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JUDGMENT/RULING The Claimant commenced this action in this court on 17th April 2018 vide the Originating Summons process. The originating summons was heard on 16th July 2018 together with the preliminary objections filed by the Defendants challenging the competence of the Claimant’s suit. Both the Judgment on the originating summons and the ruling on the preliminary objections were fixed to be delivered today. In his Originating Summons, the Claimant sought the determination of the following questions: 1. Whether or not the Claimant is a public officer in law and whether his employment with the 2nd Defendant has a statutory flavour. 2. Whether or not the Claimant can be lawfully terminated, retrenched, retired or otherwise removed from his employment with the 2nd Defendant, other than in accordance with the provisions of the Public Service Rules and other statutory provisions regulating such employment. 3. If the answer to question 2 above is in the negative, whether or not the Claimant is entitled to be reinstated to his employment with the 2nd Defendant. Upon the determination of the above questions, the Claimant sought the court to grant him the following reliefs: 1. A Declaration that the Claimant's employment with the 2nd Defendant has a statutory flavour and same may only be lawfully determined strictly in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Public Service Rules. 2. A Declaration that the Claimant's retirement from the service of the 2nd Defendant is null and void and of no legal effect. 3. An Order of Court setting aside the purported retirement of the Claimant from the service of the 2nd Defendant. 4. An Order of Court reinstating the Claimant to the employment of the 2nd Defendant, accompanied with all the attendant rights, rank, status including the corresponding salaries, allowances, benefits and other emoluments. 5. An Order of Court directing the Defendants to pay the Claimant all his accrued salaries, allowances and benefits from the time of the purported retirement to when judgment is delivered. 6. An Order of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendants to carry out reliefs 4 and 5 above. The facts upon which the above reliefs were sought by the Claimant are contained in the affidavit of the Claimant in support of the originating summons. The Claimant averred therein that the 1st Defendant is the Chief Law Officer of the Federation while the 2nd Defendant is a Federal Government Security Service. The 3rd Defendant is the head of the 2nd Defendant and co-ordinates the operations of the 1st Defendant. The Claimant joined the service of the 2nd Defendant in February 1992 and rose to become an Assistant Director in the Service. Sometime in September 2015, he received a letter dated 1st September 2015 from the 2nd Defendant retiring him from the service of the 2nd Defendant. He was surprised at the retirement because he still had about 11 years to his retirement date. Retirement in Public Service is upon attaining 60 years of age or upon 35 years in service, whichever comes first. He was enlisted into the Service in February 1992 while he was born on 1st October 1966. He was also shocked at his retirement because no misconduct or any infraction of any rules of the Service in the discharge of his duties was alleged against him neither was he asked to face any disciplinary panel for any misconduct. Although the retirement stated that his retirement was due to an on-going re-organisation in the 2nd Defendant, there was no re-organisation or any form of restructuring going on in the 2nd Defendant to warrant his retirement. All the institutional structures, organs and departments of the 2nd Defendant remain intact till date. Out of about 10,000 personnel in the employment of the 2nd Defendant, only about 17 personnel were given retirement letters. Recently, there was a newspaper report where it was reported that the Claimant and the few others affected by the retirement were eased out of the Service due to partisanship, corrupt practices and other acts of misconduct. The originating summons was also supported by a further affidavit of the Claimant and written addresses of counsel for the Claimant. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants filed a counter affidavit, supported with a written address, in opposing the originating summons. I have mentioned earlier that the Defendants have filed preliminary objections to this suit. As a result, I cannot proceed further with the suit beyond this point. The NPOs must be considered and determined first before the Claimant’s suit can be examined in detail. 1ST DEFENDANT’S NPO In the 1st Defendant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on 1st June 2018, the 1st Defendant contended that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear or adjudicate on the Claimant's suit and it prayed the court to either dismiss or strike out the Claimant’s suit. The grounds of the NPO are as follows: a. The Claimant’s suit is Statute Barred as it was filed outside the time stipulated in the Public Officers Protection Act 2004. b. The Claimant’s suit as constituted and conceived does not disclose any cause of action against the 1st Defendant. In the written address in support of the NPO, counsel for the 1st Defendant, Maimuna Lami Shiru Esq., formulated one issue for determination to wit: whether in the circumstances of this suit this Honourable Court will grant the Claimants application. In arguing this issue, learned counsel submitted that this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit as the suit is statute barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. Counsel submitted further that the Claimant was retired from service on 1st September 2015 but he commenced this present action against his compulsory retirement on the 17th April 2018 which is about two years and seven months after the Claimant had received his letter of retirement. Since the Claimant’s cause of action in this case arose on the 1st September 2015, this action was filed outside the provisions of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. The Claimant's suit is therefore statute barred at the time the action was filed. This Court consequently lacks the jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate on the suit. In support of these submissions, counsel cited the cases of CHRISTIANA I. YARE vs. NATIONAL SALARIES, WAGES AND INCOME COMMISSION (2013) LPELR 20520 (SC); IBRAHIM vs. JSC (KADUNA) STATE (1998) 14 NWLR 1 at 31 – 32; UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN vs. MR. A. I. ADENIRAN (2006) LPELR-11801(CA). Counsel urged this Court to decline jurisdiction and strike out the matter on this ground. Counsel for the 1st Defendant did also submit that there is no cause of action against the Defendants and the reliefs sought by the Claimant cannot be granted. Counsel’s reasons for this contention are that the Claimant’s contract of service was at the pleasure of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and subject to the Public Service Rules as stated in the Claimant’s letter of appointment. The Claimant accepted this appointment and agreed it was at the pleasure of the President and subject to the Public Service Rules. An appointment at the pleasure of the employer can be terminated at any time without assigning any reason by the employer thereof. The Claimant's appointment is also subject to the current Public Service Rules, Regulations and Instructions of the Federal Republic of Nigerian. The Claimant cannot successfully challenge his retirement from the 2nd Defendant because his appointment is at the pleasure of the President and subject to the Section 8 Rule 020806 (ii) of the Public Service Rules 2006 which provides that any officer whose service is no longer required in event of abolition of office, reorganization of the office or redundancy shall be required to leave the service. It was submitted further that it is too late in the day for the Claimant to complain against his retirement after the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, based on the reorganization exercise carried out in the 2nd Defendant, approved the Claimant’s compulsory retirement from the Service. In response to the 1st Defendant’s NPO, the Claimant’s counsel, Adeola Adedipe Esq., filed a written address wherein learned counsel adopted the issue formulated in the written address in support of the 1st Defendant’s NPO. Learned counsel for the Claimant started the written address by giving a background of the events which happened before this instant suit was filed. According to the Claimant’s counsel, relying on the facts deposed to in an affidavit of record filed on 11th June 2018, this suit was re-filed on 17th April 2018. The Claimant had initially filed the suit on 26th November 2015 when the Claimant was unlawfully retired from service. The Claimant was unable to effect service of the initial Originating Summons on the Defendants because reconciliatory steps were being taken for the purpose of a possible out-of-Court settlement. In the process, the life span of the Originating process expired. On 6th April 2017, the Claimant filed a Motion Ex parte seeking an extension of time to renew the Originating Summons. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to grant the reliefs sought in the Ex parte application. In the Ruling of the court on the applications delivered on 10th April 2018, the Notice of Preliminary Objection was dismissed while the Originating Summons was equally struck out but with leave for the Claimant to re-file his suit. The Claimant’s counsel submitted that the Ruling remains in force and permits the Claimant to re-file the Suit. Following that ruling, the Claimant re-filed the instant Originating Summons on 17th April, 2018. The Claimant’s counsel submitted that re-filing this suit after it was struck out on 10th April 2018 does not raise a bar of limitation against the Claimant. This is because the limitation period stopped to run the moment the original suit was commenced in November 2015. Counsel stated that the time when the Claimant commenced an action in respect of his cause of action will be reckoned from the time when the initial suit was filed. In that case, the Claimant filed his suit within the statutory time which makes this suit not caught by Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. Learned counsel for the Claimant cited the following cases in support of the arguments: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. MORENIKE O. SOULE HARRIS (2017) LPELR-43538 (CA); SIFAX NIGERIA LTD vs. MIGFO NIGERIA LTD (2015) LPELR - 24655 (CA); ALHAJI HARUNA KASSIM vs. HERMANN EBERT (TRADING AS CASH STORES) (1966) 1 SCNLR 170 and Supreme Court judgment in SIFAX NIGERIA LTD vs. MIGFO NIGERIA LTD (SC.417/2015) delivered on the 16th February 2018. Counsel for the Claimant concluded that this suit was filed timeously originally, and the fact that it was struck out in April 2018 will not impose a limitation on it. This suit is not statute barred and this court’s jurisdiction has been properly invoked to entertain the suit. With regard to the 2nd leg of the arguments of counsel for the 1st Defendant, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that those were arguments touching the merits of the case. The Claimant’s counsel also pointed out the fact that the 1st Defendant did not file any counter affidavit in opposition to the Originating Summons. I agree with the Claimant’s counsel on this point. The issues contained in the arguments of the 1st Defendant’s counsel with regards to the 2nd leg of the submissions in the written address in support of the NPO are matters of facts touching on the merits of the originating summons. But the 1st Defendant did not file a counter affidavit to the originating summons. Not having defended the originating summons, the 1st Defendant cannot, in the NPO, advance arguments in defence of the suit. Again, the matters upon which the 1st Defendant’s counsel based her arguments in the 2nd leg of the written address in support of the NPO are matters touching on the merits of the case. This court cannot be drawn into going into the merits of the substantive suit at this stage of determining the NPO. I will disregard the said submissions in the written address of 1st Defendant. Counsel for the 1st Defendant filed a reply on points of law where two issues were further formulated. The issues are whether negotiation stops time from running in an action for limitation of time and whether enforceable rights can accrue from a dead originating summons. On issue one, counsel submitted that this suit filed on 17th April 2018 has nothing to do with the previous suit filed by the Claimant. Counsel stated that the two suits are distinct from one another with different file numbers. It was further submitted that reconciliatory moves by the parties is not an excuse not to comply with statute of limitation. EBOIGBE vs. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649 was cited by counsel on the point. Counsel argued also that the Claimant’s right to re-file the action is not absolute but subject to the provisions of limitation statute. On issue two, counsel for the 1st Defendant submitted that the writ of the earlier suit expired since on 25th November 2016 and it was therefore extinguished. An existing suit cannot derive its life from a dead suit. Counsel cited the cases of OGBAH vs. B.D.U.J.B (2001) 8 WLR and KOLAWOLE vs. ALBERTO (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 98) 417. THE 2ND AND 3RD DEFENDANTS’ NPO is similar in context to that of the 1st Defendant. In the NPO filed on 24th May 2018, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants prayed the court to dismiss this suit for want of jurisdiction on the grounds that: a. The suit was filed more than three (3) months after the claim had arisen and it is therefore statute barred under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004. b. The Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit. In the written address filed in support of the NPO, counsel for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, Mr. G. O. A. Agbadua Esq., submitted the following two issues for determination: 1. Whether the Claimant's suit is statute barred by the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap LFN 2004; 2. Whether this Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the Claimant's suit. On issue one, counsel submitted that where a statute has prescribed a period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly be instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. The cases of EBIOGBE vs. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.3 47) 649 and KASANDUBU vs. ULTIMATE PETROLEUM LTD (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1086) 274 were referred to. Counsel went on to say that the facts of the Claimant’s case in paragraphs 10 to 22 of his affidavit in support of the Originating Summons disclose the cause of action as the termination of his appointment by the Defendants. Time began to run from the 1st September 2015, when the cause of action, which was the retirement, arose. However, from the face of the Claimant's Originating Summons, he filed this action on 17th April 2018, which was a period well over two (2) years after the cause of action arose. The Claimant filed this action outside the three (3) months prescribed by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act and the suit is therefore statute barred. These cases, among other were cited by counsel to support his arguments: SANDA vs. KUKAWA LOCAL GOV'T (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) 379; NPA vs. LOTUS PLASTICS LTD (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 158; REUBEN EDEME vs. STATE SECURITY SERVICE (unreported) (2008) Suit No. FHC/B/CS/52/05 and F.R.I.N vs. GOLD (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) 1. On issue two, counsel for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants submitted that having become obvious that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain same. Reason being that the Claimant has lost his right to sue on his stale claim. EBOIGBE vs. NNPC (Supra) and FRIN vs. GOLD (Supra) were referred to. It was argued in conclusion that the proper order to be made in the circumstance is an order of dismissal of the suit. CLAIMANT’S MOTION The Claimant, in addition to the written address filed in opposition to the NPO of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, also filed a motion on 11th June 2018 wherein he prayed the court for an order striking out the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on 24th May 2018, for being incompetent, for being an abuse of Court process and for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Order 18 Rules 2 and 4 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. The grounds upon which the Claimant premised his motion are as follows: i. This case was originally instituted on 26th November 2015 with Suit No. NICN/ABJ/367/2015; and was consequently set down for adjudication before Hon. Justice S. O. Adeniyi. ii. While out-of-Court settlement was being explored, the Claimant failed to effect service of the Summons on the Defendants, the lifespan of which expired in the process. iii. An Ex-parte application was filed by the Claimant to renew the Originating Summons, but same was opposed by a Notice of Preliminary Objection filed by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. iv. After hearing both applications on 13th February 2018, this Honourable Court, in a Ruling delivered on 10th April 2018, dismissed the Notice of Preliminary Objection for incompetence, while the Suit was struck out, with leave for the Claimant to re-file. v. In the Notice of Preliminary Objection filed by the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ out of time, the historical background of this case was deliberately withheld, with the intention to mislead the Court. vi. The Notice of Preliminary Objection is an abuse of Court process, and grossly incompetent for non-compliance with the mandatory provision of Order 18 Rule 2(2) & (4) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017. vii. This Honourable Court has inherent powers to dismiss or strike out the notice of preliminary objection. In the affidavit in support of the motion deposed to by Fatima Shehu, a legal practitioner in the law firm representing the Claimant in this suit, it was deposed that before the re-filing of this suit, the suit was originally filed on 26th November 2015. However, the originating process of that suit was not served on the Defendants because internal and administrative steps were being considered for possible out-of-Court settlement. When it became apparent that reconciliation cannot occur, the Claimant immediately filed an Ex parte application on 6th April 2017 to renew the life span of originating summons. On the 13th of February 2018, the Claimant's Motion and a Notice of Preliminary Objection filed by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants were jointly heard by Hon. Justice. S. O. Adeniyi. In a ruling delivered in the consolidated suits involving suit numbers NICN/ABJ/367/2015, NICN/ABJ/368/2015, NICN/ABJ/369/2015, NICN/ABJ/370/2015, NICN/ABJ/371/2015 and NICN/ABJ/372/2015, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ preliminary objection was dismissed while the Claimant's suit was struck out, with a liberty to re-file it. The instant suit was re-filed on 17th April 2018. The ruling remains extant and has not been varied or set aside by any Court. It was upon re-filing the instant suit and serving same on the Defendants that the Defendants filed the preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the suit. The Defendants suppressed material facts in respect of the earlier suit in the NPO. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ NPO was not filed alongside the Memorandum of Conditional Appearance and it was filed over 30 days of receiving the Originating Summons. The arguments canvassed in the written address in support of the motion are with respect to the issue whether the suit is statute barred are the same as those made in the written addresses in opposition to the NPO of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. I observe that it is the same arguments which have been made by counsel for the Claimant in response to the NPO of the 1st Defendant. Since I have reviewed that written address in this ruling, it will be a waste of time to reproduce the same arguments again. The other aspects of the Claimant’s arguments which need to be considered here is with respect to the allegation of non-compliance with the provisions of the rules of this court. The Claimant’s counsel submitted that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Order 18 Rules 2 and 4 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Rules 2017 thereby rendering their Notice of Preliminary Objection incompetent. It was argued that these provisions required that an application disputing the jurisdiction of the Court must be made by a motion on notice supported by an affidavit with a written address. The motion must also be filed along with a memorandum of conditional appearance. The claimant’s counsel argued that the NPO was not brought by a motion neither was it supported by an affidavit. The NPO was also not filed when the memorandum of appearance was filed. While the memorandum of conditional appearance of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants was filed within 14 days of service of the originating summons, the NPO was filed over 30 days thereafter without leave of court or order extending time for the Defendants. It was submitted that these non-compliances render the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ Preliminary Objection incompetent and liable to be struck out. The 2nd and 3rd Defendant filed a counter affidavit to oppose the Claimant’s motion. The counter affidavit was deposed to by Ayuba Adam, a personnel of the 2nd Defendant. He stated that the Claimant has earlier instituted a similar suit before this Honourable court with suit No. NICN/ABJ/367/2015 dated 26th November 2015. That suit had similar subject matter and reliefs with the present one and also against the same Defendants. The earlier suit was struck out by the court due to the failure of the Claimant to serve the Defendants with a copy of the originating summons within the time permitted by the law. In the ruling of the Honourable Court, it was held that the originating summons was completely dead and that the best of excuses could not have revived or resuscitated it or breathe life back to it. The court further held that that the Claimant has the right to recommence the action where the circumstances permit. After the suit was struck out, the Claimant instituted another fresh suit with suit No. NIC/ABJ/100/2018 against the same Defendants, with the same reliefs and subject matter. The Defendants have now filed a preliminary objection on the ground that the suit is statute barred and should be dismissed as it was filed more than three (3) months after the cause of action had arisen. It was concluded by the deponent that the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought. In the written address in support of the counter affidavit, counsel for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, Mr. Agbadua, stated the issue to be determined to be whether the 2nd and 3rd Defendants' preliminary objection is competent and has complied with the provisions of the law. In arguing this issue, counsel submitted that the Originating Summons in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/367/2015 dated 26th November 2015 is dead and cannot be resuscitated. This means that the matter cannot be re-filed. Reinstituting the same matter by the Claimant means resuscitating the originating summons. The statement of the Court that the claimant reserves the right to recommence the action where the circumstances permit is conditional and not absolute. It was submitted that in view of the fact that the Claimant’s cause of action is already statute barred, the circumstance of this matter does not permit the Claimant to commence another action on the same subject matter against the Defendants. Counsel for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants further submitted that the provision of Order 18 Rule 2 (2) is not mandatory when it used the word “may”. Again, it was submitted that the NPO of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are not raising issues of fact but law. The facts in support of the NPO are already before the court, as such, it was not necessary to support it with an affidavit. The Claimant filed a further and better affidavit in support of his motion. It was deposed by Fatima Shehu, same person who deposed to the affidavit in support of the motion. It was averred that paragraph 9 of the Defendants’ counter affidavit is untrue. The reason for the Claimant's failure to effect service of the summons on the Defendants was that an out-of-Court settlement was being explored. The circumstances permit the Claimant to re-file this suit and that the Claimant's cause of action remains extant, and same has equally been preserved by the order of the court striking out the initial suit. The submission made by the Claimant’s counsel in the reply on points of law is a repeat of the same arguments counsel has made previously in these applications. I see no need to go over the reply. COURT’S DECISION The Defendants’ notices of preliminary objection are challenging the competence of this suit and the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the suit. However, in a motion filed by the Claimant on 11th June 2018, he prayed this court to strike out the NPO of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. The reasons given by the Claimant for the prayer are these: The 2nd and 3rd Defendants did not comply with Order 18 Rules 2 and 4 of the NICN Rules 2017 and that the NPO is an abuse of court process for suppression of material facts. The Claimant’s counsel submitted, as a result, that the NPO is not competent and should be struck out. Counsel for the Claimant submitted that the NPO of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants flouted Order 18 Rule 2(2) in two major respects. That is the NPO is not by motion and it is not supported by affidavit. To resolve this issue, it is important I examine the provision of the said Order 18 Rule 2 (2) of the Rules of this court. It provides thus: “Where in a matter before the Court, a defendant wishes to dispute the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such a matter, the Defendant may by a motion on notice, and an affidavit disclosing the facts in support of the application with a written address, apply to the Court to hear and determine the motion." Let me state that a reading of this provision in isolation of other provisions of the order will not do the justice of the matter. The provisions of the whole Order 18 ought to be read together. When that is done, it will be understood that an application to challenge the jurisdiction of the court need not be by motion on notice. It can be made by notice of preliminary objection. See particularly Rules 2 (1), 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Order 18. Having said these, I will return to examine Rule 2 (2). The word “may” was used in the rule when describing the type of application to be brought when disputing court’s jurisdiction. That is to say it is not immutable that a motion on notice must be used in bringing application to challenge the jurisdiction of the court. This rule when read in conjunction with Rules 2 (1), 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Order 18 reveal that a notice of preliminary objection is a permissible alternative to a motion on notice when jurisdiction of court is to be challenged in a matter before the court. Although Rule 2 (2) of Order 18 requires an application to be supported by an affidavit, it is not necessary that every motion or notice of preliminary objection be supported by an affidavit. In a notice of preliminary objection raised purely on points of law or one where the facts upon which the objection is based are before the Court, there is no need for additional affidavit evidence to be filed. See ALHAJI LAI MOHAMMED vs. CHIEF AFE BABALOLA, SAN (2011) LPELR-8973(CA) 25. In the Defendants NPO where they contended that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred, the facts necessary to determine the objection are the facts of what the cause of action is, when it arose and when the suit was filed. It is settled law that it is the facts of the Claimant’s case in the record of the court that should be examined to discover these facts. See FRIN vs. GOLD (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt.1044) 1; J.S.F. INVESTMENT LTD. vs. BRAWAL LINE LTD. (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 578) 876 at 902; AMEDE vs. UBA (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 469) 479 at 506-507. In the circumstance, the Defendants NPO can be determined without affidavit evidence. Therefore, the Defendants need not file an affidavit to support the NPO. The Claimant’s counsel also submitted that the NPO of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants is incompetent because it was filed out of time without the leave of court extending time for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants to file the NPO. The Claimant’s counsel relied on the provision of Order 18 Rule 2 (4) on this point. According to the Claimant’s counsel, the NPO ought to have been filed alongside the Defendants’ memorandum of appearance within 14 days of receiving the original process. While the Defendant’s memo was filed within 14 of service of the originating process, the NPO was filed over 30 days of receiving the originating summons. Order 18 Rule 2(4) of the Rules of this court provides thus: "A defendant making an application in line with the provisions of sub-rule (2) of this rule shall file along with the motion on notice a memorandum of conditional appearance stating that he or she is appearing conditionally”. The Claimant’s counsel appears to say that this rule requires that an NPO and a memorandum of appearance must be filed at the same time. I do not think so. The provision should not be construed to have set a time limit for bringing a preliminary objection. The import of the rule is that a Defendant served with an originating process but wants to file a preliminary objection, such a Defendant must file a memorandum of appearance along with the application. That is to say a Defendant cannot file a preliminary without filing a memorandum of appearance. In my view, a Defendant who has filed a memorandum of appearance in a suit is not precluded from subsequently filing an NPO. That is not the implication of the said rule. It is therefore not necessary that an NPO must be filed at the same time a memorandum of appearance is being filed. It must be clearly emphasised that an objection to the jurisdiction of court can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, and even for the first time on appeal. See OUR LINE LTD vs. S.C.C. NIGERIA LTD (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 498) 210 at 234; OKUDANO vs. KEREGBE (2003) FWLR (Pt. 148) 1384; OGUNLEYE vs. OKE (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 469) 552 at 577. Contrary to the arguments of counsel for the Claimant, Order 18 Rule 2(4) did not limit time for filing NPO. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants filed their memorandum of conditional appearance on 20th April 2018 before filing their NPO on 24th May 2018. The Defendants do not need leave of court or extension of time to bring the NPO. The 3rd point canvassed by the Claimant for seeking the striking out of the NPO of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants is that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants did not bring to the knowledge of the court the fact that the Claimant had earlier filed a suit. The facts allegedly suppressed by the Defendants relate to the fact of an initial suit filed by the Claimant in this court. According to the facts deposed to in the affidavit in support of the motion and the counsel for the Claimant in his submissions, the Defendants deliberately hid the fact from the court in order to deceive the court into believing that the instant suit of the Claimant is statute barred. I do not think this point of the Claimant’s motion is a material point to dwell on in this ruling. The Defendants did not even file any affidavit in support of the NPO. Therefore, there was no means by which such fact would have been put before the court. Let me also say that the fact that the Defendants did not disclose the fact of the previous suit in their NPO is not suppression of fact nor can it be considered to be an abuse of court process. It is the duty of the Claimant who thinks such fact is important in the determination of the NPO to supply same to the court. In any case, I have observed that the issue of the said previous suit of the Claimant is an issue for consideration in the NPO. I will therefore not pre-empt the NPO at this point by going into the circumstances and legal status of the previous suit. I have considered all the points raised by the CLAIMANT against the competence of the NPO of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants but I find no merit in them. The Claimant’s motion is hereby dismissed. I will now consider the preliminary objection of the Defendants. The notices of preliminary objection by the Defendants have a common ground, which is that this suit is statute barred by the effect of Section 2 (a) of POPA. The Defendants have contended that the Claimant’s cause of action arose on 1st September 2015 when he was retired from service, but he instituted this action on 17th April 2018. It was further argued that since the action was instituted more than 3 months from the date the Claimant’s cause of action arose, the suit was filed in default of Section 2 (a) of POPA, and consequently, statute barred. From the grounds of the Defendants’ preliminary objection and the submissions of counsels made in support, it is observed that the NPO is predicated on the provision of Section 2(a) of Public Officers Protection Act. Its provision goes thus: “2. Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provision shall have effect: (a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” This provision is to the effect that any action against a public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or law or in performance or default in performance of any public duty or authority must be commenced within 3 months from the date of the cause of action. Where the suit is not commenced within the period so prescribed, the Claimant’s right of action in respect of that cause will be statute barred and the court will no longer have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is a settled principle of law that where a statute prescribes a period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C, KADUNA STATE (1998) 12 SC 20; EGBE vs. ALHAJI (1990) 3 S.C (Pt. 1) 63; KASANDUBU vs. ULTIMATE PETROLEUM LTD (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1086) 274. From the processes filed by the Claimant in opposing the NPOs, the Claimant did not dispute the fact that the Defendants are public officers. The Claimant has also not disputed the fact that his cause of action was his retirement from service on 1st September 2015. The Claimant has also not been heard to say that his retirement was not an act done by the Defendants in pursuance of their public duty or authority. There is no dispute also that this suit was filed on 17th April 2018. From the facts deposed in the Claimant’s affidavit in support of the originating summons, the grounds of the NPO, the arguments in the written addresses filed in support of the NPO, it is clear to me that the Claimant’s cause of action, which is his retirement from service, arose on 1st September 2015. The Claimant filed this action on 17th April 2018. From the time the Claimant’s cause of action arose and to the time this action was filed was a period of 2 years and 7 months. It means that this suit was filed more than 3 months after the Claimant’s cause of action arose. In view of these obvious facts, the Defendants are therefore entitled to rely on the provision of Section 2 (a) of POPA to seek the dismissal of the Claimant’s action. The Claimant has contended however that his suit is not statute barred. The Claimant based his assertion on his claim that this suit was a re-filed suit pursuant to the leave of this court after his earlier Suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 was struck out by the court. The facts deposed in the affidavit in support of the motion filed on 11/6/2018, the affidavit of record filed on 11th June 2018 and the arguments made by the Claimant’s counsel in the written addresses filed in opposition to NPOs, disclose that the Claimant initially filed suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 on 26th November 2015 but the originating summons was not served on the Defendants until the summons expired. Upon expiry of the summons, the Claimant filed an application to renew the life span of the originating summons. The application was refused, and the suit was struck out with liberty given to the claimant to re-file the suit. It was on that basis this instant suit was re-filed on 17th April 2018. The point being made by the Claimant in all these processes is that the time when he commenced his action in respect of his cause of action be reckoned to the time when the initial suit was filed. The Claimant’s counsel found in support of the Claimant’s assertion, the recent Supreme Court decision in SIFAX vs. MIGFO (supra). As for the Defendants, they contended that suit No. NICN/ABJ/367/2015 is different from the instant suit. The Defendants’ argument is that suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 was a completely dead suit when the summons expired. As such, it was not capable of being revived by a fresh action. From the facts put forward by the parties and all the processes filed in respect of the Claimant’s position that his suit is not statute barred in view of his previous suit, I have observed the following: the Claimant previously filed suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 by way of originating summons on 26th November 2015 before this court against the same Defendants on the same subject matter and seeking the same reliefs. That originating summons was not served on the Defendants until the life span of the summons expired. After the expiration of the summons, the Claimant brought an application on 6th April 2017 to renew the summons. In a ruling on the motion delivered on 10th April 2018, my learned brother, Hon. Justice S. O. Adeniyi, refused the Claimant’s application and also struck out the suit on account of its expired summons. The Claimant subsequently filed this instant suit on 17th April 2018. It is a fact that the originating summons in Suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 expired and the application to renew was refused. The summons was not renewed at any time since the time it expired. What then is the status of Suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 with an expired writ? Order 6 Rules 4 and 5 of the NICN Rules 2017 provide that an originating process is VALID for only 6 months in the first instance but where there were renewals, it cannot be in force for a period longer than 12 months. See also Order 6 Rules 4 and 5 of the NIC Rules 2007 which was the applicable rules of this court at the time suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 was filed. The implication of these provisions is that an originating process which is not served within 6 months or in the case of renewals, within 12 months, of its issuance becomes invalid and ceases to be in force from the date of its expiration. In the case of suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015, the originating summons was issued on 26th November 2015, but it was not served 6 months after. It was not renewed at any time thereafter. Consequently, by the 26th day of May 2016, the originating summons in suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 had become invalid and void. There was no longer a suit since the date the summons in suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 expired. In my view, a writ that became void means there was no action in the first place. Therefore, suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 is not capable of being a considered a valid suit as to be used to determine the date the Claimant filed an action in respect of his cause of action. In other words, Suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 did not stop or freeze time from running against the Claimant. The Claimant contended further that this court, in the ruling of 10th April 2018, gave him the liberty to re-file the case. What the Claimant appears to say is that he was given leave by this court to re-file the action. Perhaps, that was why he said this suit, being a re-filed suit pursuant to that leave of court, is not statute barred. I have read the ruling of my learned brother, Hon. Justice S. O. Adeniyi, but I cannot find where such leave was given to the Claimant to re-file his action. The words used by my brother in the ruling are these: “The applicant reserves the right to recommence the action where the circumstances permit”. This holding is by no means leave or permission to file a fresh suit. The Claimant was only informed that he has the right to recommence the action if permitted by circumstance. Now, such circumstance will include statute of limitation. The Claimant ought to have taken the prescribed time limit for commencing action against public officers into consideration when filing this action and not to rely on, what I will consider an advice by the court, to say he was given leave to re-file the action outside the limitation period. In any case, it was categorically held in the ruling that Suit No. NICN/ABJ/367/2015 was dead and cannot be resuscitated. This means that the matter cannot be re-filed. Re-filing the same matter, as the claimant said he has done in this instant case, will mean that suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 has been resuscitated by the Claimant. He cannot do that. Let me refer to Counsel’s earlier submission on behalf of the Claimant that the ruling of 10th April 2018 remains extant and has not been varied or set aside by any Court. This is a clear indication that the said ruling of my learned brother was never appealed against. This action filed by the Claimant after the ruling in suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 is a fresh action which is not derived from or linked to the previous suit. In my view, this suit is a fresh suit distinct from suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015. I hold in the result that the date this suit was filed cannot be reckoned to be the date suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 was filed. The Claimant’s counsel put heavy reliance on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in SIFAX vs. MIGFO in his arguments that the Claimant’s action is not statute barred. Learned Counsel for the Claimant submitted that limitation period in respect of the Claimant’s cause of action ceased to run the moment the original suit was commenced on 25th November 2015. This action, being a re-filed suit after the initial suit was struck out, is not statute barred. Let me first say that the facts of the SIFAX case and its circumstances are quite different from the facts and circumstances of this case. In the SIFAX case, the freezing of time for the purpose of limitation of action was used in relation to suits commenced in a wrong court. It was the view of the Supreme Court that when the suit was recommenced in the right court, limitation of time with respect to the cause of action stopped running when the suit was first filed in the wrong court. According to the Supreme Court, where an aggrieved person commences an action within the period prescribed by the statute and such action is subsequently struck out without being heard on the merit, such action is still open to be recommenced and the limitation period will not count during the pendency of the earlier suit. This is because a matter which was struck out remained in the general cause list of the court at all times until revived. The SIFAX authority will not apply in this case. The circumstance of suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 is that the originating process expired, and the suit became invalid and without life from the date the summons expired. It could only have been revived by an order of renewal by the court. Since the Claimant’s application for renewal was refused, the summons remained as it was – dead and buried since the date of its expiration. Therefore, in view of this different scenario, the SIFAX case cannot be of help to the Claimant. The Claimant’s counsel has argued that suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 was struck out on 10th April 2018. Perhaps, his intent is to say since it was struck out only on 10th April 2018, the case has remained on the cause list of the court all the material time and the time remained frozen until the date it was struck out. The fact that suit NICN/ABJ/367/2015 was struck out in the ruling of 10th April 2018 does not mean that the life of the summons extended to that day. The suit was no longer a valid suit capable of remaining on the cause list of the court since the day the summons expired. Therefore, the order striking it out on 10th April 2018 was a mere formality. The result of the foregoing is that the computation of the time the Claimant instituted his action against the Defendants in respect of his cause of action will be reckoned from the date he instituted this action, which is on 17th April 2018. I have found earlier in this ruling that the Claimant filed this action 2 years and 7 months from the date his cause of action arose. From the period his cause of action arose and the time he filed this action was more than 3 months. Clearly, the Claimant did not commence this suit against the Defendants within the statutorily prescribed 3 months. It is settled law that where a statute prescribes a time limit for the institution of an action, no valid proceedings can be instituted after the time prescribed by the statute. This is because an action brought outside the prescribed period is contrary to the provision of the law and does not give rise to a cause of action. See ELEBANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 604; INEC vs. OKORONKWO (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 488) 227 at 247. By the effect of Section 2 (a) of POPA, the Claimant’s suit is clearly statute barred having been filed outside the statutory period. The action is no longer maintainable, and this court lacks jurisdiction to continue to entertain it. In the circumstance, the appropriate order to make is to dismiss the Claimant’s suit. The 2nd ground of the NPO of the 1st Defendant is that the Claimant’s suit does not disclose any cause of action against the 1st Defendant. This ground of the 1st Defendant’s NPO is no longer relevant for consideration in view of the present circumstance. This is because the Claimant’s cause of action, having become statute barred, the question whether a cause of action is disclosed against any of the parties to the action is no longer material. In the result, this suit is dismissed. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge