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JUDGMENT This action was commenced by way of complaint dated and filed 21st December 2015. By an amended Writ and amended Statement of Facts dated and filed the 25th day of May 2017, the Claimant sought the following reliefs jointly and severally against the Defendants: 1. A DECLARATION that the dismissal of the Claimant’s employment vide the 1st Defendant’s letter dated 23rd April 2015 was wrongful and without justification. 2. A DECLARATION that the Defendants breached the terms and conditions as contained in the contract of employment of the Claimant vide the1st Defendant's letter of employment reference No. OCB/IT/114 dated 25th January 2007. 3. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court directing the Defendants to pay to the Claimant the sum of Twenty Million Naira (N20,000,000.00) only as General Damages for Breach of Contract of Employment. 4. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court directing the Defendants to pay to the Claimant the sum of Twenty-Five Million Naira (N25,000,000.00) only as General Damages for wrongful dismissal of the Claimant. 5. The cost of this action put at Two Hundred Thousand Naira (N200,000.00) only. Pleadings were duly exchanged, and hearing commenced on the 18th day of October 2017 with the Claimant testifying for himself as CW1. One Tayo Adebisi, the 1st Defendant’s head of outsourcing operations testified as DW1 while one Oluwabukola Adeyanju, a staff of the 2nd Defendant’s HR department testified as DW2. Hearing ended on the 30th day of November 2017 and parties were ordered to file their Final Written Addresses in accordance with the Rules of Court. Parties’ addresses were duly regularized and adopted on the 10th day of July 2018. The 1st Defendant’s Final Written Address filed on 21st March 2018 raised two (2) issues for the Court’s determination. 1. Whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant herein is entitled to the reliefs sought. 2. Whether in view of the Claimant's absconding, abandonment and voluntary exit from his primary employers, the Claimant can claim the reliefs sought against the Defendants. On issue one, counsel argued that the basic principle is that a party must prove the rights upon which he lays his Claims, at the end of the case if the party fails to prove the facts upon which he claims, the claim fails in its entirety. It was submitted by counsel that the Claimant’s action rests on a purported wrongful dismissal, the duty to prove it rests on the Claimant, to which the Claimant never led any evidence that he was dismissed from employment, as was reiterated in OSOH vs. CBN (2013) 35 NLLR (Pt. 103) 1, where the Court of Appeal held that when an employee complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated, he has the onus, first, to place before the Court the terms of his contract of employment, and second, to prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. Learned Counsel for the 1st Defendant submitted that both reliefs 1 and 2 stated above by the Claimant have no factual basis and remained unproven in law, because he did not prove any wrongfulness in the manner in which he left his employment or demonstrate that his employment was in fact terminated; thereby failing to discharge the burden of proof on him. See IBRAHIM v OJOMO (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 199) 1285, where the Supreme Court held that in civil cases, the burden of proof is cast on the party who asserts the affirmative of a particular issue. See also IKE v UGBOAJA (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 301) 539. It was submitted by Counsel that the Claimant failed in every material particular to prove his assertion of 'wrongful dismissal' by his employers or anything in his terms of employment giving him the powers to exit his work place of the 1st Defendant at will, retaining extant rights to sue on his exit and claim damages, as was upheld in FEDERAL MORTGAGE FINANCE LTD vs. EKPO (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 248) 1667. Again, counsel argued that in Exhibit C2 which is the Appointment as Teller letter, it was stated in paragraph 10 that on termination, either party can exercise the right to terminate the appointment. Circumstances of termination without compensation includes absence from work for more than three working days, from the facts of the case; the Claimant was asked to return to his primary employer, the 1st Defendant but he refused to address the query issued him or report back to his employers and was not seen again. Counsel utilized the case of OKOBI vs. STANBIC BANK PLC (2013) 30 NLLR (Pt. 86) 241 to illustrate that an employment is said to be wrongfully terminated when it is not carried out according to the manner provided for by the terms of the employment, and submitted that the Claimant did not prove his wrongful termination of employment by proving in what manner the terms and conditions of his employment was breached, as decided in UZONDU vs. UBA PLC (2011) 22 NLLR (Pt. 63) 392. The additional questions posed by Counsel in this regard were: a. Was the 1st Defendant acting within its rights and powers to issue the Claimant an administrative query requesting him to address the allegations made out against him? b. Was the Claimant right in law in refusing to respond to the administrative query issued him and further refusing to report to his employers? On the first question, counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant retains the rights to ask the Claimant to return to his primary employers his services being no longer required by the 2nd Defendant. The reasons for such directive can range from integrity, suspicion or out of routine corporate decision. Counsel cited the cases of SAMUEL vs. THE RECTOR FED POLY, BIDA (2013) 35 NLLR (Pt. 106) 645 and BASHIRU ATANDA vs. H. SAFFEIDDINE TRANSPORT LTD (2007) 8 CLRN, 114, where it was held that an employer could bring the appointment of an employee to an end for any reason or for no reason at all. It was submitted by counsel that in the instant case, there was an allegation of some unauthorised activities on the Henry Marc Moore account by the Claimant, which according to the Claimant in his Statement of Facts, averred was the cause of his troubles with the 2nd Defendant who exercised the right not to disclose or state the reasons for sending a staff away. Counsel argued further that throughout this case, the Claimant was not able to establish anywhere, how the 2nd Defendant acted beyond its powers in asking him to return to the 1st Defendant; and the only fact the Claimant showed in his statement of facts was his own deliberate refusal to comply with directives and subsequent unwillingness to report to the 1st Defendant, both of which amounted to a voluntary exit from employment. On the second question, counsel was of the view that the purpose of the query was to comply with the rule and necessity of fair hearing, The Claimant was given every opportunity to explain what transpired, but he wilfully neglected to do so, and Exhibit C3 notified the Claimant that the 2nd Defendant, where he served as an outsourced staff no longer required his services. He was issued a query and requested to address an allegation arising from the 2nd Defendant's complaint to the 1st Defendant. The case of IMONIKHE vs. UNITY BANK PLC (2013) 34 NLLR (Pt. 101) 539, was cited by Counsel, where the Supreme Court held that an employer has the power to discipline an erring employee for acts of misconduct without having to prove that in court. On issue two, counsel argued that by the Claimant’s failure to respond to the administrative query duly issued him, he by express conduct, voluntarily exited his employment leading to a breach of contract of employment, giving each party a right to terminate the agreement in accordance with the terms of the contract, as was held in UBN vs. SOARES (2012) 29 NLLR (Pt. 84) 329. Also, Counsel referred to the case of MAJA vs. STOCCO (1968) SCNLR 191, where the Court held that: “Wilful disobedience of lawful order and reasonable order of an employer by an employee is of a definite act of misconduct which at common law attracts the penalty of summary dismissal since such a willful disobedience is a reflection of total disregard of an essential condition of service, namely, that the servant must obey a proper, reasonable and lawful order of the master in default of which their contract relationship cannot be expected to continue.” In the same light, counsel argued that paragraph 10 of Exhibit Cl indicates that the Claimant was in clear violation of his terms of employment by refusing to return to the 1st Defendant; refusing to answer the query issued, by being absent from work place of the 1st Defendant; by general acts of misconduct, voluntary exit from the employment all of which attracts summary dismissal. See BORISHADE vs. NBN LTD (2014) 43 NLLR (Pt. 137) 520. Counsel submitted that the Claimant abused the authority of the 1st Defendant through outright disobedience, insubordination, absenteeism and finally voluntary exit of the employment. Rather than await his employer’s action or reaction for his misconducts, he voluntarily exited the employment. Regarding the third, fourth and fifth reliefs sought by the Claimant, counsel argued that the Claimant did not prove the factual or legal basis for general damages, and that a clear look at this case shows that the Claimant failed totally to prove any wrongful dismissal under relief 4 or that the Defendants acted outside the scope of their powers within the terms of the employment or the basis for entitlement to the sum of N25,000,000.00. On relief 5, counsel submitted on the authority of MICHAEL vs ACCESS BANK (supra) that the Cost of action in the sum of N200,000.00 is unmerited and cannot properly form a claim against the Defendants. Furthermore, counsel submitted following the decision in TSOKWA OIL MARKETING CO. vs. BON LIMITED (2002) 11 NWLR (Pt. 777) 201, that all the reliefs of the Claimant fail because he failed to establish the liability of the Defendants or establish his case. Also, counsel submitted that the Claimant’s voyage of discovery on a guessing game of fortune seeking against the Defendants was revealed when he revealed during cross-examination that his lawyer said they should claim the sum of N45,000,000 against the Defendants. The Court’s attention was drawn by counsel to the case of AKWA RUBBERS LTD vs. IJU INDUSTRIES LTD (2001) FWLR (Pt. 71) 1760, where it was held that the basis of damages in contract is restitution of the injured party to a position he would have been if the contract was not breached and not restitution to give a windfall. See also OKONGWU vs. NNPC (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1l5) 296 and AGIP LIMITED & ORS vs. EZENDU & 9 ORS (2010) 1 SC (pt.11) 98 at 162-163. According to Counsel, guiding principle for assessing damages for award in a case which has been made out for wrongful termination of employment where proved or established beyond reasonable doubt is the amount he would have earned under the contract for the period until the employer could have lawfully terminated it, less any amount he could reasonably be expected to earn in other employment. See STRABAG CONSTRUCTION CO. NIG LTD vs. ADEYEFA (2001) FWLR (Pt. 60) 1538. Similarly, counsel submitted that a party cannot profit from his own wrong acts and errors as in the case of the Claimant who breached his contract of employment. The case of VINZ INTERNATIONAL NIG. LTD vs. MOROHUNDIYA (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1153) 562, was relied on by Counsel, where the Court held that a party in breach of a contract is not entitled to any relief because there is no relief for a breaker of contract. It was argued by counsel that under paragraph 10 of the Claimant’s Terms of Appointment as a Teller, the Claimant is obligated to pay the 1st Defendant one-month salary as a penalty fee for his absenteeism. It is the contention of counsel that the idea of an employee who disobeys his employer, exits his employment and turns around to claim damages for unproven wrongful dismissal or termination of employment is totally unsustainable in law, because the Claimant was not terminated wrongfully or dismissed; instead he breached the terms of his contract by disobedience and absenteeism through voluntary exit from the employment of the 1st Defendant. Concluding, counsel submitted that the Claimant's case lacks merit and falls short of the provision of Section 131(1) Evidence Act, 2011 which reads: whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. It was further submitted by Counsel that the Claimant did not show in his case that he was wrongfully terminated or that he is entitled to the sums of money claimed as damages against the Defendants. The Court was urged to hold that the Claimant’s entire claim fails and dismiss the case with substantial costs awarded against the Claimant. The 2nd Defendant’s Final Written Address filed on the 20th day of December 2017 addressed the Claimant’s Notice of Non-Admission which Counsel for the Claimant had filed on 22nd June 2017 pursuant to Order 34 of the Rules of Court, wherein counsel had objected to the admissibility of Exhibit D1 on the following grounds: i. The document is brought to overreach the 2nd Defendant's case. ii. The Document did not capture the Henry Marc Moore’s account from where the said sum of money purportedly missed. iii. It did not capture the purported Report of the auditors set by the 2nd Defendant to investigate the criminal allegation against the clamant. iv. It is an afterthought document aimed at deceiving the Honourable Court. Leave was granted to parties by the Court to address the Claimant’s Counsel’s objection in their respective final written addresses. Counsel therefore responded to the Claimant’s objection to Exhibit Dl, by referring to the case of AKANINWO vs. NSIRIM (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 439 at 475 paras E -F, where the term “overreach” was described to be “to circumvent, outwit or get the better of by cunning or artifice; that is by a clever trick.” Similarly, the case of OLATIDOYE vs. THE STATE (2010) LPELR-9079 (CA) was cited by Counsel, in which “afterthought” was held to mean “a thing thought of after the occasion; a later thought or reflection or modification”. Counsel argued that following the pronouncements of the superior courts highlighted earlier, for a document to be overreaching or an afterthought, the party tendering it must have failed to include certain facts in its case, and in a bid to destroy the case of its opponent, amend its own case to correct all defects in their case, after being privy to the case of its opponents. It is Counsel’s argument that in the extant suit, the 2nd Defendant in paragraph 10, and paragraph 11 of the initial Statement of Defence, and amended Statement of Defence denied that the Claimant’s employment was terminated because of fraudulent activities but was simply returned to the 1st Defendant as his services were no longer required by them, to which Exhibit D1 was attached to support these averments. Again, counsel submitted that the basis for admissibility of a document is relevance, particularly if the said document can determine an issue in contention before the Court, in line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the case of HARUNA vs. A.G. FEDERATION (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 632) 1617 at 1628. In addition, relying on the case of BUNGE vs. GOVERNOR RIVERS STATE (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt.995) 573 at 629- 630, counsel submitted that documentary evidence is the best proof of oral averments, thus the said Exhibit D1 is highly relevant to resolving the dispute regarding the reason for which the Claimant was returned to his employers by the 2nd Defendant. The Court was urged to admit it. Similarly, it was argued by counsel that Exhibit D1 is admissible in law, and the “doctrine” of after-thought put forward by the Claimant’s Counsel is not a relevant consideration for rejecting it, because the exhibit complied with Section 84 of the Evidence Act in respect of electronically generated evidence, as well as Order 40 (1) (3) of the NICN Rules. Furthermore, counsel reasoned that the Claimant having never filed a reply to the 2nd Defendant's original statement of Defence or the amended one filed on 12th June 2017, is deemed to have conceded all the averments contained in them, in conformity with the principle enunciated in the cases of: i. A.G. ABIA STATE vs. A. G. FEDERATION (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt.940) 452 at 513 ii. IWUOHA vs. NIPOST (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt. 822) 308 at 341 iii. REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE LIVING CHRIST MISSION & ORS vs. ADUBA & ANOR (2016) LPELR- 41591(CA). From the foregoing, Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the submissions of the Claimant in its entirety and admit Exhibit D1. With respect to the Claimant’s objections to the admissibility of Exhibit D1 on the ground that same does not reflect a Henry Marc Moore account, or a purported auditor’s report on an investigation which was conducted by the 2nd Defendant over criminal allegations levied against the Claimant; counsel submitted that the Claimant was merely returned to the 1st Defendant, because his services were no longer required by the 2nd Defendant. In this regard, DW2 stated under oath, that although there was an issue with the account of a customer of the 2nd Defendant named Henry Marc Moore, there were no criminal allegations levied against the Claimant in this respect, neither was that the reason for returning the Claimant to his employers, and it was the structural rebranding of the 2nd Defendant that made the Claimant’s position unavailable, the reason for his return. The DW2 in her witness statement on oath, and under cross examination stated that there was never a time when the 2nd Defendant caused its auditors to investigate the Claimant, this point having been denied filed before this Honourable Court. Again, counsel submitted that Exhibit D1 seeks to give credence to the fact and averments made by the 2nd Defendant, on the principle pronounced in the cases of IDESOLI vs. ORDIA (1997) 3 NWLR (Pt .491) 17 at 27 and OMISORE & ANOR vs. AREGBESOLA & ORS (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205 at 280, that averments made in pleadings must be substantiated by documentary evidence. Also, the 2nd Defendant’s Counsel submitted that Section 12 (2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 as well as Order 1(9) of the NICN Rules confers on the Court power to depart from any radical provision of the Evidence Act to ensure substantial justice in a case. Counsel urged the Court to exercise this discretionary power in favour of the 2nd Defendant and admit Exhibit D1 into evidence, having demonstrated that the said Exhibit D1 was pleaded, relevant and in an admissible state. After responding to the Claimant’s objections, two issues for determination were formulated as follows: (i.) Whether there was privity of contract between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant. (ii) Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in the Amended Statement of Facts dated 27th May 2015. On issue one, counsel opined that it is settled law that where an employer and employee enter into a contract of employment, both parties are bound by the terms and conditions of that contract, and the parties’ obligations, rights and liabilities are defined by such contract. Counsel referred to the case OLANIYAN & ORS. vs. UNILAG & ANOR (1985) NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 at 669 where it was held that contracts of employment like all other contracts their creation and termination are both subject to the general principles governing the law of contract. Hence where the contract of employment is in writing, the parties are bound by the express terms and conditions so stipulated. See also WAEC vs. OSHIONEBO (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 370) 1501 at 1512 PARAS E-F; and LAYADE vs. PANALPINA WORLD TRANS. NIG. LTD. (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 456) 544. In the present case, counsel submitted that there is no dispute with regards to the fact that a contract of employment was in existence between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant, was regulated by Exhibit C1, which provided in part that: “Vic-Lawrence & Associates (VLA) shall employ you on a contract basis and outsource your services to our client (Oceanic Bank International Plc) as Teller”. Exhibit C2 also indicates that the 1st Defendant was the Claimant's employer at the material time the Claimant was seconded to the 2nd Defendant. It was argued by Counsel that the doctrine of privity of contract is all about the sanctity of contract as between the parties to the contract, an agreement is not binding on third parties; and the fact that a person may benefit from the performance of a contract does not alone give such person the right to enforce the contract, neither can any of the contracting parties sue the third party on the performance of any of the contractual obligations. Thus, it is Counsel’s opinion that the employment contract is only binding between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant, and the 2nd Defendant cannot be held liable for failure of any of the parties to abide by the terms of the contract or enforce its terms. The Court was referred to the case of NEGBENEBOR vs. NEGBENEBOR (1971) NSCC 202, where the Supreme Court held that third parties cannot themselves enforce a contract made for their benefit, but the person with whom the contract is made is entitled to enforce the contract, a contract only affects the parties to it and cannot be enforced by or against a person who is not a party, even if the contract is made for his benefit and purports to give him the right to sue or to make him liable. The case of DALHATU vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL, KATSINA STATE & ORS (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 405) 1651 at 1678 - 1679 was cited by counsel in explanation of “secondment” as: “to be sent to another department or office in order to do or carry out a different job for a short period of time”. According to Counsel, the Claimant admitted that he was employed by the 1st Defendant but seconded to the 2nd Defendant; a fact corroborated by the testimony of the 1st Defendant’s witness Mr. Tony Adebisi. It was submitted by Counsel that based on the provisions of the above judicial authority; it is evident that the Claimant during the period of his employment remained a staff of the 1st Defendant, all his salaries and all relevant trainings he received during this period were provided by the 1st Defendant, showing that the 2nd Defendant was not privy to any contract of employment between the 1st Defendant and the Claimant, and the 2nd Defendant also did not maintain any contractual relationship with the Claimant, who at all times remained an employee of the 1st Defendant. Furthermore, counsel submitted that there are certain incidents of an employment relationship created between an employer and employee, they include and are not limited to the following: who is the hiring authority; who reserves the right to terminate the employee's appointment/ employment; who controls the employee and who pays the employee. Addressing the incidents of an employment relationships case, counsel argued that from the evidence adduced in this case, as well as Exhibits Cl, C2 and C3, the 1st Defendant possessed the hiring power of the 1st Defendant. Again, it was submitted by Counsel that Exhibit C1 regulating the employment relationship between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant provides that “termination of appointment by either party hereto shall be by giving the other at least two weeks’ notice in writing of intention to terminate or two weeks basic salary in lieu of notice”, while Exhibit C3 stated as follows: “You are hereby notified that your service is no longer required by Eco Bank Nigeria Plc and by this letter Vic-Lawrence & Associates Limited is withdrawing you from the bank effective immediately”, establishing that the 1st Defendant had the right to recall the Claimant from the 2nd Defendant which was done by Exhibit C3. In the same vein, counsel submitted that the averments contained in the Claimant's pleadings with regards to the fact that he was employed by the 1st Defendant but outsourced to the 2nd Defendant, was validated by the evidence led that the 1st Defendant issued the Claimant an Identification card, and was responsible for regular training sessions and workshops to boost the capacity of its employees including the Claimant, to deliver on the task(s) they are hired to perform. Also, counsel reasoned that clause 10 of Exhibit Cl confirms the controlling powers of the 1st Defendant as it concerns the powers to terminate the employment relationship with the Claimant indicating that the 1st Defendant reserves the right to evaluate the Claimant's performance based on its performance policy as communicated to the Claimant. Counsel argued that the Claimant under cross-examination admitted paragraph 24 of the 2nd Defendant’s statement of defence and DW1’s testimony that the 1st Defendant was directly responsible for payment of his salary and benefits while he was on secondment to the 2nd Defendant. Relying on his submissions, Counsel stated that it is clear that the Claimant was never employed by the 2nd Defendant, and that the 2nd Defendant was not privy to the employment relationship between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant. In responding to the Court’s directive to parties to consider the concept of joint employment, counsel submitted that joint employment denotes that an individual is employed by at least two entities, which are responsible together and individually for compliance with employment regulations, which is alien to the Nigerian Labour Law jurisprudence, because employment relations are principally governed by the Contract of Employment, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the Labour Act, relevant labour law statues as enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, International treaties domesticated by the National Assembly and International Best practices; all of which do not provide for the concept of joint employment. Counsel went further to argue that the concept of joint employment is firmly rooted in Fair Labour Standard Act 1938, 29 US Code (applicable in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A, and since the 1999 Constitution (as amended), and National Industrial Court Act 2006 has not conferred jurisdiction on this Court to take cognizance of the US Fair Labour Standard Act 1938, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to give effect to the concept of joint employment enshrined in the US Fair Labour Standard Act 1938 as applicable in the United States. The Court’s attention was drawn to the case of CHIGBU vs. TONIMAS NIG. LTD (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt .984) 189 at 213, where the Supreme Court held that: “where a local statute is available and applies to a particular local situation, courts of law have no jurisdiction to go all the way to England to search for an English statute. This is because by the local statute, the law makers intend it to apply in the locality and not any English statute which is foreign and inapplicable. Much as I appreciate the colonial tie between England and Nigeria, it will seriously hamper and compromise our sovereignty if we continue to go on a borrowing 'spree', if I may so unguardedly call it, to England for the laws of that country without any justifiable reason. Nigeria is Nigeria and England is England. Statutes of England cannot apply to Nigeria as a matter of course, even the so-called statutes of general application.” See also: U.T.C. LTD vs. PAMOTEI & ORS. (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 103) 244 at 301; and DANGANA vs. USMAN (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1349)50 at 79. Counsel urged the Court to hold that the US Fair Labour Standard Act 1938 is inapplicable to our domestic laws and to give effect to its provisions would defeat the very essence of the jurisdiction of this Court. With respect to issue two, counsel submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought. Regarding the Claimant’s first relief, it was argued by counsel that a declaratory relief is not granted solely on admission, its purpose is essentially an equitable relief, granted discretionarily by the court to pronounce an existing state of affairs on law in the Claimant’s favour as established from the averments in the statement of facts and evidence led in support of same. Counsel relied on the case of EMENIKE vs. PDP & 3 ORS (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1315) 556 at 590 paras A - B, where it held as follows: “The burden of proof on the Plaintiff in establishing the declaratory relief to the satisfaction of the Court is quite heavy in the sense that such declaratory reliefs are not granted even on admission by the Defendant where the Plaintiff fails to establish his own entitlement to the declaration by his own evidence.” In counsel’s view, the Claimant has failed to prove that he was dismissed from the employment of the Defendant, or that his dismissal was wrongful, to warrant any right to sustain this relief. Counsel urged the Court not to grant this relief, because the claim is most unlawful and inequitable. On relief two, counsel submitted that the Claimant was not employed by the 2nd Defendant, and a relief is not granted as a matter of course but based on substantiated evidence which has been proven in the trial or hearing of the case. A Claimant has a duty to prove its entitlements to the reliefs sought in its case; in conformity with the decision in DIBAL vs. EGUMA (2016) LPELR-41236 (CA) where it was held that a Court of law is not a charitable institution and its duty in civil cases is to render unto everyone according to his proven claim, it cannot grant a claim not proved or supported by evidence. Also, counsel submitted that all the evidence led throughout the trial of this suit reveals that the Claimant has neither established any contract of employment which he entered with the 2nd Defendant, nor any purported breach of the employment; in face of the state of evidence in the present case, the Claimant's relief against the 2nd Defendant must fail. The court was urged by counsel to discountenance this relief sought by the Claimant as because it is unfounded. About the third and fourth reliefs, counsel argued that judicial precedents have settled the issue that a Claimant in a claim for breach of contract will only be entitled to damages that were reasonably contemplated at the time the contract was executed, and the 2nd Defendant in the extant suit cannot be liable for the breach of the Claimant's contract of employment because it was not privy to the contractual arrangement between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant, the Claimant has failed to establish that his contract of employment was terminated by the 1st Defendant. In the event of a holding that the 2nd Defendant breached the terms of the Claimant's contract of employment with the 1st Defendant, Counsel submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to general damages, but only damages contemplated at the time the contract was executed, arising from foreseeable losses. See ATIVE vs. KABELMETAL (NIG.) LTD. (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399 at 425. See also OMONUWA vs. WAHABI (1976) 4 SC 62 at 69- 70 where it was held thus: “In the contemplation of such a loss there can be no room for claims which are merely speculative or sentimental unless these are specially provided for by the terms of the contract. It is only in this connection that damage can be properly described as 'special' in the conception of contractual awards and it must be borne in mind that damages normally recoverable are based on the normal & presumed consequences of the breach complained of...” The attention of the court was also drawn to the following cases- 1. KHATOUN ENTERPRISES LIMITED vs. UNITED NIGERIA TEXTILES & ANOR (2014) LPELR- 3487 (CA); 2. AGU vs. GENERAL OIL LIMITED (2015) LPELR- 24613(SC); 3. MOBIL OIL NIG. LTD vs. AKINFOSILE (1969) 1 NMLR 227; 4. ARIONS TRADING & ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD vs. THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF OGUN STATE (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 26; 5. CHITEX IND. LTD. vs. O.B.I. (NIG.) LTD. (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt.945)392 It was submitted by Counsel that in the event that the Claimant's case succeeds, the Claimant is only entitled to two weeks’ salary in lieu of the notice as specified under his contract of employment, which are the damages contemplated at the time the contract of employment between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant was executed. The third relief seeking Twenty Million Naira as general damages for breach of contract must fail, based on the fact that same is wholly speculative, far reaching, sentimental and unsupported by evidence. See AGIP (NIG.) LTD & 8 ORS vs. EZENDU & 9 ORS (2010) 1 SC (Pt II) 98 at 162 -163. Again, counsel urged the court to dismiss the claim for N45,000,000 (Forty Five Million Naira Only) in general damages, which are speculative especially in view of the Claimant’s admission under cross-examination by the 1st Defendant's counsel, that he was following the instruction of his Counsel by praying for this relief. Similarly, Counsel was of the view that the Claimant having failed to establish any contract of employment between him and the 2nd Defendant or the breach of same, cannot claim wrongful dismissal against the 2nd Defendant or damages. The Court was referred to the case of OGBIRI vs. N.A.O.C (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 208 at 225, where it was decided that the law is settled that where there is no evidence to support the claim of damages, the claim ought to be dismissed, the award of damages is discretionary and it has to be exercised judiciously and judicially, and are only awarded against those who actually caused them. In addition, counsel asserted that the Claimant has failed to transfer the burden of proof placed on him to prove that he was indeed wrongfully dismissed by the 2nd Defendant as required by Section 136(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. His claim against the 2nd Defendant cannot succeed. With respect to the fifth relief, counsel submitted that the law has since been settled on the fact that such relief is not grantable, being unconnected to the cause of action sought to be ventilated by the Claimant, as was held in MICHAEL vs. ACCESS BANK (2017) LPELR-41981 (CA), GUINNESS NIGERIA PLC vs. NWOKE (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135 at 150 paras D - E, and NWANJI vs. COASTAL SERVICES (NIG.) LTD. (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 885) 552 at 568 - 570. Also, counsel argued that before the cost of action/solicitor's fees can be recovered in this instant action, it must be predicated on the averments of the Claimant and evidence in that regard because the cost of an action is in the nature of special damages which must be specifically pleaded and specially proved; which the Claimant in this case failed to specifically prove the cost he incurred in litigating this action, in failing to lead any iota of evidence on the cost he incurred in litigating this suit, it would be highly unconscionable for the Court to award cost in favour of the Claimant without justiciable reasons for doing so. See NNPC vs. KLIFCO (NIG) LTD (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 209 at page 234-235, paras H-B. Counsel urged the court to dismiss this relief which is not supported by evidence and is at variance with laid down judicial authorities. In conclusion, counsel submitted that the entire case of the Claimant must fail in view of the above stated reasons. He urged the Court to dismiss this suit for being frivolous, vexatious, misconceived and without any merit. The Claimant’s Final Written Address was filed on the 22nd day of March 2018, wherein Learned counsel for the Claimant formulated three issues for determination: 1. Whether or not the Claimant has proved his case against the Defendants and is entitled to all the reliefs sought against them on the preponderance of evidence he placed before the Honourable court. 2. Whether or not the Defendants are jointly and severally liable to the Claimant for wrongful and unlawful dismissal and breach of contract of employment between them. 3. Whether the Defendants have discharged the onus shifted to them to disprove the evidence placed by the Claimant before the Honourable court. On the first issue, Counsel was of the view that based on the material evidence placed before the court, particularly the last paragraphs of Exhibit C3 the dismissal or withdrawal letter dated 23rd April 2015 which reads: “please respond in writing to the allegation against you at the branch which led to the loss of customer's money in the branch. Kindly respond to this letter”, the Claimant has established unequivocally that his dismissal was based on an unproved criminal allegation of theft and fraud by the Defendants of causing loss of money in the 2nd Defendant customer's account belonging to one Harry Marc Moore. It was contended by counsel that the 1st Defendant did not state how much money was missing in their client's customer's account but in paragraph 8 of the DW1's statement on oath, he stated that the Claimant closed the account of a customer named Henry Marc Moore, an allegation investigated and found to be true against the Claimant. See paragraphs 11 and 14 of the 1st and 2nd Defendants witness statements on oath respectively. Again, counsel argued that it was the case of the 2nd Defendant that it never set any audit or panel against the Claimant, while it was the case of the 1st Defendant at the trial that it issued query to the Claimant who answered the query using a lawyer instead of answering the said query by himself being an internal affair of the company, and that they have not dismissed or terminated the Claimant up till date but only withdrew him from the services of the 2nd Defendant. Counsel submitted that since the withdrawal or dismissal was based on criminal allegation of fraud and theft, it is a panel issue where the Claimant and the Defendants would be given the opportunity to cross-examine themselves, and the Defendants ought to have set up an internal fact-finding panel of enquiry and give all the parties involved an opportunity to cross-examine themselves based on the criminal allegation. It was submitted by counsel that where an employer dismisses an employee based on an unproven criminal allegation, the employee is entitled to damages for wrongful or unlawful dismissal in line with the decision in UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD vs. OGBOH (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 167) 369. Furthermore, counsel contended that the position of the law where an employee was dismissed on the allegation of criminal offence against him by his employer without trial in court or without even administrative fact-finding panels or alerting the police is a constitutional issue based on fundamental right of citizens enshrined in Section 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which reads that: “in the determination of his civil rights and obligations including any question or determination by or against any government or authority a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by Law and constituted in such number as to secure its independence and impartiality.” In the same vein, counsel argued that in any allegation of criminal offence against any person, the accused shall be given a fair hearing to the said allegation, any dismissal based on unproven criminal allegation cannot stand; relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in OLAREWAJU vs. AFRIBANK NIG PLC (2001) 90 LRCN 2771, where the court held that a person accused of a criminal offence, must first be tried in a court of law where the complaints against him will be examined in public and where he will get a fair hearing as set out in the Constitution; and where the dismissal of a servant is based on a criminal charge or allegation, such allegation must first be proved before the dismissal can stand. Counsel’s argument is that the implication of this above cited decision is that such dismissal is not only wrongful but also unlawful, that the servant is still under the employment of the master and entitled to his salaries and allowances till judgment day. Again, counsel contended that reliefs available to an employee who alleges that his contract of employment was wrongfully or unlawfully terminated will depend on whether the employment is governed by a statute or by ordinary contract of employment i.e. mere master/servant employment; where the employment is one with statutory flavour, the employee may be entitled to reinstatement and may also be entitled to claim for damages as an alternative for claim for reinstatement. In such cases damages will be calculated as salaries and other benefits from the period when he was unlawfully dismissed to the day judgment is delivered, but where the employment is a mere master servant relationship the employee affected would not be entitled to re-instatement as wrongful dismissal or termination only entitles him to award of damages which will be calculated as amount the employee would have earned as salaries and allowances if the dismissal or termination was not done. See the case of UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD v OGBOH (Supra). It was argued by counsel that the Claimant is entitled to all the reliefs sought, having proved his case that his dismissal, termination or withdrawal was wrongful and unlawful, and it is clear that the Claimant is still in the employment of the Defendants and is entitled to all the salaries and allowances he would have earned from the day of his wrongful dismissal till the judgment, particularly in view of the 1st Defendant alluding to the fact the Claimant is still their staff, who started with the salary of Five Hundred and Forty Thousand Naira (N540,000.00) per annum in 2007 and was on salary of One Million Eight Thousand Naira (N1,008,000.00) per annum at the time he was wrongfully dismissed on 23rd April, 2015, about three years ago. Counsel argued that the 1st Defendant’s statement under cross examination that the Claimant ought to have replied their query personally instead of using a lawyer, is a defence unknown in law, because Section 36(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that a person accused of a criminal offence shall be entitled to defend himself in person or by a legal practitioner of his own choice, in respect of the fact that an accusation of criminal offence against any employee takes the whole matter to a public domain and is no longer an issue of private or internal affair of the employer. On the issue of assessment of General damages to be awarded to an employee wrongfully dismissed or terminated, counsel relied on the case of BRIG-GENERAL BAM ADEKUNLE v. ROCKVIEW HOTEL LTD (2003) 36 WRN 30 at 132, where damages were defined as pecuniary compensation obtainable by a successful party in an action for a wrong which is either a tort or a breach of contract. Counsel urged the Court to grant the Claimant all the reliefs he is seeking, having proved his case against the Defendants jointly and severally. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION vs. GODWIN OLUSEGUN KOLAWOLE AJAYI (2000) 2 WRN at 133. Regarding issue two, counsel submitted that from the material evidence the Claimant placed before the court, the Defendants are obviously liable jointly and severally for wrongful and unlawful dismissal of the Claimant, and are also liable for the breach of the contract of employment between them and the Claimant, with the 1st Defendant being a staffing firm or company that employed the Claimant under a contract of employment agreement dated 25th January 2007, and outsourced or transferred his services to the oceanic Bank international Plc as a Teller and later in 2012 transferred him to ECOBANK NIGERIA LIMITED, the 2nd defendant still as a Teller with the same conditions and terms of service. It was argued by Counsel that there was contractual relationship between the 1st Defendant and the Claimant, and also between the 2nd Defendant and the Claimant, in view of the Labour Act 2004, which defines an employer as “any person who has entered a contract of employment to employ any other person as a worker either for himself or for the services of any other person”. Section 10(1) of the same Act allows an employer to enter into contract of employment with a worker (employee) and outsource the services of the said worker or employee to another employer, while Section 11 of the said Act provides also for the termination of employment by notice dependent on the length of service (number of years or week) the employee has worked with employer. On the principle of co-employment which the Court ordered parties to address the court on, counsel submitted that the employment relationship between the 1st and 2nd Defendants and the Claimant is a typical example of co-employment, as Co-employment refers to a situation where an employee would be regarded as being employed by employers anyone of which may be bound by the terms of the contract of employment; a relationship between 2 employers where each employers has duties and obligations as an employer towards the employee. It is a relationship between two or more employers in which each employer has actual or potential legal rights and duties with respect to the same employee. It was contended by counsel that in the extant case, co-employment is evident in the manner the 2nd Defendant extended its control over the Claimant beyond the 1st Defendant and took over the role of the primary employer, as it was the 2nd Defendant that assigned daily duties to the Claimant, who discharged the said duties according to the 2nd Defendant’s preferences. Similarly, counsel submitted that Exhibit C1 (paragraph 1) under period of service makes it clear that the bank, 2nd Defendant has the primary control of the Claimant while the staffing company, the 1st Defendant has only secondary control of the Claimant, the employee, with two supervisors over the Claimant, one from the 1st and 2nd Defendants. Further, counsel submitted that Section 10(1) of Labour Act envisages the concept of co-employment, which is totally different from joint employment discussed by the 2nd Defendant’s Counsel. Counsel urged the court to hold that the 1st and 2nd Defendants qualify as co-employers of the Claimant, and are therefore jointly and severally liable to him for wrongful dismissal and termination of contract of employment. Counsel argued further that an analysis of the roles played by the Defendants with regard to the unlawful and wrongful dismissal or termination of the Claimant’s contract of employment, indicate that it was the 2nd Defendant that demanded and influenced the 1st Defendant to dismiss or withdraw the Claimant from their services because they were no longer satisfied with the conduct of the Claimant, and this buttressed the fact that both Defendants are liable. Also, counsel argued that the 1st Defendant averred in paragraph 10 of its statement on oath that the 2nd Defendant's auditors indicted the Claimant, and that on its own personal investigation, also indicted the Claimant based on the summary of the 2nd Defendant’s auditor’s report. While the 2nd Defendant denied making any criminal allegation against Claimant, or investigating him, it failed to challenge or refute paragraphs 7-10 and 14 of DW1’s witness statement on oath or Exhibit C3 which alleged that the Claimant caused, the loss of money in the 2nd Defendant's customers account. Also, counsel contended that the 2nd Defendant counsel’s failure to cross-examine the DW1's averments in paragraphs 7-10 and 14 of his witness statement on oath or on Exhibit C3 implied that he accepts the truth of the matter as led in evidence by the DW1. In such instance, the Court is bound to accept this unchallenged piece of evidence. See OFORLETE vs. STATE (2000) 80 LRCN 2670 at 2694. Regarding issue three, counsel submitted that the Defendants have failed woefully to discharge the onus shifted to them by the Claimant to disprove the evidence he placed before the court, because while the Claimant tendered five exhibits including Exhibit C2 to support the fact that the Defendants unlawfully dismissed and terminated him based on malice by levelling an unproven criminal allegation of theft and fraud on him, the Defendants did not tender any document to disprove the evidence of the Claimant, as required by Sections 133 (1) and 133 (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 that show how the burden of proof moves between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Counsel submitted that the evidence in this case placed by the Defendants, made the case of the Claimant stronger. The 2nd Defendant, instead of denying the material allegations of facts raised by the Claimant specifically, merely denied the facts raised by the said Claimant in his statement of claim without traversing any as required by the rules of pleadings in our courts, and this is fatal to the case of the 2nd Defendants, in light of the decision in the case of OSHODI vs. EYIFUNMI (2000) LRCN 877, where it was held that a denial of a material allegation of fact must not be general or evasive but specific, and any allegation of fact not denied specifically or by necessary implication shall be taken as established at the hearing. See also ODIBA vs. MUEMUE (1999) 6 SCNJ 245 at 253. According to counsel, though the 2nd Defendant denied having any contractual relationship with the Claimant, the evidence before the court shows that they are the de facto employer of the Claimant, and they provided money to the 1st Defendant to pay the Claimant’s salaries since the inception of the employment contract, and contrary to the 2nd Defendant’s denial that the removal of the services of the Claimant was based on a criminal allegation. Under cross-examination by the 1st Defendant's counsel, DW2, Oluwabukola Adeyanju admitted that really there was an issue with the account of Henry Marc Moore with the Claimant. Further to the Claimant counsel’s Notice of non-admission challenging Exhibit D1, counsel submitted that if Exhibit D1 is the report which the 1st Defendant got from the 2nd Defendant complaining of the loss of money in Henry Marc Account and the auditor’s report, the said exhibit failed to capture the vital facts as stated in paragraph 7-10 of the 1st Defendant witness statement on oath that the Claimant closed the account of one Henry Marc Moore, the 2nd Defendant’s customer. It was argued by Counsel that by leaving out such crucial information, the main issue why parties are in court, Exhibit D1 lacks credibility, and is not from a credible source, considering the decision in GOODNEWS AGBI vs CHIEF AUDU OGBEH & ORS (2006) 7 MJSC 1 at 23, where it was held that credible evidence in this context means the evidence worthy of belief and for evidence to be worthy of belief and credit, it must not only proceed from credible source it must be credible in itself in the sense that it should be natural, reasonable and probable in view of the entire circumstances. In Counsel’s view, the issue before the court is that the Claimant was dismissed or terminated or withdrawn from the services of the 2nd Defendant based on unproven criminal allegation of theft of money belonging to one Henry Marc Moore, 2nd Defendant’s customer, for which the law is clear that where a person is accused of a criminal offence he must first be tried in court of law where the complaints against him will be examined in public and where he will get a fair hearing as set out in the constitution. See OLAREWAJU vs. AFRIBANK NIG. PLC (supra). Counsel urged the Court not to attach any weight to Exhibit D1, because it is not relevant, did not emanate from a credible source or capture the main issue of this case that can help the court arrive at a just decision. Again, counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant’s statement during trial corroborates the Claimant’s case that his services were not terminated. The implication is that the Claimant is still under the employment of the Defendants till date, and is entitled to his salaries and allowances from the 23rd day of April, 2015 to the judgment date of this case. In the same vein, counsel argued that the 1st Defendant’s issue about the Claimant responding to his query by a lawyer is unconstitutional, in view of the fact that Exhibit C3 was a query accusing the Claimant of causing loss of money in the 2nd Defendant's customer's account and a dismissal or termination letter at the same time. Similarly, counsel reasoned that the principal ingredients of proof of theft is that the thief stole with intent to cause wrongful gain to himself or wrongful loss to that person. In relation to this case, when the 1st Defendant said in Exhibit C3 that the Claimant caused the loss of money in the 2nd Defendant’s customer's account, the implication was that the Claimant had made wrongful financial gain to himself and has caused financial loss to the 2nd Defendant's customer, to which Section 36(6) c of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) operates to afford the right to “defend himself in person or by a legal practitioner of his own choice”. Furthermore, counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant never denied receipt of Exhibit C4, through which the Claimant refuted the allegations of Exhibit C3, which was as offensive as paragraph 14 of DW1’s statement which insinuated that the Claimant is a fraudulent criminal completely damaging his image, especially as these criminal allegations were never investigated by the 1st Defendant or police or court to give the Claimant opportunity to cross- examine his accuser(s). From the foregoing, Counsel urged the Court to grant all the reliefs sought by the Claimant, having proved his case on the preponderance of evidence he placed before the court. The 2nd Defendant’s Counsel's Reply on points of law to the Claimant's final written address was filed on 13th April 2018. Counsel was of the view that the Claimant's counsel lack of response to his submissions in his final address demonstrating the Claimant's lack of entitlement to his fifth relief amounts to an admission that the Claimant is not entitled to it. Also, counsel argued that the Claimant agreed with the 2nd Defendant that the concept of joint employment emanates from the US laws, which has not been domesticated in Nigeria making them inapplicable to this case. Further, counsel contended that the Claimant is deemed to admit all the submissions of the 2nd Defendant’s Counsel in his final address, which were not refuted in the Claimant counsel’s address. Similarly, counsel argued that contrary to the Claimant’s counsel’s argument that Exhibit D1 does not reflect a Henry Marc Moore account, or a purported auditor's report on an investigation which was conducted by the 2nd Defendant over criminal allegations levied against the Claimant; the purpose of Exhibit D1 was merely to substantiate its averment in paragraph 1 of its amended Statement of Defence and paragraph 13 of the Witness Statement on Oath of DW2, that the Claimant was returned to his employer as his services were no longer required by the 2nd Defendant, and the Claimant and the 1st Defendant have not been able to provide credible evidence of any such allegation made by the 2nd Defendant, or the elusive auditor's report of the 2nd Defendant which gave rise to these averments, to which end counsel cited the case of AJERO vs. UGORJI (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 621) 1 at 19 where it was held that a mere assertion should not be accepted without proof, and if no such evidence is called, the averment is deemed to be abandoned. On the strength of the above judicial pronouncement, counsel urged the court to disregard the submission of the Claimant in this regard and admit Exhibit D1 into evidence. Regarding the issues raised in the Claimant counsel’s final written address, counsel submitted that there is still no evidence of a contract of employment between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant before this Court. The Claimant at the trial of this instant suit did not allude to the existence of such a contractual relationship between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant, and the definition of an “employer” from Section 91 of the Labour Act does not avail the Claimant in respect of his relationship with the 2nd Defendant, because it was the 1st Defendant who entered into an employment contract with the Claimant to provide services for the 2nd Defendant; as shown by Exhibit C1. As a result, counsel opined that the fact that the Claimant was employed to provide services to the 2nd Defendant does not cause the contractual relationship between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant to abate; neither does it create a contractual relationship between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant. Again, counsel repeated his earlier argument that the Claimant has failed to establish the incidents of an employment relationship between him and the 2nd Defendant, and the testimony of the Claimant in his witness statement on oath and at the trial of this suit maintained the fact that the Claimant was always employed by the 1st Defendant and seconded to the 2nd Defendant. Contrary to the Claimant's assertion, it was the 1st Defendant who was solely responsible for the payment of the Claimant's remuneration, a fact confirmed by the Claimant as well as DW1 during the trial of this suit. Counsel contended that the 1st Defendant maintained sufficient control over the affairs of the Claimant at all material times during his employment and also reserved the right to terminate its contract with the Claimant in the event of misconduct or breach of the terms of the said contract of employment, as evinced by Exhibits C1 and C3, proof that there was no existing contract of employment or an employment relationship between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant. It is therefore counsel’s view that the Claimant cannot hold the 2nd Defendant liable for the termination or breach of a contract of employment to which the 2nd Defendant was never privy. The 2nd Defendant only maintained an agreement with the 1st Defendant for the purposes of outsourcing labour, and consequent upon the above submissions and in line with the pronouncement of the Court of Appeal in the case of NEGBENEBOR vs. NEGBENEBOR (supra), DALHATU vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL, KATSINA STATE & ORS (supra), counsel urged the court to entirely discountenance the submissions of the Claimant. Counsel maintained that the aim of a party's pleading is to narrow the field of controversy between the parties, producing in the end, live issues for determination, but the Claimant did not plead any fact to suggest or prove that the 2nd Defendant induced the breach of the Claimant's employment. In the same vein, counsel argued that the Claimant has not been able to establish by evidence his claim of a criminal allegation levied against him, and the address of his counsel cannot take the place of evidence; repeating the evidence of DW2 during the trial of this suit that although there was an issue with the account of a customer of the 2nd Defendant named Henry Marc Moore, there were no criminal allegations levied against the Claimant. In this respect, counsel submitted that to the extent that the Claimant is unable to prove the existence of any alleged criminal allegations levied against him, his assertions should be disregarded for being wholly speculative and unsubstantiated by any credible evidence, in conformity with AGIP (NIG.) LTD & 8 ORS vs. EZENDU & 9 ORS (supra). Again, counsel contended that the concept of co-employment is not contemplated by Section 10(1) of the Labour Act, the provision being only suggestive of transfer of employment, which cannot avail the Claimant. In the absence of a contract of employment or an employment relationship between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant, the 2nd Defendant cannot be held to be an employer of the Claimant in any ramification. With respect to reliefs 1 and 2 sought by the Claimant, counsel adopted his earlier submission in this regard to the effect that the Claimant has failed or refused to place any evidence to sustain his entitlement to these reliefs and therefore same must fail. Also, Claimant counsel’s arguments concerning a denial of fair hearing is baseless in light of the fact that the Claimant is yet to demonstrate with credible evidence that he maintained any employment with the 2nd Defendant, or that his said employment was wrongfully dismissed by the 2nd Defendant. See AJERO vs. UGORJI (supra) and AGIP (NIG.) LTD & 8 ORS vs. EZENDU & 9 ORS (supra). It is counsel’s further submission that with the lack of evidence of contract of employment, breach of contract, or wrongful dismissal between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant, the Claimant’s claims for damages fail. Also, the cases cited by the Claimant’s counsel defining damages cannot apply to the Claimant who has failed to establish any loss occasioned to him as a result of any action of the 2nd Defendant which will result in the award of damages. Also, counsel argued that the Claimant’s counsel was mistaken about the burden of proof shifting to the Defendants in this case; because a review of the 2nd Defendant’s processes reveal that the 2nd Defendant adequately denied and led evidence to support its stance that that Claimant was never employed by the 2nd Defendant, but the Claimant was merely seconded to it. In conclusion, counsel urged the court to dismiss the claims of the Claimant in its entirety, having failed to establish his entitlement to the reliefs sought in his originating processes. Claimant’s counsel filed a Reply on points of Law to the 1st Defendant’s final written address. Regarding the second issue formulated by counsel to the 1st Defendant, Counsel stated that it should be expunged having not been distilled from the evidence placed before this court, in line with Order 45(2)(c)of the NICN Rules 2017, which provides that a final written address of a party should contain only issues arising from the evidence before the court. Again, counsel submitted that the said issue offends the principles guiding pleadings, that parties are bound by their pleadings, the said issue 2 is completely outside the pleadings and the evidence in this case. Furthermore, counsel argued that in the 1st Defendant’s statement of defence, and statement on oath by the sole witness, none of their paragraphs raised the issue of absconding, abandonment and voluntary exit of the Claimant from his primary employer, a point that indicates that issue 2 raised in its final written address was distilled outside pleadings and evidence, and ought to be expunged as it goes to no issue. Counsel relied on the case of OLOHUNDE vs. ADEYOJI (2000) 79 LRCN 2297 at 2323, where it was held that parties are bound by their pleadings, and any evidence which is at variance with the averments in the pleadings goes to no issue and should be disregarded by the court. Also, counsel contended that the 1st Defendant did not specifically adopt Exhibit C3 during trial to suggest that the Claimant refused or neglected to respond to Exhibit C3 as being claimed by the 1st Defendant under issue 2 in question, and a perusal of the 1st Defendant’s statement of defence shows that the 1st Defendant caused an investigation to be carried out in furtherance of which an administrative query dated 23rd April, 2015, was sent to the Claimant to explain in writing the said allegation against him from 2nd Defendant. The 1st Defendant did not follow up its pleading of Exhibit C3 in paragraph 9(b) of its statement of defence to state further that the Claimant refused to respond to the administrative query issued to him or that the Claimant abandoned or exited from his primary employer, the 1st Defendant. Counsel argued that the implication of the 1st Defendant's pleading in its paragraphs 7 and 10 of their statement of defence that both Defendants no longer wanted the Claimant for any employment was confirmed by its paragraph 13 of statement of defence that the 1st Defendant had agreed with the 2nd Defendant to sack or dismiss the Claimant before issuing him with Exhibit C3. According to Counsel, it is clear from the averments of the 1st Defendant in paragraph 13 of its statement of defence, that the 1st Defendant never intended for any reason to have any employment deal with the Claimant again, because they have lost confidence reposed on him for causing unproven wrongful loss to the bank, the 2nd Defendant, their client, and wrongful gain to himself. The 1st Defendant is a staffing firm and has no job directly for the Claimant who has a banking work experience, and cannot reassign the Claimant to any other employer having found him already guilty of stealing employer's money; it was out of anger that the 1st Defendant refused or neglected to react to the Claimant's response to the administrative query and thereby leaving the employment of the Claimant open till date. Counsel submitted further that this matter is not a matter that could be solved with an administrative query, owing to the fact that the 1st Defendant ought to have set up an administrative panel of enquiry to enable the Claimant and his accusers to present the matter before the panel, giving each of them the opportunity to cross examine the other based on the loss of the money from Henry Marc Moore account, with the primary objective being to find out whether the allegation against the Claimant was true or not. It was contended by counsel that to answer a query alleging criminal offence with a lawyer does not amount to abandonment of the said query or amount to lack of response to it, because the Constitution affords the Claimant a right to answer their query alleging criminal offence against him through a lawyer. In response to the argument of the Counsel for 1st Defendant in issue 1 of his final address, counsel adopted his arguments made earlier in response to issue 2 of the 1st Defendants final written address. In conclusion, counsel urged the Court to disregard the entire argument submitted by the 1st Defendant in its final written address based on issues 1 and 2 for the above-stated reasons. COURT Having reviewed the submissions of counsels for the parties in their respective final written addresses, I shall proceed to determine this case. I will begin by examining the facts of the case. CLAIMANT’S CASE The Claimant testified as the only witness in his case. From the facts pleaded by the Claimant and the evidence adduced by him, the case of the Claimant is that he was employed by the 1st Defendant on 25th January 2007 as a Teller and outsourced him to the Oceanic Bank Plc at a start off salary of N540,000.00 per annum. The 1st Defendant renewed his employment contract on 1st October 2012 and seconded him to the 2nd Defendant. In early 2015, an auditor of the 2nd Defendant sent him a mail from the 2nd Defendant’s head office in Lagos to the effect that there was an attempted fraud on a customer’s account and the Claimant’s profile was used in that attempt. The Claimant said he went through the transaction posted by him on that day but he did not see any transaction related to the said account. The Claimant said he stated this fact in his reply the allegation. When he got to the office on 3rd April 2015, he discovered he had been disabled from logging into the computer. He drew the attention of the Human Resources of the 2nd Defendant to his discovery but he was told that he had been disabled because of the mail sent to him. The Claimant was also told to return to his employer. The Claimant received a mail from the 1st Defendant alleging that the Claimant caused loss of customer’s money. This was contrary to the allegation of the 2nd Defendant. The 1st Defendant fired him without hearing from him. The Claimant further stated that the 1st Defendant breached the terms of his employment when it dismissed him. The Claimant made the following allegations as constituting the wrongfulness of his dismissal: His dismissal was done in disregard of the terms of his employment contained in his employment letter; the allegation against him was a serious criminal allegation; the 1st Defendant found him guilty of criminal allegation without trial in a law court; the allegation for which he was dismissed was false making his dismissal wrongful; he was not investigated by any panel set up by the Defendants nor taken to the police for investigation; he was dismissed by the 1st defendant without being heard or tried. The claimant also alleged that his dismissal has caused him damages, suffering and loss of money. He stated that his salary per annum was N1,008,000; multiplied by 30 years to come will amount to N30,240,000. Because of the dismissal, his contribution to his pension account has stopped, making him lose his savings. He urged the court to grant his claims. 1ST DEFENDANT’S CASE The witness who testified on behalf of the 1st Defendant is Tayo Adebisi, Head of outsourcing operations of the 1st Defendant. The evidence adduced by the witness and the facts pleaded in the statement of defence of the 1st Defendant is to the effect that the 1st Defendant employed the Claimant and seconded him to work in the 2nd Defendant. Sometimes ago, the 1st Defendant received a report from the 2nd Defendant wherein the 2nd Defendant expressed dissatisfaction with the Claimant and requested the 1st Defendant to withdraw the services of the Claimant. The 2nd Defendant stated that its Auditors investigation reveal that there was an attempted fraud on a customer’s account. The 2nd Defendant investigated the incidence and gave the Claimant a query. Based on its findings, the 2nd Defendant wrote a letter dated 22nd April 2015 to the 1st Defendant that it did not find the services of the Claimant satisfactory and that the services of the Claimant are no longer required. Based on the report of the 2nd Defendant, the 1st Defendant made its investigation and found the allegations of the 2nd Defendant against the Claimant to be true. The conditions of the Claimant’s employment in his employment letter include circumstances where his employment can be terminated, and the Claimant’s conduct fell under the provision in paragraph 10. The consequence of the Claimant’s action led to the withdrawal of his services as demanded by the 2nd Defendant. The 1st Defendant urged the court to dismiss the suit. 2ND DEFENDANT’S CASE The 2nd Defendant too defended the suit by calling a witness. The witness is Oluwabukola Adeyanju, a staff of 2nd Defendant in the Human Resources Department. Testifying in line with the facts pleaded in the 2nd Defendant’s statement of defence, the witness told the court that the Claimant was on secondment from the 1st Defendant and was a Teller with the 2nd Defendant until 23rd April 2015 when he was asked to return to his employer as his services were no longer required. The 2nd Defendant did not have a contractual relationship with the Claimant but with the 1st Defendant. When the Claimant’s services were no longer required, the 2nd Defendant informed the 1st Defendant accordingly. The 2nd Defendant is not privy to the contract of employment between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant. As such, the 2nd Defendant is not responsible for the termination of the Claimant’s employment. The 2nd Defendant did not lay any false allegation against the Claimant to the 1st Defendant which led to the dismissal of the Claimant. The Claimant was not an employee of the 2nd Defendant and he was not dismissed from his employment by the 2nd Defendant. Throughout the Claimant’s services in the 2nd Defendant, his salaries were paid by the 1st Defendant. DW2 concluded that the Claimant does not have a reasonable cause of action against the 2nd Defendant and urged the court to dismiss the Claimant’s case. COURT’S DECISION In view of the facts and evidence presented before the court, and the submissions of counsels in the final written addresses, I have identified only an issue to be determined in this case. The issue is: Whether the Claimant has proved his case to entitle him to the reliefs he sought in this case. The reliefs sought by the Claimant in this case were claimed against the Defendants jointly. His first claim is for a declaration that his dismissal from his employment was wrongful and unjustified. All other reliefs sought by the Claimant were founded on the 1st relief. Before I consider his allegation of wrongful dismissal, it is necessary to first of all resolve the issue whether the Claimant can sustain his claims against the 2nd Defendant. This issue arose from the 2nd Defendant’s averments that the Claimant has no reasonable cause of action against the 2nd Defendant because the 2nd Defendant was not the Claimant’s employer and did not dismiss the Claimant from his employment. From the evidence adduced by the parties, it is clear to me that the Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant but only seconded to work in the 2nd Defendant. Exhibits C1 and C2 are the Claimant’s employment letters from the 1st Defendant. The Claimant had his contract of employment with the 1st Defendant and not with the 2nd Defendant. The Claimant also alleged he was dismissed from his employment by the letter dated 23rd April 2015. This letter is Exhibit C3. It was written by the 1st Defendant to the Claimant. It is not the 2nd Defendant’s letter. The Claimant has not shown any letter emanating from the 2nd Defendant dismissing him from his employment. From my findings, the Claimant was not employed by the 2nd Defendant neither was it the 2nd Defendant that dismissed him from his employment with the 1st Defendant. It would seem the Claimant truly has no reasonable cause of action against the 2nd Defendant but there is however the allegation of the Claimant against the 2nd Defendant that he was dismissed from his employment as a result of the false accusation of attempted fraud on a customer’s account using the Claimant’s profile leveled against him by the 2nd Defendant. This, perhaps, is the reason the 2nd Defendant was made a party to this case. Whether or not the Claimant’s allegation against the 2nd Defendant is worth any consideration will, in my view, depend on whether the Claimant is able to prove that his dismissal was wrongful in the first place. The Claimant alleged that he was dismissed from his employment by the 1st Defendant and he gave several reasons in his evidence why the dismissal was wrongful. The summary of his complaints against the dismissal are that the dismissal was done in disregard of the terms of his employment contained in his employment letter; the allegation against him was a serious criminal allegation but the 1st Defendant found him guilty of the criminal allegation without trial in a law court; the allegation for which he was dismissed was also false; he was not investigated by any panel set up by the Defendants nor taken to the police for investigation and that he was dismissed by the 1st Defendant without being heard or tried. In paragraph 2 of the 1st Defendant’s statement of defence, the 1st Defendant denied all the paragraphs of the statement of facts containing the Claimant’s allegation of dismissal from the employment. In the evidence of DW1, he told the court that the 1st Defendant received a letter dated 22nd April 2015 from the 2nd Defendant wherein the 2nd Defendant stated that it did not find the services of the Claimant satisfactory and that the services of the Claimant are no longer required. Based on the report of the 2nd Defendant, the 1st Defendant made its investigation and found the allegations of the 2nd Defendant against the Claimant to be true. The consequence of the Claimant’s action led to the withdrawal of his service as demanded by the 2nd Defendant. From the facts pleaded by the 1st Defendant and the evidence adduced by DW1, it is the case of the 1st Defendant that the Claimant’s services were withdrawn from the 2nd Defendant as requested by the 2nd Defendant. The 1st Defendant did not admit dismissing the Claimant from the employment. The claimant has said in his relief 1 that the dismissal letter was dated 23rd April 2015. In his evidence, he also said the 1st Defendant sent him a letter dated 23rd April 2015 dismissing him from employment. He tendered this letter in evidence as Exhibit C3. The letter reads: RE: Return to Employer- Vic Lawrence & Associates Limited You are hereby notified that your services is no longer required by Ecobank Nigeria Plc and by this letter, Vic Lawrence & Associates Limited is withdrawing you from the bank effective immediately. Kindly submit all company items in your possession to your branch. Please respond in writing to the allegation against you at the branch which led to the loss of customer’s money in the branch. Kindly respond to this letter. Thank you. Signed: Tayo Adebisi Ifi Osineme Recruitment & Outsourcing Executive Director The content of this letter reveals that the Claimant was informed that the 2nd Defendant no longer required his services and he was consequently required to return to the 1st Defendant. The Claimant was also required to submit a written response to the 1st Defendant on the allegations against him by the 2nd Defendant. There is nowhere in this letter the 1st Defendant dismissed the Claimant from its employment or terminated the Claimant’s employment. The 1st Defendant only withdrew the Claimant from the services of the 2nd Defendant and instructed him to return to the 1st Defendant. The fact that the Claimant was told to submit a written response to the 1st Defendant indicates that the 1st Defendant still considered him to be its employee. I find that Exhibit C3 was not a dismissal letter. The effect is that the 1st Defendant did not dismiss the Claimant from the employment contrary to the Claimant’s allegation. It is also clear to me that since that letter, the Claimant never reported back to the 1st Defendant’s employment. The Claimant’s case reveals that he mistook the letter to be a dismissal letter and he, as a result, did not report to the 1st Defendant. He left the employment altogether thinking he had been dismissed. This fact is more clearly expressed in the letter of the Claimant’s solicitor to the 1st Defendant dated 22nd May 2015. This is Exhibit C4. In the 5th and 6th paragraphs of the letter, the Claimant’s solicitor alleged that the Claimant’s employment has been terminated by the 1st Defendant and demanded for the Claimant’s reinstatement. The facts of his case and the letter by his solicitor show clearly that the Claimant took the 1st Defendant’s letter of 23rd April 2015 to mean a dismissal from his employment. Instead of returning to his employer and submitting a written response as demanded, the Claimant decided to abandon the employment. He never returned to his employer till the time he filed this action. The Claimant is rather the one who has terminated the employment with the 1st Defendant by his act of abandoning his employment. In view of these facts, there is no reason whatsoever for the Claimant to allege wrongful dismissal. The 1st Defendant at no time dismissed him from the employment. All his allegations about wrongful dismissal are without basis. His case against the Defendants is frivolous and without any merit. Without any further ado, the Claimant’s case is hereby dismissed. Parties shall each bear their respective costs. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge