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RULING 1. The claimants had filed this suit on 22nd June 2015 by way of a complaint and the accompanying originating processes against the defendant praying for the following reliefs: (a) An order for the immediate enforcement and full implementation of the judgement of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Appeal No. SC/190/2003 between the 1991 retrenched staff of the Nigeria Port Authority and the Nigeria Port Authority. (b) An order of Court directing the defendant to pay the claimants the sum of Eight Billion, Five Hundred and Eighty-Three Million, Three Hundred and Two Thousand, Two Hundred and Six Naira, Seven Kobo (N8,583,302,206.07) being the balance of the unpaid pension arrears due to the claimants from 10th of June 1991 to February 2015. (c) An order of Court directing the defendant to immediately include the names of the claimants in the list of its pensioners and/or in its pension’s pay roll. (d) An order of Court compelling and directing the defendant to immediately commence the payment of the claimants’ monthly pensions as at when due inclusive of the various pensions increases given by the Federal Government of Nigeria. (e) An order of Court compelling and directing the defendant to immediately pay each of the claimants the sum of Five Million Naira as redundancy benefit due to them in line with the judgement of the Supreme Court in Suit no. SC/190/2003. (f) An order of Court directing the defendant to pay the claimants two months’ salary being the balance on the three months’ salary due to the claimants in lieu of notice as granted by the judgement of the Supreme Court in Appeal No. SC/190/2003. (g) An order of Court directing the defendant to pay 20% interest on the judgement sum before judgement is entered and 10% interest on the judgement sum until the judgement is fully liquidated. 2. In reaction, the defendant filed its statement of defence and accompanying defence processes; and then filed a preliminary objection urging this Court to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction on the following grounds: the matter is statute-barred in virtue of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act; the failure to serve a pre-action notice as enjoined by section 92 of the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) Act Cap N126 LFN 2004; the claimants were not parties to Suit No. SC/190/2003; and the suit discloses no justiciable/reasonable cause of action against the defendant. In support of the preliminary objection is an affidavit and a written address. In opposition, the claimants filed a counter-affidavit and a written address. To these, the defendant filed a further affidavit and a reply on points of law. 3. At the Court’s sitting of 21st June 2017, this Court noted that parties were trying to settle the case out of Court. However, the Court raised the issue whether, given section 10 of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006, this Court has the power to enforce the judgment of the Supreme Court as prayed in this suit. The Court called on the parties to note this issue for possible address of the Court on it. 4. The defendant submitted three issues for determination regarding its preliminary objection, namely: (1) Whether or not this suit is statute-barred/time barred same not having been commenced within 3 months and 6 years respectively from the date of the Supreme Court judgment in SC/190/2003. (2) Whether or not failure to issue pre-action notice renders this suit incompetent. (3) Whether or not the claimants have locus standi to maintain this action. 5. On issue (1), the case of the defendant is that this suit was filed on 22nd June 2015 whereas the cause of action given the 7 reliefs the claimants seek arose on 11th May 2007 when the judgment of the Supreme Court in SC/190/2003 was delivered i.e. this suit was filed way out of the 3 months allowed by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap P41 LFN 2004, the defendant being a public officer. The defendant then referred to Ibrahim v. JSC [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 at 31 - 32, CBN v, Adedeji [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 226 at 245 and Woherem v. Emeruwa [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 398 at 415. That even if section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act is inapplicable, the suit is time barred by virtue of Order IV Rule 8(1) of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules of Court made pursuant to the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act Cap S6 LFN 2004, which provides thus: As between the original parties, process, otherwise than against the person, may issue at any time within six years, and against any person at any time within two years, from the date of the judgment which is immediately sought to be enforced. To the defendant, a period of 8 years had elapsed after the delivery of the the Supreme Court judgment; as such this suit is dead on arrival, citing Emitter v. Nigerian Army [1999] 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) 362 at 372, UBN Ltd v. Oki [1999] 8 NWLR (Pt. 614) 244 at 252, Anozie v. AGF [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 278 at 291 and Comptroller-General Prisons v. Idehen [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1182) 502 at 515, ad urging the Court to dismiss this suit. 6. Regarding issue (2), the defendant submitted that the claimants had a duty to notify the defendant of their intention to commence legal proceedings against the defendant, citing section 92(1) of the NPA Act 2004. That the claimants failed to issue the pre-action notice required of them under section 92(1) of the NPA Act 2004, citing Nigercare Development Co. Ltd v. Adamawa State Water Board [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093) 498 at 526 - 527, Nigerian Ports Plc v. Ntiero [1998] 6 NWLR (Pt. 555) 640 at 651, NNPC v. Fawehinmi [1998] 7 NWLR (Pt. 559) 598 at 619 and Odoemelam v. Amadiume [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1070) 179 at 189. The defendant then urged the Court to resolve issue (2) in its favour. 7. For issue (3), the defendant submitted that from the judgment of the Supreme Court placed before the Court, the names of the parties to the judgment and those they represent are not before this Court. That the locus of the claimants to enforce the judgment of the Supreme Court has not been established by the claimants. Consequently, the claimants lack the locus to enforce the judgment of the Supreme Court in this enforcement proceedings, citing Sodipo v. Ogidan [2008] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1077) 342 at 374. That the statement of facts is supported by the witness statement on oath and attachments do not identify the claimants as beneficiaries of the Supreme Court judgment; as such this Court has been starved of necessary materials on which to take informed decision on the justiciability of the claimant’s cause of action against the defendant. That the claim should therefore be dismissed. 8. The claimants in reaction submitted only one issue for determination, namely: Given the facts and circumstances of this suit, whether the Court has jurisdiction to enforce the judgment of the Supreme Court. Citing CBN v. SAP Nig. Ltd [2005] 3 NWLR (Pt. 911) 152, Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341, Ajao v. Obele [2005] 5 NWLR (Pt. 918) 400 at 414 - 415 and Sken Consult v. Ukey [1981] 1 SC 6, the claimants submitted that in this suit the proper parties are before the Court (the claimants are ex-employees of the defendant), the subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Court (the payment of entitlements and pensions falls within the jurisdiction of this Court in virtue of section 254C(1)(k) of the 1999 Constitution), there is no issue as to the composition of the Court as to its member and qualification, and the suit was commenced by due process of the law and upon the fulfillment of all conditions precedent to assumption of jurisdiction. 9. The claimants went on that by section 287(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the decision of the Supreme Court shall be enforced by all authorities, persons and Courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Supreme Court. That the claimants are members of the retrenched employees of the NPA who were disengaged from the NPA in 1991 and the action at the Supreme Court was commenced in representative capacity for an on behalf of the 1991 retrenched NPA staff. Accordingly, that the claimants are beneficiaries of the said judgment and so can enforce it, citing Atanda v. Olanrewaju [1988] 4 NWLR (Pt. 89) 394 and section 287(1) of the 1999 Constitution. 10. The claimants also referred to Order IV Rule 8(1) and (2) of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules under the Sheriff and Civil Process Act 2004. That a cursory look at the said Rule 8(1) and (2) shows that the claimants are still within the law since the enforcement of the Supreme Court judgment has been on since 2008 and which terms of settlement was entered in 2014 and still open gate for those who want to proceed on further litigation. That this suit is thus not statute-barred, citing Purification Technique (Nig.) Ltd v. Jubril [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1331) 109 at 139. That a declaratory judgment can be enforced by an action, citing Okoya v. Santili [1990] 2 NWLR (Pt. 131) 172 at 228. That this is what the claimant have done in this suit. However, that the is not a fresh suit that would need a pre-action notice as the defendant seems to think. Furthermore, that the issue of pension payment is not caught up by the Public Officers Protection Act, citing Amao v. CBN [2010] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1219) at 295. The claimants then urged the Court to discountenance the preliminary objection. 11. In replying on points of law, the defendant simply reiterated the submissions it made in its written address. I shall not waste precious judicial time recasting them here. I shall, however, only highlight fresh points made by the defendant. On the issue Order IV Rule 8(1) and (2) of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules. the defendant submitted that the leave of Court enjoined by Rule 8(2) has not been sought in this case; as such this suit is incompetent, citing Okangi v. Fatoba [2012] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1299) 266 at 291 and Bodunde v. SCI & CS Ltd [2013] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1367) 197 at 219. That the claimants conveniently left out the qualification laid down in Purification Technique (Nig.) Ltd v. Jubril voted by the claimants, which is: “It is an action to enforce the reliefs granted in the judgment that may be statute-barred” used to explain whether it is the judgment or the action to enforce the judgment that can be statute-barred. The defendant urged the Court to note that the proposition by the claimants that pre-action notice is needed only where a fresh suit is being instituted was not substantiated by the claimants. To the defendant, section 92 of the NPA Act applies to all suits given the words “No suit shall be commenced…” used in the provision. On the claimants’ reference to Amao v. CBN, the defendant submitted that it is not owing the claimants any monthly pension; as such Amao v. CBN is distinguishable on that ground. That even if the cause of action of the instant suit arose in 2014 as argued by the claimants, in filing this suit in June 2015, the claimants were well outside the 3 months allowed by the Public Officers Protection Act. The defendant concluded by urging the Court to dismiss this suit. 12. The instant suit going by relief (a) is for “the immediate enforcement and full implementation of the judgement of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Appeal No. SC/190/2003 between the 1991 retrenched staff of the Nigeria Port Authority and the Nigeria Port Authority”. The plaintiffs who were also the appellants in the Supreme Court suit SC/190/2003 are 10 in number suing “for and on behalf of NPA Retrenched staff June 1991”. The 10 named plaintiffs/appellants in SC/190/2003 are not the 11 named claimants in the instant suit who are “Suing for themselves and on behalf of the 1991 retrenched staff of Nigeria Port Authority who have insisted on further litigation to press home their entitlement”. Paragraph 1 of the statement of facts reiterates this fact; and paragraphs 3 and 4 reinforced the fact that the claimants in this suit were disengaged from the employment of the defendant in 1991. The grouse of the claimants in the instant case is that the judgment of the Supreme Court has not been fully implemented by the defendant hence the instant suit. See paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 of the statement of facts. At paragraph 17 of the statement of facts, the claimants put the total arrears of pension owed to them by the defendant as N8,583,302,206.07. In paragraphs 5 and 18, the claimants complained about not being paid monthly pension. Additionally, the claimants had also in paragraph 5 complained of not having been paid redundancy benefit and three months’ salary in lieu of notice. Essentially, therefore, the claimants’ case is for payment of arrears of pension, monthly pension, redundancy and three months’ salary in lieu of notice. Given section 254C(1)(a) and (k) of the 1999 Constitution, there is no shred of doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claims of the claimants. See Keystone Bank Limited v. Mr. Olukayode Abiodun Oyewale [2014] LPELR-23612(CA). 13. The questions that arise, however, are whether this suit is statute-barred or time-barred, whether there is necessity to issue pre-action notice and whether the claimants have the locus to sue. To start with the issue of locus, the argument of the defendant is that the claimants in the instant case are not the same with those in Suit SC/190/2003. The pleadings of the claimants as I just highlighted go against this argument of the defendant. The pleadings sufficiently show that the claimants in the instant suit were all part of Suit SC/190/2003. That the claimants can sue in a representative capacity is no longer in doubt. See Durbar Hotel Plc v. Mr Abella Ityough & 4 ors [2016] LPELR-42560(SC). For the sake of argument, even if the claimants in the instant case are not the same as the ones in Suit SC/190/2003, Order 4 Rule 2 of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules under the Sheriff and Civil Process Act 2004 dealing with “Execution on behalf of persons not parties to the suit”, provides that “Execution may issue on behalf of any person not a party to the suit, by leave of the court, upon proof of his title to the benefit of the judgment, and upon substitution of the name of the new judgment creditor, together with a statement of his derivative title, for that of the former judgment creditor”. This Rule, although subject to obtaining leave of court, acknowledges that a judgment may be executed on behalf of persons not parties to the suit. I am accordingly not convinced with the defendant’s argument as to locus. It fails and is hereby dismissed. I hold that the claimants have the locus to sue. 14. On the issue of pre-action, the defendant hinged its case on section 92(1) of the NPA Act 2004 which enjoins pre-action notice before any suit can be filed against the defendant. The claimant’s reaction is that the instant suit is not a fresh suit; it being an enforcement of Suit SC/190/2003. The defendant responded that no authority was given for this proposition of the claimant. I agree with the claimants that the instant suit is one for the enforcement of Suit SC/190/2003. I think it is accordingly logical that in the instant case, a case for enforcement of the judgment of the Supreme Court in respect of a cause of action that had been validly litigated, pre-action notice is not a necessity. The argument that no authority was given by the claimants for its proposition overlooks the fact that there is always a beginning, a start. If a court of law is to await an authority in respect of an issue raised anew, the question arises: that authority that is being awaited, how did it come about in the first place if not that it or its precursor was a first. 15. My brother Hon. Justice Peter O. Affen, writing extra-judicially in a paper titled, “The Law on Pre-action Notice in Nigeria: The Search for a New Outlook”, and published as Chapter 13 in C. C. Nweze, et al (eds.) - Beyond Bar Advocacy: Multidisciplinary Essays in Honour of Anthony Okoye Mogboh, SAN (Umuahia: Impact Global Publishers Ltd: Umuahia), 2011 at pages 251 - 275 underscored the point that there is a yawning need to rethink the present judicial posture on pre-action notice and lamented how trial courts are routinely confronted with an infinite miscellany of disquieting scenarios on this thorny issue of pre-action notice. In the main, His Lordship examined the desirability or otherwise of the continued retention of the requirement of pre-action notice in our corpus juris and then made a case for a new judicial outlook towards pre-action notice by adverting attention to certain factual situations or circumstances in which the requirement ought to be discounted in appropriate proceedings. I think the instant case is one such instance. He would later take the liberty in Banex Plaza Wuse 2, Tenants Association v. Abuja Environmental Protection Board unreported Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1774/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 21st March 2017, to hold that the requirement under section 40(3) of the Abuja Environmental Protection Board (AEPB) Act that “No suit shall be commenced against a member of the Board, director, officer or employee of the Board before the expiration of a period of one month after written notices of intention to commence the suit shall have been served upon the Board by the intending plaintiff or his agent” was one that did not require service of pre-action notice on the Board itself (the defendant in the case). In fact, other case law authorities have created qualifications to the application of pre-action notices in cases. For instance, in International Tobacco Co. Plc v. NAFDAC [2007] LPELR-8442(CA); [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 613 CA, Ogunbiyi, JCA (as Her Ladyship then was) opined that in cases of necessity pre-action notice may not be a requirement; for example, that where a speedy remedy by injunction is sought, the requirement of pre-action notice may not apply. See also Mrs Kikelomo Kola-Fasanu v. Prestige Assurance Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/25/2016, the ruling of which was delivered on 24th January 2017. In the instant case, therefore, I hold that pre-action notice is not a requirement, this suit being an enforcement suit. 15. Being an enforcement suit, the suit is not caught up by the Public Officers Protection Act. Even if it were so caught up, I note that Ajao v. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Economic Planning Budget Civil Service Pensions Office & anor [2016] LPELR-41407(CA) held that a claim for pensions/terminal benefits cannot be caught up by the limitation law although the decision was arrived at on the premise that the cause of action accrued upon the completion of the computation of the terminal benefits of the appellant by the respondents and the communication of the same to the appellant by the respondents. The Court raised the issue of section 10 of the NIC Act 2006. However given the constitutional provision of section 287(1) of the 1999 Constitution, which supersedes section 10 of the NIC Act 2006, the said issue as raised by the Court is no longer an issue. Section 287(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides thus: “The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Supreme Court”. The Court is one with subordinate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court and so enjoined to enforce all decisions of the Supreme Court including Suit SC/190/2003 presently in issue. 16. There is, however, the issue of Order 4 Rule 8(1) and (2) of the Judgment (Enforcement) Rules under the Sheriff and Civil Process Act 2004. Rule 8 deals with “Execution after two and six years”; and provides thus: (1) As between the original parties, process, otherwise than against the person; may issue at any time within six years, and against the person at any time within two years, from the date of the judgment which is immediately sought to be enforced. (2) After such periods respectively process shall not issue without leave of the court, but no notice to the judgment debtor before applying for such leave shall be necessary. The claimants argued that even if their instant suit where to be time-barred, they are within time because the cause of action arose in 2014 given the terms of settlement entered in that year. The claimants’ statement of facts is silent on any 2014 terms of settlement. This aside, Rule 8(1) provides the time limit as “As between the original parties…within six years, and against the person at any time within two years, from the date of the judgment which is immediately sought to be enforced”. The key phrase here is “from the date of the judgment which is immediately sought to be enforced”. What the claimants seek to enforce is the judgment of SC/190/203, which was delivered on 11th May 2007, not any terms of settlement that occurred after 11th May 2007. Between 11th May 2007 and 22nd June 2015, over 8 years had elapsed. This means that the claimants are way out of the stipulation in Rule 8(1). This being so, the applicable rule is Rule 8(2), which enjoins that the claimants seek leave of court before approaching this Court for enforcement. No such leave has been sought. The claimants are accordingly prematurely before this Court. This being so, the instant suit is incompetent. I so find and hold. The claimants can only come to this Court upon leave of this Court first sought and granted. On this ground alone, this suit is incompetent and so is hereby struck out. 10. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD