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JUDGMENT 1. Introduction & Claims The Claimant commenced this suit on 22/4/16 via a General Form of Complaint and statement of facts and sought the following reliefs - 1. A declaration that the deliberate withholding of the Claimant’s salaries by the Defendant without reason from February 2013 till date amounts to constructive dismissal of the Claimant by the defendants and to that extent wrongful, illegal, unfair labour practice and malicious and therefore a breach of section 12 of the Defendant’s Act 1993 relating to discipline of junior staff of the Defendant. 2. A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to all his salaries, allowances, bonuses and other entitlements etc. accruing from February 2013 until his employment is properly determined according to the Defendant’s Act 1993 and Civil Service Rules of the Federation. 3. A declaration that the defendant is under obligation to recall the Claimant forthwith to his work, position and current level by virtue of his appointment and the provision of section 9 (6) of part IV of the defendant’s Act 1993. 4. A declaration that the constructive dismissal of the claimant by the defendant is a breach of the claimant’s right to fair hearing under section 12 (2) of the defendant’s Act 1993 and the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and therefore, unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional. 5. An order of this Honourable Court compelling the defendant to pay to the claimant all his arrears of salaries at N87,945.80 per month and other entitlement that has accrued or is accruing from February 2013 until his employment is properly determined. 6. An order of this Honourable Court re-instating the Claimant to his work and current position and level with the defendant with immediate effect. 7. An order for exemplary damages against the defendant in the sum of =N=2,000,000.00 for the breach of the Claimant’s right to fair hearing. 8. The cost of this suit and legal fee in the sum of =N=1,000,000.00. In addition to the statement of facts filed, the Claimant also filed witness statement on oath, list of witness as well as list and copies of documents to be relied on at trial. On 4/6/16, the Defendant entered an appearance to this case and filed its statement of defence along with all requisite frontloaded processes. 2. Case of the Claimant The Claimant opened his case on 3/1/17, testified as CW1, adopted his written depositions made on 22/4/16 and 7/10/16 and tendered 7 documents as exhibits. The 7 documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exh. C1-Exh. C7. The case of the Claimant as revealed from his pleadings is that he was employed by the Defendant in 2000 as a Clerical Officer II on salary scale of HTISS 04/3; that he progressed steadily to Chief Clerical Officer (GD) on salary scale CONTISS 06 in 2009; that on 7th December, 2012, the Defendant through one Ijeoma Evbayemwenru (Ijeoma) granted an oral permission to him to go to the Defendant’s Apapa office; that on his arrival, the Defendant arrested him and one other person on an alleged involvement in the forgery of an import permit; that he was not allowed to return to office as he and the Consultant were handed over to the waiting Policemen from the Federal Intelligence and Investigation Bureau, Alagbon Close, Ikoyi Lagos for investigation; that he spent about seven days in detention before being released on bail; that when he returned to work after detention on 15/12/12 Ijeoma (being the claimant’s immediate boss) informed him that the Defendant’s then Director General Dr. Paul Orhii (DG) had directed her to inform the Claimant to stay away from work until further notice and that the office keys with him was retrieved and told to await further directives from the Director General. Claimant added that while he was in his house waiting for the DG’s further directive for his possible return to work, the Defendant’s Apapa office invited him to Apapa and handed him over to another set of Policemen from another unit of the Police Force for another round of investigation and was further detained for another 7 days; that he was released on bond and he returned to his office at the Defendant’s Oshodi office where he worked; that he asked from Ijeoma whether the Defendant's Director General has directed that he resumes work but Ijeoma said no that the Director-General said until he received a copy of the Police report of his case he should not resume; that the Defendant then stopped his salary from February, 2013 without recourse to the known law and rules governing his employment; on the stoppage of his salary, his immediate boss Mrs. Ijeoma advised him to remain calm as the salary would be paid to him after his recalled to work particularly, if the Police report exonerates him. It is also the case of the Claimant that he kept going to ask from Ijeoma about the expected directives of the Director-General; that efforts to personally meet the Director General were fruitless as he was not so allowed; that the Director-General later sent Aisha Garba to the Claimant that he should not resume until the Police report was received and that when eventually the Police informed him that the Police Investigation Officer (IPO) who investigated the case had been transferred from PSFU and that the other officers in the unit knew nothing about the investigation he decided to brief his Solicitors to serve a pre-action notice on the Defendant; that despite the pre-action notice dated 1/2/16 served on the Defendant which was actually received by the Defendant on 2/2/16 the Defendant refused, neglected and failed to pay his salaries which is accruing every month and also failed and refused to recall him to work and that it is upon the above ordeal and unfair labour practice and deliberate witch-hunt by the Defendant that he resorted in the institution of this action. Under cross examination, CW1 testified that he did not assist anybody to procure Chemical Import Permit; that the means of communication at Defendant include writing and oral or verbal communications; that oral Communication is not enough for him to stop work; that he still kept going to work until he was arrested at work at the instance of the Defendant; that after he was released he kept going to work until Defendant stopped his salary; that while he was invited by the Director of Enforcement of Defendant he informed his boss - Mrs. Ijeoma and she permitted him to go; that after the oral instruction to stop work he kept going to work until Defendant stopped his salary and Mrs. Ijeoma collected the key to the office from him and that he was still going to work for about 3 months after. 3. Case of the Defendant On 3/7/17, the Defendant opened its case. Its DW1 one Evbayemwehru Ijeoma Precious adopted her witness deposition dated 6/9/16 as her evidence in chief and prayed the Court to dismiss the case of the Claimant. The case of the Defendant is that the Claimant abandoned his duty post. Under cross examination, the witness stated that the Claimant’s employment is governed by the Civil Service Rules; that she is not in the Human Resources of the Defendant; that she does know under what law the salary of the Claimant was stopped; that on 7/12/12 Claimant took permission to go for breakfast; that when she did not see him on time she called and the Claimant informed her that he was at Defendant’s Enforcement Unit at Apapa; that the Defendant arrested Claimant at Apapa and from that day Claimant had not returned to the office; that the Defendant keeps contact addresses of its employees including the Claimant; that the Claimant worked with her for about a year; that she informed her Director of the absence of the Claimant; that the Director told her that he was aware that the Claimant was being held by the Enforcement Unit and that another staff was sent to replace the Claimant. Defendant also called one Oboli Augustine as DW2. DW2 adopted his witness statement on oath dated 6/9/16 as his evidence in chief and tendered 5 documents as exhibits. The documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exh. D1 - Exh. D5. Under cross examination, the witness testified that he knew the Claimant; that he is a public servant; that the 5 exhibits tendered are not the reasons for stopping the salary of the Claimant; that Claimant's absence from duty is a misconduct under the Civil Service Rules; that there are procedures under Civil Service Rules for dealing with such matter; that the Defendant has bio data of everyone of its staff; that there is no evidence before the Court that he went to look for the Claimant in his house when he did not come to work; that the author of Exh. D3 is Mr. Emmanuel Nwaogu; that he knew one Mrs. Ijeoma Evbayemwenru and that she was a colleague of the Claimant. 4. Submissions of learned Counsel At the close of trial and pursuant to the direction of the Court learned Counsel to the Defendant filed 2 processes. Counsel filed a notice of preliminary objection asking for an order of Court dismissing this suit as well as final written address both on 9/2/18. In its notice of preliminary objection filed on 9/2/19, the Defendant Defendant/Applicant sought an order this Court dismissing the suit of the Claimant. The grounds for the application are that (1) the Claimant failed to comply with Section 27(2) of the National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration and Control Act, Cap. N1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 to serve the complaint and the statement of facts at the head office and registered office at Plot 2032, Olusegun Obasanjo Way, Wuse Zone 7, Abuja; (2) that the case of the Claimant is statute barred same having been filed outside of the time allowed by Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004; and (3) that the Claimant did not comply with Section 97 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap. S6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. In its affidavit in support of the application filed on 9/2/18, the Defendant/Applicant had averred that the cause of action in this suit arose in February, 2013; that the Claimant filed his Complaint and statement of facts on 22/4/16; that the period between when the cause of action arose and the filing of this suit is more than 3 years as against the 3 months allowed by the law; that the Complaint filed by the Claimant was not endorsed as one to be served out of jurisdiction of this Court as required by the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and that the Complaint was served in the Lagos office of the Defendant instead of its Head Office in Abuja. In his address in support of the application, learned Counsel set down a lone issue for determination as follows - Whether this Honorable Court has jurisdiction to continue to entertain this suit in the face of non-compliance with Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap. P41, LFN, non-compliance with Section 27(2) of the NAFDAC Act Cap. N1, LFN, 2004 for failure to serve the complaint and the statement of facts at the Head Office and Registered Office of the Defendant at Plot 2032, Olusegun Obasanjo Way, Wuse Zone 7, Abuja and non compliance with Section 97, of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap. S6, LFN, 2004. Arguing this lone issue, learned Counsel to the Applicant submitted that the Originating processes in this case was served on the Defendant at its address in Isolo Industrial Estate, lagos rather than at its Head Office in Abuja as required by Section 27(2), National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control Act, 2004. Counsel submitted further that by Section 2, Public Officers Protection Act, this action ought to have been instituted within 3 months next of the accrual of the cause of action. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this case citing Unilorin v. Adeniran (2007)6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 498 at 505 & CBN v. SCSBV (No. 1) (2015)11 NWLR (Pt. 1469) 130 at 135. Finally, Counsel submitted that the Claimant did not endorse on his Complaint that it would be served outside the jurisdiction and that it rendered the process a nullity citing Idris v. Archibong (2001)9 NWLR (Pt. 718) 447. Counsel prayed the Court to dismiss this case being a statute barred matter. In reaction to this notice of preliminary objection, the Claimant filed an 11-page counter affidavit and a reply on points of law on 9/4/18. In his reply on points of law, learned Counsel to the Claimant/Respondent submitted that the Defendant is estopped from complaining of improper service at this stage of the proceedings having participated in the proceedings from the beginning to the end; that the Defendant entered an unconditional appearance to this suit, filed its statement of defence; participated fully in the trial and filed its final written address, citing Bank of the North v. Yau (2001)5 S.C (Pt. 1) 121& Rosa Investment v. Arewa Metal Containers Limited (2010) LPELR-4900 (CA) and urged the Court to so hold. Learned Counsel added that the employment of the Claimant is undoubtedly governed by the statute; that such an employment must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by that statute and any other manner of termination inconsistent with the relevant statute is null, void and of no effect citing Sapara v. University College Hospital Management Board (1988)4 NWLR (Pt. 86) 581 and that Public Officers Protection Act will not come in aid of failure to comply with statutory provisions respecting termination of employment regulated by a statute and that in the instant case, the Defendant failed to comply with the provision of Civil Service Rules particularly Rules 030307 and National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control particularly Section 12(1) on the laid down procedure for determining an employment with statutory flavour; that failure to comply with statutory provisions render any accompanying act null and void and that such failure will not find protection under the Public Officers Protection Act. Learned Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection raised. In his 6-page final written address dated and filed 9/2/18, learned Counsel to the Defendant set down the following 4 issues for determination - 1. Whether the Claimant can continue to absent himself from work in the Defendant’s employment without any written permission or approved leave of absence. 2. Whether the claim of constructive dismissal by the Claimant without any formal or written letter of dismissal can be sustained against the Defendant. 3. Whether the Claimant is entitled to payment of any salary, payment(s), allowance(s), bonuses and entitlements from the Defendant from February, 2013 and 4.Whether the Claimant is entitled to payment of any exemplary damages, costs and the legal fees. Arguing these issues, Counsel submitted that the Claimant abandoned his duty and that the Defendant was justified in terminating his employment citing Udegbunam v. Federal capital Development Authority (2003)10 NWLR (Pt. 829) 487 in support. Counsel further referred to Rules 030413 & Rules 030401, Public Service Rules, 2008 Edition in support of the proposition that it is improper to continue to pay the salary of the Claimant who abandoned his duty; that the Claimant is not entitled to payment of any salary or allowances as the Federal Government had issued a circular dated 22/6/16 with Ref. No: 58598/S/11/182 on No work No pay principle and respecting claim for exemplary damages and cost, Counsel submitted that the Claimant has not proved his entitlement to same. he prayed the Court to dismiss the case of the Claimant. On 9/4/18, the Claimant filed his 26-page final written address and in which his Counsel set down 3 main issues for determination as follows - 1. Whether the claimant whose employment is governed by law can be validly terminated or constructively dismissed summarily without regards to the procedure for disciplining the claimant contained in the defendant’s establishment Act and the Public Civil Service Rules. 2. Whether the failure and refusal of the defendant to hear from the claimant before taking any disciplinary action against him is not a breach of the claimant’s right to fair hearing as guaranteed by Section 36 of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and section 12 of the defendant’s establishment Act and Civil Service Rules of the Federation? and 3. Whether the claimant has not proved his case to entitle him to the reliefs claimed?. Arguing these issues, learned Counsel submitted that both parties agreed that the employment of the Claimant is one with statutory flavour; that the implication is that employment with statutory flavor must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by the relevant statute and where that is not done it is null, void and of no effect citing Sapara v. University College Hospital Management Board (1988)4 NWLR (Pt. 86) 581; that the Defendant and the Public Services Rules laid down the official procedure for terminating the employment of the Claimant and which the Defendant did not follow referring to Section 12, National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control and Rules 030307. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the step taken by the Defendant is null, void and of no effect. Counsel submitted that the Claimant was not given any hearing as provided for under is. Section 12(1) of NAFDAC Act before a disciplinary action was taken against the Claimant and that this offends the provision of Section 36(1), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. Finally, learned Counsel submitted that the available evidence before the Court including the evidence led by the Defendant is in support of the case of the Claimant. 5. Decision I carefully read and understood all the processes filed by learned Counsel on either side. I listened patiently to the testimonies of the witnesses called by the parties and watched their demeanor as well. I heard the oral argument of both learned Counsel and carefully evaluated all the exhibits tendered and admitted. Having done all this, I narrow the issues for the just determination to be following - 1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. 2. Whether the Claimant is still a bona fide staff of the Defendant. 3. Whether the Claimant has proved his case to be entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought. After the conclusion of trial, learned Counsel to the Defendant had raised a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine this case. The planks of the objection are mainly 3. Counsel had submitted that the suit is statute barred; that the Defendant was not properly served the originating processes in this suit and that the Claimant did not comply with the provisions of Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. A challenge to the jurisdiction of a Court goes to the very root of the case. A challenge based of statute of limitation constitutes a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine a cause or matter. Issue of jurisdiction once raised, it is imperative that it be resolved one way or the other. Jurisdictional issue is a fundamental and critical issue. It is a challenge that can be raised at any point in the cause of the proceedings. It may even be raised on appeal. In any event, jurisdiction is not an issue of fact. It is one of law. That being the case, it can even be raised by a trial Judge suo motu the only proviso being that a trial Judge must allow parties to proffer their addresses on same before delivering a Ruling. The reason being that a challenge of jurisdiction goes to the very root and foundation of the case before the Court and where jurisdiction is absent every effort dissipated in hearing a case amounts to efforts in futility. This is irrespective of the genuine intention, diligence and erudition of the trial Judge. A case is said to be barred by the statute if it is not brought and instituted within the time limit statutorily allowed to institute such an action. In a scenario as this, though the right of a party suing is there, it can however not be enforced through the judicial process. To determine whether or not a case is or is not barred by a statute, two critical points must be established. Firstly, the provision of the statute must be established as to the class of suits and the duration or time limit permitted. Secondly, the time when the suit concerned is instituted must be established so as to determine whether or not it comes outside the time limit. Now section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P 41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 provides as follows: 'Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect - a. the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof'. The purport of the above provision is that all actions against public officers must be instituted within three months failure to do which the right to ventilate same through the judicial process is extinguished, see Christiana Yare v. National Salaries, Wages and Income Commission (2013) LPELR 20520 (SC). Where an action is instituted outside the time allowed by the statute, the Court which hitherto had jurisdiction to hear and determine same is automatically divested of that adjudicatory power. In much the same vein, the right available to a Claimant or Plaintiff in such a situation is one that cannot be enforced through the judicial process. Now, the next critical point to consider is whether or not this suit is caught by the said statute being a statute of limitation. In determining whether or not a case is not caught by a statute of limitation, the starting point is the examination of the date the cause of action arose vis-a-vis the date the suit was instituted. The appropriate focus is certainly the statement of facts in the instant case. Now, when did the cause of action in this case arise? A cause of action arises the day a party is entitled under the law to approach the Court for redress against an alleged wrong committed by the other party. In the instant case, the events leading to its institution occurred in 2013 while the Claimant filed this case in April of 2016. The argument of the Defendant that this case is barred by the statute not having been instituted within the 3 months allowed by POPA was met by the argument that the injury complained about is still subsisting and continuing. The position of the Claimant is that the stoppage of his monthly salary by the Defendant is a continuing injury which is an acceptable exception within the provision of Section 2(a), Public Officers Protection Act. The Supreme Court took time to espouse on the meaning of continuing injury within the meaning of that statute in a decision not too long ago. In INEC v. Ogbadibo Local Government & Ors. (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC) the SC referring to earlier decision on the point being made stated thus - ''Continue of injury means, the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It does not and cannot be said to mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. In Olaosebikan vs Williams (1996) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt.449) 437 at 456, Salami, JCA quoting Dickson, J had this to say:- "The issue is very well illustrated by the dictum of Dickson J, in Michael Obiefina Vs. Alexander Okoye (1961) All N.L.R. 357. At pages 360 and 362 Dickson J, said the Continuance of injury or damage means Continuance of the legal injury, and not merely continuance of injury or damage within the meaning of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893: 20 Halsbury (2nd Edition) page 771. ..... with regards to the construction of those words, I am clearly of opinion that the matter is governed by the decision of the court of Appeal as far back as 1903, in the case of Curey Vs. Metropolitan Borough of Bermondey (67 J. P. 447), confirming the judgment of Channel J., in that case, reported in the same volume at page 111. Lord Halsbury, L. C. in giving judgment in the Court of Appeal in that case, affirming the judgment of channel J, said:- "It is manifest that continuance of the injury or damage' means the continuance of the act which caused the damage. It was not unreasonable to provide that, if there was the continuance of an act causing damage, the injured person should have a right to bring an action at any time within the months of the ceasing of the act complained of." I concur. I have nothing to add." For me, I agree as that is the correct interpretation of that section''. I have carefully perused the reliefs sought by the Claimant before me alongside his statement of facts. I find as a fact that the plank of the Claimant's case is that the Defendant without cause stopped payment of his monthly salary. That fact was not disputed by the Defendant. Payment of salary to an employee is critical to life of an employee as well as that of his immediate or nucleus family. Non-payment of the salary of the Claimant as required monthly since 2013 is an injury which continues till date. It has not stopped. It amounts to a continuous injury within the meaning of Section 2(a) of Public Officers Protection Act. I thus find and hold that the suit of the Claimant is not barred by the statute as argued. Counsel to the Applicant also argued that the Claimant failed to comply with Section 27(2), National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control Act. The whole of section 27 of the Act deal with legal proceedings against the Defendant including issue of pre-action notice before commencement of act. Now, sub-section 2 of section 27 states thus - ''The notice referred to in subsection (1) of this section and any summons, notice or other document referred or authorised to be served on the Agency under the provisions of this Act or any other enactment or law, may be served by - (a) delivering the same to the Director-General; or (b) sending it by registered post addressed to the Director-General at the head office of the Agency''. The submission of learned Counsel to the Defendant is that the processes in this case were served on it at its Lagos office rather than its Head Office in Abuja. I read the provision of S.27(2) above carefully. I note that the word used respecting service in the statute is may. I also not that service may be effected on the Defendant by delivering same ''... to the Director-General'' (without specifying whether at its head office or any of the States' offices); or by sending it by registered post addressed to the Director-General at the head office of the Agency. There is no complain by the Defendant that it was not served the processes in this case. In any event, if it was not served or properly served it would not have been adequately represented in the entire trial. I also note that the Defendant in entering an appearance to defend this suit did not indicate that it was doing so under some form of protest. I find no merit in this ground of objection. I thus overrule same accordingly. Learned Counsel to the Defendant had also urged this Court to decline jurisdiction to hear and determine this case on the ground that the Claimant failed to comply with Section 97, Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. That section of the statute deals with Endorsement on writ for service outside a State. It provides as follows - ''Every writ of summons for service under this Part out of the State or the Capital Territory in which it was issued shall, in addition to any other endorsement or notice required by the law of such State or the Capital Territory, have endorsed thereon a notice to the following effect (that is to say) - ''This summons (as the case may be) is to be served out of the ... State (or as the case may be) ... and in the ... State (as the case may be)''. The General Form of Complaint in this case was issued in Lagos on 22/4/16. It was issued against and for service on the Defendant. The address for service as stated on the writ is - ''National Agency for Food & Drug Administration & Control, (NAFDAC); of Plot 1 Isolo Industrial Estate, Isolo Lagos; in the Lagos Division of the National Industrial Court''. The writ issued in this case was not meant or designed to be served outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The address of the Defendant for service as indicated showed that it is within the jurisdiction of the Court. I overrule the preliminary objection raised by the Defendant relating to the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine same. I thus hold that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction. The second issue for determination is whether the Claimant is still a bona fide staff of the Defendant. The parties are ad idem on some critical issues in this case. For instance parties are agreed that the employment of the Claimant as an employee of the Defendant is one regulated by the Defendant's establishment Act and Civil Services Rules. Indeed DW1 did confirm under cross examination that the employment of the Claimant is one governed by the Civil Service Rules. For clarity and emphasis sake, Section 9(6), National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control Act states specifically that the members of staff of the Agency shall be public officers as defined in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. The important implication of this is that the employment of the Claimant can only be brought to end in compliance with the provision of the applicable statute and the Civil Service Rules. I am constrained to repeat part of the evidence of DW1 who happened to be the immediate and direct superior officer of the Claimant. DW1 stated on oath that she did not know under what law the salary of the Claimant was stopped; that on 7/12/12 Claimant took permission to go for breakfast; that when she did not see him on time she called and the Claimant informed her that he was at Defendant’s Enforcement Unit at Apapa; that the Defendant arrested Claimant at Apapa and from that day Claimant had not returned to the office; that the Defendant keeps contact addresses of its employees including the Claimant; that the Claimant worked with her for about a year; that she informed her Director of the absence of the Claimant; that the Director told her that he was aware that the Claimant was being held by the Enforcement Unit and that another staff was sent to replace the Claimant. In much the same vein, DW2 also testified under oath that he is a public servant; that the 5 exhibits tendered are not the reasons for stopping the salary of the Claimant; that Claimant's absence from duty is a misconduct under the Civil Service Rules; that there are procedures under Civil Service Rules for dealing with such matter; that the Defendant has bio data of everyone of its staff and that there is no evidence before the Court that he went to look for the Claimant in his house when he did not come to work. Claimant was accused of abandoning or absconding from duty. According to the Defendant that accounted for stopping his salary in February 2013. The 5 exhibits tendered by the Defendant were dated between 15th and 31st of May, 2007. They all have no relevance to the treatment meted to the Claimant by the Defendant. Again I revert to the evidence of the Defendant when the DW2 stated under cross examination that the 5 exhibits tendered are not the reasons for stopping the salary of the Claimant; that Claimant's absence from duty is a misconduct under the Civil Service Rules; that there are procedures under Civil Service Rules for dealing with such matter; that the Defendant has bio data of everyone of its staff and that there is no evidence before the Court that he went to look for the Claimant in his house when he did not come to work. Now, a pertinent question to ask is, if the Claimant's absence from duty is a misconduct and there are procedures under the Civil Service Rules for dealing with such matter, did the Defendant follow any such procedure in dealing with the issue of absence from duty by the Claimant? There is no record or evidence of any steps taken by the Defendant under the Civil Service Rules against the Claimant. Even though DW2 testified that the Defendant has bio data of everyone of its staff, witness also added that there is no evidence before the Court that he went to look for the Claimant in his house when he did not come to work. Throughout the trial, I find no evidence of a query issued to the Claimant between May 2007 and January 2012. I find as a fact that although the Defendant has the contact address of the Claimant, no contact was made to find out why he did not show up for work. It is my finding that no panel of inquiry was set up to investigate any complain of misconduct against the Claimant. There is no report of Police investigation of the Claimant before me and neither was there any Charge Sheet of criminal charge against him. In paragraphs 14-19 and 26, the Defendant alleged that the Claimant collected various sums of money from certain individuals; that the Claimant procured a fake renewed NAFDAC chemical permit for one Mr. Daniel Essiet and that in the course of interrogation by its Investigation and Enforcement Directorate, the Claimant admitted to the commission of the forgery together with two accomplices. Yet there is no single evidence led in support of these weighty accusations. The Claimant drew my attention to Section 12 of the Defendant's establishment Act and alleged failure of the Defendant to comply with same. That section deals with Discipline of Junior Staff. It provides as follows - (1). If any junior member of the staff is accused of misconduct or inefficiency, the Director-General may suspend him for not more than three months and forthwith shall direct the matter to the Junior Staff Appointment and Promotion Committee to – (a) consider the case; and (b) make recommendation as to the appropriate action to be taken by the Director-General. (2). In all cases under this section, the junior member of the staff shall be informed in writing of the charges against him and be given reasonable opportunity to defend himself. (3). The Director-General may, after considering the recommendation made pursuant to subsection (1) (b) of this section, dismiss, terminate, retire or downgrade the junior members of the staff concerned. (4). Any person aggrieved by the Director-General’s decision under subsection (3) of this section may, within a period of 21 days from the date of receipt of the letter communicating the decision to him, address a petition to the Council to reconsider his case and the Council’s decision thereon shall be final. It is apparent that the Defendant completely failed to pay attention to the provisions above in matter relating to how the Claimant was treated. It is a case of a Defendant refusing to obey its own laws and rules in dealing with staff affairs. Finally and by no means of least importance, there is no letter of interdiction, suspension, termination, retirement or dismissal issued against the Claimant. In other words, I find no evidence led before me to the effect that the employment of the Claimant has been in any way or manner determined within the purview of the applicable laws and rules. I therefore find and I so hold that the employment of the Claimant subsists and that he remains an employee of the Defendant until same is determined in accordance with the extant Civil Service Rules. Having so found and held, I also hold that the Claimant is entitled to all his arrears of salaries and allowances from February 2012 till date and payment of his salary and allowances on a monthly basis as an employee of the Defendant. The third issue for determination is whether the Claimant has proved his case to be entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought. The reliefs sought by the Claimant are 8 in number. I note that relief 2 and relief 5 are essentially the same. I thus grant reliefs 1 to 6. I declare that the deliberate withholding of the Claimant’s salaries by the Defendant without reason from February 2013 till date amounts to constructive dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant and to that extent wrongful, illegal, unfair labour practice and malicious and therefore a breach of section 12 of the Defendant’s Act relating to discipline of junior staff of the Defendant. I declare that the Claimant is entitled to all his salaries, allowances, bonuses and other entitlements etc. accruing from February 2013 until his employment is properly determined according to the Defendant’s Act 1993 and Civil Service Rules of the Federation. I declare that the Defendant is under obligation to recall the Claimant forthwith to his work, position and current level by virtue of his appointment and the provision of Section 9 (6) of Part IV of the Defendant’s establishment Act . I declare that the constructive dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant is a breach of the Claimant’s right to fair hearing under Section 12 (2) of the Defendant’s establishment Act and the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and therefore, unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant all his arrears of salaries at =N=87,945.80 per month and other entitlement that has accrued or is accruing from February 2013 till July 2018 amounting to =N=5,804,422.80 until his employment is properly determined. The Claimant is here reinstated to his work and current position and level with the Defendant effective from today. The Claimant has also sought an order for exemplary damages against the Defendant in the sum of =N=2,000,000.00 for the breach of the Claimant’s right to fair hearing. In First Inland Bank v. Craft 2000 Limited & Anor. (2011) LPELR-4167 (CA), Akeju, JCA took time out to put the concept of exemplary damages in perspectives in the following words - "As well explained by the Supreme Court in Odogu v. Att. Gen. of the Federation (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 456) 508, exemplary damages are usually awarded whenever the defendants' conduct is sufficiently outrageous to merit punishment such as instances where malice, fraud, cruelty, insolence, flagrant disregard of the law are disclosed. The Supreme Court made it clear in Allied Bank of Nigeria Limited v. Akabueze (1977) 6 SCNJ 116 that exemplary damages are recoverable only in matters in the realm of torts and not in claims for breach of contract with of course the only exception being in an action for breach of promise of marriage. It was also stated in that case that even in the realm of torts, the circumstances in which exemplary damages may be awarded are where the following are shown: (a) Oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants, of government; (b) Where the Defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the Plaintiff; (c) Where exemplary damages are expressly authorized by statute''. In the instant case, I note the denial of the Claimant right to be heard is in violation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended that the conduct of the Defendant is neither in tandem with the statute establishing it nor in compliance with the Civil Service Rules to which it is bound. I am however reluctant to hold the conduct to be oppressive. In any event there is no evidence before me to the effect that the Defendant's conduct has been calculated by it to make a profit for itself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the Plaintiff and neither is any shown that exemplary damages are expressly authorized by statute in the instant case. Exemplary damages must be proved. See Sonuga & Anor. v. The Minister, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja & Anor (2010) LPELR-19789 (CA). In any event, this Court has ordered the Defendant to pay to the Claimant all his arrears of salaries and allowance up to date of this judgment and to continue to pay same until the Claimant's appointment is determined in accordance with the extant statute and Civil Service Rules. I refuse and dismiss the head of relief for lack of proof by cogent, credible and admissible evidence. The final relief sought by the Claimant is for the sum of =N=1,000,000.00 as cost of this suit. Cost, it is said, follows event. The facts and circumstances leading to this case arose in 2012 while the injury resulting from same continues till date. This suit was filed in 2016. I have declared the act and conduct of the Defendant as null, void and of no effect in whatever form or manner. Yet, the Defendant by its conduct had forced the Claimant to seek judicial intervention for the protection of his rights and livelihood. No doubt money and time have been invested to get to this level. I hold that the Claimant is entitled to the cost of this proceedings assessed at =N=100,000.00. The Defendant is therefore ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=100,000.00 as cost of this proceedings. The Defendant was established by law. It is part and parcel of the Civil Service of the Federation of Nigeria. Those who are put charge of its affairs must operate within the ambits of the law. The hierarchy of public institution cannot afford to be law unto to itself. Laws are meant to be obeyed as the society cannot afford the danger of sliding into lawlessness. It is in this light that I am constrained to say that the Defendant will do itself a lot of good to obey the dictates of this Court in this Judgment without delay. Finally, for the avoidance of doubt and for all the reasons as stated in this Judgment, - 1. I overrule the preliminary objection raised by the Defendant relating to the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine same. I hold that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction. 2. I find and I so hold that the employment of the Claimant subsists and that he remains an employee of the Defendant until same is determined in accordance with the extant Civil Service Rules. Having so found and held, I also hold that the Claimant is entitled to all his arrears of salaries and allowances from February 2012 till date and payment of his salary and allowances on a monthly basis as an employee of the Defendant. 3. I declare that the deliberate withholding of the Claimant’s salaries by the Defendant without reason from February 2013 till date amounts to constructive dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant and to that extent wrongful, illegal, unfair labour practice and malicious and therefore a breach of section 12 of the Defendant’s Act relating to discipline of junior staff of the Defendant. 4. I declare that the Claimant is entitled to all his salaries, allowances, bonuses and other entitlements etc. accruing from February 2013 until his employment is properly determined according to the Defendant’s Act 1993 and Civil Service Rules of the Federation. 5. I declare that the Defendant is under obligation to recall the Claimant forthwith to his work, position and current level by virtue of his appointment and the provision of Section 9 (6) of Part IV of the Defendant’s establishment Act . 6. I declare that the constructive dismissal of the Claimant by the Defendant is a breach of the Claimant’s right to fair hearing under Section 12 (2) of the Defendant’s establishment Act and the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and therefore, unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional. 6. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant all his arrears of salaries at =N=87,945.80 per month and other entitlement that has accrued or is accruing from February 2013 till July 2018 amounting to =N=5,804,422.80 until his employment is properly determined. 7. The Claimant is here reinstated to his work and current position and level with the Defendant effective from today. 8. I refuse and dismiss the head of relief for lack of proof by cogent, credible and admissible evidence. 9. The Defendant is therefore ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of =N=100,000.00 as cost of this proceedings. All the terms of this Judgment are to be complied with immediately. Judgment is entered accordingly. ____________________ Hon. Justice J. D. Peters Presiding Judge