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RULING 1. As Supernumerary (Spy) Police Officers employed in the Ikeja Local government Area, the claimants on 20th March 2017 took up a complaint against 3 defendants praying for: (1) A declaration that the claimants are entitled to their salaries and entitlements as per their conditions of service and the terms of their employment with the 1st defendant. (2) An order directing the defendants to pay the sum of Twenty-Five Million, Four Hundred and Thirty-Seven Thousand, Two Hundred and Ten Naira (N25,437,210.00) being the total salaries and entitlements owed to the claimants. (3) An order directing the defendants to pay the sum of Five Million, Six Hundred and Five Thousand, Nine Hundred and Seventy-Eight Naira (N5,605,978.00) being arrears of salary increment from July 2010 to 2013, to the claimants. (4) The sum of Ten Million Naira (10,000,000.00) as general damages for the wrongful withholding of the arrears of salaries and entitlements of the claimants. 2. In a considered ruling of this Court delivered on 21st February 2018, the name of the 1st defendant was struck out on the ground that it lacked the capacity to sue or be sued, thus leaving the instant two defendants. The instant 1st defendant (as 2nd defendant) had on 8th June 2017 filed a preliminary objection praying that its name be struck out of this suit on the grounds that it is not qualified as a party in this suit and that there is no reasonable cause of action against it in this suit. In support of the preliminary objection is an affidavit and a written address. In opposition, the claimants filed a counter-affidavit and a written address. The now 1st defendant did not file any reply on points of law. 3. The 1st defendant submitted two issues for determination, namely: (1) Whether the 1st defendant/applicant can be said to be qualified as a party to this suit. (2) Whether the claimants’ case discloses any reasonable cause of action against the 1st defendant/applicant in the suit. 4. On issue (1), the 1st defendant submitted that parties to an action are classified into three namely: necessary, desirable and proper parties, citing Green v. Green [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480. That necessary party to an action is that person who is not only interested in the subject matter of proceedings but whose presence is essential for effectual and complete determination of the claim before the Court. It is also a party in whose absence the proceedings could not be fairly dealt with, citing NNN Ltd v. Ademola [1997] 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) 76 at 83 and Chief Adegbenro Afolayan v. Oba Joshua Ogunrinde [1990] 1 NWLR (Pt. 127) 369. Desirable party to an action is that person who have an interest in the matter or who may be affected in one way or the other by the result or outcome of a matter, citing Igbokwe v. Kehinde [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072) 445 and Peenok Investment Ltd v. Hotel Presidential Ltd [1982] 12 SC 1. Proper party to an action is that person who though not interested in the claimant’s claim is made a party for some good reason. That applying this provision to the instant case, the 1st defendant is not in any way involved in the issues giving rise to this suit and so is not in any way qualified as a party in this suit. That the 1st defendant has already stated in the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection that the redeployment of the claimants back to the Lagos State Police Command is not subject to the approval or otherwise of the 1st defendant. 5. Furthermore, that to determine whether a party or a defendant is a necessary, desirable or proper party to a matter in a Court, recourse must be made to the claim of the plaintiffs before the Court which gives him the right to initiate the action for the alleged wrongful act, citing Ogebor v. INEC [2005] 15 NWLR (Pt. 948) 376 and Dantata v. Mohammed [2000] 7 NWLR (Pt. 664) 176. That the persons against whom complaints are made in an action must be made parties to the suit. That trial courts have prerogative and responsibility to ensure that proceedings agree with the justice of the case by joining as claimants or defendants all persons who may be entitled to or claim some share or interest in the subject matter of the suit or who may likely be affected by the result if they had not already been made parties, citing Mobil Oil Plc v. Drexel Energy & Natural Resources Ltd [2004] 1 NWLR (Pt. 853) 142 CA. That it is trite that what constitutes a cause of action is the entire set of circumstances given rise to an enforceable claim and it is from the cause of action as endorsed on the complaint that determines the proper parties before the Court, referring to AG, Federation v. AG, Abia State [2001] 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 689. That no complaint whatsoever had been made against the 1st defendant in this case; therefore, the claimants can fairly deal with this matter against the 2nd defendant without including the 1st defendant as a party in this suit. That this Court can effectively and justly adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in this suit without joining the 1st defendant as a party be it necessary, desirable or proper party in this suit. 6. For issue (2), the 1st defends t submitted that it is well settled principle of law that it is the claim of the claimants that has to be examined to ascertain whether or not a Court is possessed with the jurisdiction to hear and determined the matter before it. That a reasonable cause of action signifies the entire set of facts or circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim including all things necessary to give right to action and every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the claimant to succeed, citing PVC Ltd v. Lawal [2005] 3 NWLR (Pt. 911) 121 CA and Bello v. AG, Oyo [1986] 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828. That to decide whether or not a suit discloses a cause of action, recourse must be made to the statement of facts. This can be achieved by a careful scrutiny of the averments contained therein, so that when facts establishing a civil right or obligation and facts establishing an act of violation or trespass on those rights or obligation exist side by side, a cause of action is said to have accrued, referring to Alalade v. Moroundiya [2002] 16 NWLR (Pt. 792) 81. Therefore, that an intending claimant must ensure that his originating process discloses a cause of action that is reasonable and not frivolous to be able to invoke the jurisdiction of a Court. 7. The 1st defendant went on that there is difference between a cause of action and a reasonable cause of action. It is only where the statement of fact of a claimant discloses a triable issue that it can be said to have disclosed a reasonable cause of action, citing Nigeria Airways v. Gbajumo [1992] 5 NWLR (Pt. 244) 735 at 750 - 751. That applying this provision to the instant case and a perusal of all the pleadings as contained in the statement of facts will show that no reasonable cause of action has been disclose against the 1st defendant. That it can be clearly seen that the dispute is between the claimants and the defendant that was struck out. That it is trite law that in order to discover whether a cause of action is disclosed in a case, the Court must limit itself to the claimant’s pleadings; no resort whatever must be made to the statement of defence, citing Ikeja Hotel Plc v. LSBIR [2005] 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 343 CA. The 1st defends t then submitted that the consequence of failure to disclose reasonable cause of action is for the Court to strike out the claimant’s suit. That it is, therefore, the responsibility of the claimant’s counsel to plead all material facts that will disclose reasonable cause of action in his statement of claim/facts. That failure to do so is fatal to the case and mere speculation of possible amendment will not save the action from being struck out, citing Williams v. Williams [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 375) 1. To the 1st defendant, there is no iota of evidence showing any wrong committed by it in this case and that it is well settled law that the claimants as in the instant case cannot sue a defendant against whom he has no cause of action, citing Military Administrator Akwa Ibom State v. Obong [2001] NWLR (Pt. 694) 220. That any claim that discloses no reasonable cause of action will be struck out as the competency of the action is affected and the Court will be deprived of the jurisdiction to entertain same, citing Thomas v. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669 at 680. In conclusion, the 1st defendant urged the Court to grant this application by striking out the name of the 1st defendant from this suit as a party be it necessary, desirable or proper parties and failure of the claimants to disclose any reasonable cause of action against it, citing Order 30 Rule 18 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017. 8. In reaction, the claimants submitted a lone issue for determination: whether the 1st defendant/applicant is not a proper/necessary party that ought to be joined in this action. To the claimants, it is a fundamental principle of law that bringing the correct parties before the Court is necessary to enable the Court determine the issues between the parties effectually, adequately and completely in order to do justice in the matter, as parties must not only be joined, but must have interest in the subject matter of the proceedings, and in whose absence the proceedings cannot be fairly dealt with. That where it becomes necessary to make the judgment in the matter to be binding on another, it would be proper to join such a person in the matter as a necessary party, citing Re: NDIC (Liquidator of Alpha Merchant Bank) Adesauya & anor v. Lawal & 2 ors [2007] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1032) 54 CA at 68. That the Lagos State Government operates a State/Local Governments joint account into which statutory allocations are paid. That the crux of the claimant’s case is that they were not paid the arrears of their salaries and entitlements owed to them as provided in their conditions of service despite several demands. 9. The claimants went on that the Lagos State Government, through its Ministry of Local Government and Community Affairs, has tremendous involvement and participation through itself and its Ministries in supervising the defendant struck out. That Exhibit C in the claimants’ 1st witness statement on oath is a letter dated 16th September 2009, written by the Lagos State Ministry of Local Government and Community Affairs to the defendant struck out on the unfavourable attitudes of the defendant struck out to Supernumerary Police Officers posted to the defendant struck out, raising issues to be addressed by the defendant struck out. Unfortunately, that these issues were not addressed by the defendant struck out. That the defendant struck out also in a letter dated 14th November 2016, (Exhibit N in the claimants’ 1st witness statement on oath) in defence to the claimants’ demand for the arrears of their salaries and entitlements on retirement gave reasons for relieving the claimants of their duties and non-payment of salaries and entitlements, one of which was the restructuring of personnel as a result of paucity of funds at the Local Government/Councils’ disposal and due to compliance with directives received from the supervising Ministry i.e. the Lagos State Ministry of Local Government and Community Affairs. 10. The claimants continued that from the correspondences between the claimant and the defendant struck out, the defendant struck out always refers to the Ministry of Local Government and Community Affairs of the Lagos State Government which is represented by the present 1st defendant in the instant suit, as its supervisor and director of all their affairs. That by virtue of the 1st defendant’s position as the Chief Law Officer of Lagos State, he is a necessary party, for without his presence the matter will not be justifiably determined on its merits and also the 1st defendant will be affected financially by the result of the litigation. Furthermore, that section 7 of the 1999 Constitution provides for the Local Government system in the following words: “the system of local government by democratically elected local government council is under this Constitution guaranteed; and accordingly, the Government of every State shall subject to section 8 of this Constitution, ensure their existence under a Law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils”. That these duties are defined by the State Government through laws enacted by the State House of Assembly. That the Constitution provides for the Local Government/Council as a creation of the State Government making the State Government parties to suits affecting the Local Government/Councils. Citing Order 13 Rules 4, 7 and 8 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, the claimants submitted that the Rules of this Court empower the claimants to bring a claim against a party upon whom a relief lies against. That the claimants instituted this suit against the defendants and has provided the extent to which the defendants are liable. It is thus the claimants’ submission that the circumstances of this suit warrant that the 1st defendant, who is the Attorney General of Lagos State, to be joined as a parry in this suit in order for questions and issues which may have arisen to be effectually and completely resolved to bring about a just determination and favour the interest of justice. That the 1st defendant has not been able to disclose sufficient reasons as to why the application should be granted, urging the Court to dismiss the 1st defendant’s preliminary object in its entirety. COURT’S DECISION 11. In considering the 1st defendant’s preliminary objection, I start off with relief (3) of the claimants. Relief (3) is for an order directing the defendants to pay to the claimants the sum of N5,605,978.00 being arrears of salary increment from July 2010 to 2013. The 1st defendant in adopting its written address orally submitted that this relief is statute-barred, but that it is leaving the issue to the discretion of the Court. The claimants, on their part, submitted that relief (3) is not statute-barred given that the period 2010 to 2013, which they are asking for, is a continuous process and so is not caught up by the limitation law. The continuing injury rule which the claimants alluded to is met only when there is periodicity of payment as enjoined by AG Rivers State v. AG Bayelsa State [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 SC. This is not the case as far as relief (3) is concerned. The claimants are already out of work; as such, there is no periodicity of payment of salary to make applicable the continuing injury rule. This being the case, the claim for “N5,605,978.00 being arrears of salary increment from July 2010 to 2013” means that the cause of action, which is payment of salary increment, crystallized in 2013 since by that year there was no longer any right to salary increment. The defendants are public officers under the Public Officers Protection Act going by Ibrahim v. JSC, Kaduna State & ors [1998] 12 SC 20. The claim for salary increment between 2010 to 2013 is one that is outside of the three months allowed by section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act; as such, the claim is statute-barred. In any event, LUTH & MB v. Adewole [1998] 5 NWLR (Pt. 550) 406 held that where the claim is that payment of salaries has been wrongfully withheld, the cause of action accrues from the date the salaries are due for payment. By this authority, the salary increment prayed for by the claimants arose on the date the salary increment was due for payment i.e. 2013. I accordingly hold that relief (3) is statute-barred and so is hereby dismissed. 12. All through their submissions in opposition to the 1st defendant’s preliminary objection, the claimants kept emphasizing how their cause of action is against the defendant whose name was struck off this suit. The claimants made it very clear in paragraph 4.4 of their written address that it was this defendant that refused to pay their arrears of salaries and entitlements owed them as provided in their conditions of service. This complaint against the defendant struck out continued in paragraphs 4.5 to 4.8 of the written address. This being the case, and given the ruling of this Court delivered on 21st February 2018 wherein the name of the 1st defendant was struck out on the ground that it lacked the capacity to sue or be sued, it becomes very certain that the claimants have no cause of action against the defendants worth pursuing. If the work the claimants did was with a body that cannot sue or be sued, it is clear then that an action is not maintainable in that regard against any person. I accordingly agree with the 1st defendant that there is no reasonable cause of action in this suit. The suit is, therefore, incompetent and is hereby struck out. 13. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD