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JUDGMENT (Delivered by Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe) This is an appeal against the award made on 14th June 2016 by the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) sitting in Abuja, in the matter of trade dispute between the Food Beverages and Tobacco Senior Staff Association (Appellant herein) and Grand Cereals Nigeria Ltd and Spring Waters Nigeria Ltd (the Respondents), which dispute was referred to the IAP for arbitration by the Honourable Minister of Labour and Productivity in an instrument dated 29th February 2016. After hearing the parties in their respective memoranda and submissions of the counsels for the parties, the IAP made two distinct awards in the arbitration. They are as follows: 1. That the appellant is the appropriate and legal trade union registered to organise members of the Association in the employment of the Respondents. The Respondents were accordingly directed to accord unfettered and unconditional recognition to the Appellant in their employments. 2. That all the members of the Appellant whose employments were terminated or who were retired from the employment of the respondents be reinstated immediately without loss of seniority, salary and other emoluments due to them. The IAP went further to give the names of the affected staff to be the following: 1. Dung Bala Gwom 2. Cyprian Maren 3. Peter Pam Guang (Gyang) 4. Victor U. Anger 5. James Shehu 6. Mrs Motunrola A. Olaiya 7. Luka Gyang Yakubu 8. Sunday Egbunu 9. Pam Deme, and 10. Vincent Davon Pam Dissatisfied with part of the award made by the IAP, the Appellant, by a Notice of Objection to the Minister of Labour and Productivity dated 26th July 2016, objected to the award on the following grounds: i. When the IAP listed, in the award, the names of members of the Appellant who lost their employment with the Respondents, it left out some of the Appellant’s members in the employment of the Respondents whose names were mentioned in the list of affected members presented to the IAP. ii. The award listed members of the Appellant in the 1st Respondent to be reinstated but it left out the members of the Appellant affected in the 2nd Respondent’s employment. On 23rd October 2017, leave was granted to the Respondents to cross appeal from the award made by the IAP. Exhibited to the Respondents’ motion is a Notice of Objection addressed to the Minister of Labour and Productivity on 29th July 2016 and which was received on 1st August 2016. The grounds of the Respondents’ objection against the award of the IAP are: i. The award of the IAP is founded on technicalities and therefore, no court or arbitral body in Nigeria will enforce such illegal contract and agreement. ii. The issues submitted to the IAP by the 1st Party/Appellant are not justiciable or enforceable under the Nigerian Law as they are not subject of arbitration. iii. The award was made in violation of Nigeria public policy and liable to be set aside. From the objections to the award of the IAP, this appeal involves the main appeal of the Appellant and a cross appeal by the Respondents. In the Appellant’s/Respondent’s brief to the cross appeal, it is however contended by the Appellant that the Respondents do not have a competent cross appeal before this court. Before we proceed any further in this judgment, we are of the view that it is necessary to resolve the issue whether there is a cross appeal to be considered in this judgment. In the Appellant/Respondent’s brief to the cross appeal, the Appellant’s counsel, Mr. Femi Aborisade Esq., submitted that the Cross Appeal has not been commenced in accordance with prescribed process of law under both the 2007 and 2017 Rules of this court. According to learned counsel for the Appellant, Order 3 Rule 5 of the 2007 rules requires an appeal to be originated by a Complaint. The Respondent however did not file a Complaint to originate the cross appeal but filed only the Cross Appellants' brief of argument. Counsel submitted in addition that Order 50, Rule 1(1), NICN Rules, 2017 requires that an appeal be commenced by a Notice of Appeal. Since the Cross Appeal was filed on 9/5/2017, the Cross Appellants were expected to have filed a Notice of Appeal in compliance with the provisions of the 2017 Rules. Relying on Order 50, Rule 14(2), NICN Rules 2017, the counsel for the Appellant urged the Court to dismiss the Cross Appeal for the reason that there is no competent cross appeal. Responding to the objection of the Appellant, the Respondents/cross appellants’ counsel, Mr. Alex Akoja Esq., in the cross appellants’ reply brief submitted that Order 50, Rule 1(1) NIC Rule 5, 2017 is inapplicable to the cross appeal. Counsel also submitted that although Order 3 Rule 5 of the 2007 Rules of this court is no longer in effect as the rule has been repealed on the coming into effect of the 2017 rules, "Complaint" as used in the 2007 rules means the appeal or Notice of Objection to the Arbitral award. The Respondents/cross appellants’ counsel further submitted that the award and the Notice of Objection were made and filed respectively during the operation of the 2007 Rules of the NIC and as such, all that is expected of any party aggrieved by the award is to file a Notice of Objection to the Minister. Upon being served with the Notice of Award on the 26th July, 2016, the Cross Appellant caused a notice of objection to be served on the Hon. Minister for Labour and Productivity on the 29th July, 2016. The Cross Appellant also received the notice that the Honourable Minister had referred the matter to the National Industrial Court on the 15th of August, 2016. To determine the instant objection of the Appellant to the cross appeal, let us first recount how this appeal came before this court. In an instrument under the hand of the Honourable Minister of Labour and Productivity dated 15th August 2016, the Minister of Labour and Productivity referred the objection raised by the parties to the award of the IAP in the trade dispute between the parties to this court for adjudication. The term of reference to this court as stated in the instrument is: To inquire into the trade dispute between Food Beverages and Tobacco Senior Staff Association (FOBTOB) and Grand Cereals Nigeria Ltd and Spring Waters Nigeria Ltd over the following issues: (i) Refusal to allow unionization of the Senior Staff in the respondent companies. (ii) Termination/Pre-mature retirement of the senior staff of the appellant on account of union related activities. The reference by the Minister was conveyed to the Chief Registrar of this court in a letter dated 25th August 2016. Forwarded to this court along with the letter is a copy of the disputed award of the IAP. Section 14 (1) of the Trade Dispute Act 2004 provides that if notice of objection to the award of an arbitration tribunal is given to the Minister, the Minister shall forthwith refer the dispute to the National Industrial Court for adjudication. Under the TDA, the objection to the award of the IAP is analogous to a notice of appeal. Therefore, by this provision of the TDA, the objections to the award of the IAP and the referral to this court from the Hon. Minister have effectively originated this appeal. Although Order 3 Rule 5 of the NIC Rules 2007 requires a Claimant who complains against an award or decision by an arbitral tribunal, board of inquiry or decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions to file a Complaint, the process by which this appeal was commenced takes the appeal from the district of Order 3 Rule 5. The appeal came to this court pursuant to the provision of Section 14 (1) of the TDA. In addition, the cross appellants filed their notice of objection to the award of the IAP since on 29th July 2016 and were also granted leave by this court to maintain the cross appeal pursuant to that notice of objection. These steps effectively put up a cross appeal in this appeal. The cross appellants need not file a fresh notice of appeal or complaint as argued by the Appellant’s counsel. In the circumstance of the referral of this appeal to this court, all that the parties needed to file, after transmission of record from the IAP, is their respective briefs. This, the cross appellants have done. Since the appeal was not commenced directly by either party in this court, the submission of the Appellant’s counsel that there is no cross appeal because the cross appellant did not file a Complaint or Notice of Appeal, in our view, holds no water. We find that the cross appeal is competent. Therefore, the objection of the Appellant to the competence of the cross appeal has no merit and it is dismissed. We will now turn to consider the appeal and the cross appeal. In doing that, we will first examine the submissions of counsels to the parties in the respective and several briefs of arguments filed in this appeal. MAIN APPEAL: The Appellant’s brief of argument was filed on 14th December 2016. In the brief, the Appellant’s counsel formulated 2 issues for determination in the Appellant’s appeal. The issues are these: 1. Whether all members of the Appellant in the employment of the Respondents are eligible to enjoy the universal right to associate (or join the appellant) without employers' interference, authorization, threats, intimidation or coercion to the contrary, or Whether the IAP was right in excluding all ten (10) members of the Appellant in the 2nd Respondent and nine (9) other members of the Appellant in the 1st Respondent from being entitled to reinstatement having found that their employments were either prematurely retired or terminated on account of their trade union membership of the Appellant, just as those members of the senior staff enjoyed the Award of reinstatement. 2. If it is established that the right of association is universal and that the appellant is the union statutorily recognized to organize the senior staff in the employment of the respondents, whether the Appellant is entitled to the check-off dues of all its members in the employment of the Respondents with effect from the date the Appellant introduced its branch executive committee members to the Respondents. In his argument on issue one, the learned counsel for the Appellants, Mr. Femi Aborishade, submitted that although the IAP awarded that all the members of the appellant whose employments were prematurely retired and/or terminated on account of trade union activities be reinstated without loss of seniority in their positions, salary and other emoluments due to them, but in listing the affected members of the appellant, the IAP listed only 10 out of the 19 affected members of the Appellant in the 1st Respondent while all those affected in the 2nd Respondent, 10 in number, were not listed at all. Counsel submitted that since the IAP found that the employments of members of the Appellant in the Respondents were either prematurely retired or terminated on account of their trade union membership of the Appellant, it was then wrong to exclude some members of the Appellant terminated or retired on account of union activities from the award of reinstatement. Counsel submitted further that the right of association is universal and inherent in every person without distinction. The exclusion of some members of the Appellant, who were victims of retirement and termination from the remedy of reinstatement, is not only a breach of the right of association guaranteed in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and contrary to international standards of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), it is also discriminatory. Counsel cited section 40 of the 1999 Constitution, Section 12 (4) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act No. 17 of 2005, Articles 2 and 23 (4) of the ILO Convention No. 87, Article 10 (1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1986) to buttress the point that every worker has the right to join any trade union of his or her choice without discrimination or interference. Counsel submitted that in view of the provisions of these enactments, this court should enforce the fundamental right of every member of the appellant in the employment of the respondents who were prematurely retired or terminated on account of taking up membership of the Appellant and direct the respondents to reinstate the every affected member of the appellant. Learned counsel went further that it is mandatory for an employer to recognize duly registered trade unions joined by its workers and to avail the workers and their unions all assistance for smooth operation. The cases of DANGOTE INDUSTRIES vs. NUFBTE (2009) 14 NLLR (Pt. 37) 25; ANIGBORO vs. SEA TRUCKS NIGERIA LIMITED (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 299) 35 at 62; MIX & BAKE FLOUR MILK INDUSTRIES LTD. vs. NATIONAL UNION OF FOOD BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO EMPLOYEES (2004) NLLR (Pt. 2) 247; HOTEL & PERSONAL SERVICES SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION vs. OWENA HOTELS LTD., AKURE (2005) 3 NLLR (Pt. 7) 163; NASU vs. VICE CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, ABEOKUTA (2012) 29 NNLR (Pt. 83) 258, among others, were cited by counsel who further submitted that where an employer goes ahead to terminate the employment of a worker or retire any worker on account of trade union membership, the remedy which was prescribed by this Court in the case of NUFBTE vs. COCOA INDUSTRIES LTD., IKEJA (2005) 3 NLLR (Pt. 8) 2016 is a reinstatement. The award of reinstatement applied to some of the affected members of the appellant ought to be applied to all the affected staff, without distinction or discrimination. Counsel urged the court to resolve the first issue in favour of the appellant In issue two of the Appellant’s brief, the Appellant’s counsel submitted that although the IAP found that the Appellant is the union statutorily recognized to organize the senior staff in the employment of the Respondents, but it failed to make any pronouncement on the Appellants relief which is for the Respondents to remit check off dues of all its members in the employment of the Respondent to the Appellant with effect from the date the Appellant introduced its members to the Respondents. Counsel submitted that since the Appellant is the union statutorily recognized to organize the senior staff in the employment of the Respondents, it is entitled to the check-off dues of all its members in the Respondents with effect from the date the Appellant introduced its branch Executive Committee members to the Respondents on 27/7/15 and 13/5/15 respectively. This is in view of Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act which provides that upon the registration and recognition of any trade union, the employer shall make deductions from the wages of every worker who is a member of the trade union and remit such deductions to the trade union. Counsel cited NESTOIL PLC vs. NATIONAL UNION OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS WORKERS (2012) 29 NLLR (Pt. 82) 91 and submitted that since the IAP found that that the Appellant is the proper trade union registered to organize the senior staff in the Respondents, deduction and remittance of check off dues of its members in the Respondents is therefore compulsory. Counsel stated in conclusion that the IAP was wrong for not making any pronouncement on this relief and urged this court to also resolve issue two in favour of the Appellant. The Respondents filed the Respondents’ brief of argument on 15th September 2017. In the brief, the Respondents’ counsel submitted the following 2 issue for determination in the appeal: 1. Whether in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the right of the UAC Senior Staff Association under Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (As Amended) to be recognized and allowed to operate freely as an association can be denied it by any of the parties under any guise. 2. Whether the Appellants were entitled to check-off dues of the members of staff of the Respondents, having failed to foist itself on the said members of staff. On issue one, the Respondents’ counsel, Mr. Alex Akoja, submitted that the workers of the Respondents are entitled to form and maintain any association of their choice as provided under Section 40 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Accordingly, before the emergence of the Appellant into the 1st and 2nd Respondent companies, there was the UACN Senior Staff Association catering for the interest and welfare of the senior staff of the Respondents. Thus, the Respondents are not opposed to their staff taking up membership of unions in recognition of the rights of the workers in Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. Counsel relied on the case of NIGERIA SEAFARERS COLLABORATING UNIONS vs. NIGERIAN UNION OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS (2013) 31 NLLR (PT.88) 84. The dispute had been the resolve of the Appellant that it is the statutorily recognized union to organize the senior staff in the employment of the Respondents in an attempt to oppress and suppress the existing senior staff union and to coerce the senior staff members of the Respondents into its fold. This attitude of the Appellant negates the intent and purpose of Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution which guarantees the freedom and right of association of every person. Learned counsel for the Respondents also challenged the ground upon which the IAP came to the conclusion that the UAC SSA is not a registered trade union and that the Appellant is the statutory union unilaterally allowed by the law to protect and promote the affairs of the senior staff members of the Respondents when there was never any material placed before it in support of such claim. Counsel submitted that the freedom of a group to acquire recognition as an association is not tied down to registration as a trade union but on fulfilment of conditions especially of the constitution and that of the entity within which it wishes to operate. The said body is therefore a legal entity in its own right, especially to serve the purpose of its establishment and made responsible for its action. Counsel cited the decision of this court in ASTRAL CONTRACTING SERVICES LTD & CHEVRON NIG. LTD vs. NUPENG (2013) 31 NLLR (Pt. 88) 137 and added that where a union is not registered as a trade union, it does not cease to be recognized as such. The conclusion of the IAP is an importation of extraneous matters into the interpretation of Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution contrary to the law that where the provisions of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the provision must be given its literal and ordinary meaning without importation of any extraneous matters into it. Counsel referred to the case of MWANA vs. UBN PLC (2003) 28 WRN 142. Therefore, the existence, formation and constitutionality of the UAC Senior Staff Association as an association or union of the senior staff cannot be faulted particularly that Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution and Article 2 of the ILO Convention No. 87 of (1948) protect the right of every worker or employer to establish or to join organizations of their own choice to protect their interest. The Respondents’ case before the IAP was that there is in existence an association known as the UAC Senior Staff Association formed to protect the interest of senior staff in the Respondent’s company. It is therefore unreasonable for the Appellant to impose itself on the existing association contrary to the Constitution. The acts of the appellant, which was supported by the IAP, are clearly unfair labour practices which this court is empowered to prevent. With the evidence available before the IAP, there are no grounds for it to accede to the request of the Appellant to be super-imposed on the Rspondents and the existing UAC Senior Staff Association. Counsel stated that all the laws and authorities cited by him are in support of the right of equality and freedom of association without any distinctions or discrimination of any form. The IAP failed in the interpretation and application of the provisions of Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution in suppressing the existence, recognition and rights of UAC Senior Staff Association to operate freely. Finally, counsel urged this court to reverse the decision of the IAP in this regard and sustain the right and equality of the UAC Senior Staff Association as a lawful union. On issue two, learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that the relationship between the Respondents and their respective staff is that of master and servant. Furthermore, the workers of the Respondents do not have any relationship with the Appellant. The Appellant is also not an employee of the Respondents, neither is it an association operating within the domain of the Respondents. Therefore, the Appellant has no relationship, contractual or legal, with the Respondents. Consequently, the Appellant has no business with the check-off dues of the senior staff of the Respondents or the locus standi to seek this relief. Counsel urged the court to resolve the 2nd issue in favour of the Respondents and dismiss the appeal. CROSS APPEAL: In respect of the cross appeal of the Respondents, the cross appellants’ brief of argument was filed on 9th May 2017 but deemed properly filed and served on 23rd October 2017. In the brief, learned counsel for the cross appellants, Mr. Alex Akoja, formulated the following 5 issues for determination in the cross appeal: 1. Whether the right of association guaranteed under section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) expresses preferential discrimination and judgmental recognition of one association over other associations. 2. Whether the failure of the Industrial Arbitral Panel to consider and protect the constitutional right of the existence and functionality of the UAC of Nigeria Senior Staff Association sought to be oppressed by the Respondent has not occasioned injustice and violation of the constitution and related labour laws. 3. Whether in the peculiar circumstances of this case and status of employment of its staff, the Respondents violated any law in the termination of the appointment of its staff with accruing benefits released as expected. 4. Whether in the peculiar circumstances of this suit, this case presented a situation where a court or a tribunal can order reinstatement of discharged staff or force an employee on an unwilling or incapable employer. 5. Whether the Respondent as the first party proved its case to be entitled to the award reached in its favour. The learned counsel for the cross appellants argued issues 1 and 2 together. The submissions of learned counsel on these issues are not different from the points already canvassed in issue 1 of the respondents brief in respect of the main appeal. In fact the submission made by counsel on these issues is a repeat of the arguments made in issue 1 of the Respondents’ brief of argument. Notwithstanding this observation, it is vital we highlight briefly the points canvassed by counsel in these issues of the cross appellants brief. Counsel submitted that before the advent of the Respondent there existed and still in existence in the cross appellants' companies the UAC Senior Staff Association, The dispute was the position of the Respondent that it is the union statutorily recognized to organize the senior staff in the employment of the cross appellants. There is however no instrument, statute or court order which conferred such statutory right on the Respondent against the subsisting right and interest of another association. There was also nothing before IAP to prove that the UAC Senior Staff Association is not registered in any form even though that was not the issue submitted for adjudication before the IAP. The IAP merely misdirected itself in qualifying the UAC Senior Staff Association as unregistered so as to foist the Respondent on the existing association when the provisions of Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution never made any such distinction or qualification. Counsel submitted that the freedom of a group to acquire recognition as an association is not tied down to registration as a trade union but on fulfilment of conditions especially of the Constitution and that of the entity within which the group wishes to operate. Therefore, the existence and right of the UAC Senior Staff Association is preserved and protected on equal strength by the law. The Respondent is making it appear as if the existence of the UAC Senior Staff Association has no implication in law or that its existence is illegal or unconstitutional in an attempt to hide the fact that the right to establish or join organizations is reserved for both workers and employers. Counsel cited the case of NASU vs. VICE CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, ABEOKUTA (2012) 29 NLLR (Pt. 83) 258 where it was held inter alia that both the workers and employers have the right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing without distinction. Counsel further stated that there is no application or suit filed before any court seeking to proscribe the UAC Senior Staff Association. This was also not the issue taken before the IAP. The Respondent merely sought to impose itself on the UAC Senior Staff Association on the ground of superiority or registration. This amounted to distinction which is forbidden by law. Section 40 of the Constitution did not make any distinction between trade union and association unlike the Trade Union Act which expressly mentioned trade union. The IAP therefore failed in the interpretation and application of the provisions of Section 40 of the 1999 constitution by suppressing the existence, recognition and rights of the UAC Senior Staff Association to operate freely. This court was urged to reverse the decision of the IAP in this regard and sustain the right and equality of the UAC Senior Staff Association. Issues 3, 4 and 5 of the cross appellants’ brief of argument were argued together. In respect of these issues, the cross appellants’ counsel submitted that one of the grouses of the Respondent to cross appeal is about the propriety or otherwise of the termination of the employment of the union members by the cross appellants. According to the counsel for the cross appellants, the Respondent has no locus standi to present this leg of claim. Counsel submitted that the relationship between the cross appellants and their staff is that of master and servant. The mode of termination of this type of employment is settled at the point of engagement. The Respondent is not an employee of the cross appellants neither is there a relationship, contractual or legal, with the cross appellants. Therefore, since the Respondent has no connection whatsoever with the cross appellants, it has no cause of action against them. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Respondent lacks the requisite standi to seek this head of relief and to accordingly set aside the award made by the IAP. Learned Counsel for the cross appellant further submitted that the cross appellants were facing some difficulties in the business and had to introduce palliative measure as not to go bankrupt. This measure was to declare redundancy in which some workers were laid off. Counsel submitted that assuming the affected workers were wrongly put under redundancy, they have waived their right to complain of any irregularity when they accepted redundancy benefits. Counsel relied on the case of BAKARE vs. CGC NIG LTD (2013) 30 NLLR (Pt. 87) 379. The cross appellants acted lawfully in the termination of the employment of their workers in addition to the fact that an employer has the right to hire and fire with or without giving reason for so doing. Counsel cited SAMUEL vs. RECTOR FEDERAL POLY, BIDA (2013) 35 NLLR (Pt. 106) 654 in support of the point and stated that a court of law will not force an employee on an unwilling employer. Although it is the law in BAKARE vs. CGC NIG LTD that one of the instance where a terminated employee can be reinstated is when the termination of the worker’s employment was as a result of trade union activities, this was however not the situation in this case. The respective letters of termination of the appointments did not state that the workers were terminated for misconduct but merely that their services were no longer required. The cross appellants acted rightly. There was nothing before the IAP to support its findings that the cross appellants, threatened and victimized the affected staff on the basis of union activities. The findings and decisions of the IAP were reached on improper evaluation of evidence and deserves to be set aside having occasioned miscarriage of justice on the cross appellants. Counsel urged the court to set aside all the findings of the IAP reinstating the laid off staff. In the brief of the Respondent to cross appeal filed on 18th July 2017 but deemed properly filed on 23rd October 2017, learned counsel for the Respondent to cross appeal, Mr. Femi Aborishade, formulated these 3 issues for determination in the cross appeal: 1. Whether the Cross Appellants, not being members of the UAC PLC Senior Staff Association have a reasonable cause of action and the locus standi to bring their Appeal with respect to the constitutional right of UAC PLC Senior Staff Association to exist as an Association. 2. Assuming without necessarily conceding that this Court would hold that the Cross Appellants have the locus standi to complain on behalf of the UAC PLC Senior Staff Association, whether the constitutional right of association guaranteed under Section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended can be exercised outside the provisions of Section 45 of the same Constitution and the Trade Unions Act to confer the status of a trade union on the UAC PLC Senior Staff Association. 3. Whether all members of the Respondent who were terminated and/or prematurely retired on the ground of trade union activities are entitled to reinstatement in spite of their accrued benefits having been released. With respect to issue one of the Respondent’s brief of argument, counsel submitted that the cross appellants are not members of the UAC Senior Staff Association. The cross appellants lack reasonable cause of action and the locus standi to bring their cross appeal with respect to the constitutional right of UAC Senior Staff Association to exist as an association. Counsel referred to several authorities on this point among which are UWAZURUONYE vs. GOV. IMO STATE (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; AHMED vs. AHMED (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 274; A-G LAGOS STATE vs. A-G FED. (2014) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1412) 217; NESTOIL PLC. vs. NUPENG (2012) 29 NLLR (Pt. 82) 90. Counsel submitted further that assuming that the Respondent has done any wrong against UAC Senior Staff Association, only members or affiliates of the UAC Senior Staff Association have the right to challenge any alleged breach and not a non-member such as the Cross Appellants. Counsel urged the Court to find and hold that the Cross Appellants, not being members of the UAC Senior Staff Association, lack reasonable cause of action and the locus standi to maintain the cross appeal on the issue of the legality or constitutionality of the UAC PLC Senior Staff Association to exist as an Association or trade union. On issue 2, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the constitutional right of association guaranteed under Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution cannot be exercised outside the provisions of Section 45 of the Constitution and the Trade Unions Act to confer the status of a trade union on the UAC Senior Staff Association. Counsel cited Section 2 (1) of the Trade Unions Act and submitted that an unregistered association, such as the UAC Senior Staff Association, is prohibited from operating as a union. Counsel also submitted that the voluntary right of a worker to decide which union to belong to is not absolute but must be exercised within the limits of the Trade Unions Act and within all existing relevant laws and regulations. Counsel relied on the cases of NUSDE vs. SEWUN [2013] 35 NLLR (Pt.106) 606; NCSU vs. ASCSN [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 3) 429. Counsel concluded his arguments on this issue with the contention that while the UAC Senior Staff Association has the constitutional right to exist as an association; it cannot operate in the capacity of a trade union to supplant the Respondent. On issue 3, the Respondent’s counsel submitted that once it is established that members of the Respondent were terminated or prematurely retired on the ground of trade union activities, then they are all entitled to be reinstated, in spite of their accrued benefits having been paid to them. Counsel stated that the view of this court in NUFBTE vs. COCOA INDUSTRIES LTD., IKEJA (2005) 3 NLLR (Pt. 8) 2016; NASCO FOODS NIGERIA LIMITED vs. FOOD BEVERAGE & TOBACCO SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION (Suit No. NIC/6/2003 which judgment was delivered on 16/7/2007) and MIX AND BAKE FLOUR MILLS INDUSTRIES LTD (NOW ACQUIRED AS CROWN FLOUR MILLS LTD) vs. FOOD BEVERAGE & TOBACCO SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION (Suit No. NIC/LA/02/2010 which judgment was delivered on 16/6/2011) is that where an employer goes ahead to terminate the employment of a worker or retire any worker on account of trade union membership or trade union activities, the remedy is reinstatement of the worker. Therefore, since the IAP found that the employments of members of the Respondent were terminated because of trade union activities, the affected members are entitled to reinstatement notwithstanding having been paid terminal benefits. Counsel cited MANAGEMENT OF DANGOTE INDUSTRIES LTD. V. NUFBTE (2009) 14 NLLR (Pt. 37) 25 in support, and urged this court to dismiss the cross appeal. In the cross appellants reply brief, their counsel responded to specific issues raised in the respondent’s brief of argument. With respect to the issue of lack of cause of action and locus standi to present the cross appeal, the cross appellants counsel submitted that the respondent who sued the cross appellants as parties to this case is now contending that they do not have right to appeal against the award of the IAP. The right of Appeal is a constitutional right that cannot be denied any party under any guise, either as a party at the lower court or as a party later interested. The case of NIGERIAN ARMY vs. YAKUBU (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 1 was relied upon by counsel on this point. Counsel added that what determines the ground of Appeal actionable before an appellate court is the content of the judgment. When the Respondent decided to sue the cross appellants instead of the UAC Senior Staff Association, the act conferred all requisite locus standi and cause of Action on the Cross Appellant. With respect to issue 2 of the Respondent’s brief of argument where its counsel submitted that the UAC Senior Staff Association is not registered as a trade union and cannot supplant the Respondent, counsel to the cross appellants submitted that nothing was placed before the IAP to suggest that the UAC Senior Staff Association is not a registered trade union. The issue at hand has nothing whatsoever to do with registration as an association or a trade union but the right of individual worker to join an Association of its choice. As reflected in the pleadings of the parties before the IAP, the UAC Senior Staff Association was not presented as or made to appear as a body carrying on like a trade union but as an association with the main objective of making the welfare of its members paramount. Counsel submitted that the case of OSAWE vs. REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS and Section 2(1) of the Trade Union Act do not apply. On the 3rd issue, learned counsel for the cross appellants submitted that in view of the status of the employment of the sacked workers, the law is that a servant, whether willing or unwilling, will not be forced on an unwilling master especially where condition precedent to an effective termination of appointment has been fulfilled. The authority of ZIIDEH vs. RIVERS STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2011) 24 NLLR (Pt. 67) 113 was referred to. Counsel submitted also that the question is not whether or not reinstatement is applicable but whether the appointments which were terminated were done in compliance with the mode or status of appointment of the workers. Upon reading the briefs of argument of the parties in respect of the appeal and the cross appeal, it is observed that the appeal and the cross appeal are materially connected to same issues. The appeal cannot be considered on one side without touching significantly on major aspects of the cross appeal. The points canvassed in the respondents brief in the main appeal are also the points raised in the cross appellants brief. This connection is to such extent that the appeals cannot be considered or determined separately. The best approach, in our view, is to consider the two appeals together. In the determination of the appeal and the cross appeal, we will maintain the title “appellant” for the appellant/respondent to cross appeal and “respondent” for the respondent/cross appellant. COURT’S DECISION This appeal was argued on the 23rd day of October 2017 and adjourned to 8th December 2017 for judgment. In the course of writing the judgment however, the court observed that the award sent to this court by the Minister of Labour was undated. Even though the copy of the same award contained in the record of Appeal from IAP was dated, yet the court raised the question as to what is the effect of an undated award. This question was based on the fact that what gives jurisdiction to this court to hear this appeal, is the Minister’s referral. It is therefore the copy of the award accompanying the referral that is the instrument requiring this court’s intervention. Counsel on both sides addressed the court on this point, and both urged that the court should direct the Chief Registrar of the court to request for a dated copy of the award from the Minister of Labour. The court so ordered. On the 19th day of January 2018 when the case came up, it was reported that the Chief Registrar had on the 10th day of January 2018, obtained the appropriately dated IAP award from the Minister of Labour. Upon perusal, the court found it satisfactory, as it appeared to be the exact same award attached to the record of appeal from IAP, both in form and content. Counsel on both sides submitted that the Minister’s slip in previously forwarding an undated award does not negate the jurisdiction of the court to consider the appeal. They both urged the court to deem the already filed and adopted processes as properly filed and adopted. The court granted the application of counsel and deemed their processes as duly filed on the date of filing, and duly adopted on the 19th day of January 2018. Taking into consideration the various issues formulated by the parties for determination in this appeal and the arguments canvassed in the various briefs of argument, we have identified the following issues for consideration in this appeal: 1. Whether the UAC Senior Staff Association can be denied the right to be recognized and allowed to operate freely as a trade union in the Respondents’ employment? 2. Whether all the members of the appellant in the respondents employ who were affected by retirement or termination of employment are entitled to reinstatement? 3. Whether the Appellant is entitled to the check-off dues of all its members in the employment of the Respondents? ISSUE 1: This issue arose from the cross appeal of the Respondents. The IAP found in its award that “The first party therefore ought to be accorded recognition being the proper and appropriate trade union to organise and cater for the interest of the senior staff association in its employment being the legal and lawfully registered trade union in the food, beverage and tobacco industries instead of the UACN Plc Senior Staff association which is not registered”. The IAP accordingly awarded thus: “This tribunal hereby directs and awards that the first party union is the proper, legal and appropriate trade union that is registered to organise members of the first party in the employment of the second and third parties respectively.” The Complaint of the Respondent in the cross appeal is that the IAP was wrong to have made the award which suppressed the UAC SSA and promoted the Appellant over the UAC SSA. In the brief of the Respondent in respect of the cross appeal, the Respondent’s counsel submitted that before the advent of the Appellant into the Respondents employment, there was UAC Senior Staff Association which had unionised the senior staff of the Respondents. By Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution, the senior staff of the Respondents have the right to form an association of their choice, but the IAP failed to properly interpret the provision when it suppressed the existence, recognition and right of UAC Senior Staff Association to operate freely. To the Respondents, the UAC SSA is an association whose existence is recognised in Section 40 of the Constitution; as such, the Appellant union is not superior to it. The Respondents’ counsel urged this court to reverse the decision of the IAP and sustain the right and equality of the UAC SSA. The Appellant’s counsel however challenged the locus standi of the Respondents to bring the cross appeal. In the Appellant’s brief in response to the cross appeal, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Respondents have no reasonable cause of action and the locus standi to appeal in respect of the constitutional right of the UAC SSA to operate as an association when the Respondents are not members of the association. According to the Appellant’s counsel, only members or affiliates of the UAC Senior Staff Association have the right or locus to bring an action with respect to the constitutional right of the association to operate. In response to this objection, the learned counsel for the Respondents submitted in the reply brief that the Respondents cannot be denied the constitutional right to appeal from the decision of the IAP and by virtue of the fact that it was the Appellant who instituted proceedings against them in the first place, the Respondents have the locus standi to maintain the cross appeal. To resolve this objection, lets us first remind learned counsel for the Appellant that this matter is an appeal from the award of the IAP. The 1st aspect of the cross appeal of the Respondents concerns the existence and right of UAC SSA to exist and operate as workers’ association in the Respondents’ companies. This ground of the cross appeal arose from the award of the IAP. The award of the IAP touching on legal status and operation of the UAC SSA had is foundation in the facts presented before the IAP by the parties. In paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Appellant’s memorandum before the IAP, it was stated that the UAC SSA is an “amorphous organisation” promoted by UAC PLC to “unlawfully carry on trade union activities”. It was also stated by the Appellant that the UAC SSA is “unregistered” but masquerading as a trade union. In the Respondents’ further memorandum before the IAP, the facts were stated that the only senior staff union known to the Respondents was the UAC SSA and it was the union which the senior staff in the Respondent's company belonged to. Issues were accordingly canvassed by the parties in the arbitration on the legal status and right of the UAC SSA to operate as a trade union. The IAP made a pronouncement and an award on the issue. The Respondents who were dissatisfied with any of the award made by the IAP or the decision of the IAP are entitled to challenge the decision or award on appeal. Since it is a matter of appeal, the issue of locus standi does not arise in such a situation. The right of appeal also conferred the requisite locus standi on the Respondents. In our view, the Respondents have the locus standi and cause of action to bring the cross appeal in respect of the award of the IAP touching on the existence and the right of the UAC SSA to operate as a trade union. In the submissions of counsel for the Respondents in both the Respondents’ brief to the main appeal and the cross appellants brief, counsel made it clear the UAC SSA is the association protecting the interest of senior staff of the Respondents. Counsel also submitted that the UAC SSA has been in existence in the Respondents companies as the association to which the senior staff of the Respondents belonged before the Appellant surfaced. The submissions of the counsel in respect of the operation of the UAC SSA suggest that the UAC SSA operates and functions as a trade union for the senior staff of the Respondents. However, the Respondents counsel backtracked in his reply brief to the Appellant’s/Respondent’s brief to the cross appeal. Counsel submitted this time that from the pleadings of the parties before the IAP, the UAC SSA was not presented as or made to appear as a body carrying on like a trade Union. This latter view of counsel does not appear to us to be the true position. Annexures U and R at pages 304 and 356 of the record are the 1st and 2nd respondents’ letters to Plateau State Controller of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity respectively. In the letters, they stated that their workers are not members of the Appellant union but are members of the UAC SSA. Similarly, in paragraph 3.2 of the Respondents further memorandum before the IAP, it was submitted that “before the 1st party started coercing 2nd party senior staff to join it, there was/is in existence the UACN Senior Staff Association” and in paragraph 3.10, it was submitted that “the only union known to the 2nd party was UACN Senior Staff Association”. Further in paragraphs 3.22 and 3.27, the Respondents made it known that the UAC SSA was the union they related with in respect of issues concerning the senior staff of the Respondents. See pages 397, 398, 400 and 401 of the record. A trade union is defined in Section 1 (1) of the Trade Union Act to mean any combination of workers or employers for the purpose of regulating the terms and conditions of employment of workers. Therefore, from these facts and in addition to the submissions of the counsel for the Respondents in this appeal, it is clear to us that the UAC SSA operated and functioned as a trade union. Now, the Respondents counsel has maintained the view that the UAC SSA cannot be suppressed from existing or operating to unionise senior staff of the Respondents. It is the law however that no association, body or group can function as a trade union or purport to unionize or protect the interest of workers unless it is registered as a trade union. The Trade Unions Act 2004 is explicit on this point when it provides in Section 2 (1) thus: “A trade union shall not perform any act in furtherance of the purposes for which it has been formed unless it has been registered under this Act.” Therefore, to resolve the issue raised by the Respondents in the cross appeal, we must find whether the UAC SSA is a registered trade union. The Appellant made the averment in paragraph 13 of the memorandum that the UAC SSA is an unregistered association operating as a trade union. The Respondents did not dispute this fact nor provide evidence of the registration of UAC SSA as a trade union. In a surprising development, it is the Respondents’ counsel who argued in this appeal that the non-registration of the UAC SSA was not proved by the Appellants before the IAP. The responsibility to prove the registration of UAC SSA was rather that of the Respondents than of the appellant. When the Appellant contended in the arbitration that the UAC SSA was not a registered body the duty shifted to the Respondents to disprove the allegation. The respondents failed to establish the legal status of the UAC SSA. It was this failure that permitted IAP to find that the UAC SSA is not a registered trade union. Having not been listed in the Trade Unions Act, the onus is on the Respondents to prove that the UAC SSA is a registered trade union. The Respondents are still unable to convince us in this appeal that the UAC SSA is registered as a trade union. The effect of non-registration is that the UAC SSA cannot function as or be considered a trade union. Not having obtained the status of a trade union, can the UAC SSA operate as such in view of what the Respondents’ counsel sought this court to pronounce in the cross appeal? The Respondents’ counsel did submit that whether the UAC SSA is registered or not does not prevent it from functioning as a trade union. Counsel stated that the freedom of a group to acquire recognition as an association is not tied down to registration as a trade union. Counsel relied on Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution in support of the argument that the existence, formation and constitutionality of the UAC SSA as a union of the senior staff cannot be faulted. The purport of this argument of counsel is that Section 40 of the Constitution allows the UAC SSA to exist and function as a trade union. To properly deal with this angle of submission of the Respondents’ counsel, let us examine the provision of the said Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. It provides as follows: “Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in particular may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interests.” This provision of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of individuals to associate freely and also grants right to form or join any political party, trade union or association of choice. Let us mention that the section did not create any association or trade union. It only granted the right to form or join any association or trade union of choice. In the formation or in the exercise of the right to form such association or trade union, there may be statutory provisions or laws which regulate the formation or existence or operation of such associations or trade unions. Where the requirements of the statute or laws with respect to the formation or operation of such association or trade union are not met, the legal status of such association or trade union remains inchoate. In that situation, Section 40 of the Constitution does not validate the existence or operation of the association or trade union. It is settled law that the constitutionally provided rights do not exclude statutory provisions which regulate the exercise of the rights. See CROSS RIVER UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY vs. OBETEN (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 641) 1567 at 1583. Although the senior staff of the Respondents have the constitutional right to form the UAC SSA as an association, but in purporting to operate the association as a trade union, Section 2 (1) of the Trade Unions Act will come to play. The right of the workers to form a trade union of their choice cannot derogate from the mandatory provision of Section 2 (1) of the Trade Unions Act which stipulates that an association cannot function as a trade union unless it is registered as one. In our view therefore, Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution did not entitle the UAC SSA, an unregistered trade union, to operate or function as a trade union. It is the further submission of the Respondents’ counsel that the Appellant is not superior to the UAC SSA and as such, the Appellant cannot supplant the UAC SSA or unionise the workers who already belonged to the UAC SSA. It is now clear that the UAC SSA is not a registered trade union. Therefore, the issue of the Appellant being preferred over it or superior to it is dead on arrival. There should not also be a dispute as to which of them should unionise the senior staff of the Respondents. In paragraph 1 of the Appellant’s memorandum before the IAP, the Appellant was described as a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act to unionise senior staff in the food, beverage and tobacco industry. The Respondents did not dispute this fact. It is observed that the senior staff and employers’ associations registered under the Trade Unions Act include the Appellant. See item 7 of part C, third schedule of the Act. The fact that the Appellant is a registered trade union for senior staff in the food, beverage and tobacco industries gives it jurisdiction to unionise the senior staff of the Respondents’ companies. The counsels to the parties are unanimous on the fact that the workers of the Respondent have the right to join the trade union of their choice. This right also includes the right of the workers to leave the UAC SSA and join the Appellant union. Annexure B1, B2, and D of the Appellant’s memorandum before the IAP are the request by the senior staff of the Respondents to join the Appellant union and the membership enrolment forms the workers filled to join the Appellant union. Although the Respondents counsel alluded to the fact that the workers were coerced by the Appellant to join the union, the allegation was not substantiated. There are no sufficient facts to support the assertion. From the facts, it is obvious that the workers freely decided to join the Appellant in the exercise of their constitutional right of association. In such an instance where the workers decided to join the Appellant union notwithstanding the existence of UAC SSA, it is not for the Respondents to complain. The Respondents appear to us to be crying more than the bereaved in this matter. In view of the foregoing, this court cannot accede to the request of the Respondents to declare that the UAC SSA has the constitutional right to exist and function as a trade union in the Respondents’ companies. We find no reason to make such a pronouncement or to tamper with the finding of the IAP on this subject. We resolve issue one against the Respondent/cross appellant. ISSUE 2: One of the complaints of the Appellant in this appeal is that although the IAP rightly awarded that all those members of the Appellant whose employments were prematurely retired and/or terminated or whose names were listed in the award be reinstated forthwith without loss of seniority in their positions, salary and other emoluments due to them, however, in listing the members of the Appellant to benefit from the award, the IAP listed only a few of the affected members of the Appellant in the 1st Respondent’s employment while all those affected in the 2nd Respondent’s employment were totally excluded. According to the Appellant’s counsel, the IAP restricted the award of reinstatement and payment of salary and emoluments to those specifically listed in the award leaving out the other members of the Appellant in the employment of Respondents who were also affected by the termination or retirement of employment on account of union activities. The claims of the Appellant before the IAP as contained in the Appellant’s memorandum include a declaration that the termination of the employment of union officials and members of the Appellant by the Respondents is unlawful, illegal, null and void and an order directing the Respondents to forthwith reinstate union officials and members of the Appellant to their positions without loss of service or seniority and a consequential order for payment of their salaries and allowances. See reliefs (f) and (i) at page 40 of the record of proceedings from the IAP. In paragraphs 19 and 22 of the Appellant’s memorandum before the IAP, the members and officials of the Appellant in the employment of the 1st Respondent who were allegedly victimized by termination or retirement by the 1st Respondent are as follows: Peter Pam Gyang, Emmanuel Bauda, Uilehemba Victor Anger, Matthew F. Osenoyenim, Baba Ali James, Cyprian M. Maren, Vincent Davou Pam, Dung Bala Gwom, Ruth Ibrahim Pankyes, Oshioke Joy Dennis, Muncha Audu Gwong, Sahuna Direba Zabe, Sunday Egbunu, Luka Gyang Yakubu, Patrick Pamkatai, Pam Deme, Olaiya Motunrola, Aboyi Idoko and Shehu James. Annexure C1 to C16 in the record of proceedings are the termination and retirement letters of these employees. The letters were issued to the employees between 27th July 2015 and 3rd August 2015. In paragraphs 44, 45, 46 and 47 of the Appellant’s memorandum, the members and officials of the Appellant in the employment of the 2nd Respondent who were allegedly victimized by termination or retirement by the 2nd Respondent are as follows: Samuel Danyaro, Yabe Jatau, Sunday Ekara, Yillim Daton, Sati Dasihit, Dachan Inusa, Kirmang Danjuma, Victor Bakfur and Moses Toktu. Annexures M1 to M9 in the record of proceedings are the termination and retirement letters of these employees. The letters were given to the employees on 31st July 2015. The case of the Appellant before the IAP was that these members who were staff of the Respondents were terminated or retired from the employment as a result of their membership of the Appellant union. The IAP found that the retirement and termination of the employment of members of the Appellant by the Respondents was due to union activities and in its award directed that all the members of the Appellant in the Respondents employment who were prematurely retired or whose employment were terminated be reinstated without loss of seniority in their positions, salary and other emoluments. The IAP went further to specify the names of the employees of the Respondents affected by the award to be the following persons: 1. Dung Bala Gwom 2. Cyprian Maren 3. Peter Pam Guang 4. Victor U. Anger 5. James Shehu 6. Mrs Motunrola A. Olaiya 7. Luka Gyang Yakubu 8. Sunday Egbunu 9. Pam Deme 10. Vincent Davou Pam The complaint of the Appellant in this appeal is that the names of the affected members of the Appellant mentioned by the IAP are the ones in the 1st Respondent’s employment and only 10 of the 19 members listed by the Appellant were mentioned by the IAP. Again, the names mentioned by the IAP do not include any member of the Appellant whose employments were terminated in the 2nd Respondent’s employment. The Appellant is therefore seeking that the list of the beneficiaries of the award be expanded to include all its members in the Respondents who were affected by termination or retirement. However, the Respondents counsel, in both the Respondents’ brief and in the cross appellants brief, argued that the workers of the Respondents were not sacked for their involvement in union activities but as a result of redundancy. Learned Counsel also submitted that an employer has the right to hire and fire its employee at any time, as such, the IAP was wrong to have ordered reinstatement of the staff sacked by the Respondents in exercise of their right under the employment contract. In this appeal where the Appellant is seeking that the award of reinstatement and payment of arrears of salary be extended to all its members in the Respondents employment who were sacked because of their involvement in union activities, it is necessary we consider whether the said staff of the Respondents were sacked by the Respondents for the reason that they joined the Appellant union. In the Appellant’s memorandum before the IAP, the facts were averred that in separate letters to the Appellant, the senior staff of the Respondents indicated interest to join the Appellant and requested for membership enrolment forms following the resolution of their congress meetings held on 19th June 2015 and 2nd April 2015 respectively. The Appellant provided the membership enrolment forms to the senior staff of the Respondents which forms were completed and submitted to the Appellant. By letters dated 27th July 2015 and 13th May 2015, the Appellant notified the Respondents of the interest shown by their senior staff to join the Appellant union and also introduced the union and its executives to the Respondents. After these letters, the Respondents threatened the executives and members of the Appellant to withdraw their membership of the Appellant or risk losing their employment. The Respondents carried the threat into effect by retiring and terminating the employment of some executives and members of the Appellant. The 1st Respondent immediately advertised vacancies for the positions of the terminated or retired staff. The 1st Respondent also mounted pressure on the remaining members of the Appellant to withdraw their membership. The 1st Respondent went further to procure the Appellant’s members to sign withdrawal letter which it forwarded to the Appellant through letters dated 2nd September 2015 and 28th September 2015. See paragraphs 14 to 21 and 31 to 47 of the Appellant’s memorandum before the IAP at pages 3-12 and 14 to 18 of the record of proceedings. The Respondents stated the following facts in their memoranda before the IAP. By letters dated 27th July 2015 and 13th May 2015 to the Respondents respectively, the Appellant informed the Respondents of the inclusion of some senior staff as members and executives of the Appellant union. The Appellant is free to unionize willing workers, so the Respondent did not oppose unionism. The Respondents were only restructuring and it has nothing to do with unionism. The Respondents had an engagement with the staff on 23rd July 2015 to inform them of the performance and economic challenges affecting the business. Due to increased competition, low purchases, and lack of growth, the Respondents decided to restructure from February 2015. The restructuring carried out on the workers was to downsize and lay off excess labour which was done in line with the condition of service. The restructuring exercise started before July 2015 and it was not a victimization but cut across all cadres and business of UACN. It has affected both management, senior and junior staff even before the Appellant’s introduction letters of 27th July 2015 and 13th May 2015. Nobody was threatened with retirement and the retired staffs were those retired at 50 years of age in accordance with the condition of service. The advert for vacancy was for specialized skills in the new production plant in the 1st Respondent. The advert was not for the position of the retired or terminated staff and no worker was coerced to renounce membership of the Appellant. See pages 368 to 374 and 394 to 404 of the record of proceedings. From the case of the parties, it is not in dispute that the Appellant wrote the letters of 27th July 2015 and 13th May 2015 to the Respondents respectively to inform the Respondents of the establishment of its branches in the Respondents’ employments, and also to introduce the union branch executives to the Respondents. It is also not in dispute that the Respondents retired some of their senior staff and terminated the employment of some others. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that these senior staff that were laid off were among those who enrolled to be members of the Appellant union. In its award, the IAP considered certain circumstances in arriving at the conclusion that the termination of the employment of the Appellant’s members was for union activities. These circumstances which the panel relied on are that the Respondents actually threatened and intimidated members of the Appellant to withdraw their membership of the Appellant; that the Respondents immediately advertised vacancies for the positions of the terminated staff and that some staff whose employment were terminated were recalled by the Respondents when those staff renounced their membership of the Appellant. It is the same circumstances the Appellant wants this court to consider to find that its members whom it wants to be reinstated in this appeal were terminated or retired for joining the Appellant union. Having considered the averments of the parties in their respective memoranda filed before the IAP and the submissions made in the briefs filed in his appeal, we find sufficient material facts which support the findings of the IAP that the members of the Appellant whose employments were terminated or retired by the Respondents was on account of their membership of the Appellant union. From the facts in the record of proceedings and the submissions of counsels in their briefs in this appeal, it is clear to us that there was a dispute between the Appellant and the Respondents as to allowing the Appellant to unionize the senior staff in the Respondents’ companies. We have made this point when resolving issue one in this judgment therefore, we need not stress it again here, save to say that the dispute had a direct link to the termination or retirement of the employment of some of the senior staff of the Respondents who joined the Appellant union. The Appellant’s letter introducing the union and its executives to the 1st Respondent was received by the 1st Respondent on 27th July 2015. Two days after this letter, which is on 29th July 2015, the 1st Respondent severed the employment of some of the workers who had joined the Appellant union. Among those who were affected were 7 out of the 9 union executives newly introduced to the 1st Respondent. For the 2nd Respondent, the letter introducing the union members and its executives to the 2nd Respondent was received by the 2nd Respondent on 13th May 2015. Annexure F is the Appellant’s letter dated 1st June 2015 to the 2nd Respondent. From the tone of the letter, it appeared the 2nd Respondent refused to accord recognition to the Appellant by disregarding the letter of 13th May 2015. The issues which the 2nd Respondent was alleged to have raised for discountenancing the letter of introduction were these: That the letter of 13th May 2015 was signed by somebody else other than the executive secretary of the union; that the number of staff who registered with the Appellant were less than 50 as such they were not qualified to join a union. Annexure G is the 2nd Respondent’s letter dated 10th June 2015. The 2nd Respondent acknowledged the Appellant’s letter of 1st June 2015 and stated that it is “engaging with our employees and we will revert to you as soon as we are through with our engagement.” There are also annexure K and L by the Appellant to the 2nd Respondent dated 13th July 2015 and 27th July 2015. The attitude of the 2nd Respondent complained of by the Appellant in these letters is still on the refusal to recognize the Appellant union. The Appellant further, in annexure L, proposed a meeting with the 2nd Respondent to hold on 5th August 2015 for parties to resolve the dispute with respect to recognition and membership of the Appellant. Four days after this letter, which was on 31st July 2015, the 2nd Respondent terminated the employment of some of the members of the Appellant. Among those who were affected were 4 out of the 7 union executives newly introduced to the 2nd Respondent. The fact that the Respondents terminated the employments of some of their staff when the issue of recognition of the Appellant union by the Respondents was being discussed, in our view, imputes bad faith in the termination. The Respondents, by their acts and letters, did not want the Appellant to operate in their employment. Therefore, the easy way to discourage membership of the union was by terminating the employment of the members and executives of the union. The Respondents, shortly after the Appellant introduced its members and executives to them, sacked some of the employees who have joined the Appellant union. The unmistakable conclusion to be drawn from the act of the Respondents is that the termination was meant to intimidate the employees from having any relationship with the Appellant. True to fact, some of the sacked employees of the 1st Respondent who later withdrew their membership of the Appellant were recalled or reinstated to work. The Appellant gave the instances where this occurred in items 25, 47, 95, 102 and 116 of table 1 of the Appellant’s memorandum before the IAP. The Respondents did not controvert this fact in their memorandum before the IAP. The Appellant has also shown that the Respondents intimidated and threatened their staff to withdraw their membership of the Appellant or risk losing their employment. After the Appellant had written to introduce the union and its executives to the 2nd Respondent, the 2nd Respondent, in annexure G told the Appellant that it was having engagements with its employees on the issue and would revert to the Appellant. Instead of reverting to the Appellant as promised, what the 2nd Respondent did next was to terminate the employment of union executives and members of the Appellant. From the actions of the 2nd Respondent, it is clear to us that the “engagement” it said it was having with the employees was no more than coercing them to withdraw membership of the Appellant. Obviously, the “engagement” failed, hence it resorted to termination of employment of the Appellant’s members. By letters dated 2nd September 2015 and 28th September 2015, which are annexures V1 and V2 to the Appellant’s memorandum at the IAP, the 1st Respondent wrote to inform the Appellant that most of its senior staff have written to withdraw from the Appellant. The 1st Respondent, by the letters, forwarded copies of the withdrawal letters to the Appellant. The question raised by the 1st Respondent’s letters is why was it the 1st Respondent who had to inform the Appellant of the withdrawal of membership? The obvious answer is that it procured those withdrawal letters from the said senior staff. The 1st Respondent has no business with the relationship between the Appellant and its members. In fact, when the senior staff of the 1st Respondent signed the enrolment forms to join the Appellant union, they didn’t do so through 1st Respondents. The fact that the information of their subsequent or alleged withdrawal from the union came from the 1st Respondent clearly shows that the 1st Respondent played a compelling role in getting those staff to withdraw their membership of the Appellant. Consequently, these acts of the Respondents amounted to interference in the rights of the staff to belong to trade union of their choice. We are of the view that the employments of the staff were terminated for the reason of their membership of the Appellant union. The Respondents contended that the termination of the employment of their staff was to reduce their workforce because of redundancy. We do not find this contention to be tenable. After the Respondents have terminated the employment of some of the staff, allegedly for reason of redundancy, the 1st Respondent went ahead to place advertisement for vacancies into various positions in the company. Although the Respondents counsel has argued in this appeal that the employment advertised were for a new factory and not to fill the vacancies of the sacked workers, we find this hard to believe. A company going through economic and financial hardship, as alleged by the Respondents cannot be seen opening new factory and making new employments. A wise decision in such a situation would be to transfer some existing staff to the new factory and not make fresh employment altogether at the time the company was allegedly suffering hardships. The fact that the Respondents had the capacity to take new employees shortly after terminating the employments of members of the Appellant implies that they were not going through redundancy at the time the employments of members of the Appellant were terminated. The implication is that the employments were terminated by the Respondents for a reason other than redundancy. From the facts we have examined in this appeal, this court is inclined to believe that the reason the employment of the members of the Appellant was terminated was their membership of the Appellant. Section 20 (3) of the Labour Act 2004 defines redundancy as an involuntary and permanent loss of employment caused by excess manpower. Accordingly, where an employer is to reduce workforce as a result of redundancy, subsection 1 of the section laid down the procedure to be adopt as follows: a. The employer shall inform the trade union or workers' representative concerned of the reasons for and the extent of the anticipated redundancy; b. The principle of "last in, first out" shall be adopted in the discharge of the particular category of workers affected, subject to all factors of relative merit, including skill, ability and reliability; and c. The employer shall use his best endeavours to negotiate redundancy payments to any discharged workers who are not protected by regulations made under subsection (2) of this section. The Respondents did not furnish the IAP with evidence or facts showing compliance with this procedure when they began terminating employment of the staff. We do not find anything in the record to show that the Respondent duly went through redundancy. This absence of compliance with redundancy procedure by the Respondents lends support to the fact that the termination of the employments of members of the Appellant was not for reason of redundancy. An examination of all the circumstances the IAP took into consideration to arrive at the conclusion that the termination or retirement of the workers was for union activities support the findings of the IAP. It is clear to us that the retirement and termination of the employment of members of the Appellant was satisfactorily linked by the Appellant to be a result of union membership. Therefore, we find and hold that the employments of the affected senior staff of the Respondents were terminated or retired by the Respondents because they took up membership of the Appellant union. In order words, it was on account of union activities that the Respondents terminated the employment of members of the Appellant. Section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) guarantees the citizens freedom of association. It provides that every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons or form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interest. By this Constitutional provision, every worker is entitled to belong to or join a trade union of his or her choice. Accordingly, a worker ought not to be victimised in any way by the employer for the reason that the worker decided to join a trade union not liked or recognised by the employer. Similarly, Section 12 (4) of the Trade Unions Act 2004 provides thus: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, membership of a trade union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimised for refusing to join or remain a member”. Then there is Section 9 (6) Labour Act 2004 which provides as follows: No contract shall- (a) make it a condition of employment that a worker shall or shall not join a trade union or shall or shall not relinquish membership or a trade union; or (b) cause the dismissal of, or otherwise prejudice, a worker- (i) by reason of trade union membership, or (ii) because of trade union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours, or (iii) by reason of the fact that he has lost or been deprived ne membership of a trade union or has refused or been unable to become, or for any other reason is not, a member of a trade union The import of all the above provisions of our legislations is to clearly prohibit against the termination of the employment of an employee on account of trade union membership. It is in view of these statutory provisions the courts have taken the position that when an employee’s employment is terminated as a result of his involvement in trade union activities or membership of trade union, such an employee is entitled to be reinstated. This court was of that view in MANAGEMENT OF DANGOTE INDUSTRIES LTD. vs. NUFBTE (2009) 14 NLLR (Pt. 37) 25 at 48 when it held that an employee is entitled to be reinstated where his or her employment has been terminated because of union activities. See also NATIONAL UNION OF FOOD BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO EMPLOYEES vs. COCOA INDUSTRIES LIMITED IKEJA [2005) 3 NLLR (Pt. 8) 206 at 218. Where an employer interferes in the employment of its worker by terminating the employment because the worker decided to join a trade union of his choice or to participate in union activities, the act of the employer amounts to an interference with the worker’s constitutional right of association. The worker who was so punished by the employer is entitled to reinstatement. Thus, the right to be reinstated is a consequence of the interference with the constitutional right of association of the worker. The Respondents’ counsel submitted that the sacked workers cannot be reinstated because the Respondents have the right to hire and fire, and that an employee cannot be forced on an unwilling employer. This submission of counsel will not suffice in this case. The right of an employer to terminate the employment of his worker at any time is not sacrosanct. There are limitations to that right. One of them is with respect to trade union matters. In trade union matters, an employer is prohibited by statute from terminating employment of workers for reason of trade union activities or membership of trade union. Where it is found that the employment of a worker was terminated because of trade union activities or membership of trade union, the established remedy is reinstatement of the worker. In BAKARE vs. CGC NIG LTD (2013) 30 NLLR (Pt.87) 379 at 427, it was held that two instances where an employee will be reinstated are where the employment has statutory flavor and the procedures laid down by statute for terminating appointment were not adhered to or where the termination of the workers was as a result of trade union activities. See also MANAGEMENT OF DANGOTE INDUSTRIES LTD. vs. NUFBTE (supra); NATIONAL UNION OF FOOD BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO EMPLOYEES vs. COCOA INDUSTRIES LIMITED IKEJA (supra). Therefore, the contention of counsel for the Respondents that the sacked workers cannot be forced on their employer is without merit. Counsel for the Respondents did not stop there. Counsel also argued that the sacked employees of the Respondents were paid and they accepted their redundancy benefits. The said workers are therefore deemed in law to have waived any complaint arising from the termination of their employment. In our view, once it is found that the employees of the Respondents were terminated or prematurely retired on ground of trade union activities, they will be entitled to be reinstated notwithstanding the fact that their redundancy benefits have been paid to them. This was how this court put the law on this point in MANAGEMENT OF DANGOTE INDUSTRIES LTD. vs. NUFBTE (SUPRA) at 49-50: “It was pointed out by the appellant that the affected employees were paid their terminal benefits. But evidence abound that they were compelled into accepting the terminal benefits ... It should not lie within the whims of an employer to determine when, which and how a union should be formed, to its workers; and when one is formed, to offload from its employment those in the forefront of the unionization drive. Workers' right to unionise needs to be protected and not allowed to depend on the likes or dislikes of employer. So, the payment of terminal benefit, which the workers were compelled to accept, is not sufficient to override the remedy of reinstatement. Since the order of this Court is that the affected employees be reinstated forthwith without loss of salaries and other emoluments, the terminal benefits paid to them is to be deducted from what is due to them as Salaries/emoluments since their wrongful termination on March 17, 2004.” Therefore, the fact that the affected employees of the Respondents were paid their redundancy benefits when their employments were terminated does not preclude this court from ordering their reinstatement. In its memorandum before the IAP, the Appellant listed 19 of its members in the 1st Respondent’s employment affected by the termination of employment or premature retirement while it listed 9 of its members in the 2nd Respondent’s employment affected by the termination or premature retirement. However, the IAP, in the award specifically limited the order of reinstatement to 10 persons which it mentioned in the award. These reinstated employees are part of the affected members of the Appellant in the 1st Respondent. The award left out 9 affected members of the Appellant in the 1st Respondent and all the 9 affected members in the 2nd Respondent. The IAP did not state any reason for limiting the award of reinstatement to only ten of the affected workers in the 1st Respondent. We too cannot find any justification for that part of the award of the IAP. These affected members of the Appellant left out from the award of reinstatement are among the employees of the Respondents who filled enrolment forms to join the Appellant union. They were members of the Appellant and since the IAP found that the employment of members of the Appellant in the Respondent’s employment were terminated on account of their membership of the Appellant, the IAP ought to have included them in the award of reinstatement. Consequently, it is our view that all the members of the Appellant union whose employments were terminated by the Respondents are entitled to be reinstated to their employments. The award of the IAP to the effect that members of the Appellant in the respondents affected by the retirement and termination be reinstated is extended to all other affected staff not mentioned by the IAP in the award. The 2nd issue in this judgment is resolved in favour of the Appellant. ISSUE 3: Another compliant of the Appellant against the award of the IAP in this appeal is that the IAP did not make any pronouncement on the Appellant’s specific relief for an order directing the Respondents to remit check off dues of all its members in the employment of the Respondent to the appellant with effect from the date the Appellant introduced its members to the Respondents. In the Appellant’s brief, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that since it was the finding of the IAP that the Appellant is the proper trade union to unionise the senior staff in the employment of the Respondents and awarded that the Respondents recognise the Appellant as such, the Appellant is therefore entitled to the check-off dues of all its members in the Respondents’ employment with effect from the date the Appellant introduced its branch executives and members to the Respondents. The Respondents’ counsel submitted however that the staff of the Respondents do not have any relationship with the Appellant neither is the Appellant an association operating in the Respondents. As a result, the Appellant has no relationship with the Respondents to warrant the Respondents to remit check of dues of their senior staff to the Appellant. The Appellant has shown in the memorandum before the IAP that the senior staff of the Respondents resolved to join the Appellant union and wrote to the Appellant to indicate interest to join the Appellant and requested for membership enrolment forms. The senior staff of the Respondents filled the membership forms and they were accordingly organised into branches of the Appellant. After that, the Appellant wrote to the Respondents’ letters dated 27th July 2015 and 13th May 2015 respectively, to introduce the union and the executives of the branches in the Respondents, and also demanded deduction and remittance of monthly check off dues of its members. The enrolment forms filled by the senior staff of the Respondents to be members of the Appellant are annexure B2 (1 to 162). Although the Respondents have alleged in this appeal that the staff who joined the Appellant were coerced and intimidated by the Appellant to join, the Respondents did not substantiate the allegation before the IAP. In the absence of proof of the allegation, the obvious result is that the staff merely exercised their right to join the union of their choice. By filling the membership forms of the Appellant, the workers who did so have become members of the Appellant union and they are entitled to pay check-off dues to the Appellant. From the dates of the Appellant’s letters of 27th July 2015 and 13th May 2015 to the Respondents respectively to demand remittance of the check-off dues of its members in the Respondents’ employment, the Respondents ought to have recognised the Appellant as a union within the employment and grant it its due entitlements. See NESTOIL PLC vs. NATIONAL UNION OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS WORKERS (2012) 29 NLLR (Pt. 82) 90 at 155. We find no substance in the submissions of the Respondents’ counsel that the staff of the Respondents did not have any relationship with the Appellant. The facts reveal that the senior staff of the Respondent opted to join the Appellant. It is the Respondents who had rather not allowed the Appellant union to operate in their employment. The Respondents’ position had been that the UAC Senior Staff Association is the union which should unionise the senior staff of the Respondents and not the Appellant. This controversy has been resolved in issue 1 of this judgment. Let us add that it is not the duty of the employer to decide which union should operate in the employment or to regulate the choice of union for the workers. The Court of Appeal in the case of SEA TRUCKS (NIGERIA) LTD. vs. PAYNE (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1041) did not mince words when it condemned in strong terms, companies who interfere with unions. The Court specifically held that an employer has no business querying the unionization of employees. The choice of which union to associate with or not is entirely that of the workers. Once the workers have joined a trade union, the employer has no choice than to recognise the trade union, deduct and remit check-off dues of the members to the union. Section 17 of the TUA provides: “Upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in the Third Schedule to this Act, the employer shall- (a) make deduction from the wages of every worker who is a member of any of the trade unions for the purpose of paying contributions to the trade union so registered; and (b) remit such deductions to the registered office of the trade union within a reasonable period or such period as may be prescribed from time to time by the Registrar. We find in this appeal that the workers who registered with the Appellant are members of the Appellant and their check-off dues ought to be remitted to the Appellant commencing from the date the Appellant introduced its members to the Respondents. The IAP found that the Appellant is the proper trade union to unionise the senior staff in the employment of the Respondents and also directed the Respondents to recognise the Appellant accordingly but it failed to make any consequential award for the remittance of check-off dues to the Appellant as sought by the Appellant in the arbitration. The Respondents have not denied non-compliance with remittance of check-off dues to the Appellant. Also, the submission of the Respondents’ counsel that the workers had no relationship with the Appellant is an admission that the Respondents have not deducted check-off dues of the workers who registered with the Appellant or remit same to the Appellant. It is our view that the Appellant is entitled to the check-off dues of all its members in the employment of the Respondents. We therefore resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant. In the final result, we find that the appeal has merit and it is allowed. For the cross appeal, it is unmeritorious and we hereby dismiss same. We make the following orders with respect to the Appellant’s appeal: 1. The award of the IAP for the reinstatement of the members of the Appellant whose employments were terminated or who were retired by the Respondents is expanded to cover all the members of the Appellant affected by termination or premature retirement in the employment of the respondents. 2. For the avoidance of doubt, in addition to the ten (10) names initially listed in the IAP award (Dung Bala Gwom, Cyprian Maren, Peter Pam Guang (Gyang), Victor U. Anger, James Shehu, Mrs Motunrola A. Olaiya, Luka Gyang Yakubu, Sunday Egbunu, Pam Deme, and Vincent Davon Pam), the following members of the Appellant are also hereby ordered to be reinstated forthwith into the employment of the Respondents: 1st Respondent’s employment: i. Emmanuel Bauda, ii. Mattew F. Osenoyenim, iii. Baba Ali James, iv. Ruth Ibrahim Pankyes, v. Oshioke Joy Dennis, vi. Muncha Audu Gwong, vii. Sahuna Direba Zabe, viii. Patrick Pamkatai, ix. Aboyi Idoko 2nd Respondent’s employment: i. Samuel Danyaro, ii. Yabe Jatau, iii. Sunday Ekara, iv. Yillim Daton, v. Sati Dasihit, vi. Dachan Inusa, vii. Kirmang Danjuma, viii. Victor Bakfur ix. Moses Toktu 3. The Respondents are also ordered to pay the arrears of salary and allowances to these employees from the date of the termination of their employment to the date of this judgment less the amount of the redundancy or terminal benefits paid to them. 4. The Respondents are ordered to compute and remit to the Appellant the check-off dues of the Appellant’s members in the employment of the Respondents starting from the respective dates the Appellant introduced the union to the Respondents, to the date of this judgment. 5. Parties shall each bear their costs of this appeal. Judgment is entered accordingly. _______________________ Hon. Justice E. N. Agbakoba (Presiding Judge) _____________________ ______________________ Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Hon. Justice R. B. Haastrup (Judge) (Judge)