RULING The claimant by a general form of complaint filed on ………………., commenced this action claiming the following reliefs: a. A DECLARATION that the Defendants whether by themselves, officers, agents subordinates, privies, representatives, associates or anybody acting on their behalf howsoever cannot institute and/or sustain any valid disciplinary action against the Claimant on the basis of her personnel records which the Defendants amended via its letter of 14th September 2012. b. A DECLARATION that the letter dated 28th October 2013 is an atrocious violation of the Public Service Rules 2008 and the NYSC Condition of Service (revised edition of August, 2013) and approved, as the alleged act of the Claimant was discovered since 2011, to the knowledge of the 1st and 2nd Defendants and the said letter of 28th October 2013 is null, void and of no legal consequences whatsoever. c. A DECLARTION that the Defendants acts of allowing or permitting Claimant to continue with the Batch A NYSC Orientation Camp in FCT after taking the decision to compulsorily retire her with effect from 3rd day of March 2014 and subsequent payment of Claimant’s entitlement for the official/special duty in FCT camp and salary for the month of March , April, and May 2014 did nullify the purported letter of compulsory retirement from service dated 7th March 2014. d. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants whether by themselves, officers, agents, subordinates, privies, representatives, associates or anybody acting on their behalf howsoever from instituting any disciplinary proceedings against the Claimant on the basis of the alleged discrepancy in her personnel record same act having been amended by the Defendants via their letters dated 14th September 2012. e. AN ORDER reinstating the Claimant immediately to her position and should also be paid immediate all her salaries and entitlement from the date her salary was stopped until judgment is given with 20% interest on such sum of money and 10% on such sum of money from when judgment is given until the Defendants comply with the judgment. Upon being served with the originating Court processes commencing this suit, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants/applicants filed two motions on notice for preliminary objection. The first motion on notice for preliminary objection was filed by the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants, praying this court for an order dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction and competence. O. P. Omuru, Esq; counsel for the 1st and defendants/applicants in arguing the motion on notice for preliminary objection, relied on his supporting affidavit of 5 paragraphs and adopted his written address as his argument in respect of this objection. Counsel further adopted his reply on points of law filed in answer to the claimant/respondent’s argument in the written reply address. He premised this application on the grounds that: 1. The suit is statute barred as same is not instituted within the time statutorily allowed to seek redress. 2. The suit is premature as the Claimant/Respondent did not comply with the provisions of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 In the written address Counsel submitted two issues for determination, to wit: 1. Whether this suit is statute barred, having been filed seven months and nineteen days after the accrual of the cause of action. 2. Whether, in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the suit is premature. ARGUMENT ISSUE ONE Counsel argued that by section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, an action against a public officer must be instituted within three Months of the accrual of cause of action. He then submitted that this action having been instituted seven Months nineteen days from the date of accrual of cause of action on 6/4/14, is statute barred. He urged the court to so hold and dismiss the suit. He cited and relied on the cases of; Ofili V. C. S. C. (2008) 2 NWLR (pt. 1071) 238 at 252 - 253, Ibrahim V. Judicial Service Committee (1998) 14 NWLR (pt. 584) 1, Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria V. Gold (2007) 9 MJSC 210 at 220, paras. C-E and Ofili V. C. S. C. (Supra) 253, Egbe V. Adefarasin & Anor (1985) 1 NSCC Vol. 16 643 at 658 Lines 39 to 44. ISSUE TWO On issue two counsel argued that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit due to non-fulfilment of condition precedent provided by section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. Counsel submitted before an action can be instituted by any person aggrieved by the decision of the defendants/applicant, such person must first appeal to president. The claimant/respondent being dissatisfied with the decision of defendant ought to appeal to presidency the failure by the claimant to appeal (which is a condition precedent), as stipulated in section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, before instating this action has divested this court with jurisdiction to entertain this suit. On this submission counsel cited and relied on Aribisala V. Ogunyemi (2005) 6 MJSC 188 at 205, paras, Akintemi & Ors v. Onwumechi & Ors (1985) 1 NSCC Vol. 16, 46 at 61, Lines 31 to 35. In concluding his argument Counsel urged the Court to resolve the two issues submitted for determination in favour of the defendants/applicants and dismiss the case for want of maturity and for being stature barred. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION BY THE 3RD DEFENDANT The second motion on notice for preliminary objection was dated 15/5/2018 and filed on the same day by the 3rd defendant/applicant is praying for an Order of this Honourable Court striking out the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant from this suit for want of reasonable cause of action. In compliance with the rules of this Court the motion on notice for preliminary objection by the 3rd defendant/applicant was accompanied by a written address. In the written address two issues were distilled for determination, to wit: (i) Whether the Claimant's case as constituted discloses a reasonable cause of action against the 3rd Defendant? (ii) Whether the non-disclosure of the requisite cause of action is not a condition precedent to the competence of this suit for adjudication? Ovoke Celenstine O. Esq; Counsel for the 3rd defendant/applicant in his oral submission before the Court adopted the written address as his argument and also sought leave to argue the two issues submitted for determination together. Counsel argued that the claimant/respondent’s action did not disclose reasonable cause of action against the 3rd defendant/applicant as there is no allegation of wrong doing levelled against the 3rd defendant in the complaint and the statement of facts. It is submitted that disclosure of reasonable cause of action is a condition precedent to the Court assuming jurisdiction over a matter and therefore the non-disclosure of a reasonable cause of action robs the court of jurisdiction to entertain the matter submitted to it for adjudication. In support of his position counsel placed reliance on the cases of ALHAJI AMINU IBRAHIM VS. FELIX OSIM (1988)3 N.W.L.R. (Part 82) page 257 at 260 paragraphs A-B, and that of DIM CHUKWU EMEKA ODUMEGWU OJUKWU VS. ALH. UMARU MUSA YAR'ADUA & 4 ORS. (2009) 28 N.S.C.Q.R. (Part 1), 492 at 565. It is further submitted that, from the totality of the claimant/respondent's Statement of facts filed in this matter there is no wrongful act of the 3rd defendant/applicant shown, and the claimant/respondent's pleadings have not equally shown any damage arising from any wrongful act of the 3rd defendant/applicant. It is equally argued that the 3rd defendant/applicant is not a necessary party in this suit. On this submission reliance was placed on the case of LAGOS STATE BULK PURCHASE CORPORATION V. PURIFICATION TECHNIQUES (NIG) LTD (SUPRA), AT PAGE 304 – 305. Further reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of HON. EMMANUEL BW ACIIA V. HON. JOEL DANLAMI IKENYA & 2 OTHERS (2011) 3 N. W. L. R. (PART 1235) PAGE 610. In concluding his argument counsel urged the Court to strike out the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant for non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action and not being a necessary party. OPPOSITION BY THE CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT. In opposing the preliminary objection of the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants, the claimant/respondent filed a written address dated 20/4/18. However, in respect of the objection of 3rd defendant/applicant no response was filed by the claimant/applicant. However, counsel replied orally to the objection on points of law. In the written address adopted by counsel lone issue was formulated for determination, to wit: ‘‘Whether this Honourable court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the Claimant’’. In arguing the sole issue, counsel submitted that limitation law is in law a defence, consequently, there is need for evidence to be taken before resolving the issue. According to counsel facts upon which this application should be determine are not yet before the court. Counsel submitted the appropriate thing to do is to step down such application and take evidence and that such issues raised will then form part of the issue for determination in the case. On this submission counsel cited and relied on the cases of WOHERE V EMEREUWA (2004)13 NWLR (PT.890) 398, The National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) V Geco Prakla Nigeria Limited (2010) 20 NLLR (Pt. 57) 372 @397-398, Nigeria Union of Teachers V State Security Services (SSS); NICN IABJ/109/2011, delivered by the President of this Honourable Court Hon. Justice B.A. Adejumo, OFR on 17th September, 2014, Nigeria Union of Teachers V Trade Union Congress of Nigeria SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/165/2013 ruling delivered on 3rd February 2014. It is also argued that the claimant/respondent’s action falls within the recognized exception to the general provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, in that there is continuance of damage or injury. Alternatively, Counsel submitted that in determining issue of jurisdiction, it is the claim of the claimant that will be examined and not affidavit evidence. On this proposition of the law, counsel relied on AGF v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 187 at 233. Counsel also disputed 6/4/14 as the date of accrual of cause of action in this suit. It is also the position of counsel that the 3rd defendant/applicant in this suit represent the presidency, because the letter head paper of 3rd defendant/applicant bears presidency. It is further argued that the condition of service of the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants front loaded was approved by the 3rd defendant/applicant for the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants. Counsel also submitted that the 3rd defendant/applicant is a necessary party and reasonable cause of action has been disclosed against the 3rd defendant/applicant. According to counsel the provisions of National Youth Service Corps Decree of 1993, cannot be invoke to interpret ‘presidency’ as it is an abolished law. Counsel also submitted that the President created the office of the Head of Civil and Secretary of Government and named same as the Presidency. It is also the submission of counsel that the acts of the Applicants are outside the colour of their statutory or constitutional duty which is not protected by the Act. See A.G. Rivers State V A.G. Bayelsa State (supra). Also see In TheNational Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) V Geeo Prakla Nigeria Limited (supra). Counsel urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objections with substantial cost and an order for speedy trial. REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW BY THE 1ST AND 2ND DEFENDANTS/APPLICANTS. Counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants filed a reply on points of law wherein he responded to the issues raised in the claimant/respondent’s written address in opposition to the preliminary objection. On conflicting issues counsel contended the two issues raised and argued by the defendants/applicants in their preliminary objection are the basic features of the action. An action is statute barred, as in this case, when it is instituted outside the time statutorily allowed to seek redress in Court. Also, an action is premature when a condition-precedent is not fulfilled, as in this case, before instituting it. It is also contended that there is no law prohibiting a party from raising and arguing all the issues that are considered to be the features of a case. On the contention that the action is of continuous damage or injury, Counsel submitted that the claimant/respondent has missed the point. It is settled law that law on limitation of the action runs from the date of alleged commission. It is immaterial to the date the effect of the complainant's injury or wrong continues 'ad infinitum'. On issues of bad faith, born out of malice, an abuse of office, unjust and outside the colour of statutory duty. Counsel responded that the issues are all fundamentally substantive issues which have no bearing in a matter that is statute barred as in this case. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of Sani V. Okene Local Government & Anor (2008) 10 MJSC 199 at 205 to 206 and the case of Anozie V. Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & 4 Drs (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 278. On payment of salary and assignment of duty after the decision to compulsorily retire him from service have nullified his retirement. It is argued by counsel that that the effective date of the claimant/respondent's compulsory retirement was the 6th day of April, 2014 when he admittedly received the letter in respect thereof. It would not be an act of responsibility on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants to stop the claimant/respondent's salary and stop assigning duties to him when he was not formally informed of his compulsory retirement. The purported assignment of duty preceded the date he received his letter of retirement. Also, it is a common knowledge that salaries of public servants are paid by the Integrated Personnel Payroll Information System (IPPIS). By implication, the Applicants have no control over payment of salaries and bureaucracy did not allow immediate stoppage of the Claimant/Respondent's salary. Granted however but not conceding that the cause of action arose by the end of June, 2014 when the claimant/respondent claims that his salary was not paid, it took him four months and twenty five days before he instituted the suit on the 25th day of November, 2014. This is still clearly outside the three months limited by law for seeking redress in court against the Applicants. On technicality and non-filing of defence, it is argued that the Applicants' preliminary objection is based on jurisdiction. An issue of jurisdiction is not an ordinary point to be dismissed as a mere or overstretched issues of technicalities. It is a very fundamental issue that goes to the root of the matter. The law is meant to be obeyed. Where there is a stipulated procedure, as in this case, it must be followed to the later. Where the procedure is not followed, as in this case, the Court will lack jurisdiction. Counsel agree that the Honourable Court is a Labour Court as argued by the Respondent. However, the Court is first and foremost a Court of Law, and must not be seen to sacrifice a fundamental issue of jurisdiction on a platter of perceived "speed". It will amount to going on a frolic and embarking on an exercise in futility for a Court to adjudicate on a matter without jurisdiction. Counsel referred to Order 18, Rule 6 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 and submitted that it recognizes the weighty nature of the issue of jurisdiction when it copiously exempts preliminary objections that challenge jurisdiction of the Court from the discretion given to the Court to hear a preliminary objection together with the substantive suit. In view of the fundamental nature of the issue of jurisdiction, it can be raised at any time or stage and in any manner whatsoever, even for the first time in the Supreme Court. Demurrer does not apply when jurisdiction is in issue. This principle received the blessings of the Supreme Court in Military Governor of Ondo State & 5 Ors V. Kolawole & 4 Ors (2008) 9 MJSC 203 at 212, Paras F- G when it held as follows "It is trite law that the issue of jurisdiction by whatever name and under any shade, can be raised at any stage. It can be raised viva voce or the Court can raise it suo motu. Counsel also referred to Oloriode V. Oyebi (1984) 15 SCNLR 390, (1984) 5 SC 1 and Elebanjo V. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (pt. 1001) 76. On presidency, it is submitted that the claimant/respondent’s letter to the 3rd defendant/applicant cannot in an anyway amount to appeal to presidency within the contemplation of Section 20 of the NYSC Act. It is submitted that, it is the law that defines Presidency in matters involving the applicants, but not facts or letter headed paper as the claimant/respondent wants the court to believe. Counsel reiterated that, the definition of the word "Presidency" is provided by Section 22 of the National Youth Service Corps Decree 51 of 16th June, 1993 which established the National Youth Service Corps. It is the Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 221, Vol. 80 of 9th August, 1993. It is contended that the Decree clearly defines the word "Presidency" to mean "the Office of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces." There is nothing in this clear and unambiguous definition to mean, suggest, include or refer to the Office of the Head of Civil Service of the Federation or any other office. On this contention Counsel relied on Line Limited V. S.C.C. Nigeria Limited & 2 Ors (2009) 7 MJSC (pt. III) 1 at 21-22. Counsel also submitted that the claimant/respondent argues inadvertently that the National Youth Service Corps Decree 51 of 16th June, 1993 has been abrogated and therefore no longer part of our laws. When the said the National Youth Service Corps Decree is an existing law. To buttress this submission Counsel referred to Section 315(5)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides that, "nothing in this Constitution shall invalidate the National Youth Service Corps Decree 1993". It further provides that the provisions of the Decree shall continue to apply and have full effect in accordance with its tenor and shall not be altered or repealed except in accordance with the provisions of Section 9(2) of the Constitution. This has shown clearly that NYSC Decree 1993 is constitutional and subsisting. Counsel contended that the NYSC Decree 1993 has never been amended, let alone abrogated. Like any other existing law, it has only been re-coded as Chapter N84 in the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. The re-coding does not and cannot suffice as an amendment within the contemplation of Section 9(2) of the CFRN, 1999 (as amended). The omission of the definition of the word "Presidency" in the re-coded Laws of the Federation of Nigeria is, at best, a printer's error which also does not suffice as an amendment. In concluding his submission Counsel insisted that this suit is statute barred and the claimant/respondent did not appeal to presidency as required by section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this suit for want of competence. COURT’S DECISION I have carefully read through the originating process commencing this suit and all the papers so far filed in respect of the two motions on notice for preliminary objection. It is clear from the prayers contained in the motion papers, the dispute between the parties can adequately be disposed of upon determination of the issues formulated below: 1. Whether the Claimant’s suit is statute barred within the purview of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act?. 2. Whether by virtue of the provisions of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act this suit is premature. 3. ‘‘Whether the 3rd Defendant is a necessary party in this suit’’. Before delving into the main issues for determination. I shall endeavor to resolve some preliminary issues raised by counsel in the course of arguing their respective positions before the court. The first question that calls for answer is that of appropriateness or otherwise of supporting notice of preliminary objection with an affidavit. Ordinarily a notice of preliminary objection filed to raise issue in limine, is dealing with point of law before the court. That is to say the objector is relying solely on law only in raising the objection and is not relying on any facts. However, where the facts are not in dispute an affidavit can accompany a notice of preliminary objection. But in an application regarding statute of limitation of action, the law is settled, it is the statement of claim that will be looked at to determine the period of limitation. See IBRAHIM V JUDICIAL SERVICE CPOMMITTEE OF KADUNA STATE (supra), FORESTRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NIGERIA V GOLD (supra) and WOHEREM V EMEREUWA (2004)13 NWLR (PT.890) 398. This position of the law clearly debunked the submission of counsel for the claimant/respondent to the effect that oral testimony has to be given before the objection can be resolved. In determining the applications filed by the defendants/applicants, this Court will restrict itself to only the originating process commencing this suit and its accompanying documents, since the law permit looking at those processes in resolving preliminary objection. It is trite law that an application by way of a preliminary objection for the dismissal of a suit in limine may be made on points of law and where there are no facts in dispute for the purpose of determining such an objection. See WOHEREM V ENWEREUM (Supra) and BELLO ADEGOKE FOKO and ORS V OLADOKUN FOKO & ANR. (1968) NMLR 441, in this situation the defendants/applicants relies only on the facts as disclosed by the complaint and statement of facts and for this purposes, the facts are deemed to have been admitted by the defendants/applicants. See AYANBOYE V BALOGUN (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.151) 392. It is only where disputes as to facts appears on the pleadings of the parties, that it is open to the Court to defer hearing of the objection till when credible evidence has been adduced to enable determination of the point law or where there is paucity of material on which the objection is based. In the case at hand not all the pleadings are before the court and there is enough materials on which issue of limitation can be decided. It is trite law that in determining issue of statute barred it is the writ of summons and the statement of claim that the court will be entitled to look at in this case the complaint and statement of facts. This exercise does not require taking of oral evidence. See EGBE V ADEFARASIN (supra). In the case at hand the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants are yet to file their defence. This means there are no facts in dispute between the defendants/applicants and the claimant/respondent. It is only when issues are joined that dispute or lack factual dispute will emerge. Therefore, as far as this suit is concerned the facts are not obscure or at large as submitted by the counsel for the claimant/respondent to warrant stepping down the objection as the Counsel for the Claimant want this Court to do. The case of WOHEREM (supra), being relied upon by counsel for the claimant/respondent is not helpful to his case. The situation is completely different in this case. In arguing his position the claimant/respondent referred severally to decisions of this Court in other similar matters. I must state from the outset that each case is distinct from the other and must be decided as per the facts before the court. That the mere fact that in some cases this court has postponed determination of objection till after hearing of the substantive matter does not mean that such shall happened in all cases. The decision on whether an application shall be differed to conclusion of substantive suit will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The cases being relied upon by counsel for the claimant/respondent were decided based on their respective merits. On technicality, the trends nowadays is that Courts are moving away from technicality. Technicality could arise if a party is relying on abstract or inordinate legalism to becloud or drawn the merit of a case. A technicality arises if a party quickly takes an immediately available opportunity, however, infinitestimal it may be, to work against the merit of the opponent’s case. In other words, he holds and relies tenaciously unto the rules of court with little or no regard to justice of the matter. As far as he is concerned the rules of court must be followed to the last sentences, the last words and the last letters without much ado, and with little or no regard t the injustice that will be caused the opponent. See YUSUF V ADEGOKE & ANOR. 200711 NWLR PT.1045 332. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that raising points of law in limine on issue of statute of limitation cannot amount to using technicality. DETERMINATION OF MAIN ISSUES ISSUE ONE It is clear from the provisions of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, that the provisions constitute a limitation law, which the legislature designed it to provide protection for public officers corporate or incorporated bodies from detraction in the conduct of their discharge of their official duties or assignment by litigation that might have become otiose or in which witnesses may no longer be available or may not reasonably be gotten to testify due to time lag. See OFFOBOCHE V OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt.739) 458. The object of the provision is therefore to afford protection to public officers in respect of anything done in the discharge or execution or carrying out their duty, the protection comes into play after the expiration of three Months from the date of the Commission of the act or acts, neglect or default which give rise to the cause of action. See YABUGBE V COP (1992) 4 NWLR (pt.234) 152; EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549, EGBE V ALHAJI (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.128) 546, EKEAGU V ALIRI ((1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.179) 258. It is quite clear that the general effect of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, is that where a law provides for the institution of an action in a court of law within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action accruing to the party entitled to enforce his remedy before the court, proceedings shall not be brought after the expiration of the period circumscribed by law. Where any action is statute barred, a party who might otherwise have had a cause of action loses right to enforce it by judicial process, because the period of time prescribed by the limitation law for instituting such an action has elapsed. Thus, an action commenced after the expiration of the period within which an action must be brought as stipulated in a statute of limitation is not maintainable. See EBOIGBE V NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.347) 649, ALHAJI (DR) ADO IBRHIM Vs. ALHAJI MAIGIDAU LAWAL AND ORS (2015) LPELR – 24736, EGBE VS. ADEFARASIN & ANR (1987) 1 NWLR PT 471 AT 21, FADERE V A. G. OYO STATE (1982) 4 SC 1, A. G. ADAMAWA STATE V A. G. OF THE FEDERATION (2014) LPELR-23221(SC), OBIEFUNA V OKOYE (1961) 1 ALL NLR 357. However, it is pertinent to note that the general rule laid down in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, like every other general rule is not without exception. Though, an action against public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or Law or public duty or default on same can only be commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, the situation is not the same in a case of continuance of damage or injury in which the person aggrieved must institute the action within three months next after the cessation of the damage or injury complained of. See the case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. JACOB OLADELE AMAO & 2 ORS (2011) ALL FWLR PART 558 PAGE 806 AT 812RATIO 3. In the case at hand, counsel for the defendants/applicants maintained that the claimant/respondent’s action is caught by the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. While the position of the counsel for the claimant/respondent is that the act being complained of by the defendants/applicants is that of continuance of damage or injury which is yet to abate. This position was canvassed in the written address filed in opposition by the claimant/respondent to this objection. To buttress his argument counsel for the claimant/respondent relied on the case of A-G RIVERS V A-G BAYELSA (supra), relying on this case Counsel for the Respondent maintained that this action falls within the exceptions provided in section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. It was also argued that the acts is outside the colour of office. It can be deduced from the submission of counsel for the claimant/respondent that it is conceded that the present action was not instituted within three Months from the date of the act, neglect, or default complained of by the defendants/applicants. This has narrowed down the issue for consideration in this objection. The case of the claimant/respondent is that the case is covered by the issue of continuance of damage or injury in which case, the protection or cover provided for public officers can only come within the ambit of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, if the action was brought three Months after the cessation of continuance of damage or injury. The apex court of the land has interpreted the phrase ‘“continuance of damage or injury” to means the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It does not and cannot be said to mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. See INEC v. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC). In view of the definition of the phrase ‘‘continuance of damage or injury’’ as provided by the Supreme Court, the question to be asked is, does the act complained of in this suit of continuous damage or injury? Since this suit was commenced via Complaint, to find answer to the question posed, the claims as contained in the Complaint and statement facts will be looked at to determine this issue. This is in line with principle of law that in determining issue of statute bar, it is the writ of summons and the statement of claim of the plaintiff (Respondent in this case) that the Court would look into. SEE OLAOSEBIKAN V WILLIAMS & ANR. (1996) 5 NWLR (449) 437. From paragraphs 2 and 11 of the statement of facts it can be gleaned that what triggered this action was the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent from service. That is the fulcrum of this suit. According to claimant/respondent after receipt of her letter of compulsory retirement on 6th April 2014, she was paid salary up to May 2014, but as from June 2014 to time of filing this suit on 2/12/14 no salary. Claimant also stated that he appealed to the 2nd Defendant, and Head of service, Secretary to the Government of the Federation and Attorney General of the Federation but to no avail. It is to be noted that the letter of retirement was handed over to the claimant/respondent on 6/4/14, from then to 2/12/14, when this suit was instituted was a period of more than 3 months this clearly established that this suit is statute barred. Because time for purposes of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, started running from 6/4/14. However, the alleged damage or injury as a result of the compulsory retirement did not continued as the Claimant want the Court to believe going by the definition of ‘’continuous damage or injury; as defined by the Supreme Court in the case cited above. It is to be noted that from 6/4/14 to 2/12/14 when this suit was instituted is a period of more than 3 Months, this clearly shows that this action was instituted beyond the three Months allowed by the law. My holding that there is no continuance of damage or injury regarding compulsory retirement is predicated on the fact that the statement of facts did not show that there was another compulsory retirement, a part from that which was handed over to the claimant/respondent on 6/4/14. The Claimant has contended that payment of salary up to May means nullification of retirement this is not correct, if there has been any nullification the Claimant would not have asked this Court to order his reinstatement back to his job. It is also apparent that the issue of payment of salary is an ancillary issue an appendage to the claim on the issue of compulsory retirement of the clamant/respondent from the service of the 2nd defendant/applicant. The issue of payment of salary depend wholly on resolution of compulsory retirement. If it was taken the date for purpose of determining the period of limitation is June, 2014, when the claimant/applicant was not paid salary, this suit is still statute barred. And I so hold. There is no disputing the fact that the defendants/applicants in this suit are public officers within the context of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. This position is strengthened by the decision in IBRAHIM V JSC KADUNA STATE (Supra), where the Supreme Court held that ‘person’ in section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, include both natural and artificial persons such as the defendants/applicants in this case. It is also clear from the claim that the defendants/applicants were sued because they are public officers performing public duty in respect of the act, neglect or default complained of. The decision to compulsorily retire the claimant/respondent from service is part of the function of the defendants/applicants. See section 4 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. In view of the reasons given above and the facts that the defendants/applicants are public officers acting in pursuance of execution of public duty and the action against them having not been instituted within the time allotted by the law, this suit is statute barred. I agree with the submission of the Applicants that issues of bad Faith, malice, acting outside colours of office or duties is not a relevant consideration at this stage of preliminary objection those issues are questions for resolution if the suit is not statute barred. But, having found that the suit is statute barred for this Court to embark on resolution of those issues will. Amount to academic exercise which a court of law should not embarked upon as it is moot and exercise in futility. Consequently, this suit is hereby dismissed for being statute barred. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO It is to be noted that issue one has disposed of this suit. But, I shall consider issues two and three so that in case there is an appeal and I was overruled on issue one the Court of appeal will have the opportunity of having the views of this court on issues two and three. The claimant/respondent’s position on issue two is that the letters written to the 2nd defendant/applicant and to 3rd defendant/applicant (Head of Service), which have been frontloaded and attached to the originating processes commencing this suit, have satisfied the requirement of appealing to presidency. On the contrary, the defendants/applicants are of the view that the letters cannot qualify as appeal to presidency, going by the extant provision of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, provide as follows:- ‘’Notwithstanding the provision of section 19 of this Act, any person aggrieved by any decision of the Directorate or by the exercise by the Directorate of any power under this Act shall have the right of appeal to the presidency in the first instance and the presidency may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act and subject to the approval of the National Defence and Security Council, confirm or reverse the decision of the Directorate or take such further measures in relation to the appeal as he may think just before any action may be commenced in any court of law’’. It is cardinal principle in the construction of statute that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the statutes themselves. Where the words of any section are clear and unambiguous, then no more is necessary than to give them their natural and ordinary meanings unless this will lead to absurdity or be in conflict with the other provisions of the statute. The words of the statute do alone best declare the intention of the law makers where the words aforesaid are clear and unambiguous. See CHIEF D. O. IFEZUE V LIVINUS MBADIGGHA & ANOR. 1984 5 SC 79, ALHAJI IBRAHIM V GALADIMA BARDE AND OTHERS V 1996 9 NWLR PT.474 513, 577, ADESANOYE V ADEWOLE 2000 5 SCNJ 96, @ 47-54 Therefore, in interpreting section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, this court is to give the words used therein their plain and ordinary meaning. That is because the words themselves appear clear and unambiguous to me. When words of a legislation or constitution are clear, plain and unambiguous, there is no need to give them any other meaning than their ordinary, natural and grammatical construction would permit unless that would lead to absurdity, or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the legislation or constitution. Even where words are ambiguous the power of court to go on voyage of discovery is very limited. See A-G BENDEL STATE V A-G OF THE FEDERATION & ORS. (1981) 10 SC 1, A-G ONDO STATE V A-G OF THE FEDERATION & ORS. (2001) 10 SCNJ 146. It is with the above principles in mind that the provisions of section 20 will be interpreted. The words of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, to my mind are clear as the sun light. However, the role of this court as can be gleaned from well settled principles of interpretation is that effect must of necessity be given to plain and ordinary meaning of statute or constitution. The reason being that it is clear and unambiguous language that best conveys the intention of the lawmakers. The lawmakers must be taken to have intended the meaning expressed in such clear and unambiguous language. It is therefore not the constitutional responsibility of the court to make laws. Neither can it amend the laws made by the legislature. It must therefore be borne in mind always that courts cannot amend law neither can they change words used in legislation. In the case at hand, learned counsel for the claimant/respondent has insisted that presidency as used in section 20 is synonymous or means 2nd and 3rd defendants/applicants. This view clearly will be stretching the law beyond its limit and imputing into the provisions of the law what was not there. To construe the provision in the way and manner the claimant/respondent want this Court to do, will definitely defeat the intention of the legislature. The interpretation of the claimant/respondent in respect of the provisions of section 20 of National Youth Service Corps Act, if accepted will do violence to the section and will amount to amendment which is not part of the functions of this Court. That will be within the realm of the legislature. The interpretation of section 20 of National Youth Service Act, as given by the claimant/respondent is not inconsonance with well-known tenets of interpretation, to interpret ‘presidency’ to mean 2nd defendant or 3rd defendant (Head of Service). The definition and meaning assigned to the word ‘presidency’ by the provision of section 22 National Youth Service Corps Decree of 1993, is the appropriate meaning to be given to the word ‘presidency’ more particularly when by the provisions of section 315(5) (a) of the Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), the Decree has been saved from extinction. Section 315(5) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), states: Nothing in this constitution shall invalidate the following enactments, that is to say; (a) The National Youth Service Corps Decree 1993; (b) ………………………………………………………………………… (c) …………………………………………………………………………. (d) …………………………………………………………………………. And the provision those enactments shall continue to apply and have full effect in accordance with their tenor and to the like extent as any other provisions forming part of this Constitution and shall not be altered or repealed except in accordance with the provisions of section 9(2) of this Constitution. From the above provision of the constitution it is beyond any doubt that the entire provisions of the National Youth Service Decree of 1993, has been left intact and saved by the constitution. Therefore, it is an existing law that has full force of law in the country. Section 22 of the National Youth Service Corps Decree defined ‘presidency’ to mean ‘’the office of the President, Commander-in-chief of the Armed forces’’. Having the above definition of the word ‘presidency’ at the back of the mind, can it be said that an appeal written to 2nd defendant and 3rd defendant (Head of Service), is appeal to the presidency, the answer is a resounding capital NO. To construe office of the 2nd and 3rd defendants as ‘presidency’ will tantamount to re-writing the law. The 2nd defendant is creature of the statute and the office of the 3rd defendant is creature of the constitution, see section 171(1), (2), and (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). The mere fact that the letter head of 3rd defendant/applicant bears presidency is not enough to make 3rd defendant presidency. In view of the lucidity of the provisions of the law quoted above, I have no hesitation in resolving issue two in favour of the defendants/applicants. Since there was no appeal to the presidency, the claimant/respondent has failed and neglected to comply with condition precedent before instituting this suit to challenge the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent. This suit is therefore premature and the court has no power to pry into it without the compliance with the provision of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE THREE It is argued that the 3rd Defendant is not a proper party to be joined in this suit as is not a necessary party and no reasonable cause of action has been disclosed against him. The claimant/respondent on the other hand submitted that the 3rd defendant/applicant is a proper party duly joined and there is reasonable cause of action disclosed against the 3rd defendant/applicant and that it was the 3rd defendant/applicant that approved the condition of service of the 2nd Defendant. In law for a party to be properly joined in a suit, the Claimant must established by facts that he has a claim against that party and that the party is a necessary party without his presence the suit cannot be properly, efficient and completely resolved. See PEECOCK INVESTMENT LTD V HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD (1982) 12 SC REPRINT 1 @ Pp.39-40. I have had a hard look at the entire pleading of the claimant (Statement of facts) there is nothing in it to show that the claimant has any grouse against the 3rd defendant/applicant there is no specific claim against the 3rd defendant/applicant. From the complaint and the statement of facts, it is clear that the main grouse of the claimant/respondent is on her compulsory retirement from service. It has not been shown by the pleadings that the 3rd defendant/applicant played any role in respect of the action taken that culminated into the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent from service. The only role played by the 3rd defendant/applicant was receipt of appeal on the compulsory retirement of the claimant and refusal to reverse same. This was after the claimant/respondent had been retired from service. It is my view that this clearly goes to confirm that the 3rd defendant/applicant played no role in the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that this suit can be properly and completely determined without the presence of the 3rd defendant/applicant as a party in this suit. In view of the foregoing, I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the 3rd defendant/applicant is not a proper party in this suit and there is no reasonable cause of action disclosed against the 3rd defendant/application as the pleading has not shown any role played by the 3rd defendant/respondent in the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent from service. This Issue is therefore, resolved against the claimant/applicant, the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant is hereby struck out for not being proper party before the Court due to non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action. For avoidance of doubt and in view of the above findings, the defendants/applicants’ preliminary objection succeeds and is hereby granted. The claimant’s action is hereby dismissed for being statute barred. Sanusi Kado, Judge.