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RULING. The claimant commenced this suit via a complaint dated 25th day of November 2014 and filed on the same day, the Claimant prayed for: a. A DECLARATION that the Defendants whether by themselves, officers, agents subordinates, privies, representatives, associates or anybody acting on their behalf howsoever cannot institute and/or sustain any valid disciplinary action against the Claimant on the basis of her personnel records which the Defendants amended via its letter of 14th September 2012. b. A DECLARATION that the letter dated 28th October 2013 is an atrocious violation of the Public Service Rules 2008 and the NYSC Condition of Service (revised edition of August, 2013) and approved, as the alleged act of the Claimant was discovered since 2011, to the knowledge of the 1st and 2nd Defendants and the said letter of 28th October 2013 is null, void and of no legal consequences whatsoever. c. A DECLARTION that the Defendants acts of assigning official/special duties by posting the Claimant to Batch A NYSC Orientation Camp in Rivers State on or about the 11th day of March, 2014 after taking the decision to compulsorily retire her with effect from 3rd of March, 2014 and subsequent payment of Claimant’s entitlement for the official/special duty in Rivers State and salary for the month of March , April, and May 2014 did nullify the purported letter of compulsory retirement from service dated 7th March 2014. d. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants whether by themselves, officers, agents, subordinates, privies, representatives, associates or anybody acting on their behalf howsoever from instituting any disciplinary proceedings against the Claimant on the basis of the alleged discrepancy in her personnel record same act having been amended by the Defendants via their letters dated 14th September 2012. e. AN ORDER reinstating the Claimant immediately to her position and should also be paid immediate all her salaries and entitlement from the date her salary was stopped until judgment is given with 20% interest on such sum of money and 10% on such sum of money from when judgment is given until the Defendants comply with the judgment. Upon being served with the originating Court processes commencing this suit, the defendants/applicants filed three motions on notice for preliminary objection. The first motion on notice was by the 1st and 2nd Defendants, which was brought pursuant to Order 17 Rule 1 (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act and the inherent Jurisdiction of the Court. The motion on notice is praying for AN ORDER dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction and competent. AND FOR such further or other order(s) the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. The grounds for this application are as follows:- 1. The suit is statute barred as same is not instituted within the time statutorily allowed to seek redress. 2. The suit is premature as the Claimant/Respondent did not comply with the provisions of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. The motion on notice is supported by a five (5) paragraphed affidavit of Emmanuel Tsamya, a litigation Secretary in the office of the 2nd Defendant/Applicant. A written address was also filed along with the notice of preliminary objection. Mr. O. P. Omuru, Esq; Counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants, while arguing the notice of preliminary objection seek to rely on all the grounds of the objection, all the paragraphs of the affidavit and the processes filed by the claimant/respondent in this suit. Counsel also adopted the written address as his argument. Counsel further adopted his reply on points of law filed in answer to the claimant/respondent’s argument in the written reply address. In the written address Counsel submitted two issues for determination, to wit: i. Whether this suit is statute barred, having been filed seven months and nineteen days after the accrual of the cause of action. ii. Whether, in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the suit is premature. ARGUMENT ISSUE ONE In arguing issue one Counsel submitted that having regard to the processes filled by the claimant/respondent in this suit, the Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as same is statute barred, as same is caught up by Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, Cap p41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. It is submitted that in addition to its general application, section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act specifically apply to the 1st and 2nd Applicants by virtue of the provisions of Section 19 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. It is submitted that the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants are public officers entitled to protection under the Public Officers (protection) Act. In support of this contention Counsel relied on Ofili V.C. S.C. (2008) 2 NWLR (pt.1071) 238 at 252-253 and IBRAHIM V JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE (1998) 14 NWLR (pt.584) 1. Counsel submitted that the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants are creatures of sections 5(1) and 3 (1) respectively of the National Youth Service Corps Act. The cumulative effect of these provisions is that, the 1st and 2nd Applicants being Offices of the National Youth Service Corps, an Agency of the Federal Government, are both persons within the protection contemplated by the Public Officers (Protection) Act. The compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent by the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants which has occasioned the claimant/respondent’s grievance was an act of public officers in their official capacities. Counsel also submitted that in determining period of limitation of action, it is the writ of summons and the statement od claim that would be looked at and then comparing the date on which the Writ of Summons was filed and the date on which the cause of action giving right of action accrues. If the date pleaded as to when the right to sue accrued is beyond the limitation period enacted by the applicable statute, the action is statute barred and incompetent. In support of this position Counsel cited the cases of Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria V Gold (2007) 9 MJSC 210 at 220, paras. C-E and Ofili V.C.S.C. (Supra) 253, paras. F-H. It is submitted looking at the processes filed by the claimant/respondent, it is clear therefrom that the cause of action arose on 6th day of April, 2014 when the claimant/respondent admittedly received her letter of compulsory retirement dated 7th day of March, 2014. Counsel referred particularly to paragraphs 2 and 11 of the claimant/respondent’s Statement of Facts. This suit was filed on the 25th day of November, 2014, seven months and nineteen days after the accrual of the cause of action. This is clearly over the three months prescribed by Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, Cap P41, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, within which the claimant/respondent is required to seek redress. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. It is further submitted that where a law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the law has elapsed. An action brought outside the prescribed period offends the provision of the section and does not give rise to a cause of action. On this submission Counsel relied on Egbe V. Adefarasin & Anor (1985) 1 NSCC Vol. 16, 643 at 658, Lines 39 to 44 also Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria V. Gold (supra) paras. B-F. Counsel contended that the claimant/respondent, having not brought the action within three months, her action statute barred. ISSUE TWO In arguing issue two counsel submitted that having regard to the processes filled by the claimant/respondent in this suit, the Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as same is premature. Counsel contended that the National Youth Service Corps was established by Section 1 (1) of the National Youth Service Corps. Section 3(1) and (2) of the said Act created the 2nd Applicant and gave it powers to be the governing body while Section 5(1) and (2) of the said Act created the 1st Applicant and empowered him the general responsibility for matters affecting the day to-day running of the National Youth Service Corps. Section 20 of the said Act provides in very clear terms that any person aggrieved by any decision of the Directorate or by the exercise by the Directorate of any power under this Act shall have the right of appeal to the presidency in the first instance and the Presidency may. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act and subject to the approval of the National Defence and Security Council, confirm or reverse the decision of the Directorate or take such further measures in relation to the appeal as he may think just before any action may be commenced in any court of law. It is submitted that the claimant/respondent having been aggrieved with the decision of his retirement ought to comply with section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. However, having failed to appeal to presidency this suit is premature. The non-compliance thereto is against the respondent and fatal to her case as it has stripped the Honourable Court of its jurisdiction to entertain this suit. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of Adesanoye V. Adewole (2006) 10 MJSC 1 at 15, paras. E-F. Counsel went on to argue that in her purported compliance with the provision 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, the claimant/respondent states in paragraph 12 of her Statement of Fact she appealed to the 2nd Defendant/Applicant by letters dated 9th April, 2014 and 7th November, 2014. The said letters were attached to claimant/respondent’s originating process but not marked. It is the submission of Counsel that a letter to 2nd defendant/applicant did not suffice as an appeal to be Presidency within the contemplation, spirit and intention of the provision of Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. Although the word “Presidency” is not defined by the Act in the re-coded Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, Counsel urged the Honourable Court to hold that the 2nd defendant/applicant and “Presidency” are not contemplated to mean the same office. According to counsel if the Draftsmen in their wisdom intended that the definition of “Presidency” would mean or include the 2nd defendant/applicant, it would have been so clearly stated in the Act. This is further buttressed by the provisions of Section 22 of the National Youth Service Corps Decree No. 51 of 16th June, 1993, which define “Presidency” to means the Office of the President, Commander –in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It is further submitted that, where the provision of a statute is clear, plain and unambiguous, as in the case at hand, it must be given its ordinary meaning. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. On this submission reliance was placed on Aminu Tanko V. The State (2009) 1-2 MJSC 209 at 255, paras. F-G. Counsel also submitted if a matter is justiciable in Nigeria, the remedies available in the domestic forum must first be exhausted. Until this is done, any resort to court action would be premature. On this proposition Counsel cited the case of Akintemi & Ors V. Onwumechi & Ors (1985) 1 NSCC VoL. 16, 46 at 61, Lines 31 to 35. In concluding his submission Counsel contended that the cause of action in this suit arose seven months and nineteen days prior to the 25th day of November, 2014 when the suit was filed. Consequently, the suit is statute barred and must fail, as it not instituted within the three months statutorily limited for the claimant/respondent to seek redress in court. The claimant/respondent did not appeal to the Presidency in respect of her grievance that has occasioned this suit. She has therefore failed, refused or neglected to comply with the clear provisions of Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Supra. Consequently, the action is premature and must fail. On the whole, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the suit for want of competence and jurisdiction. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION BY THE 3RD DEFENDANT. The second motion on notice for preliminary objection was dated 15/5/2018 and filed on the same day by the 3rd defendant/applicant, praying for: 1. An Order of this Honourable Court striking out the name of the 3rd Defendant from this suit for want of reasonable cause of action. 2. And for such order(s) as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case. The ground for the objection is that this suit does not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the 3rd Defendant/Applicant. The application was brought under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. A written address was filed along with the notice of preliminary objection. In the written address two issues were submitted for determination, to wit: (i) Whether the Claimant's case as constituted discloses a reasonable cause of action against the 3rd Defendant? (ii) Whether the non-disclosure of the requisite cause of action is not a condition precedent to the competence of this suit for adjudication? Ovoke Celenstine O. Esq; Counsel for the 3rd defendant/applicant in his oral submission before the Court adopted the written address as his argument. Counsel begun his submission by submitting that the claimant's case discloses no reasonable cause of action. As a reasonable cause of action consists of two fundamental elements which the law expects the claimant's case to establish simultaneously, side by side. These elements are: (i) The wrongful acts of the defendant(s) sued; and (ii) The consequent damage arising from the wrongful act. It is the submission of Counsel that the above elements of a reasonable cause of action were laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of ALHAJI AMINU IBRAHIM VS. FELIX OSIM (1988)3 N.W.L.R. (Part 82) page 257 at 260 paragraphs A-B and that of DIM CHUKWU EMEKA ODUMEGWU OJUKWU VS. ALH. UMARU MUSA YAR'ADUA & 4 ORS. (2009) 28 N.S.C.Q.R. (Part 1), 492 at 565, Paras. A – D. It is also argued that a cause of action is the entire set of circumstances giving rise to enforceable claim. It is in effect, the fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right to sue. Counsel submitted that, from the totality of the claimant's Statement of claim filed in this matter there is no wrongful act of the 3rd defendant/applicant shown, and the claimant's pleadings have not equally shown any damage arising from any wrongful act of the 3rd defendant/applicant. It is further submitted that from the claimant's pleadings before this Honourable Court, there is nowhere an allegation was raised against the 3rd defendant/applicant. In paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6, 10,11, 12, and 13 of the Statement of Facts, the claimant/respondent clearly stated who employed him and who removed him from the service. Nowhere in the entire Statement of Facts did the claimant mention the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant as being responsible for either his employment or removal from the service. It is also submitted that the law is trite and established that for a person to be joined as a defendant in a suit, it must be established that the presence of the party before the court as defendant will be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause. On this submission reliance was placed on the cases of LAGOS STATE BULK PURCHASE CORPORATION V. PURIFICATION TECHNIQUES (NIG) LTD (SUPRA), AT PAGE 304 – 305, HON. EMMANUEL BWACHA V. HON. JOEL DANLAMI IKENYA & 2 OTHERS (2011) 3 N. W. L. R. (PART 1235) PAGE 610. It is submitted that the 3rd defendant/applicant is not necessary party as this suit can be effectually and effectively determined without the presence of the 3rd defendant/applicant as it was neither the 3rd defendant/applicant that employed the claimant nor was it the 3rd defendant/applicant that allegedly removed the claimant/respondent from the service. It is further submitted that the National Youth Service Corps Act Cap. N84 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 under which the claimant/applicant was employed clearly spelt out the statutory body vested with the powers to appoint, advance, terminate and discipline employees including the claimant/respondent; and nowhere in the whole Act was the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant mentioned. Counsel also referred to all the documents attached to the Statement of Facts and submitted that they clearly indicate the authority that employed, confirmed, promoted and terminated the claimant/applicant's employment. Nowhere in the documents was the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant stated or is referred to in any form whatsoever. In concluding his argument counsel urged the court to strike out the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant for non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action and not being a necessary party. OBJECTION BY THE 4TH DEFENDANT The third motion on notice was dated 2/5/18 and filed on 4/5/18, it was filed by the 4th Defendant/Applicant brought pursuant to Order 17 Rule 1(4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9), Order 18 Rule 2 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The application is seeking for an order dismissing this suit due to non-compliance by the claimant/respondent with condition precedent to exercise of this Honourable Court’s jurisdiction contrary to section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act and contrary to Chapter 9, section 1 and 2 of the Public Service Rues, 2008. The application is supported by a 4 paragraphs affidavit and a written address filed along with the motion on notice. Akintunde Ajayi, Esq; Counsel for the 4th defendant/applicant while making oral submission before the court relied on all the averments in the affidavit in support and adopted the written address as his argument on the application. In the written address single issue was formulated for determination. To wit: ‘‘Whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit same having been initiated without complying with condition precedent to the exercise of the Court jurisdiction’’. In arguing the lone issue formulated, counsel submitted that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit as the claimant/respondent has not fulfilled necessary condition that vest in her right of action. It is argued that failure by the claimant/respondent to comply with condition precedent to commencement of action denies a competent court of law jurisdiction to entertain such suit. On this submission reliance was placed on ATOLOGBE V AWANI (1997) 9 NWLR (PT.522) 536. It is submitted that no action can lie unless there has been due conformity with the pre-requisite conditions that would ground a valid action and vest the court with jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter. In support of this submission counsel relied on the cases of OKANGI V FATOBA (2012) 7 NWLR PT.1299 266, BODUNDE V S.C.I.&C.S TD 2013 12 NWLR PT.1367 197. It is submitted that section 20 of the National youth Service Corps has provided condition precedent that has to be fulfilled before commencement of an action. The non-compliance with the condition precedent has robbed this Court of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is also submitted that the claimant/respondent has also failed or neglected to follow the procedure for petition to and appeal as laid down in the public service rules 2008. According to Chapter 9, section 1 and rule 090102 of the public service rules 2008, an aggrieved person is to address his complaint or petition to Head of Government through Chairman Federal Civil Service Commission or Head of Service of the Federation. It is submitted that failure of the Claimant/Respondent to channelled her grievance through the approved channel before institution of this case has deprived this Court of jurisdiction to entertain this suit. OPPOSITION BY THE CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION. In reaction to the motion on notice for preliminary objection filed by the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants the claimant/respondent opposed the preliminary objection by filing written address in opposition. However, no process was filed by the claimant/respondent in respect of the applications filed by the 3rd and 4th defendants/applicants. The response of counsel was on points of law made orally. Anthony Itedjery, Esq; Counsel for the claimant/respondent adopted the written address filed in opposition to the application of the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants as his argument in opposition. In the written address Counsel submitted lone issue for determination, to wit: ‘’Whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the Claimant’’. ARGUMENT In arguing the sole issue, counsel submitted that the authorities cited by the counsel for the defendants/applicants on their own are good laws but they are most inapplicable to the facts of this case and should be rejected. It is the contention of Counsel that this application can only be determine after evidence had been taken in this case. According to Counsel the facts upon which this application should be determine are not yet before the court. Counsel submitted that the appropriate thing to do is to step down such application and take evidence and that such issues raised will then form part of the issue for determination in the case. This is so as the premise for this application is the limitation law which in legal jurisprudence is a defence to the suit. It is the contention of Counsel that to dismiss the suit of the Claimant at this stage without examining the merit would be tantamount to disposing of an action at interlocutory stage which our appellate court frowns at. It is further contended that when a court lacks jurisdiction to determine a case, it also lack the power to dismiss same but can only strike same out. It is also argued that the claimant/respondent has raised the issue in its claims that there is a continuing damage by the defendants for refusal to pay him and other claimants in the sister suits their salary without justification or any legal bases. Counsel contended that the statement of facts and prayers d and e of the claimant these are act still in operation till date. Counsel referred to Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, by this provision this suit falls within exception to the general rule as there is continuance of damage or injury. Counsel contended that the law is trite that a party must stick to its case and that a case of a party must be consistent. The present two issues raised in the instant application not being raised in the alternative are inconsistent and same must be rejected by this Honourable Court. The point is that the issues are in direct conflict with each other. An action that is statute barred had out lived it usefulness. While an action that is premature is yet to have life. The argument of Applicants' counsel in this application is therefore misleading and the court should discontinuance same. Counsel further contended assuming the court determines both issues and agree with the Applicants on the two issues raised and hold that an action which is statute barred is also premature and then proceeds to dismiss same. The ruling will certainly be inconsistent and same will not reflect the true position of our laws. Counsel submitted that there is no logical pronouncement that can be made on the two issues distilled by the Applicants to this Honourable Court and therefore urged the court to strike out this motion with substantial cost. It is also submitted that having regards to the state of the law, the Motion on Notice filed by the Applicants is incompetent. According to counsel this submission is based on the fact that this application has stray from issues of law to that of facts and evidence must be taken, on this contention Counsel relied on the Supreme Court decision in WOHERE V EMEREUWA (supra). Counsel submitted that the Applicants should not be allowed to mislead this court to decide substantial issues of facts at interlocutory stage. On this submission counsel placed reliance on the case of National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) V Geco Prakla Nigeria Limited (2010) 20 NLLR (Pt. 57) 372 @397-398, a decision of a penal of Five Justices of this Honourable Court. Counsel urged the Court to hear this application with the main suit. To support this contention Counsel urged the Court to follow the following cases of this Honourable court where similar application raising the issue of jurisdiction of the court was raised but same was suspended pending the hearing of the main suit. They are Nigeria Union of Teachers V State Security Services (SSS); NICN IABJ/109/2011 delivered by the President of this Honourable Court Hon. Justice B.A. Adejumo, OFR on 17th September, 2014, in this suit the defendants filed an application urging the court to hold that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the suit but the application was taken after evidence together with the written address and ruling was delivered first on the application before the court proceeded to its judgment after it held it had jurisdiction to hear the case. Also reliance was placed on the case of Nigeria Union of Teachers V Trade Union Congress of Nigeria SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/165/2013 ruling delivered on 3rd February 2014. Alternatively, Counsel contended that the law is trite that in determining whether or not a Court has jurisdiction to entertain a matter it is the claim of the Claimant that should be examined and nothing more. For this proposition of the law, Counsel relied on AGF v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 187 at 233. The claimant/respondent filed a complaint (writ of summons) as it is called in the High court because the facts upon which to determine the suit are in dispute or riotously so, the law is that writ of summons lie where the proceedings are hostile in the sense of violent dispute. Facts in such cases have a pride of place in the determination of the case. Therefore there must be some evidence upon which a court of law must rely on in determining a matter that comes to it through a writ of summon. This application cannot be determine with the affidavit evidence attached to the motion but by way of evidence (witness testimony) which is applicable in this case this account for why the attached documents to the writ were not marked as the Court would mark same when evidence is taken during hearing as against the proposition of the defendants/applicants in their said application that the claimant did not mark the attached documents. The first contention of the defendants/applicants is that the claimants/respondents' action is statute barred and in another wise that the action is premature. The twist is rather perplexing in the Applicants' argument and their prayer. One wonders how an action that is statute barred can also be premature and if action that is premature can be dismissed by a Court that lacks jurisdiction to entertain same. This clearly shows that the defendants/applicants brought this application for a singular reason to waste the judicious time of this Honourable Court. Counsel added that this Honourable Court is a Labour Court and it is not given to technicalities of the regular high courts with its attended delays. The 3rd defendant/applicant is the only defendant that filed a defence to this suit. The other defendants/Applicants refused to file any defence to this suit rather they only filed a preliminary objection premised on limitation law. It is submitted that this suit is of continuous injury and limitation is held to be a defence which does not take away the jurisdiction of the court. On this submission Counsel placed reliance on the case of National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) V Geco Prakla Nigeria Limited (2010) 20 NLLR (Pt. 57) 372 @397-398 The defendants/applicants have argued that the cause of action aroused when the Claimant (s) received the letter of compulsory retirement how can that be the case when the salary for the month of March, April and May 2014 was paid by the defendants. Counsel also want the court to bear in mind the fact that after the said decision reached in the said letter was taken official assignments were given to the claimant and others. The claimant has also stated that there is no legal basis for the refusal by the defendants to continue to withhold paying her salary and that of others in the sister cases since June 2014. It is the contention of Counsel that on definition of Presidency, the law is clear that Decrees and abolished laws cannot be relied upon by any Court of law. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), further empowers the President to delegate its power to a minister or another person to carry out its duties we submit that the President has delegated its powers in this regard to the 3rd defendant/applicant who over sees their activities. It is respectfully submitted, that the Presidency is not defined in the current NYSC Act and urged the Court to resist the invitation to rely on what defendants/applicants have on their own acknowledge not to be part of the present Act. This is so as the President has created the office of the Head of Civil and Secretary of Government and named same as the Presidency. It is argued that this Honourable Court should refuse these applications by the Defendants for being premature and take evidence in this suit and parties should produce their respective evidence in support of their respective positions in this suit. The Applicants have in the paragraph d line 11 said "Although the word "Presidency" is not defined by the Act in the re-coded laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004" counsel submitted that since the legislature in their wisdom did not define the word presidency in the said act. This Court cannot use repealed law to define presidency. Counsel also contended that the 3rd defendant/applicant is a necessary party in this suit and that declaratory reliefs binds even nonparties to a suit. On the 4th defendant/applicant’s submission counsel argued that there is no provision in the Act that takes care of the condition of service. Whatever act was taken by 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants was not in line with the law. It is also contended that the 4th defendant/applicant has no locus to cry as the provisions under which the application was brought was not for the benefit of the 4th defendant/applicant. It is further submitted that the statute of limitation is a defence and an application to hear same will only be proper after the party has filed a defence to the suit. The law is well settled that pleadings have to be filed and exchanged by the parties before an objection to an action being statute barred can properly be taken. This is invisibly is the case where demurrer has been abolished. The practice is that a party seeking to rely on limitation of statute must plead same and thereafter apply to the court to set down for hearing the defence of limitation law by an application raising specifically the question of limitation of statute and that the Court lacks power to entertain the matter. On this submission Counsel relied on Sulgarre Holdings INC V F • G.N (2012) 17 NWLR Pt. 1329 @ 309 pg 339-340 para G-B. Counsel also urged the Court to in line with the 2017 rules of this court that this is an appropriate situation in the interest of justice to take evidence before hearing this application. The act of this Court 2006 and the 2017 rules gives the Court the power to conduct its proceeding in a manner that will meet the justice of the case. Counsel urged the Court to find that for all the above authorities and reasons this application will not meet the end of justice if same is determine without taking evidence wherein the rules of Court has provided that in such situation as this both application and main suit can be taken together. It is also the submission of Counsel that the acts of the defendants/applicants are outside the colour of their statutory or constitutional duty which is not protected by the Act. See A.G. Rivers State V A.G. Bayelsa State (supra). Also see In The National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) V Geeo Prakla Nigeria Limited (supra), in concluding his submission counsel submitted that they have demonstrated that the action of the Claimant is not a challenge to the letter of retirement but the continued stoppage of salary without any bases whatsoever and howsoever. To do otherwise would be to dispose of a substantive matter at the interlocutory stage, a course which the appellate Courts frown seriously at. This court is the only court in Nigeria that has jurisdiction by virtue of section 254 C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended to entertain this action. Counsel urged this court to hold that it has jurisdiction and allow this matter to proceed to trial. It is contended that when a court finds that it lacks jurisdiction the only and proper order it has power to make is an order striking out the suit and not dismissal. Counsel submitted that no power to dismiss an action that is either statute barred or premature. REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW BY THE 1ST AND 2ND DEFENDANTS/APPLICANTS. Counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants filed a reply on points of law wherein he responded to the issues raised in the claimant/respondent’s written address in opposition to the preliminary objection. On the argument of the claimant/respondent that the two issues raised and argued are conflicting, the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants contended that the two issues raised and argued by the Applicants in their preliminary objection are the basic features of the action. An action is statute barred, as in this case, when it is instituted outside the time statutorily allowed to seek redress in Court. Also, an action is premature when a condition-precedent is not fulfilled, as in this case, before instituting it. It is also contended that there is no law prohibiting a party from raising and arguing all the issues that are considered to be the features of a case. On the contention that the action is of continuous damage or injury, Counsel submitted that the claimant/respondent has missed the point. It is settled law that law on limitation of the action runs from the date of alleged commission. It is immaterial to the date the effect of the complainant's injury or wrong continues 'ad infinitum'. On the claimant/respondent’s submission that, the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants' action that occasioned his grievance was in bad faith, born out of malice, an abuse of office, unjust and outside the colour of statutory duty. It is contended that the issues raised by the claimant/respondent in his argument are all fundamentally substantive issues which have no bearing in a matter that is statute barred as in this case. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of Sani V. Okene Local Government & Anor (2008) 10 MJSC 199 at 205 to 206 and the case of Anozie V. Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & 4 Drs (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 278. On the claimant/respondent’s contention that the payment of salary and assignment of duty after the decision to compulsorily retire him from service have nullified his retirement. It is submitted that the effective date of the claimant/respondent's compulsory retirement was the 6th day of April, 2014 when he admittedly received the letter in respect thereof. It would not be an act of responsibility on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants to stop the claimant/respondent's salary and stop assigning duties to him when he was not formally informed of his compulsory retirement. The purported assignment of duty preceded the date he received his letter of retirement. Also, it is a common knowledge that salaries of public servants are paid by the Integrated Personnel Payroll Information System (IPPIS). By implication, the Applicants have no control over payment of salaries and bureaucracy did not allow immediate stoppage of the Claimant/Respondent's salary. Granted however but not conceding that the cause of action arose by the end of June, 2014 when the claimant/respondent claims that his salary was not paid, it took him four months and twenty five days before he instituted the suit on the 25th day of November, 2014. This is still clearly outside the three months limited by law for seeking redress in court against the Applicants. It is further submitted that the stoppage of salary and assignment of duty to the claimant/respondent which he claims to be his grievance are all ancillary issues rooted in his compulsory retirement, and cannot stand on their own. If he was not compulsorily retired from service, his salary would still have been paid, he would still have been sent on assignment and there would have been no issue to warrant approaching the court for redress. This explains the reason for the claimant/respondent's prayer for immediate reinstatement to service. The Court was referred particularly to Relief (e) in the claimant/respondent's complaint and Statement of Facts. This was a definite and conclusive disciplinary decision against the claimant/respondent by his former employer (2nd defendant/applicant) which is the Directorate and empowered by Section 4 (4) of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 "to appoint, (including power to appoint on promotion and transfer and of dismissal. Notwithstanding the above arguments, Counsel maintain that these issues are also substantive in nature. If an action is statute barred, as in this case, no amount of resort to the merit of the claimant/respondent's contention will serve to keep the action in being. To buttress this submission Counsel relied on Owners of the MV "Arabella" V. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation (2008) 8 MJSC 145 at 173, paras. D-G and urge the Honourable Court to so hold. On the claimant/respondent’s allegation that the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants’ preliminary objection is predicated on issues of technicalities and that the applicants did not file a defence to the claimant/respondent's claim. It is contended that the Applicants' preliminary objection is based on jurisdiction. An issue of jurisdiction is not an ordinary point to be dismissed as a mere or overstretched issues of technicalities. It is a very fundamental issue that goes to the root of the matter. The law is meant to be obeyed. Where there is a stipulated procedure, as in this case, it must be followed to the later. Where the procedure is not followed, as in this case, the Court will lack jurisdiction. Counsel agree that the Honourable Court is a Labour Court as argued by the Respondent. However, the Court is first and foremost a Court of Law, and must not be seen to sacrifice a fundamental issue of jurisdiction on a platter of perceived "speed". It will amount to going on a frolic and embarking on an exercise in futility for a Court to adjudicate on a matter without jurisdiction. Counsel referred to Order 18, Rule 6 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 and submitted that it recognizes the weighty nature of the issue of jurisdiction when it copiously exempts preliminary objections that challenge jurisdiction of the Court from the discretion given to the Court to hear a preliminary objection together with the substantive suit. Moreover, this is not Originating Summons procedure where preliminary objection and substantive matter are heard together. Being an action commenced by way of complaint, pleadings is not a pre-condition for hearing of preliminary objection which must always be resolved first. In view of the fundamental nature of the issue of jurisdiction, it can be raised at any time or stage and in any manner whatsoever, even for the first time in the Supreme Court. Demurrer does not apply when jurisdiction is in issue. This principle received the blessings of the Supreme Court in Military Governor of Ondo State & 5 Ors V. Kolawole & 4 Ors (2008) 9 MJSC 203 at 212, Paras F- G when it held as follows "It is trite law that the issue of jurisdiction by whatever name and under any shade, can be raised at any stage. It can be raised viva voce or the Court can raise it suo motu. " Counsel also referred to Oloriode V. Oyebi (1984) 15 SCNLR 390, (1984) 5 SC 1 and Elebanjo V. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (pt. 1001) 76. On presidency, it is submitted that the claimant/respondent’s letter to the 3rd Defendant cannot in an anyway amount to appeal to presidency within the contemplation of Section 20 of the NYSC Act. It is submitted that, it is the law that defines Presidency in matters involving the applicants, but not facts or letter headed paper as the claimant/respondent wants the court to believe. Counsel reiterate that, the definition of the word "Presidency" is provided by Section 22 of the National Youth Service Corps Decree 51 of 16th June, 1993 which established the National Youth Service Corps. It is the Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 221, Vol. 80 of 9th August, 1993. It is contended that the Decree clearly defines the word "Presidency" to mean "the Office of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces." There is nothing in this clear and unambiguous definition to mean, suggest, include or refer to the Office of the Head of Civil Service of the Federation or any other office. The Court is urged upon to look at the Official Gazette in this regard. Its content is a prima facie proof of any fact of a public nature which it is intended to notify. On this contention Counsel relied on Line Limited V. S.C.C. Nigeria Limited & 2 Ors (2009) 7 MJSC (pt. III) 1 at 21-22. Counsel also submitted that the claimant/respondent argues inadvertently that the National Youth Service Corps Decree 51 of 16th June, 1993 has been abrogated and therefore no longer part of our laws. When the said the National Youth Service Corps Decree is an existing law. To buttress this submission Counsel referred to Section 315(5)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides that, "nothing in this Constitution shall invalidate the ... National Youth Service Corps Decree 1993". It further provides that the provisions of the Decree shall continue to apply and have full effect in accordance with its tenor and shall not be altered or repealed except in accordance with the provisions of Section 9(2) of the Constitution. This has shown clearly that NYSC Decree 1993 is constitutional and subsisting. Counsel contended that the NYSC Decree 1993 has never been amended, let alone abrogated. Like any other existing law, it has only been re-coded as Chapter N84 in the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. The re-coding does not and cannot suffice as an amendment within the contemplation of Section 9(2) of the CFRN, 1999 (as amended). The omission of the definition of the word "Presidency" in the re-coded Laws of the Federation of Nigeria is, at best, a printer's error which also does not suffice as an amendment. In concluding his submission Counsel insisted that this suit is statute barred and the claimant/respondent did not appeal to presidency as required by section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this suit for want of competence. COURT’S DECISION I have thoroughly examined the Originating Process commencing this suit with all the accompanying documents, as well as the three motions on notice for preliminary objections filed by the Defendants contesting the competency of this suit. I have equally attentively listened to all the Counsel for the parties in their oral submissions before the Court and read the written addresses of Counsel and the authorities cited therein. Having regards to the prayers as contained in the motion on notice and the grounds for the application, it is my humble view that these applications can adequately be disposed of upon determination of the issues formulated as follows: 1. Whether the Claimant’s suit is statute barred. 2. Whether by virtue of the provisions of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps this suit is premature. 3. ‘‘Whether the 3rd Defendant is a necessary party in this suit’’. ISSUE ONE I shall start consideration of this application with resolution of certain preliminary issues raised by the Counsel in the course of arguing this application. The first question is that of appropriateness or otherwise of supporting notice of preliminary objection with an affidavit. Ordinarily a notice of preliminary objection filed to raise issue in limine, is dealing with point of law before the Court. That is to say the objector is relying solely on law only in raising the objection and is not relying on any facts. However, where the facts are not in dispute an affidavit can accompany a notice of preliminary objection. But in an application regarding statute of limitation of action, the law is settled, it is the statement of claim that will be looked at to determine the period of limitation. See IBRAHIM V JUDICIAL SERVICE CPOMMITTEE OF KADUNA STATE (supra), and WOHEREM V EMEREUWA (2004)13 NWLR (PT.890) 398. In determining the applications filed by the Defendants/Applicants this Court will restrict itself to only the originating processes commencing this suit since the law permit looking at those processes in resolving preliminary objection. It is trite law that an application by way of a preliminary objection for the dismissal of a suit in limine may be made on points of law and where there are no facts in dispute for the purpose of determining such an objection. See WOHEREM V ENWEREUM (Supra) and BELLO ADEGOKE FOKO and ORS V OLADOKUN FOKO & ANR. (1968) NMLR 441 in this situation the applicant relies only on the facts as disclosed by the complaint and statement of facts and for purposes the facts are deemed to have been admitted by the Defendants. See AYANBOYE V BALOGUN (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.151) 392 It is only where disputes as to facts appears on the pleadings of the parties, that it is open to the Court to defer hearing of the objection till when credible evidence has been adduced to enable determination of the point law. In the case at hand parties have not joined issues the Defendants are relying on the complaint and the statement of facts in raising the objection. As far as this suit is concerned there the facts are not obscure or at large to warrant stepping down the objection as the Counsel for the Claimant want this Court to do. The case of WOHEREM being relied upon by the Claimant is not helpful to her case. The case of WOHEREM is distinguishable with the present case, as some of the defendants are yet to join issues with the claimant in the present case. On technicality, the trends nowadays is that Courts are moving away from technicality. Technicality could arise if a party is relying on abstract or inordinate legalism to becloud or drawn the merit of a case. A technicality arises if a party quickly takes an immediately available opportunity, however, infinitestimal it may be, to work against the merit of the opponent’s case. In other words, he holds and relies tenaciously unto the rules of court with little or no regard to justice of the matter. As far as he is concerned the rules of court must be followed to the last sentences, the last words and the last letters without much ado, and with little or no regard t the injustice that will be caused the opponent. See YUSUF V ADEGOKE & ANOR. 200711 NWLR PT.1045 332. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that raising points of law in limine on issue of statute of limitation cannot be using technicality. Coming to issue one respecting statute barred. It is clear from the provisions of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, that the provisions constitute a limitation law, which the legislature designed it to provide protection for public officers corporate or incorporated bodies from detraction in the conduct of their discharge of their official duties or assignment by litigation that might have become otiose or in which witnesses may no longer be available or may not reasonably be gotten to testify due to time lag. See OFFOBOCHE VOGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt.739) 458. The object of the provision is therefore to afford protection to public officers in respect of anything done in the discharge or execution or carrying out their duty, the protection comes into play after the expiration of three Months from the date of the Commission of the act or acts, neglect or default which give rise to the cause of action. See YABUGBE V COP (1992) 4 NWLR (pt.234) 152; EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549, EGBE V ALHAJI (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.128) 546, EKEAGU V ALIRI ((1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.179) 258. It is quite clear that the general effect of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, is that where a law provides for the institution of an action in a Court of law within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action accruing to the party entitled to enforce his remedy before the Court, proceedings shall not be brought after the expiration of the period circumscribed by law. The statutes that prescribe such period and regulate the subsistence of causes of action are known as statutes of limitation of period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Where any action is statute barred, a party who might otherwise have had a cause of action loses right to enforce it by judicial process, because the period of time prescribed by the limitation law for instituting such an action has elapsed. See ALHAJI (DR) ADO IBRHIM Vs. ALHAJI MAIGIDAU LAWAL AND ORS (2015) LPELR – 24736, EGBE VS. ADEFARASIN & ANR (1987) 1 NWLR PT 471 AT 21. However it is pertinent to note that the general rule laid down in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, like every other general rule is not without exception. Though, an action against public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or Law or public duty or default on same can only be commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, the situation is not the same in a case of continuance of damage or injury in which the person aggrieved must institute the action within three months next after the cessation of the damage or injury complained of. See the case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. JACOB OLADELE AMAO & 2 ORS (2011) ALL FWLR PART 558 PAGE 806 AT 812RATIO 3. In the case at hand, Counsel for the Applicants maintained that the Respondent’s action is caught by the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. While the position of the Counsel for the Respondent is that the act of the being complained of by the Applicants is that of continuance of damage or injury which is yet to abate. This position was canvassed in the reply written address in opposition by the claimant/respondent to this objection. To buttress his argument Counsel for the claimant/respondent relied on the case of AG RIVERS V AG BAYELSA (supra), relying on this case Counsel for the claimant/respondent maintained that this action falls within the exceptions provided in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. It was also argued that the act complained of (compulsory retirement) is outside the colour of office. It can be deduced from the submissions of counsel for the claimant/respondent that they have conceded that the present action was not instituted within three Months from the date of the act, neglect, or default complained of. This has narrowed down the issue for consideration in this objection. The case of the claimant/respondent is that the case is covered by the issue of continuance of damage or injury in which case, the protection or cover provided for public officers can only come within the ambit of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, if the action was brought three Months after the cessation of continuance of damage or injury. The apex Court of the land has interpreted the phrase ‘“continuance of damage or injury” to means the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It does not and cannot be said to mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. See INEC v. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC). In view of the definition of the phrase ‘‘continuance of damage or injury’’ as provided by the Supreme Court, the question to be asked is, does the act complained of in this suit, of continuous damage or injury? Since this suit was commenced via Complaint, to find answer to the question posed, the claims as contained in the Complaint and statement facts will be looked at to determine this issue. This is in line with principle of law that in determining issue of statute bar, it is the writ of summons and the statement of claim of the plaintiff (Respondent in this case) that the Court would look into. SEE OLAOSEBIKAN V WILLIAMS & ANR. (1996) 5 NWLR (449) 437, FORESTRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NIGERIA V GOLD (supra). From paragraphs 2 and 11 of the statement of facts it can be gleaned that what triggered this action was the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent from service. That is the fulcrum of this suit. According to Respondent after receipt of her letter of compulsory retirement on 6th April 2014, she was paid salary up to May 2014, but as from June 2014 to time of filing this suit on 25/11/17 no salary. Claimant also stated that she appealed to the 2nd Defendant, Head of service, Secretary to the Government of the Federation and Attorney General of the Federation but to no avail. It is to be noted that the letter of retirement was handed over to the claimant/respondent on 6/4/14, from then to 25/11/14, when this suit was instituted was a period of more than 3 months this clearly established that this suit is statute barred. Because time for purposes of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, started running from 6/4/14, when letter of compulsory retirement was handed over to the claimant/respondent. However, the alleged damage or injury as a result of the compulsory retirement did not continued as the claimant want the court to believe going by the definition of ‘’continuous damage or injury; as defined by the Supreme Court in the case cited above. It is to be noted that from 6/4/14 to 25/11/14 when this suit was instituted is a period of more than 3 Months, this clearly shows that this action was instituted beyond the three Months allowed by the law. My holding that there is no continuance of damage or injury regarding compulsory retirement is predicated on the fact that the statement of facts did not show that there was another compulsory retirement, a part from that which was handed over to the claimant/respondent on 6/4/14. However, the Claimant has contended payment of salary up to May means nullification of retirement this is not correct, if there has been any nullification the Claimant would not have asked this Court to order her reinstatement back to her job. If it was taken the date for purpose of determining the period of limitation is June, 2014, this suit is still statute barred. And I so hold. There is no disputing the fact that the defendants/applicants in this suit are public officers within the context of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. This position is supported by the Supreme Court decision in IBRAHIM V JSC KADUNA STATE (Supra), where the Supreme Court held that ‘person’ in section 2(a) of the public officers (protection) Act, include both natural and artificial persons such as the defendants/applicants in this case. It is also clear from the Claim that the defendants/applicants are public officers performing public duty in respect of the act, neglect or default complained of by the Applicants/Respondents. The act of compulsory retirement of the Respondent is part of statutory function of the defendants/applicants. It is also inconsonance with the saying that he who has the right to hire has the right to fire. In view of the reasons given above and the facts that the defendants/applicants being public officers acting in pursuance of execution of public duty and the action against them having not been instituted within the time allotted by the law, is statute barred. I agree with the submission of counsel for the defendants/applicants that the issues of bad Faith, malice, acting outside colour of office or duties is not a relevant consideration at this stage of preliminary objection those issues are questions for resolution if the suit is not statute barred. But, having found that the suit is statute barred for this Court to embark on resolution of those issues will amount to academic exercise which a court of law should not embarked upon, as it is moot and exercise in futility. Consequently, this suit is hereby dismissed for being statute barred. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO It is to be noted that issue one has disposed of this suit. But, I shall consider issues two and three, so that in case there is an appeal and I was overruled on that issue the Court of appeal will have the opportunity of having the views of this Court on issues. The claimant/respondent’s position on issue two is that the letters written to Head of Service Secretary to the Government of Federation as well as to Attorney General have satisfied the requirement of appealing to presidency. On the contrary, the defendants/applicants are of the view that the letters cannot qualify as appeal to presidency, going by the extant provision of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. It is clear that the provisions are plain clear and unambiguous and should be given their ordinary meaning in line with cardinal principle of interpretation. Unless if such interpretation will do violence the provision under consideration, then the Court is allowed to resort to other aids in the interpretation. It will be stretching the law and imputing into the provisions of the law what was not there to construe the provisions of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act in the way and manner the claimant/respondent want this court to do. The interpretation of the claimant/respondent in respect of the provision of this provision of the law will do violence to the section and will amount to amendment which is not part of the functions of this Court. That will be within the realm of the legislature. The interpretation of section 20 of NYSC Act, as given by the claimant/respondent is not inconsonance with well-known tenets of interpretation to interpret presidency to mean Head of Service, Secretary to the Government of the Federation and Attorney-General of the Federation, will amount to making or amending the law which is not part of the court’s function. The definition and meaning assigned to the word presidency by the provision of section 22 NYSC Decree is the appropriate meaning to be given the words more particularly when by the provisions of section 315(5) (a) of the Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), has saved the Decree from extinction. The National Youth Service Corps Decree of 1993, is an existing law still in inforce. The refusal by the claimant/respondent to appeal to the presidency in line with the provision of section 20 of the NYSC Act has deprived this court of jurisdiction to hear this suit until the condition stipulated in the said section of the law is complied with to the letter. This is because the law is trite where a statute has provided a line of action or procedure to be followed before instituting an action the action will not be entertain until the procedure or condition laid down in the statute is fulfilled. See SAUDE V ABDULLAHI (1989) 4 NWLR (PT.116) 342, MADUKOLU V NKEMDLIM (1962) ALL NLR 587, ALHAJI AUDU SHUGABA V UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (1999) 11 NWLR (627) 459. It is the view of this court that since there was no appeal by the claimant/respondent to the presidency in respect of her compulsory retirement as required by law the suit is therefore premature for non-fulfillment of condition precedent. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE THREE It is argued that the 3rd defendant/applicant is not a proper party to be joined in this suit as is not a necessary party and no reasonable cause of action has been disclosed against him. The claimant/respondent on the other hand submitted that the 3rd defendant/applicant is a proper party duly joined and there is reasonable cause of action disclosed against him, in that, it is the 3rd defendant/applicant that approved the 1st Defendant’s condition of service. In law for a party to be properly joined in a suit, the Claimant must established by facts that he has a claim against that party and that the party is a necessary party without his presence the suit cannot be properly, efficient and completely resolved. See TAIWO V ABDUL 2006 2 FWLR PT.309 2116, RE-ABACHA 2000 5 NWLR PT.655 50, IGE V FARINDE 1994 7 NWLR PT.354 42. I have combed the entire pleading of the Claimant (Statement of facts) there is nothing in it to show that the Claimant has any grouse against the 3rd Defendant there is no specific claim against the 3rd defendant/applicant. The main grouse of the claimant/respondent is on her compulsory retirement. It has not been shown by the pleadings that the 3rd defendant/Applicant played any role in respect of the action taken that led to the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent. In my view this suit can be properly and completely determined without the presence of the 3rd defendant/applicant. In view of the foregoing, I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the 3rd defendant/applicant is not a proper party in this suit and there is no reasonable cause of action disclosed against the 3rd defendant/applicant to warrant being made a party to this suit. This position strengthened by the fact that the pleading has not shown role played by the 3rd defendant/applicant in the debacle that led to the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent from service. This issue is therefore resolved against the claimant/applicant, the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant is hereby struck out for not being proper party before the Court due to non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action. In view of all what I have said above the defendants/applicants preliminary objection succeeds and is hereby granted the claimant’s action is hereby dismissed for being statute barred. SanusiKado, Judge.