Download PDF
JUDGMENT 1. The claimant had filed this suit on 12th January 2017 vide a complaint with the accompanying originating processes. By the complaint and statement of facts, the claimant claims against the defendant as follows: (a) A declaration that the claimant is still validly and contractually within the employment of the defendant and is, therefore, entitled to all his salaries, entitlements, allowances, pension and other benefits from November 2013 until it is properly and lawfully determined. (b) An order commanding the defendant to reinstate the claimant to its services and to pay the claimant his full salaries, entitlements, allowances, pension and other benefits from November 2013 up to the date of judgment. PARTICULARS (i) The sum of N174,551.59 (One Hundred and Seventy-Four Thousand, Five Hundred and Fifty-One Naira, Fifty-Nine Kobo only) per month being the claimant’s gross monthly salary. (ii) Yearly Housing Allowance from year 2014 till date = N637,660.80 (Six Hundred and Thirty-Seven Thousand, Six Hundred and Sixty Naira, Eighty Kobo only) per year from 2014 till date. (iii) Annual Productivity Bonus from year 2014 till date = N75,912.00 (Seventy-Five Thousand, Nine Hundred and Twelve Naira only) per year. (iv) Leave Grant (usually 20% of annual basic salary) from 2014 till date N182,188.80 per year. (v) The sum of N104,730.96 being pension for the period November 2013 and June 2014 and N17,455.16k per month from 1st August 2014 till date. Remittable to the claimant’s pension manager (Leadway Pension PFA/UBA PFC Acct. Number 1005906472). (c) An order directing the defendants to pay the claimant the sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira only) as general damages for the years of inconvenience caused the claimant. (d) An order directing the defendants to pay interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 10% from the date judgment is delivered until the date when sum is finally liquidated. 2. The defendant entered formal appearance and then filed its defence processes; to which the claimant filed a reply to the statement of defence and further witness statement on oath. 3. At the trial, the claimant testified on his own behalf as CW and tendered Exhibits C1 to C10; while Miss Osato Ogbeide, Lead HR Operations of the defendant, testified for the defendant as DW and tendered Exhibit D. At the close of trial parties filed their respective final written addresses. The defendant’s final written address was filed on 30th May 2018, while the claimant’s was filed on 21st June 2018. The defendant’s reply on points of law was filed on5th July 2018. THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 4. The claimant was a staff of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria before its privatisation. Just before the privatisation exercise, the claimant was transferred from the Eko Electricity branch of Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) to Ikeja Electricity Branch where he continued to work prior to and after the privatisation exercise. Upon privatisation, the claimant was assured by the defendant to continue his work under the defendant’s employment pending when the defendant will finish compiling records of the defunct PHCN employees under its employment. Even though the claimant was invited for job placement by Eko Electricity (now privatized), the defendant misled the claimant into carrying on with his work under the defendant’s employment on the assurance that it was compiling its records and the claimant was going to be confirmed as its employee. It was based on the defendant’s assurances that the claimant applied for leave and was granted by the defendant shown in Exhibit C6. Notably too, the defendant instructed the claimant to retrieve the document verifying his status as a staff of PHCN from Eko Electricity and submit to the defendant for the processing of his confirmation by the defendant. This was because due to bureaucracy, the claimant’s records were yet to be updated with the defunct Ikeja Electricity Company prior to privatisation. The claimant retrieved the said document and submitted to the defendant a fact that the defendant did not deny. The defendant, however, turned round to deny the claimant the opportunity to continue to resume under the defendant’s employment at a period when it was too late for the claimant to resume at Eko Electricity, hence this case. THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT 5. The defendant admitted that the claimant was an employee of Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) Eko Zone before he was transferred to Ikeja Zone sometime in 2013 and that the claimant remained an employee of PHCN in the Eko Zone despite the transfer to Ikeja Electricity Distribution Company. The defendant averred that the claimant was never documented as their staff and that they never paid any salary and allowance to the claimant as he remained a staff of PHCN, Eko Electricity Distribution Company. The defendant’s case is that upon conclusion of the privatization process on 1st November 2013 all the contracts of employment of PHCN staff were terminated; and to provide soft landing for the PHCN staff, the Bureau of Public Enterprises in conjunction with PHCN brokered a 6 months fixed contract for PHCN staff based on their last known staff records. The defendant averred that since the claimant did not receive a fixed contract employment from them he was advised on his resumption from leave to proceed to Eko Electricity Distribution Company to verify the status of his employment since that was the place of his last official posting. To the defendant, the claimant was never in its employment; and that the claimant’s salaries were paid by PHCN, Eko Zone, the place of his last posting from PHCN HQ. That by design of the privatization exercise, the employment of all staff of PHCN was terminated and severance and compensation packages were paid to all staff. That the claimant was paid the sum of N8,293,968.07 as his severance payment and the sum of N4,679,531.10 representing his accrued retirement savings amount (RSA). That this suit is frivolous and should be dismissed with substantial cost. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT 6. The defendant submitted three issues for determination, namely: (a) Whether the claimant had a contract of employment with the defendant. (b) Whether the defendant (sic) is entitled to his claim for salaries, entitlement, allowance, pension and other benefit from November 2013 up till the date of judgment. (c) Whether the claimant is entitled to general damages of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira). 7. On issue (a), the defendant submitted that the claimant’s employment is one of written contract between an employer and employee where the Court has a duty to determine the written contract. That in determining the rights and obligations of the claimant, the Court is bound to look only at the conditions regulating the employment of the claimant. Likewise, in terminating the employment of the claimant, the defendant is bound to comply with the conditions regulating the employment, citing Momoh v. CBN [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1055) 504 at 529 - 530. That in construing the relationship between an employee and an employer under a contract, the Court must confine itself to the plain words and meanings to be derived from the written contract and in doing this, no addition or subtraction is permissible, citing Momoh v. CBN (supra). That the burden is on the employee who complains of the breach of his contract of employment to place before the Court the term of the contract of employment and to prove the manner in which the said terms were breached by the employer; the onus of proof is not on the employer, citing Amodu v. Amode [1990] 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) at 373. 8. The defendant continued that the claimant is claiming a declaration that he is still validly and contractually within the employment of the defendant and entitled to all his salaries and other benefits from November 2013 until his employment is lawfully determined. To the defendant, in order to succeed on this relief the claimant must tender his contract of employment which is the bedrock of any employment claim. That under cross-examination, the claimant identified Exhibits C7 and C8 as his contract of employment but a close look at the documents show that the documents are evidence of the payment of claimant’s salary by Eko Electricity Distribution Company prior to privatization on 1st November 2013 and not a contract of employment between him and the defendant. That there is no evidence that the clamant was given a contract of employment by the defendant and was paid salary at any point in time after privatization and even before. That although the claimant claims that he was absorbed into the employment of the defendant, there is no document to establish the terms and conditions of this employment/absorption into the employment of the defendant. That the letter of 17th December 2013 (Exhibit C9) titled application for annual leave is not a contract of employment and there is nothing to establish the new terms of the defendant’s job engagement. That the evidence of DW in paragraphs 14 and 15 of her witness statement is that by the privatization exercise, the employment of all staff of PHCN was terminated and severance and compensation package was paid to all PHCN staff including the claimant. That the claimant in paragraph 15 of his reply to the defendant’s statement of defence admitted that he received the severance payment and the amount due to him under the retirement saving account which brought to an end the claimant’s employment with PHCN. 9. The defendant then asked as to what happened to the claimant and other employees of PHCN after their employment with PHCN was brought to an end. That the claimant would want us to believe that he was absorbed into the employment of the defendant on 1st November 2013 when the privatization of PHCN took effect and the defendant and Eko Electricity Distribution Company emerged as the 2 main electricity distribution companies in Lagos without the participation of PHCN and Bureau of Public Enterprises, who midwifed the privatization process on behalf of the Federal Government. That it appears also that the claimant has hinged his employment on Exhibit C6, the letter approving his leave and making reference to his new terms of job employment without tendering the contact of employment. On the other hand, that the defendant led evidence that after the employment of all the staff of PHCN was on 1st November 2013 brought to an end and severance payment made to them, a six (6) months contract with new job engagement was issued to PHCN staff at their last know staff record/official posting by PHCN. That it was the evidence of DW that this fixed term contract was for the benefit of all former staff of PHCN and was delivered in batches from the PHCN Headquarters to the new private entities for onward transmission to the former staff of PHCN. That the evidence of DW was that before the delivery of the fixed term of contract, the former staff of PHCN (including the claimant) continued in their employment and that the claimant never received a fixed contract of employment and that the claimant was advised to proceed to PHCN now under the Eko Electricity Distribution Company on his resumption from leave to verify the status of his employment. That under cross-examination, CW confirmed that he received a 6 months employment contract from PHCN under the Eko Electricity Distribution Company and this is further corroborated in Exhibit D, the letter from Bureau of Public Enterprises which confirmed that at the date of privatization on 1st November 2013, Eko Electricity Distribution Company retained James Francis Etim for the initial period of 6 months and further confirmed the claimant as a staff of Eko Electricity Distribution Company. 10. The defendant went on that the evidence of CW in paragraph 8 of his witness statement of 16th May 2017 is that when he complained about his salary for November 2013, he was asked to continue to work as payment will be made as soon as the defendant finished compiling records of the defunct PHCN employees that were reabsorbed. That this is further proof that he was never employed by the defendant because there is no evidence that the claimant’s name was listed as one of the PHCN staff to be reabsorbed by the defendant and to receive a 6 months contract. That the evidence of CW that he continued to work pending when the defendant finished compiling the list of staff to be absorbed for 6 months is corroborated by the evidence of DW under cross-examination that the claimant was just coming to the premises of the defendant but was not given any work to do and not paid a salary. The evidence of DW also shows that the claimant was advised to verify his employment status with Eko Electricity Distribution Company since the defendant did not give him a contract after the compilation of the list of staff to be retained. That CW under cross-examination confirmed that he received a contract of employment from Eko Electricity Distribution Company and failed to prove how he was absorbed into the defendant’s employment. To the defendant, the claimant has been mischievous and clever in the presentation of his case by giving the impression that the transfer of his service from PHCN/Eko Electricity Distribution Company before the privatization exercise automatically made him an employee of the defendant upon privatization on 1st November 2013, which is very far from the truth. 11. The defendant urged the Court is urged to take judicial notice that prior to the privatization of the power sector, Nigerian Electric Power Authority (NEPA) was unbundled by the Federal Government under auspices of BPE and the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) set up to unbundle NEPA. That in Lagos, Eko Electricity Distribution Company and the defendant emerged as the 2 main electricity distribution companies and they operated with the staff of NEPA/PHCN without any contract of employment and paid their salaries. That even though the claimant transferred his services to the defendant he was still regarded as a staff of PHCN, Eko Electricity Zone, a position confirmed in Exhibit D and this also explains why Eko Electricity Distribution Company continued to pay his salary. That the management structure between Power Holding Company Nigeria (PHCN) Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), Eko Electricity Distribution Company and the defendant prior to privatization on 1st November 2013 came to an end when all staff of PHCN were disengaged and severance paid to all of them. That the Federal Government through the BPE negotiated 6 months’ employment contracts for all defunct staff of PHCN including the claimant but the defendant never offered the claimant a contract. That the claimant’s evidence under cross-examination was that he was offered a contract by Eko Electricity Distribution Company. 12. The defendant proceeded that the claimant in paragraph 5 of his witness statement on oath of 16th May 2017 confirmed the defendant’s position that severance payment and retirement saving due was paid to all employees of PHCN including himself prior to privatization on 1st November 2013. That the only twist in his evidence is that he says he was absorbed into the employment of the defendant after the severance exercise but he is unable to prove and establish how this absorption into the employment of the defendant took place. That although the defendant granted approval to the claimant to proceed on leave in line with the new terms of job engagement there is no evidence that the claimant was issued a new 6 months’ contract as negotiated by the Bureau of Public Enterprises and PHCN for former staff to create a self landing for both the defunct staff of PHCN and the new Electricity Distribution Companies. To the defendant, the letter of leave cannot take the place of a letter of employment; more so, when there is no evidence that he received any salary from the defendant at any point in time before or after privatization on 1st November 2013. Furthermore, that without a contract of employment, the leave granted the claimant makes no sense since it was not based on any contractual agreement between the parties. That the severance payment the claimant received automatically ended his contract of employment from PHCN and he could not, therefore, have proceeded on leave on a contract of employment that had been brought to an end. On the other hand, that the defendant could not have granted the claimant annual leave because the defendant did not offer him a contact of employment that entitled him to leave. That if the claimant has no letter of employment, he cannot be entitled to leave and there is no evidence that he was receiving salary, or ever received salary from the defendant after privatization on the 1st of November 2013. That the burden is on the claimant to prove that his name was compiled by the defendant as one of the staff of the defunct PHCN staff to be reabsorbed into the defendant and to be issued with the 6 months’ employment contract. The defendant then urged the Court to resolve issue (a) in the defendant's favor and hold that the claimant has no contact of employment with the defendant. 13. For issue (b), the defendant submitted that except in employments governed by statute wherein the procedure of employment and discipline is clearly spelt out, any other employment outside the statute is governed by the terms under which the parties agree to be master and servant. That a master is entitled to dismiss his servant from his employment for good or bad reasons or for no reason at all. Where the master purports to dismiss a servant even though not in accordance with the laid down procedure in the contract the servant cannot treat the contract as still subsisting but must proceed as if he has been wrongfully dismissed. That specific performance or reinstatement of contract of service will not be ordered where the master brings the master-servant relationship to an end, and to do so will be tantamount to forcing a willing employee on an unwilling employer. That in the instant case, the relationship between PHCN/Eko Electricity Distribution Company before privatization was brought to an end with the payment of severance package and the retirement saving (RSA) to all staff of PHCN. That there cannot be any reinstatement ordered because the entity that existed post privatization has ceased to exist; what now exists after privatization are two (2) new distinct and separate legal companies, Eko Electricity Distribution Company and the defendant, and the claimant has not produced any contract of employment to establish his monetary claims. 14. To the defendant, it is the contract of employment that will determine the salary, entitlement, allowance, pension and other benefits of the claimant and in the absence of this, relief (b) of the complaint must fail. That the monetary claims of the claimant are in the nature of special damages which must be pleaded and established by credible evidence, citing Prof Ajiboye Akinkugbe v. Ewelumu Holdings [2008] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1098) 375. That the monetary claims must be proved and it is the contract of employment that determines what is paid to the claimant. That the special damages that can be recovered by the claimant depends on what he can establish as being owed in salary, pension, allowance and benefits, citing Amodu v, Amodu [1990] 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 356 at 372 and Co-operative Development Bank v. Essien [2001] 4 NWLR (Pt. 704) 479 at 492. Furthermore, that specific performance or reinstatement of employment will not be ordered where the master brings the master-servant relationship to an end and the employment is not protected by statute, citing Onagoruwa v. ABC [1997] 12 NWLR (Pt. 531) 150 at 158 and NSITFBN v. Adebiyi [1999] 13 NWLR (Pt. 633) 16 at 28. That in the instant case there is no evidence the defendant employed the claimant at the inception of privatization on 1st November 2013 and the issue of terminating his appointment does not even arise. That there is also nothing to support the monetary claims which are in the nature of special damages. That the payment advice (Exhibits C7, C8, C10) and the document titled implementation of monetized fringed benefits (Exhibit C9) were issued by PHCN before privatization on 1st November 2013. That the payment advice clearly indicates that the claimant was being paid by PHCN/Eko Electricity Distribution Company during the period before privatization. That all arrangements before privatization on 1st November 2013 with PHCN staff was terminated by the severance package paid to all PHCN staff and a new 6 months’ employment contract was to be issued to the claimant by the Eko Electricity Distribution Company, which from the cross-examination of the claimant was issued. That the claimant failed and refused to tender his letter of employment from Eko Electricity Distribution Company because it will be detrimental to his case. 15. Regarding issue (c), the defendant submitted that the claimant is not entitled to damages for the reasons proffered in issues (a) and (b) above. Furthermore, that the claimant contributed to the situation he has found himself when he failed to accept the contact of employment given to him by Eko Electricity Distribution Company. That in a case of mater and servant, damages is calculated to cover the period of notice necessary to terminate the contract together with other accrued entitlements and damages claimable do not extend to injured feeling and loss of reputation. In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to dismiss the claimant’s action with substantial cost. THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT 16. The claimant first raise issues as to the incompleteness of Exhibit D and the fact that the said Exhibit D was not certified nor was proper foundation laid for the said document. On the incompleteness of Exhibit D, that the defendant sought to rely on Exhibit D, which is an incomplete document. That while it was within the power of the defendant to forward the full document, the defendant deliberately withheld the purported “copy of bio data information from Eko EDC” referred to in the last paragraph of the exhibit. That it is trite that a party ought to place all relevant facts before the Court to assist it to arrive at a fair and reasonable conclusion and it would be improper for a Court of law to enter judgment for a party on incomplete and inconclusive facts or evidence, referring to Felix Nyoye Adim v. Nigerian Bottling Company Plc & anor [2010] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1200) 543. That applying this position of law to the present case, the claimant’s submission is that Exhibit D being an incomplete document is unreliable as the Court has not been given the opportunity to see the bio data information; more so as the defendant’s witness actually mentioned in the course of cross-examination that the document is with the defendant’s lawyers. 17. The claimant also submit that the defendant refused to certify or otherwise lay proper foundation for the tendering of Exhibit D. That the defendant during examination in chief tendered a coloured print out of what it purported to be the letter addressed to it by the Bureau of Public Enterprises. No form of compliance was made of it as a computer generated evidence, neither was the copy certified and the original was also not produced. In essence, that there is no way the Court can ascertain that what was exhibited as Exhibit D has not been doctored, altered or even fabricated. To that extent, the claimant urged the Court to discountenance the said exhibit and strike it out as an unreliable document. 18. The claimant went on that paragraphs 6 and 11 of the defendant’s statement of defence and paragraph 8 of the defendant’s witness statement on oath offend the rule against hearsay evidence and likewise contain unsubstantiated assertions and, therefore, liable to be struck out. That the witness’ assertion here was that the defendant could not have issued the claimant with a letter of employment because of a directive of PHCN and BPE which placed embargo on promotions, posting recruitment and transfers. That no evidence was led, nor was any document produced by the witness to substantiate the assertion. It is the claimant’s contention that the defendant has a duty tendering such weighty evidence before the Court if at all it was in existence, but it merely decided to fabricate stories to exempt itself from responsibilities. Consequently, that paragraphs 6 and 11 of the defendant’s statement of defence and paragraph 8 of the defendant’s witness statement on oath ought to be struck out, citing section 131(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, which has been reasserted in plethora of cases to the extent that evidence must be adduced in support of averments before the Court so as to guide against speculations, and that where there is no evidence adduced in support of an averment, such averment must be discountenanced by the Court, referring to Kafor v. Ezenwa [2012] 12 NWLR (Pt. 784) 334, INEC v. Action Congress [2009] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1126) 627. 19. That assuming but without conceding that paragraphs 6 and 11 of the defendant’s statement of defence and paragraph 8 of the defendant’s witness statement on oath are not hearsay, the gravamen of the claimant’s claim has nothing to do with promotion, posting, recruitment or even transfer; his claim is based on the fact that the defendant actually led him to believe that he was in its employment something which he also acted upon which this Court has the inherent power to estop the defendant from denying. The claimant then urged the Court to discountenance paragraphs 6 and 11 of the defendant’s statement of defence and paragraph 8 of the defendant’s witness statement on oath on the account that they offend the rule against hearsay evidence. 20. The claimant proceeded to submit two issues for determination, namely: (a) Whether the claimant had a contract of employment with defendant and is consequently entitled to his claim for salaries, entitlement, allowance, pension and benefit from November 2013 up till the date of judgment. (b) Whether the claimant is entitled to general damages of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira only). 21. On issue (a), the claimant submitted that is trite that the creation and termination of contracts of employment are both subject to the general principles governing the law of contract, referring to Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] NWLR (Pt. 9) 599. That flowing from basic principles of contractual relations, a contract may be express or implied. It is express when the terms and conditions are clearly spelt out in written documents, whereas a contract is implied where terms and conditions are not expressly spelt out but can be deduced from the conduct of parties or from established practice. In the present case, the claimant’s submission is that contractual relations emanated from the conduct of the parties, urging the Court to so hold. By way of emphasis, the claimant submitted that the following surrounding circumstances are sufficient grounds from which this Court can infer the existence of employee-employer relations between parties: (i) The claimant resumed work everyday and actively participated in the daily operations of the defendant both before and after privatisation, referring to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the claimant’s witness statement on oath dated 12th January 2017 and paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the claimant’s further witness statement on oath deposed to on 16th May 2017. (ii) It was based upon the claimant’s active involvement in the activities of the defendant that he was granted leave as contained in Exhibit C6. (iii) As established by the evidence before the Court, the defendant carried on with the same salary structure that was in place before the privatisation exercise and the defendant’s witness attested to this fact in her evidence during cross-examination. 22. The claimant, therefore, submitted that the Court can take notice of the claimant’s salary prior to privatization (as clearly spelt out in paragraph 10 of the claimant’s statement of claim) in calculating his salaries and entitlements from the defendant. Interestingly, that the defendant in its statement of defence admitted that the claimant’s employment as a PHCN employee terminated on 1st November 2013 (para. 9) and the claimant was allowed to proceed on leave in December 2013 (para. 8). That the defendant’s witness categorically mentioned in paragraph 14 of its witness statement on oath that “sometime in December 2013, the Defendant whilst awaiting his fixed term contract of employment from the BPE and PHCN HQ, applied for and proceeded on its annual leave”. In essence, that the defendant clearly admitted the fact that the claimant actively worked under its employment immediately after privatization and it ought, therefore, to be estopped by this Court from denying the fact of the claimant’s employment. That the law is also well settled that facts admitted need no further proof, citing Segun Ajibade v. The State [2012] LPELR-15531(SC) and Amala v. State [2004] 6 SCM 55 at 67. 23. To the claimant, the question that, therefore, begs for an answer is whether the defendant is not estopped by conduct from denying that it employed the claimant, bearing in mind the above admissions and Exhibit C6 (letter approving leave). In answering this question, the claimant referred to Abdulkadir Oba Alao v. Vice Chancellor, University of Ilorin & 2 ors, without giving the citation of the case; Nsirim v. Nsirim [2002] 31 NWLR (Pt. 755) 697, Ude v. Nmira [1993] 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 638, Hoi-icon Limited v. Wasurum [1987] 4 NWLR (Pt. 66) 646, Ikpuku v. Ikpuku [1991] 5 NWLR, (Pt. 193) 571 and Ukaegbu v. Ugoji [1991] 6 NWLR (Pt. 196) 127. To the claimant, he has established the following facts to the Court: (a) Prior to privatisation of PHCN, he was transferred from the Eko Electricity branch of Power Holding Company of Nigeria to Ikeja Electricity Branch where he continued to work even after the privatisation exercise (paragraph 2 of his witness statement on oath, paragraph 1 of further witness statement on oath). (b) Upon privatisation, he was assured by the defendant to continue his work under the defendant’s employment pending when the defendant will finish compiling records of the defunct PHCN employees under its employment. (paragraph 7). (c) Even though he was invited for job placement by Eko Electricity (now privatised), the defendant misled him into carrying on with his work under the defendant’s employment on the assurance that it was compiling its records and the claimant was going to be confirmed as its employee (paragraphs 8 and 10 of claimant’s further witness statement on oath). (d) It was based on the defendant’s assurances that the claimant applied for leave and was granted by the defendant as shown in Exhibit C6 and paragraphs 2 and 9 of his further witness statement on oath. (e) Notably too, the defendant instructed the claimant to retrieve the document verifying his status as a staff of PHCN from Eko Electricity and submit to the defendant for the processing of his confirmation by the defendant. (f) The claimant retrieved the said document and submitted same to the defendant, a fact that the defendant did not deny (paragraph 11 of further witness statement on oath). (g) The defendant, however, turned round to deny the claimant opportunity to continue to resume under the defendant’s employment at a period when it was too late for the claimant to resume at Eko Electricity (paragraph 8 of the claimant’s statement on oath). 24. To the claimant, the dictum of Denning, LJ in Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 KB 215 at 220 still resonates in our legal system to the effect that the doctrine of promissory estoppel prevents a party from insisting on his strict legal rights, when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. That in a self-contradictory way, the defendant seemed to claim through Exhibit D that the claimant was always a staff attached to Eko Electricity. That Exhibits C4 and C5 speak volume of the fact that the claimant was actually transferred and was under the engagement of the defendant upon privatization. That the defendant’s witness also admitted during cross-examination that it did not matter which zone an employee was working from as the employer was Power Holding Company of Nigeria and it was responsible for paying employees’ salaries. To the claimant, it goes to no issue where the claimant was receiving his salary prior to privatization and that what is material before the Court is where he was resuming and contributing his labour input to (which in this case is the defendant). 25. That the defendant’s counsel in his final address made a heavy weather of the fact that there was no written terms of contract between the parties. It is the claimant’s submission that at the material time, the defendant had a statutory obligation under section 7 of the Labour Act LFN 2004 to give a written statement containing the claimant’s terms and conditions of employment and cannot, therefore, seek to benefit from its refusal to follow the law. That the law is very clear on the statutory obligation of employers under section 7 of the Labour Act and it is trite that an employer who has refused to obey the law will not be allowed to hide under the cloak of imposing burden of proof on the employee, citing Mobil Producing (Nig) Unltd & anor v. Udo [2008] 36 WRN 53 at 115. 26. Furthermore, that counsel to the defendant made a heavy weather of the fact that 6 months contract was issued to the defunct employees of the PHCN. To the claimant, the fact that the claimant received a copy of his own contract from Eko Electricity does not exempt the defendant from liability to the claimant because the said 6 months contract did not limit the defendant from engaging whoever they wished to engage nor did it stop the defendant from paying salaries to those that worked under it from November 2013 immediately upon privatization. In essence, that the fact remains that the claimant worked under the defendant prior to and consequent upon privatization and the defendant cannot seek to avoid its duty to pay the claimant for his services. That the law is trite that every worker is entitled to his wages, urging he Court to so hold. Interestingly too, that the defendant’s witness mentioned during her re-examination that the author of Exhibit C6, which emanated from the defendant, must have been misled. That this Court is a court of facts and law and not that of opinion, urging the Court to discountenance the witness assertion as an opinion that cannot hold water. 27. That assuming but without conceding that the defendant’s witness statement does not amount to an opinion, that same amounts to a hearsay as the only person capable of giving evidence on the document is the author in as much as there is no evidence that the maker of the document is no longer in the defendant’s employment. That sections 37 and 38 of the Evidence Act 2011 are clear in this regard that evidence given in respect of a statement, document or record by a person other than the maker of the statement, document or record is hearsay and generally inadmissible, citing Ezeazoposiako v. Okeke [2005] 16 NWLR (Pt. 952) 612 CA. What more, that it is a well established principle of law that documents speak for themselves and oral evidence to alter or add to them will be disallowed, referring to NIDB v. Olalomi Industries Ltd [2002] 15 NWLR (Pt. 761) 532. Flowing from his submissions, the claimant urged the Court to hold that the claimant had a contract of employment with the defendant and is consequently entitled to his claim for salaries, entitlement, allowance, pension and other benefit from November 2013 till the date of judgment. 28. Issue (b) is whether the claimant is entitled to general damages of N5,000,000.00. To the claimant, the rule of restitio in integrum in labour law (or contract generally) permits of certain exemptions including but not limited to cases of occupational injuries or diseases, and matters of unfair labour practices. However, that this position allows for certain exceptions. Thus general damages can be awarded to assuage losses suffered by a claimant to the extent that it can be traced to flow naturally from the defendant’s act; as reasonable compensation for costs incurred in pursuing suit including cost of services by counsel; and to a claimant who has been denied the use of his or her money for a period. The claimant referred to Mbilitem v. Unity Kapital Assurance Plc unreported Suit No: NICN/ABJ/108/2011 delivered on 28th February 2013 and section 19(d) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006, which confers inherent jurisdiction on the Court to award general damages in deserving cases. 29. The claimant went on that he has 2 legs of claims which are: his active engagement between November and December 2013 and his engagement during the period he was not allowed to work until presently. That having been denied the use of his money ought to be compensated for the deprivation by the defendant, and due to the consistent devaluation of the Naira, the worth of the money owed the claimant since 2010 would have depreciated. That the essence of general damages in cases of this nature is more pertinent so as to discourage abuse of discretion by employers who wield high power against their employees, and to couching the cost of engaging legal practitioner to prosecute the claimant’s claims and the cost of appearing in court throughout court’s proceedings, etc. 30. In the alternative, that the Court has the power, whether discretionary or otherwise, to order the defendant to pay interest at the appropriate percentage per annum from 2013 when the defendant started owing the claimant to when judgment is delivered, and at the appropriate percentage from when judgment is delivered till when the defendant pays the judgment sum, citing Imoloame v. WAEC [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 265), Nigeria Produce Marketing v. Adewumi [1972] 11 SC 111 and WNDC v Abimbola [1966] NMLR 381. That the Court further held that in calculating the damages due to an employee who had been wrongfully dismissed the court will also take into account the value of benefits in kind which would have accrued to the employee if he had continued in the employment and also the amount of tax which would have been payable on them. Also cited is Mobil v. Asuah [2001] 30 WRN.25 at 45; [2001] 16 NWLR (Pt. 740) 723 at 758, which held that the measure of damages for wrongful dismissal is prima facie the amount the plaintiff would have earned had he continued with the employment. The claimant concluded by urging the Court to grant him exemplary damages for the illegal seizure of his salaries for the period for which he had rendered services to defendant; and enter judgment in his favour. THE DEFENDANT'S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW 31. The defendant reacted on points of law, which in the main was a rehash of already presented arguments. On the issue of the Exhibit D being incompetent, the defendant submitted that admissibility of Exhibit D depends on its relevance and whether it was pleaded; and that objection to the admissibility of Exhibit D ought to have been taken at the time it was being tendered. That where the original of Exhibit D is not available a photocopy can be tendered after proper foundation has been laid and where no objection is taken to the admissibility of the document it will be admitted into evidence. The defendant went on that for the purpose of admissibility there is the category of evidence which are absolutely inadmissible on the ground of statutory exclusionary provisions. This category of evidence remains inadmissible and cannot under any circumstance constitute evidence in the case at trial or on appeal even where admitted by consent or without objection, citing Ikenye v. Ofunne [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 1. That there is the other category of inadmissible evidence rendered admissible on the fulfillment of certain conditions. This category of evidence is admissible if admitted without objection, citing Alade v. Olukade [1976] 6. SC 183. That Exhibit D falls into the second category and the claimant cannot be heard to complain if he failed to take objection at trial. That Exhibit D is also not a public document. It is a letter addressed to Eko Electricity Distribution Company and was admitted without objection. That the fact that the bio data referred to in Exhibit D was not tendered will not make it inadmissible. More importantly the bio data is not likely to change the contents of Exhibit D which confirms that as at 1st November 2013 Eko EDC retained Mr James Francis Etim for the initial period of 6 months. To the defendant, Nwoye v. NBC Ltd [2010] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1200) 543 does not support the claimant’s contention that Exhibit D is incompetent. In fact, that it supports the defendant’s position that documentary evidence may be admitted in Court by consent of the parties without objection and that wrongful admission of evidence may not necessarily affect the decision of a Court unless the use of the evidence caused a miscarriage of justice or if the evidence is in any event inadmissible. In any event, that by section 12 of the NIC Act 2006 this Court may in the interest of justice depart from the Evidence Act, urging the Court to so hold. 32. On the refusal of the defendant to certify or lay proper foundation for the tendering of Exhibit D, the defendant submitted that Exhibit D does not require certification since it is not a public document. That it is a private document and was tendered without any objection. That it is not in the category of documents which are inadmissible in law notwithstanding the consent of parties. That Exhibit D is not a computer generated document and was not tendered as one. DW never identified Exhibit D as a computer generated document and this objection should have been raised at the time the document was being tendered to enable parties address the Court on any contentious issue concerning the admissibility. That the claimant also never raised the issues of alteration, doctoring and fabrication at trial to afford the defendant the opportunity to answer to the allegation and is, therefore, estopped from raising same now. 33. On the assertion that the defendant led hearsay evidence, the defendant submitted that the evidence given by DW that the defendant could not have issued the claimant with a letter of employment because of the directive of PHCN and BPE, which placed embargo or promotion, posting, recruitment and transfer, is not hearsay evidence. That the evidence is based on her position as Human Resource Administrative Manager. It is not evidence concerning a statement made to her by another person not called as a witness. That the mere fact that she did not tender the directive from BPE will not make the evidence hearsay evidence. 34. On issue (a) formulated by the claimant, the defendant submitted that it is obvious form the submission of the claimant that he has no written contact of employment with the defendant and he is relying on Exhibit C6 to establish a master-servant relationship with the defendant. What the claimant is in effect saying is that by Exhibit C6, the defendant has by conduct admitted that he was in their employment. To the defendant, where there is no written document to evidence the contractual relationship between the parties and there is no third party to prove the contractual relationship, the Court will fall back on the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the parties as narrated by both of them to determine whether there was such a contract, citing Buhari v. Takuma [1994] 2 NWLR (Pt. 325) 183 at 190. In the instant case, that this Court in determining if there in a contract of employment must look at all the surrounding circumstances and not only at Exhibit C6. That the evidence of DW under cross-examination was that Exhibit C6 should not have been issued because the claimant was not their staff, was just coming around to the office after the privatization exercise and was not assigned any duty. That there is evidence from the Bureau of Public Enterprises, Exhibit D, that the claimant was classified as an employee of Eko Electricity Distribution Company and was offered a 6 months’ contract of employment. That there is also no evidence that the claimant received salary from the defendant before and after privatization. In fact, the evidence shows that the claimant’s salary was paid by Eko Electricity Distribution up until privatization. That it is all this evidence that the Court should piece together in coming to the conclusion that the claimant was not employed by the defendant despite Exhibit C6. That the fact that the defendant denied the claimant access into their premises on resumption from leave is evidence of a repudiation of any contractual relationship between the parties and shows that the defendant never had any intention of employing the claimant. That the claimant specifically pleaded the fact that upon resumption to office after his leave he was asked to reapply to Eko Electricity Distribution Company and that he has been locked out of the defendant’s premises despite that fact he goes there everyday to resume work. That this is clear evidence of a repudiation/termination of any contractual relationship created by Exhibit C6, citing Ilodibia v. NCC Ltd [1997] 7 NWLR (Pt. 512) 174 at 188 and 202, ACB v. Ufondu [1997] 10 NWLR (Pt. 523) 169 at 177, Onwunemu v. ACB [1997] 12 NWLR (Pt. 531) at 158 and Osakwe v. Nigeria Paper Mill [1998] 10 NWLR (Pt. 568) 1 at 13 - 14. 35. For issue (b) formulated by the claimant, the defendant submitted that in the unlikely event that Exhibit C6 is said to establish a contractual relationship between the parties, this Court will still have to determine whether the claimant is entitled to the salary, allowances and benefits claimed which he must establish by adducing credible evidence and not by merely pleading his entitlements. What followed was once again a rehash of already presented arguments, reiterating that the claimant is not entitled to general damages, and thus urging the Court to dismiss the claimant’s action with substantial cost. COURT’S DECISION 36. In considering the merit of this case, I start off with the defendant’s reply on pints of law, which I indicated earlier was mainly a rehash of already presented arguments. And the further argument by the defendant that the claimant is not entitled to general damages because he failed to mitigate his loss when he failed to take up the 6 months’ contract, which he was offered by Eko Electricity Distribution Company, is an argument that is new and so cannot be raised in a reply on points of law. A reply on points of law is meant to be just what it is, a reply on points of law. It is not meant for the party replying on points of law to reargue its case or bring in points it forgot to advance when it filed its final written address. Alternatively put, a reply on points of law is not meant to improve on the quality of a written address; a reply brief is not a repair kit to correct or put right an error or lacuna in the initial brief of argument. See Dr Augustine N. Mozie & ors v. Chike Mbamalu [2006] 12 SCM (Pt. I) 306; [2006] 27 NSCQR 425, Basinco Motors Limited v. Woermann Line & anor [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 149; [2009] 8 SCM 103, Ecobank (Nig) Ltd v. Anchorage Leisures Ltd & ors [2016] LPELR-40220(CA), UBA Plc v. Ubokolo [2009] LPELR-8923(CA) and Musaconi Ltd v. Aspinall [2013] LPELR-20745(SC). I had accordingly only highlighted the issues that I think appropriately rank as replies on points of law. 37. The claimant had raised issues regarding the admissibility of Exhibit D dated 22nd February 2017 written by Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) and which responded to an enquiry about the claimant. On this issue, I need to first clarify an issue raised by the defendant, which is that the claimant cannot even object to the admissibility of Exhibit D having not objected to it when it was tendered. On record, the claimant actually did not object to Exhibit D when it was tendered. However, although there was no objection to Exhibit D by the claimant, the Court admitted it “without prejudice to the right of any of the parties to raise any issue in the final written address as to its admissibility or [evidential] value”. As it is, the claimant is accordingly right to have raised the issue of admissibility in his final written address. 38. The claimant had argued that Exhibit D, being an incomplete document, is unreliable as the Court has not been given the opportunity to see the bio data information; more so as the defendant’s witness actually mentioned in the course of cross-examination that the document is with the defendant’s lawyers. In reply, the defendant submitted that the fact that the bio data referred to in Exhibit D was not tendered will not make it inadmissible. The utility of Exhibit D in terms of this case is not the missing bio data but the content of Exhibit D itself. As such, the absence of the bio data cannot impugn on the competence of the said exhibit. I do to see any sense in the argument of the claimant in this regard. The same is the case regarding the claimant’s argument as to certification. The defendant rightly referred to section 12 of the NIC Act 2006 as one capable of curing the defects of lack of certification. 39. However, the key problem with Exhibit D, which none of the parties alluded to, is the fact that being dated 22nd February 2017 means that it was generated after this suit was filed on 12th January 2017; it was generated for the suit. The opening paragraph of Exhibit D attests to this fact. It reads: “We write in response to your enquiry about James Francis Etim who has sued Ikeja Electric Distribution Company”. By Iheanacho & anor v. Iwuamadi & anor [2013] LPELR-20689(CA), following section 83(3) of the Evidence Act 2011, a document (an exhibit) made during the pendency of a suit is not admissible. See also UTC Nigeria Plc v. Lawal [2013] LPELR-23002(SC). See also Mr Abisi Sylvester Eneanya v. Simart Investment Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/60/2016, the ruling of which was delivered on 16th July 2018. On this score, Exhibit D cannot have an evidential value as far as this suit is concerned; and I so find and hold. It will accordingly be discountenanced for purposes of this judgment. I so hold. 40. In paragraph 5 of the statement of facts, the claimant pleaded that it is standard practice of all the Electricity Companies (including Eko Electricity Distribution Company and the defendant) at the material time was that any staff that is transferred will continue to be entitled to the same salaries and allowances since there was uniformity of salaries and allowances across the electricity companies. The evidence of this standard practice of transferred staff retaining his salaries and allowances given by the claimant is his personal knowledge. See paragraph 6 of his deposition of 12th January 2017. Now, the rule is that evidence of customary practice (or usage and practice), what the claimant terms as standard practice in the present case, must come from other than the person asserting its existence. This is the effect of the combined reading of sections 18(1) and (2) and 73 of the Evidence Act 2011. Additionally, the ratio of the Supreme Court decisions in Queen v. Chief Ozogula [1962] WNLR 136, Adeyemi & ors v. Alhaji Shitu Bamidele & ors [1968] 1 All NLR 31, Richard Ezeanya & ors v. Gabriel Okeke & ors [1995] LPELR-1199(SC); [1995] 4 NWLR (Pt.388) 142 at 165 and Orlu v. Gogo-Abite [2010] LPELR-2769(SC); [2010] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1196) 307 SC is to the effect that it is unsafe to accept the testimony of the only person asserting the evidence of custom as conclusive; it is desirable and certainly good law that another witness who is versed in the alleged custom should also testify. See also James Adekunle Owulade v. Nigeria Agip Oil Company Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/41/2012, the judgment of which was delivered on12th July 2016 and Mr Dandson O. Obi v. Access Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/406/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 16th July 2018. As it is, the claimant cannot rely on his personal knowledge as evidence of the standard practice he talks of and wants this Court to use in deciding his case. That piece of evidence is hereby discountenanced for purposes of this judgment. I note the evidence of DW under cross-examination that prior to privatization, PHCN paid the salaries of all; and whatever zone it was, PHCN paid the salary. This evidence of DW, however, said nothing about entitlement as to salary and allowances of staff who are transferred. 41. Both parties are agreed on the transfer of the claimant to the defendant in terms of Exhibit C5. See paragraph 3 of the statement of facts and paragraph 4 of the statement of defence. But while the claimant argues that this transfer was (or at least was the harbinger of) a change of employers, the defendant argues that it did not translate to a change of employers. Though not raised as such by the parties, the Courts have upheld the fact of co-employer status between two employers in relation to an employee as was the case in Onumalobi v. NNPC and Warri Refining and Petrochemical Company [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 304. In Esther Ogbodu v. Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/32/2012, the judgment of which was delivered on 5th December 2014, this Court found that a co-employer status exists and held both defendants to be individually and jointly employer(s) of the claimant. See also Engineer Ignatius Ugwoke v. Aeromaritime (Nigeria) Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/482/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 30th November 2016 and Mr Olalekan Kehinde & anor v. Airtel Nigeria Limited & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/453/2012, the judgment of which was delivered on 13th December 2016. I acknowledge that this Court has accepted that the transfer or secondment of an employee by an employer to another employer does not necessarily imply that the transferring employer is no longer an employer of the employee. But in the instant case, the argument of the defendant is that the inter-zonal transfer of the claimant to it did not take away the fact that the claimant continued to be and remained an employee of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria Plc (PHCN), Eko Zone. Everything depends on the facts of the case. So what are the facts of the instant case? This remains the question. 42. Exhibit C1, the identity card of the claimant, indicates the claimant to be an employee of the PHCN. By Exhibit C2 dared 9th April 2013, the claimant applied to the MD/CEO of PHCN, Eko Electricity Distribution Company, Marina for inter-zonal transfer to Ikeja Electricity Distribution Company, the defendant. The fact of an inter-zonal transfer meant that both the defendant and Eko Electricity Distribution Company, where the claimant worked as at 9th April 2013, were all part of and answerable to the PHCN. By Exhibit C3 dated 23rd April 2013, the MD/CEO asked the defendant if it had vacancy for the claimant. By Exhibit C4 dated 27th June 2013, the defendant replied that it had vacancy for the claimant. And by Exhibit C5 dated 22nd June 2013, the claimant was formally transferred to the defendant. Now, the question is: was this transfer, a transfer within a system of a transfer from one employer to another? Exhibit C7 is the October 2013 pay slip of the claimant, a pay slip issued after the transfer. It shows that the salary of the claimant was paid by Eko Electricity Distribution Company. Under cross-examination, the claimant acknowledged that even after his transfer to the defendant, Eko Electricity Distribution Company continued to pay his salary. He also acknowledged that he never received salary from Ikeja Electricity Distribution Company. So when the claimant’s application for annual leave was granted by the defendant vide Exhibit C6 dated 17th December 2013, was that fact sufficient evidence that the claimant is an employee of the defendant? The defendant thinks not. 43. By paragraph 6 of the statement of facts, a privatization exercise took place in November 2013 and the claimant was still a staff of the defendant after the said privatization. Thus when the claimant was granted his annual leave vide Exhibit C6, he remained a staff of the defendant. In paragraph 8 of the statement of defence, the defendant denied the claimant’s paragraph 6, stating that the claimant’s supposed transfer was prior to the conclusion of the privatization on 1st November 2013 and thereafter the claimant proceeded on leave in December 2013. The defendant in paragraph 9 went on that the contract of employment of all PHCN staff was as at 1st November 2013 terminated and severance and compensation packages paid to all staff. The allusion to termination is not supported by any document. The oral evidence of DW under cross-examination that contracts of employment of all staff of PHCN as at 1st November 2013 were terminated is equally unsubstantiated by any documentary evidence. As for the allusion to payment of severance and compensation, the defendant relied on Exhibit D, which I already discountenanced. Even the allusion in paragraph 10 of the statement of defence, to the broker of a 6 month fixed contract for disengaged PHCN staff is unsupported by any documentary evidence. Equally unsubstantiated by any documentary evidence is the testimony of DW under cross-examination that “by May 1, 2014, the new companies gave us fresh offer letters; and then identified units where there were ways, for which recruitments were then made”. The advice the defendant gave to the claimant i.e. to proceed to PHCN Eko Zone to verify his status, which it alluded to in paragraph 11 of the statement of defence, is once again unsupported by any documentary evidence. 44. So the state of proven facts as we had it is that both parties are agreed that there was a privatization in November 2013 of the component companies which made up PHCN. Like I pointed out earlier, both parties agree that the claimant was transferred to the defendant prior to the said privatization. I also indicated that even after the transfer, the claimant’s salary was paid by Eko Electricity Distribution Company, not the defendant. See Exhibit C7 as well as the acknowledgment under cross-examination by the claimant himself. Now the payment of salaries is one of the incidents of a contract of service. See Shena Security Co. Ltd v. Afropak (Nig.) Ltd & ors [2008] 4 – 5 SC (Pt. II) 117 at pp. 128 – 130. A fortiori, whoever pays salary is indicative of being the employer. So despite the transfer, PHCN, Eko Zone, continued to be the claimant’s employer. When, therefore, the privatization was done in November 2013, the claimant was an employee of PHCN, Eko Zone. That the defendant granted the claimant annual leave is not sufficient proof that thereby the claimant became (since he was not up to that time) an employee of the defendant. After all, the claimant worked at the defendant’s, and only the defendant could sanction an annual leave. In any event, Shena held that it is not fatal to the existence of a contract of employment/of service that the work is not carried out on the employer’s premises. Consequently, the fact that the claimant worked in the defendant’s workplace is not fatal to the fact that he remained an employee of PHCN, Eko Zone. 45. I indicated earlier that the averments of the defendant in paragraphs 8 to 11 of the statement of defence are unsupported by any documentary evidence. However, the testimony of the claimant under cross-examination provides sufficient evidence. The testimony of the claimant is to the effect that prior to privatization on 1st November 2013, he and all other employees were paid severance packages; and that both those who were still in service and those who were not re-engaged were all paid. He went on that post-privatization, some employees like himself were given six months’ contracts as soft-landing; and that by the new contract he was employed by either Eko or Ikeja Electricity Distribution Companies. The claimant then concluded that he received the contract from Eko. Given this evidence, and all that has been stated so far, can the claimant still argue that he had any employment relationship with the defendant after privatization? I do not think so. In Mr Olalekan Kehinde & anor v. Airtel Nigeria Limited & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/453/2012, the judgment of which was delivered on 13th December 2016, this Court held thus: In Engineer Ignatius Ugwoke v. Aeromaritime (Nigeria) Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/482/2013 the judgment of which was delivered on 30th November 2016, this Court accepted the fact of co-employer status as was also the case in Onumalobi v. NNPC and Warri Refining and Petrochemical Company [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) 304. This Court also proceeded to accept that the transfer or secondment of an employee by an employer to another employer does not necessarily imply that the transferring employer is no longer an employer of the employee. In the instant case, the sequence of events were orchestrated by the 1st defendant. Exhibits TM3/KA1 and TM4/KA2 were orchestrated by the 1st defendant for its sole benefit. They were not meant to bring to an end the employer-employee relationship between the 1st defendant and the claimants. The coincidence of exhibits between the 1st and the 2nd defendants in this suit merely show the 1st defendant as effectively the driving force in the so-called employer-employee relationship between the 2nd defendant and the claimants. This being the case, it is my holding that the claimants remained employees of the 1st defendant despite the interposition of Bezaleel and the 2nd defendant in that relationship. In this respect, the argument of the 1st defendant, when the claimants (referring to Exhibits C4 and C10) argued that communication between them and the 1st defendant continued after the Mutual Separation Agreement, that it is manifestly clear that Exhibits C4 and C10 were not issued by it, goes to no issue and so is discountenanced. I accordingly agree with the argument of the claimants that contrary to paragraph 6 of the 1st defendant’s statement of defence, they were never at anytime transferred to any new employer. 46. In like manner, the transfer of the claimant to the defendant in the instant case did not mean that PHCN, Eko Zone, ceased to be the employer of the claimant. I so find and hold. This being the case, the claimant has not shown to this Court any sufficient proof that his employment relationship was transferred to the defendant as to make the defendant his employer. I so hold. The reliance of the claimant on Exhibit C6, the approval of annual leave by the defendant, is insufficient to prove that thereby the defendant became his employer. The argument of the claimant that contractual relations can emanate from the conduct of the parties since a contract may be implied does not help his case since sufficient facts have not been placed before the Court to enable the Court come to that conclusion in his own case. The claimant himself acknowledged that his salary was paid by other than the defendant; indeed, that he never received any salary from the defendant. 47. In all, there is no sufficient proof that the claimant was an employee of the defendant. The claims of the claimant are all hinged on being an employee of the defendant. Since this has not been shown, the claims fail and so are hereby dismissed. 48. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD