RULING This deals with two Motions on Notice for Preliminary Objection filed by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants challenging the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to entertain this suit. The first motion on notice was dated 13/2/18 and filed on 14/2/18, by the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Applicants. The motion was brought pursuant to: Order 17, Rules 1 (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure Rules), 2017; Section 2 (a) of Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004; Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004; and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Honourable Court. The application is supported by a five (5)-paragraphed affidavit of Emmanuel Tsamya. A written address was also filed. O. P. Omuru, Esq; Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants in his oral submission relied on all the grounds of the objection, all the paragraphs of the affidavit and the processes filed by the Respondent in this suit. Counsel also adopted the written address as his argument. In the written address two issues were submitted for determination to wit: 1. ‘‘Whether this suit is statute barred, having been filed seven months and nineteen days after the accrual of the cause of action’’. 2. ‘‘, in view of the provision of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation, 2004, the suit is premature’’. ISSUE ONE In arguing issue one counsel submitted that having regard to the processes filed by the Respondent in this suit, this Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit as same is statute barred. According to counsel to exercise jurisdiction in a matter, this Honourable Court is guided by laid down principles. Among these principles, the subject matter of the case must be within the jurisdiction of the court and there must be no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. The case of Attorney-General, Anambra State Vs. Attorney-General of the Federation (2007) 8 MJSC 28, was relied upon on this contention. Counsel contended that this action is statute barred as same is caught up by Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. It is the submission of Counsel that in addition to its general application, the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, specifically apply to the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Applicants by virtue of the provisions of Section 19 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. It is the submission of Counsel that a "person" when used in a legal sense, as in this case, is an apt word to describe a corporation as well as a natural person, to support this submission Counsel cited the case of Ofili V. C. S. C. (2008) 2 NWLR (pt. 1071) 238 at 252 - 253, paras. H – B. Counsel also relied on Ibrahim V. Judicial Service Committee (1998) 14 NWLR (pt. 584) 1, it is argued by Counsel that the Court in this Country have remained consistent in holding that Agencies of Federal or State Governments are public officers entitled to the protection envisaged and contemplated by the Public Officers Protection Act/Laws. Counsel submitted that the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Applicants are created by Sections 5(1) and 3(1) respectively of the National Youth Service Corps Act, supra. The cumulative effect of these provisions is that the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Applicants being Officies of the National Youth Service Corps, an Agency of the Federal Government, are both persons within the protection contemplated by the Public Officers Protection Act. The compulsory retirement of the Respondent by the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Applicants which has occasioned the Respondent's grievance was an act of public officers in their official capacities and Counsel urged the Court to so hold. It is the submission of Counsel that the period of limitation of action is determined by looking at the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim with a view to ascertaining the date on which the wrong complained of was committed and to compare that date with the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed. If the date pleaded as to when the right to sue accrued is beyond the limitation period enacted by the applicable statute, the action is statute barred and incompetent. On this submission Counsel relied on Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria V. Gold (2007) 9 MJSC 210 at 220, paras. C-E and Ofili V. C. S. C. (Supra) 253, paras. F-H. It is the submission of Counsel that looking at the processes filed by the Respondent. It is clear therefrom that the cause of action arose on 6th day of April, 2014, when the Respondent admittedly received his letter of compulsory retirement dated the 7th day of March, 2014. To support his submission Counsel referred to paragraphs 2 and 11 of the Respondent's Statement of Facts. This suit was filed on the 25th day of November, 2014, seven months and nineteen days after the accrual of the cause of action. This is clearly over the three months prescribed by Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 within which the Respondent is required to seek redress. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. It is further submitted that where a law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the statute. An action brought outside the prescribed period offends the provision of the section and does not give rise to a cause of action. On this submission Counsel referred to Egbe V. Adefarasin & Anor (1985) 1 NSCC Vol. 16 643 at 658 Lines 39 to 44 and Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria V. Gold (supra) paras. The Respondent having not brought the action within the three months prescribed by Public Officers Protection Act, supra, is definitely statute barred from commencing the action and Counsel urged the Court to so hold, and resolve issue one in favour of the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Applicants and dismiss the suit. ISSUE TWO In arguing issue two Counsel submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit as same is premature. Counsel contended that the National Youth Service Corps was established by Section 1 (1) of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Section 3(1) and (2) of the said Act created the 2nd Defendant/Applicant and gave it powers to be the governing body while Section 5(1) and (2) of the said Act created the 1st Defendant/Applicant and empowered him with the general responsibility for matters affecting the day- to-day running of the National Youth Service Corps. Vide section 20 of the said Act it was provided that any aggrieved person with the decision of the directorate or the exercise by the directorate of any of its powers under the Act shall have the right of appeal to the presidency in the first instance before any action may be commenced in any Court of law. Counsel argued that in determining jurisdiction, the Court is enjoined to look at the processes filed by the Plaintiff, in this case, the claimant/respondent. To support this submission Counsel relied on the case of Omnia Nigeria Ltd. Vs. Dyktrade Ltd. (2007) 12 MJSC 115 at 142-143, paras. G-C and urged the Court to look at the processes filed by the claimant/respondent in this suit. The subject matter of the suit is the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent by the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants from the employment of the National Youth Service Corps. The claimant/respondent is aggrieved by the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants' action, but there is nothing to show that he appealed to the Presidency in respect of his grievance as provided by Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, supra. Counsel contended section 20 is a mandatory statutory provision. The non-compliance thereto is against the claimant/respondent and fatal to his case as it has stripped the Honourable Court of its jurisdiction to entertain this suit. In support of this contention Counsel relied on Adesanoye V. Adewole (2006) 10 MJSC 1 at 15, paras. E-F. It is the submission of counsel that in his purported compliance with the provisions of Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, the claimant/respondent states in paragraph 13 of his Statement of Facts that he appealed to the 2nd defendant/applicant by letters dated 11th April, 2014 and 29th October, 2014. He also stated in paragraph 17 of his Statement of Facts that he appealed to the Head of Civil Service of the Federation (3rd Defendant). The said letters are attached to claimant/respondent's complaint but not marked. It is submitted that the letters to 2nd defendant/applicant and that to Head of Civil Service of the Federation (3rd defendant/applicant), did not suffice as an appeal to the Presidency within the contemplation, spirit and intention of the provisions of Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. It is the contention of Counsel that the 2nd defendant/applicant or Head of Civil Service of the Federation (3rd defendant/applicant), and "Presidency" are not contemplated to mean the same office. It is argued that if the Draftsmen in their wisdom intended that the definition of "Presidency" would mean or include the 2nd defendant/applicant or Head of Civil Service of the Federation (3rd defendant/applicant), it would have been so clearly stated in the Act. This is further buttressed by the provisions of Section 22 of the National Youth Service Corps Decree No. 51 of 16th June, 1993 which define ‘presidency’ in an unambiguous manner. The word "Presidency" was defined as follows: "Presidency means the Office of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces’’. It is also the submission of Counsel that the provisions of Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, supra, is a local remedy which the Claimant/Respondent has not exhausted before approaching the Court for redress. Where a statute prescribes a legal line of action for determination of an issue, as in this case, the aggrieved party must exhaust all the remedies in that law before embarking on actual litigation in Court. On this submission Counsel relied on Aribisala V. Ogunyemi (2005) 6 MJSC 188 at 205, paras. It is also the contention of counsel that if a matter is justiciable in Nigeria, the remedies available in the domestic forum must first be exhausted. Until this is done, any resort to Court action would be premature. On this submission Counsel relied on Akintemi & Ors v. Onwumechi & Ors (1985) 1 NSCC Vol. 16, 46 at 61, Lines 31 to 35. In concluding his argument Counsel urged the Court to resolve the two issues submitted for determination in favour of the defendants/applicants and dismiss the case for want of maturity and for being stature barred. The second motion on notice for preliminary objection was dated 15/5/2018 and filed on the same day by the 3rd defendant/applicant praying for an Order of this Honourable Court striking out the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant from this suit for want of reasonable cause of action. In compliance with the rules of this Court the motion on notice for preliminary objection by the 3rd defendant/applicant was accompanied by a written address. In the written address two issues were distilled for determination, to wit: (i) Whether the Claimant's case as constituted discloses a reasonable cause of action against the 3rd Defendant? (ii) Whether the non-disclosure of the requisite cause of action is not a condition precedent to the competence of this suit for adjudication? Ovoke Celenstine O. Esq; Counsel for the 3rd defendant/applicant in his oral submission before the Court adopted the written address as his argument and also sought leave to argue the two issues submitted for determination together. Counsel begun his submission by submitting that the Claimant's case discloses no reasonable cause of action. As a reasonable cause of action consists of two fundamental elements which the law expects the Claimant's case to establish simultaneously, side by side. These elements are: (i) The wrongful acts of the defendant(s) sued; and (ii) The consequent damage arising from the wrongful act. It is submitted that the disclosure of the requisite reasonable cause of action is a condition precedent to the Court assuming jurisdiction over a matter and therefore the non-disclosure of a reasonable cause of action robs the court of jurisdiction to entertain the matter submitted to it for adjudication. In support of this position counsel placed reliance on the case of ALHAJI AMINU IBRAHIM VS. FELIX OSIM (1988)3 N.W.L.R. (Part 82) page 257 at 260 paragraphs A-B, and that of DIM CHUKWU EMEKA ODUMEGWU OJUKWU VS. ALH. UMARU MUSA YAR'ADUA & 4 ORS. (2009) 28 N.S.C.Q.R. (Part 1), 492 at 565. It is further submitted that, from the totality of the claimant/respondent's Statement of facts filed in this matter there is no wrongful act of the 3rd defendant/applicant shown, and the claimant/respondent's pleadings have not equally shown any damage arising from any wrongful act of the 3rd defendant/applicant. It is also submitted that from the claimant/respondent's pleadings before this Honourable court, there is nowhere an allegation was raised against the 3rd defendant/applicant. In paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6, 10,11, 12, and 13 of the Statement of Facts, the Claimant clearly stated who employed him and who removed him from the service. Nowhere in the entire Statement of Facts did the claimant/respondent mention the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant as being responsible for either his employment or removal from the service. It is also submitted that the law is trite and established that for a person to be joined as a defendant in a suit, it must be established that for the court to adjudicate upon the cause of action set up by the plaintiff, the presence of the party before the court as defendant will be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause. On this submission reliance was placed on the case of LAGOS STATE BULK PURCHASE CORPORATION V. PURIFICATION TECHNIQUES (NIG) LTD (SUPRA), AT PAGE 304 – 305. Further reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of HON. EMMANUEL BW ACIIA V. HON. JOEL DANLAMI IKENYA & 2 OTHERS (2011) 3 N. W. L. R. (PART 1235) PAGE 610. It is submitted that this suit can be effectually and effectively determined without the presence of the 3rd defendant/applicant as it was neither the 3rd defendant/applicant that employed the claimant nor was it the 3rd defendant/applicant that allegedly removed him from service. It is further submitted that the National Youth Service Corps Act Cap. N84 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 under which the Claimant was employed clearly spelt out the statutory body vested with the powers to appoint, advance, terminate and discipline employees including the claimant/respondent; and nowhere in the whole Act was the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant mentioned. Counsel also referred to all the documents attached to the Statement of Facts which clearly indicate the authority that employed, confirmed, promoted and terminated the claimant/respondent's employment. Nowhere in the documents was the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant stated or is referred to in any form whatsoever. In concluding his argument counsel urged the Court to strike out the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant for non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action and not being a necessary party. OPPOSITION BY THE CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT. In opposing the preliminary objection of the 1st and 2nd Defendants/Applicants, the claimant/respondent filed a written address dated 20/4/18. However, in respect of the objection of 3rd defendant/applicant no response was filed. But, counsel replied to the objection on points of law. In the written address, counsel formulated a lone issue for determination, to wit: ‘‘Whether this Honourable court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the Claimant’’. In arguing the sole issued Counsel submitted that the authorities cited on their own are good laws but they are most inapplicable to the facts of this case and should be rejected. It is the contention of Counsel that this application can only be determine after evidence had been taken in this case. According to Counsel the facts upon which this application should be determine are not yet before the court. Counsel submitted the appropriate thing to do is to step down such application and take evidence and that such issues raised will then form part of the issue for determination in the case. This is so as the premise for this application is the limitation law which in legal jurisprudence is a defence to the suit. It is the contention of Counsel that to dismiss the suit of the Claimant at this stage without examining the merit would be tantamount to disposing of an action at interlocutory stage which our appellate Court frowns at. It is further contended that when a Court lacks jurisdiction to determine a case it also lack the power to dismiss same but can only strike same out. It is also argued that the Claimant has raised the issue in its claims that there is a continuing damage by the defendants for refusal to pay him and other Claimants in the sister suits their salary without justification or any legal bases. Counsel contended that the statement of facts and prayers d and e of the claimant these are act still in operation till date. Counsel referred to Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, by this provision this suit falls within exception to the general rule as there is continuance of damage or injury. Counsel contended that the law is trite that a party must stick to its case and that a case of a party must be consistent. The present two issues raised in the instant application not being raised in the alternative are inconsistent and same must be rejected by this Honourable Court. The point is that the issues are in direct conflict with each other. An action that is statute barred had out lived it usefulness. While an action that is premature is yet to have life. The argument of Applicants' Counsel in this application is therefore misleading and the Court should discontinuance same. Counsel further contended assuming the Court determines both issues and agree with the Applicants on the two issues raised and hold that an action which is statute barred is also premature and then proceeds to dismiss same. The ruling will certainly be inconsistent and same will not reflect the true position of our laws. Counsel submitted that there is no logical pronouncement that can be made on the two issues distilled by the Applicants to this Honourable Court and therefore urged the Court to strike out this motion with substantial cost. It is also submitted that having regards to the state of the law, the Motion on Notice filed by the Applicants is incompetent. According to Counsel this submission is based on the fact that this application has strayed from issues of law to that of facts and evidence must be taken, on this contention Counsel relied on the Supreme Court decision in WOHERE V EMEREUWA (supra). Counsel submitted that the Applicants should not be allowed to mislead this court to decide substantial issues of facts at interlocutory stage. On this submission Counsel placed reliance on The National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) V Geco Prakla Nigeria Limited (2010) 20 NLLR (Pt. 57) 372 @397-398 was a decision of a penal of Five Justices of this Honourable Court. Counsel urged the Court to hear this application with the main suit. To support this contention Counsel urged the Court to follow the following cases of this Honourable Court where similar application raising the issue of jurisdiction of the court was raised but same was suspended pending the hearing of the main suit. They are Nigeria Union of Teachers V State Security Services (SSS); NICN IABJ/109/2011 delivered by the President of this Honourable Court Hon. Justice B.A. Adejumo, OFR on 17th September, 2014 in this suit the Defendants filed an application urging the court to hold that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the suit but the application was taken after evidence together with the written address and ruling was delivered first on the application before the court proceeded to its judgment after it held it had jurisdiction to hear the case. Also reliance was placed on Nigeria Union of Teachers V Trade Union Congress of Nigeria SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/165/2013 ruling delivered on 3rd February 2014. Alternatively, Counsel contended that the law is trite that in determining whether or not a court has jurisdiction to entertain a matter it is the claim of the claimant that should be examined and nothing more. For this proposition of the law, counsel relied on AGF v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 187 at 233. The claimant filed a complaint (writ of summons) as it is called in the High Court because the facts upon which to determine the suit are in dispute or riotously so, the law is that writ of summons lie where the proceedings are hostile in the sense of violent dispute. Facts in such cases have a pride of place in the determination of the case. Therefore there must be some evidence upon which a Court of law must rely on in determining a matter that comes to it through a writ of summon. This application cannot be determine with the affidavit evidence attached to the motion but by way of evidence (witness testimony) which is applicable in this case this account for why the attached documents to the writ were not marked as the Court would mark same when evidence is taken during hearing as against the proposition of the defendants/applicants in their said application that the claimant did not mark the attached documents. Counsel wonders how an action that is statute barred can also be premature and if action that is premature can be dismissed by a Court that lacks jurisdiction to entertain same. According to counsel this clearly shows that the defendants/applicants brought this application for a singular reason to waste the judicious time of this Honourable Court. Counsel added that this Honourable Court is a Labour Court and it is not given to technicalities of the regular high courts with its attended delays. The 3rd defendant/applicant is the only defendant that filed a defence to this suit. The other defendants/applicants refused to file any defence to this suit rather they only filed a preliminary objection premised on limitation law. It is submitted that this suit is of continuos injury and limitation is held to be a defence which does not take away the jurisdiction of the court. On this submission Counsel placed reliance on The National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) V Geco Prakla Nigeria Limited (2010) 20 NLLR (Pt. 57) 372 @397-398 Counsel also faulted the submission of counsel for the defendants/applicants on date of arual of cause of action from the date claimant/respondent received the letter of compulsory retirement. It is also the position of counsel that the 3rd and 4th defendants in this suit represent the presidency, because the letter head paper of 3rd defendant/applicant bears presidency. It is further argued that the condition of service of the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants front loaded was approved by the 3rd defendant/applicant for the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants. According to counse the provisions of National Youth Service Corps Decree of 1993, cannot be invoke to interpret ‘presidency’ as it is an abolished law. Counsel also submitted that the President created the office of the Head of Civil and Secretary of Government and named same as the Presidency. It is further submitted that the statute of limitation is a defence and an application to hear same will only be proper after the party has filed a defence to the suit. The law is well settled that pleadings have to be filed and exchanged by the parties before an objection to an action being statute barred can properly be taken. This is invisibly is the case where demurrer has been abolished. The practice is that a party seeking to rely on limitation of statute must plead same and thereafter apply to the court to set down for hearing the defence of limitation law by an application raising specifically the question of limitation of statute and that the Court lacks power to entertain the matter. On this submission Counsel relied on Sulgarre Holdings INC V F • G.N (2012) 17 NWLR Pt. 1329 @ 309 pg 339-340 para G-B. It is also the submission of Counsel that the acts of the Applicants are outside the colour of their statutory or constitutional duty which is not protected by the Act. See A.G. Rivers State V A.G. Bayelsa State (supra). Also see In The National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas orkers (NUPENG) V Geeo Prakla Nigeria Limited (supra), in concluding his submission counsel submitted that they have demonstrated that the action of the claimant is not a challenge to the letter of retirement but the continued stoppage of salary without any bases whatsoever and howsoever. To do otherwise would be to dispose of a substantive matter at the interlocutory stage, a course which the appellate Courts frown seriously at. This court is the only court in Nigeria that has jurisdiction by virtue of section 254 C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended to entertain this action. Counsel urged this court to hold that it has jurisdiction and allow this matter to proceed to trial. It is contended that when a court finds that it lacks jurisdiction the only and proper order it has power to make is an order striking out the suit and not dismissal. Counsel submitted that no power to dismiss an action that is either statute barred or premature. The prayer of the objectors cannot be granted if the court holds that it lacks jurisdiction to determine the suit we ask for substantial cost and an order for speedy trial enters accordingly. REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW BY THE 1ST AND 2ND DEFENDANTS/APPLICANTS. Counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants filed a reply on points of law wherein he responded to the issues raised in the claimant/respondent’s written address in opposition to the preliminary objection. On the argument of the claimant/respondent that the two issues raised and argued are conflicting, the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants contended that the two issues raised and argued by the Applicants in their preliminary objection are the basic features of the action. An action is statute barred, as in this case, when it is instituted outside the time statutorily allowed to seek redress in Court. Also, an action is premature when a condition-precedent is not fulfilled, as in this case, before instituting it. It is also contended that there is no law prohibiting a party from raising and arguing all the issues that are considered to be the features of a case. On the contention that the action is of continuous damage or injury, Counsel submitted that the claimant/respondent has missed the point. It is settled law that law on limitation of the action runs from the date of alleged commission. It is immaterial to the date the effect of the complainant's injury or wrong continues 'ad infinitum'. On the claimant/respondent’s submission that, the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants' action that occasioned his grievance was in bad faith, born out of malice, an abuse of office, unjust and outside the colour of statutory duty. It is contended that the issues raised by the claimant/respondent in his argument are all fundamentally substantive issues which have no bearing in a matter that is statute barred as in this case. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of Sani V. Okene Local Government & Anor (2008) 10 MJSC 199 at 205 to 206 and the case of Anozie V. Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & 4 Drs (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 278. On the claimant/respondent’s contention that the payment of salary and assignment of duty after the decision to compulsorily retire him from service have nullified his retirement. It is submitted that the effective date of the claimant/respondent's compulsory retirement was the 6th day of April, 2014 when he admittedly received the letter in respect thereof. It would not be an act of responsibility on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants to stop the claimant/respondent's salary and stop assigning duties to him when he was not formally informed of his compulsory retirement. The purported assignment of duty preceded the date he received his letter of retirement. Also, it is a common knowledge that salaries of public servants are paid by the Integrated Personnel Payroll Information System (IPPIS). By implication, the Applicants have no control over payment of salaries and bureaucracy did not allow immediate stoppage of the Claimant/Respondent's salary. Granted however but not conceding that the cause of action arose by the end of June, 2014 when the claimant/respondent claims that his salary was not paid, it took him four months and twenty five days before he instituted the suit on the 25th day of November, 2014. This is still clearly outside the three months limited by law for seeking redress in court against the Applicants. It is further submitted that the stoppage of salary and assignment of duty to the claimant/respondent which he claims to be his grievance are all ancillary issues rooted in his compulsory retirement, and cannot stand on their own. If he was not compulsorily retired from service, his salary would still have been paid, he would still have been sent on assignment and there would have been no issue to warrant approaching the court for redress. This explains the reason for the claimant/respondent's prayer for immediate reinstatement to service. The Court was referred particularly to Relief (e) in the claimant/respondent's complaint and Statement of Facts. This was a definite and conclusive disciplinary decision against the claimant/respondent by his former employer (2nd defendant/applicant) which is the Directorate and empowered by Section 4 (4) of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 "to appoint, (including power to appoint on promotion and transfer and of dismissal. Notwithstanding the above arguments, Counsel maintain that these issues are also substantive in nature. If an action is statute barred, as in this case, no amount of resort to the merit of the claimant/respondent's contention will serve to keep the action in being. To buttress this submission Counsel relied on Owners of the MV "Arabella" V. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation (2008) 8 MJSC 145 at 173, paras. D-G and urge the Honourable Court to so hold. On the claimant/respondent’s allegation that the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants’ preliminary objection is predicated on issues of technicalities and that the applicants did not file a defence to the claimant/respondent's claim. It is contended that the Applicants' preliminary objection is based on jurisdiction. An issue of jurisdiction is not an ordinary point to be dismissed as a mere or overstretched issues of technicalities. It is a very fundamental issue that goes to the root of the matter. The law is meant to be obeyed. Where there is a stipulated procedure, as in this case, it must be followed to the later. Where the procedure is not followed, as in this case, the Court will lack jurisdiction. Counsel agree that the Honourable Court is a Labour Court as argued by the Respondent. However, the Court is first and foremost a Court of Law, and must not be seen to sacrifice a fundamental issue of jurisdiction on a platter of perceived "speed". It will amount to going on a frolic and embarking on an exercise in futility for a Court to adjudicate on a matter without jurisdiction. Counsel referred to Order 18, Rule 6 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 and submitted that it recognizes the weighty nature of the issue of jurisdiction when it copiously exempts preliminary objections that challenge jurisdiction of the Court from the discretion given to the Court to hear a preliminary objection together with the substantive suit. Moreover, this is not Originating Summons procedure where preliminary objection and substantive matter are heard together. Being an action commenced by way of complaint, pleadings is not a pre-condition for hearing of preliminary objection which must always be resolved first. In view of the fundamental nature of the issue of jurisdiction, it can be raised at any time or stage and in any manner whatsoever, even for the first time in the Supreme Court. Demurrer does not apply when jurisdiction is in issue. This principle received the blessings of the Supreme Court in Military Governor of Ondo State & 5 Ors V. Kolawole & 4 Ors (2008) 9 MJSC 203 at 212, Paras F- G when it held as follows "It is trite law that the issue of jurisdiction by whatever name and under any shade, can be raised at any stage. It can be raised viva voce or the Court can raise it suo motu. " Counsel also referred to Oloriode V. Oyebi (1984) 15 SCNLR 390, (1984) 5 SC 1 and Elebanjo V. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (pt. 1001) 76. On presidency, it is submitted that the claimant/respondent’s letter to the 3rd Defendant cannot in an anyway amount to appeal to presidency within the contemplation of Section 20 of the NYSC Act. It is submitted that, it is the law that defines Presidency in matters involving the applicants, but not facts or letter headed paper as the claimant/respondent wants the court to believe. Counsel reiterate that, the definition of the word "Presidency" is provided by Section 22 of the National Youth Service Corps Decree 51 of 16th June, 1993 which established the National Youth Service Corps. It is the Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 221, Vol. 80 of 9th August, 1993. It is contended that the Decree clearly defines the word "Presidency" to mean "the Office of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces." There is nothing in this clear and unambiguous definition to mean, suggest, include or refer to the Office of the Head of Civil Service of the Federation or any other office. The Court is urged upon to look at the Official Gazette in this regard. Its content is a prima facie proof of any fact of a public nature which it is intended to notify. On this contention Counsel relied on Line Limited V. S.C.C. Nigeria Limited & 2 Ors (2009) 7 MJSC (pt. III) 1 at 21-22. Counsel also submitted that the claimant/respondent argues inadvertently that the National Youth Service Corps Decree 51 of 16th June, 1993 has been abrogated and therefore no longer part of our laws. When the said the National Youth Service Corps Decree is an existing law. To buttress this submission Counsel referred to Section 315(5)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides that, "nothing in this Constitution shall invalidate the ... National Youth Service Corps Decree 1993". It further provides that the provisions of the Decree shall continue to apply and have full effect in accordance with its tenor and shall not be altered or repealed except in accordance with the provisions of Section 9(2) of the Constitution. This has shown clearly that NYSC Decree 1993 is constitutional and subsisting. Counsel contended that the NYSC Decree 1993 has never been amended, let alone abrogated. Like any other existing law, it has only been re-coded as Chapter N84 in the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. The re-coding does not and cannot suffice as an amendment within the contemplation of Section 9(2) of the CFRN, 1999 (as amended). The omission of the definition of the word "Presidency" in the re-coded Laws of the Federation of Nigeria is, at best, a printer's error which also does not suffice as an amendment. In concluding his submission Counsel insisted that this suit is statute barred and the claimant/respondent did not appeal to presidency as required by section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this suit for want of competence. COURT’S DECISION From the two motions on notice for preliminary objection filed by the defendants/applicants in this suit, the dispute between the parties can adequately be disposed upon determination of the issues formulated below: 1. Whether the Claimant’s suit is statute barred within the purview of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act?. 2. Whether by virtue of the provisions of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act this suit is premature. 3. ‘‘Whether the 3rd Defendant is a necessary party in this suit’’. I, shall before resolving the issues for determination resolve certain preliminary issues raised by Counsel in the course of arguing their respective positions before the court. The first question is that of appropriateness or otherwise of supporting notice of preliminary objection with an affidavit. Ordinarily a notice of preliminary objection filed to raise issue in limine, is dealing with point of law before the Court. That is to say the objector is relying solely on law only in raising the objection and is not relying on any facts. However, where the facts are not in dispute an affidavit can accompany a notice of preliminary objection. But in an application regarding statute of limitation of action, the law is settled, it is the statement of claim that will be looked at to determine the period of limitation. See IBRAHIM V JUDICIAL SERVICE CPOMMITTEE OF KADUNA STATE (supra), FORESTRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NIGERIA V GOLD (supra) and WOHEREM V EMEREUWA (2004)13 NWLR (PT.890) 398. In determining the applications filed by the Defendants/Applicants, this Court will restrict itself to only the originating process commencing this suit and its accompanying documents, since the law permit looking at those processes in resolving preliminary objection. It is trite law that an application by way of a preliminary objection for the dismissal of a suit in limine may be made on points of law and where there are no facts in dispute for the purpose of determining such an objection. See WOHEREM V ENWEREUM (Supra) and BELLO ADEGOKE FOKO and ORS V OLADOKUN FOKO & ANR. (1968) NMLR 441 in this situation the applicants relies only on the facts as disclosed by the complaint and statement of facts and for this purposes, the facts are deemed to have been admitted by the defendants/applicants. See AYANBOYE V BALOGUN (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.151) 392. It is only where disputes as to facts appears on the pleadings of the parties, that it is open to the Court to defer hearing of the objection till when credible evidence has been adduced to enable determination of the point of law. In the case at hand not all the pleadings are before the court. It is trite law that in determining issue of statute barred it is the writ of summons and the statement of claim that the court will be entitled to look at in this case complant and statement of facts. This exercise does not require taking of oral evidence. See EGBE V ADEFARASIN (supra). In the case at hand parties have not joined issues the defendants are relying on the complaint and the statement of facts in raising the objection. As far as this suit is concerned the facts are not obscure or at large as submitted by the counsel for the claimant/respondent to warrant stepping down the objection as the Counsel for the Claimant want this Court to do. The case of WOHEREM being relied upon by the Claimant is not helpful to his case. The situation is completely different in this case. In arguing his position the claimant/respondent referred severally to decisions of this Court in other similar matters. I must state from the outset that each case is distinct from the other and must be decided as per the facts before the court. That the mere fact that in some cases this court has postponed determination of objection till after hearing of the substantive matter does not mean that such shall happened in all cases. The decision on whether an application shall be differed to conclusion of substantive suit will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The cases being relied by counsel for the claimant/respondent were decided based on their respective merits. On technicality, the trends nowadays is that Courts are moving away from technicality. Technicality could arise if a party is relying on abstract or inordinate legalism to becloud or drawn the merit of a case. A technicality arises if a party quickly takes an immediately available opportunity, however, infinitestimal it may be, to work against the merit of the opponent’s case. In other words, he holds and relies tenaciously unto the rules of court with little or no regard to justice of the matter. As far as he is concerned the rules of court must be followed to the last sentences, the last words and the last letters without much ado, and with little or no regard t the injustice that will be caused the opponent. See YUSUF V ADEGOKE & ANOR. 200711 NWLR PT.1045 332. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that raising points of law in limine on issue of statute of limitation cannot amount to using technicality as subscribe. DETERMINATION OF MAIN ISSUES ISSUE ONE It is clear from the provisions of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, that the provisions constitute a limitation law, which the legislature designed it to provide protection for public officers corporate or incorporated bodies from detraction in the conduct of their discharge of their official duties or assignment by litigation that might have become otiose or in which witnesses may no longer be available or may not reasonably be gotten to testify due to time lag. See OFFOBOCHE V OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt.739) 458. The object of the provision is therefore to afford protection to public officers in respect of anything done in the discharge or execution or carrying out their duty, the protection comes into play after the expiration of three Months from the date of the Commission of the act or acts, neglect or default which give rise to the cause of action. See YABUGBE V COP (1992) 4 NWLR (pt.234) 152; EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549, EGBE V ALHAJI (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.128) 546, EKEAGU V ALIRI ((1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.179) 258. It is quite clear that the general effect of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, is that where a law provides for the institution of an action in a court of law within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action accruing to the party entitled to enforce his remedy before the court, proceedings shall not be brought after the expiration of the period circumscribed by law. The statute that prescribe such period and regulate the subsistence of causes of action are known as statutes of limitation of period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Where any action is statute barred, a party who might otherwise have had a cause of action loses right to enforce it by judicial process, because the period of time prescribed by the limitation law for instituting such an action has elapsed. Thus, an action commenced after the expiration of the period within which an action must be brought as stipulated in a statute of limitation is not maintainable. See EBOIGBE V NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.347) 649, ALHAJI (DR) ADO IBRHIM Vs. ALHAJI MAIGIDAU LAWAL AND ORS (2015) LPELR – 24736, EGBE VS. ADEFARASIN & ANR (1987) 1 NWLR PT 471 AT 21, FADERE V A. G. OYO STATE (1982) 4 SC 1, A. G. ADAMAWA STATE V A. G. OF THE FEDERATION (2014) LPELR-23221(SC), OBIEFUNA V OKOYE (1961) 1 ALL NLR 357. However it is pertinent to note that the general rule laid down in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, like every other general rule is not without exception. Though, an action against public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or Law or public duty or default on same can only be commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, the situation is not the same in a case of continuance of damage or injury in which the person aggrieved must institute the action within three months next after the cessation of the damage or injury complained of. See the case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. JACOB OLADELE AMAO & 2 ORS (2011) ALL FWLR PART 558 PAGE 806 AT 812RATIO 3. In the case at hand, counsel for the defendants/applicants maintained that the claimant/respondent’s action is caught by the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. While the position of the counsel for the claimant/respondent is that the act being complained of by the defendants/applicants is that of continuance of damage or injury which is yet to abate. This position was canvassed in the written address filed in opposition by the claimant/respondent to this objection. To buttress his argument counsel for the claimant/respondent relied on the case of A-G RIVERS V A-G BAYELSA (supra), relying on this case Counsel for the Respondent maintained that this action falls within the exceptions provided in section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. It was also argued that the acts is outside the colour of office. It can be deduced from the submissions of Counsel for the claimant/respondent that they have conceded that the present action was not instituted within three Months from the date of the act, neglect, or default complained of by the defendants/applicants. This has narrowed down the issue for consideration in this objection. The case of the claimant/respondent is that the case is covered by the issue of continuance of damage or injury in which case, the protection or cover provided for public officers can only come within the ambit of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, if the action was brought three Months after the cessation of continuance of damage or injury. The apex Court of the land has interpreted the phrase ‘“continuance of damage or injury” to means the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It does not and cannot be said to mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. See INEC v. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC). In view of the definition of the phrase ‘‘continuance of damage or injury’’ as provided by the Supreme Court, the question to be asked is, does the act complained of in this suit of continuous damage or injury? Since this suit was commenced via Complaint, to find answer to the question posed, the claims as contained in the Complaint and statement facts will be looked at to determine this issue. This is in line with principle of law that in determining issue of statute bar, it is the writ of summons and the statement of claim of the plaintiff (Respondent in this case) that the Court would look into. SEE OLAOSEBIKAN V WILLIAMS & ANR. (1996) 5 NWLR (449) 437. From paragraphs 2 and 11 of the statement of facts it can be gleaned that what triggered this action was the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent from service. That is the fulcrum of this suit. According to Respondent after receipt of his letter of compulsory retirement on 6th April 2014, he was paid salary up to May 2014, but as from June 2014 to time of filing this suit on 25/11/17 no salary. Claimant also stated that he appealed to the 2nd Defendant, and Head of service, Secretary to the Government of the Federation and Attorney General of the Federation but to no avail. It is to be noted that the letter of retirement was handed over to the Respondent on 6/4/14, from then to 25/11/14, when this suit was instituted was a period of more than 3 months this clearly established that this suit is statute barred. Because time for purposes of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, started running from 6/4/14. However, the alleged damage or injury as a result of the compulsory retirement did not continued as the Claimant want the Court to believe going by the definition of ‘’continuous damage or injury; as defined by the Supreme Court in the case cited above. It is to be noted that from 6/4/14 to 25/11/14 when this suit was instituted is a period of more than 3 Months, this clearly shows that this action was instituted beyond the three Months allowed by the law. My holding that there is no continuance of damage or injury regarding compulsory retirement is predicated on the fact that the statement of facts did not show that there was another compulsory retirement, a part from that which was handed over to the claimant/respondent on 6/4/14. The Claimant has contended that payment of salary up to May means nullification of retirement this is not correct, if there has been any nullification the Claimant would not have asked this Court to order his reinstatement back to his job. It is also apparent that the issue of payment of salary is an ancillary issue an appendage to the claim on the issue of compulsory retirement of the clamant/respondent from the service of the 2nd defendant/applicant. The issue of payment of salary depend wholly on resolution of compulsory retirement. If it was taken the date for purpose of determining the period of limitation is June, 2014, when the claimant/applicant was not paid salary, this suit is still statute barred, because it was beyond three months. And I so hold. There is no disputing the fact that the defendants/applicants in this suit are public officers within the context of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. This position is strengthened by the decision in IBRAHIM V JSC KADUNA STATE (Supra), where the Supreme Court held that ‘person’ in section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, include both natural and artificial persons such as the defendants/applicants in this case. It is also clear from the claim that the defendants/applicants were sued because they are public officers performing public duty in respect of the act, neglect or default complained of. The decision to compulsorily retire the claimant/respondent from service is part of the function of the defendants/applicants. See section 4 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. In view of the reasons given above and the facts that the defendants/applicants are public officers acting in pursuance of execution of public duty and the action against them having not been instituted within the time allotted by the law, is statute barred. I agree with the submission of the Applicants that issues of bad Faith, malice, acting outside colours of office or duties is not a relevant consideration at this stage of preliminary objection those issues are questions for resolution if the suit is not statute barred. But, having found that the suit is statute barred for this Court to embark on resolution of those issues will. Amount to academic exercise which a court of law should not embarked upon as it is moot and exercise in futility. Consequently, this suit is hereby dismissed for being statute barred. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO It is to be noted that issue one has disposed of this suit. But, I shall consider issues two and three so that in case there is an appeal and I was overruled on issue one the Court of appeal will have the opportunity of having the views of this court on issues two and three. The claimant/respondent’s position on issue two is that the letters written to the 2nd defendant/applicant and to 3rd defendant/applicant (Head of Service), have satisfied the requirement of appealing to presidency. On the contrary, the defendants/applicants are of the view that the letters cannot qualify as appeal to presidency, going by the extant provision of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. Further; Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, provide as follows:- ‘’Notwithstanding the provision of section 19 of this Act, any person aggrieved by any decision of the Directorate or by the exercise by the Directorate of any power under this Act shall have the right of appeal to the presidency in the first instance and the presidency may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act and subject to the approval of the National Defence and Security Council, confirm or reverse the decision of the Directorate or take such further measures in relation to the appeal as he may think just before any action may be commenced in any court of law’’. It is cardinal principle in the construction of statute that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the statutes themselves. Where the words of any section are clear and unambiguous, then no more is necessary than to give them their natural and ordinary meanings unless this will lead to absurdity or be in conflict with the other provisions of the statute. The words of the statute do alone best declare the intention of the law makers where the words aforesaid are clear and unambiguous. See CHIEF D. O. IFEZUE V LIVINUS MBADIGGHA & ANOR. 1984 5 SC 79 “ 101, ALHAJI IBRAHIM V GALADIMA BARDE AND OTHERS V 1996 9 NWLR PT.474 513 “ 577, ADESANOYE V ADEWOLE 2000 5 SCNJ 96 “ 47-54 In interpreting section 20 of the national youth service corps act, this court is to give the words used therein their plain and ordinary meaning. That is because the words themselves appear clear and unambiguous to me. When words of a legislation or constitution are clear, plain and unambiguous, there is no need to give them any other meaning than their ordinary, natural and grammatical construction would permit unless that would lead to absurdity, or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the legislation or constitution. Even where words are ambiguous the power of court to go on voyage of discovery is very limited. See A-G BENDEL STATE V A-G OF THE FEDERATION & ORS. 1981 10 SC 1, A-G ONDO STATE V A-G OF THE FEDERATION & ORS. (2001) 10 SCNJ 146. It is with the above principles in mind that the provisions of section 20 will be interpreted. The words of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, to my mind is as clear as the sun light. However, the role of this court as can be gleaned from well settled principles of interpretation is that effect must of necessity be given to plain and ordinary meaning of statute or constitution. The reason being that it is clear and unambiguous language that best conveys the intention of the lawmakers. The lawmakers must be taken to have intended the meaning expressed in such clear and unambiguous language. It is therefore not the constitutional responsibility of the court to make laws. Neither can it amend the laws made by the legislature. It must therefore be borne in mind always that courts cannot ament law neither can they change words used legislation. In the case at hand, learned counsel for the claimant/respondent has insisted that presidency as used in section 20 is synonymous or means 2nd and 3rd defendants/applicants. This view clearly will be stretching the law and imputing into the provisions of the law what was not there. To construe the provision in the way and manner the claimant/respondent want this Court to do, will definitely defeat the intention of the legislature. The interpretation of the claimant/respondent in respect of the provision of section 20 of NYSC Act, if accepted will do violence to the section and will amount to amendment which is not part of the functions of this Court. That will be within the realm of the legislature. The interpretation of section 20 of NYSC Act, as given by the claimant/respondent is not inconsonance with well-known tenets of interpretation, to interpret ‘presidency’ to mean 2nd defendant or 3rd defendant (Head of Service). The definition and meaning assigned to the word ‘presidency’ by the provision of section 22 NYSC Decree is the appropriate meaning to be given the word ‘presidency’ more particularly when by the provisions of section 315(5) (a) of the Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), the Decree has been saved from extinction. Section 315(5) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), states: Nothing in this constitution shall invalidate the following enactments, that is to say; (a) The National Youth Service Corps Decree 1993; (b) ………………………………………………………………………… (c) …………………………………………………………………………. (d) …………………………………………………………………………. And the provision those enactments shall continue to apply and have full effect in accordance with their tenor and to the like extent as any other provisions forming part of this Constitution and shall not be altered or repealed except in accordance with the provisions of section 9(2) of this Constitution. From the above provision of the constitution it is beyond any doubt that the entire provisions of the National Youth Service Decree 1993, has been left intact and saved by the constitution. Therefore, it is an existing law that has full force of law in the country. Section 22 of the National Youth Service Corps Decree defined ‘presidency’ to mean ‘’the office of the president, Commander-in-chief of the Armed forces’’. Having the above definition of the presidency at the back of the mind, can it be said that an appeal written to 2nd defendant and 3rd defendant (Head of Service), is appeal to the presidency, the answer is a resounding capital NO. To construe office of the 2nd and 3rd defendants as presidency will tantamount to re-writing the law. The 2nd defendant is creature of the statute and the office of the 3rd defendant is creature of the constitution, see section 171(1), (2), and (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). In view of the lucidity of the provisions of the law quoted above, I have no hesitation in resolving issue two in favour of the defendants/applicants. Since there was no appeal to the presidency, the claimant/respondent has failed and neglected to comply with condition precedent before instituting this suit to challenge the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent. This suit is therefore premature and the court has no power to pry into it without the compliance with the provision of section 20 of the NYSC, Act. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE THREE It is argued that the 3rd Defendant is not a proper party to be joined in this suit as is not a necessary party and no reasonable cause of action has been disclosed against him. The claimant/respondent on the other hand submitted that the 3rd defendant/applicant is a proper party duly joined and there is reasonable cause of action disclosed against the 3rd defendant/applicant and that it was the 1st defendant/applicant the approved the condition of service of the 2nd Defendant. In law for a party to be properly joined in a suit, the Claimant must established by facts that he has a claim against that party and that the party is a necessary party without his presence the suit cannot be properly, efficient and completely resolved. I have combed the entire pleading of the claimant (Statement of facts) there is nothing in it to show that the claimant has any grouse against the 3rd defendant/applicant there is no specific claim against the 3rd defendant/applicant. From the complaint and the statement of facts, it is clear that the main grouse of the claimant/respondent is on his compulsory retirement. It has not been shown by the pleadings that the 3rd defendant/applicant played any role in respect of the action taken that led to the compulsory retirement of the of the claimant/respondent from service. The only paragraph of the statement of facts that made mention of the 3rd defendant was paragraph 17. This averment stated that the claimant lodged an appeal to the 3rd defendant/applicant. In response vide letter dated 27/10/14, the 3rd defendant clearly stated it cannot reverse what the 2nd defendant has done. The response of the 3rd defendant/applicant has confirmed that no role was played by the 3rd defendant/applicant in the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent. Therefore, in my view this suit can be properly and completely determined without the presence of the 3rd defendant/applicant. In view of the foregoing, I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the 3rd defendant/applicant is not a proper party in this suit and there is no reasonable cause of action disclosed against the 3rd defendant/application as the pleading has not shown any role played by the 3rd defendant/respondent in the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent from service. This Issue is therefore, resolved against the claimant/applicant, the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant is hereby struck out for not being proper party before the Court due to non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action. For avoidance of doubt and in view of the above findings, the defendants/applicants’ preliminary objection succeeds and is hereby granted. The claimant’s action is hereby dismissed for being statute barred. Sanusi Kado, Judge.