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JUDGMENT The Claimant brought this action on 12th May 2016 by way of Originating Summons seeking interpretation of a clause in a collective agreement pursuant to Section 16 of the Trade Disputes Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. In an amended Originating Summons filed pursuant to the leave granted to the Claimant on 3rd April 2016 by this court, the Claimant sought the determination of these questions: 1. Whether by virtue of the provision of Clause 3 of the Agreement between the parties dated the 3rd day of July, 2008 (being a Collective Agreement as adopted, incorporated and embodied in the Claimant's conditions of service, contained in Clause 26 of its Employee's Handbook) the Claimant's employees (who are members of the Defendants) are entitled to more than the annual gratuity as provided therein and as per the categorization. 2. Whether the Claimant's employees who are members of the Defendants and of less than 5 years employment are entitled to payment of gratuity. 3. Whether the Claimant is liable to payment of any cumulative gratuity to its employees who are members of the Defendants on clocking 5 years of service. Upon the determination of the above questions, the Claimant sought the following reliefs. (a) A declaration that the Claimant's employees who are members of the Defendants are only entitled to payments vis-a-vis gratuity as per paragraph 26 on page 23 of the Claimant employee's handbook. (b) A declaration that the Claimant is only liable to payment of yearly gratuity to its employees of 5 years employment and above only and as categorized in the Collective Agreement dated 3rd day of July, 2008. (c) A declaration that the Claimant is not liable to payment of any gratuity to its employees of less than five years of employment nor payment of gratuity for the said five years subsequently be it cumulatively or otherwise. (d) An order of injunction restraining the Claimant's employees who are members of the Defendants from embarking on strike and/or industrial action pending the resolution of the issues formulated herein. (e) Such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance of this case. An affidavit of 5 paragraphs, deposed to by Chimezie Nnabugwu, the Personnel Manager of the Claimant, was filed in support of the amended originating summons. It was averred in the affidavit that the Claimant is a member of the Association of Metal Products, Iron and Steel Employers of Nigeria (AMPISEN) while its employees are members of Metal Products Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (MPROSSAN) or Steel and Engineering Workers' Union of Nigeria (SEWUN). The employment relationship between the Claimant and its staff is governed by the various Collective Agreement reached between AMPISEN and the Defendants (1) Metal Products Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (MPROSSAN) and (2) Steel And Engineering Workers' Union of Nigeria (SEWUN) representing their members some of whom are the Claimant's employees. Among the Collective Agreements is the one dated the 3rd day of July, 2008 relating to calculation and payment of gratuity particularly Clause 3 thereof which is incorporated into Clause 26 of the Claimant's condition of service contained in its Employee's Handbook. The 2008 collective agreement abrogated the retroactive method of calculating gratuity entitlement effective from the 3rd day of July, 2008 and it equally provides the basis and method of calculation of gratuity entitlements of the members of the Defendants. However, there have been controversies in the interpretation of the various clauses of the agreement, particularly Clause 3 thereof. There has also been exchange of correspondences on the issue but without reaching any agreement. The Claimant's employees had previously gone on strike on account of the dispute and may embark on another before to the hearing and determination of this matter. The understanding of the Claimant is that its employees of less than 5 years of service are not entitled to payment of gratuity let alone retroactively or cumulatively. Thus, the interpretation of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July, 2008 by this court will resolve the controversies. In the written address filed in support of the Originating summons, the Claimant’s counsel, Mr. Oluleye Sokale Esq. enjoined the court to interpret the Collective Agreement – Exhibit AB 1 embodied, incorporated and adopted in the Claimant's Internal Condition of Service as contained in the Employee's Handbook at Clause 26 thereof particularly as to the liability of the Claimant if any to its employees of less than 5 years of service in terms of gratuity. Counsel raised a sole issue for determination to wit “Whether Claimant's employees whose years of service are below 5 years are entitled to payment of gratuity in whatever term and/or manner for the said period.” In arguing the sole issue, learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that the relevant clauses of the Collective Agreement for the purpose of this submission are Clauses 2 and 3 which counsel reproduced thus: Clause 2: "That the current retroactive method of calculating gratuity entitlement will cease from the date of this agreement". Clause 3: "Consequently, gratuity in the industry will be annualized (paid annually) as follows: (i) 5 < 10 years - 4 weeks for each completed year of service (ii) 10 <15 years - 6 -do- (iii) 15 <25 years - 7 -do- (iv) 25 < 30 years - 8 -do- (v) 30 years and above- 9 -do- The existing condition as contained in the subsisting Collective Agreement in total emolument will continue". In interpreting the above, counsel submitted that it is the clear and unambiguous words according to their ordinary, natural and grammatical meanings that must be given without additions or removal therefrom. According to counsel, it is to be noted that no provision is made for less than 5 years of service. Also, the Collective Agreement (Exhibit AB 1) annulled cumulative calculation and payment with annual calculation and payment institutionalized as per Clause 3. In addition, counsel submitted that cumulative payment is equally annulled as per the provision of Clause 4 of the Collective Agreement which provides thus: "The accrued gratuity liability will be paid within 6 months. Such entitlement shall be paid to the individual employee account". The total effect of the above according to counsel, is that no gratuity accrues to employees of less than 5 years of service let alone any payable. To counsel, the Claimant has adopted and incorporated Clause 3 of the said Collective Agreement in its condition of service contained in its Employee's handbook in Clause 26. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimant is not liable to payment of gratuity to its employees of less than 5 years of service retroactively and for the said years. He urged the court to apply the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius and/or expressio unius personae est exclusio alterius to the effect that with the specification of the category of persons or things - (particularly the specified service years) in the Collective Agreement an intention to exclude all others below the starting point is inferrable. He urged the Court to resolve the sole issue in favour of the Claimant and hold that the Collective Agreement does not provide for gratuity in terms of calculation and/or payment in favour of the Claimant's employees of less than 5 years of service. The 1st and 2nd Defendants filed a counter affidavit of 24 paragraphs in defence of the suit. The counter affidavit was deposed by Comrade Peter Ogiri Ameh who is the Head of Department, Administration of SEWUN (2nd Defendant). The deponent stated that SEWUN and MEPROSSAN (1st Defendant) are both registered Trade Unions affiliated to the Nigeria Labour Union. The Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 was made between Association of Metal Products, Iron & Steel Employers' of Nigeria (AMPISEN); Iron & Steel Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ISSAN); Metal Products Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (MEPROSSAN) and Steel and Engineering Workers Union of Nigeria (SEWUN). This agreement emanated from the review of an earlier Collective Agreement dated 28th January 1981 between the same parties concerning "End of Service benefits" of employees within the industry represented by the Unions. AMPISEN, the union to which the Claimant belonged, has over 50 members and they are guided and bound by these Collective Agreements entered into for and on their behalf with the respective Unions within the Industry. None of the members of AMPISEN, including the Claimant, is privy to the said Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 and therefore not capable of individually enforcing the content of the Collective Agreement. AMPISEN is not joined in this Suit as a Claimant but as the 3rd Defendant. Consequently, AMPISEN is not capable of enforcing the Collective Agreement in this suit. The Collective Agreement of 28th January 1981 was entered into between the AMPISEN and the Metal Product Workers Union of Nigeria which later metamorphosed into SEWUN. It became necessary to review the 1981 agreement upon the passage of the Pension Reform Act 2004 which subsumed "End of Service" Entitlements/Gratuity payments. Employers within the industry represented by AMPISEN and the Defendants met with the aim of harmonizing all accumulated gratuity payments and they agreed on annualized gratuity payment rather than at the end of the employee's service. The Collective Agreement of 28th January 1981 sets out the intentions and purport of the said Collective Agreement. The Collective Agreement of 1981 indicates the eligible period for employees to qualify for End of Service benefit as 5 years in service by which time the employee becomes entitled to be paid 3 weeks’ pay for each completed year of service. Contrary to the depositions in the Claimant’s affidavit in support of the amended Originating Summons, Clause 2 of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 abrogated retroactive method of calculating gratuity entitlement or payment of accumulated entitlement at the "End of Service" hence the content of Clause 3 which states that gratuity in the industry will be annualized (Paid annually). It was agreed in the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 to annualize payment of gratuity rather than at the "End of Service". The provisions of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 are incorporated into the Conditions of Service of the Claimant's employees as shown in Clause 26 of its Employee's Handbook. The Claimant and other members of AMPISEN have been implementing the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 in line with the intendment in the earlier Collective Agreement of 28th January 1981 by paying their employees on attainment of 5 years in service, which is the eligible point, 4 weeks wages for each completed year of service without any complaint until recently when the Claimant refused to pay the annualised gratuity as per the said Collective Agreements. The Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 was signed by AMPISEN, ISSAN, MPROSSAN and SEWUN in Representative capacities. The Claimant sued only MEPROSAN, SEWUN and AMPISEN. AMPISEN has a responsibility to ensure that its members comply with the various agreements with the Unions including the Collective Agreement which is the subject of interpretation in this suit. In the written address filed in support of the counter affidavit, counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants, Mr. Kolade Akinyele Esq. formulated 2 issues for determination as follows; (i) Whether by the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008, the employees of the Claimant who have been in service of the Claimant for 5 years are entitled to payment of gratuity in line with the purport and intent of the said Collective Agreement. (ii) Whether the Claimant has the legal capacity to institute this action in its present form In resolving issue 1, learned counsel pointed out that by this action, the court is invited to interpret the Collective Agreement dated 3rd July 2008 between the Association of Metal Products, Iron & Steel Employers of Nigeria (AMPISEN), of which the Claimant is a member; and Iron & Steel Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ISSAN); Metal Products Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (MEPROSSAN) and Steel and Engineering Workers Union of Nigeria (SENUN). According to counsel, the Claimant hinged their position and reliefs sought on the basis that the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 does not make any provision for payment of annualized gratuity to their employees who have worked for up to 5 years, and that the annualized gratuity is only payable to employees who have worked for 5 years and above. In other words the first 5 years of service of an employee is discountenanced by the Claimant before annualizing the employees' gratuity. This position of the Claimant, according to counsel, is misconceived. According to counsel rather, the clear intent and purport of the Collective Agreement is that annualized gratuity is paid to employees upon attainment of 5 years in service, which is the eligible period of service. Thus it is only employees who have worked for up to 5 years that are entitled to gratuity and any employee who has not worked for up to 5 years is not entitled to gratuity if he leaves the employment before attaining 5 years. Counsel, tracing the historical background of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 submitted that it only came to existence as a result of the review of an earlier Collective Agreement, particularly one dated 28th January 1981 (Exhibit PA1). It is counsel’s view that a close look at the Collective Agreement of 28th January 1981 would reveal its intent and purport and the issue it set out to address, which according to counsel, is the issue of End of Service Benefits of employees within the industry, represented by the Defendants herein. The National Industrial Court in LASISI GBADEGESIN vs. WEMA BANK PLC [2012] 28 NWLR (Pt. 80) Pg. 274 @ P. 303 Paras C-E defined Collective Agreement as follows: Section 48 of the Trade Dispute Act CAP T8 LFN 2004 defines Collective Agreement to mean - Any Agreement in writing for the settlement of disputes and relating to terms of employment and physical conditions of work concluded between - An employer, a group of employers or one or more Organizations representative of employers on the one hand; and One or more Trade Unions or Organizations representing workers or duly appointed representative of any body of workers on the other hand. To counsel therefore, the Collective Agreements of 28th January 1981 and that of 3rd July 2008 which is the subject matter of this Originating Summons were fashioned out to settle a particular dispute namely; "End of Service" benefits of employees within the Industry. The Defendants have deposed to the fact that the Collective Agreement of 28thJanuary 1981 was signed between Association of Metal Products, Iron & Steel Employers' of Nigeria (AMPISEN) and Metal Product Workers Union of Nigeria which was one of the Unions that were merged with a number of other Union in 1996 by the Federal Military Government to form Steel and Engineering Workers Union of Nigeria (SEWUN) thus SEWUN taking over all responsibilities and liabilities of Metal Product Workers Union of Nigeria. Counsel pointed out that the Appendix at Page 5 of the said Collective Agreement of 28th January 1981 is similar to the provisions of Clause 3 contained in the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 aside from the entitlement which was upgraded from "3 weeks pay for each completed year of Service" contained in the Collective Agreement of 1981 to "4 weeks for each completed year of Service" in the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008. A further perusal of the Appendix at Page 5 of the said Collective Agreement of 28th January 1981 shows an illustration of how the Agreement and entitlement is meant to be implemented and same is set out and reproduced as follows: N.B. In the Implementation of this Agreement the following guide lines will apply;- (1) Any employee who has not served 5 completed years will not benefit from the scheme; (2) For an employee who has served over 5 years, the benefit for any uncompleted year will be worked on pro-rata basis for the number of completed months. EXAMPLE An employee leaves after 6 years and 4 months service; he takes 3 weeks for each of the 6 years and 4/12 of 3 weeks for the extra 4 months served. This illustration according to counsel, clearly shows the intendment of the parties of how the Agreement was to be implemented. To counsel, this shows that it was the intention of the parties to the said Collective Agreement that Five (5) years’ service is the eligible period for an employee to be entitled to "End of Service" benefits at which stage they become entitled to gratuity pay calculated from the date of commencement of their employment. Given that the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 emanated from the review of the 1981 Collective Agreement and a continuum from the Collective Agreement of 1981, Counsel submitted that it accords with logic that the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 is also intended to be implemented in the same manner as the Collective Agreement of 28th January 1981. Counsel further referred the court to the Supreme Court in ELELU-HABEEB vs. AG FEDERATION [2013] 32 NLLR PART 93 at 332 at 460 Per ADEKEYE JSC where it was held that: "The Schedule to a Statute or a Constitution can be a useful handmaid in construing the provisions of a Statute. By virtue of Section 18 (1) of the Interpretation Act, it has the force of Law and it therefore operates side by side or alongside the Constitution………" It is counsel’s submission that the Appendix of the Collective Agreement of 28th January 1981 is for all intent and purposes a schedule to the said Agreement and just as with the Constitution or any other document, it forms an integral part of the Agreement and a useful tool in construing the true intendment and purpose of the Agreement. Furthermore, counsel submitted that the Court has a duty when interpreting the provisions of a Statute or document to read and construe the entire document as a whole. In ELELU-HABEEB vs. AG FEDERATION (SUPRA), the Apex Court Per ADEKEYE JSC had this to say on the Principle of Whole Statute Construction: "The duty of the Court when interpreting a provision of the Constitution is to read and construe together all provisions of the Constitution unless there is a very clear reason that a particular provision of the Constitution should not be read together. It is germane to bear in mind the objective of the Constitution in enacting the provisions contained there-in. A Section must be read against the background of other Sections of the Constitution to achieve a harmonious whole. The Principle of whole statute construction is important and indispensable in the construction of the Constitution so as to give effect to it." Similarly in NURTW & ANOR vs. RTEAN & ORS [2012] 29 NLLR (Pt. 83) at Pg.161 the Supreme Court had this to say on the duty of Courts to give a holistic interpretation to a Statute: "It is basic that one of the vital cannons of Interpretation of Statute is that a Court of Record should be minded to make broad interpretation or what is sometimes referred to as giving same a liberal approach - Rabiu v The State (1980) 8-11 SC 130 at 151, 195; (1981) 2 NCLR 293. A Court should give a holistic interpretation to a Statute as required by Law. Mobil Oil Nig Plc v LAL 36 Inc (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 659) 146. A Court should aim at giving a Statute purposeful interpretation." Flowing from above, counsel urged the Court to employ a holistic approach and the Principle of Whole Statute construction in the interpretation of the said Collective Agreement in this matter as it could not be the intendment of the Collective Agreement to deprive employees who have been in the service of their employers for 5 years of entitlement to gratuity pay but rather the t the 5 years is the qualifying period. Counsel submitted that the intention is to offload the payment of gratuity on attainment of the eligible period of 5 years by paying all accrued entitlements and thereafter pay the employee's gratuity annually as per the Collective Agreement. Counsel argued that this Honourable Court ought to look at the intendment of the parties in construing the Collective Agreement. He cited the Court of Appeal case of OLOMOWEWE H. BOLAJI & ANOR. v. HON (MRS) ADEFUNMILAYO TEJUOSHO & ORS. 2015 LEGALPEDIA CA OYPU PER A. O. OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, J.C.A where it was held as follows: "In Nika Fishing Co. Ltd v Lavina Corporation [2008] 16 NWLR (Pt. 114) 509, Tobi JSC held to the effect that when construing documents in dispute between the two parties, the proper course is to discover the intention or contemplation of parties and not import into the contract ideas not patent on the face of the document. In Union Bank v Nwaokolo [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 127, IGUH JSC stated thus: "It is trite that in the construction of document, the cardinal principle is that the parties are presumed to intend what they have in fact said I or written down. Accordingly the words employed by them will be so construed and should be given their ordinary and plain meaning unless of course, circumstances, such as trade usage or the like, dictate that a particular construction ought to be applied in order to give effect to the particular intention envisaged by the parties." Further, counsel submitted that the abrogation of retroactive method of calculating gratuity entitlement as stated in Clause 2 of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 which is being relied upon by the Claimant refers to calculation of accumulated entitlement to be paid at the End of Service of the employee hence the content of Clause 3 which states that "Consequently gratuity in the industry will be annualized (Paid annually) as follows…..” And went on to state at the last Paragraph of Clause 3 that: "The existing condition as contained in the subsisting Collective Agreement on total emolument will continue." Moreover, Clause 4 of the said Collective Agreement clearly stated that “The accrued gratuity liability will be paid within 6 months. Such entitlement shall be paid to the Individual employee account.” Counsel submitted that this refers to the gratuity accrued in the first 5 years of an employees' service which is required to be paid within 6 months on attainment of 5 years in service. It is counsel’s submission that the purport of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 was to off load and put an end to the burden on the employers to pay accumulated gratuity to their employees at the end of their service, thus annualizing their gratuity pay to be payable upon attainment of 5 years in service. Counsel also submitted that it was evident from the content of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 that it is mainly intended to annualize gratuity payments rather than at the end of service and it was not intended to deprive employees attaining 5 years’ service their gratuity entitlement. Counsel pointed out that all members of AMPISEN including the Claimant have been complying and implementing the Collective Agreement in the manner of payment of 4 weeks wages for each completed year of service to their employees on attainment of 5 years in service until recently when the Claimant unilaterally raised objection to the manner of payment and sought interpretation of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 1981. A Communique dated 3rd April 2017 (Exhibit PA3) signed between Alufoils Nigeria Ltd a subsidiary of Tower Aluminium Nig. Plc one of the member Companies of AMPISEN and the 1st and 2nd Defendants herein clearly vindicates the position of counsel on this point. Counsel pointed out some details contained in page 3 of the communique relating to payment of gratuity to various staff who were rendered redundant, which were made in line with the collective agreement of 3rd July 2008 and urged the court to take note of the specific details as illustrated therein, which according to counsel, shows that the intendment of the collective agreement as implemented by other member Companies of AMPISEN, is that an employee, upon attainment of 5 years completed service which is the eligible period, is paid his full gratuity up to that 5 years; and thereafter, is paid annually as clearly indicated in the gratuity payment made to employees Nos 1 to 7 on the List of Exhibit PA3. The Claimant is bound by the said Collective Agreement, as same by its own admission is included in the Conditions of Service of its employees contained at Clause 26 of its Employees' Handbook (Exhibit AB12 in the Claimant’s Affidavit in support). On this point, counsel cited the Court of Appeal decision in UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC vs. EMMANUEL ADEREWAJU SOARES [2012] 29 NLLR (Pt. 84) at Pg. 329 which held thus: A Collective Agreement standing alone is not binding on an individual employee and the employer unless such a Collective Agreement is incorporated into the Contract of Service or adopted as part of the Contract or Condition of Service [ACB v. Nwodika (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) at 470 Union Bank of Nigeria v. Edet (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 288 Shuaibu v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt 388) 173. Also in UNITY BANK PLC vs. SOLOMON OWIE [2012] 29 NWLR (Pt. 82) at Pg. 3; the Court of Appeal stated as follows; The basic requirement under established Case Law is that there must be a legal nexus between the Conditions of Service and the terms of a Collective Agreement. This legal nexus is the incorporation of the relevant terms of the Collective Agreement into the Conditions of Service. Counsel submitted that the Claimant having incorporated the Collective Agreement into its employees' Conditions of Service is bound by same. Counsel urged the court to resolve the issue in favour of the 1st and 2nd Defendants. On Issue 2, learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants submitted that the Claimant lacks the legal capacity to institute this Suit in the form and manner it has. It is not in dispute that the Claimant is a member of AMPISEN which is the employer's Association. However, the Claimant is not a party to the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 or any of the Collective Agreements at all. The Collective Agreements were entered into and signed by AMPISEN on behalf of, and for the benefit of its members, of which the Claimant is one; but the Claimant is not privy to the Collective Agreement, and therefore lacks the legal capacity to enforce and/or seek interpretation of the Collective Agreement with a view to enforcing same. Counsel referred the court to the decision of the Court of Appeal in ACB vs. NWODIKA [1996] 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) @ 470 at Page 483 Para A-F: "It is trite Law that only the parties to a contract can sue on the contract. Strangers to a contract can neither sue nor be sued on the contract. Even where a contract is entered by two parties for the benefit of a third party, the third party cannot himself enforce it. It is the person with whom the contract is made who is entitled to enforce the contract. It is immaterial that the contract purports to give the third party the right to sue or make him liable upon it. [Negbenebor v. Negbenebor (1971) 1 All NLR 210; Ikpeazu v. ACB (1965) 1 NMLR 324 at 329 referred to and applied]" See also UNION BANK OF NIGERIA vs. EDET [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) @ 288. In BASINCO vs. WOERMANN [2009] VOL. 6 MJSC (Pt. 1) @ 66, the Supreme Court Per Adekeye JSC held as follows: "As a general Rule, a contract affects the parties thereto and cannot be enforced by or against a person who is not a party to it. In short only parties to a contract can sue or be sued on the contract and a stranger to a contract can neither sue or be sued on the contract even if the contract is made for his benefit and purports to give him the right to sue or make him liable upon it. Moreover the fact that a person who is a stranger to the consideration of a contract stands in such near relationship to the party from whom the consideration proceeds that he may be considered a party to the consideration does not entitle him to sue or sued upon the contract. See Ikpeazu v. ACB (1965) 1 NMLR 324 at 329; K.S.O Allied Products Ltd v. Kofo Trading Co. Ltd (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.436) Pg 244; Alfortrin Ltd v. A.Y. (1996) 9 NWLR 475 pg 634; Negbenebor v. Negbenebor (1971) 1 All NLR 210" The Claimant not being a party to the said Collective Agreements is therefore not capable of instituting this action to seek interpretation and implementation of same with a view to enforcing the Collective Agreement. Counsel submitted that the proper party to institute this action is AMPISEN who has been joined not as a Claimant, but as the 3rd Defendant in this Suit. The Claimant having instituted this suit without the capacity to do so therefore robs this court of jurisdiction to entertain same. Counsel contended that the suit is instituted against only three of the four parties who entered into and signed the Collective Agreement. The Collective Agreement was signed between four parties namely: (1) Association of Metal Products, Iron & Steel Employers' of Nigeria (AMPISEN) (of which the Claimant is a member); (2) Iron & Steel Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ISSAN); (3) Metal Products Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (MPROSSAN) and (4) Steel and Engineering Workers Union of Nigeria (SEWUN). The Claimant instituted this Suit against only three of the parties to the Collective Agreement namely MEPROSSAN, SEWUN and AMPISEN. The failure of the Claimant to include Iron & Steel Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ISSAN) in the suit implies that all the necessary and proper parties are not before the Court. According to counsel, the proper party to institute this action is AMPISEN who also represents over 50 other employees within the Industry. The action of the Claimant in instituting this suit solely is could result in multiplicity of action which could result in abuse of the Court Process. Citing the case of SARAKI vs. KOTOYE (1992) 9 NWLR (1966) 2 SCNLR 35, counsel submitted that the proper party to institute this action is AMPISEN rather than the individual members of AMPISEN. Citing the case of FEDERAL MINISTRY OF HEALTH vs. COMET [2009] VOL 4 MJSC (Pt. II) @ 42, counsel urged the court to consider and resolve all the issues raised in this Originating Summons and to hold in line with the submissions of the 1st and 2nd Defendants. The 3rd Defendant, AMPISEN, was joined in this suit by order of this court made on 3rd April 2016. It subsequently filed a process it titled “Response Affidavit” to the Claimant’s amended originating summons. The affidavit was deposed to by one Bologi Alli, a Legal Practitioner in the law firm representing the 3rd Defendant in this suit. It was averred that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants as well as ISSSAN entered into and executed a Collective Agreement dated 3rd July, 2008. The 3rd Defendant represented the employers in the iron and steel industry in Nigeria. The objective of the Collective Agreement was to resolve once and for all the problems of cumulative retroactive calculation of gratuity. In the light of the economic predicament in the Metal Industry and the fact that the cumulative retroactive gratuity scheme in the industry could no longer be sustained, it was proposed and finally agreed under the Collective Agreement of 2008 that the cumulative retroactive computation of gratuity benefit would cease to be operative in the industry with effect from 3rd July 2008, being the effective date of the Collective Agreement and that under the Collective Agreement of 2008, gratuity benefit will continue in the industry but those who are entitled and qualified will be paid at the end of each year. It was further averred that the understanding of the 3rd Defendant with regards to the letters and spirit of the 2008 Collective Agreement in its clauses 2 and 3 is that the retroactive method of calculating gratuity entitlement will cease from the date the agreement is signed and gratuity in the industry will be paid annually to qualified employees. The qualifying period for gratuity in the industry is 5years and no employee with less than 5 years of service is entitled to gratuity. The 3rd Defendant is a party and privy to the Collective Agreement of 3rd July, 2008 and is capable of enforcing same. None of the members of the 3rd Defendant has been implementing the Collective Agreement of 3rd July, 2008 by paying their employees 4 weeks wages for each completed year of service on attainment of 5 years of service. In the written address filed in support of the 3rd Defendant’s affidavit, counsel for the 3rd Defendant, Mr. Inam Wilson Esq., submitted a sole issue for the court’s determination, as follows: Whether upon a true and proper construction of Clauses 2 and 3 of the Collective Agreement dated 3rd July, 2008 only employees that have completed 5years of service are eligible to benefit from the Claimant's gratuity scheme and the gratuity of such eligible employees shall no longer be calculated cumulatively and retroactively for years 1-5 served but shall be calculated annually on the basis of ‘‘4weeks" base salary for year 5 only. In addition to the interpretation of Clause 3 of the collective agreement which the court is invited to do, counsel for the 3rd Defendant opines that the said Clause 3 can only be effectively interpreted if it is interpreted together with Clause 2. In determining the sole issue, counsel set out Clauses 2 and 3 as follows: clause 2- That the current retroactive method of calculating gratuity entitlement will cease from the date this agreement is signed. clause 3 - Consequently, gratuity in the industry will be annualized (i. e. Paid annually) as follows: (i) 5<10years - 4 weeks for each completed year of service (ii) 10<15years - 6 -do- (iii) 15<25year - 7 -do- (iv) 25<30year - 8 -do- (v) 30 years and above - 9 -do- Counsel urged the court to ascertain the intention of the parties conveyed in the above provisions by construing the said provisions based on the established rules of interpretation of contracts as follows: 1. The Court will not re-write or make a new contract for the parties It is now well established that the duty of the court is to respect the sanctity of the agreements reached by the parties. The court must not in the process of construction of the contract make a new contract for the parties or re-write the one they have made for themselves. See S. E. CO. LTD vs. N. B. C. I. (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt. 908) 478 (CA). 2. The written contract is the only document the court will look to determine the intention of the parties The law is that parties are bound by the terms of their written contract. Where there is any disagreement between the parties on any particular term of the contract the only reliable evidence and source of information for resolving the dispute is the written contract itself executed by the parties. See SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (NIG) LTD vs. EMEHURU (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1027) 347 (CA) 3. A document/contract should be construed as a whole In order to extract the true intention of parties to an agreement, the whole document should be read together. To pick a single clause or paragraph to the agreement and rely on it to interpret the intendment of the parties will no doubt likely result in injustice to one of the parties. See MORTGAGES PHB LTD. vs. SOVEREIGN TRUST INSURANCE CO. PLC (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1509) 465 (CA). To construe clauses 2 and 3(1) of the Collective Agreement 2008, Counsel urged the court to look at the preamble set out below to determine the background to the Agreement. PREAMBLE The Association and the Unions have been discussing the problems of gratuity as it is currently calculated. The continued existence of gratuity in its present form is being threatened... According to counsel, it is clear from the above that gratuity as it was calculated under the old regime that existed prior to the Collective Agreement 2008 was problematic and required to be changed, to remove the threat to the scheme. The question then that arises is what were the problems that bedevilled the scheme under the old regime? Counsel posited that the problems of the old regime can be gleaned from the explanatory note to Appendix 5 of the Agreement which states as follows: 5 years to under 10years service - 3weeks pay for each completed year of service In the implementation of this agreement, the following guidelines will apply:- (i) Any employee who has not served 5 completed years will not benefit from the scheme; (ii) For an employee who has served over 5 years, the benefit for any uncompleted year will be worked on a pro-rata basis for the number of completed months EXAMPLE: An employee leaves after 6years and 4months service takes 3weeks for each the 6years and 4 of 3weeks for the extra 4months served. The former regime, which applied the cumulative retroactive calculation of gratuity as shown in the example under Appendix 5 above, used the current salary of the employees at the time of separation to compute retroactively the gratuity for whatever number of years of service put in by the employees. This practice according to counsel, resulted in delays and sometimes default in payment of gratuity by the employers due to the huge pay out that would be due to the employees. In the light of the economic predicament in the Basic Metal Industry and the fact that the [cumulative retroactive] gratuity scheme in the industry could no longer be sustained, it was proposed and finally agreed under the Collective Agreement 2008 by the critical stakeholders i. e. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants as well as ISSSAN, that the cumulative retroactive computation of gratuity benefit would cease to be operative in the industry with effect from 3rd July 2008, being the effective date of the Collective Agreement. The preceding paragraphs provided the backdrop to the preamble of the Collective Agreement 2008 and it represents the problems of gratuity as it was formerly calculated. Clauses 2 and 3 of the Collective Agreement sought to correct these problems. Principle #4: Words in a document/contract should be construed in their ordinary meaning Where the provisions of a contract are clear or unambiguous, a court of law must give strength to the plain and bare words of the contract without any hesitation or quibble See JUKOK INTERNATIONAL LTD vs. DIAMOND BANK PLC (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1507) 55 (CA) A contract is to be construed in its ordinary meaning. When the language of a contract is not only plain but admits of one meaning, then that is the only meaning to be given to the contract. See LEWIS vs. UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 329 (CA). The implication is that effect should be given to the literal contents of the documents in their ordinary way as they appear on the document and anything that does not appear ex facie on the document should not be imported into it. Accordingly, the meaning to be placed on a contract is that which is the plain, clear and obvious result of the terms used. See MORTGAGES PHB LTD. vs. SOVEREIGN TRUST INSURANCE CO. PLC. (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1509) 465 (CA). Clause 2 of the Collective Agreement 2008 provides that “the current retroactive method of calculating gratuity entitlement will cease from the date this agreement is signed". A literal and ordinary construction of this clause will lead to only one conclusion. That is, the retroactive method of calculating gratuity entitlement practiced at the time will cease from the date the Collective Agreement 2008 is signed. It suffices to state that the practice supported by the example under Appendix 5 of the Collective Agreement 1981would cease and it would no longer be valid to calculate the gratuity of an employee by using the current salary of the employee at the time of separation to compute retroactively the gratuity for whatever number of years of service put in by the employee. Clause 3 provides that "consequently, gratuity in the industry will be annualized (i. e. Paid annually) as follows: ... 5<10years- 4 weeks for each completed year of service. Applying the literal and ordinary meaning to this provision, it is clear that the qualifying period for gratuity in the industry remains 5 years, and no employee with less than 5 years of service is entitled to gratuity. This position was explained in AMPISEN's letter to the Claimant dated 22nd September, 2015 (Exhibit "AB5"). The second limb of the clause is that gratuity will be paid every year. Meaning that "4 weeks for each completed year of service" means "4 weeks multiplied by 1 [year] and not by 5 [years]. This is because 5 years is the qualifying period/year..." Also, "each completed year of service is 1[year1." Principle #5: Extrinsic or external evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, or subtract from or contradict the terms of the written document/contract Where the parties have embodied the terms of their agreement in a written document, extrinsic or external evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, or subtract from or contradict the terms of the written document. In this context, there are two sets of agreements. The first set is the Share Purchase Agreement as amended by various Letter Agreements. The second set of agreements are the Separation Package Agreement and Collective Agreement. The effect of this principle is that the court cannot go outside the express provisions of these agreements to import terms that were not expressly agreed. Meaning that where the parties have signed an agreement, the subsequent correspondences between the parties cannot add to or vary the provisions of the contract unless agreed by the parties. LEWIS vs. UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC. (2016) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1508) 329 (CA). According to counsel, the 1st and 2nd Defendants cannot rely on the documents attached to the Counter Affidavit of Comrade Peter Ogiri Ameh on behalf of the 1st and 2nd Defendant on 7th June, 2017and marked Exhibits "PA1", "PA2" and "PA3" and they are not admissible to add to, vary, or subtract from or contradict the terms of the Collective Agreement 2008. Counsel submitted further that the following statements or submissions of the 1st and 2nd Defendants are extrinsic to the Collective Agreement 2008: that the member companies of the 3rd Defendant have been implementing the Collective Agreement dated 3rd July, 2008 in line with the principles of the Collective Agreement dated 28th January, 1981 by paying their employees on attainment of 5 years of service, 4 weeks wages for each completed year of service. This is inconsistent with the spirit and letter of clause 3 of the collective Agreement dated 3rd July, 2008. See paragraphs 19, 20 and 22 of the Counter Affidavit of 1st and 2nd Defendants and paragraph 4.23 - 4.25 of their Written Address. COURT’S DECISION The Claimant presented 3 questions for determination in the originating summons but in the written address of the claimant’s counsel, only 1 issue was formulated for determination in the case. The counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendant raised 2 issues while counsel for the 3rd Defendant raised 1 issue for determination. In view of the questions framed for determination in the originating summons, the facts deposed in the various affidavits of the parties and the submissions of counsel for the parties in the written addresses, two issues arise for determination in this case. They are: 1. Whether the Claimant has the locus standi to institute this action. 2. Whether the provision of clause 3 of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 covers payment of gratuity for the years of service completed by an employee before reaching 5 years in service. ISSUE 1: The case brought to this court by the Claimant in this instant suit is for the court to interpret clause 3 of a Collective Agreement made on 3rd July 2008 between the Association of Metal Products, Iron &Steel Employers' of Nigeria (AMPISEN), representing the employers in the iron and steel industry and Iron & Steel Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ISSAN); Metal Products Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (MPROSSAN) and Steel and Engineering Workers Union of Nigeria (SEWUN) representing workers in the iron and steel industry. The Collective Agreement is exhibit AB1 of the claimant’s affidavit. The 1st and 2nd Defendants have however contended in their counter affidavit that the Claimant lacks the locus standi to institute this action. It was averred in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the counter affidavit of the 1st and 2nd Defendants that although the Claimant is a member of AMPISEN, the 3rd Defendant in this suit, the Claimant is not privy to the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 and therefore it is not capable of enforcing the content of the Collective Agreement. It was also averred that the 3rd Defendant is joined in this suit as a Defendant not as a Claimant, therefore the 3rd Defendant is not capable of enforcing the Collective Agreement in this present suit. The Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants argued in the written address that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the case because the Claimant was not a party to the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 and thus not capable of instituting this action to seek interpretation and implementation with a view to enforcing the Collective Agreement. Before a Claimant can be said to have locus standi, there must be the connection between the subject matter of the suit and the Claimant’s interest in the subject matter touching him as a party. In order words, a party will have locus standi in a suit if there is sufficient interest shown in the subject matter of the suit or in the outcome of the suit or show that his interest therein is likely to be adversely affected or he suffered or stand to suffer injury either by the enforcement, or threatened exercise of some power, authority or right. See METILELU vs OLOWO-OPEJO (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 337) 418 at 429; EAST HORIZON GAS CO. LTD vs. EFIOK (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 605) 386 at 395; ADETONA vs. ZENITH INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 611) 1443 at 1465. It is not in dispute in this case that the Claimant is a member of AMPISEN who has been joined to this action as the 3rd Defendant. The said AMPISEN is an employers’ association and it was a party to the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 representing its members among which is the Claimant. In paragraphs 4 (c) and (d) of the Claimant’s affidavit in support of the amended originating summons, it was averred that the employment relationship between the Claimant and its staff is guided and governed by the Collective Agreement reached on its behalf by AMPISEN and that the Collective Agreement has been incorporated into clause 26 of the condition of service of the Claimant contained in the Employee's Handbook annexed as AB12. On the part of the 1st and 2nd Defendant, the facts were deposed in paragraphs 7, 12 and 18 of their counter affidavit that members of AMPISEN, including the Claimant, are guided and bound by the Collective Agreements entered into for and on their behalf. It was also averred that the employers within the Industry represented by AMPISEN had the responsibility to pay the agreed gratuity and the Claimant has incorporated the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 into its Conditions of Service as shown in Clause 26 of its Employee's Handbook. From these averments, it is clear that the collective agreement was made by AMPISEN on behalf of employers in the industry among who is the Claimant. The agreement as to payment of gratuity is to be implemented by the employers and amount of gratuity agreed in the agreement is to be paid by the employers. Also, any issue arising from the collective agreement as to payment of gratuity, as in the instant case, is squarely on the shoulders of the employers. The Claimant had gone further to incorporate part of the collective agreement in its condition of service. Similarly, Exhibits AB2 and AB3 are letters written by the 2nd Defendant and 1st Defendant respectively to the Claimant demanding the Claimant to comply with the terms of the Collective Agreement by paying the agreed gratuity to their members in the Claimant’s employment. Although the 1st and 2nd Defendants contend in this case that the Claimant cannot institute the instant action on the basis of the collective agreement because it was not a party to the agreement, the same Defendants had sought the Claimant, in these letters, to comply with the terms of the same agreement to which it was allegedly not a party. The 1st and 2nd Defendants appear to be blowing hot and cold at the same time. In any case, it is clear to me that the Claimant has interest in the Collective Agreement and it is affected by the terms of the Collective Agreement. Therefore, the Claimant is entitled to bring an action in court in respect of any issue arising from the Collective Agreement. The affidavit of the parties and the documents exhibited by them shows that there is a dispute as to implementation of a clause of the collective agreement on payment of gratuity to the employees of the Claimant. The Claimant, as an employer affected by the agreement, has the constitutional right in Section 6 (6)b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 to approach the courts for interpretation of the clause of the agreement. I hold that the Claimant has the locus standi to institute this suit. The 1st and 2nd Defendant also made the point that not all the parties to the collective agreement are parties to the suit. According to them in paragraph 21 of their counter affidavit, Iron & Steel Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ISSAN) is not made a party to this suit. Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants submitted that the failure of the Claimant to include ISSAN in this suit is an indication that all the necessary and proper parties are not before this Honourable Court. Although ISSAN was a party to the collective agreement, it is not made a party to this suit. Notwithstanding, I do not think its absence from the case affects the determination of the issues submitted for adjudication in the suit. See DAAR COMMUNICATIONS (NIG.) LTD. vs. WASA DELMA NIG. LTD. (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1287) 370; AKUNWATA OGBOGU MBANEFO vs. NWAKIBIE HENRY MOLOKU (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt.1403) 377 at 410. The case is merely to interpret clause 3 of the collective agreement. This can be done without the presence of ISSAN. Therefore, non joinder of ISSAN to this action is of no moment and does not render the suit incompetent. In the result of issue 1, I hereby resolve it against the 1st and 2nd Defendants. The issues of jurisdiction raised by them are dismissed. ISSUE 2: The bone of contention in this suit is Clause 3 of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008. The clause provides as follows: “Consequently, gratuity in the industry will be annualized (paid annually) as follows: (i) 5 < 10 years - 4 weeks for each completed year of service (ii) 10 <15 years - 6 -do- (iii) 15 <25 years - 7 -do- (iv) 25 < 30 years - 8 -do- (v) 30 years and above- 9 -do- The existing condition as contained in the subsisting Collective Agreement in total emolument will continue.” The above content of clause 3 in the collective agreement are, in my view, clear and unambiguous. It is trite that where the words of any statute or document are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary meaning unless this would lead to absurdity. See OKOYE vs. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 799) 1101; SHETTIMA vs. GONI LER (2011) SC 332/2011; WILLIAMS vs. WILLIAMS (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 782) 1596. Accordingly, upon the construction of the clear words of the clause, the following are its connotations: 1. An employee becomes entitled to be paid gratuity on reaching 5 years in the employment. 2. For the employee who has served up to the qualifying years, the employee is entitled to gratuity at the prescribed weeks pay for each completed year of service. 3. The amount of the prescribed weeks’ pay payable as gratuity to the category of qualified employees will be paid on yearly basis. It is clear to me from reading the affidavits of the parties in this case and the arguments of counsels for the respective parties in the written addresses that the dispute is this case is with regards to the construction of the words “each completed year of service” in clause 3 of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008. According to the Claimant and the 3rd Defendant, employees of less than 5 years of service are not entitled to payment of gratuity whether retroactively or cumulatively. In order words, the annual gratuity is payable only to employees who have worked up to 5 years and above and it is from the qualified years of service that payment of the annual gratuity commences. Simply put, the Claimant and 3rd Defendants are saying that the years of service of the employee before reaching 5 years of service is discountenanced when annualizing the employees' gratuity. The 1st and 2nd Defendants on the other hand contended that employees are entitled to gratuity after 5 years’ of service calculated from the date of commencement of their employment. According to the 1st and 2nd Defendants, gratuity for the preceding years of service before reaching 5 years is not forfeited but payable to the employee upon attaining 5 years of service and thereafter, gratuity for the succeeding years is annualised. From the arguments of the parties, while the 1st and 2nd Defendant are of the view that clause 3 of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 means that gratuity to qualified employees is calculated and paid for each year of service commencing from the time of the employment, the Claimant and 3rd Defendant hold the view that the intendment of clause 3 is that payment of annual gratuity commences from 5 years of service and the previous years of services are forfeited. The words “each completed year of service”, in my view, means each year of service since the employment. There is no indication in the clause that the words mean years of service after 5 years of the employment as the Claimant and 3rd Defendant want it to appear. That will be a wrong interpretation and it will not accord with the intention of the parties in the agreement. In a plain understanding of the clause, gratuity is payable to employee who has served for up to 5 years and such qualified employees are entitled to be paid gratuity for each year of completed service. Completed year of service means year of service from the commencement of the employment. The Claimant and the 3rd Defendant further contended that clause 2 of the collective agreement of 3rd day of July, 2008 abrogated retroactive and cumulative method of calculating or payment of gratuity, as such, employees are not entitled to be paid gratuity for the period when they were less than 5 years in the employment. The said clause 2 of the collective agreement provides as follows: “That the current retroactive method of calculating gratuity entitlement will cease from the date this agreement is signed” The affidavits of the 1st and 2nd Defendants and that of the 3rd Defendant have explained the circumstances resulting to the inclusion of clause 2 in the 2008 agreement. These circumstances must be examined to determine the veracity of the contention of the Claimant and the 3rd Defendant. The 1st and 2nd Defendants made the following averments in paragraphs 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of their counter affidavit: 6. That further to Paragraph 4 (c) of the Affidavit in Support of the Complainant/Claimant's Amended Originating Summons deposed to on 7th April 2017, the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 between Association of Metal Products, Iron & Steel Employers' of Nigeria (AMPISEN) (of which the Complainant/Claimant is a member) and Iron & Steel Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ISSAN); Metal Products Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (MEPROSSAN) and Steel and Engineering Workers Union of Nigeria (SEWUN) emanated from the review of an earlier Collective Agreement dated 28th January 1981 between the same parties touching and concerning the issue of "End of Service benefits" of employees within the industry represented by the above stated Unions. Here with attached is a copy of the said Collective Agreement dated 28th January 1981marked exhibit PA1. 11. That the review of the said Collective Agreement of 28th January 1981 became necessary following the merger of Public Sector and Private Sector End of Service benefit entitlements into Pension Scheme which gave rise to the passing Into Law of the Pension Reform Act 2004 now the Pension Reform Act 2014. 12. That the passing into Law of the Pension Reform Act 2004 (now Pension Reform Act 2014) effectively subsumed "End of Service" Entitlements/Gratuity payments and Employers within the Industry represented by AMPISEN and the Defendants/Respondents herein met with the aim and objective of harmonizing all accumulated gratuity payments and agreed on annualized gratuity payment rather than at the end of the employee's service. 13. That it was the review of the Collective Agreement dated 28th January 1981 which is on the same subject matter of "End of Service" benefit that culminated in the signing of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 which is the subject matter of interpretation in this Amended Originating Summons. 14. That the Collective Agreement of 28th January 1981 sets out the intentions and purport of the said Collective Agreement as evinced in the entire document. 15. That the said Collective Agreement of 28th January 1981 with particular reference to the Appendix at Page 5 and example contained therein indicates the eligible period for employees to qualify for End of Service benefit as 5 years in service by which time the employee becomes entitled to be paid 3 weeks’ pay for each completed year of service and so on by that Collective Agreement. 16. That contrary to Paragraph 4 (e) of the Affidavit in Support of the Complainant/Claimant's Amended Originating Summons deposed to on 7th April 2017, the abrogation of retroactive method of calculating gratuity entitlement as stated in Clause 2 of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 refers to calculation of accumulated entitlement to be paid at the "End of Service" hence the content of Clause 3 which states that "Consequently gratuity in the industry will be annualized (Paid annually)”. The 3rd Defendant, in paragraphs 5.3 to 5.5 of its affidavit stated as follows: 5.3. The objective of the Collective Agreement was to resolve once and for all and in sustainable manner the problems of gratuity as it was calculated at the material time under the former regime i.e. the cumulative retroactive calculation of gratuity. 5.4. The former [cumulative retroactive gratuity benefit] regime for calculation of gratuity used the current salary of the employees at the time of separation to compute retroactively the gratuity for whatever number of years of service put in by the employees. This resulted in delays and sometimes defaults in payment of gratuity by the employers due to the huge payout that would be due to the employees. 5.5. In the light of the economic predicament in the Basic Metal Industry and the fact that the [cumulative retroactive] gratuity scheme in the industry could no longer be sustained, it was proposed and finally agreed under the Collective Agreement 2008 by the critical stakeholders i.e. 1st, 2ndand 3rdDefendants as well as ISSSAN, that the cumulative retroactive computation of gratuity benefit would cease to be operative in the industry with effect from 3rd July 2008, being the effective date of the Collective Agreement. From the above contents of the affidavits of the 1st and 2nd Defendants and that of the 3rd Defendant, it has been shown that the collective agreement of 2008 was meant to improve on some of the policies on payment of gratuity operating in the earlier collective agreement of 1981. Particularly, the 1981 agreement provided for payment of gratuity at the end of service. The gratuity of a retiring employee was calculated at the end of service retroactively from the date of employment and paid cumulatively to the employee. It was this retroactive and cumulative method of computing and payment of gratuity at the end of service under the 1981 collective agreement that was stopped in the 2008 collective agreement vide clause 2 therefore which state that “the current retroactive method of calculating gratuity entitlement will cease from the date this agreement”. Upon putting an end to retroactive calculation and payment of gratuity at the end of service, clause 3 of the 2008 agreement introduced the new policy to the effect that gratuity will be paid annually. In my view, the retroactive or cumulative payment of gratuity which was stopped in clause 2 of the 2008 collective agreement is the old practice in the 1981 collective agreement of payment of gratuity at the end of service. Gratuity payable for preceding years of service before reaching 5 years of service is not what is envisaged in clause 2 of the 2008 collective agreement to be retroactive. It is also clear to me that the intendment in clause 3 of the Collective Agreement of 3rd July 2008 was to make payment of gratuity an annual exercise rather than at the end of service. Since under the 1981 collective agreement gratuity is paid for all the years of completed service upon end of service, the clear intention in the 2008 collective agreement was not to do away with the preceding 5 years of service. Clause 3 only stipulated 5 years of service and above as the qualifying period when gratuity become payable. The clause did not mean that the gratuity for the previous years of service before attaining 5 years in service is forfeited. Therefore, the clause was not intended to deprive employees who attained 5 years of service their gratuity entitlement for the previous years of service. In sum, clause 3 of the collective agreement of 3rd July 2008 is to the effect that an employee of the Claimant is entitled to be paid gratuity on reaching 5 years in the employment and the gratuity is payable, at the prescribed weeks pay, for each completed year of service from commencement of the employment. Let me add that an employee on attainment of 5 years completed service is to be paid his or her gratuity accruing up to the qualifying period and thereafter, his or her gratuity is paid annually. I resolve issue 2 against the Claimant. Consequently, I answer question 3 of the amended originating summons in the positive while questions 1 and 2 are answered in the negative. As for the reliefs sought by the Claimant, they fail in total. Accordingly, the reliefs sought are hereby dismissed. Parties shall bear their respective costs. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge