RULING. The Applicant commenced this suit by way of Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, wherein the Applicant pray for:- 1. A declaration that the dismissal of the applicant by the 1st respondent without trial and without fair hearing, constitutes a violation of her fundamental right to fair hearing as guaranteed under section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as Amended), and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. A9, LFN, 2004, and is therefore illegal and unconstitutional 2. A declaration that the arrest and detention of the applicant by the respondents without trial constitutes a violation of her Fundamental Rights as guaranteed under Section 35 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as Amended) and Articles 6 & 7 the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. A9, LFN, 2004, and is therefore illegal and unconstitutional. 3. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Respondents by themselves, their agents, servants or privies from further perpetuation of unlawful acts of unlawful detention. 4. The sum of N30,OOO,OOO.OO (Thirty million naira only) being general damages against the Respondents for a breach of her fundamental rights to personal liberty, fair hearing, the dignity of human person, and for unlawful detention, torture, psychological trauma, loss of self-esteem and for such other breaches of the fundamental human rights of the Applicant hereof. 5. An unreserved public apology from the Respondents to the Applicant herein, duly publicized in at least two National Dailies. 6. And for such further Order or other Orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. Upon being served with the Originating Court processes commencing this suit, the 1st Respondent/Applicant filed notice of preliminary objection praying for: (1) IAN ORDER striking out the suit, with Suit/Motion No NICN/ABJ/111 /18 for lack of Jurisdiction. (2) SUCH FURTHER ORDER(S) this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. The Grounds upon which the objection is based are as follows:- 1. That the suit which challenges the dismissal of the Applicant/Respondent was inappropriately commenced under Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 and therefore same having) not 'been initiated through due process of law is incompetent. 2. That the Applicant's/Respondent's main or principal relief/claim in this suit seeks a declaration that her dismissal by the 1st Respondent/Applicant is illegal and unconstitutional. 3. That the Applicant's/Respondent's relief for the enforcement of her fundamental right is an ancillary relief/claim and not the principal/main relief/claim in this matter. 4. That all the facts in the Applicant's/Respondent's affidavit in support does not constitute or reveal an action under Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009. 5. That this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit, same being incompetent. The objection was brought pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court. the application was supported by a 14 paragraphs affidavit. A written address was also filed along with the notice of preliminary objection. Maxwell Chiemeke, Esq; counsel for the 1st Respondent/Applicant, while making oral submission before the Court relied on all the averments in the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection. Counsel also adopted the written address filed along with the preliminary objection as his argument. In the written address counsel submitted lone issue for determination, to wit: "Whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit, same being incompetent having not been initiated/commenced by due process of law". ARGUMENT. In arguing the issue determination, counsel submitted that this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit, same being incompetent, having not been initiated by due process of law. Jurisdiction is fundamental to adjudication and Court's decision. It is threshold issue the fons et oriqo of adjudication and the life blood that animates or ignites the Court exercise of its adjudicatory powers in any suit before it, on this submission Counsel cited the case of Uwazuruike V. Nwachukwu (2013) All FWLR (pt.680), 1205. It is also submitted that any decision reached without jurisdiction is a nullity, no matter how brilliantly and well conducted as well as sound the judgment/decision may be. Counsel contended that sections 251, 257, 272 mentioned under section 254C (1) (d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) (Third Alteration) Act, 2010, apply to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and High Court of a state, respectively, which are empowered to entertain fundamental rights matters under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. 2009. According to counsel this court not being one of the courts listed of having power to enforce Fundamental Rights cannot assume jurisdiction in this matter. Counsel contended the main grouse of the applicant/respondent and indeed, the main issue leading to this suit is the dismissal of the applicant/respondent by the 1st respondent/applicant. To buttress his contention counsel referred to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, of the affidavit in support of the application for enforcement of fundamental rights filed by the applicant/respondent in support of his case. Counsel submitted in these paragraphs of the affidavit in support the applicant/respondent repeatedly made reference to her dismissal and how the said dismissal has occasioned untold hardship on her, hence her prayer to the court to declare the said dismissal illegal and unconstitutional. Counsel submitted based on the reliefs being sought this matter is not within the jurisdiction of this court. Counsel submitted that why much emphasis is laid on the reliefs/claims sought by the respondent/applicant is based on the fact that in ascertaining the competence of a suit, the determining factor is the Plaintiff's claim. It is not the manner in which the claim is couched that matters, nor is it the categorization given to the claim by the Defendant that counts. On this submission Counsel placed reliance on the case of WAEC V. Akinkunmi (2008) All FWLR, pt. 42. It is further submitted that in determining whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit, it is apt to look at the factors constituting an action under Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009. In furtherance of this counsel made reference to the cases of A-G Imo V llomuanya (2018), WRN, Vo1.17, 1101 @ 104 and that of Rev. Prof Paul Emeka V. Rev. Dr. Chidi Okoroafor & Ors (2017) 17, WRN 1, which are very apposite, as it was held in those cases that for an action to be sustained under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, the main or principal claim must be a fundamental Rights matter, i.e threatened violation, or likely violation of any of the provisions of Chapter Iv of the Constitution. Thus, where the principal reliefs touches on the Common Law, statutory or general reliefs like trespass, title to Land, employment matters, tortious action, breach of contracts and such other matters use of Fundamental Rights (Enforcement) Rules is not a viable option in such cases. It is further submitted that in ascertaining the competence of a suit commenced by way of an application under the fundamental rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, the court must ensure that the enforcement of fundamental rights under chapter iv of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN), 1999 (as amended) is the main claim and not the ancillary claim. When the above is not done, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be said to be properly invoked and the action will be liable to be struck out for incompetence. Counsel stated that is position was also captured in WAEC V. Akinkunmi (supra). It is also argued that the law is settled that a citizen who believes or has knowledge that a crime has been or is likely to be committed by a person, either against him or another citizen is entitled to report the matter to the Police. How the Police go about the performance of their duties in investigating the matter is entirely at their discretion and not the burden of the Complainant: and where there is a reasonable cause for arrest, the Police cannot be prevented from performing its duties. In support of this position counsel relied on Ezenwaka V. Okon (2015) 37, WRN, 144 @147-148. Therefore, it is in recognition of the above duty that the 1st respondent/applicant reported the applicant/respondent to the police. Counsel contended that the Police is empowered to carry out a number of functions for the benefit of the society under section 4 of the Police Act, Cap 359, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN), 1990, which stipulates that the Police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which the police is directly charged. Thus, it is In line with the above stated duty of the Police that the Police invited the applicant/respondent in respect of the allegations leveled against her by her former employers, the 1st respondent/applicant. It is contended that there is no time limit within which the Police must conclude its investigation and the Police has been advised in plethora of cases to always finish investigation before charging a matter to court. In this respect the case of USA Pic V. Durunna (2015) 24, WRN, 127 @151- 152, is very apposite. It is submitted the police is still investigating the allegations against the Applicant/Respondent. It is submitted that having established that the main/principal relief/claim of the applicant/ respondent is for her dismissal 'without benefits’ the court is urged to hold that this action cannot be properly brought or validly instituted under Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009. Finally, Counsel submitted that based on the strength of the argument canvassed above and the plethora of relevant and convincing authorities therein contained, this instant suit is wrongly brought under enforcement of fundamental rights and same being incompetent, should be struck out by this Honourable Court for lack of jurisdiction. Counsel pray this Court to so hold and graciously grant this application in the interest of justice. OPPOSITION BY THE APPLICANT/RESPONDENT TO THE 1ST RESPONDENT/APPLICANT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION. In reaction to the preliminary objection contesting the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this suit, the applicant/respondent filed a counter-affidavit in opposition to the preliminary objection. The applicant/respondent also filed a written address along with the counter affidavit. While adumbrating on the written address Counsel relied on all the content of the counter-affidavit and adopted the written address filed as his argument. In the written address a single issue was submitted for the determination by this Court, to wit: ‘‘Whether this Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this suit as it is presently constituted’’. ARGUMENT: In advancing argument on the sole issue for determination, counsel submitted that the general rule is that High Courts have the jurisdiction to handle fundamental right cases. This position of the law is supported by section 46  of the 1999 Constitution [as amended]. However, it is argued that this general rule is not without an exception. In fact, paragraph d, of section 254C 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria [Third Alteration] Act, vests the inherent jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court of Nigeria over fundamental right cases as it relates to or connects with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provision of Chapter IV in respect of any employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employer's association or any other matter which the court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine. It is submitted that what this portends is that infringement of fundamental rights in relation to the aforementioned matters can only be enforced by the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. The sections referred to in the introductory section of 254C 1, d, above, are those relating to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, and the State High Courts, respectively. The intention of section 254C(1) (d), is to supersede the above-named provisions in respect of the matters stated there under. Consequently, issues of fundamental rights, including enforcement thereof under the stated matters must therefore be brought before the National Industrial Court of Nigeria under its exclusive jurisdiction. It is argued that the 1st respondent has admitted in paragraph 4.03 of the written address in support of the notice of preliminary objection to the effect that this Honourable Court is vested with the jurisdiction to try entertain fundamental right cases as they relate to any employment, labour, industrial, unlawful dismissal, etc. However, the 1st respondent is of the erroneous opinion that the main claim of the applicant is solely dismissal which narrow reasoning is far from the true position of the law. It is further argued that the 1st respondent has also admitted in paragraph 3 [j] and [k] of their affidavit in support of the notice of preliminary objection that they made a complaint to the 2nd respondent and the 2nd respondent invited the applicant but forgot to tell the court how the applicant was detained for three days before she was eventually released to one Chizoba on bail without trial or proper arraignment in court. It is also submitted that the other crucial issue for consideration in this Application is the issue of the failure of the 1st respondent to give the applicant a fair hearing in the determination of her civil rights and obligation before her dismissal as required by Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution. It is also contended that in a similar vein, Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap. A20, LFN, 2004, also make provisions for fair hearing. It is the contention of Counsel that the above provisions are plain and unambiguous. These copious provisions signify the importance which the law attaches to the right to fair hearing. It is a fundamental right guaranteed not only by the Constitution, but also by the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights which has been ratified and domesticated in Nigeria and form part of our municipal laws. As can be seen in the Article quoted above, the right to fair hearing is a bundle of rights comprising other rights, viz: right to appeal, right to be presumed innocent, right to defence and right to be tried within a reasonable time. It is submitted by counsel that the applicant in the instant case has not been tried by any court or tribunal but she was being treated as though she was guilty of the offence alleged against her. She has been dismissed by the 1st respondent where she has served for 10 years. It is our humble submission that the dismissal of the applicant without trial or giving her fair hearing amounts to a breach of her fundamental right to fair hearing and we urge the Court to so hold. It is the contention of Counsel that the main claim is not the dismissal per se, but rather the main claim is the breach/infringement of fair hearing that led to the dismissal of the applicant by the 1st respondent. In concluding his submission, counsel urged the Court to hold that it has jurisdiction to entertain this fundamental right suit against the respondents and strike out the notice of preliminary objection filed by the 1st respondent. COURT’S DECISION I have carefully perused the originating Court process commencing this Fundamental Right Enforcement application, the preliminary objection to the Commencement of this suit by way of Fundamental Right Enforcement Procedure Rules, the affidavit in support, the counter-affidavit as well as the written addresses of Counsel for the parties. The 1st respondent/applicant has in the written address filed before the court submitted lone issue for determination. The applicant/respondent as well distilled lone issue for determination. The issue submitted by each of the parties are in substance the same, save that they were differently worded. However, in my humble view the issue to be resolved in this application is: ‘‘Whether having regards to the reliefs claimed, this action is validly brought by way of an application under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009’’. First and foremost let me point out that in an application brought before a court for resolution, the court is bound by the prayers as contained in the application, the court is not allowed to derail/depart from the issues submitted in the application. I shall be bound by the prayers of the 1st respondent/applicant in the preliminary objection. It is in this light that I will resist the invitation of the parties to discuss issues on the alleged violation of fair hearing and the arrest and detention of the applicant/respondent by the 2nd respondent for three days. These are issues that are meant for resolution after hearing of the substantive matter. The stage at which we are the only issue to be dealt with is issue of propriety of using Fundamental right Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009, to commence this action. In the circumstance, I shall discountenanced all the arguments canvassed by counsel for both parties in respect of issue of establishment and non-establishment of breach of fair, hearing, arrest and detention. These are issues meant for the substantive hearing of the suit. They are for now premature. The arguments as to violations of fair hearing arrest and detention are not relevant at this stage of the proceeding. Coming to the main issue for determination i.e jurisdiction, the 1st respondent/applicant has rather sustained his position that the condition precedent to commencement of action by way of Fundamental Rights Enforcement Rules, has not been met, in that the main claim of the applicant/respondent is the issue of dismissal from service and not threatened violation or likely hood of violation of any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter Iv of the Constitution. Therefore according to counsel, commencing this suit by way of Fundamental right is wrong. For the applicant/respondent, his position is that despite the fact that there is mention of dismissal in relief one, the action is mainly on violation of Fundamental Right to Fair hearing, arrest and detention of the applicant/respondent by the 2nd respondent for three days. The well settled principle of law regarding ascertainment of competence of an action commenced by way of Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules is that the Court must ensure that the enforcement of Fundamental Right under Chapter Iv of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) is the main claim not ancillary or corollary claim. Where the main or principal claim is not enforcement of Fundamental Right, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be said to be properly invoked and the action will be liable to be struck out for being incompetent. This principle was given affirmative seal by the apex Court in a plethora of cases. Such as TUKUR V GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.117). In TUKUR V GOVERNMENT OF TARABA STATE (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt.510) 549, OGUNDARE, JSC (of blessed memory) has this to say: ‘‘The primary complaint of the Appellant in the whole case was his deposition as the Emir of Muri; the alleged breaches of his fundamental rights to fair hearing, liberty and freedom of movement were merely accessory to his primary complaint. The proceedings by way of Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, are in appropriate in the circumstances. The Appellant herein ought to have come by way of a writ of summons …’’ Belgore, JSC (as he then was) on his part opined thus: ‘‘the matter was taken to the trial Court in a wrong vehicle instead of a writ of summons designed for initiating an action it was started with a motion on notice under Fundamental Right Enforcement Procedure under the Constitution. The crux of the complaint in the trial Court, however, is as to whether the Plaintiff was lawfully deposed as the Emir of Muri, but was cloaked under Fundamental Rights. Since the main procedural approach at the trial Court was incompetent, no relief could flow from it’’. In EGBUONU V BORNO RADIO TELEVISION CORPORATION (1997) 12 NWLR (Pt.531) 29, per Kutigi, JSC (as he then was) stated thus: ‘‘in this appeal the claims are partly for wrongful dismissal or termination of appointment and partly for breach of Fundamental Right. But here, as in Tukur the principal claim being wrongful termination of appointment which ought to have been commenced by writ of summons which was not, then all the claims, principal and subsidiary which flow directly from it, are incompetent and ought to be struck out. That was what the Court of Appeal did in this case. I believe it was right’’. Ogundare, JSC (of blessed memory) in his contribution says as follows:- ‘‘Having regards to the claims of the appellant set out in the judgment of my learned brother and the affidavit adduced at the trial, there can be no doubt that his main complaint was against the termination of his appointment with the Respondent (which he regarded as wrongful) and his sole relief was his reinstatement. All these are not matters for the procedure provided for in section 52 of the 1979 Constitution. Appellant’s action should have been commenced by a writ of summons as provided for in the High Court Rules of Borno State. The action having been thus commenced wrongly, it was rightly struck out by the Court below’’. In GRACE JACK V FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE MAKURDI (2004) LPELR-1587 (SC), KATSINA-ALU, JSC (of blessed memory) stated thus: ‘‘An action for breach of contract is commenced by a writ of summons. This is the normal procedure in actions tried on the pleadings and to which rules of pleadings apply. View conceded that the Plaintiff’s action was for breach of contract of employment. That being so, the present action should have been commenced by a writ of summons’’. In his contribution UWAIFO, JSC, (as he then was) says as follows:- ‘‘It has been established by a number of decided cases by this Court that an action for wrongful dismissal from employment cannot be brought under the fundamental rights procedure rules. Wrongful dismissal belongs to common law class of actions, whereas action for contravention or threatened contravention of a fundamental right belongs to a Constitutional class of actions which is specially provided for. It follows that the appropriate procedure must be adopted in each class of actions. Where the main or principal is not the enforcement of a fundamental right the fundamental rights procedure rules are in appropriate’’. The same principle was applied by the apex Court with equal force in SEA TRUCKS (NIG.) LTD V ANIGBORO (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt.696) 159 @ 182. In WAEC V AKINWUMI (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt.1091) 151, TABAI JSC, has this to say: ‘‘It is settled law that in the ascertaining the competence of a suit, the determining factor is the Plaintiff’s claim. On this question however, it is not the manner in which the claims was couched that matter. Nor is the categorization given to the claim by the defendant that counts. The Court has a duty to carefully examine the reliefs claimed to ascertain what the claim is all about’’. In his contribution Akintan JSC, (as he then was) has this to say:- ‘‘The law on the point is well settled, is that only action founded on a breach of Fundamental Rights guaranteed in the Constitution can be enforced under the Rules. It is also a condition precedent to exercise of the Court jurisdiction that the enforcement of fundamental right or the securing of the enforcement thereof should be the main claim and not an accessory claim. It follows therefore an action founded on contract, such as one for wrongful dismissal or termination of an appointment, cannot be brought under the Rules’’. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has in the recent case of Rev. Prof Paul Emeka V. Rev. Dr. Chidi Okoroafor & Ors (2017) 17, WRN 1, reaffirmed the above quoted position of law on Fundamental Right (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. I shall now apply the above principles of law to the facts of this case. I have carefully studied the claims of the applicant/respondent reproduced in the earlier part of this ruling. From the reliefs being sought the main or principal claim that triggers the institution of this action is the dismissal of the applicant/respondent from the service of the 1st respondent/applicant without giving the applicant/respondent fair hearing or given opportunity of being heard. Which applicant/respondent alleged violated her fundamental right to fair hearing. The reliefs relating to fair hearing, arrest and detention are all complaints arising from the dismissal of the applicant/respondent from service of the 1st respondent/applicant. In other words they are secondary or ancillary to the main claim of dismissal from service without affording the applicant/respondent fair hearing. These reliefs stems from the main claim of dismissal from service. It is well settled that all administrative bodies, even though they are not court are bound to observe the rules of natural justice and fairness in their decisions, which affects the rights and obligations of citizens. See BAKARE V L. S. C. S. C. (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.262) 641 @ 699. However, in order to seek to enforce Fundamental Right to fair hearing provided for under Chapter Iv of the Constitution, the alleged violation must be in respect of proceedings before a Court or tribunal established by law and not before a domestic or standing ad-hoc Tribunal. In this case the complaint is not against a court of law or tribunal established by law. See EKUNOLA V CBMN V (2013) 15 NWLR (13477) 224, Rev. Prof Paul Emeka V. Rev. Dr. Chidi Okoroafor & Ors (Supra). Having established that the charge of fair hearing can only be made against a Court of competent jurisdiction or statutory Tribunal and not against an ad hoc Tribunal or disciplinary Committee, the applicant/respondent’s main claim is not cognizable under Fundamental Right Enforcement Procedure Rules. Therefore, I have no difficulty in agreeing with the 1st respondent/applicant that the main claim is not on fundamental rights, the drafting of reliefs to give it semblance of fundamental right cannot give it the Constitutional flavor. It remain within the realm of the Common law. It is to be noted that the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on this court by section 254C (1) (d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) in matters relating to or connected with any dispute is over the interpretation and application of the provision of chapter iv of the Constitution as it relates to any employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employers Association or any other matter which the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine. Whereas, section 46 of the Constitution has specifically confers jurisdiction on High Court of a State to entertain and determine any question relating to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under chapter iv of the Constitution. It is apparent that by the provision of section 46 of the constitution it is only a high court that is envisage of having original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application for enforcement of rights enshrined in chapter iv of the constitution. This position is strengthened by the provision of order 1 rule 2 of the fundamental rights enforcement procedure rules 2009, which specifically defined ‘court’ to mean Federal High Court, or High court of a state or the High court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Therefore, it is beyond any doubt that the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, is not one of the courts contemplated to enforce provisions of chapter iv of the constitution via Fundamental Right (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, as in this case. This means the jurisdiction of National Industrial Court of Nigeria on issue of Fundamental Human Rights is limited to interpretation and application of the fundamental rights provision of the Constitution as it relates to labour, employment, trade disputes. It is also the law that the jurisdiction for enforcement or securing the enforcement of fundamental rights still vests in the High court. The reason being that unlike sections 251, 257 and 272, section 46 of the constitution is not made subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria by section 254C (1) of the constitution. Therefore, the constitution has preserved the provision of section 46 of the constitution. The preservation of the jurisdiction of a High court by section 46 of the constitution to enforce infraction of any of the provisions of chapter iv of the constitution connotes that the this court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain suit challenging infraction of the provisions of chapter iv of the constitution. It need to be pointed out here that section 46 of the Constitution is a special provision on jurisdiction of the High Court for enforcement of fundamental rights as contained in chapter iv of the constitution. While section 254C (1) of the Constitution is a general provision meant for determination of labour, employment, trade unionism and other industrial relations disputes. It is well settled principle of law that if there is conflict between a general and a special provision in a statute, the special provision shall prevail, the latin maxim for this is ‘generalia specialibus non derogate’. See GRACE JACK V UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE MAKURDI (supra), FEDERAL MORTGAGE BANK OF NIGERIA V P. N. OLLOH (2002) 9 NWLR PT.773 475, NDDC V PRECISION ASS. LTD (2006) 16 NWLR (PT.1006) 527, A-G OF THE FEDERATION & ORS. V ABUBAKAR & ORS. (2007) 10 NWLR (PT.1041) 1. It is clear from the foregoing that the applicant/respondent’s action ab initio was incompetent for having been commenced through the wrong procedure. The defect is fatal to the applicant/respondent’s case. This court is not competent to handle this suit as the case was not initiated by due process of law. See MADUKOLU V NKENDLIM (supra), SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TEACHING HOSPITALS RESEARCH INSTITUTS AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONS (SSAUTHRIAL) & 2 Ors. V DR. SUNDAY OSASU OLOTU (2016) 14 NWLR (pt.1531) 8. The purport of all I have been saying above is that the Fundamental rights (enforcement Procedure) 2009, was inappropriate procedure to commence an action before this court. In this case the applicant/respondent ought to have commenced this suit by way of complaint as provided by Order 3 of the Rules of this Court. The application by the 1st Respondent/Applicant is meritorious, it succeeds and is hereby granted. The applicant’s Originating application to enforce violation of the alleged violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights is hereby struck out for being incompetent. Sanusi Kado, Judge.