Download PDF
JUDGMENT 1. The claimant commenced this action vide a complaint filed on 19th March 2014 together with the accompanying originating processes, to which the defendant filed its defence processes. By the statement of facts (what the claimant also labeled as “Complaint”), the claimant is claiming against the defendant the following reliefs: (1) A declaration that the purported “reverse” of termination of appointment of the claimant’s employment into dismissal of the claimant from the employment of the defendant as borne by the defendant’s letter dated 7th November 2011 is strange, wrongful, unlawful, null and void. (2) A declaration that the termination of the appointment of the claimant from the employment of the defendant as borne by the defendant’s letter dated 22nd December 2010 remains valid and the claimant is entitled to all his benefits from the services of the defendant. (3) A declaration that the purported “reverse” of termination of appointment of the claimant’s employment into dismissal of the claimant from the employment of the defendant as borne by the defendant’s letter dated 7th November 2011 amounts to breach of contract and tort of conversion and detinue resulting in the embarrassment, dehumanization, and foreclosure of job prospect for the claimant. (4) The sum of N20,835,564.65 (Twenty Million, Eight Hundred and Thirty-Five Thousand, Five Hundred and Sixty-Four Naira, Sixty-Five Kobo) only being entitlement of the claimant from the defendant as of 31st March 2011 plus interest. (5) Interest of 20% on the sum from April 2011 until judgment and thereafter 15% interest until judgment sum is paid. (6) The sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) being the damages against the defendant for breach of contract and tort of conversion and detinue, resulting in the embarrassment, dehumanization, and foreclosure of job prospect for the claimant. (7) The cost of this action. 2. At the trial, the claimant testified on his own behalf as CW. The claimant’s frontloaded documents were admitted and marked as Exhibits C1 to C17. For the defendant, Comrade Cornelius Aiyeetan, a trade unionist with the defendant, testified as DW. The defendant's frontloaded documents were admitted and marked as Exhibits D1 to D7. At the close of trial, parties filed their respective final written addresses. The defendant’s final written address was field on 12th February 2018, while the claimant’s was filed on 14th June 2018. The defendant’s reply on points of law was filed on 4th July 2018. THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 3. In the words of the claimant, by Exhibit C1 he was employed in the services of the defendant on 1st March 1988 as an Assistant Accountant; and having been confirmed rose through the ranks and transferred from one State to the other as shown in Exhibits C3(a) to C3(d). Upon heading the Ogun/Oyo Council of the union between 2007 and 2008 the finance of the union dwindled which resulted in the inability of the union branch to pay the office rent, manage the office and pay other utility bills. The claimant after due consultation with the executive members of the Council by Exhibit C8 dated 2nd September 2009 requested the defendant’s headquarters in Abuja and the Lagos State Council for financial assistance but they failed to respond. To save the union of any further embarrassment, the union Ogun State Council pleaded with the claimant to take out of the remittance due to the headquarters in the hope that by the time the remittance for the month is due it would have been able to source sufficient fund to fully replace the sum of N342,110.02 (Three Hundred and Forty-Two Thousand, One Hundred and Ten Naira, Two Kobo). The claimant with the support of the Ogun State Council went ahead to use part of the dues received to settle the rent for the year 2009 and 2010 (referring to the receipts of payment marked as Exhibit C9 dated 21/1/10, 12/2/10 and 30/4/10) to avoid eviction (referring to Exhibit C6), and other expenses. Unfortunately, by the time the remittance was due the Ogun State Council Chapter had not raised sufficient sum to make up for the sum spent on rent, and other expenses incurred in prosecuting the action filed against the Management of Gateway Hotels (referring to Exhibit C10) at the National Industrial Court Lagos. The defendant issued the claimant a query dated 28th July 2010 (Exhibit C12 corroborated by Exhibit D1). The claimant by a letter dated 29th July 2010 (Exhibit C13) responded to the query; he was subsequently suspended from his employment by Exhibit C14 corroborated by Exhibit D3 on 13th August 2010. The Ogun State Council members by Exhibit C15 dated 6th September 2010 pleaded with the defendant and explained that it was the decision of the Council to use the sum for the benefit of the union’s accommodation and other union expenses. The defendant was not persuaded but went further to terminate the appointment of the claimant by the letter dated 22nd December 2010 (Exhibit C2 corroborated by Exhibit D4). In that same Exhibit C2 corroborated by Exhibit D4, the defendant by its 2nd paragraph backdated the termination of the claimant’s employment to 13th August 2010 when he was suspended. Also, paragraph 3 of the same Exhibit C2 corroborated by Exhibit D4 stated that “By a copy of this letter, the Head, Finance Department of the union is requested to compute your final entitlement for onward presentation to the Central Working Committee (CWC) for consideration”. 4. After his appointment was terminated, the claimant in expectation of his entitlements promised in the termination letter (Exhibit C2 corroborated by Exhibit D4) by letters dated 24th January 2011, 28th February 2011, 3rd March 2011 and 5th April 2011 (Exhibit C16) demanded the defendant to pay his entitlements. The defendant refused/neglected to pay the entitlements which he had worked out in the exhibit as N20,835,564.65 (Twenty Million Eight Hundred and Thirty-Five Thousand, Five Hundred and Sixty-Four Naira, Sixty-Five Kobo). By the defendant’s letter dated November 7, 2011 (Exhibit C17 corroborated by Exhibit D5), the defendant purportedly converted the termination of the claimant’s appointment since 13th August 2010 to a dismissal on a fresh allegation strangely evidenced by a letter dated 7th December 2011, exactly a year after the purported termination, against the claimant albeit without inviting the claimant to defend himself at all as confirmed by defendant’s witness under cross-examination. According to DW the entire decision lay exclusively within the National Executive Council who did need not the claimant to decide whether to convert termination to dismissal even upon purported fresh allegation already evidenced by a strange letter dated 7th November 2011 (referring to Exhibit D6) purported to have been written by the defendant’s landlord a month after the purported dismissal letter. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT 5. On the part of the defendant, it discovered that out of the total amount received by the claimant on its behalf from its Oyo State Council, the claimant failed to remit the sum of N373,371.14 (Three Hundred and Seventy-Three Thousand, Three Hundred and Seventy-One Naira, Fourteen Kobo) to it. The defendant thus summoned the claimant to its headquarters and subjected him to its disciplinary procedure in accordance with its constitution and staff conditions of service by first issuing him a query (Exhibits C12 and D1) to explain the shortfall. The claimant answered the query vide Exhibit C13 explaining that he purportedly used the missing fund to pay the defendant’s office rent in Ogun State (without the approval or authorization of the defendant). The defendant then suspended the claimant via Exhibits C14 and D2 and later terminated his employment via Exhibits C2 and D3. That the defendant initially believed the claimant to have used its fund to pay its office rent as he claimed but later discovered that this was not true. The defendant then dismissed the claimant through Exhibits C17 and D5 following which the claimant brought this suit. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT 6. In its final written address, the defendant first addressed two things that it termed as preliminary matters: the admissibility of some documents; and settled issues. On the issue of admissibility of some documents, the defendant objected to the admissibility of Exhibits C3(a), C3(b) and C3(c) on the ground that they were not pleaded by the claimant. However, that even if these documents were pleaded, they still have no direct relevance to the issues in controversy in this suit, urging the Court to so hold. Furthermore, that the document listed as No. 5 in the claimant’s list of documents and marked as Exhibit C5(a) purported to be a letter to Gateway Hotels but in actual fact it is headed “Situation Report from Ogun State Council” is in effect and reality not Exhibit C5(a). Likewise, the document marked as Exhibit C6 is a purported quit notice by defendant’s landlord to the defendant with respect to its office in Abeokuta, Ogun State, whereas what is pleaded is notice to pay rent (ultimatum), referring to paragraph 9 of the statement of facts. That in law one cannot plead one thing and present another to the Court, referring to Agboola v. UBA & 2 ors [2011] 2-3 MJSC (Pt. II) 150 at 165-167. 7. What is more, that the following documents were frontloaded by the claimant but not listed in the list of documents. They were thus not marked as exhibits. They are: (i) Document headed Annual Leave for the Years 1997 to 2001 dated 17th July 2007. (ii) Document with the heading, “Re-Request for Commutation of Years 2002-2007 Annual Leave to Cash” dated 11th February 2008. (iii) Letters dated March 19, 2009 and 9th March 2009 to the Managing Director Gateway Holdings Ltd, Abeokuta, referring to “paragraph 2.07 supra”. (iv) Letter to The Manager, Intercontinental Bank Plc Ota with the heading, “Change of Signature”. (v) Two documents by the defendant’s Ogun State Council headed, “Handover Note” with the dates 06/08/2010 and 07/08/2010. (vi) For the defendant, it frontloaded a document dated 29th July 2010 headed, “Re: Query” but it was not marked as an exhibit because of the absence of the second page of the document. 8. For settled issues, the defendant pointed out that from the pleadings of both parties, these facts are not in doubt: (i) The claimant was an employee of the defendant until 13th August 2010. (ii) The claimant until the determination of his employment was a Principal Assistant General Secretary in charge of the defendant’s Ogun State Council from where he was also overseeing (on relief duty) its Oyo State Chapter. (iii) While the claimant was in charge of Ogun/Oyo State Chapters of the defendant, some monies belonging to the defendant got missing. (iv) The claimant was invited to the defendant’s headquarters, subjected to the defendant’s disciplinary process, terminated and dismissed. (v) The defendant currently has serious financial challenges, referring to paragraph 23 of the statement of facts and paragraphs 10 (xxviii) and (xxix) of the statement of defence. 9. The defendant then submitted a sole issue for determination, namely: whether the claimant has shown by facts and evidence that he is entitled to the reliefs sought by him in this suit as presently constituted. The defendant first made a distinction between contracts with statutory flavour and those without (master and servant), and then submitted that the contract of employment between it and the claimant falls within the category of that of master and servant, referring to paragraph 23 of the statement of facts, The Registered Trustees of the Planned Parenthood Federation of Nigeria v. Shogbola [2005] 1 WRN 153 at 169-170 and UBN Plc v. Toyinbo [2009] 13 WRN 143 at 192. The defendant went on that the law is now well settled that an employee who complains of wrongful termination has a bounden duty to prove same to the satisfaction of the Court; this duty includes placing before the Court materials that will enable the Court to fully appreciate and determine the matter. These materials must include: the employee’s letters of appointment and termination; the contract of employment (Staff Conditions of Service, Constitution, Handbook, etc); and the last pay slip of the employee (to enable the Court determine, for instance, what his salary in lieu of notice is), etc, referring to Famakinwa v. Tower Aluminium Nig. Plc [2007] 18 WRN 36 at 49, NIMASA v. Odey [2014] 2 WRN 83 at 115, Zhdeeh v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2007] 14 WRN 84 at 99 and Daodu v. UBA [2004] 29 WRN 53 at 71-72. Unfortunately, that in the instant suit, the claimant has not placed the contract of employment including the conditions of service and his last pay slip before the Court. The defendant then wondered how the Court will be able to determine whether the claimant’s dismissal was wrongful or not. That the law is that where a claimant fails to prove these facts, his suit must be dismissed, and that is the unfortunate state this matter has landed in. 10. To the defendant, it is not contested in this suit that the defendant has a handbook, constitution and conditions of service for its staff and that the claimant pleaded same while not denying that he has all the aforesaid documents, referring to paragraph 16 of the statement of facts and paragraphs 4, 10(vi), (xii) and (xiv) of the statement of defence. That the claimant’s failure to make these documents available to the Court must be construed to mean that if he had done so, the Court would have seen through them that the defendant has the power to dismiss him after first terminating his appointment. In other words, the claimant deliberately hid these pieces of evidence from Court, urging the Court to invoke section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011 against the claimant. The defendant went on that it need not to proceed any further with this address in view of the fact that the claimant failed to tender before the Court his contract of service but for the fact that the defendant wants to make sure that safety is doubled. That failure is enough to dismiss this suit at this stage since the Court has got nothing before it as proof of any breach of contract. 11. Coming to the issue of the defendant dismissing the claimant after it first terminated him, the defendant stated that it can and has the right to do so under its constitution and staff conditions of service, referring to paragraph 10(vi) of the statement of defence and paragraph 21 of DW’s statement on oath. Given that the claimant failed to tender the handbook, conditions of service and constitution of the defendant in Court to disprove this, the defendant submitted that the Court has nothing in its hands with which to disbelieve the defendant. In any case, that the defendant still reserves the right to dismiss any of its staff summarily for misconduct; for to hold otherwise will amount to enthroning impunity and lawlessness in the work place, citing Eze v. Spring Bank Plc [2012] 20 WRN at 22 and Uzondu v. UBN Plc [2009] 3 WRN 97 at 110. 12. The defendant continued that from paragraph 10 of CW’s statement on oath, he wrote Exhibit C5(a) to the defendant’s General Secretary. Given the earlier submission of the defendant to the effect that due to the confusion created by the claimant with respect to Exhibit C5(a), that exhibit does not exist, the defendant proceeded that assuming without conceding that it exists, one can note from that exhibit that the cost of the defendant’s office rent as at end of May 2009 as suggested by the claimant in that letter was N200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira). That at the beginning of November 2009, the sum rose to N300,000.00 (Three Hundred Thousand Naira), that is, Exhibit C5(b), and there is no explanation for this. That this was said to be rent for two years. In paragraph 13 of the said statement on oath, the claimant claimed that two years rent amounted to N180,000.00 (One Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira) with an additional N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira) said to be agency, lawyer’s and caution fees making it N230,000.00 (Two Hundred and Thirty Thousand Naira). That is the content of Exhibit C8. That from paragraph 14 of CW’s evidence, the claimant stated that he used N342,110.02 (Three Hundred and Forty-Two Thousand, One Hundred and Ten Naira, Two Kobo) to pay the defendant’s office rent and other unnamed expenses (without authorization). That in answer to the query issued the claimant by the defendant, that is Exhibit C13, the claimant claimed that the amount missing in his remittance to the defendant’s headquarters was N342,110.02 (Three Hundred and Forty-Two Thousand, One Hundred and Ten Naira, Two Kobo) and not N373,371.14 (Three Hundred and Seventy-Three Thousand, Three Hundred and Seventy-One Naira, Fourteen Kobo) as claimed by the defendant. 13. To the defendant, in the said Exhibit C13, the claimant claimed that he paid the defendant’s Ogun State office rent in three installments amounting to N290,000.00 (Two Hundred and Ninety Thousand Naira) for 2009 and 2010 including agreement fee. That the claimant deliberately left out details. How much was the rent and how much was the alleged agreement fee? There was no more mention of sundry expenses. What happened to the rest of the N342,110.02 he admitted spending? The defendant invited the Court to compare paragraphs 14 and 15 of his statement on oath. That to make matters worse, he tendered Exhibit C9, three bank tellers but containing N150,000.00 (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) only. That the tellers do not show in any manner that the amounts were for rent. That they could have been for anything whatsoever. That the defendant has shown via Exhibit D7 that its Ogun State office’s landlord issues receipts when rents are paid to him. In the circumstances, the claimant actually had no explanation to make over the missing funds. He just beat about the bush and made frantic but weak and lame efforts to cover things up. 14. The rent of the defendant’s office at Ogun State, according to the claimant, was variously N200,000.00, N300,000.00, N230,000.00 and N290,000.00. But that Exhibit C9, assuming without conceding at all that it was meant for rent, has N150,000.00. That the missing sum is N373,371.14 while the claimant claims that it is N342,110.02. That the bottom line is that following from the foregoing, the defendant cannot be faulted in any way in dismissing the claimant. That the claimant has shown that he is not a person to be trusted by the defendant. His continued stay in the defendant would be highly injurious to the business of the defendant. His antecedents testify to this, referring to paragraphs 10(i) and (ii) of the statement of defence. From the foregoing, that the defendant cannot even be called upon to show cause. That the evidence of the claimant himself is enough indicting factor. The defendant then asked: with the above record coming from the claimant himself, can it be said that he is somebody that can be trusted for integrity and loyalty by the defendant? The defendant answered in the negative, referring to the undenied evidence of the DW in paragraphs 15 and 16 of his written statement on oath. Against the above backdrop, the defendant submitted that it is little wonder that the claimant did not challenge his termination. He felt delighted that he had defrauded and deceived the defendant and would, in spite of that, still get his full benefits from the defendant. 15. On the issue of whether the claimant was heard before his dismissal, the defendant submitted that he was fully heard. That it is purely a misrepresentation of facts for the claimant to claim that his dismissal was based on a new allegation. That from Exhibits C17 and D5, the defendant merely discovered that from Exhibit C13, the claimant ought to have been dismissed ab initio but it believed him (the claimant) to have used the missing fund to pay its office rent in Ogun State. That by virtue of the defendant’s constitution and staff conditions of service, corruption or fraud is gross misconduct which attracts dismissal and not termination. That DW explained this on 14/12/2017 during his cross-examination. That by the defendant’s constitution and staff conditions of service, the defendant has such power to dismiss even after termination. The defendant proceeded to ask: what is new about relief duty in Oyo State? What is new about payment of office rent at Abeokuta, Ogun State? What is new about cover up? That these are all contained in the claimant’s Exhibit C13. That from paragraphs 3 and 4 on page 1 of Exhibit C13 and paragraph 4 at page 2 of the same exhibit, it is obvious, crystal clear and pellucid that the claimant was confronted with these allegations and he put up a defence. that is, Exhibit C13. That the claimant himself confirmed on 16/12/2017 during his cross-examination that it was the same Oyo State Council fund for which he was queried leading to his suspension, termination and dismissal, referring to paragraph 36 of DW’s statement on oath. 16. To the defendant, the claimant was given fair hearing in the matter. That he only tried to deceive the defendant but unfortunately for him, the defendant found out and meted out the appropriate sanction to him in line with its constitution and staff conditions of service, referring to Exhibit D4. That the time lag between the claimant’s termination and dismissal was because the defendant’s National Executive Council (NEC), whose responsibility it is to take such decisions, meets once in a year. That DW stated so on 14/12/2017. Besides, that it has been held that such lapse of time does not affect the validity of a sanction by an employer against an employee, referring to UBN Plc v Toyinbo [2009] 13 WRN 143 at 189-190. 17. The defendant proceeded to look at the reliefs sought by the claimant to see whether the Court can grant them. For reliefs (1) and (3), the claimant wants the Court to hold that the “reversal” of his termination to dismissal is strange, wrongful, unlawful, null and void. The defendant first asked what makes it strange. That the claimant has not pleaded any treaty, charter, convention or statute to show that. That there is a mix-up in these reliefs. That even if the Court finds the dismissal inappropriate, it cannot declare it “unlawful, null and void”. That the basis for these reliefs is as contained in relief (3), that is, that it amounts to “breach of contract and tort of conversion and detinue”. The defendant asked whether the claimant has proved the terms of the alleged contract purportedly breached; or whether he laid anything before the Court to show how the contract was breached; or whether he showed by any means how it amounted to the tort of conversion and detinue. That the Court cannot grant these reliefs because they lack basis. That there is nothing in the claimant’s pleadings with regard to the said torts of conversion and detinue. That the claimant did not tender any contract of service in Court to show the Court its existence and how it was allegedly breached. Even at that, the defendant submitted that while this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain employment matters, it does not have such jurisdiction to so do with respect to torts. That the mixture of an alleged contract of employment with an alleged tort of conversion and detinue under these reliefs by the claimant makes it even worse. That the Court cannot severe one from the other; its only option in the circumstances is to reject both, urging the Court to so hold. 18. On relief (2), that the claimant wants the Court to declare that his termination remains valid. To the defendant, looking at paragraph 24 of the statement of facts and paragraph 26 of the claimant’s written statement on oath, the same claimant who is desirous of having the Court to declare his termination valid, claims that the same termination cannot be justified. So how will the Court hold that an “unjustifiable” termination is valid? Will it not amount to speaking from both sides of the mouth. That granting this relief is tantamount to reinstating the claimant to his former position which is not possible under a master and servant relationship. That the claimant himself alluded to the impossibility of the Court doing so in paragraph 23 of his statement of facts. Besides, that the non-tendering of the contract of service by the claimant still catches up with this relief. Accordingly, that this is also not grantable. 19. As to reliefs (4) and (5), the defendant submitted that relief (4) is not grantable too since there is nothing before the Court to show what the last salary of the claimant was. That even if there is, the claimant has mixed up the purported entitlement with an unspecified and unascertainable interest. That the Court has no power to speculate what the entitlement of the claimant is; neither has it the power to severe same from the alleged interest since this will amount to descending into the arena of litigation. That the Court is not a mathematician and even if it is, it still has to work with specific figures which are not provided here. Meanwhile, that on 16/2/2017, the claimant under cross-examination admitted that it is the sole responsibility of the defendant’s Head of Finance to calculate a staff's terminal benefits where the staff is entitled to same. That what this means is that the claimant’s computation in relief (4) is completely otiose and ultra vires the claimant to do so, urging the Court to so hold; and referring to Exhibits C2 and D3. That what is more, the computation was done till March 31, 2011. The defendant then asked the basis upon which the claimant is claiming till March 2011. Furthermore, that pre-judgment interest (relief 5) is not grantable unless the claimant can show inter alia that it is part of the agreement between him and the defendant, which contract is not before the Court, referring to Wema Securities and Financed Plc v. NAIC [2015] 6-7 MJSC 139 at 189-190. 20. Under relief (6), the defendant submitted that general damages is largely unknown to labour law much less for “breach of contract and tort of conversion and detinue” which are not proved. That damages in labour law is almost limited to salary in lieu of notice. That the claimant’s salary is not proved in this suit, neither was breach of any contract proved. 21. Regarding relief (7), the defendant submitted that it is vague and imprecise and cannot be granted as it has no flesh; it is akin to asking the Court to grant one the cost of breathing. The defendant concluded by urging the Court to dismiss this suit with costs. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT 22. The claimant submitted two issues for determination, namely: (1) Whether the purported conversion of termination of appointment of the claimant to dismissal by the defendant in the circumstance is wrongful, null and void. (2) If (1) above is in the affirmative whether the claimant is entitled to reliefs sought in the circumstance of the evidence before this Court. 23. The claimant first observed that, relying on its pleadings, the defendant has distilled an issue for determination that tends to change the issue brought by the claimant. That the law is trite that it is the claimant who nominates the issue for determination and not the defendant particularly where the defendant has not filed a counterclaim, citing Bernard Ojeifor Longe v. First Bank of Nig. Plc [2010] LPELR-1793(SC) and Alphonsus Numa v. Joseph Otunuya Odili [2006] LPELR-2047(SC). 24. Again, that the defendant owing to its misconceived issue for determination attempts to set up different reasons for the purported dismissal of the claimant by the defendant from the documentary evidence before the Court. That it is a time tested principle of law, and as correctly argued by the defendant, that documentary evidence is the best evidence and no oral evidence will be allowed to discredit or contradict the contents thereof except where fraud is pleaded, citing Egharevba v. Osagie [2009] LPELR-1044(SC). 25. With regard to the submission of the defendant relating to the admissibility of Exhibits C3(a), C3(b) and C3(c), the claimant submitted that contrary to the defendant’s argument the claimant pleaded the documents by virtue of paragraph 4 of his statement of claim. 26. As for the defendant distinguishing employment with statutory flavour from that without statutory flavour, the claimant submitted that that is not an issue here. That whether with statutory flavour or not, the issue in question is whether the defendant can, having determined the employment of the claimant by termination, that is, Exhibit C2, turn around to dismiss the same determined employment by Exhibit C17. To the claimant, in the circumstance, the issue of terminating the employment and later dismissing same would in law not only be wrongful but also unlawful, null and void. That the defendant’s counsel reference to Famakinwa v. Tower Aluminium Nig. Plc [2007] 18 WRN 36 and NIMASA v. Odey [2014] 2 WRN 83, therefore, goes to no issue. 27. On his issue (1) i.e. whether the purported conversion of termination of appointment of the claimant to dismissal by the defendant is wrongful, unlawful, null and void, the claimant submitted that the evidence before the Court vide Exhibit C2 acknowledged received by the defendant shows clearly that the claimant’s employment with the defendant ceased on 13th August 2010. That the defendant corroborated the submission by its Exhibit D4. That the Court has in a number of cases settled the issue that where an employee’s appointment has been terminated there is no contract between the employee and the employer any more to dismiss, citing A. S. Jombo v. Petroleum Equalization Fund (Management Board) & ors [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 443 SC at 466. 28. The claimant went on that assuming without conceding that the defendant truly found out that the explanation given by the claimant in answer to the query was unsatisfactory or even fraudulent, the new information being relied on by the defendant must be made known to the claimant to defend himself in compliance with the inalienable principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem. That failure of the defendant to confront the claimant with the purported new facts emerging to enable him defend himself robs the entire process a nullity for want of fair hearing, citing JSC of Cross River State & anor v. Young [2013] LPELR•20592(SC). The claimant proceeded to submit that since the defendant gave a reason and led evidence on same as the reason for the purported conversion of termination to dismissal, the burden is on the defendant to prove the reason, citing WAEC & ors v. Mr Monday T. Nkanta [2006] LPELR-11752(CA), Keystone Bank Plc v. Yiggon [2013] LPELR-22131(CA) and UTC Nigeria Ltd v. Peters [2009] LPELR-8426(CA). That the effect of the defendant’s purported dismissal in the circumstance is that it amounts to a nullity, citing JSC of Cross River State & anor v. Young (supra). In any event, that by Underwater Engineering Company Ltd & anor v. Dubefon [1995] LPELR-3379(SC), the retrospective purported dismissal of the claimant by the defendant is unknown to law and, therefore, a nullity. 29. The claimant continued that the evidence before the Court clearly showed the defendant has not in any manner in its defence denied the amount owed neither has it denied the receipts of the demands in Exhibits C16(a)-(d). The claimant then referred to Ogolo v. Fubara [2003] 11 NWLR (Pt. 831) 231 at 266 as authority for the proposition that a fact not denied is deemed to be admitted; citing also Adeleke v.Aserifa [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt. 30) 575, Nnonye v. Anyichie [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 110 and University of Ilorin v. Adesina [2008] LPELR-5072(CA). That the defendant upon realizing the amount owed the claimant was so much determined to avoid its obligation through unlawful means. That the contrivance and strategy are well given away by its pleading and obviously uncoordinated exhibits to support the contrivance. That paragraph XXIX of the defendant’s pleading stated clearly that the finance of its headquarters had dwindled. That the defendant did not invite the claimant to defend himself upon claim of purported new facts on the rent payment to defend himself; and worst still, the new fact was based on Exhibit D6, which bore a date, days after the date on the letter purporting to dismiss the claimant. The claimant then submitted that the entire act of the defendant in the circumstances is done in bad faith, calculated, fraudulent and meant to rob the claimant his legitimate entitlement. That rather than comply with its lawful obligation in Exhibit C2 corroborated by Exhibit D4 the defendant to wit: “By a copy of this letter, the Head; Finance Department of the union is requested to compute your final entitlement for onward presentation to the Central Working Committee (CWC) for consideration”, the defendant chose to avoid the obligation by fraudulently framing the claimant albeit with no fair hearing. 30. As for issue (2) i.e. if issue (1) is answered in the affirmative, whether the claimant is entitled to reliefs sought in the circumstance of the evidence before this Court, the claimant submitted that the reliefs he seeks are for the entitlement already acknowledged and provided for in Exhibit C2 and corroborated by Exhibit D4; and the defendant has not in any manner denied the amount owed neither has it denied the receipts of the demands in Exhibits C16(a)-(d). That the defendant’s argument that the claimant ought to specifically plead and prove the particulars of the entitlement goes to no issue as the Supreme Court had held in Osuji v. Isiocha [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 623 that the defendant in the circumstance should have demanded for the detailed particulars from the claimant. That there is a difference between terminal benefits and general damages, citing Julius Berger Nigeria Plc v. Nwagwu [2006] LPELR-8223(CA). And that in this circumstance where there is no dispute as to how much the claimant is entitled to, as the defendant had admitted, and even acting further on same to dismiss the claimant, the claimant is entitled to the amount stated. 31. The claimant also claimed for damages for tort of conversion and detinue resulting in the embarrassment, dehumanization, and foreclosure of job prospect for the claimant. That having proved that the entire cause of action arose out of the contrivance of the defendant to avoid the demand of the claimant his entitlements it becomes apparent that the defendant intentionally converted and detained the sum from the claimant. That the defendant has unlawfully kept the claimant’s entitlement and when demanded has refused him same, citing Elijah Oladeji Kosice v. Amuba Olaniyi Folarin [1989] LPELR-1705(SC) and Civil Design Construction Nig. Ltd v. SCOA Nigeria Ltd [2007] LPELR-870(SC). The claimant then urged the Court to grant the relief claimed in the circumstance as damages for tort of conversion or in the alternative damages in detinue. It is also the claimant’s submission that he paid the office rent 2009 and 2010 (referring to Exhibit C9) and not 2010/2011 as claimed by the defendant. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to find in his favour and grant all the reliefs he seeks against the defendant with substantial cost. THE DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW 32. In replying on points of law, the defendant submitted that the claimant’s final written address is incompetent on two grounds: (1) The claimant's address is in respect of a different defendant from the one they actually sued. There is no Registered Trustees of anything before this Court. Accordingly, that address is not in respect of Suit No. NICN/LA/126/2014, which the claimant instituted in this Court. (2) The defendant is confused as to who settled and signed the claimant’s final address. At the signature page, two names of counsel appeared. To the surprise of the defendant, both names were ticked. What is more, none of those two names affixed their stamp and seal on the document. The stamp and seal on the address bear a different name altogether. This is in contravention of Rules 10(1)-(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners 2007 made pursuant to the Legal Practitioners Act. On these grounds, the defendant urged the Court to strike out the final written address of the claimant. 33. The defendant continued that the claimant in his said written address completely ignored the existence of the defendant whom he sued before the Court. That the claimant treated the defendant as if he does not exist at all. In the first place, that facts of the case as presented by the claimant excluded any defence to the suit completely. Second, the claimant stated that the defendant has no right to distill issues for the determination of the Court. That in arguing this, the claimant cited authorities where defendants set up their own cases, rather than defend the claim of the claimant. That these authorities do not apply at all to the present suit. That the claimant offered no reaction to the issues and submissions made by the defendant. That under the law, such issues not challenged are deemed admitted, referring to Nsude v. COP [2014] 26 WRN 89 at 133. 34. On Jombo v. Petroleum Equalization fund (Management Board) [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 443 cited by the claimant,the defendant submitted that every decision is an authority only on facts it decided. That the facts of that case are not the same with the facts in the instant case. That the decision is based on employment with statutory flavour while the instant case is not and each has its own incident in law. That the decision in Jombo was based on employment governed by statute while this suit is a master - servant employment based on conditions of service, which is not before the Court. That in this matter, this Court cannot speculate on whether that document gives power to the defendant to dismiss after termination or not as the Court is enjoined never to speculate. That is why it has become established that where contract of employment is not tendered in any labour matter, the case is dismissed. Even at that, in Jombo, whether an employee can be dismissed after being terminated was not a live issue that called for the determination of the Court. That a careful perusal, analysis and exegesis of the case will reveal that the appellant never invited the Supreme Court to determine such. That the appellant’s issue No. 2 in that case reads thus: “Whether as in this case an employer can lawfully dismiss an employee during the pendency of an action filed in challenge of an earlier termination of his employment by the employer” (the emphasis is the defendant’s). In other words, that the appellant was merely asking: does it not amount to a breach of the hallowed doctrine of lis pendens for an employer to take any further action against an employee who is already in court with him? The appellant’s concern was not at all the propriety or otherwise of dismissal after termination. That in the judgment of the Supreme Court as domiciled, encapsulated and embodied in the lead judgment of Pats-Acholonu, JSC (of blessed memory), the Supreme Court identified the above question as being of no value in the determination of the appeal. For the apex Court, what was the live issue before it was whether the trial Court’s jurisdiction in the matter was ousted by a certain military Decree No. 17 of 1984. And having found that it did not, it merely remitted the matter back to the trial Court for a fresh trial. That the Supreme Court held that at best the above question as extrapolated from issue 2 can best be taken care at the retrial. That for the Supreme Court, the appellant’s issue No. 2 was a case for another day. That it was diversionary and, therefore, inappropriate for same to be pronounced upon. That learned counsel for the claimant never digested Jombo to note the actual position of the Supreme Court. That if he had done so, perhaps, he would not have relied on this case. 35. The defendant went on that the passages quoted by the claimant in terms of Jombo are clearly at cross purposes with the lead judgment. That they are not even obiter but an attempt to take a different position from the judgment of the Court, urging the Court to so hold. That while the Supreme Court’s judgment is that the appellant’s issue 2 has no merit, Katsina-Alu and Oguntade, JSC say the appellant’s issue 2 has merit. That the law is now clear that where a purported concurring judgment takes a radically different shape from the lead judgment, it becomes a dissent even though at the end the judge says, “I abide by the orders made in the lead judgment”; it cannot form the judgment of the Court. That this is exactly what happened in Jumbo, referring to Enang v. Umoh [2012] 46 WRN 35 at 58. That the law remains that there is no distinction between termination and dismissal. That the claimant in this suit is merely shedding crocodile tears, referring to Famakinwa v. Tower Aluminium Nig. Plc [2007] 18 WRN 37 at 58. 36. The defendant proceeded that even if it is held that termination cannot be converted to dismissal, nothing still prevents parties to a civil contract from contracting outside the rules by mutual agreement. In tenancy agreement for instance, even though most tenancy laws prescribe six month’s notice to quit for a yearly tenant, parties can by consent reduce it to three or even one month. In the same vein, that parties to an employment contract can agree and reduce notice of termination, for instance, to fourteen or seven days and a court is bound to give effect to it. This is acceptable in law. That the claimant knows that this position represents the law. He stated so in paragraph 4.04 of his address particularly in the case of Keystone Bank Plc v. Yiggon he cited. That in the present action, the defendant contends that it has the power under its Conditions of Service to dismiss a terminated staff (paragraphs 10(vi) and 12 of the Statement of Defence). The Claimant knows this and that is why he refused to make available to this Court his contract of employment. That in such a circumstance, the Court has no option but to dismiss the suit. That the situation is the same with regards to terminal benefits, as stated in Julius Berger Nig. Plc v. Nwagwu cited by the claimant. 37. On the issue of fair hearing and the cases cited by the claimant on that point, the defendant asked: assuming without conceding that a master relived his servant of his job without giving him fair hearing, what is the legal implication? Will a court of law declare such an act unlawful and void? Will it foist a willing servant on an unwilling master? It then referred to paragraph 23 of the statement of facts and paragraph 4.01 of the defendant’s final address. 38. That the case of Underwater Eng. Co. Ltd & anor v. Oubefon cited by the claimant has no application in the case at hand as the facts and circumstances in that case are radically different from the facts of the instant suit. Again, that the claimant alleged that the defendant did not deny the purported amount owed him but the defendant referred to paragraphs 10(xxvi), 11 and 13 of the statement of defence. But that assuming without conceding that the allegation is true, will it make the Court to award same without subjecting it to legal scrutiny? The defendant answered in the negative. Lastly, that in trying to make heavy weather of Exhibit D6 the claimant failed to note that Exhibit D4 is also before the Court and forms the report to the defendant’s headquarters rather than Exhibit D6. From all fronts, that it can be seen that the claimant’s suit lacks merit. COURT’S DECISION 39. I have carefully considered the processes and submissions of the parties. There are preliminary issues to resolve before addressing the merit of the case. The defendant had objected to the claimant’s final written address on two grounds. The first relates to the name of the defendant as indicated on the face of the claimant’s final written address, which is “The Registered Trustees of National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers”. To the defendant, with this name of the defendant there is thereby no valid written address before the Court since the name of the defendant on record and as sued does not commence with the words “The Registered Trustees of”. In fact, to the defendant the claimant’s “address is not in respect of Suit No. NICN/LA/126/2014, which the claimant instituted in this Court”. The problem with this last submission of the defendant is that the claimant’s final written address has “Suit No: NICN/LA/126/2014” loudly written on it. It cannot be then, as argued by the defendant, that the said address does not relate to Suit No. NICN/LA/126/2014. That argument of the defendant fails and is hereby discountenanced. The fact that the name of the defendant commences with “The Registered Trustees of” in just this process (final written address) of the claimant when all other processes rightly wrote out the name of the defendant is a mere misnomer that should not go to the competence of the address itself. In Engr Emmanuel Chukwuemeka Okeke v. Nnamdi Azikiwe University Teaching Hospital [2018] LPELR-43781(CA), Her Ladyship Ogunwumiju, JCA held thus: A misnomer has been described as occurring where the natural or legal person actually exists but a wrong name is used to sue. See Emespo Continental v. Corona S. MBH (2006) 11 NWLR Pt. 991 Pg. 365 at 378. Looking at the initiating process of the suit, there is no doubt that the Respondent would be in no doubt that it was the Management Board that was sued being the name that the Appellant ought to have used. The Appellant merely got the appropriate name wrong. This to me is a case of misnomer. See Mailafia v. Veritas Insurance (1986) 4 NWLR Pt. 38 Pg. 802 at 812. In this case, there is no doubt that the wrong description of the Respondent has not misled the Respondent. Also, hearing and determining the case with the name of the Teaching Hospital used in entering the contract between the parties instead of the Teaching Hospital Management Board would not have caused miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of this case. See Ajadi v. Ajibola (2004) 16 NWLR Pt. 898 Pg. 91; Bajoda v. Government of Nigeria (2007) All FWLR Pt. 394 Pg. 273. In the instant case, it is not in doubt that the defendant exists but wrong words have been added to its name in only the final written address; and this wrong description cannot be said to have misled the defendant nor did it cause any miscarriage of justice. The objection of the defendant on this score accordingly fails and so is hereby discountenanced. 40. The second ground of the defendant’s objection is that the stamp and seal on the claimant’s final written address has a name different from the signatory of the address. I took a look at the claimant’s final written address on record. It is dated 14th June 2018. Two names, Dr Olubukola Olugasa and Olawunmi Odunibosi (Mrs), are indicated on it; and it is signed. But there is no indication whatsoever as to who between the two signed the address. As for the stamp and seal, the name on it is Olugasa O. Adeyemi. This name certainly does not correspond with any of the two names (except for the word “Olugasa”) on the address. The defendant accordingly has a valid point here. Counsel who adopted the claimant’s final written address, however, pointed out to the Court on the day of adoption that Dr Olubukola Olugasa and Olugasa O. Adeyemi are one and the same person. Though it is common knowledge, and so judicial notice may be taken, of name abbreviation in Nigeria, I have difficulty agreeing with the claimant’s counsel here. The letter “O” used as abbreviation in the name “Olugasa O. Adeyemi” can mean anything; and I do not know where “Adeyemi” came from or how it coincides as belonging to Dr Olubukola Olugasa, the counsel on record. And as a last point, the norm is that when writing out names, surnames come, or are written, last. So which one is counsel’s surname: “Olugasa” or “Adeyemi”? 41. All of this even aside, the problem is that there is no rule of law that says an address must be signed; even if there is one, no penalty is laid down where it is not so signed. To start with, while addresses are important, the courts having noted this fact, there is no duty on counsel to file any written address; indeed, written addresses can be dispensed with. See Bosma & ors v. Akinole & ors [2013] LPELR-20285(CA) and Nicholas Elumeziem & ors v. Boniface Amadi [2014] LPELR-22459(CA). As for the requirement of stamping and sealing all court processes including written addresses, the rule is that the defaulting counsel must be given the opportunity to rectify the anomaly. There isn’t anything left in the trial of this case other than judgment to warrant the delay in terms of an adjournment to enable counsel rectify the issue of stamping and sealing. This being so, and given section 12 of the National Industrial Court Act (NIC) 2006, which enjoins that this Court can be informal, I do not think that any injustice would be done simply by overlooking just this once the anomaly associated by the claimant’s stamping and sealing of his final written address. I do not accordingly agree with the defendant that the claimant’s final written address should be struck out. I so hold. 42. In referring to letters dated March 19, 2009 and 9th March 2009 addressed to the Managing Director Gateway Holdings Ltd, Abeokuta as letters that were frontloaded by the claimant but were not listed in the list of documents, the defendant referred to “paragraph 2.07 supra” without indicating of what. The use of the word “supra” suggests that the reference is to the defendant’s final written address itself. The problem is that the defendant’s final written address has no paragraph 2.07; and the paragraph in which the claimant made the submission that the letters addressed to the MD Gateway Holdings Ltd, Abeokuta is paragraph 2.05(a). There could not have been any “paragraph 2.07 supra” coming before paragraph 2.05(a) since “supra” connotes something that came earlier or before i.e. reference to someone or something mentioned above or earlier in academic or legal texts. See the definition of the word “supra” in the New Oxford American Dictionary. 43. The defendant’s submission in paragraph 4.18(a) of its final written address to the effect that “while this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain employment matters, it does not have such jurisdiction to so do with respect to torts” is an overgeneralized submission. While this Court may not have jurisdiction in certain torts (such as defamation - MHWUN v. Dr Alfred Ehigiegba unreported Appeal No. CA/B/401/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 4th May 2016), that is not true of others. This Court, for instance, has jurisdiction over injuries at the workplace that come within the tort of negligence and the economic tort of inducing breach of contract. Overgeneralization by counsel in making submissions says very little of counsel’s advocacy. 44. The defendant’s sole issue i.e. whether the claimant has shown by facts and evidence that he is entitled to the reliefs sought by him in this suit as presently constituted is one that the claimant quarrels with, arguing that thereby, the defendant tended to change the issue brought to Court by the claimant. The claimant did not, however, state how much of a change this is. The claimant is the person asking for reliefs. The burden of proof is on him. So if the defendant asks if the claimant has proved his case, for that is what the statement “whether the claimant has shown by facts and evidence that he is entitled to the reliefs sought by him” signifies, how can it be said that the defendant has changed the case of the claimant? I do not see, and has not been shown, how. 45. The defendant had objected to the admissibility of Exhibits C3(a), C3(b) and C3(c), arguing that they were not pleaded; and that even if they were pleaded, they have no direct relevance to the issues in controversy. In answer, the claimant submitted that he pleaded the documents by virtue of paragraph 4 of his statement of claim. In paragraph 4 of the claimant’s statement of facts (Complaint), the claimant pleaded his appointment on probation, his confirmation, his forfeiture of annual leave, and that he served in Kwara, Adamawa/Taraba and Ogun States. Exhibit C3(a) is a letter transferring the claimant from Kwara to Adamawa/Taraba State Councils. Exhibits C3(b) and C3(c) respectively send the claimant on relief duty to Ogun State. To the extent that paragraph 4 of the pleadings of the claimant plead that he served in Kwara, Adamawa/Taraba and Ogun States, Exhibits C3(a), C3(b) and C3(c) are very relevant for that fact since they show that fact. Contrary to the submission of the defendant then, it is sufficient for facts upon which the documents relate are pleaded. In Mr Francis Owoade & anor v. Unity Bank Nigeria Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/224/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 6th June 2017, this Court, reviewing the authorities, held thus at paragraph 15: On the other hand, in support of the rule that the document itself has to be pleaded in order to be admitted (the claimants’ stance) are: SEC v. Abilo Uboboso (supra) [i.e. unreported Suit No. CA/A/388/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 21st December 2016], where the Court of Appeal, relying on Oyediran v. Alkbiosu II [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 550 at 566 and Okonji v. Njokannma [1999] 14 NWLR (Pt. 638) 250, puts it that for a document to be admissible and admitted in evidence before a trial Court, the document must inter alia be pleaded; and Agboola v. UBA Plc & 2 ors [2011] LPELR-9353(SC), where Mukhtar, JSC was quite specific that pleadings are meant to be specific and documents sought to be relied upon must be specifically pleaded. JFS Inv. Ltd v. Brawal Line Ltd [2010] LPELR-1610(SC); [2010] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 495 SC (appearing to take a middle course stance), simply held that if documents are referred to in a pleading they become part of the pleading and it is open to the court to look at them without the need of any affidavit exhibiting them; as such, if an agreement in writing is referred to in a pleading, it becomes part of the pleading and it is open to the court to give the agreement its true legal effect, irrespective of the terms used in the pleadings to indicate such effect. See also SGCC v. C. M. I. S Limited [1962] 1 All NLR 570 at 511 and Lawal v. G. B. Olivant [1972] 3 SC 124 at 130. It would appear then from all of this that there is the choice to either specifically plead documents to be relied upon in the pleadings or to simply plead facts upon which the documents would be brought in proof thereof. This being the case, Exhibit D is relevant to the case at hand in terms of paragraph 5 of the statement of defence; and I so find and hold. That being so, Exhibit D was appropriately admitted. I so hold. All that is left is its cogency (weight or probative value) in terms of its interpretation and application to the issues at hand. I am satisfied, and so agree with the claimant, that facts were pleaded in paragraph 4 of the statement of facts (Complaint) sufficient to make Exhibits C3(a), C3(b) and C3(c) relevant and admissible. Whether or not they have any direct relevance to the issues in controversy is a question of cogency (weight or probative value) in terms of their interpretation and application to the issues at hand. I so hold. 46. The law is that a claim is circumscribed by the reliefs claimed. See Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd [2008] LPELR-591(SC); [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399; [2008] 5 - 6 SC (Pt. II) 47. To understand the claimant’s case, it is worthwhile reiterating the facts of the case. The defendant had issued the claimant a query dated 28th July 2010 (Exhibit C12/D1) over the non-remittance of N373,371.14. The claimant by a letter dated 29th July 2010 (Exhibit C13) responded to the query stating therein that the actual sum stands at N342,110.02, not N373,371.14 indicated in the query. He was subsequently suspended without pay from his employment by Exhibit C14/D3 on 13th August 2010 “in accordance with section 8(c)(iv) and (d) of the union’s staff conditions of service until appropriate organ(s) of the union decide on the next line of action”. The Ogun State Council members by Exhibit C15 dated 6th September 2010 pleaded with the defendant and explained that it was the decision of the Council to use the sum for the benefit of the union’s accommodation and other union expenses. The defendant was not persuaded but went further to terminate the appointment of the claimant by the letter dated 22nd December 2010 (Exhibit C2/D4). In the first paragraph of Exhibit C2/D4, it is stated that it was the National Executive Committee (NEC) at its meeting of 2nd December 2010 that took the decision as to the services of the claimant being no longer needed, which decision was effective from 13th August 2010, the date the appointment of the claimant was severed (effectively backdating the termination to the date of the suspension). Also, paragraph 3 of same Exhibit C2/D4 stated that “By a copy of this letter, the Head, Finance Department of the union is requested to compute your final entitlement for onward presentation to the Central Working Committee (CWC) for consideration”. After his appointment was terminated, the claimant in expectation of his entitlements promised in the termination letter (Exhibit C2/D4) by letters dated 24th January 2011, 28th February 2011, 3rd March 2011 and 5th April 2011, respectively Exhibits C16(a), C16(b), C16(c) and C16(d), demanded the defendant to pay his entitlements. The defendant refused to pay the entitlements, which the claimant had worked out in Exhibit C16(d) as N20,835,564.65 (Twenty Million Eight Hundred and Thirty-Five Thousand, Five Hundred and Sixty-Four Naira, Sixty-Five Kobo). By the defendant’s letter dated November 7, 2011 (Exhibit C17/D5), the NEC of the defendant reversed its earlier decision to terminate the appointment of the claimant and instead dismissed the claimant with effect from 13th August 2010, the date of the claimant’s suspension. The reason the defendant gave for this is that it discovered that the claimant defrauded the defendant during the period that the claimant was sent on relief duty to Oyo State, which the claimant claimed that the fund was used for the payment of accumulated office rent in Abeokuta, something the defendant discovered to be cover up. To the claimant, this act of dismissal was done without even inviting him to defend himself at all as confirmed by defendant’s witness under cross-examination. That the evidence of DW is that the entire decision lay exclusively within the NEC who did need not the claimant to decide whether to convert termination to dismissal even upon purported fresh allegation already evidenced by a strange letter dated 7th November 2011 (Exhibit D6) purported to have been written by the defendant’s landlord a month after the purported dismissal letter. It is for all this that the claimant sued claiming the reliefs he claims. 47. What is the reaction of the defendant? The defendant took off from the technical stance that the claimant failed to make his contract of employment, conditions of service and last pay slip available to the Court; as such this must be construed to mean that if he had done so, the Court would have seen through them that the defendant has the power to dismiss him after first terminating his appointment, citing section 167(d) of the Evidence Act 2011. The cases (Famakinwa v. Tower Aluminium Nig. Plc [2007] 18 WRN 36 at 49, NIMASA v. Odey [2014] 2 WRN 83 at 115, Zhdeeh v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2007] 14 WRN 84 at 99 and Daodu v. UBA [2004] 29 WRN 53) cited by the defendant in arguing that the claimant did not make available to the Court his contract of employment, conditions of service and last pay slip correctly stated that where an employee is contesting his termination or dismissal, he needs to make available his contract of employment and conditions of employment in order to determine the validity or otherwise of the termination or dismissal. In the instant case, however, the defendant missed a profound point. While the claimant is contesting his dismissal, he is not contesting his termination; and the basis of his contesting his dismissal is on a point of law i.e. can the defendant reverse itself and substitute a verdict of termination with that of dismissal? This is a question of law. I do not thus see how sustainable the argument of the defendant in this regard is. In any event, once the parties are agreed on the fact of the claimant being an employee of the defendant, that obviates the need for the contract of employment. See Efuribe v. Ugbam [2010] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 257 CA and Okoebor v. Police Council & ors [2003] 12 NWLR (Pt. 834) 444 SC. It is my holding, therefore, that given the reliefs of the claimant as claimed, except for relief (4), the contract of employment and conditions of service are immaterial to determining the case of the claimant. These documents are necessary only for relief (4) in order to determine how the claimant arrived at the sum he claims therein. I so hold. 48. The key issue regarding the case of the claimant is that the defendant terminated his appointment and reversed itself by converting it to dismissal. Exhibit C17/D5 dated 7th November 2011 and titled “Re: Services No Longer Required” is a letter from the defendant to the claimant. In the first paragraph, it states thus: We write in respect of the above subject as conveyed to you through our letter of 22nd December, 2010 and to also inform you that, at its meeting of 2nd November, 2011 the National Executive Council resolved to reverse its decision of Services no longer required to dismissal from service effective 13th August, 2010. Can the defendant do this? This is the case of the claimant; and to him, the defendant cannot do this. In answer, the defendant submitted both in its final written address and reply on points of law that it can and has the right to do so under its constitution and staff conditions of service, referring to paragraph 10(vi) of the statement of defence and paragraph 21 of DW’s statement on oath. And that given that the claimant failed to tender the handbook, conditions of service and constitution of the defendant in Court to disprove this, the Court has nothing in its hands with which to disbelieve the defendant. In any case, that the defendant still reserves the right to dismiss any of its staff summarily for misconduct; for to hold otherwise will amount to enthroning impunity and lawlessness in the work place. The defendant went on to submit that it is little wonder that the claimant did not challenge his termination given that he felt delighted that he had defrauded and deceived the defendant and would, in spite of that, still get his full benefits from the defendant. 49. I must point out that the defendant’s argument that under its constitution and staff conditions of service, it has the power to dismiss even after termination is without any authority, statutory or case law. The defendant did not refer to any provision of its constitution and staff conditions of service wherein this power is provided for. Instead, the defendant referred to paragraph 10(vi) of its statement of defence and paragraph 21 of DW’s statement on oath as its supporting authority. The defendant cannot be serious with this submission. Paragraph 10(vi) of the statement of defence is a pleading to the effect that “The Claimant was subjected to due process under the Conditions of Service and the Constitution of the Union in the process leading to the termination of his appointment, and his eventual dismissal”; and paragraph 21 of DW’s statement on oath is the averment in support of the pleading. It too states that “The Claimant was subjected to due disciplinary process under the Union’s Conditions of Service and Constitution in the process leading to the termination of his said appointment, and his eventual dismissal”. None of these paragraphs indicate the provision of the conditions of service and constitution that grants the defendant the power to dismiss the claimant after terminating his employment. It is the duty of a litigant to refer the Court to the specific provisions of an instrument it is relying on to prove an entitlement, the entitlement here being the claim by the defendant that it can reverse termination and convert it to dismissal. In Mr. Mohammed Dungus & ors v. ENL Consortium Ltd [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 208) 39, this Court denounced the claimant for making no attempt whatsoever to indicate to the Court the exact provisions of the documents they frontloaded that grants them the entitlements they claim. This Court went on to hold that merely frontloading a document and saying that a right inures from it without indicating the clause, section, article or paragraph that grants the right is not sufficient. This Court then cautioned that counsel should not expect that it is the Court that will shop for the relevant article that substantiates the claim of his/her client. This Court concluded by noting that this is very bad advocacy; and cases can be lost just on that score. In the instant case, the defence of the defendant is that it has the power to terminate an employment and later convert it to a dismissal. It behoves on the defendant to show to this Court the exact provision of its instrument(s) that so empowers it. The defendant failed to do. It means that the defendant’s submission in that regard remains unsubstantiated. I so find and hold. 50. The argument of the defendant that the claimant knows of the power of the defendant to convert a termination to a dismissal and that is why he failed to tender his contract of employment is lame, escapist and an attempt to turn the law upside down. If the defendant does not know, once contested, the duty to justify a dismissal is always on the employer, not the employee. See NIMASA v. Odey [2013] LPELR-21402(CA). It is the defendant who argues that it has the power to covert a termination to dismissal. The duty is thus on the defendant justify that. 51. In arguing his case, the claimant cited and relied on Jombo v. PEFMB [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 443 SC as authority for his stance that the defendant has no power to convert a termination to dismissal. In reaction, the defendant in its reply on points of law spent so much time arguing that Jombo v. PEFMB is not only distinguishable from the instant case but its ratio did not relate to the issue raised by the claimant in the instant case. This may be so; but the defendant seems to forget that other case law authorities exist on the issue, and that this Court has already accepted as good law the fact that an employer cannot dismiss an employee after terminating his/her employment. The defendant itself acknowledged that in Jombo, the Supreme remitted to the trial Court the question whether an employer can dismiss an employee after a termination of employment has been done. This Court in a number of cases has answered that question; as such, the argument of the defendant that the claimant cannot rely on Jombo is misplaced given the plethora of the decisions of this Court on the matter. 52. To start with, in Mr. Bisiriyu Adegoke Sheu v. Lagos NURTW (First BRT) Cooperative Society Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/532/2013 the judgment of which was delivered on July 1, 2015, this Court referred to Underwater Eng. Co. Ltd v. Dubefon [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 156 SC as holding that an employer cannot dismiss or terminate his employee’s employment with retrospective effect. This Court went on to hold that “like dismissal and termination, suspension can be with immediate effect but certainly cannot be retrospective”. What this authority signifies is that Exhibit C2/D4 or even Exhibit C17/D5, both of which backdated the claimant’s termination/dismissal to 13th August 2010, cannot do so. On this score alone, the claimant’s termination/dismissal is wrong and invalid. However, from the claimant’s reliefs, he is not contesting his termination, only his dismissal. In fact, the claimant in relief (2) wants a declaration that the termination of his appointment remains valid and he is entitled to all his benefits from the services of the defendant. The law is that a claimant cannot get that which he/she did not ask for (or more than what he asked for). See Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd [2008] LPELR-591(SC); [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399; [2008] 5 - 6 SC (Pt. II) 47. Since the claimant is not contesting the termination of his employment, I cannot make any order as to the invalidity of the termination on the ground that it was backdated as I indicated earlier. This of course leaves out the question whether the defendant has the power to convert a termination to a dismissal, which is actually the case the claimant brought to this Court in terms of this suit. 53. I indicated earlier that there are a number of cases of this Court where this Court held that an employer cannot dismiss an employee after a termination of the employment has been done. The first of the cases I wish to refer to is Engineer Ignatius Ugwoke v. Aeromaritime (Nigeria) Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/482/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 30th November 2016. This Court at paragraph 32 held thus: … Once Annexure 4 was written, it became effective; as such there was no longer an appointment that could be subsequently terminated. By Jombo v. PEFMB [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 443 SC, it is elementary that an employee cannot be dismissed from an employment that had ceased to exist. Therefore, a dismissal coming after the termination of appointment would be futile exercise. Accordingly, Annexure 5 is ineffective as there was no employment that could be terminated. Even if there was, the termination cannot be backdated. Annexure 5 is accordingly invalid, null and void; and I so find and hold. This means that Annexure 4 is the effective document that determined the employment of the claimant. 54. The second is Olufemi Amodu v. Epesok Paper Mill Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/304/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 22nd June 2016 where this Court held thus: The dismissal of the claimant by the defendant is wrongful for another reason. In stating that the defendant first terminated the claimant’s appointment before converting same to dismissal, the defendant thereby acted wrongly. This is because, having terminated the claimant’s appointment, the claimant’s appointment thereby came to an end; as such there was no longer an appointment for which the act of dismissal related to. See Jombo v. PEFMB [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 443 SC, which held that it is elementary that an employee cannot be dismissed from an employment that had ceased to exist; therefore, a dismissal coming after the termination of appointment would be futile exercise. The dismissal of the claimant by the defendant is accordingly wrongful for this additional reason; and I so find and hold. 55. The third is Dr (Mrs) Ebele Felix v. Nigerian Institute of Management unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/321/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 4th July 2017. In it, this Court at paragraph 46 held thus: In the instant case, the claimant resigned with immediate effect on 19th May 2014. The defendant received the said letter of resignation on same 19th May 2014. This means that going be the above case law authorities, the claimant’s resignation was effective from 19th May 2014, the date the defendant received the letter of resignation. I so find and hold. This being the case, there was no employment relationship between the parties which the defendant can reject and so dismiss the claimant afterwards. By Jombo v. PEFMB [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 443 SC, it is elementary that an employee cannot be dismissed from an employment that had ceased to exist. Therefore, a dismissal coming after the termination of appointment would be futile exercise. The claimant effectively resigned her appointment on 19th May 2014; there was no employment relationship on 22nd May 2014 for the defendant to dismiss with immediate effect. It is ironic, indeed funny I would say, that Exhibit D8 is dated 22nd May 2014 but was delivered to the claimant on 21st May 2014, and the defendant’s response is that it was merely postdated. There was no employment for a postdated dismissal either. I so hold. See also Kelvin Nwaigwe v. Fidelity Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/85/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 24th January 2017 and Ineh Monday Mgbeti v. Unity Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/98/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 21st February 2017. 56. I must stress the point that even if the defendant were to argue that this Court’s decisions that applied Jombo (referred to above) wrongly did so, the defendant must equally realize, as it argued, that the issue of converting termination to dismissal was remitted to the trial court for determination; as such, the said decisions of this Court, being trials on merit, must be read as complying with that remit. So strong is this Court’s stance that it had declared invalid and an unfair labour practice for employers to seek to hold back employees who resigned with immediate effect by refusing to accept their resignation on the ground that the employee is being investigated for whatever infractions. See Ineh Monday Mgbeti v. Unity Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/98/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 21st February 2017 and Dr (Mrs) Ebele Felix v. Nigerian Institute of Management unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/321/2014, the judgment of which delivered on 4th July 2017. All of this also means that the argument of the claimant that he was not invited by the defendant to defend the charges that led to the defendant converting his termination to dismissal becomes irrelevant. This is because there is no employment relationship existing between the two parties as to entitle the defendant calling the claimant to come and defend himself. 57. The defendant would in the euphoria of analyzing Jombo make the generalized submission that “the law remains that there is no distinction between termination and dismissal”. I know that at the level of the International Labour Organization (ILO), termination and dismissal are used interchangeably. However, our domestic law makes clear distinctions between the two. Even Jombo, analyzed by the defendant, acknowledged that while dismissal is punitive, termination is not. Additionally, Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Soares [2012] LPELR-8018(CA), citing Adeko v. Ijebu-Ode District Council [1962] 1 SC NLR 349, held thus: “There is a clear distinction between termination of a contract of employment and a dismissal. Termination gives the parties the right to determine the contract at any time by giving the prescribed period of notice. Dismissal on the other hand, is a disciplinary measure which carries no benefits”. 58. Given all I have said so far, I hold in favour of the claimant that the defendant has no power whatsoever to convert the termination of the claimant’s employment communicated to him vide Exhibit C2/D4 to dismissal as it did vide Exhibit C17/D5. This being so, the claimant has proved and so is entitled to reliefs (1) and (2). They are hereby granted. 59. Relief (3) prays for “a declaration that the purported “reverse” of termination of appointment of the claimant’s employment into dismissal of the claimant from the employment of the defendant as borne by the defendant’s letter dated 7th November 2011 amounts to breach of contract and tort of conversion and detinue resulting in the embarrassment, dehumanization, and foreclosure of job prospect for the claimant”. There are two components of this relief: that the reversal of the termination into dismissal is a breach of contract, on the one hand; and a breach of tort of conversion and detinue, on the other hand. To take the first component, that the reversal is a breach of contract, I just held that after the termination there was no contract of employment for which the claimant can be dismissed. If there was no contract of employment, which contract is the claimant talking of that the defendant’s reversal of the termination decision breached? It is thus logically impossible to hold that the purported reverse of termination of appointment into dismissal amounts to a breach of contract. 60. As for the second component, there is a difficulty. The claimant here is claiming for damages for tort of conversion and detinue resulting in the embarrassment, dehumanization, and foreclosure of job prospect for him. To him, having proved that the entire cause of action arose out of the contrivance of the defendant to avoid the demand of the claimant’s entitlements it becomes apparent that the defendant intentionally converted and detained the sum from the claimant; and that the defendant has unlawfully kept his entitlement and when he demanded same it refused him. Conversion and detinue as torts deal with chattels or goods or properties. See Martchem Industries Nig. Ltd v. M.F. Kent West Africa Ltd [2005] LPELR-1842(SC); [2005] 10 NWLR (Pt. 934) 645; [2005] 5 SC (Pt. II) 121 and Civil Design Construction Nig. Ltd v. SCOA Nig. Ltd [2007] LPELR-870(SC); [2007] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1030) 300; [2007] 2 SC 195. As couched, relief (3) talks of ‘the purported “reverse” of termination of appointment of the claimant’s employment into dismissal…amounts to…tort of conversion and detinue…’ Is “the purported reverse” the chattel or property? The duo of B. S. Markesinis & S. F. Deakin - Tort Law (Clarendon Press: Oxford), 3rd Edition, 1994 at pages 406 to 407 have it that the gist of conversion and detinue is dealing with another’s property in a way which amounts to denial of his right over it. In order to be able to sue, the claimant must have the right to any one of ownership, possession, or the immediate right to possess, or a lien or equitable title; but a mere contractual right will not suffice (Rogers v. Kennay (1846) 9 QB 592 and International Factors Ltd v, Rodriguez [1979] QB 35). Secondly, that there must be an act of some kind; an omission will not suffice. Even if the clamant's contention, that he demanded for his entitlements, which the defendant refused, as such there is conversion and detinue, is taken on its face value, has the claimant shown ownership, possession, lien or equitable title? Is the claimant’s right not merely contractual? Has the claimant shown the act of the defendant given that omission is not enough? There is another point. Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (Sweet & Maxwell: London), 16th Edition, International Student Edition, 2002 at page 596, on what may be converted, has it that any corporeal, moveable property may be converted; and that this includes money in the form of coins and notes though once the taker has paid them to another they become currency and the payee and subsequent recipients cannot be sued for conversion by the original owner. Which notes and coins of the claimant did the defendant convert or detain? I think that the insufficient clarity in the conception of the torts of conversion and detinue is what has led the claimant to frame relief (3) as he did. As it is, relief (3) cannot be granted. It fails and so is dismissed. Once relief (3) fails, relief (6), the claim for N20 Million as damages for breach of contract and the torts of conversion and detinue, must equally fail. Relief (6) is thus also dismissed. 61. This leaves out relief (4), the claim for “N20,835,564.65…only being entitlement of the claimant from the defendant as of 31st March 2011 plus interest”. This a claim for special damages, which by 7UP Bottling Company Plc v. Augustus [2012] LPELR-20873(CA) and NNPC v. Clifco Nigeria Ltd [2011] LPELR-2022(SC) are exceptional, are never inferred from the nature of the act complained of and must be claimed specially and proved strictly with credible evidence. The Court is not entitled to make its own estimate of same. As proof of relief (4), the claimant referred to Exhibit C16(d) wherein he calculated and put his entitlement as N20,835,564.65. Exhibit C16(d) is a demand letter written by the claimant to the defendant. It cannot amount to proof of the claimant’s entitlement to the said sum of N20,835,564.65. It is here that the argument of the defendant that the claimant did not make available to the Court his contract of employment and conditions of service in order to determine if he is entitled to relief (4); and if he is, how he came by the said sum claimed (Mr. Mohammed Dungus & ors v. ENL Consortium Ltd [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 208) 39), becomes relevant. In this sense, I agree with the defendant that relief (4) has not been proved by the claimant. It fails and so is hereby dismissed. Since relief (4) fails, relief (5), the claim for interest on the sum claimed in relief (4), must equally fail. It fails and so is dismissed. Relief (7) is a claim for cost, which is at the discretion of the Court. 62. As it is, and for the reasons given, only reliefs (1) and (2) succeed in this suit; and they are granted in the following terms: (1) It is hereby declared that the purported “reverse” of termination of appointment of the claimant’s employment into dismissal of the claimant from the employment of the defendant as borne by the defendant’s letter dated 7th November 2011 is strange, wrongful, unlawful, null and void. (2) It is also declared that the termination of the appointment of the claimant from the employment of the defendant as borne by the defendant’s letter dated 22nd December 2010 remains valid and the claimant is entitled to all his benefits from the services of the defendant. 63. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD