input. How is this so, when there is no relationship/nexus between Regulation 17(1) and Regulation 17(2)? Even if the report was given to the claimant, the NJC can proceed almost immediately to take any of the decisions as per Regulation 17(2) since there is no impediment of any kind for doing this under the Regulations. The point I seek to make is that the performance of the duty under Regulation 17(1) does not in anyway require anything else from the claimant as input before any of the decisions under Regulation 17(2) is taken; as such the question of his right to fair hearing being compromised or that he was denied any further input does not arise at all’’. I apply the above reasoning in this case and hold that the failure to give the Claimant summary is not fatal, since hearing has been concluded. Such failure to make available to Claimant draft report or summary cannot vitiate the work of the Committee. The issue raised here is out of point since fair hearing is during and not post hearing issue. When parties have closed their cases fair hearing cannot arise. I hold there is no denial of fair hearing. It is to be noted here that upon receipt of exhibit D the 1st Defendant pursuant to powers conferred on it by the Constitution referred exhibit D to the Chief Judge of Abia state for the Claimant’s response, the Claimant’s response was exhibit E and an additional response by the Claimant was submitted to the Chief Justice of Nigeria, see exhibit G. In furtherance of the response of the Claimant vide exhibits E and G, respectively, the 1st Defendant set up an investigation Committee to investigate the allegations contained in exhibit D. the investigation Committee invited the Claimant and the petitioner to appear before the investigation Committee. The Committee sat on 28th 29th and 30th where the Claimant and petitioner were given equal opportunity to present their positions on the petition. Parties were also given opportunity to call witness and cross-examine. At the end of the hearing the Committee submitted exhibit J (exhibit J and J 1, means one and same thing, it is same document exhibit J is a copy while J 1 is CTC)), to the 1st Defendant as the outcome of the investigation. The 1st defendant after consideration of exhibit J came up with exhibits K 1 and L 1 which the Claimant is seeking to quashed. There is no doubt that the disciplinary proceedings that led to recommendation for the removal of the Claimant were done in compliance with the rules of natural justice nemo judex in caus sua. The investigation Committee afforded the parties fair hearing and gave them equal opportunity of presenting their cases. The Claimant and the petitioner both called their witnesses, they were allowed to cross examine witnesses from both sides and to submit written addresses after close of their evidence. It is based on the hearing conducted that the investigation Committee made findings which indicted the Claimant of misconduct for being reckless, negligent and display of high degree of incompetence in the way and manner he discharged his judicial function which led to the petition written by the petitioner. The report of the investigation Committee clearly established that the petitioner did not file written address and committee directed that since the petitioner failed or neglected to file written address, it means he is satisfied with the case he had made during the oral hearing. With this finding I do not see how claimant can contend that there was breach of natural justice regarding filing of written address. It should be understood that that the address is meant to assist the committee to in considering its decision and where a party chose not to file any written address that should be a clog in the wheel to hamstring the committee from performing its functions. A heavy whether has been made by the Claimant on recommendation to the 3rd defendant regarding investigation to be carried out by the police in respect of the allegation regarding N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira). It is to be noted that the allegation is criminal in nature even the claimant has acknowledged that in her response to the petition. The committee in law does not have power to investigate crime. The function belongs to law enforcement agencies. The Committee is only restricted to the issue of misconduct. Therefore, the recommendations to 2nd defendant to conduct full investigation of this criminal allegations is in the right direction. The submission that the recommendations breached the provision of natural justice cannot hold water, it is hereby discountenanced. There is also the issue of composition of the investigation committee according to the claimant he was investigated by one member of the 1st Defendant contrary to rule 13 of the regulation which requires at least three members sitting for the investigation. For the counsel for the 1st defendant the committee was properly constituted by three members comprising of judicial and non-judicial members of the 1st defendant. It was also argued that even if there is vacancy the committee is still properly constituted going by the interpretation Act. It seems to me that the Investigation Committee of the 1st Defendant should comprised of three or five members. This means that the 1st Defendant has discretion regarding setting up of committee. But the chairman must be a judicial officer of higher rank than the claimant. The committee that investigated the Claimant was therefore in order. It is also clear to me that if there is vacancy in the committee, that cannot invalidated the work of the committee. See section 27 of the Interpretation Act; where a body comprises three or more persons, "any act which the body is authorised or required to do may be done in the name of the body by a majority of those persons or of a quorum of them'. Thus, any act done by two out of three members of the committee is valid. Vide section 28 of the Interpretation Act, the committee consisting of three members can validly carry out its work where the Chairman and one member is present throughout. Thus, even if Exhibit J shows that only the Chairman and a member sat, the sitting remains valid. For purpose of clarity the provisions of sections 27 and 28 of the Interpretation Act are reproduced hereunder:- 27. (1) Where a body established by an enactment comprises three or more persons, then- (a) any act which the body is authorised or required to do may be done in the name of the body by a majority of those persons or of a quorum of them; and (b) in any vote taken at a meeting of the body the person presiding when the vote is ordered shall have a casting vote, whether or not he also has a deliberative vote. (2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this section, where a body established by an enactment comprises three or more persons and is empowered to make subsidiary instruments, any such instrument may be executed under the hand of any two of the members thereof as may be authorised by such body generally for that purpose or specially on any particular occasion. 28. Notwithstanding anything contained in any Act or any other enactment, the quorum of any tribunal, commission or inquiry (including any appeal tribunal established for the purpose of hearing any appeal arising therefrom) shall not be less than two (including the Chairman): Provided that the Chairman and the member shall be present at every sitting of the tribunal, commission or inquiry throughout the duration of the trial or hearing. Contrary to the case of the Claimant, the 1st Defendant’s position is that the Investigation Committee demonstrated clearly how orders granted by the Claimant were arbitrary or unreasonable. The committee found that an order was made by the Claimant on 22/8/14, the order was not shown to have been made without jurisdiction the Claimant vacated the said order when, he was functus officio and went ahead to grant another order to pay any money into account of a private legal practitioner, when the money sought in the order was meant for payment of probate fees which is to be paid to the probate Registry official account. It is also clear that in vacating the first order the Claimant was not correcting any typographical error or clerical mistakes or was acting based on slip rule. The two applications sought for two distinct orders. It has also been established that the money paid to probate Registry was N83,000,000.00 (Eighty Three Million Naira) out of the N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira), paid into the personal account of a private legal practitioner. The submission of Counsel for the Claimant to the effect that the recommendation for investigation to be conducted by the Police on the balance of the N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira), was unfair or not fair seems to have overlooked the fact that the Committee does not have statutory power of investigating crime. Thus, why the recommendation for the police to investigate the criminal allegation contained in the petition. The recommendations as contained in exhibit J now J 1, cannot be faulted on the grounds on which exhibit J is being attacked by the Claimant. The kind of attack is what can be done on appeal and there was no appeal despite the fact that the Claimant has right of appeal against the decision of 1st Defendant, but chose to contest the validity of the recommendations via certiorari proceeding. In certiorari proceeding it is not allowed to test the reasoning for coming to the decision being attacked or challenged. What the Claimant is allowed to do by law is to show that the decision was reached without or in excess of jurisdiction conferred by law. The Claimant has woefully failed to do so. This is a case in which the 1st Defendant is the only organ or body duly established by law to exercise control over judicial officers and exercise of disciplinary control over them. See FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT V. GOVERNOR MID-WESTERN STATE & ORS (1973) LPELR-1269(SC) (P.16, paras.D-F) the Supreme Court held Per ELIAS, C.J.N thus: “….it is settled law that certiorari lies to the High Court to quash the orders or the proceedings of an inferior tribunal which has acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that although the remedy was in early times limited to courts in the normal sense, it has since been extended to other authorities or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers: R.v. Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 K.B. 171, at pp. 204-5.” Since the Claimant has not established that the 1st Defendant acted without jurisdiction order of certiorari or prohibition cannot be granted. In JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION OF CROSS RIVER STATE & ANOR. V. DR. (MRS). ASARI YOUNG (2013) LPELR-20592(SC) (P. 38-39, paras. E-Z) the Supreme Court also held Per FABIYI, J.S.C thus: “…what really, in law, is certiorari? It is depicted as follows:- “Certiorari is one of the prerogative writs whose main function is to ensure that inferior courts or anybody entrusted with performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions keep within the units of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by statue which create them. Therefore, an order of certiorari will lie to remove into the High Court for purpose of being quashed any judgments, orders, convictions or other proceedings of such inferior courts or body, civil or criminal made without or in excess of jurisdiction (T. Akinola Aguda of blessed memory in his book – Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Courts of Nigeria 1995 Edition pages 654-655).” Having shown that the findings of the Committee as contained in Exhibit J 1 and the recommendations of the 1st Defendant were not made without or in excess of jurisdiction, and there was no error shown on the face of the decision of 1st Defendant and the parties were given opportunity to present their position, which they did. This Court cannot in the circumstance quash such decisions. Before concluding this judgment I wish to say regarding issue of fair hearing, the position of the law as per the recent decision of the Supreme Court in REV. PROF. PAUL EMEKA V. REV. DR. CHIDI OKOROAFOR & ORS [2017] 14 NWLR (PT. 1577) 410, where the Supreme Court, relying on BAKARE V. LSCSC [1992] 8 NWLR (PT. 266) 641 AT 699 - 700 and EKUNOLA V. CBN [2013] 15 NWLR (PT. 1377) 224 AT 262 - 263, held that breach of a fundamental right under section 36(1) of the Constitution arises only where the denial of fair hearing has been charged against a Court or tribunal established by law and not before a domestic or standing ad-hoc tribunal raised departmentally by parties. In other words, there would be no case of infringement of the right to fair hearing under Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution when the decision alleged to have violated one’s constitutional right to fair hearing, is that of a non-judicial body. This court In HONOURABLE JUSTICE BASSEY TAMBU EBUTA V. NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL & 3 ORS unreported Suit NO. NICN/ABJ/301/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 13th July 2017, held “that a careful reading of REV. PROF. PAUL EMEKA V. REV. DR. CHIDI OKOROAFOR & ORS. Supra will reveal that the Supreme Court acknowledged that fair hearing comes in two forms: the constitutional form under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution; and the common law form in terms of the rules of natural justice as expressed in the Latin maxims - audi alterem partem and nemo judex in causa sua”. The former relates to criminal trials in Courts of Tribunals whilst the latter is the yardstick of the domestic tribunes and administrative panels. I find and hold. In HONOURABLE JUSTICE BASSEY TAMBU EBUTA V. NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL & 3 ORS SUPRA this court went on to state that “The reliance by lawyers on Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution when challenging the disciplinary processes of employers is accordingly uncalled for and wrong. They have unwittingly taken to the realm of constitutional law what is rightly of the realm of administrative law. Under administrative law, by judicial review, the court can always set aside any disciplinary process that does not adhere to the common law rules of natural justice” Furthermore in OGBORO v. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF LAGOS POLO CLUB & ANOR (2016) LPELR-40061(CA) "Fair hearing in essence means giving equal opportunity to the parties to be heard in the litigation before the Court. where parties are given opportunity to be heard, they cannot complain of breach of fair hearing principles." Per NIMPAR, J.C.A. (P. 22, Paras. B-D) And in the world of work fair hearing since MR YESUFU AMUDA GARBA & ORS V. UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI [1986] LPELR-1305(SC); [1986] 1 NWLR (PT. 18) 550; [1986] ALL NLR 149; [1986] 2 SC 128, resonates as opportunity to be heard. An employee whose employment is terminated on ground of misconduct after being given an opportunity and has replied to a written query regarding the issue forming the basis of his termination cannot complain of lack of fair hearing. GUKAS v. JOS INTERNATIONAL BREWRIES LTD [1991] 6 NWLR (Pt. 199) 614. SOGBESAN v. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS & ORS. (2014) 47 NLLR (PT. 153) 346 NIC @ 351 IMONIKHE v. UNITY BANK PLC (2011) 12 NWLR (PT. 1262) 624 @ 640 referred to.] U.B.A. PLC v. ORANUBA (2014) 2 NWLR (PT. 1390) 1 @ 5 C.A. [YUSUF v. U.B.N. (1996) 6 NWLR (PT. 457) referred to.] (Pp. 41-42, PARAS. H-B) OSUMAH v. E.B.S. (2004) 17 NWLR (PT. 902) 332 referred to.] (P. 39, PARAS. E-G). In the present suit the Claimant having been given ample opportunity to responds to the allegations levelled against him both orally and in writing cannot be heard to complain of breach of fair hearing. In the end it is my humble view that the 1st Defendant given the circumstances of this suit has acted appropriately when faced with a damming report, of the investigation Committee. The 1st defendant was justified, acted within the constitutional mandate given to it. The Claimant’s removal is not a matter for certiorari as the 1st defendant did not in any way acted without or in excess of the Constitutional mandate given to it, nor breach the rule of natural justice or commit any error in law. The 1st Defendant having acted within its powers, when it set up a committee to investigate the petition, the Claimant appeared before the committees, the committees considered the applicants submissions before coming out with its report and recommendations. The 1st Defendant received the report, considered the Committees recommendations before making its own recommendations. This Court not being sitting on appellate jurisdiction does not have the power to grant the relief being sought by the Claimant. This Court cannot review by substituting its own reasoning or decision of the 1st Defendant. The simple reason being that this Court is not sitting on appeal on the decision of the 1st Defendant. In view of all I have been saying, the application fails. The reliefs being sought are refused and the entire suit is hereby dismissed. Sanusi Kado, Judge.