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JUDGMENT 1. The claimant commenced this action vide a complaint filed on 16th March 2016 together with the accompanying originating processes. By the statement of facts, the claimant is claiming against the defendant the following reliefs: (1) A declaration that the purported and/or induced letter of resignation dated 22nd January, 2016 and signed by the claimant under duress is invalid and unlawful. (2) A declaration that the claimant’s employment with the defendant still subsists. (3) A declaration that the harassment, intimidation and/or humiliation of the claimant by the defendant to force her to write letter of resignation of employment under duress at the Human Resources office at Samuel Asabia House, 35 Marina Street, Lagos on 22nd January, 2016 is illegal, unlawful, inhuman and unconstitutional. (4) A declaration that the act of the defendant referred to in paragraph (3) hereof amounts to an unfair labour practice. (5) A declaration that the defendant cannot convert the claimant’s welfare loan to a commercial loan and run at the prevailing commercial interest while the claimant is still challenging her forceful resignation from the defendant. (6) An order setting aside the purported letter of resignation of appointment referred to in paragraph (1) hereof. (7) An order directing the defendant to reinstate and/or recall the claimant to her duty post or employment and allow the claimant to enjoy all benefits attached to the claimant’s status. (8) An order directing the defendant to pay to the claimant all her outstanding salaries, allowances and other entitlement due to her from the 22nd January, 2016 to date. (9) The sum of N500,000,000:00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) for the impairment of the claimant’s health as damages suffered as a result of the claimant’s employment with the defendant, which further aggravated as a result of forcing the claimant to resign her employment. (10) The sum of N50,000,000:00 (Fifty Million Naira) as cost of solicitors fees. 2. The defendant entered formal; appearance and then filed its defence processes, which defense processes were later amended with leave of the Court. By the amended statement of defence & Counterclaim, the defendant counterclaimed thus: (a) Judgment in the sum of N17,388,772.09 (Seventeen Million, Three Hundred and Eighty-Eight Thousand, Seven Hundred and Seventy-Two Naira and Nine Kobo) owed to the claimant by the defendant with respect to the loan facility extended to her. (b) Interest at the rate of 23% per annum from the date of this counterclaim toll judgment and thereafter at 6% per annum until final liquidation. (c) Cost of this action. 3. In reaction, the claimant filed her reply and defence to counterclaim, additional witness statement on oath, list and copies of additional documents. 4. At the trial, the claimant testified on her own behalf as CW. Her frontloaded documents were admitted and marked as Exhibits C1 to C16. For the defendant, Mrs Nkechinyelu Ivwurie, Head Employee Support Services with the defendant, testified as DW. The defendant’s frontloaded documents were admitted and marked Exhibits D1 to D8. Parties were then informed that in their final written addresses, they were at liberty to raise any issue as to the admissibility or evidential value of any of the frontloaded documents admitted and marked. At the close of trial, parties filed their respective final written addresses. The defendant’s final written address was filed on 19th February 2018; while the claimant’s was filed on 27th March 2018. The defendant’s reply on points of law was filed on 6th April 2018. THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 5. In the words of the claimant, she was an employee of the defendant. She joined the services of the defendant on 3rd December 2007 as a Manager and rose steadily in the services to the position of a Principal Manager. During and in the course of her employment with the defendant, her promotions were purely earned on merit by reason of her sterling tract record of performance and contributions to the overall profitability of the defendant and based on this, the defendant repeatedly promoted her from one rank to the other. Over the years of diligent service to the defendant, she visibly demonstrated the sterling qualities of handwork, integrity, sincerity, vision, honesty and dedication to duty which earned her high percentage of performance in her Annual Appraisals measured in accordance with the Employee Handbook. She never had any disciplinary issues with the defendant and was never asked to appear before the defendant’s Staff Disciplinary Committee and neither was she ever accused of any misconduct whatsoever. 6. On 22nd January 2016, the claimant was compelled and forced to write her letter of resignation in a manner inconsistent with the term of contract of employment between them. And on the said date her official e-mail box was disabled by the defendant, an averment which the defendant did not deny in their pleadings. Based on the above, the claimant wrote a letter dated 16th February 2016 (Exhibit C9) protesting and/or challenging the cruel manner in which she was forced to resign. She also caused her solicitor to write to the defendant on 23rd February 2016 on the need to rescind their decision (Exhibit C10) but the defendant replied by a letter dated 2nd February 2016 that the claimant’s resignation process cannot be concluded (Exhibit C8) showing that defendant is a probating and reprobating at the same. That despite this exchange of the letters, the defendant has acted in bad faith by threatening the claimant to pay the welfare loan and that it will be converted to a commercial loan at the prevailing commercial interest contrary to the letters of offer and acceptance of Exhibits C15 and C16 respectively. That the claimant is jobless and over 50 years and has no prospect of getting another job. As a result of her forceful resignation the claimant has suffered psychological trauma and aggravated hypertension. That when the defendant did not re-instate the claimant or rescind their position on the forceful resignation of the claimant, the claimant approached this Court for justice. However, the defendant joined issues and denied the allegation of forceful resignation which is not true on the face of overwhelming evidence before the Court that the claimant was forced to resign her employment with the defendant. That the defendant who frustrated the repayment plan of the loan advanced to the claimant now counterclaimed and is demanding for the staff welfare loan advanced to the claimant at the prevailing commercial rate of interest which was not part of the agreement between the parties in terms of letters of offer and acceptance. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT 7. By its pleading, the defendant joined issues with the claimant on her case. To the defendant, the claimant was never coerced, compelled, threatened or forced to resign. That the claimant’s resignation was a consequence of her poor performance within the financial year as contained in Exhibits D1 and D2. That had the claimant not resigned she was liable to be dismissed based on poor performance. That during the pendency of the claimant’s employment and as a senior staff of the defendant, she was fully aware of the Performance Incentives Scheme (PIS) (Exhibit D1) of the defendant which is aimed at motivating and encouraging teamwork and improving overall business performance by rewarding/sanctioning differential performances and achievements with differential incentives. That the claimant enjoyed all the benefits entitled to her by virtue of her position in the defendant Bank and none was ever denied by the defendant before her voluntary resignation. That the claimant received allowance meant for staff still in the employment of the defendant for the whole of 2016, which became unearned from the time of the claimant’s resignation in January 2016, and for which the claimant is liable to refund vide Exhibits D7 and D7A. That the claimant is bound to repay the loan which she obtained whilst in the defendant’s employment as contained in Exhibits D4 and D4A. That the loan received by the claimant is distinct and separate from the claimant’s contract of employment. That the employment of the claimant carries with it benefits such as pension, ability to engage in collective bargaining, provisions for leave days and the like in line with International Labour Organization guidelines; and that none of these were breached by the defendant before the claimant’s voluntary resignation. In effect, that nothing surrounding the claimant’s resignation of her employment can be regarded as unfair labour practice or non-standard work arrangement. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT 8. The defendant submitted two issues for determination, namely: (a) Whether the claimant has proved her case to make her entitled to all her claims. (b) Whether the defendant/counterclaimant has proved its counterclaims, and entitled to the claims sought therein. 9. For issue (a), the defendant first asked: what is it that the claimant says the defendant did that was unlawful? The answer: that the defendant coerced her into resigning when she did not want to and now wants the Court to declare that Exhibit C5 is invalid and unlawful; that she is still in the employment of the defendant; and give orders setting aside Exhibit C5 and that defendant should reinstate her into its employment, amongst other reliefs ancillary to these. To the defendant, it is pertinent to note that the evidence before this Court is not that the defendant terminated the employment of the claimant; rather, it is claimant’s case that she was coerced to resign. Accordingly, that the claimant’s evidence to the effect that the defendant followed no due process in the termination of her employment is neither here nor there and ought to be discountenanced, as this was neither her case nor the defendant’s defence. It amounts to nothing but a red-herring which must be side-stepped, urging the Court to so hold. Also, that until the defendant pleaded otherwise, the claimant’s initial story was that she was forcefully resigned from the defendant’s employment. However, upon being served with the defendant’s extant defence dated 20th September 2016, the claimant by her reply pleading in paragraph 9 thereof averred as follows, “(a) The Defendant had the right to terminate her employment which it did, but due process was not followed”. 10. The defendant then submitted that Exhibit D3 is a resignation letter showing that the claimant voluntarily resigned from the defendant’s employ. That the claimant as a senior officer admitted under cross-examination that the proper procedure was for an exit interview with her Executive Director as pleaded by the defendant. Yet she failed, refused and/or neglected to follow this procedure by her admission under cross-examination. And her excuse was that because the relief Executive Director, Mr. Dibieze, was the one who directed her to see them in Human Capital, there was no need for her to go back for any exit interview since it “she was coerced into resigning”. That this seems a bit far-fetched, particularly since, if her story is to be believed (which is denied), she surely should be feeling hard done by and willing to take an opportunity of an exit interview with her line ED to put this on the record. That, on the evidence admitted, a comparison of the 2 versions of the letter of resignation in evidence - Exhibits D3 and C5, should conclusively proof that the defendant’s version of the nature of the resignation being voluntary is the more probable. 11. As a background to this, the defendant submitted that the case of the claimant is that “on the 22nd of January 2016, she was called on phone by one Mr. Obiora Dibieze, the Relief Executive Director of the Defendant’s company, and directed her to see them in the Human Capital Management and Development (HCMD), and on getting there, she was directed to one Nkechiyelu Ivwurie who coerced, compelled, threatened and forced her to write a resignation letter or be handed a letter of termination”, referring to paragraph 7 of CW’s statement on oath dated 16th March 2016. However, that under cross-examination, CW further testified that Exhibit C5 was typed by her using Mrs Nkechiyelu Ivwurie's computer and the said letter (Exhibit C5) was also printed using Mrs Nkechiyelu Ivwurie’s office printer and all of these were done at HCMD on 22nd January 2016. To the defendant, Exhibit C5 was not received at the HCMD until 25th January 2016 which was 3 days after the claimant was allegedly forced to write same. That how strange and improbable it is for a document written on 22nd January under (if CW is to be believed) strict urgency will only be received 3 full days after the seemingly ‘hot’ letter was written. That this is the first exposure of CW's lies sir. That Exhibit C5 exposes the fabricated testimony of CW, urging the Court not to believe her testimony and relying on Osokoya v. Onigemo [2017] LPELR-42730(CA), Ezemba v. Ibeneme [2004] 14 NWLR (Pt. 894) 617 and Ajide v. Kelani [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 245. 12. The second, equally damaging, lie of CW is this. That Exhibit C5 is not a document which could have been written by someone who was under coercion or threat of immediate authorship, else dismissal, as the claimant claimed. That the Court should situate a tensed situation where a staff is confronted with the alleged “coercion to resign”. The defendant then asked: would such a staff in the state of mind paragraph 7 of CW’s statement on oath convey, have time also to create and design a letter headed paper in the form of “VIVIEN FOLAYEMI ASANA BLOCK 5E, FLAT 2, JAKANE ESTATE, ISOLO” on another person’s computer? The defendant answered in the negative. That it is indicative of a document prepared on a pre-designed letter headed paper, a copy of which cannot possibly be on Mrs Ivwurie’s computer. Furthermore, that the content of Exhibit C5 was well composed and arranged, which suggests that CW was well composed when the letter was written, urging the Court to so hold. 13. The third, and also equally damaging untruth of CW’s testimony is that not only did Mrs Ivwurie coerce her (a senior officer, senior in rank to Mrs Ivwurie) but that she used Mrs Ivwurie’s computer system, not only to type her resignation letter, but also to print it. That she lied when she said no password was needed to access Mrs Ivwurie’s computer when the said computer needed activation to type. Even if she is to be believed that Mrs Ivwurie “voluntarily gave her access to the computer”, and she did type the said Exhibit C5 therefrom, how did she access the central printer used by all other staff? Also, that it was the claimant’s evidence that access to Mrs Ivwurie’s computer (which is a lie) gave her access to the printer. This cannot be true because by the time the letter would have been completed (even if she had typed it there) she would need Mrs Ivwurie’s staff number to access the central printer. That the impression this gives is that the testimony of CW is not true, and the Court should not believe same. The claimant was never forced or threatened to write Exhibit C5 or any letter at all. That it is obvious that the claimant cooked up this story of threat and force to get sympathy and to mislead this Court, urging the Court to so hold and rely on Ayeni v. People of Lagos State [2016] LPELR-41440(CA), which held that an untruthful witnesses do not deserve to be accorded any credibility by the Court. That regardless of the oral evidence of CW to the effect that she was coerced and forced to resign from the defendant’s employ, the best evidence is documentary evidence, which Exhibits D3 and C5 represent, which documentary evidence is better than any oral evidence, relying on Mrs Abiola Osibowale v. Caribbean Finance Ltd & 7 ors [2011] LPELR-4548. 14. Not to over-flog this issue of whether the claimant’s resignation was coerced or voluntary, the defendant submitted further that by paragraph 7 of CW’s witness statement on oath, the claimant reiterated that “on the 22nd January 2016, she received a call on phone from one Mr. Obiora Dibieze, the Relief Executive Director of the Defendant's Company, who directed her to see them in Human Capital Management and Development (HCMD)...” That under cross-examination, CW testified that there was no need for her to meet the ED again after meeting with Mrs Ivwurie since it was a direct instruction from Mr Dibieze that she should see them at the Human Capital Department. That Mr. Dibieze did not say the claimant was sacked but only told her to see them at the HCMD. However, having seen them at the HCMD, the claimant was expected to have returned to her line ED which she never did nor spoke with him about what happened at the HCMD. That while giving evidence under cross-examination, DW explained that the procedure for the removal of principal manager was duly followed by the defendant as stipulated in Exhibit C4, clause 8:11 thus: Employees leaving the Bank must settle all their indebtedness to the Bank or make acceptable arrangement for the settlement. Exit interview shall be held with every employee leaving the Bank on his/her own in order to establish the true motive or reason for leaving: The interview will be conducted as follows: Employees on SBO Grade & Below - BM or Departmental Head Employees on A/M Manager Grade - Business Development Manager Senior Manager-principal Manager Grade - Head of Departmental/Line E.D AGM & DGM Grades - Line E.D or MD/CEO To the defendant, the exit interview was never conducted because the claimant did not trigger it as the claimant never returned to her line ED to discuss the advice given to her by the HCMD. That there was nothing unlawful in the exit of the claimant as proper procedure was followed and anything done contrary to it was as a result of the claimant not submitting herself to the laid down procedure, urging the Court to so hold and discountenance reliefs (1), (2), (3) (4), (6), (7) and (8) of the claimant's claims. 15. The defendant went on that CW lied about Exhibit C13, calling it a PROMOTION LETTER as per paragraph 32 of her statement on oath, when in fact it is only a REDEPLOYMENT LETTER. That CW is not a witness of truth! That if CW blatantly lied about this, what other lies is she trying to make this Court believe? 16. The claimant has also tried to couch the defendant’s alleged infractions as being one of unfair labour practice. To the defendant, because unfair trade practice is equity-based labour jurisprudence, as with everything equity, the fair principles of equity must apply for this genus of labour jurisprudence to be seen as balanced and fair. That within the ambit of the evidence before this Court in this matter, and applying the principle of equity (that, he who comes to equity must do so with clean hands), the actions of this claimant, on the events leading to this suit, and her clear untruthful testimony exposed under cross-examination, she who seeks this equitable remedy of unfair labour practice has approached this temple of justice with very soiled hands indeed. If she lied that she was coerced into resigning, when she obviously was not, she lied and comes to equity with soiled hands. If she tried to pass on a redeployment letter as a promotion letter, she lied and cannot enjoy the benefits of equity. That as the defendant would show in arguing issue (b), if she took and benefitted from a loan from the defendant, and now does not want to repay same, that is unconscionable and should not be encouraged. She is not worthy of equitable reliefs, citing Alalade v. National Bank of Nig Ltd [1997] LPELE-5540(CA). 17. That the claimant, in a bit to turn the screw on her “unfair labour practice” claim also pleaded in paragraph 8 of her additional written statement on oath that “Defendant breached all International Labour Organization guidelines”, without offering any proof thereon. That the least she could have done was to particularize which ILO guidelines were breached. The ILO convention and guidelines are readily available and within easy reach of the claimant. To the defendant, even though the Court is by Evidence Act to presume all statutes, connections and policies, it cannot do so for these claims because he who alleges must prove. That to develop the doctrine of unfair labour practice requires more diligence and hard work by litigants, not just to hide under the umbrella of “Unfair Labour Practice” but to show how exactly acts complained of amount to such unfair labour practice. Doing otherwise would keep the defendant who is to meet that case in the dark, urging the Court to so hold and to presume under section 167(D) of the Evidence Act 2011 that no such proof was offered by claimant because same would not have availed her. 18. The defendant then submitted that the claimant is not entitled to any of the claims contained in her statement of facts as she was advised to resign based on her poor performance and instead of having her appointment terminated; the claimant decided to resign her appointment and having done so, the claimant is not entitled to be re-instated or to any of the claim contained in her statement of facts. That the claimant cannot eat her cake and have it. However, that having resigned her appointment, the claimant is expected to take responsibility for any consequences from her action. The defendant reiterated that Exhibits D3 and C5 are documentary evidence showing that the claimant formally and voluntarily resigned her appointment and, therefore, relinquished her office, not as she painted it, but as the endorsement on Exhibit D3 show - on 25th January 2016; the same day the claimant submitted Exhibit C5 and her staff identity card to the HCMD which means the claimant did not only show her intention to relinquish her office alone but also accompanied it with the act to relinquish her office, urging the Court to so hold. 19. Part of the claimant’s claim is the sum of N500,000,000:00 (Five Hundred Million Naira only) allegedly for the impairment of her health as damages suffered in the defendant’s employment, which she claims was further aggravated as a result of forcing her to resign her employment. To the defendant, the claimant is not entitled to this claim because there was no proof of same. That the only document tendered in respect of this head of claim is Exhibit C7, which does not prove anything. There is nothing in that exhibit that links the state of health stated therein to defendant’s employment, or the purported coercion to resign. In fact, that the only thing Exhibit C7 shows is that the claimant is hypertensive which by that exhibit, was diagnosed even long before she resigned her appointment from the defendant, referring to lines 1-2 thereof. That there is no nexus between Exhibit C7 and the claimant’s resignation from the defendant’s Bank; there is also no evidence showing that she became hypertensive because of her work in the defendant’s employment; and it will be conjecture and speculative at best to so contend without more, relying on Sebastian Adigwe v. FRN [2015] LPELR-24694(SC), where the Supreme Court cautioned against courts of law relying on conjecture where no proof is offered of insinuations. That he who alleges must prove, and that this exhibit has no link with the defendant, urging the Court to so hold. Therefore, that this claim cannot be sustained. That the Court should bear in mind that it is the claimant’s pleading and evidence that she intended to work in the defendant bank for a long time, to the very pinnacle of the ladder. That the question is whether if she was still in the defendant’s employment this issue of impaired health would have come up, or even allowed her to work as she had wished to. That the claimant has failed to prove this head of claim, and same should be dismissed with cost. 20. The last claim of the claimant is the sum of N50,000,000:00 (Fifty Million Naira only) being cost of solicitor’s fees. First, that this claim is in the nature of a liquidated sum, which ought to be particularized. No particulars were given. Also, the only documents the claimant tendered in the name of its counsel are Exhibits C10 and C12, the former a letter dated 25th February 2016 the latter one dated 8th March 2016. That this is no proof required to ground the claim for N50,000,000:00 as claimed, or at all. Besides, that this Court decided that a solicitor’s demand letter is not proof of liquidated sums, citing Oyewumi Oyetayo v. Zenith Bank [2012] 29 NLLR (Pt. 84) 370 at 425-426, urging the Court to hold that neither Exhibits C10 nor C12 is proof of claimant’s liquidated claim for this head of claim;as such, the claim is not proved. That the claimant having voluntarily resigned her appointment cannot then claim that her employment with the defendant subsists or for this Court to reinstate and/or recall her to her duty post, urging the Court to so hold and discountenance the claims of the claimant for lack of merit and dismiss all the said claims. 21. The defendant proceeded to challenge the admissibility of the claimant’s Exhibits C6, C6(a), C6(b), C6(c) and C14. To the defendant, these documents are computer generated but were tendered contrary to section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 given that the claimant did not file any certificate of compliance in respect of the documents which is a condition precedent for their admissibility, relying on Dr Imoro Kubor & anor v. Hon. Seriake Dickson & 2 ors [2013] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 534 at 578. As to whether the Court has the power to expunge from its record evidence or documents earlier admitted without objection by counsel, that it is settled law that the court can do that and has been doing that over the years, citing NIPC Ltd v. Thompson Organization Ltd [1968] 1 NMLR 99 at 104. That since the claimant never fulfilled the pre-conditions laid down by law, Exhibits C6, C6(a), C6(b), C6c and C14 are inadmissible, urging the Court to so hold. 22. On Exhibit C3, that only “relevant pages” of defendant’s Annual Report and Accounts for 2014 were tendered. The defendant wondered whether this truly reflects the documents itself, referring to section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act, which provide thus: The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it deems likely to have happened, regard shall be had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business; in their relationship to the facts of the particular case, and in particular the court may presume that: (d) evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. The defendant then submitted that the claimant tendered only the part of the defendant’s Annual Report that is favourable to their case instead of the whole document itself, urging the Court to be careful of the probative value it will attach to Exhibit C3. 23. Furthermore, that the Court should be wary of the probative value it will attach to Exhibit C13. That the document tells a lie vis-a-vis the claimant’s pleading. That the claimant in paragraph 32 of her pleadings misled the Court that Exhibit C13 is proof of her promotion and she confirmed this in paragraph 32 of her statement on oath already in evidence. That Exhibit C13 confirms itself not to be a promotion but redeployment letter. That a document is better than oral evidence, and so the Court must be wary what value this exhibit adds to the claimant’s claims, relying on Okafor v. Okafor & ors [2014] LPELR-23561(CA). 24. Issue (b) is whether the defendant has proved its counterclaim. During trial, DW tendered Exhibits D4-D8 to establish the defendant’s claims against the claimant. By Exhibits D4-D8, the outstanding sum of the claimant’s indebtedness to the defendant is in the sum of N17,388,772.09 (Seventeen Million, Three Hundred and Eighty-Eight Thousand, Seven Hundred and Seventy-Two Naira and Nine Kobo) which are the loan facilities granted to the claimant consisting of acquisition of 2 shops at Tejuoso Market Complex, Lagos State; Staff Home Loan facility for acquisition of a property building; and unearned allowances for a year which was paid to the claimant as a staff of the defendant. By Exhibit D8, the defendant demanded for the repayment of the loan facility taken by the claimant while still in the employment of the defendant. That the claimant in paragraph 41 of her statement of facts and paragraph 41 of her witness statement on oath admitted her indebtedness to the defendant in the sum of N11,000,000.00 (Eleven Million Naira only). It is the defendant’s submission that despite the denials in Exhibit C9, the claimant’s admission of this sum stands, as Exhibits C9 and C10, while denying owing a total sum of N17,388,772.09, still confirmed owing an amount, although both documents did not mention a figure. 25. That Exhibit C9 is the claimant’s response to defendant’s own demand for the sum. In paragraph 4 of the said letter, the claimant wrote: As regards the alleged outstanding indebtedness of N17,388,772.09 (Seventeen Million, Three Hundred and Eighty-Eight Thousand, Seven Hundred and Seventy-Two Naira and Nine Kobo). Please note that I did not resign by my own volitions, I was intimidated, harassed and compelled to resign, as such I cannot be compelled to pay this sum within 30 days, and you cannot convert it to a commercial loan. She went further in the last paragraph of the said Exhibit C9 to state: I did not plan to resign at this stage of my life and career and as such I do not have such funds to repay you within the said period. In addition, my indebtedness is not N17,388,772.09 as alleged in your letter. 26. Exhibit C10 is the claimant’s solicitor’s letter dated 25th February 2016. In paragraph 6 of the said letter, the claimant’s solicitor wrote thus: Your letter of demand for the sum of N17,388,772.09 (Seventeen Million, Three Hundred and Eighty-Eight Thousand, Seven Hundred and Seventy-Two Naira, and Nine kobo) has also been shown to us by our Client. We gather that her indebtedness was not up to that amount. Apart from that you cannot convert the indebtedness to Commercial Loan from welfare. 27. The defendant relied on Okafor v. Okafor & ors [2014] LPELR-23561(CA), which held that a written document speaks for itself, urging the Court to hold that there is an admission in the said sum of N11,000,000.00 (Eleven Million Naira only), which the defendant does not need more to prove and enter judgment in the admitted sum without more. 28. The defendant went on that having admitted her indebtedness to the defendant in the sum of N11,000,000.00 (Eleven Million Naira only), the only amount in dispute is the difference which is in the sum of N6,288,772.09 (Six Million, Two Hundred and Eighty-Eight Thousand, Seven Hundred and Seventy-Two Naira and Nine Kobo). That by defendant’s evidence, these are unearned allowances paid to the claimant before she resigned her appointment for the whole of year 2016 - January to December, referring to paragraph 33 of DW’s statement on oath and Exhibit D7. That since the claimant resigned her appointment in January of that year, the payments to her for February - December of that year becomes a debt she has to repay, as they amount to unearned income, urging the Court to so hold. That the claimant offered no tangible defence to this claim of unearned allowance, urging the Court to grant same. 29. The defendant continued that under cross-examination, CW insisted that there is nowhere in Exhibit D4 where it provides that repayment of the loan facility will be from her salary. She also referred to clause 12 of Exhibit C4 and the offer letter which stated that repayment of the loan facility will be from salary. However, that the question is: can we say the repayment of the loan will still be from the salary, when the employee has resigned her appointment? The defendant answered in the negative. Can we then say because the employee has resigned her appointment, the loan will not be repaid? The defendant again answered in the negative. That the loan agreements constitute contracts, separate from the claimant’s employment; and none of the occurrences that can vitiate a valid contract was pleaded, let alone proved by the claimant; urging the Court to so hold. 30. That the claimant has not disputed the fact that she took the loan; as such she cannot now seek to avoid the responsibility of repaying same. She had enjoyed the facility. That it is against good conscience, and contract, for her to now seek to dodge repaying same; relying on Bank of the North Ltd v. Alhaji Abba Sotomi Saleh [1999] LPELR-6544 (CA). Furthermore, that clause 12 of Exhibit C4 is applicable to staff of the defendant who are still in the employment of the defendant. That what qualified the claimant to be entitled to welfare loan and the non-commercial interest rate was the fact that she was a staff of the defendant at the time the loan was taken; nothing more. That having, however, ceased to be a staff of the defendant, she forfeited her rights over the interest rate that applies to welfare loans, urging the Court to so hold. That it is the defendant’s policy that upon the exit of a staff, welfare loan taken by the staff will be converted to commercial loan and interest rate applicable to commercial loan will be applicable, urging the Court to so hold. That the claimant is under a contractual obligation to repay the outstanding sum she is owing the defendant despite her resignation from the defendant’s employment, urging the Court to so hold. 31. The defendant referred to Exhibits C15 and C16. Clause 8 of C16, under the heading condition subsequent, provides thus: “The Bank reserves the right to vary the terms and conditions of the loan at any time during its life span”; and then submitted that the claimant having accepted those terms, consented to the defendant’s right to vary the terms and conditions of the loan facility at any time during its life span. That this does not limit such consent to whether the claimant was still in the employment of the defendant or not, urging the Court to so hold. Also, on Exhibits C15 and C16, the defendant invited the Court to take another look at the “Repayment Method” on the first page of both documents. That there are four boxes to show the various methods of repayment applicable to the loans covered by these exhibits. That none of these boxes are checked, which if it had happened, would have ruled out other repayment methods. That the same first page of each exhibit also has provision for a charge of N2,000:00 (Two Thousand Naira only) for any bounced cheque. That these documents are supportive of the defendant’s case that repayment of the loan facility would not necessarily be from income earned from the salaries of the claimant as an employee; otherwise what use would the option of “Post Dated Cheque” be? In conclusion, the defendant submitted that on the above premises, the counterclaim has been proved, urging that same be granted. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT 32. The claimant on her part submitted four issues for determination, namely: (1) Whether the actions of the defendant by coercing, harassing and/or forcing the claimant to resign her employment is proper in law and/or constitutes an unfair labour practice and a breach of contract between the parties. (2) Whether the claimant is entitled to damages and all her reliefs as a result of breach of contract of employment between the parties herein. (3) Whether the claimant’s employment with the defendant still subsists. (4) Whether having regard to the circumstances of this case, the counterclaimant has proved its entitlement to the counterclaim. 33. For issue (1), the claimant submitted that it is trite that the document which regulates the relationship between an employer and employee is the contract of employment between the parties, which in this case is Exhibit C1, the letter of employment dated 19th November 2007, and Exhibit C4, the Employee Handbook, citing Ekhator v Alliance Autos Nig. Ltd & ors [2015] 59 NLLR (Pt. 205) 416 NIC, which held that the letter of employment and the staff handbook or condition of service form the contract of employment. To the claimant, parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the contract of Employment, citing Alhassan v. ABU Zaria [2011] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 417, Olarewaju v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc [2001] 12 NWLR (Pt. 731) 691, GTB v. Fox Glove Nig Ltd [2016] LPELR-40167(CA), NITEL v. Ikpi [2007] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1035) 96, Adetoun Oladeji Nig Ltd v. NB Plc [2007] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1027) 415 and Group v. BPE [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1332) 209. That failure of the defendant to follow a laid down procedure for exit of the claimant is a fundamental breach of the contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant herein, referring to Shell Pet. Dev. Co. (Nig) v. Lawanson Jack [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 545) 249 CA. That it is not in dispute that the claimant rose steadily in the services of the defendant and became a Principal Manager in the said services of the defendant on 1st January 2013, referring to paragraphs 3-10 of the written statement on oath dated 16th March 2016. 34. The claimant went on that if, being a Principal Manager in the defendant employment, she voluntarily resigned her employment with the defendant, the defendant ought to comply with clause 8.11 of the Employee’s Handbook dealing with exit interview for an employee who leaves on his/her own (also cited by the defendant) but did not. To the claimant, this is a clear breach of the contract of employment between her and the defendant. That the defendant while fishing for fault against the claimant surreptitiously brought and filled a document (Exhibit D1) called PIS, (Performance Incentive Scheme) in their amended statement of defence and counterclaim dated 20th September 2016, which document (Exhibit D1) was never part of the contract of employment between the parties. That during cross-examination, DW admitted that Exhibit D1 was not given to the claimant and was not signed for by the claimant. That the claimant in her testimony denied being aware of such document called PIS i.e. Exhibit D1. That in as much as the claimant was not given Exhibit D1 or signed for same, it follows, therefore, that the defendant manufactured Exhibit D1 for the purpose of this case so as to mislead this Court, urging the Court to discountenance it and hold that Exhibit D1 was never part of the contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant. 35. The claimant further contended that she was forced/coerced to resigned her employment, citing Ladipo v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd [2005] 1 NWLR (Pt. 907) 227, which hole that the courts cannot rewrite contracts entered into by parties. That Exhibit D1 did not exist and that is why it was not mentioned, produced or frontloaded at the time the defendant filed their initial defence and counterclaim. That the document was thereafter annexed after the amendment of their defence. That this is a document made by the defendant when proceedings were pending in this case with a view to misleading the Court into believing the existence of a state of affairs. It is thus caught by section 83(3) of the Evidence Act 2011 and is, therefore, of no probative or evidential value. Flowing from this, that Exhibit D1 could not have been in existence as at the time the defendant filed the initial defence until its amended statement of defence dated 18th September 2017. 36. The clamant referred to paragraph 8 of her written statement on oath over which she was never cross-examined and paragraphs 7, 10 and 25 of her written statement on oath, which show the circumstances of how she was coerced, compelled, threatened and forced to write a resignation letter of 22nd January 2016. She then submitted that this action of the defendant has no other name in law but unfair labour practice which the law and international best practice frown at. Also that such action as contained herein amounts to unfair labour practice as it is callous and unfair to disengage the claimant in such a manner after such dedication of exemplary service. She then urged the Court to resolve the issue in her favour. However, that her forceful resignation of her employment amounts to unfair labour practice and is, therefore, invalid and illegal. 37. The claimant further contended that the day she was forced and compelled to write her letter of resignation of the (HCMD) was the day the letter was collected from her by DW (Mrs Nkechiyelu Ivwurie) and that was the day her official e-mail box was disabled. She referred to paragraph 10 of her written statement on oath confirming the day DW collected the letter dated 22nd January 2016 from the claimant which was Friday and was asked by the DW for collection of the acknowledgement on Monday as shown from Exhibit C5. That the defendant pleaded and admitted paragraph 7 of the defendant’s witness statement on oath that the defendant’s official e-mail box was disabled because the email box was meant for the existing staff. That this confirms the admission of collection of the letter (Exhibit C5) on the day it was written. That it is trite that what is admitted needs no further proof. That it is important to state that the claimant was not cross-examined during trial by the defence counsel on this issue, urging the Court to hold that paragraph 10 of the claimant’s witness statement on oath and paragraph 7 of the defendant’s witness statement on oath confirm the date of collection of the letter of 22nd January 2016 i.e. Exhibit C5. 38. The claimant proceeded that the defendant pleaded in paragraphs 7(a) - (o) of the amended statement of defence and counterclaim and in paragraphs 4 - 7 of the defendant’s witness statement on oath that the claimant was not forced to resign her employment but her willful resignation was as a consequence of her poor performance. To the claimant, Exhibit C3, PDF defendant Annual Report and Accounts 2014 which is already admitted in evidence, column (2) under Role and FOCUS states clearly that the appointment of a Principal Manager can only be effected by the Board of Directors of the defendant through the Board of Finance and Human Capital Committee. That the defendant did not follow their own Annual Report in following due process by compelling the claimant to resign, urging the Court to consider Exhibit C3 so as to do substantial justice to the case of the claimant. It is thus the claimant’s contention that she was forced to resign as shown by the content of Exhibit C5 already before the Court which reads thus: Further to the request that I should resign, by the Management of First Bank of Nigeria Ltd. I hereby tender my letter of resignation (emphasis is the claimant’s). That it is crystal clear that the claimant did not voluntarily resign her employment. 39. To the claimant, she was cross-examined on this letter and she maintained that on the said date she was forced to write the letter (Exhibit C5). That a cursory look at Exhibit C5 will reveal that the claimant was forced to write it. That Exhibit C5 has no ambiguity to interpret, urging the Court to give the literary meaning to the heading and/or title of Exhibit C5, citing IBWA Ltd v. Unakalamba [1998] 9 NWLR (Pt. 565) 245, Abdullahi v. Waje Community Bank [2000] 7 NWLR (Pt. 663) 9, UBN v. Ozigi [1904] 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385, Dantata Jnr v. Mohammed [2012] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1319) 122, Action Congress v. Independent National Electoral Commission [2007] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 220 and Our Line Limited v. SCC Nigeria Ltd [2009] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1170) 382. The claimant then submitted that the combined effect of section 128(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 as well as the literal rule of interpretation of unambiguous documents is that this Court must consider Exhibit C5 and give effect to the plain and ordinary words applied therein. 40. The defendant had argued that Exhibit C5 was not received at the HCMD until 25th January 2016. In response, the claimant submitted that the date of receipt of the letter (Exhibit C5) is immaterial but the time the act complained occurred. That the question is that, if the claimant was not forced to write the letter, why did the defendant collect the said letter from her i.e. Exhibit C5? The claimant urged the Court to hold that she was forced and compelled to write her letter of resignation dated 22nd January 2016 against her wish. 41. The defendant had also argued that the claimant did not submit herself for exit interview. To the claimant, the defendant, however, failed to provide evidence of invitation of the claimant to any panel for interview. That the defendant failed to comply with the procedure laid down in the Handbook showing the forceful resignation of the claimant by the defendant, urging the Court to so hold. 42. In response to paragraph 2.09 of the defendant’s written address, the claimant submitted that all issues raised therein are not pleaded in their defence and as such it cannot proffer any argument on those issues. That it is trite that facts not pleaded goes to no issue, urging the Court to disregard the argument as irrelevant and misleading. 43. Contrary to the submission of the defendant in paragraphs 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14 of its final written address that the defendant followed the laid down procedure, the claimant contended that proper and laid down procedure was not followed at all. The claimant went on that the defendant’s argument that the claimant resigned on her own is not true. That clause 8.11 of Exhibit C4 is applicable to an employee who resigned voluntarily on his/her own. Even at that, the claimant asked if the defendant conducted exit interview with the claimant if her resignation was voluntary; and answered in the negative given that no exit interview was ever conducted as stipulated in clause 8.11 of Exhibit C4. That Exhibit C4 placed the burden on the defendant to conduct exit interview with the claimant. That the operative word used in clause 8.11 is “shall”. Therefore, the burden and obligation is on the defendant to issue exit interview letter to the claimant which the defendant did not do. Therefore, it shows that the resignation of the claimant was not voluntary and was forceful, urging the Court to so hold. 44. In reply to the defendant’s submission that the claimant lied about her promotion in the defendant’s company, the claimant contended that she never lied throughout in her statement of fact, written statement on oath and the evidence at the trial. That in paragraph 32 of the statement of facts and the witness statement on oath, she averred that her promotion was based on her sterling tract record of performance which made the defendant to repeatedly promote her from one rank to the other. That Exhibit C13 confirms this assertion, while Exhibit C2 shows her promotion letter. The claimant wondered why the defendant is deceiving and misleading the Court. 45. In reply to the defendant’s argument that the claimant is not entitled to any of her reliefs as the claimant was advised to resign based on her poor performance, the claimant submitted that she is entitled to all the claims contained in her statement of facts. To the claimant, she pleaded in paragraph 18 of her statement of facts and witness statement on oath of her high percentage of performance as shown in the Annual Appraisal - FBN Template. That she can never be regarded as a low performer because she always scores up to 83.27 since 2011. How then can she be regarded as a low performer? That clause 8.21 of Exhibit C4 (Employee Handbook) regards a non-performer as a member of staff whose appraisal score is below 40%. That under cross-examination, DW admitted that based on Exhibits C6, C6A, C6B and C6C (CW Appraisals) she has performed for the years not on the (PIS) for years 2014 and 2015. That DW also testified that PIS was not given to the claimant. That there is no evidence before this Court showing that the defendant indeed communicated or delivered any document called PIS to the claimant. That the claimant also under cross-examination stated that she has not come across or is aware of any document called PIS in her employment with the defendant. That the defendant has failed to establish that the claimant indeed received a copy of the PIS as part of her contract of employment. That the evidence of such delivery to the claimant was not tendered during trial as proof of such. That in the absence of such evidence no PIS exist, citing section 136(1) of the Evidence Act. 46. The claimant referred to the testimony of DW under cross-examination wherein she testified that Exhibit D1 (PIS) was introduced in 2011. To the claimant, the question is that if Exhibit D1 (PIS) was introduced truly in 2011, why didn’t the defendant measure the performance of the claimant by that Exhibit D1 from 2011 till date of her forceful resignation? That Exhibit D1 was doctored, fabricated and deliberately designed by the defendant to mislead this Court and to frustrate the claimant’s case in her pursuit for justice before this Court. The claimant then asked why the defendant measured her by the Employee Handbook from year 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 as shown by the claimant’s Appraisals communicated to the claimant by the defendant. That this means that the Employee Handbook is the proper document to measure employees Performance/Appraisals. The claimant continued that DW (Mrs Nkechiyelu Ivwurie) lied to this Court regarding the PIS (Exhibit D1). That she is not a witness of truth and the Court should discountenance her testimony before the Court, citing Oguntayo v. Adebutu [1997] 12 NWLR (Pt. 531) 81. 47. Proceeding, the claimant submitted that Exhibits C6 - C6(c) are e-mail correspondences between the defendant and the claimant; they are the claimant’s Annual Appraisals communicated to her through her official email by the defendant. That a look at those exhibits will show the name of the writer and the addressee including the date thereof. That it is trite that email is a form of communication and is admissible in evidence, referring to Continental Sales Ltd v. R. Shipping Inc. [2013] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1343) 67 and Omoshehin v. Crowns Relocations (Nig) Ltd [2015] 53 NLLR 188. As regards Exhibit C14, the claimant referred to section 12 of the National Industrial Court Act and urged the Court to discountenance the totality of the defendant’s argument in respect of those exhibits; and to admit Exhibits C6 - C6(c) and Exhibit C14 as admissible in evidence. Furthermore, that the claimant did not tell a lie as regards Exhibits C3 and C13 as erroneously alleged by the defendant, referring the Court to paragraphs 32 and 34 of the claimant’s written statement on oath as well as Exhibit C2 confirming the claimant’s promotion to the position of Principal Manager effective 1st January 2013. The claimant then urged the Court to resolve issue (1) in her favour. 48. Issue (2) is whether the claimant is entitled to damages in all her reliefs as a result of breach of contract of employment between the parties. To the claimant, she is entitled to reliefs (9) and (10). That she pleaded in paragraphs 38 to 47 of her witness statement on oath to the effect that by her forceful resignation the defendant had made her to be visiting hospital and was confirmed with hypertension, heart palpitation, insomnia amongst other ailment for which she was diagnosed 3 years previously and has now aggravated in the course of her forceful resignation of her appointment. She tendered Exhibits C7, C9 and C10 in support of her assertion. That she was not cross-examined on these exhibits and paragraphs during trial; submitting thus that failure to cross-examine her on these important issues amount to admission in law and, therefore, she is entitled to damages as claimed. 49. The claimant indicated that she is also praying for the sum of “N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as general damages” as well as “N20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Naira)” as solicitors fees in her pleadings. That the court has defined general damages in plethora of cases as direct, notional and probable consequence of the act complained of and which is awarded at the discretion of the court, which exercise can only be premised on the convincing and cogent facts before the court, citing Ndah v. Chinauokwu [2006] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1007) 74 at 91-92. That the complaint of the claimant in this case is that she was forcefully compelled to write her letter of resignation dated 22nd January 2016 without following due process and against her wish. That she joined the services of the defendant on 3rd December 2007 as a manager and has risen to the rank of a Principal Manager due to the hard work and sterling tract record of promotions in the defendant employ. She also avers that she would soon be getting ready for another promotion to the position of Assistant General Manager (AGM). That she is ready to work for the defendant till her retirement age, referring to paragraphs 1-3, 9-12, 15, 17-19, 26, 27, 31, 32 and 34-38 of the claimant’s witness statement on oath as well as Exhibits C7, C9, C10 and C12. To the claimant, as a result of her forceful resignation, she became jobless with no means of livelihood again to feed herself and family and this has aggravated her health. That based on this, she caused her solicitor to write a letter dated 25th February 2016 and 8th March 2016 to the defendant, referring to paragraphs 39, 40, 43, 44, 45 and 46 of her written statement of oath. That the Court should note that she was not cross-examined on these issues during trial of the suit. That this is an admission of the evidence, citing Amadi v. Nwosu [1992] 5 NWLR (Pt. 240) 273 and Ogunyade v. Oshunkeye [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 389) 1175 at 1192-1193. That this is the exact position herein when the defendant was entirely at liberty to challenge and discredit the testimony of CW in this regard during cross-examination but failed to discredit and controvert the evidence of CW in this regard. 50. The claimant proceeded to submit that all these wrongful acts of the defendant against the claimant amount to unfair labour practice and also constitute a breach of contract between the parties by not following the contract between the parties; as such the claimant is entitled to the amount of general damages as claimed, referring to UTC (Nig.) Ltd v. Philips [2012] 6 NWLR (Pt. 2012) 136, Ighreriniowo v. SCC (Nig) Ltd [2013] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1361) 136, FBN Plc v. Olaleye [2013] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1334) 102, Agi v. Access Bank Plc [2014] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1411) 121, and Julius Berger (Nig) Plc v. Ogundehin [2014] 2 NWLR (Pt.139) 3888, which laid down the heads of general damages as pain and suffering, loss of amenities, loss of expectation of life, future loss of earnings and earning capacity, and future expenses. Relying on section 19 of the National Industrial Act, the claimant urged the Court, in the light of grave harm which the defendant has done to her career by making her unemployable since the year 2016 coupled with her impaired health as a result of her forceful resignation and breach of the contract of employment, unfair labour practice, to award reliefs (9) and (10) i.e. damages and cost of solicitor's fees as claimed. 51. Issue (3) is whether the claimant’s employment with the defendant subsists. The claimant answered in the affirmative. That the defendant failed to prove before this Court that the claimant was not forced or compelled to resign her employment and has also failed to establish that they followed due process in exiting the claimant. To the claimant, she pleaded in paragraphs 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36 and 37 of her witness statement on oath showing that she is still vibrant and ready to continue with her job since the defendant did not follow the process laid down in the Employee Handbook by forcing her to write a letter of resignation. That she was not also cross-examined on this evidence before the Court. 52. The defendant had pleaded in paragraph 7(1) of the amended statement of defence that it retained the right to terminate the employment of the claimant, which said right it never contracted away. To the claimant, it is not in dispute that a master has unfettered right to terminate the employment of a servant but in doing so he must comply with the laid down procedure stipulated in their contract of employment. That the defendant further pleaded in paragraphs 7(b), (c) and (d) that the claimant performed low based on Performance Incentive Scheme (PIS) i.e. Exhibit D1 as a reason for advising her to resign. That this is untrue because PIS was doctored and never formed part of the claimant’s contract of employment. That the said Exhibit D1 was an afterthought and was contrived after proceedings began for the purpose of misleading this Court. That the above submission is further proven by the fact that the so called PIS was not frontloaded by the defendant at the beginning of this suit. That the defendant filed and served its process but did not put forward any evidence of PIS until much later, citing section 83(3) of the Evidence Act 2011. That under cross-examination, DW testified that the PIS (Exhibit D1) was introduced in 2011/2012. That it is important to note that the PIS which was introduced in 2011/2012 was never used to measure the performance of the claimant until 2015, whereas the defendant is using the Employee Handbook to measure the claimant performance since 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. That it is clear from the above that the PIS was doctored to mislead this Court contrary to section 83(3) of the Evidence Act. Furthermore, that DW admitted under cross-examination that the claimant performed very well in the years 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. That it is trite that facts admitted need no further proof. 53. The claimant went on that she averred in her additional written statement on oath of 12th October 2016 in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 to the effect that being a Principal Manager, she ought to have been communicated to if there was any improper performance of duties, but such alleged improper performance of duties was never communicated to her in accordance with clause 14 of the Employee Handbook (Exhibit C4), which provides a procedure for disciplinary action for the staff. That she was not queried or summoned to appear before the Human Capital Disciplinary Management Committee to defend herself. Accordingly, that the defendant failed to comply with the contract of employment by failing to follow due process in exiting the claimant. That there was no evidence of any query issued against her and neither the evidence of alleged improper performance communicated to her. The counterclaimant admitted in its letter of 2nd February 2016 (Exhibit C8) that the claimant’s resignation process cannot be concluded whereas the claimant did not resign on her but as a result of coercion by the defendant, which they force on her to do, referring to Exhibit C8, which states thus: “…We reiterate, however, that the resignation process cannot be concluded as there are impaired accounts to the tune of N3,309,982,933.22 as at 27th January, 2016 against your profile and you may be required at any time to provide clarity on any other unresolved issues. However, adequate notice will be given to you in this regard”. That this implies that the claimant’s employment with the defendant still subsists. That it is trite that what is admitted need no further proof. The claimant then urged the Court to hold that her employment with the defendant still subsists as her forceful resignation was done involuntarily and she is ready to work till her retirement age. She also urged the Court to grant her reliefs (7) and (8). 54. Issue (4) is whether the defendant is entitled to the counterclaim. The claimant referred to Exhibits C5 (letter of forceful resignation), C15 (letter of offer of credit facility), C16 (letter of offer and acceptance), C9 (claimant’s response letter dated 16th February 2016) and C10 (claimant’s solicitor’s letter dated 25th February 2016) as containing the facts leading to the frustration of the staff home loan as well as paragraphs 19 - 28 of her statement of defence to the defendant’s counterclaim and paragraphs 19 - 28 of her additional written statement on oath in support of her assertion. As regard Exhibit C5, which is the letter of her forceful resignation, the claimant referred to her earlier submissions to the effect that she did not resign on her own volition but as a result of her forceful resignation. 55. Contrary to the defendant’s argument that the claimant admitted her indebtedness in Exhibits C9 and C10, the claimant submitted that the argument of the defendant is misleading and never reflected her position To the claimant, this Court cannot deem Exhibits C9 and C10 as admission of indebtedness. That she denied her indebtedness and maintained that her debt is not up to N17,388,772.09. That she further contended that she should be paid all her salaries and entitlements till her retirement age which is 60 years, urging the Court to take a look at these exhibits critically. That clause 12 of Exhibit C4 explains the term and condition for granting a loan to the employee of the defendant. That Exhibit C4 confirms the fact that repayment of employee’s loan shall be from the salary. That the claimant pleaded in paragraphs 25 and 26 of her statement of defence to the counterclaim and her additional written statement on oath that the source of repayment of the staff welfare loan is from her salary as shown from the letter of offer and acceptance of credit facility between the parties i.e. columns 6-8 of Exhibits C15 and C16. 56. To the claimant, it is settled law that parties are bound by their agreement. That she has consistently payed her indebtedness from her salary, urging the Court to so hold. The defendant had contended that the loan will be converted to a commercial loan at the bank’s prevailing commercial interest rate. To this, the claimant submitted that there is no shred of evidence before the Court or in Exhibits C15 and C16 showing that payments of credit facility shall attract or be converted to a commercial loan at the bank’s prevailing commercial interest rate. That he who asserts must proof. That the defendant accordingly failed to prove this fact and so is not entitled to charge the debt of the claimant at the prevailing commercial interest rate, urging the Court to hold. To the claimant, clause 8 of Exhibit C16, which the defendant referred to, is misconceived and cannot be applicable where parties to the agreement have not agreed to such a variation. That even if the defendant (Bank) reserves the right to vary the terms and conditions of the loan, parties must agree on such a new term and on such percentage in black and white. That the clause does not give the Bank unilateral power to vary terms and conditions at will but subject to the agreement of both parties, citing RMAFC v. UES Ltd [2013] 34 NLLR (Pt. 102) 730. 57. Furthermore, the claimant pleaded in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the statement of defence to the counterclaim and paragraphs 25 and 26 of the additional written statement on oath that the defendant frustrated her employment, which equally frustrated the repayment structure of the staff welfare loan. That the act of the defendant by forcing and/or compelling her to resign totally frustrated the agreement between the claimant and the defendant because the repayment can only be from staff salary and which the claimant has been paying before she was coerced to write her resignation letter of 22nd January 2016, citing Lagos State Govt. v. Toluwase [2013] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1336) 555 and Mazin Eng. Ltd v. Tower Aluminum [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt. 295) 526. 58. Additionally, that the amount of N5.7 Million given to her by the defendant was her yearly upfront entitlement as a Principal Manager and cannot be converted to a loan. That the amount is rightly earned by her being her yearly entitlement and cannot amount to a loan because she never applied for any such loan. That under cross-examination, DW admitted that the defendant did not apply for a loan of N5.7 Million. Therefore the defendant cannot demand for it as it was rightly earned by CW, urging the Court to so hold. That the defendant paid her the said amount knowing full well that she was entitled to the sum. That the defendant is estopped from making a demand of money rightfully paid to the claimant as the defendant cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. That she is entitled to the sum of N5.7 Million as her yearly upfront entitlement and which is rightly earned, urging the Court to so hold. In any event, that there is no term in Exhibits C15 and C16 that says that commercial interest rate shall apply to the staff home loan upon suspension, dismissal or termination or resignation of the claimant as the case may be. That the defendant is not entitled to the sum of N5.7 Million because it was her entitlement which made the defendant credited her account on its own volition of some allowances due to her. Also, that the defendant frustrated the repayment of the staff home facility by itself by forcing and compelling the claimant to resign her employment. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to enter judgment in her favour and dismiss the counterclaim. THE DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW 59. The defendant reacted to the clamant’s final written address on points of law. The claimant had argued that Exhibit D1 was “surreptitiously brought” in by the defendant because it was never part of the contract of employment between the parties which they argued DW admitted was not given to the claimant; also that Exhibit D1 “did not exist and that is why it was not mentioned, produced or frontloaded at the time the defendant filed its initial defence and Counter Claim”; that Exhibit D1 was made “when proceedings were pending with a view to misleading the court”; relying on section 83(3) of the Evidence Act 2011. To the defendant, Exhibit D1 was pleaded by the defendant (referring to paragraph 7 of amended defence and counterclaim). That DW also led evidence on this document at paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 11 of DW’s witness statement on oath sworn to on 21st September 2016; that is the basis upon which Exhibit D1 was tendered. That there was nothing surreptitious about it, urging the Court to so hold. 60. Secondly, that there is no pleading, oral or documentary evidence by the claimant alleging that Exhibit D1 was surreptitiously brought in to deceive this Court. That the claimant filed a reply pleading to the amended defence which pleaded Exhibit D1. That nowhere in the said reply pleading was any of the claimant’s attack on this exhibit pleaded, or evidence led on same. Accordingly, that the argument of claimant’s counsel on the nature and purpose of Exhibit D1 amounts to counsel giving evidence from the bar; and that the Court must reject the same as this Court cannot speculate, relying on PDP & ors v. INEC [2012] LPELR-9225(CA). 61. Thirdly, on whether Exhibit D1 forms part of the claimant’s contract of employment or not because she was not given a copy and did not sign one, the defendant submitted that as goes Exhibit D1 also goes Exhibit C4. That the Court will see from Exhibit C4 that there is a signature column on page 68 thereof. That in as much as claimant did not tender the copy of Exhibit C4 she acknowledged upon her employment, but wants this Court to regard it as an integral part of her contract of employment, it would amount to approbating and reprobating for her to now claim that Exhibit D1 could not be binding on her because she did not sign it, urging the Court to so hold. 62. Fourthly, that there is testimony of DW under cross-examination that Exhibit D1 was introduced in the defendant bank in year 2011/2012, and this testimony is borne out by page 1 of the exhibit itself, which stated the commencement date as April 2012. That the claimant’s suit was instituted in March 2016, almost four (4) years after Exhibit D1 became a tool to measure performance in the defendant’s employment. That Exhibit D1 cannot, therefore, be accused of having been prepared for a suit that will not be filed until four (4) years down the road, as to be caught out by section 83(3) of the Evidence Act, urging the Court to so hold. More importantly, that it is not the law that an amended pleading is an after-thought. That the principle behind amendments is to prevent manifest injustice and allow a party bring into sharp focus the real issues for determination in a suit, relying on Imie v. Popoola [2008] All FWLR (Pt. 416) 1975 at 1983-1984. That the claimant had an opportunity to respond to the said amendment, and she did. That her argument in respect thereof defies logic, urging the Court to so hold. 63. The defendant went on to submit that contrary to the claimant’s arguments, DW never admitted that the defendant got Exhibit C5 on the “day it was written”. The there is nothing in paragraph 7 of DW’s witness statement on oath that has anything to do with Exhibit C5, contrary to submission of claimant. Furthermore, that there is nothing in the defendant’s pleadings, witness statement on oath or its exhibits that comes close to an admission, which Sea Petroleum & Gas Co. Ltd v. Henchy Nig. Ltd [2014] LPELR-24095(CA) says must be clear and unequivocal. Rather, it is the defendant’s case that it disputes the fact that it coerced the claimant to resign, as claimed, urging the Court to so find. 64. The claimant had argued that all issues raised in paragraph “2.09” of the defendant’s final written address were not pleaded, and as such arguments could not be proffered on them. To the defendant, first, there is no paragraph “2.09” in the arguments of the defendant’s said final address. That there is, however, a paragraph “2.9” but that is part of a recap of DW’s testimony covered by defence pleadings on page 3 of the said address. However, that if the claimant meant paragraph 5.09 of the defendant’s final address (since the claimant’s paragraph 4.37 just dwelt on the defendant’s paragraph 5.04), that paragraph advanced arguments on the claimant’s case, and the cross-examination of CW. That defence pleadings, save joining issues with the claimant’s pleadings, is not expected to raise issues that would be covered in the cross-examination of the claimant’s witness. That this cannot, therefore, be argument of counsel, submitting that the claimant also got this wrong. 65. The defendant then reiterated that its attack on the probative value to be attached to Exhibits C6-C6(c) and C14 is not as to whether they were signed or not; but that they did not comply with section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011, being computer generated documents. Accordingly, that the claimant’s arguments are misconceived, urging the Court to so hold. With respect to section 12 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act referred to by the claimant, the defendant submitted that this section or any of its sub-sections cannot override the mandatory provisions of the Evidence Act in view of the combined effects of sections 256(1) and 252 of the Evidence Act. That the Evidence Act is to apply to all superior courts of record in Nigeria, and that includes this Court. Finally on this point, the defendant submitted that the phrase “in the interest of justice” mentioned in section 12(2)(b) of the NIC Act flows both ways - to both the claimant and the defendant. That invoking it in favour of the claimant would wrought injustice on the defendant, urging the Court to so hold. The defendant concluded by urging the Court to decide that the balance of probabilities in this case tilts in favour of the defendant, reject the arguments of the claimant and uphold the submissions advanced in favour of the defendant. COURT’S DECISION 66. After due consideration of the processes and submissions of the parties, I need to clarify a thing or two. In the first place, the claimant in paragraph 4.39 of her final written address referred to a “paragraph 2.09” of the defendant’s written address, to which she reacted. Like pointed out by the defendant in its reply on points of law, the defendant has no “paragraph 2.09”. What the defendant has is a “paragraph 2.9”. 67. Secondly, the claimant indicated in paragraph 4.60 of her final written address that she is praying for the sum of “N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as general damages” as well as “N20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Naira)” as solicitors fees in her pleadings. The figures as per reliefs (9) and (10) for these heads of claims are respectively “N500,000,000:00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) for the impairment of the claimant’s health as damages suffered as a result of the claimant’s employment with the defendant, which further aggravated as a result of forcing the claimant to resign her employment” and “N50,000,000:00 (Fifty Million Naira) as cost of solicitors fees”. As it is, I do not know why the claimant decided to change the figures in her final written address; as such, I do not know if the claimant no longer desires to be given respectively N500 Million and N50 Million respectively for reliefs (9) and (10). However, I note that addresses are designed to assist the Court; and that cases are normally not decided on addresses but on credible evidence. See Bosma & ors v. Akinole & ors [2013] LPELR-20285(CA) and Niger Const. Ltd v. Okugbene [1987] 2 NSCC 1258. 68. The defendant challenged the admissibility of the claimant’s Exhibits C6, C6(a), C6(b), C6(c), respectively appraisals of the claimant dated 24-Jan-2014, 23-Jan-2013, 06-Feb-2012 and 18-Feb-2015, and Exhibit C14, a document showing the claimant’s (as an ex-staff) total entitlement from, and indebtedness to, the defendant. The ground of the defendant’s objection is that these documents are computer generated, tendered contrary to section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011 given that the claimant did not file any certificate of compliance in respect of the documents. The claimant had relied on section 12 of the of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 in defence of the documents. In reaction, the defendant submitted that the said section 12 or any of its sub-sections cannot override the mandatory provisions of the Evidence Act in view of the combined effects of sections 256(1) and 252 of the Evidence Act, which provide that the Evidence Act is to apply to all superior courts of record in Nigeria, including this Court. Arguments as to especially section 256 (section 252 merely defining “Court” for purposes of Part XV to mean “a High Court or a magistrate’s court and courts of similar jurisdiction”) of the Evidence Act 2011 were raised in Honourable Justice Bassey Tambu Ebuta v. National Judicial Council & 3 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/301/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 13th July 2017. This is what this Court held in paragraphs 74 and 75: 74. …I am not unmindful of SEC v. Abilo Uboboso unreported Suit No. CA/A/388/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 21st December 2016. In this case, the NIC had admitted in evidence public documents that were not certified as such on the ground that section 12(2) of the NIC Act 2006 permitted the Court to depart from the Evidence Act. The Court of Appeal held that the provisions of section 12(2) of the NIC Act 2006 cannot operate to encumber the provisions of the Evidence Act 2011 especially as section 256(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 states that the Evidence Act 2011 shall apply to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court established in Nigeria. Part of the reasons upon which the Court of Appeal based its decision was that the Evidence Act 2011 was made by the National Assembly subsequent to the NIC Act 2006. 75. This decision aside, there are four grounds upon which SEC v. Abilo Uboboso is distinguishable, grounds that were not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeal when SEC v. Abilo Uboboso was decided. The grounds are: (a) The first ground is section 4(2)(b) of the Interpretation Act Cap. I23 LFN 2004, which provides that where an enactment is repealed and another enactment is substituted for it then any reference to the repealed enactment shall, after the substituted enactment comes into force, be construed as a reference to the substituted enactment. It should be noted that by section 1 of the Interpretation Act, the Interpretation Act “shall apply to the provisions of any enactment except in so far as the contrary intention appears in this Act or the enactment in question”. By section 4(2)(b) of the Interpretation Act, therefore, the reference to the “Evidence Act” in section 12(2) of the NIC Act 2006, must be read to mean reference to the “Evidence Act 2011”. So the question of section 256 of the Evidence Act 2011 being subsequent to the NIC Act 2006 would not arise. A decision of my learned brother of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) High Court, Hon. Justice Peter O. Affen, in The Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Emmanuel Owoicho & 5 ors unreported Suit No. FCT/HC/CR/192C/2015, the ruling of which was delivered on 14th December 2015, illustrates the point I make here. A preliminary objection had been raised in a criminal trial before His Lordship. One of the grounds of the objection was that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 does not confer power to prosecute for offences under the Advance Fee Fraud Act 2006. His Lordship, in rejecting this argument held thus: It is noteworthy that s. 7(2) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004 specifically refers to the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act of 1995 which has since been repealed and supplanted by the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act of 2006. On the face of it, it is quite arguable that since specific reference is made to the repealed 1995 Act, offences under the 2006 Act do not fall within the purview of the Acts the EFCC is empowered to administer and enforce. However, the Interpretation Act, Cap. I23 LFN, 2004 has clearly taken the wind out of the sails of that line of argument. The clear and unambiguous provision of s. 4(2)(b) of the Interpretation Act is that where an enactment is repealed and another enactment is substituted for it, any reference to the repealed enactment shall, after the substituted enactment comes into force, be construed as a reference to the substituted enactment. By s. 1 thereof, the Interpretation Act “shall apply to the provisions of any enactment except in so far as the contrary intention appears in this Act or the enactment in question.” There is no gainsaying that the 2006 Act is a “substituted enactment” for the repealed 1995 Act of the same title, and it seems to me that a proper application of s. 4(2)(b) of the Interpretation Act would lead inescapably to the conclusion that the reference in s. 7(2)(b) of the EFCC Act of 2004 to the repealed 1995 Act shall be construed as a reference to the 2006 Act. If the Court of Appeal’s attention in SEC v. Abilo Uboboso had been drawn to section 4(2)(b) of the Interpretation Act, the more plausible conclusion would have been that the reference to the Evidence Act in section 12(2) of the NIC Act 2006 would have been interpreted to read a reference to the Evidence Act of 2011. (b) The second ground is section 2 of the Evidence Act 2011 itself, which provides that ‘for the avoidance of doubt, all evidence given in accordance with section 1 shall, unless excluded in accordance with this or any other Act, or any other legislation validly in force in Nigeria, be admissible in judicial proceedings to which this Act applies’. I note the proviso to section 2, which provides that admissibility of such evidence shall be subject to all such conditions as may be specified in each case by or under the Evidence Act. This notwithstanding, section 2 acknowledges that there are existing laws that exclude the application of even the Evidence Act 2011. (c) The third ground is section 3 of the Evidence Act 2011, which provides that “Nothing in this Act shall prejudice the admissibility of any evidence that is made admissible by any other legislation validly in force in Nigeria”. A fortiori, if another legislation makes any evidence inadmissible, the intention of the legislature in that regard must be respected. In other words, section 3 must be read to mean nothing in this Act shall prejudice the admissibility or otherwise i.e. inadmissibility of any evidence that is made admissible or inadmissible by any other legislation validly in force in Nigeria. (d) The Fourth and last ground is that section 12(2) is not delimited by time or date. It talks of “Evidence Act”, not “Evidence Act 1990 or 2004”. So, the argument often advanced that the Evidence Act 2011 is subsequent to the NIC Act 2006 i.e. because the NIC Act was passed in 2006, it cannot be said that the Evidence Act 2011 was contemplated under it, cannot really hold ground as the NIC Act 2006 simply talks of the “Evidence Act”; not even in the side note to section 12 of the NIC Act 2006 is the 1990 Evidence Act referred to. This means that the draftsman intended the reference to the Evidence Act in section 12 of the NIC Act 2006 to be fluid. However, even if section 12(2) of the NIC Act were to be delimited by time or date, section 4(2)(b) of the Interpretation Act has taken care of the problem. What all of this means is that the arguments advanced as to section 4(2)(b) of the Interpretation Act, sections 2 and 3 of the Evidence Act 2011 and the fact that section 12(2) of the NIC Act 2006 is not delimited by time or date, not raised and brought for the consideration of the Court of Appeal by counsel in SEC v. Abilo Uboboso, makes SEC v. Abilo Uboboso distinguishable… 69. The very essence of this Court was explained in Dorothy Adaeze Awogu v. TFG Real Estate Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/262/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 4th June 2018; and the need to side-step even the requirement of certification in virtue of section 12 of the NIC Act 2006 was equally explained. See also Honourable Justice Bassey Tambu Ebuta v. National Judicial Council & 3 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/301/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 13th July 2017 and Mr Dawodu Azeez v. 3 Peat Investment Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/628/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th July 2018. The defendant in the instant case is not complaining about the authenticity of these exhibits; only that they were not certified. This is not good enough to do away with these exhibits as the defendant wants this Court to do. Accordingly, I discountenance the argument of the defendant and hold that Exhibits C6, C6(a), C6(b), C6(c) and C14 are admissible and would be used as such in this judgment. 70. In any event, the argument as to section 12 of the NIC Act 2006 aside, and especially as it relates to Exhibits C6, C6(a), C6(b) and C6(c), all dealing with the appraisal of the claimant by the defendant, the evidence of DW under cross-examination was that the percentage for low performance is scorecard score of less than 75% for 3 consecutive quarters; and when DW was referred to clause 8.21 of Exhibit C4, the Employee Handbook, she testified that for a non-performance, the percentage in the said clause 8.21 is 40%. DW proceeded to testify that based on the claimant’s results of 88.93% for 2013, 85.73% for 2011 and 83.27% for 2012, respectively seen in Exhibits C6, C6(a) and C6(b), in terms of Exhibit C4, the claimant was not considered a non-performer. For year 2014, DW testified that the claimant’s performance was good. However, that it was in 2015 that she was considered a non-performer. Like I pointed out, DW had earlier testified that “the percentage for low performance is scorecard score of less than 75% for 3 consecutive quarters”. The evidence of DW before the Court is that it was in 2015 that the claimant was considered a non-performer. Was this sufficient to brand the claimant a non-performer given the good performance for years 2011 to 2014? I do to think so. I am convinced that arguments of the defendant as to the claimant being a low performer are an afterthoughts meant to paint the claimant black, a last straw to cling on sort of defence. 71. The defendant also urged the Court not to give any probative value to Exhibits C3 (the defendant’s Annual Report and Accounts 2014) and C13 (a memo dated 19th March 2014 from ED. CBG to the claimant redeploying her to Ogun Group as Group Head effective 1st April 2014) on the ground that for Exhibit C3, only part of it (the portion relevant to the claimant’s case) was tendered; and for Exhibit C13, it is misleading given that the claimant described it as proof of her promotion when in fact it is a redeployment letter. Exhibit C3 is actually an incomplete document. The claimant did not tender it as an extract, which would have required certification as such, to warrant it being used as such in this judgment. See Oluwole Olatunji Kolade v. The Industrial Training Fund Governing Council & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/60/2015, the judgment of which was delivered on 14th June 2016. As an incomplete document, the authenticity of Exhibit C3 is in issue. In a similar scenario, this Court in Oyewumi Oyetayo v. Zenith Bank [2012] 29 NLLR (Pt. 84) 370 held inadmissible and of no evidential value an incomplete exhibit on the ground that the fact of being an incomplete document rendered “suspect its authenticity and probative value”. Also, in Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & ors v. Federal Ministry of Health unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/238/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on July 22, 2013, this Court rejected incomplete documents and so discountenanced them, holding that they have no evidential value. See also Overland Airways Ltd v. Captain Raymond Jam [2015] 62 NLLR (Pt. 219) 525 and Mr. Godwin Agbone v. Nulec Industries Ltd unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/427/2012, the judgment of which was delivered on 2nd February 2015. In like manner, Exhibit C3 is hereby discountenanced for purposes of this judgment as it has no evidential value. 72. For Exhibit C13, given its content, I agree with the defendant that it is a redeployment letter, not a promotion letter; as such, it will be treated as a redeployment letter for purposes of this judgment. 73. The claimant had urged the Court not give effect to the defendant’s Exhibit D1 headed, “Framework for the Final Performance Incentive Scheme to Apply from April 2012”. The defendant on its part urged the Court to discountenance the claimant’s contention. One of the grounds raised by the defendant is that since Exhibit C4, the Employee Handbook, is not signed, Exhibit D1 does not need to be signed. By this argument, the defendant intuited that the employee handbook is a document that should be signed. This Court judicially notices that conditions of service, which is what the employee handbook (Exhibit C4) is, do not need to be signed by employees. The attempt by the defendant to, therefore, equate Exhibit D1 with Exhibit C4 is accordingly wrong. If the attempt by the defendant is to treat Exhibit D1 as an extension of Exhibit C4, then the defendant needs clear words in Exhibit D1 to that effect. This aside, the argument of the claimant is that she is unaware of Exhibit D1 since it was not given to her or her attention drawn to it. Under cross-examination, the claimant actually denied being aware of anything called “quality performance review” nor had she ever done “a quality performance review of any staff under me”; and as such, as a 2012 document, she questioned how the defendant brought it up only in 2016 when it filed its amended statement of defence and counterclaim. There is no evidence before the Court that Exhibit D1 was made available to, or its content brought to the attention of, the claimant. The evidence of DW under cross-examination as to the claimant scoring 88.93% for 2013, 85.73% for 2011 and 83.27% for 2012 in her appraisal was not shown to be on the basis of Exhibit D1. So if the claimant’s appraisal for 2013 was not based of Exhibit D1, a 2012 document, then surely something is suspect as to the existence of Exhibit D1 in 2013 when the claimant was appraised. The defendant has not been able to explain this anomaly; as such, I agree with the claimant that Exhibit D1 is suspect. I will accordingly discountenance it for purposes of this judgment. This means that the evidence of DW that “the Claimant’s willful resignation was a consequence of her poor performance within the financial year” (paragraph 5 of DW’s witness statement on oath) is untenable” I so hold. 74. A claim is circumscribed by the reliefs claimed. See Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd [2008] LPELR-591(SC); [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399; [2008] 5 - 6 SC (Pt. II) 47. Going by the reliefs claimed by the claimant, the main stay of the claimant’s case is that she was forced to resign; a case of constructive dismissal/discharge, to use the technical term. And to the claimant, because she was forced to resign, her employment subsists and so the said letter of resignation should be set aside, the forced resignation should be declared an unfair labour practice, she should be reinstated, paid her outstanding salaries, paid damages for the resultant humiliation she suffered and a declaration in her favour that the defendant cannot convert her welfare loan to a commercial loan while she is still challenging her forceful resignation. It is pertinent, therefore, to first resolve the issue as to the claimant’s claim that she was forced to resin by the defendant. 75. The clamant’s evidence of being forced to resign by the defendant is as contained in paragraphs 7, 8, 10 and 25 of her written statement on oath as well as Exhibit C5/D3, the letter of resignation dated 22nd January 2016. The evidence of the claimant as per these paragraphs is that she was called on Phone by one Mr Obiora Dibieze, the Relief Executive Director of the defendant, and directed to see them in Human Capital Management and Development (HCMD) and on getting there was directed to DW who coerced, compelled, threatened and forced her to write a resignation letter or be handed a letter of termination. The claimant continued that after writing the letter of resignation (Exhibit C5/D3) as requested and threatened by the defendant on 22nd January 2016, she sought to gain access to her official electronic mail (email) box with the defendant but could not do so as the defendant had disabled her system (mailbox). The defendant’s response is that “the claimant was never forced to resign” and that “official electronic e-mail is only for existing staff of the defendant”; as such, “upon her resignation the Claimant was no longer entitled to its use” (paragraph 7 of DW’s witness statement on oath). 76. The question remains: was the claimant forced by the defendant to resign? In Exhibit C5/D3 dated 22nd January 2016, the claimant indicated thus: Further to the request that I should resign, by Management of First Bank of Nigeria Ltd. I hereby tender my letter of resignation. Thank you for the opportunity to have served in First Bank. The response of the defendant here is that under cross-examination, CW further testified that Exhibit C5/D3 was typed by her using Mrs Nkechiyelu Ivwurie’s (DW’s) computer and the said letter (Exhibit C5/D3) was also printed using Mrs Nkechiyelu Ivwurie’s (DW’s) office printer and all of this was done at HCMD on 22nd January 2016. To the defendant, Exhibit C5/D3 was not received at the HCMD until 25th January 2016 which was 3 days after the claimant was allegedly forced to write same. The defendant then questioned how strange and improbable this is for a document written on 22nd January under (if CW is to be believed) strict urgency only to be received 3 full days after the seemingly ‘hot’ letter was written. Additionally, that the testimony of the claimant that she typed and printed Exhibit C5/D3 in DW’s office is just not believable given that she said no password was needed to access DW’s computer when the said computer needed activation to type. 77. The law is that documentary evidence is the best evidence. See Skye Bank Plc v. Akinpelu [2010] LPELR-3073(SC); [2010] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1198) 179, The Attorney- General, Bendel State & 2 ors. v. United Bank for Africa Ltd [1986] 4 NWLR (Pt. 337) 547 at 563 and Chief S. O. Agbareh & anor v. Dr Anthony Mimra & ors [2008] LPELR-235(SC); [2008] NWLR (Pt. 1071) 378 SC; [2008] 1 SC (Pt. III) 88. In fact, the document being the best proof of its contents, no oral evidence, will be allowed to discredit the said contents except in cases where fraud is pleaded. See B. Stabilini & Co. Ltd v. Nwabueze Obasi [1997] 9 NWLR (Pt. 520) 293 at 305. All of this means that nothing can be added to Exhibit C5/D3 especially as no fraud has been pleaded about it by the defendant. 78. By Exhibit C5/D3, the claimant stated thus: “Further to the request that I should resign, by Management of First Bank of Nigeria Ltd. I hereby tender my letter of resignation”. Here, the claimant made it very clear that she was requested to resign by the defendant. A number of additional points are evident here supporting the assertion of the claimant that she was forced to resign. For one, the defendant itself in paragraph 5.15 of its final written address submitted that the claimant is not entitled to any of the claims contained in her statement of facts as she was advised to resign based on her poor performance and instead of having her appointment terminated the claimant decided to resign her appointment and having done so, the claimant is not entitled to be re-instated or to any of the claims contained in her statement of fact. Is this a case of double-speak on the part of the defendant? The statement in italics that the claimant was advised to resign based on her poor performance and instead of having her appointment terminated the claimant decided to resign her appointment, is the classic case of constructive dismissal/discharge (to which I shall return shortly), and suggests that the defendant did advise the claimant to resign in order to avoid being sacked for poor performance. Secondly, the claimant in Exhibit C5/D3 categorically stated that she is resigning because the management of the defendant requested her to resign. There is no evidence before the Court that the defendant replied to Exhibit C5/D3 denying the fact that it requested the claimant to resign. The natural conclusion is that the defendant accepted that fact when it did not deny it. 79. The law as to constructive dismissal/discharge has been stated by this Court in number of its decisions. For instance, in Mr Charles Ughele v. Access Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/287/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 10th February 2017, this Court at paragraph 59 held thus: The claimant did not leave anyone in doubt that he resigned involuntarily. Exhibit C4 (same as Exhibit D4) is the Exit Form. Against the reasons for exit, the claimant ticked “redundancy” under “involuntary”; and under question 1 at page 2, to the question, “What are your primary reason(s) for leaving?”, the claimant answered, “Management decision to create room for new people to work with new GM”. This entry is pretty clear that the reason for leaving stems from management decision. I am satisfied and convinced with the evidence of the claimant that they were forced to resign; and I so find and hold. In any event, this Court, in Miss Ebere Ukoji v. Standard Alliance Life Assurance Co. Ltd [2014] 47 NLLR (Pt. 154) 531 NIC and Mr. Patrick Obiora Modilim v. United Bank for Africa Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/353/2012 the judgment of which was given on 19th June 2014, held that to attempt to have the employee resign, rather than outright firing the employee means that the employer is trying to create a constructive discharge and for which a case of constructive dismissal is made. I do not see any difference between the instant case and Miss Ukoji and Modilim. Accordingly, it is my finding and holding that the claimants were invited to a meeting and in that meeting were asked to resign their appointments. Their resignation from the service of the defendant was, therefore, involuntary. I so hold. 80. And though a claim for constructive dismissal failed in Joseph Okafor v. Nigerian Aviation Handling Company Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/29/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 25th April 2018, this Court, regarding the requirements for a successful plea of constructive dismissal, however, in paragraph 61 held thus: …to be able to succeed in a claim for constructive dismissal, the claimant must show that he resigned soon after the incident(s) he is complaining about. See Miss Ebere Ukoji v. Standard Alliance Life Assurance Co. Ltd (supra). The claimant himself agreed with the defendant that for the claimant’s case to succeed, he must prove as enumerated in Western Excavations v. Sharp [1978] 1 All ER 713 that there is a repudiatory breach (actual or anticipatory) on the part of the employer, which must be sufficiently serious to justify the employee resigning; the employee must resign in response to the breach; and the employee must not delay too long in acting on the breach… 81. The point in these cases is that for a claim for consecutive dismissal/discharge (for that is what the claimant’s case actually is in the instant suit) to succeed, the claimant must have resigned so soon after the employer’s act. The defendant argues that the 3 days in between the date of Exhibit C5/D3 and when it was received is too long a period for the claimant’s claim for forceful resignation (constructive dismissal/discharge) to be hinged on. Is this the case? I do not think so. Three days is not too long a period in this regard especially as the defendant made no attempt before now to dispute the fact that the claimant alleged that she was requested by the defendant to resign her employment. The defendant was until now silent on that fact. I accordingly believe the claimant that she was requested by the defendant to resign her employment. I so find and hold. I accordingly hold that the claimant has made out a case for constructive dismissal/discharge. Relief (1) accordingly succeeds and so is hereby granted. Constructive dismissal/discharge once proved evinces a poor and unfair labour practice on the part of the employer. This being so, relief (4) equally succeeds and so is also granted. Was the claimant thereby, given all of this, harassed, intimidated and/or humiliated as to be entitled to relief (3)? I do not think so as there is no sufficient proof before the Court establishing this claim. Relief (3) cannot thus succeed. It fails and so is dismissed. 82. Having established that she was forced to resign i.e. constructively dismissed/discharged and that this amounts to an unfair labour practice, is the claimant entitled to a declaration that her employment subsists (relief 2), to an order setting aside the letter of resignation (relief 6), to an order of reinstatement (relief 7) and to an order for the payment of her outstanding salaries (relief 8)? In asking for these reliefs, I think the claimant misunderstands what constructive dismissal/discharge entails. In Miss Ebere Ukoji v. Standard Alliance Life Assurance Co. Ltd [2014] 47 NLLR (Pt. 154) 531 NIC, this Court laid bare what constructive dismissal/discharge entails, and the fact that constructive dismissal/discharge brings to an end the employment of the employee constructively dismissed or discharged by the employer leaving the employee with only the right of recompense. In the words of this Court: Globally, and in labour/employment law, constructive dismissal, also referred to as constructive discharge, occurs when an employee resigns because his/her employer’s behaviour has become intolerable or heinous or made life difficult that the employee has no choice but to resign. Given that the resignation was not truly voluntary, it is in effect a termination. In an alternative sense, constructive dismissal or constructive discharge is a situation where an employer creates such working conditions (or so changes the terms of employment) that the affected employee has little or no choice but to resign. Thus where an employer makes life extremely difficult for an employee, to attempt to have the employee resign, rather than outright firing the employee, the employer is trying to create a constructive discharge. The exact legal consequences differ from country to country, but generally a constructive dismissal leads to the employee’s obligations ending and the employee acquiring the right to seek legal compensation against the employer. The employee may resign over a single serious incident or over a pattern of incidents. Generally, the employee must have resigned soon after the incident. See generally Western Excavating v. Sharp [1978] 1 All ER 713 and Oladosu Ogunniyi’s Nigerian Labour and Employment Law in Perspective (Folio Publishers Limited: Ikeja), 2004, 2nd Edition, at pages 462 – 464. What all of this means is that in the instant case, there is no employment relationship between the claimant and the defendant that is subsisting as to warrant the grant of reliefs (2), (6), (7) and (8). Reliefs (2), (6), (7) and (8) accordingly fail and so are dismissed. 83. The claimant can only seek legal compensation, which is what relief (9) is all about. In Miss Ebere Ukoji v. Standard Alliance Life Assurance Co. Ltd (supra), having found for the claimant in terms of constructive dismissal, damages was assessed and awarded. In relief (9), the claimant claims the sum of N500 Million Naira for the impairment of the claimant’s health as damages suffered as a result of the claimant’s employment with the defendant, which further aggravated as a result of forcing the claimant to resign her employment. In paragraph 38 of the witness statement on oath, the claimant averred that after her forceful resignation on 22nd January 2016, she “had to visit the hospital and she was confirmed with hypertension, heart palpitation and insomnia for which she was diagnosed 3 years previously and has now aggravated in the course of forcing her the Claimant to resign her appointment”. In paragraph 39 of same deposition, the claimant averred that she suffered psychological trauma, shame, disgrace, heart palpitation, aggravated hypertension and insomnia; and that she wakes up in the middle of the night sweating and soliloquizing uncontrollably. She relied on Exhibit C7, a medical report dated 17th February 2016, as proof of her claim for ill health. Exhibit C7 is a document from Clinics Ltd; it is signed “For Medical Director” without the name of the signatory disclosed. Exhibit C7 then describes the claimant as “a 51 year old known hypertensive who was diagnosed 3 years ago in our facility following an acute febrile illness. She is presently on tab amlodipine 5mg day, tab aldomet 250mg ads vasoprin 75mg day and has been compliant with her medication. BP has remained relatively well controlled ranging between 138/73 - 152/88mmhg. However, BP today = 158/94mmhg (yet to take antihypertensive today)”. This is the document the claimant relied on as proof of health conditions caused by the defendant forcing her to resign. 84. To start with, by Exhibit C7, the claimant’s health challenges were diagnosed 3 years ago i.e. in 2013 given that Exhibit C7 is a 2016 document. Exhibit C7 does not show how the claimant’s health condition was aggravated by her forceful resignation; if anything, it confirms her health condition of three years old. More importantly, since the name of the signatory to Exhibit C7 is not disclosed, not much cogency (weight or probative value) can be attributed to it since it has no author that can be cross-examined should the need arise; indeed, the claimant called no witness in that regard as far as Exhibit C7 is concerned. As it is, not much value can be attributed to Exhibit C7. This being so, the claimant’s health claims remain unsatisfactorily proved. I so hold. 85. This still leaves out the damages the claimant is entitled to, not because of her health challenges, but because of her forced resignation (constructive dismissal/discharge) which I already found in her favor. Here, the case of the claimant is that by her forceful resignation, she lost the remuneration of the remaining nine years she had to retire; and she put her annual salary as N21 Million. See paragraphs 26, 27, 30 and 31 of the claimant’s witness statement on oath. There is, however, no documentary proof before the Court showing that the claimant’s annual salary is actually N21 Million. The problem with this claimant’s position is that the fact that an employee has an employment up to retiring age is no guarantee that that employment will last that long. Okeke v. Civil Service Commission, Edo State [2000] 14 NWLR (Pt. 68) 480, for instance, laid down that an employer does not guarantee a job to an employee until the employee’s retirement age; and that the time stipulated for retirement only set out the maximum duration possible for the employment under the existing contract. Consequently, that the court will not grant a claim for payment of salary up to the retirement age of the employee in a claim of wrongful dismissal. See also Folayemi Lawrence Alonge v. WAEC unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/277/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 5th October 2017. The earlier Court of Appeal authority of Uwagbanebi v. Nigeria Palm Produce Board [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt. 29) 489 CA intuited this stance when it held that where the appointment of a servant is expressed to be a permanent employment until retirement age, so long as he does not render himself liable to dismissal and he is willing and able to serve his employer, he is entitled to continue in his employment until retirement age. The italicized words suggest that there are no guarantees. In any event, by Ado v. Commissioner of Works, Benue State [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1058) 429 CA, an employee dismissed in breach of his contract of employment cannot choose to treat his contract as subsisting and sue for an account of profits which he should have earned to the end of the contracted period; rather he must sue for damages for wrongful dismissal and must mitigate those damages as far as he reasonably can. 86. In Mr Charles Ughele v. Access Bank Plc (supra), this Court held that the claimant proved his claim of involuntarily resignation which rendered him redundant. Regarding the claim for damages, this Court proceeded to hold thus: Relief (viii) is a claim for “the sum of N20 Million for anguish and injustice suffered by the claimant as a result of the sudden redundancy by the defendant”. The claimant’s argument is that he was suddenly told to leave the Bank and was not paid all the entitlements due to him. The law is that general damages are always made as a claim at large, the quantum of which need not be pleaded and proved and is awarded for loss or inconvenience which flows naturally from the act of the defendant. It does not depend upon calculation made and figure arrived at from specific items. See UBN Plc v. Alhaji Adams Ajabule & anor [2011] LPELR=8239(SC). Section 19(d) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 permits this Court to make an award of compensation or damages. Given the circumstances of this case, therefore, I agree with the claimant that he is entitled to general damages, but certainly not in the sum of N20 Million claimed. To my mind, the sum of One Million Naira (N1,000,000.00) will be adequate and fair compensation/damages to the claimant. I so order. Though the scenario in the instant case is similar to Charles Ughele, the times are slightly different. As such, I award the sum of Two Million Naira as damages to the claimant for her constructive dismissal. I must state that this award has no bearing whatsoever to any other terminal entitlement that the claimant may have against the defendant as a result of her disengagement from the defendant. I acknowledge that this was not an issue brought before the Court in this suit. 87. There is nothing that has been shown to this Court in proof of relief (10), the claim for solicitor’s fees. Like the defendant pointed out, this is a claim for a liquidated sum i.e. special damages, which by NNPC v. Clifco Nigeria Ltd [2011] LPELR-2022(SC) is exceptional and so must be claimed specially and proved strictly. See also 7UP Bottling Company Plc v. Augustus [2012] LPELR-20873(CA). Since the claimant did not prove the claim for solicitor’s fees, it fails and so is dismissed. 88. I now turn to the defendant’s counterclaim, which is a claim for “N17,388,772.09…owed to the claimant by the defendant with respect to the loan facility extended to her”, plus interest and cost. In her defence against this counterclaim, the claimant argued that the defendant frustrated the repayment plan of the loan advanced to her by the defendant. To the claimant, the act of the defendant by forcing and/or compelling her to resign totally frustrated the agreement between her and the defendant given that the repayment of the loan could only be from her salary. In support of her reliance on the doctrine of frustration, the claimant relied on Lagos State Govt. v. Toluwase [2013] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1336) 555 and Mazin Eng. Ltd v. Tower Aluminum [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt. 295) 526, where frustration was defined. However, the claimant appeared not to have given much thought to Mazin Eng. Ltd v. Tower Aluminum, which held that frustration does not occur where: (a) the intervening circumstance is one which the law would not regard as so fundamental as to destroy the basis of the agreement; (b) the terms of the agreement show that the parties contemplated the possibility of such an intervening circumstance arising; and (c) one of the parties had deliberately brought about the supervening event by his own choice. 89. Two questions arise here: when the claimant and the defendant entered into the loan agreement, was the possibility of termination of the claimant’s employment not one that was in their contemplation? Secondly, if as the claimant argued, and as I have found, the defendant asked her to resign, does this not bring the matter within the contemplation of exception (c) above i.e. that one of the parties (the defendant in this case) deliberately brought about the supervening event (the defendant’s act of asking the claimant to resign) by its own choice? The point is that, as the cases cited by the claimant show, where frustration arises, it operates to bring the agreement to an end as regards both parties forthwith and quite apart from their violation. Since the frustrating event in the instant case was contemplated and was the deliberate act of the defendant, it means that frustration as presented by the claimant has no place in the instant case. This being the case, the manner of the argument of the claimant that the loan agreement was frustrated cannot stand; as such the loan agreement has not been brought to an end as presented by the claimant. 90. However, the argument of the claimant that her repayment of the loan she took from the defendant was frustrated by the defendant forcing her to resign brings to the fore Lewis v. UBA Plc [2016] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 329, where the Supreme Court laid down the yardstick for determining whether the repayment of a loan taken by an employee is frustrated simply because the employee’s employment was terminated by the employer especially where the repayment of the loan is tied to the employee’s salary. In Lewis v. UBA Plc [2016] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 329. At pages 346 - 347, the Supreme Court per Peter-Odili, JSC (delivering the Leading judgment) had this to say: The stance of the appellant that his continued retention in the employment of the respondent is a condition precedent to his repayment of the personal loans and his employment having been terminated by the respondent, the enforcement of the personal loans had been frustrated is not sustainable either in the context of the facts of this case or the prevailing law. This is because the contract of employment and personal loans between the appellant and the respondent are two distinct contracts having distinct subject-matters and their duration not co-existent nor can it be said one is dependent on the other or that the right to terminate the contract of employment by either party could operate as a condition precedent to the repayment or the personal loan or balance thereof. A refresher to the situation is that the respondent had fully preferment his obligation under the contract for the personal loan by making available the said sums and the next cease because his employment has ended. This is because mere hardship, inconvenience or other unexpected turn of events which have created difficulties though not contemplated cannot constitute frustration to release appellant from that obligation, a situation which not even the death of the appellant, grave as that might be, would not alter the course of events of the repayment as his estate would bear the liability. I anchor on the case of Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C. (1956) AC 696. 91. Lewis v. UBA Plc talked of “the context of the facts of this case or the prevailing law”. This means that the Supreme Court stressed the primacy of the context of the case and the prevailing law in coming to the conclusion it did. This means that any application of Lewis v. UBA ought to be based on the context of each case. For instance, in Mr Adebayo Gbolahan Adepoju v. Coscharis Group unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/409/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th February 2018, the claimant raised three arguments: that he did not resign his appointment, rather it was wrongly terminated; accordingly, the car loan repayments were breached and frustrated by the defendant; and the repayment of the car loan cannot come from other sources save his salary. This Court rejected the said arguments given that “the context of the facts of the case or prevailing law” did not support the claimant’s argument. Also in Mrs Kikelomo Kola-Fasanu v. Prestige Assurance Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/25/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 25th April 2018, this Court applied Lewis v. UBA and held that the claimant is obliged to pay to the defendant the sum of N16,502,877.00 only being the outstanding sum in terms of the housing loan advanced to her by the defendant. In coming to this conclusion, this Court rejected the argument of the claimant that the permanent loss of employment has put her in the predicament of having to fulfill a contractual impossibility; considering the fact that the satisfaction of her obligations under the Housing Loan and Deed of Legal Mortgage, which is tied to deductions from her salary with the defendant, was abruptly severed. The context of the case, the very holding of the Court, was that that the claimant took undue advantage of her position in securing the housing loan from the defendant factoring the fact that the claimant as an interested party side tracked some of the procedures enjoined for an applicant of the said loan in terms of the applicable defendant’s policy. In like manner, in Mr Dandson O. Obi v. Access Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/406/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th July 2018, the claimant did not object to the share allocation to him and the deductions made in that regard; as such, this Court held that the claimant cannot thus talk of the repayment being tied to his employment with the defendant as that is coming too late in the day. 92. Is the instant case any different? I think so. Unlike all the cases I just referred to, I made a specific finding of the defendant forcing the claimant to resign (constructive dismissal/discharge). This is blameworthiness on the part of the defendant. The claimant was constructively dismissed/discharged for no fault of her. The context of the case thus does not support the exoneration of the defendant. To do otherwise would mean to allow the defendant benefit from its wrongfulness; and legal policy frowns on this. See Brossette Manufacturing (Nig.) Ltd v. M/S Ola Ilemobola Ltd [2007] LPELR-809(SC); [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) 109 SC; [2007] 5 SC 84, which referring to Solanke v. Abed [1962] 1 All NLR 230; [1962] NRNLR 92 and Re London Celluloid Y.O (1888) 3 Ch. D 206, held that “the court will not allow any person or party or body to benefit from his own wrong”. See also OSHC v. Shittu [1994] 1 NWLR (Pt. 321) 476 CA, which held that that where an employee gives notice of his voluntary retirement to his employer, and the employer refuses to accept the notice, the position is that the employee is still in the employer’s service. It is only that employee who can rely on that notice in his favour and not the employer who rejected the notice. This is because it has to be adjudged not only a deviation from “natural equity” but also contrary to law for an employer who is guilty of the illegality of refusing a notice of voluntary retirement to turn around and benefit from that illegality. In the instant case, the defendant as employer gave the claimant as employee a loan, which by clause 12 of Exhibit C4 is repayable from the salary of the claimant. The defendant is a bank whose primary business is loan giving. I take judicially notice of this fact. In giving the claimant a loan, the defendant was merely in business. To force the claimant to resign is double jeopardy to the claimant (the loss of an employment and the conversion of what was an employment loan to a commercial one since the interest rate is now commercial) but double advantage to the defendant (doing away with the claimant and having an employment loan with a lower interest rate being converted to a commercial loan at a higher interest rate). This is not just inequitable but most unjust. So in finding for the claimant in terms of constructive dismissal, the context of the case demands that the defendant not be allowed to benefit from its wrongdoing. The argument of the defendant, relying on Exhibits C15 and C16 especially clause 8 of C16, under the heading condition subsequent, which provides that “The Bank reserves the right to vary the terms and conditions of the loan at any time during its life span”, simply reinforces the undue advantage of the defendant over the claimant. I must stress, as has been aptly put by Arturo Bronstein – International and Comparative Labour Law: Current Challenges (Palgrave Macmillan), 2009 at pp. 1 – 2: “…the goal of labour law is to ensure that no employer can be allowed to impose – and no worker can be allowed to accept – conditions of work which fall below what is understood to be a decent threshold in a given society at a given time”. The defendant should not, indeed cannot, be allowed to impose on the claimant a fair accompli - entice the claimant with an employment loan at a low rate, then turn around and constructively dismiss her and convert the low rate loan to one of a higher rate. Head of tail, the employer benefits much against the interest of the claimant. This cannot be. 93. The defendant counterclaimed for a total of N17,388,772.09. To the defendant, the claimant admitted indebtedness to the defendant in the sum of N11,000,000.00 (Eleven Million Naira only); and that the only amount in dispute is the difference which is in the sum of N6,288,772.09 (Six Million, Two Hundred and Eighty-Eight Thousand, Seven Hundred and Seventy-Two Naira and Nine Kobo); it needs to be noted that at paragraph 33 of DW’s deposition, she put the total unearned allowance of the claimant as N5,719,908.44. The defendant went on that the N6,288,772.09 is made up of unearned allowances paid to the claimant before she resigned her appointment for the whole of year 2016 (January to December). The very fact that the defendant constructively dismissed the claimant means that it can lay no claim to any unearned allowances it paid to the claimant. The defendant cannot eat its cake and have it. In James Adekunle Owulade v. Nigeria Agip Oil Company Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/41/2012, the judgment of which was delivered on 12th July 2016, the claim for including unamortized allowances was rejected by this Court given that the retirement of the claimant by the defendant was involuntary. This Court reasoned thus: If the claimant had not been retired by the defendant, the question of the claimant enjoined to pay off these sums will not have arisen. The evidence before the Court is that while in service, there was no obligation on the claimant to pay any of these sums. The obligation to pay only arose as a result of the retirement of the claimant by the defendant. Is it not, therefore, a question of the defendant eating its cake and having it if allowed to benefit from its act of wrongly retiring the claimant? I think so. In like manner, but for the constructive dismissal of the claimant by the defendant, there would have been no duty to repay the unearned allowances of N5,719,908.44; the defendant claimed N6,288,772.09 on its understanding that the claimant admitted indebtedness of N11 Million. I so find and hold. This means that the defendant has no right whatsoever to make a claim for this sum of N5,719,908.44 (or even the N6,288,772.09 as unearned allowance it indicated). I so hold. 94. This leaves out the said admission as to indebtedness in the sum of N11,000,000.00. The evidence of DW is that the two loan facilities were given to the claimant by the defendant to acquire two shops at Tejuosho market, and another loan facility was given as staff home loan. The loans to buy two shops are secured by loan agreements, Exhibits D4 and D4(a), at an interest rate of 9% per annum. See also paragraphs 26 to 29 of DW’s witness statement on oath. The staff home loan mentioned by DW in paragraph 31 of her deposition is unsupported by any agreement shown to the Court. By paragraphs 30 and 31 of DW’s deposition, the amounts outstanding on the loans are: N4,782,183.26 and N5,610,415.28 (for the two loans given to buy two shops), and N1,535,800.10 (for the staff home loan). All these sums if added together gives us a total sum of N11,929,398.64, which if added to the N5,719,908.44 DW indicated in paragraph 33 of her deposition as the total unearned allowance given to the claimant gives us a total indebtedness of N17,649,307.08, not N17,388,772.09 that the defendant is counterclaiming and as supported by the letter of demand, Exhibit D8. Of course, a Court cannot give a claimant a sum over and above that which is actually claimed. 95. I must state that since the staff home loan is unsupported by any document (the agreement is not before the Court), the claim for N1,535,800.10 in that regard remains unsubstantiated. So what we have as the actual counterclaim of the defendant is N4,782,183.26 and N5,610,415.28 for the two loans given to buy two shops, the total of which is thus N10,392,598.54. This is the counterclaim that can be considered by this Court, the counterclaims for unearned allowance and staff home loan having been knocked off. Exhibits D5, D5(a), D5(b), D5(c) and D5(d) are either undertakings or authorizations by the claimant to the defendant in respect of the two loans taken to buy the two shops. By Exhibit D5, the allocation of the two shops was done by the defendant bank. What this tells us is that it was the defendant that allocated the two shops to the claimant, and it was the defendant that gave the loans to the claimant to buy the two shops allocated to her by same defendant. This is the scenario before us for which the defendant is counterclaiming. The wordings in Exhibits D5, D5(a), D5(b), D5(c) and D5(d) show the overbearing control of the defendant over its relationship with the claimant: should the claimant default in the repayment of the loans, she will forfeit her allocation; and because of the default and forfeiture, she must immediately yield vacant possession of the shops to the Bank. Nothing can be more onerous. There is no doubt that the claimant took the two loans to buy two shops from the defendant, but the role of the defendant as already narrated in all of it cannot be discounted. In that wise, and taking the context of the facts on ground as Lewis v. UBA enjoins, the defendant cannot be entitled to anything beyond the N10,392,598.54 outstanding on the said two loans. This is the sum the defendant is only entitled to in terms of its counterclaim and which I presently order. The counterclaims for interest and cost must thus fail; and I so hold. 96. For the avoidance of doubt, this is my decision: (1) It is declared that the purported and/or induced letter of resignation dated 22nd January 2016 and signed by the claimant under duress is invalid and unlawful. (2) It is declared that the act of the defendant referred to in paragraph (1) hereof amounts to constructive dismissal of the claimant by the defendant as well as an unfair labour practice. (3) I award the sum of Two Million Naira as damages payable by the defendant to the claimant for her constructive dismissal. (4) The counterclaim of the defendant succeeds but only in terms of N10,392,598.54 outstanding on the two loans given the claimant to buy two shops. (5) The claimant shall pay to the defendant the said sum of N10,392,598.54 less the N2 Million ordered in paragraph (3) hereof i.e. N8,392,598.54 only. This N8,392,598.54 is to be paid within 30 days of this judgment, failing which it shall attract interest at the rate of 10% per annum. 97. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD