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RULING. The claimant in this suit approached this court via complaint dated 25th day of November 2014 and filed on the same day, praying for: a. A DECLARATION that the Defendants whether by themselves, officers, agents subordinates, privies, representatives, associates or anybody acting on their behalf howsoever cannot institute and/or sustain any valid disciplinary action against the Claimant on the basis of her personnel records which the Defendants amended via their letters of 19th April 2011 and 14th September 2012. b. A DECLARATION that the letter dated 28th October 2013 is an atrocious violation of the Public Service Rules 2008 and the NYSC Condition of Service (revised edition of August, 2013) and approved, as the alleged act of the Claimant was discovered since 2011, to the knowledge of the 1st and 2nd Defendants and the said letter of 28th October 2013 is null, void and of no legal consequences whatsoever. c. A DECLARTION that the Defendants acts of assigning official/special duties by posting claimant to Batch A NYSC orientation camp in Delta on the 11th day of March 2014 after taking the decision to compulsorily retire him with effect from 3rd of March, 2014 and subsequent payment of Claimant’s entitlement for the official/special duty in Delta State and salary for the months of March, April and May 2014 did nullify the purported letter of compulsory retirement from service dated 7th March 2014. d. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants whether by themselves, officers, agents, subordinates, privies, representatives, associates or anybody acting on their behalf howsoever from instituting any disciplinary proceedings against the Claimant on the basis of the alleged discrepancy in his personnel record same act having been amended by the Defendants via their letters dated 19th April 2011 and 14th September 2012. e. AN ORDER reinstating the Claimant immediately to his position and should also be paid all his salaries and entitlement from the date his salary was stopped until judgment is given with 20% interest on such sum of money and 10% on such sum of money from when judgment is given until the Defendants comply with the judgment. Upon being served with the originating court processes commencing this suit, the 1st 2nd and 3rd defendants filed two motions on notice for preliminary objection. First, vide motion on notice dated 13/2/18 and filed on 14/2/18, brought pursuant to Order 17 Rule 1(4) – (9) of the National industrial Court of Nigeria, (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants, prayed for an order of this Honourable Court dismissing this suit for want of jurisdiction and competence. The grounds for the objection are as follows:- I. The suit is statute barred as same is not instituted within the time statutorily allowed to seek redress. II. The suit is premature as the claimant/respondent did not comply with the provision of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap N48, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. In support of the application the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants filed a 5 paragraphs affidavit. A written address was also filed along with the motion on notice for preliminary injunction. O. P. Omuru, Esq; Counsel for the applicants in adumbration informed the court that he is relying on all the deposition contained in the affidavit in support. Counsel also adopted the written address as his argument. In the written address two issues were submitted for determination. They are:- 1. ‘‘Whether this suit is statute bared, having been filed seven Months and nineteen days after the accrual of the cause of action’’. 2. ‘‘Whether in view of the provision of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap N84, Laws of the Federation, 2004, this suit is premature’’. ARGUMENT. ISSUE ONE In arguing issue one, counsel submitted that having regards to the processes filed by the respondent in this suit, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as same is statute barred. The suit is statute barred because it is caught by section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. It is also submitted that in addition to the general application, the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, specifically, apply to the applicants by virtue of the provision of section 19 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. Counsel submitted that the applicants being creatures of sections 5(1) and 3(1) of the National Youth Service Corps Act, are public officers. To buttress this submission counsel relied on the cases of IBRAHIM v J. S. C. (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt.584) 1 and OFILI V C. S. C. (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt.1071) 238. According to counsel looking at the processes filed by the claimant/respondent the cause of action in this matter arose on 6th day of April 2014, when the claimant/respondent received his letter of compulsory retirement dated 7th day of March 2014. The filing of this suit on 25th day of November 2014, means that this suit was filed seven Month nineteen days after the accrual of the cause of action. Therefore, this suit having been brought outside the three Months allowed by law, the suit is statute barred. On this submission counsel relied on EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1985) 1 NSCC Vol. 16, 643 and FORESTRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NIGERIA V GOLD (2007) 9 MJSC 210. Counsel ended his argument of this issue by urging the Court to hold that this suit is statute barred. ISSUE TWO On issue two, counsel submitted that this suit is premature due to non-compliance with section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps, Act, which made provisions for appeal against the decision of the defendants/applicants to be lodged with the Presidency. The claimant/respondent having failed or neglected to appeal to the presidency, this action is premature. To support this contention counsel relied on ADESANYA V ADEWOLE (2006) 10 MJSC 1. It is also argued by counsel that letters written to the 2nd and 3rd defendants, cannot qualify as appeal to presidency as required by section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. The reason being that they were not contemplated by section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. In support of this contention counsel cited section 22 of the National Youth Service Corps Decree No. 51 of 1993, which is an existing law as saved by section 315(5) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). It is the contention of counsel that the claimant/respondent having not exhausted the remedy provided by law, this suit is premature and the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same. MOTION ON NOTICE BY 3RD DEFENDANT/APPLICANT The second motion on notice for preliminary objection was dated 15/5/2018 and filed on the same day by the 3rd defendant/applicant, wherein the 3rd defendant/applicant prayed for the following Orders: 1. An Order of this Honourable Court striking out the name of the 3rd defendant from this suit for want of reasonable cause of action. 2. And for such order(s) as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case. The ground for the objection is that this suit does not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the 3rd defendant/applicant. The application was brought under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The 3rd defendant/applicant also filed a written address along with the notice of preliminary objection. In the written address two issues were submitted for determination, to wit: (i) Whether the Claimant's case as constituted discloses a reasonable cause of action against the 3rd Defendant? Whether the non-disclosure of the requisite cause of action is not a condition precedent to the competence of this suit for adjudication? Ovoke Celenstine O. Esq; Counsel for the 3rd defendant/applicant in his oral submission before the Court adopted the written address as his argument and argued the two issues for determination together. In arguing the issues for determination counsel submitted that the claimant/respondent’s action did not disclose reasonable cause of action against the 3rd defendant/applicant as there is no allegation of wrong doing levelled against the 3rd defendant in the complaint and the statement of facts. It is submitted that disclosure of reasonable cause of action is a condition precedent to the Court assuming jurisdiction over a matter and therefore the non-disclosure of a reasonable cause of action robs the court of jurisdiction to entertain the matter submitted to it for adjudication. In support of his position counsel placed reliance on the cases of ALHAJI AMINU IBRAHIM VS. FELIX OSIM (1988)3 N.W.L.R. (Part 82) page 257 at 260 paragraphs A-B, and that of DIM CHUKWU EMEKA ODUMEGWU OJUKWU VS. ALH. UMARU MUSA YAR'ADUA & 4 ORS. (2009) 28 N.S.C.Q.R. (Part 1), 492 at 565. It is further submitted that, from the totality of the claimant/respondent's Statement of facts filed in this matter there is no wrongful act of the 3rd defendant/applicant shown, and the claimant/respondent's pleadings have not equally shown any damage arising from any wrongful act of the 3rd defendant/applicant. It is equally argued that the 3rd defendant/applicant is not a necessary party in this suit. On this submission reliance was placed on the case of LAGOS STATE BULK PURCHASE CORPORATION V. PURIFICATION TECHNIQUES (NIG) LTD (SUPRA), AT PAGE 304 – 305. Further reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of HON. EMMANUEL BW ACIIA V. HON. JOEL DANLAMI IKENYA & 2 OTHERS (2011) 3 N. W. L. R. (PART 1235) PAGE 610. In concluding his argument counsel urged the Court to strike out the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant for non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action and not being a necessary party. OPPOSITION BY THE CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION. In reaction to the motion on notice for preliminary objection filed by the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants, the claimant/respondent on 20/4/18, filed a written address in opposition. With respect to the 3rd defendant/applicant’s preliminary objection, counsel for the claimant/applicant did not file any process, but opposed the application on points of law, which he canvassed orally. Anthony Itedjere, Esq; counsel for the claimant/respondent in adumbration adopted the written address as his argument in the matter. In the written address Counsel submitted lone issue for determination, to wit: ‘Whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the claimant’ Argument of Issue In arguing the sole issue Counsel submitted that the authorities cited by the counsel for the defendants/applicants on their own are good laws but they are most inapplicable to the facts of this case and should be rejected. It is the contention of counsel that this application can only be determine after evidence had been taken in this case. According to Counsel the facts upon which this application should be determine are not yet before the court. Counsel submitted that the appropriate thing to do is to step down such application and take evidence and that such issues raised will then form part of the issue for determination in the case. This is so as the premise for this application is the limitation law which in legal jurisprudence is a defence to the suit. It is the contention of Counsel that to dismiss the suit of the Claimant at this stage without examining the merit would be tantamount to disposing of an action at interlocutory stage which our appellate Court frowns at. It is further contended that when a court lacks jurisdiction to determine a case it also lack the power to dismiss same but can only strike same out. It is also argued that the claimant has raised the issue in its claims that there is a continuing damage by the defendants for refusal to pay him and other Claimants in the sister suits their salary without justification or any legal bases. Counsel contended that the statement of facts and prayers d and e of the claimant these are act still in operation till date. Counsel referred to Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, by this provision this suit falls within exception to the general rule as there is continuance of damage or injury. Counsel contended that the law is trite that a party must stick to its case and that a case of a party must be consistent. The present two issues raised in the instant application not being raised in the alternative are inconsistent and same must be rejected by this Honourable Court. The point is that the issues are in direct conflict with each other. An action that is statute barred had out lived it usefulness. While an action that is premature is yet to have life. The argument of Applicants' Counsel in this application is therefore misleading and the Court should discountenance same. Counsel further contended assuming the Court determines both issues and agree with the Applicants on the two issues raised and hold that an action which is statute barred is also premature and then proceeds to dismiss same. The ruling will certainly be inconsistent and same will not reflect the true position of our laws. Counsel submitted that there is no logical pronouncement that can be made on the two issues distilled by the Applicants to this Honourable Court and therefore urged the Court to strike out this motion with substantial cost. It is also submitted by counsel that having regards to the state of the law, the Motion on Notice filed by the defendants/applicants is incompetent. According to Counsel this submission is based on the fact that this application has strayed from issues of law to that of facts and evidence must be taken, on this contention Counsel relied on the Supreme Court decision in WOHERE V EMEREUWA (2004)13 NWLR (Pt 890) 398 @419. Counsel also submitted that the defendants/applicants should not be allowed to mislead this court to decide substantial issues of facts at interlocutory stage. On this submission counsel placed reliance on The National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) V Geco Prakla Nigeria Limited (2010) 20 NLLR (Pt. 57) 372 @397-398, a decision of a penal of Five Justices of this Honourable Court. Counsel urged the Court to hear this application with the main suit. To support this contention counsel urged the court to follow the decisions of this Honourable court where similar application raising the issue of jurisdiction of the court was raised but same was suspended pending the hearing of the main suit. They are Nigeria Union of Teachers V State Security Services (SSS); NICN IABJ/109/2011 delivered by the President of this Honourable Court Hon. Justice B.A. Adejumo, OFR on 17th September, 2014, in this suit the defendants/applicants filed an application urging the court to hold that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the suit but the application was taken after evidence together with the written address and ruling was delivered first on the application before the court proceeded to its judgment after it held it had jurisdiction to hear the case. And the case of Nigeria Union of Teachers V Trade Union Congress of Nigeria SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/165/2013 ruling delivered on 3rd February 2014. Alternatively, Counsel contended that the law is trite that in determining whether or not a court has jurisdiction to entertain a matter it is the claim of the claimant that should be examined and nothing more. For this proposition of the law, counsel relied on AGF v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 618) 187 at 233. The Claimant filed a complaint (writ of summons) as it is called in the High Court because the facts upon which to determine the suit are in dispute or riotously so, the law is that writ of summons lie where the proceedings are hostile in the sense of violent dispute. Facts in such cases have a pride of place in the determination of the case. Therefore, there must be some evidence upon which a court of law must rely on in determining a matter that comes to it through a writ of summon. This application cannot be determine with the affidavit evidence attached to the motion but by way of evidence (witness testimony) which is applicable in this case, this account for why the attached documents to the complaint were not marked as the court would mark same when evidence is taken during hearing as against the proposition of the applicants in their said application that the claimant did not mark the attached documents. Counsel wonders how an action that is statute barred can also be premature and if action that is premature can be dismissed by a court that lacks jurisdiction to entertain same. According to counsel this clearly shows that the applicants brought this application for a singular reason to waste the judicious time of this Honourable court. Counsel added that this Honourable Court is a Labour court and it is not given to technicalities of the regular high courts with its attended delays. The 3rd defendant/applicant is the only defendant that filed a defence to this suit. The other defendants/applicants refused to file any defence to this suit rather they only filed a preliminary objection premised on limitation law. It is submitted that this suit is of continuous injury and limitation is held to be a defence which does not take away the jurisdiction of the court. On this submission counsel placed reliance on The National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) V Geco Prakla Nigeria Limited (2010) 20 NLLR (Pt. 57) 372 @397-398 Counsel faulted the submission of the counsel for the defendants/applicants to the effect that the cause of action arose when the Claimant (s) received the letter of compulsory retirement. This disagreement was premised on payment of the claimant’s salary for the month of March, April and May 2014. Counsel also want the court to bear in mind the fact that after the said decision reached in the said letter was taken official assignments were given to the claimant and others. The claimant has also stated that there is no legal basis for the refusal by the defendants to continue to withhold paying his salary since June 2014. Counsel contended that the 3rd defendant in this suit represent the presidency. Based on this premise counsel also faulted the argument that appeal to Head of Civil Service of the Federation is not made to presidency. To support his position counsel stated that it is clear on the letter headed paper of the 3rd defendant/applicant one of the documents front loaded for consideration of this suit, that 3rd defendant is presidency. It is the contention of Counsel that on definition of Presidency, the law is clear that Decrees and abolished laws cannot be relied upon by any Court of law. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, (as amended), further empowers the President to delegate its power to a minister or another person to carry out its duties we submit that the President has delegated its powers in this regard to the 3rd defendant/applicant who over sees their activities. It is respectfully submitted, that the Presidency is not defined in the current NYSC Act and urged the Court to resist the invitation to rely on what applicants have on their own acknowledge not to be part of the present Act. This is so as the President has created the office of the Head of Civil Service and Secretary of Government and named same as the Presidency. On the objection of 3rd defendant/applicant to its being made a party in this suit, counsel for the claimant/applicant contended that the 3rd defendant/applicant is a necessary party in this suit and that declaratory reliefs binds even non-parties to a suit. It is also submitted that the condition of service of the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants front loaded was approved by the 3rd defendant/applicant for the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants. It is also the submission of Counsel that the acts of the applicants are outside the colour of their statutory or constitutional duty which is not protected by the Act. On this submission reliance was placed on A.G. Rivers State V A.G. Bayelsa State (supra) and THE NATIONAL UNION OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS WORKERS (NUPENG) V GEEO PRAKLA NIGERIA LIMITED (supra). In concluding his submission counsel urged this court to hold that it has jurisdiction to entertain this suit and allow this matter to proceed to trial. REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW BY THE 1ST AND 2ND DEFENDANTS/APPLICANTS. Counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants filed a reply on points of law wherein he responded to the issues raised in the claimant/respondent’s written address in opposition to the preliminary objection. On the argument of the claimant/respondent that the two issues raised and argued are conflicting, the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants contended that the two issues raised and argued by the Applicants in their preliminary objection are the basic features of the action. An action is statute barred, as in this case, when it is instituted outside the time statutorily allowed to seek redress in Court. Also, an action is premature when a condition-precedent is not fulfilled, as in this case, before instituting it. It is also contended that there is no law prohibiting a party from raising and arguing all the issues that are considered to be the features of a case. On the contention that the action is of continuous damage or injury, Counsel submitted that the claimant/respondent has missed the point. It is settled law that law on limitation of the action runs from the date of alleged commission. It is immaterial to the date the effect of the complainant's injury or wrong continues 'ad infinitum'. On the claimant/respondent’s submission that, the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants' action that occasioned his grievance was in bad faith, born out of malice, an abuse of office, unjust and outside the colour of statutory duty. It is contended that the issues raised by the claimant/respondent in his argument are all fundamentally substantive issues which have no bearing in a matter that is statute barred as in this case. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of Sani V. Okene Local Government & Anor (2008) 10 MJSC 199 at 205 to 206 and the case of Anozie V. Attorney-General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & 4 Drs (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 278. On the claimant/respondent’s contention that the payment of salary and assignment of duty after the decision to compulsorily retire him from service have nullified his retirement. It is submitted that the effective date of the claimant/respondent's compulsory retirement was the 6th day of April, 2014 when he admittedly received the letter in respect thereof. It would not be an act of responsibility on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants to stop the claimant/respondent's salary and stop assigning duties to him when he was not formally informed of his compulsory retirement. The purported assignment of duty preceded the date he received his letter of retirement. Also, it is a common knowledge that salaries of public servants are paid by the Integrated Personnel Payroll Information System (IPPIS). By implication, the Applicants have no control over payment of salaries and bureaucracy did not allow immediate stoppage of the Claimant/Respondent's salary. Granted however but not conceding that the cause of action arose by the end of June, 2014 when the claimant/respondent claims that his salary was not paid, it took him four months and twenty five days before he instituted the suit on the 25th day of November, 2014. This is still clearly outside the three months limited by law for seeking redress in court against the Applicants. It is further submitted that the stoppage of salary and assignment of duty to the claimant/respondent which he claims to be his grievance are all ancillary issues rooted in his compulsory retirement, and cannot stand on their own. If he was not compulsorily retired from service, his salary would still have been paid, he would still have been sent on assignment and there would have been no issue to warrant approaching the court for redress. This explains the reason for the claimant/respondent's prayer for immediate reinstatement to service. The Court was referred particularly to Relief (e) in the claimant/respondent's complaint and Statement of Facts. This was a definite and conclusive disciplinary decision against the claimant/respondent by his former employer (2nd defendant/applicant) which is the Directorate and empowered by Section 4 (4) of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 "to appoint, (including power to appoint on promotion and transfer and of dismissal. Notwithstanding the above arguments, Counsel maintain that these issues are also substantive in nature. If an action is statute barred, as in this case, no amount of resort to the merit of the claimant/respondent's contention will serve to keep the action in being. To buttress this submission Counsel relied on Owners of the MV "Arabella" V. Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation (2008) 8 MJSC 145 at 173, paras. D-G and urge the Honourable Court to so hold. On the claimant/respondent’s allegation that the 1st and 2nd defendants/applicants’ preliminary objection is predicated on issues of technicalities and that the applicants did not file a defence to the claimant/respondent's claim. It is contended that the Applicants' preliminary objection is based on jurisdiction. An issue of jurisdiction is not an ordinary point to be dismissed as a mere or overstretched issues of technicalities. It is a very fundamental issue that goes to the root of the matter. The law is meant to be obeyed. Where there is a stipulated procedure, as in this case, it must be followed to the later. Where the procedure is not followed, as in this case, the Court will lack jurisdiction. Counsel agree that the Honourable Court is a Labour Court as argued by the Respondent. However, the Court is first and foremost a Court of Law, and must not be seen to sacrifice a fundamental issue of jurisdiction on a platter of perceived "speed". It will amount to going on a frolic and embarking on an exercise in futility for a Court to adjudicate on a matter without jurisdiction. Counsel referred to Order 18, Rule 6 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 and submitted that it recognizes the weighty nature of the issue of jurisdiction when it copiously exempts preliminary objections that challenge jurisdiction of the Court from the discretion given to the Court to hear a preliminary objection together with the substantive suit. Moreover, this is not Originating Summons procedure where preliminary objection and substantive matter are heard together. Being an action commenced by way of complaint, pleadings is not a pre-condition for hearing of preliminary objection which must always be resolved first. In view of the fundamental nature of the issue of jurisdiction, it can be raised at any time or stage and in any manner whatsoever, even for the first time in the Supreme Court. Demurrer does not apply when jurisdiction is in issue. This principle received the blessings of the Supreme Court in Military Governor of Ondo State & 5 Ors V. Kolawole & 4 Ors (2008) 9 MJSC 203 at 212, Paras F- G when it held as follows "It is trite law that the issue of jurisdiction by whatever name and under any shade, can be raised at any stage. It can be raised viva voce or the Court can raise it suo motu. " Counsel also referred to Oloriode V. Oyebi (1984) 15 SCNLR 390, (1984) 5 SC 1 and Elebanjo V. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (pt. 1001) 76. On presidency, it is submitted that the claimant/respondent’s letter to the 3rd Defendant cannot in an anyway amount to appeal to presidency within the contemplation of Section 20 of the NYSC Act. It is submitted that, it is the law that defines Presidency in matters involving the applicants, but not facts or letter headed paper as the claimant/respondent wants the court to believe. Counsel reiterate that, the definition of the word "Presidency" is provided by Section 22 of the National Youth Service Corps Decree 51 of 16th June, 1993 which established the National Youth Service Corps. It is the Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 221, Vol. 80 of 9th August, 1993. It is contended that the Decree clearly defines the word "Presidency" to mean "the Office of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces." There is nothing in this clear and unambiguous definition to mean, suggest, include or refer to the Office of the Head of Civil Service of the Federation or any other office. The Court is urged upon to look at the Official Gazette in this regard. Its content is a prima facie proof of any fact of a public nature which it is intended to notify. On this contention Counsel relied on Line Limited V. S.C.C. Nigeria Limited & 2 Ors (2009) 7 MJSC (pt. III) 1 at 21-22. Counsel also submitted that the claimant/respondent argues inadvertently that the National Youth Service Corps Decree 51 of 16th June, 1993 has been abrogated and therefore no longer part of our laws. When the said the National Youth Service Corps Decree is an existing law. To buttress this submission Counsel referred to Section 315(5)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides that, "nothing in this Constitution shall invalidate the ... National Youth Service Corps Decree 1993". It further provides that the provisions of the Decree shall continue to apply and have full effect in accordance with its tenor and shall not be altered or repealed except in accordance with the provisions of Section 9(2) of the Constitution. This has shown clearly that NYSC Decree 1993 is constitutional and subsisting. Counsel contended that the NYSC Decree 1993 has never been amended, let alone abrogated. Like any other existing law, it has only been re-coded as Chapter N84 in the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. The re-coding does not and cannot suffice as an amendment within the contemplation of Section 9(2) of the CFRN, 1999 (as amended). The omission of the definition of the word "Presidency" in the re-coded Laws of the Federation of Nigeria is, at best, a printer's error which also does not suffice as an amendment. In concluding his submission Counsel insisted that this suit is statute barred and the claimant/respondent did not appeal to presidency as required by section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this suit for want of competence. COURT’S DECISION I have thoroughly examined the Originating Process commencing this suit with all the accompanying documents, as well as the three motions on notice for preliminary objections filed by the Defendants contesting the competency of this suit. I have equally attentively listened to all the Counsel for the parties in their oral submissions before the Court and read the written addresses of Counsel and the authorities cited therein. Having regards to the prayers as contained in the three motions and the grounds for the objections, it is my humble view that the dispute can adequately be disposed of upon determination of the issues formulated as follows: 1. Whether the Claimant’s suit is statute barred within the purview of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act?. 2. Whether by virtue of the provisions of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act this suit is premature. 3. ‘‘Whether the 3rd Defendant is a necessary party in this suit’’. I shall before resolving the issues for determination resolve certain preliminary issues raised by Counsel in the course of arguing their respective positions before the court. The first question is that of appropriateness or otherwise of supporting notice of preliminary objection with an affidavit. Ordinarily a notice of preliminary objection filed to raise issue in limine, is dealing with point of law before the Court. That is to say the objector is relying solely on law only in raising the objection and is not relying on any facts. However, where the facts are not in dispute an affidavit can accompany a notice of preliminary objection. But in an application regarding statute of limitation of action, the law is settled, it is the statement of claim that will be looked at to determine the period of limitation. See IBRAHIM V JUDICIAL SERVICE CPOMMITTEE OF KADUNA STATE (supra), FORESTRY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF NIGERIA V GOLD (supra) and WOHEREM V EMEREUWA (2004)13 NWLR (PT.890) 398. In determining the applications filed by the Defendants/Applicants, this Court will restrict itself to only the originating process commencing this suit and its accompanying documents, since the law permit looking at those processes in resolving preliminary objection. It is trite law that an application by way of a preliminary objection for the dismissal of a suit in limine may be made on points of law and where there are no facts in dispute for the purpose of determining such an objection. See WOHEREM V ENWEREUM (Supra) and BELLO ADEGOKE FOKO and ORS V OLADOKUN FOKO & ANR. (1968) NMLR 441 in this situation the applicants relies only on the facts as disclosed by the complaint and statement of facts and for this purposes, the facts are deemed to have been admitted by the defendants/applicants. See AYANBOYE V BALOGUN (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.151) 392. It is only where disputes as to facts appears on the pleadings of the parties, that it is open to the Court to defer hearing of the objection till when credible evidence has been adduced to enable determination of the point law. In the case at hand not all the pleadings are before the court. In the case at hand parties have not joined issues the defendants are relying on the complaint and the statement of facts in raising the objection. As far as this suit is concerned the facts are not obscure or at large as submitted by the counsel for the claimant/respondent to warrant stepping down the objection as the Counsel for the Claimant want this Court to do. The case of WOHEREM being relied upon by the Claimant is not helpful to his case. The situation is completely different in this case. In arguing his position the claimant/respondent referred severally to decisions of this Court in other similar matters. I must state from the outset that each case is distinct from the other and must be decided as per the facts before the court. That the mere fact that in some cases this court has postponed determination of objection till after hearing of the substantive matter does not mean that such shall happened in all cases. The decision on whether an application shall be differed to conclusion of substantive suit will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The cases being relied by counsel for the claimant/respondent were decided based on their respective merits. On technicality, the trends nowadays is that Courts are moving away from technicality. Technicality could arise if a party is relying on abstract or inordinate legalism to becloud or drawn the merit of a case. A technicality arises if a party quickly takes an immediately available opportunity, however, infinitestimal it may be, to work against the merit of the opponent’s case. In other words, he holds and relies tenaciously unto the rules of court with little or no regard to justice of the matter. As far as he is concerned the rules of court must be followed to the last sentences, the last words and the last letters without much ado, and with little or no regard t the injustice that will be caused the opponent. See YUSUF V ADEGOKE & ANOR. 200711 NWLR PT.1045 332. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that raising points of law in limine on issue of statute of limitation cannot be using technicality. DETERMINATION OF MAIN ISSUES ISSUE ONE It is clear from the provisions of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, that the provisions constitute a limitation law, which the legislature designed it to provide protection for public officers corporate or incorporated bodies from detraction in the conduct of their discharge of their official duties or assignment by litigation that might have become otiose or in which witnesses may no longer be available or may not reasonably be gotten to testify due to time lag. See OFFOBOCHE V OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt.739) 458. The object of the provision is therefore to afford protection to public officers in respect of anything done in the discharge or execution or carrying out their duty, the protection comes into play after the expiration of three Months from the date of the Commission of the act or acts, neglect or default which give rise to the cause of action. See YABUGBE V COP (1992) 4 NWLR (pt.234) 152; EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549, EGBE V ALHAJI (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.128) 546, EKEAGU V ALIRI ((1991) 3 NWLR (Pt.179) 258. It is quite clear that the general effect of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, is that where a law provides for the institution of an action in a court of law within a prescribed period in respect of a cause of action accruing to the party entitled to enforce his remedy before the court, proceedings shall not be brought after the expiration of the period circumscribed by law. The statute that prescribe such period and regulate the subsistence of causes of action are known as statutes of limitation of period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Where any action is statute barred, a party who might otherwise have had a cause of action loses right to enforce it by judicial process, because the period of time prescribed by the limitation law for instituting such an action has elapsed. Thus, an action commenced after the expiration of the period within which an action must be brought as stipulated in a statute of limitation is not maintainable. See EBOIGBE V NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.347) 649, ALHAJI (DR) ADO IBRHIM Vs. ALHAJI MAIGIDAU LAWAL AND ORS (2015) LPELR – 24736, EGBE VS. ADEFARASIN & ANR (1987) 1 NWLR PT 471 AT 21, FADERE V A. G. OYO STATE (1982) 4 SC 1, A. G. ADAMAWA STATE V A. G. OF THE FEDERATION (2014) LPELR-23221(SC), OBIEFUNA V OKOYE (1961) 1 ALL NLR 357. However it is pertinent to note that the general rule laid down in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, like every other general rule is not without exception. Though, an action against public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or Law or public duty or default on same can only be commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, the situation is not the same in a case of continuance of damage or injury in which the person aggrieved must institute the action within three months next after the cessation of the damage or injury complained of. See the case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. JACOB OLADELE AMAO & 2 ORS (2011) ALL FWLR PART 558 PAGE 806 AT 812RATIO 3. In the case at hand, counsel for the defendants/applicants maintained that the claimant/respondent’s action is caught by the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. While the position of the counsel for the claimant/respondent is that the act being complained of by the defendants/applicants is that of continuance of damage or injury which is yet to abate. This position was canvassed in the written address filed in opposition by the claimant/respondent to this objection. To buttress his argument counsel for the claimant/respondent relied on the case of A-G RIVERS V A-G BAYELSA (supra), relying on this case Counsel for the Respondent maintained that this action falls within the exceptions provided in section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. It was also argued that the acts is outside the colour of office. It can be deduced from the submissions of Counsel for the claimant/respondent that they have conceded that the present action was not instituted within three Months from the date of the act, neglect, or default complained of by the defendants/applicants. This has narrowed down the issue for consideration in this objection. The case of the claimant/respondent is that the case is covered by the issue of continuance of damage or injury in which case, the protection or cover provided for public officers can only come within the ambit of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, if the action was brought three Months after the cessation of continuance of damage or injury. The apex Court of the land has interpreted the phrase ‘“continuance of damage or injury” to means the continuance or repeat of the act which caused the injury. It does not and cannot be said to mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. See INEC v. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC). In view of the definition of the phrase ‘‘continuance of damage or injury’’ as provided by the Supreme Court, the question to be asked is, does the act complained of in this suit of continuous damage or injury? Since this suit was commenced via Complaint, to find answer to the question posed, the claims as contained in the Complaint and statement facts will be looked at to determine this issue. This is in line with principle of law that in determining issue of statute bar, it is the writ of summons and the statement of claim of the plaintiff (Respondent in this case) that the Court would look into. SEE OLAOSEBIKAN V WILLIAMS & ANR. (1996) 5 NWLR (449) 437. From paragraphs 2 and 11 of the statement of facts it can be gleaned that what triggered this action was the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent from service. That is the fulcrum of this suit. According to Respondent after receipt of her letter of compulsory retirement on 6th April 2014, he was paid salary up to May 2014, but as from June 2014 to time of filing this suit on 25/11/14 no salary. Claimant also stated that he appealed to the 2nd Defendant, and Head of service, Secretary to the Government of the Federation and Attorney General of the Federation but to no avail. It is to be noted that the letter of retirement was handed over to the Respondent on 6/4/14, from then to 25/11/14, when this suit was instituted was a period of more than 3 months this clearly established that this suit is statute barred. Because time for purposes of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, started running from 6/4/14. However, the alleged damage or injury as a result of the compulsory retirement did not continued as the Claimant want the Court to believe going by the definition of ‘’continuous damage or injury; as defined by the Supreme Court in the case cited above. It is to be noted that from 6/4/14 to 25/11/14 when this suit was instituted is a period of more than 3 Months, this clearly shows that this action was instituted beyond the three Months allowed by the law. My holding that there is no continuance of damage or injury regarding compulsory retirement is predicated on the fact that the statement of facts did not show that there was another compulsory retirement, a part from that which was handed over to the claimant/respondent on 6/4/14. However, the Claimant has contended that payment of salary up to May means nullification of retirement this is not correct, if there has been any nullification the Claimant would not have asked this Court to order his reinstatement back to his job. If it was taken the date for purpose of determining the period of limitation is June, 2014, this suit is still statute barred. And I so hold. There is no disputing the fact that the defendants/applicants in this suit are public officers within the context of the Public Officers (Protection) Act. This position is strengthened by the decision in IBRAHIM V JSC KADUNA STATE (Supra), where the Supreme Court held that ‘person’ in section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, include both natural and artificial persons such as the defendants/applicants in this case. It is also clear from the claim that the defendants/applicants were sued because they are public officers performing public duty in respect of the act, neglect or default complained of. The decision to compulsorily retire the claimant/respondent from service is part of the function of the defendants/applicants. See section 4 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. In view of the reasons given above and the facts that the defendants/applicants are public officers acting in pursuance of execution of public duty and the action against them having not been instituted within the time allotted by the law, is statute barred. I agree with the submission of the Applicants that issues of bad Faith, malice, acting outside colours of office or duties is not a relevant consideration at this stage of preliminary objection those issues are questions for resolution if the suit is not statute barred. But, having found that the suit is statute barred for this Court to embark on resolution of those issues will. Amount to academic exercise which a court of law should not embarked upon as it is moot and exercise in futility. Consequently, this suit is hereby dismissed for being statute barred. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO It is to be noted that issue one has disposed of this suit. But, I shall consider issues two and three so that in case there is an appeal and I was overruled on issue one the Court of appeal will have the opportunity of having the views of this court on issues two and three. The claimant/respondent’s position on issue two is that the letters written to the 2nd defendant/applicant and to 3rd defendant/applicant (Head of Service), have satisfied the requirement of appealing to presidency. On the contrary, the defendants/applicants are of the view that the letters cannot qualify as appeal to presidency, going by the extant provision of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act. Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, provide as follows:- ‘’Notwithstanding the provision of section 19 of this Act, any person aggrieved by any decision of the Directorate or by the exercise by the Directorate of any power under this Act shall have the right of appeal to the presidency in the first instance and the presidency may, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act and subject to the approval of the National Defence and Security Council, confirm or reverse the decision of the Directorate or take such further measures in relation to the appeal as he may think just before any action may be commenced in any court of law’’. It is cardinal principle in the construction of statute that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the statutes themselves. Where the words of any section are clear and unambiguous, then no more is necessary than to give them their natural and ordinary meanings unless this will lead to absurdity or be in conflict with the other provisions of the statute. The words of the statute do alone best declare the intention of the law makers where the words aforesaid are clear and unambiguous. See CHIEF D. O. IFEZUE V LIVINUS MBADIGGHA & ANOR. 1984 5 SC 79 “ 101, ALHAJI IBRAHIM V GALADIMA BARDE AND OTHERS V 1996 9 NWLR PT.474 513 “ 577, ADESANOYE V ADEWOLE 2000 5 SCNJ 96 “ 47-54 In interpreting section 20 of the national youth service corps act, this court is to give the words used therein their plain and ordinary meaning. That is because the words themselves appear clear and unambiguous to me. When words of a legislation or constitution are clear, plain and unambiguous, there is no need to give them any other meaning than their ordinary, natural and grammatical construction would permit unless that would lead to absurdity, or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the legislation or constitution. Even where words are ambiguous the power of court to go on voyage of discovery is very limited. See A-G BENDEL STATE V A-G OF THE FEDERATION & ORS. 1981 10 SC 1, A-G ONDO STATE V A-G OF THE FEDERATION & ORS. (2001) 10 SCNJ 146. It is with the above principles in mind that the provisions of section 20 will be interpreted. The words of section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, to my mind is as clear as the sun light. However, the role of this court as can be gleaned from well settled principles of interpretation is that effect must of necessity be given to plain and ordinary meaning of statute or constitution. The reason being that it is clear and unambiguous language that best conveys the intention of the lawmakers. The lawmakers must be taken to have intended the meaning expressed in such clear and unambiguous language. It is therefore not the constitutional responsibility of the court to make laws. Neither can it amend the laws made by the legislature. It must therefore be borne in mind always that courts cannot ament law neither can they change words used legislation. In the case at hand, learned counsel for the claimant/respondent has insisted that presidency as used in section 20 is synonymous or means 2nd and 3rd defendants/applicants. This view clearly will be stretching the law and imputing into the provisions of the law what was not there. To construe the provision in the way and manner the claimant/respondent want this Court to do, will definitely defeat the intention of the legislature. The interpretation of the claimant/respondent in respect of the provision of section 20 of NYSC Act, if accepted will do violence to the section and will amount to amendment which is not part of the functions of this Court. That will be within the realm of the legislature. The interpretation of section 20 of NYSC Act, as given by the claimant/respondent is not inconsonance with well-known tenets of interpretation, to interpret ‘presidency’ to mean 2nd defendant or 3rd defendant (Head of Service). The definition and meaning assigned to the word ‘presidency’ by the provision of section 22 NYSC Decree is the appropriate meaning to be given the word ‘presidency’ more particularly when by the provisions of section 315(5) (a) of the Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), the Decree has been saved from extinction. Section 315(5) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), states: Nothing in this constitution shall invalidate the following enactments, that is to say; (a) The National Youth Service Corps Decree 1993; (b) ………………………………………………………………………… (c) …………………………………………………………………………. (d) …………………………………………………………………………. And the provision those enactments shall continue to apply and have full effect in accordance with their tenor and to the like extent as any other provisions forming part of this Constitution and shall not be altered or repealed except in accordance with the provisions of section 9(2) of this Constitution. From the above provision of the constitution it is beyond any doubt that the entire provisions of the National Youth Service Decree 1993, has been left intact and saved by the constitution. Therefore, it is an existing law that has full force of law in the country. Section 22 of the National Youth Service Corps Decree defined ‘presidency’ to mean ‘’the office of the president, Commander-in-chief of the Armed forces’’. Having the above definition of the presidency at the back of the mind, can it be said that an appeal written to 2nd defendant and 3rd defendant (Head of Service), is appeal to the presidency, the answer is a resounding capital NO. To construe office of the 2nd and 3rd defendants as presidency will tantamount to re-writing the law. The 2nd defendant is creature of the statute and the office of the 3rd defendant is creature of the constitution, see section 171(1), (2), and (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). In view of the lucidity of the provisions of the law quoted above, I have no hesitation in resolving issue two in favour of the defendants/applicants. Since there was no appeal to the presidency, the claimant/respondent has failed and neglected to comply with condition precedent before instituting this suit to challenge the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent. This suit is therefore premature and the court has no power to pry into it without the compliance with the provision of section 20 of the NYSC, Act. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE THREE It is argued that the 3rd Defendant is not a proper party to be joined in this suit as is not a necessary party and no reasonable cause of action has been disclosed against him. The claimant/respondent on the other hand submitted that the 3rd defendant/applicant is a proper party duly joined and there is reasonable cause of action disclosed against the 3rd defendant/applicant and that it was the 1st defendant/applicant the approved the condition of service of the 2nd Defendant. In law for a party to be properly joined in a suit, the Claimant must established by facts that he has a claim against that party and that the party is a necessary party without his presence the suit cannot be properly, efficient and completely resolved. I have combed the entire pleading of the claimant (Statement of facts) there is nothing in it to show that the claimant has any grouse against the 3rd defendant/applicant there is no specific claim against the 3rd defendant/applicant. From the complaint and the statement of facts, it is clear that the main grouse of the claimant/respondent is on his dismissal and non-payment of salaries. It has not been shown by the pleadings that the 3rd defendant/applicant played any role in respect of the action taken that led to the compulsory retirement of the of the claimant/respondent from service. The only paragraph of the statement of facts that made mention of the 3rd defendant was paragraph 17. This averment stated that the claimant lodged an appeal to the 3rd defendant/applicant. In response vide letter dated 27/10/14, the 3rd defendant clearly stated it cannot reverse what the 2nd defendant has done. The response of the 3rd defendant/applicant has confirmed that no role was played by the 3rd defendant/applicant in the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent. Therefore, in my view this suit can be properly and completely determined without the presence of the 3rd defendant/applicant. In view of the foregoing, I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the 3rd defendant/applicant is not a proper party in this suit and there is no reasonable cause of action disclosed against the 3rd defendant/application as the pleading has not shown any role played by the 3rd defendant/respondent in the compulsory retirement of the claimant/respondent from service. This Issue is therefore, resolved against the claimant/applicant, the name of the 3rd defendant/applicant is hereby struck out for not being proper party before the Court due to non-disclosure of reasonable cause of action. For avoidance of doubt and in view of the above findings, the defendants/applicants’ preliminary objection succeeds and is hereby granted. The claimant’s action is hereby dismissed for being statute barred. Sanusi Kado, Judge.