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RULING/JUDGMENT This matter was instituted by way of Complaint dated and filed on the 21st day of April 2016. In an amended complaint filed on the 4th day of April 2017, the Claimant sought the following reliefs: 1. A Declaration of this Honourable Court that the Defendant's act of abandoning the Claimant for over one year at the Hospital is wrongful and constitutes a breach of the Defendant's duty of care which has led to the Claimant’s permanent deformity. 2. A Declaration of this honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay to the Claimant his salaries from the month of October, 2009 till date and continues to pay his salaries at the agreed sum of N10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Naira) only, per month until his appointment is officially terminated. 3. An Award of N30,000,000.00 (Thirty Million Naira) only against the Defendant being compensation for permanent deformity on the Claimant's right leg. 4. An Award of N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira) only, being General Damages for ill-treatment, abandonment and refusal to pay the Claimant's salaries till date. 5. An Award of 10% interest per annum on the entire Judgment sum from the date of Judgment till same is fully liquidated. Upon resolution of a Preliminary Objection by a ruling dated the 29th day of November 2017, hearing in this matter commenced on the 31st day of January 2018. On 5th March 2018, the Defendant filed a motion which it brought under Section 7 (1)a) and 8 (1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, Laws of the Federal Capital Territory, Section 6 (6) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and under the inherent powers of this court. In the motion, the Defendant prays for an order dismissing the Claimant’s suit and the grounds upon which the prayer is sought are as follows 1. The Claimant’s suit is statute barred having been instituted outside the period stipulated in Section 7 (1) and 8 (1) & (2) of the Limitation Act, Laws of the Federal Capital Territory. 2. The suit is incompetent. 3. The court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 4. The suit constitutes abuse of court process. In the affidavit of Mfoniso Asikpo, a litigation secretary in the law firm of Ola Olanikpekun & Co, filed in support of the motion, it was deposed that the Claimant instituted this suit on 21st April 2016 against U.A.C Supreme Ice Cream but on 4th April 2017, the Claimant amended the Complaint to reflect the name of the Defendant as presently constituted in the suit. The Claimant’s cause of action are founded in negligence/breach of duty of care arising from his allegation that he was abandoned in hospital for over a year and breach of contract of employment arising from his allegation of stoppage of his salaries from October 2009. The cause of action of the Claimant arose on 20th October 2009, however, he instituted this suit on 21st April 2016 which is over six years the cause action arose. The Claimant’s suit is statute barred having been instituted outside the time prescribed by law. Consequently, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The motion was also supported by a written address of Counsel for the Defendant, Daniel Alumun Esq. A sole issue was submitted in the written address, for the Court’s determination: "Whether the Claimant's Suit as constituted is statute-barred pursuant to Sections 7 (1) (A) and 8 (1) & (2) of Limitation Act, CAP 522, Laws of Federal Capital Territory and should be dismissed?" In arguing the sole issue, learned counsel for the Defendant/Applicant relied on the case of EGBE vs. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 at Pg. 20 and submitted that the Claimant's cause of action are breach of duty of care in respect of personal injury as contained in the head claim of the Claimant and breach of contract of employment by the Defendant as reflected on the faces of the Claimant's Amended Complaint and Statement of Facts respectively. Counsel also submitted that the Claimant’s cause of action arose on the 20th October, 2009, being the date the Claimant suffered the alleged injury and consequently, his salaries was stopped by the Defendant as pleaded by the Claimant in paragraphs 13 and 18 of his Statement of Fact. Counsel further contended that the statutory provisions of Sections 7(1) (a) and 8(1) & (2) of Limitation Act, CAP 522, Laws of Federal Capital Territory, the Claimant’s causes of action are statute-barred and the Claimant's right to the instant action is extinguished. Counsel also reproduced the provision of Section 8 (1) and (2) of the Limitation Act CAP 522, Laws of the Federal Capital territory and argued that the Claimants cause of action also failed and as a result the court lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter. See ITA vs. ARCHIBONG (1995) 5 NWLR (Pt. 387) Pg. 83 at Pg. 79, ARAKA vs. EJEAGWU (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt. 692) Pg. 684. Counsel urged the court to resolve the issue against the Claimant and dismiss the suit. In opposing the motion, the Claimant filed a counter affidavit deposed to by Patience Chukwu, a litigation secretary in Maxwell Okpara & Associates. The deponent averred that the Claimant was involved in an accident on 20th October 2009 in the course of his official duties. The Defendant initially paid some money for the Claimant’s treatment in October 2009 but abandoned the Claimant as a result of which the Claimant is now permanently deformed in his right leg. This suit was first instituted in 2013 within time and the same counsel represented the Defendant. During the case, the Claimant could no longer come to court or communicate with his counsel due to his deteriorated health. As a result, the suit was struck out at that time. When the Claimant got better, he contacted his counsel to continue the case and the matter was filed again. In the written address filed in support of the counter affidavit, the Claimant’s counsel, Patricia Owoupele Esq. formulated three issues for determination to wit: 1. Whether the Claimant suit is an abuse of court process. 2. Whether the Honourable court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. 3. Whether the Claimant action is statute barred. On Issue 1, learned counsel for the Claimant/Respondent placed reliance on the courts’ pronouncements in the case of AMACHREE vs. PRINCEWILL (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1098) and submitted that the suit is not an abuse of Court process a there was neither any suit of the same parties and reliefs anywhere nor was it instituted to annoy, harass, embarrass, or intimidate anyone. Counsel argued that the suit was filed, struck out and simply re-filed. See CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF & ANOR vs. TIJAH (2016) LPELR 4088 (CA), NDIC vs. OKEKE (2011) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1244) at Pg. 462-463 para G-A, HB (NIG) PLC vs. LODIGIANI (NIG) LTD (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 330 at 348 para B-D. Counsel urged the court to hold that refiling the suit that was struck out is not an abuse of Court process. On Issue 2, counsel placed reliance on the pronouncement of the locus classicus MADUKOLU vs. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCRVLR on the competence of the court to handle matters before it. Counsel submitted that there was no feature in the case that is capable of preventing the Court from exercising its jurisdiction and urged the Court to so hold. On Issue 3, counsel submitted the exceptions in the Limitations Act and contended that the Limitation period does not run during the pendency of action. Thus where an aggrieved person commences an action within the period prescribed by the statute and such action is subsequently struck out for one reason or the other without being heard on the merit or subjected to an outright dismissal, such action is still open to be recommenced at the instance of the Claimant. Counsel further contended that the limitation period will not count during the pendency of the earlier suit, hence computation of time during the pendency of an action will remain frozen from the filing of the action until it is determined or it abates. See SIFAX (NIG) LTD vs. MIGFO (NIG) & ANOR (2015) LPELR-24655 (CA) where the Supreme Court held that when a matter is struck out, it is merely temporarily removed from the cause list and can be brought back. Counsel urged the court to so hold The Defendant on 26th March 2018, filed a further affidavit deposed to by Mfoniso Asikpo where it was averred that Suit ABJ/136/2016 was never instituted before this court in 2013. Rather, the Claimant instituted suit ABJ/238/2013 against the Defendant on 18th September 2013 before this court. This suit and suit ABJ/238/2013 are two different suits instituted at different times. On 2nd November 2015, Suit ABJ/238/2013 was struck out for want of diligent prosecution. As at the time the suit was struck out, it was already statute barred. The Claimant did not relist suit ABJ/238/2013 but chose to file a fresh suit. In his reply on points of law, the Defendant’s counsel, Daniel Alumun Esq., argued that counsel for the Claimant Respondent quoted the case of SIFAX (NIG) LTD vs. MIGFO (NIG) & ANOR (2015) LPELR-24655 (CA) out of context, and that time can only stop running for the purpose of one action alone and not for the purpose of two different actions as in the instant case, vide Suit No NICN/ABJ/136/2016 and Suit No NICN/ABJ/238/2013. Counsel argued that the provision of the Limitation Law is stringent and, the operation of a limitation statute is of strict liability. Counsel emphasized that once the time limited by statute within which to institute an action has run out, the right to institute the action is lost forever. See OKE vs. OKE (2006) 17 NWLR 224 CA, HASSAN vs. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR 547 SC, EBOIGBE vs. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649 SC. Counsel for the Defendant/Applicant also invoked the doctrine of stare decisis as canvassed in OGBORU vs. IBORI (2006) 17 NWLR 503 SC and urged the court to be bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court on the effect of on action caught by the limitation law, and accordingly discountenance the argument canvassed by the Claimant/Respondent in his Written Address that Suit No NICN/ABJ/136/2016 was filed within time. Counsel also argued that the case of NDIC vs. OKEKE (SUPRA) is not on all fours with the facts and circumstances of the instant case and that it referred to an action that was still within time when struck out. Counsel reproduced the provision of Order 38 Rules 6(1) & (3) of the Rules of Court and argued that the instant Suit was not relisted in line with the stipulated provisions of the Rules of Court into the General Cause List, hence it is caught up with the Limitation Act of the FCT and accordingly statute-barred . Counsel urged the court to so hold and resolve the issues in favour of the Defendant/Applicant. The Claimant sought and obtained the leave of court to file a Reply on Points of Law to the Defendant’s further and better affidavit. In the Reply which was filed on the 29th day of March 2018, learned counsel for the Claimant urged the court to expunge paragraphs 4f, g, i, j, k of the Defendant's Further and better affidavit as they were not statement of facts. Counsel also defended the Claimant’s position on the Sifax case. Counsel argued that the Applicants are aware that the two suits are actually the same. The Claimant/Respondent Counsel submitted that it is the same cause of action and between the same parties, and argued that it is a settled principle of law that were there are different suits and the cause of action is the same and it is between the same parties, it is one action filed multiple times which will be an abuse of court process. Further, counsel argued that going by the decision in the Sifax's case, the Limitation Act will not run when the matter is pending before the court and that a suit or cause of action that is struck out is still alive and kept in the Court's general cause list, see PANALPINA WORLD TRANSPORT (NIG) vs. J. B. OLADEEN INTERNATIONAL & ORS (2010) 19 NWLR (Pg. 1226) 1 at 20 where the court stated that the matter struck out had not left the cause list, as it is still a pending case or pending cause. In conclusion counsel submitted that the Claimant’s case that was struck out was still pending before the Court and the Statute of Limitation did not run against it, being a pending matter in Court. See OLANIYAN vs. OYEMOLE (2008) 5 NWLR (Pg. 1079) 144 at P.137, JOSEPH AFOLABI & ORS vs. JOHN ADEKUNLE & ANOR (1983) 8 SC. 98 at 119, OKONJE vs. ODJE & ORS (1985) 2 NSCC 1278. Counsel urged the court to resolve the issue in favour of the Claimant/Respondent. COURT’S DECISION I have considered the grounds of the motion, the facts deposed in the affidavits of the parties and I have also heard the arguments of counsels for the parties for and against the motion. In my view, the issue to be determined in this ruling is whether the claimant’s suit is statute barred. From the averments in the affidavit in support of the motion, the basis of the Defendant’s motion is that the Claimant’s cause of action is founded on negligence or breach of duty of care and breach of contract of employment. This cause of action of the Claimant arose on 20th October 2009 but the Claimant filed this suit on 21st April 2016 outside the period limit set in sections 7 (1)(a) and 8 (1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, Laws of the Federal Capital Territory for instituting the nature of the Claimant’s suit. The Defendant contends in the result that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred. To properly determine the Defendant’s motion, it is necessary to examine the provisions of Sections 7 (1)(a) and 8 (1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, Laws of the Federal Capital Territory. Section 7 (1) a) provides: 1. The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued: (a) an action founded on simple contract.” Section 8 (1) and (2) provides: 1. This action applies to action claiming damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exist by virtue of a contract or of a provision made by or under an enactment or independently of a contract or of the provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance of breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to person. 2. Subject to the provision of this section, no action to which this section applies shall be brought after the expiration of three years from the date the cause of action accrued. The above provisions are clear and unambiguous. I need only to emphasise that where any action in respect of the mentioned subject matters is not filed within the period prescribed in the provisions, the action will be statute barred and cannot be entertained by the courts. See ELEBANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 604. In the amended statement of facts of the Claimant, the facts of his case is simply that he was involved in an accident on 20th October 2009 while travelling to Jos on the instruction of the Defendant and the accident took his right leg. He was admitted in the hospital but the Defendant abandoned him there for over a year. His salaries from October 2009 have not been paid by the Defendant. On the basis of these facts, he sought the following reliefs: i. A declaration that the act of the Defendant in abandoning the Claimant for over a year at the hospital is wrongful and a breach of the Defendant’s duty of care which has led to the Claimant’s permanent deformity ii. A declaration directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant his salaries from the month of October 2009 till date and to continue to pay his salaries at the agreed sum of N10,000 per month until his appointment is officially terminated. iii. Award of N30,000,000 against the Defendant as compensation for the Claimant’s permanent deformity iv. award of N2,000,000 as general damages for ill treatment, abandonment and refusal to pay the Claimant’s salaries till date v. Award of 10% interest per annum on the entire judgment sum from date of judgment till same is fully liquidated. From the facts of the Claimant case and the reliefs he sought, it is clear that his cause of action and claims are founded on: (1) breach of contract of employment for the stoppage of his salaries from October 2009 and (2) breach of duty of care of the Defendant in abandoning him in hospital for over a year including claim for personal injury. From the facts of his case, the Claimant’s cause of action in respect of these claims arose in October 2009. By the provisions of Sections 7 (1)(a) and 8 (1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, Laws of the Federal Capital Territory, the Claimant ought to have filed this case within three years and six years from the time the respective causes of action arose. This suit was filed on 21st April 2016 as disclosed on the endorsement on the originating Complaint. The Claimant’s suit appears to have been filed outside the period prescribed in the Limitation Act. The Claimant has however contended that his suit is not statute barred because he had brought an action in respect of his claim since 2013. In the counter affidavit of the Claimant, it was averred that this suit was first instituted in 2013 but it was struck out when the Claimant could no longer attend court as a result of his ill health. When he became well, the suit was re-filed. In his written address in support of the counter affidavit, the Claimant’s counsel cited the case of SIFAX NIG. LTD vs. MIGFO NIG. LTD (2015) LPELR-24655 (CA) and submitted that where an action is commenced within time but the action is later struck out without being heard on the merit, such action can be recommenced and limitation period will not count during the pendency of the earlier suit. It was further argued by the Claimant’s counsel that computation of time during the pendency of an action is frozen until it is determined or it abates. In the further affidavit of the Defendant, it was explained that the Claimant instituted Suit ABJ/238/2013 against the Defendant on 18th September 2013 before this court. On 2nd November 2015, Suit ABJ/238/2013 was struck out for want of diligent prosecution, and the Claimant later filed this Suit no ABJ/136/2016 as a fresh suit. It was also averred that this suit and Suit ABJ/238/2013 are two different suits instituted at different times. A copy of the Complaint in Suit ABJ/238/2013 and the ruling striking out the suit are exhibited to the Defendant’s further affidavit as Exhibits AA and BB respectively. From the counter affidavit of the Claimant and the further affidavit of the Defendant, it is clear to me that the Claimant previously filed Suit No ABJ/238/2013 against the Defendant before this court on 18th September 2013 but the suit was struck out for want of diligent prosecution on 2nd November 2015. Then, on 21st April 2016, the Claimant filed this instant Suit No. ABJ/136/2016 against the same Defendant. In the originating Complaint in Suit ABJ/238/2013 annexed as Exhibit AA to the Defendant’s further affidavit, the reliefs sought and the facts of that suit are the same with this instant suit. It is clear to me that the Claimant decided to file a new case against the same Defendant on the same cause of action and facts as that in Suit ABJ/238/2013 that was struck out on 2nd November 2015. The SIFAX vs. MIGFO case cited by the Claimant’s counsel is the Court of Appeal judgment delivered in 2015. The case had further gone to the Supreme Court in Appeal No. SC. 417/2015 and judgment therein was delivered on 16th February 2018. In my view, the Supreme Court’s decision in the SIFAX vs. MIGFO does not support the Claimant’s contention in this application. In the SIFAX vs. MIGFO case, the freezing of time for the purpose of limitation of action was used in relation to suits commenced in a wrong court. It was the view of the Supreme Court that when the suit was recommenced in the right court, limitation of time with respect to the cause of action stopped running when the suit was first filed in the wrong court. The decision should not be interpreted to mean that limitation of time stops running from the time every struck out matter was filed. The Claimant’s suit ABJ/238/2013 and this suit were filed in the same court. Also, the reason for striking out Suit ABJ/238/2013 was not because it was filed in a wrong court. Suit ABJ/238/2013 was a competent suit before this court before it was struck out. Therefore, the decision in SIFAX vs. MIGFO will not apply in this case. Let me mention here that Suit ABJ/238/2013 was merely struck out for want of diligent prosecution. It is the law that a matter struck out by the court remains on the general cause list of court in as far as the rights of the parties therein have not been determined. Therefore, Suit ABJ/238/2013 has remained in the general cause list of this court till date. The Claimant has also submitted so in his reply on points of law which was filed with leave of court on 29th March 2018. I have also observed that hearing had commenced in Suit ABJ/238/2013 before the Claimant abandoned the suit and it was struck out. What the Claimant ought to have done was to relist Suit ABJ/238/2013 and continue from where he stopped but he decided to file this instant action between the same parties, same issues and same claims. Abuse of court process is said to occur when there is multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter between the same parties or instituting different actions between same parties simultaneously in the same or different courts. See OPEKUN vs. SADIQ (2003) FWLR (Pt. 150) 1654 at 1661, A.R.C vs. J.D.P CONSTRUCTION NIG. LTD (2003) FWLR (Pt. 153) 251 at 270. When this occurs, as in this case, the latter case is said to constitute an abuse. Clearly, this instant action is an abuse of court process and it is liable to be struck out on this ground. I have also found in this ruling that this suit was filed outside the limitation period specified in Sections 7 (1)(a) and 8 (1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, Laws of the Federal Capital Territory. The Claimant’s cause of action arose in October 2009 but he filed this case 21st April 2016. This was a period of 6 years and 6 months. This case is also statute barred. Consequently, Suit No. ABJ/136/2016 is hereby dismissed. The Claimant is at liberty to relist suit ABJ/238/2013 if he so wishes. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge