RULING/JUDGMENT. This deals with preliminary objection filed on 11/4/18 by the Defendant seeking for an order of Court dismissing this suit for lack of jurisdiction. The grounds for the objection are: 1. The Defendant is not a juristic person, 2. The suit is statue barred In compliance with the Rules of this Court the Defendant filed a written address to the preliminary objection. Counsel for the Defendant adopted the written address as his argument. In the written address two issues were distilled for determination, to wit: 1. ‘‘Whether the defendant is a juristic person’’. 2. ‘’Whether, having regards to the fact that the Claimant was retired from the State Security Service vide a letter dated 11th July, 2016, this suit which was filed on 25th September, 2017 is not statute-barred’. ARGUMENT ISSUE ONE Jamilu Hamisu, Esq; Counsel for the Defendant in arguing issue one, submitted that it is trite law that only a juristic person can sue and be sued. The State Security Service is a creation of law, to wit, the National Security Agencies Act, Cap. N74, Laws of the Federation, 2004. The said Act in Section 1 (c) confers the name State Security Service on the agency. But, the Defendant/Applicant is not a creation of this Act, and is therefore not a juristic person, and as such cannot be sued. AGBONMAGBE BANK V. GENERAL MANAGER, GB OLLIVANT & ANOR (1961) ALL NLR (Pt.1) 116. Counsel also submitted that in the BANK of BARODA V. IYALABANI COMPANY LIMITED (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt. 785) 551 at Pp. 588 - 589 Paras G - E the Supreme Court held that: "No action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural person or persons unless such party has been given by statute, expressly or impliedly, or by the common law, either:- a. A legal persona under the name by which it sues or is sued; or b. A right to sue or be sued by that name. Counsel also cited the case of THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE V. LAWAL (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1051) 347 at P .379 Paras B – C, where the Court held thus: "Juristic persons consist of several categories and they include natural persons, incorporated companies, corporations with perpetual succession and unincorporated associations granted the status of legal persons by law. Only juristic persons can sue and be sued in their names generally" It is the submission of Counsel that the Defendant/Applicant does not fall into any of the foregoing categories and is therefore, not a juristic person. To further buttress the foregoing assertion, Counsel relied on the case of PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT SECONDARY SCHOOL, IKACHI V. IGBUDU (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 940) 543 at Pp. 566 - 567 Paras H - B where the Court of Appeal held that: "To be a competent party to a suit, the name must be the real name by which that party is known in the case of a natural person or its corporate name in the case of a legal entity. In the instant case, the t" and 9th appellants as constituted could not sue and be sued, not being legal entities". The Court went further to hold that: "The Principal, Government Secondary School, Ikachi is a position or office. The office or position is not a creation of statute and is not an incorporated entity. Similarly, the Commissioner for Education, Benue State (9th respondent) is not a creation of statute. It is an office created by the State Governor who may merge the portfolio with another Ministry if he so wishes at any time. The position or the office is a mere floating body without any legal capacity or personality." Counsel submitted that Director - General, State Security Service, as was held in the old case of AGBONMAGBE BANK is only an office or title. It is therefore unknown to law, just as Principal Government Secondary School, Ikachi and Commissioner for Education are not legal entities. ISSUE TWO ‘‘Whether having regards to the fact that the Claimant was retired from the State Security Service vide the letter dated 11th July, 2016, this suit which was filed on 25th September, 2017 is not statute-barred’’. In arguing issue two Counsel submitted that this suit was instituted fourteen (14) months after the Claimant was retired. It is not in doubt that the cause of action arose on 11th July, 2016 or immediately thereafter. This suit was instituted outside the three (3) months limited by the Public Officers Protect Act, Cap. P41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 for commencement of legal actions against public officers. Counsel cited the case of OMOMEJI v. KOLAWOLE (2008) 14 NWLR (Pt.1106) 180 at 195 on his submission that Statute of limitation is a condition precedent, which a case must fulfill prior to its being said to be properly before the court. On when time begin to run Counsel submitted that time begins to run for purposes of a cause of action from the date on which the cause of action accrues. A cause of action generally accrues on the date in which the incident giving rise to the cause of action occurs. Proceedings must begin normally by the issue of a writ of summons within the period prescribed by the relevant statute. On this submission reliance was placed on the case of N.P.A PLC v Lotus Plastics Ltd (2005) 19 NWLR (pt.959) 158. According to Counsel from the time cause of action accrues to the time this action was instituted the there is no doubt that the claimant has lost the right to bring this action. On this assertion Counsel relied on Okere v. Amadi (2005) 14 NWLR (pt. 945) 545 at p.556 Paras B - E where the Supreme Court held that: "Where the period of time laid down by a limitation law for bringing an action has elapsed, a plaintiff loses the right to enforce that cause of action ....." The Court of Appeal in Duzu v. Yunusa (2010) 10 NWLR (pt 1201) 80 at pp. 111 -112 Paras. F – A, also held thus: "Where an action is statute-barred, a plaintiff who might otherwise have a cause or right of action loses the right to enforce it by judicial process. A statute of limitation removes the right to judicial relief and leaves a person with what is effectively a bare, barren and empty cause of action which cannot be enforced or protected through judicial process". Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this suit for being statute-barred. According to Counsel this is in line with the decision in N.P.A PLC V. Lotus Plastics Ltd (supra) where the Supreme Court held that: "Where a defendant raises a defence that the plaintiff's action is statute-barred and the defence is sustained by the court, the proper order for the court to make is an order of dismissal of the plaintiff's action and not to merely strike it out". P. 189 Paras F-G. In concluding his submission Counsel urged the Court to sustain the objection on the basis of the contentions that the defendant is not a juristic person and that the action is statute-barred. OPPOSITION TO THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION. In reaction to the Defendant’s objection to this suit, the Claimant through his Counsel filed a written address wherein he adopted the two issues formulated by the Defendant for determination. ARGUMENT. ISSUE ONE D. K. Kolawole, Esq; Counsel for the Claimant in arguing issue one, submitted that the issue of juristic person is sacrosanct in determining whether a competent court can acclaim jurisdiction. It is contended that where an act provides that a person is seized with the administrative duties of an agency, as in this case he gains legal personality for the cause of being sued. Counsel submitted the Director-General of the Department of state security services is the overall head and is seized with the administrative powers of the agency. It therefore follows that being the head of the agency, he is liable for the acts, negligence, omissions and commissions of the members of the agency. It is also submitted that the intent of statute creating the agency was to make the functionaries have a legal personality. It is the contention of Counsel that it will be a fallibility to state that the Director- General is only an office and not a legal personality as that will be delimiting the persona of the Director-General. It is the submission of Counsel that the Director-general being an occupant of an office where injuries can be committed, it will be a great injustice to state that such a person cannot be sued. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of Mr. Jude Eruke Ukusare vs. Inspector General of Police & 4 0RS FCTIHC1MI3064/2010, where the court held as follows: "The combine effect of the decision in RUFUS EKEKWE OKEREKE V SUNDAY BARTHOLOMEW DIKE AND 3 ORS (2003) FWLR page 1744 at 1748, NIGERIA FOOTBALL COACHES ASSOC AND 1 OR V MR. KASHIMAWOLALOKO AND 2 ORS (2003 FWLR page 482 at 498, THE OWNERS OF THE REPUBLIC DIGENOVA AND ANOR V C.O.P LAGOS STATE, (2003) FWLR page 1885 at 1890 is that though the Director General State Security service (SSS) is not a juristic person but the law confers on the Director General of the State Security Service such duties which he must perform and which duties include the arrest and search of a person that commits or purports to commit offences under the National Security Agencies Act or the instrument SSSI. See also the cases of DIRECTOR SSS V AGBAKOBA, (1999) 3 a statute, the law views his position, by implication as one that can sue and be sued. The position of the law is that by virtue of the public office he holds, a great deal of injustice would result if a public official who has duties through which injury can be done to others cannot be sued." It is submitted that from the afore stated suit it is preponderant to glean from the holding of the Honourable Court that the Director-General of the Department of State Security Service is a juristic person and we urge this Honourable court to hold so in dismissing this preliminary objection with attending cost. ISSUE TWO Counsel begun his submission on issue two by contending that the defence of Public Officers' Protection Act does not avail the Defendant by virtue of the fact that the act of the Defendant falls under the purview of the exceptions provided for under the Public Officers Protection Act. On this submission Counsel relied on the case of Attorney-General Rivers State v. Attorney-General Bayelsa State & Anor.  LPELR-9336 [SC]. It is the submission of Counsel that the instant suit falls under the purview of continuous damages and injury which is one of the exceptions provided in the aforestated suit. More so, it is trite knowledge that the Supreme Court has stated categorically that where a Plaintiff raises one of the exceptions to the Public Officers Protection Act as a defence to the Defendant's objection, the case ought to be allowed to proceed into hearing and determined on the merit. On this contention Counsel relied on the case of WO Frank Alade & 3 Ors V. The Nigerian Army & lOR NICNIABJI34312013 where it was held as follows: ‘‘that in such a situation, the POPA cannot be sustained as a preliminary objection, the court must wait until evidence is led on the issue and not like the applicants claim, and should not shutout the Respondent from proving their coming within the exceptions in issue." It is the submission of Counsel that from the totality of authorities stated above, it is safe not to be said to be statute barred in any way. The cases cited by the learned Counsel to the Defendant/Applicant does not assail the objections proffered by the Defendant/Applicant. Counsel urged the Court to hold so and dismiss this preliminary objection with attending cost. COURT’S DECISION: I have carefully perused all the processes filed in this suit. I have equally examined the notice of preliminary objection and the addresses of Counsel. I shall also adopt the two issues submitted by the Defendant/Applicant in disposing of this objection. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE The Counsel for the Defendant has strenuously contended that the Defendant is not a juristic person that can sue and be sued because it was not a creation of a statute with power to sue and be sued. The Claimant on his part insisted that the Defendant has legal personality derived from being the Chief Administrative Officer of the Department of State Security Service with powers of arrest and detention that affects third parties. In our jurisprudence two categories of persons are recognised as having juristic personality to sue or be sued. The case law is replete with decisions asserting that any person, natural or artificial, may sue or be sued in a court of law. No action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural or artificial person or persons, expressly or impliedly, unless status, rules of court or common law has given such a person legal persona under a name or a right to sue or be sued by that name. See FAWEHINMI V N. B. A. (NO.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (PT.105) 558; IYKE MED. MMERCH V PFIZER (2010J 10 NWLR (Pt.722) 540. All authorities on issue of legal personality or juristic personality, are in agreement that the power of a party including corporate bodies to sue and be sued can therefore be expressly conferred on it by the statute creating it. However, where the statute creating the body or artificial person is silent on issue of suing or being sued. The statute of the body must of necessity go through the task of examining meticulously the relevant statutory provisions of the statute which establishes, confers rights, and imposes duties on the body can be inferred. The court in doing this bear in mind the relationship of the body to other persons or bodies such that unless legal personality is ascribed to it, an injustice to such person or bodies might result. Therefore, it follows that an enactment can create an indeterminate group of persons or even inanimate objects juristic persons that may sue or be sued eo nomine, as prescribed by the enactment. Also it is to be noted that the categories of legal personae are open and infinite. The controversy in this case is surrounding the legal personality of the Defendant, the counsel for the Defendant has made copious submissions to the effect that the Defendant is not a juristic person for not having been expressly conferred with it in section 1(c) of the National Security Agencies Act, that granted power of establishment of the office of the Defendant. To the claimant the Defendant is in law clothe with legal personality to sue or be sued. The resolution of this issue will revolves round the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the National Security Agencies. It is apt at this juncture to reproduce the relevant provisions of the National Security Agencies Act. Section 1 provides: 1. Establishment of National Security Agencies There shall, for the effective conduct of national security, be established the following National Security Agencies, that is to say— (a) the Defence Intelligence Agency; (b) the National Intelligence Agency; and (c) the State Security Service. 2. General duties of the National Security Agencies (1) …………………………….. (a) ………………........... (b) ……………………….. (c) ……………………… (2) ……………………………… (a) …………………………. (b) ………………………… (3) The State Security Service shall be charged with responsibility for— (a) the prevention and detection within Nigeria of any crime against the internal security of Nigeria; (b) the protection and preservation of all non-military classified matters concerning the internal security of Nigeria; and (c) such other responsibilities affecting internal security within Nigeria as the National Assembly or the President, as the case may be, may deem necessary. (4) …………………………………………. (5) ………………………………………….. 3. Principal Officers of the Agencies (1) There shall be appointed for each of the agencies, a principal officer, who shall be known by such designation as the President may determine. (2) The principal officers of the agencies shall in the discharge of their functions under this Act— (a) in the case of the State Security Service and the National Intelligence Agency, be responsible directly to the President; and (b) in the case of the Defence Intelligence Agency, be directly responsible to the Chief of Defence Staff. A careful perusal of the above provisions of the National Security Agencies Act, will clearly revealed that the office of the Defendant was established pursuant to the provision of section 3(1) and (2) of the National Security Agencies Act, to superintend the affairs of the State Security Service established by section 1(c) of the National Security Service Act. The powers and function of the Defendant are as specified in section 2(3) (a), (b) and (c) of the Act. The above provisions of the National Security Agencies Act, are very clear and unambiguous. It is to be noted that the case law on legal personalities are unanimous that legal personality is either expressly conferred or impliedly conferred by the statute establishing the legal entity. See CHIEF GANI FAWEHINMI V NBA (No 2) (supra), CARLEN V UNIVERSITY OF JOS (Supra), UZOHO V NCP (Supra). Taking into consideration the functions and duties assign by law to the Defendant as the Chief Executive officer of the State Security Service established pursuant to section 1(c) of the Act, as well as section 2(3) (a) (b) and (c) of the Act, it can be said authoritatively without any fear of contradiction that the Defendant has been conferred with juristic personality by implication of law to sue and be sued. This position is arrived at having regards to the facts that the actions of the Defendant are capable of affecting the rights of third parties. Furthermore the law is settled that categorisation of legal personae is open and infinite. So circumstance of each case will determine whether legal personality can be conferred or not. In view of the foregoing, the objection of the Defendant based on lack of legal personality is to my mind baseless, it is on total misconception of the law. Issue one is resolved against the Defendant. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO It is contended by the Defendant that the Claimant’s action is statute barred for having been instituted 14 Months after accrual of cause of action which is contrary to provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, which enjoined that any action against a Public Officer must be commenced within three Month of the occurrence of the event being complained of. However, Counsel for the Claimant while relying on the case of AG RIVERS V BAYELSA GOVERNMENT (Supra), has contended that the acts complained of being continuance of damage or injury has made section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Act, in applicable to the claim of the Claimant’s in this suit, it is therefore, not statute barred, Counsel submitted that this suit is within the exception to the general rule. I have thoroughly examined the case being relied upon by Counsel in making this submission and found it in applicable to this case. In the case of AG RIVERS Vs BAYELSA GOVERNMENT (supra) the facts of that case and this case are not on all fours, they are distinguishable the case being relied upon deal with issue of revenue allocation which is due on Monthly basis, the monthly accrual made it continuous damage or injury. But in the present case it deal with retirement which was effected on 16/7/16. In INEC V OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVERNMEMT & ORS (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC), the apex court define continues injury as ‘‘continuous or repeat of the act which cause the injury. It does not and cannot be said to mean the concomitant effect of the damage or injury. Applying the definition of continuance of damage or injury as proffered by the Supreme Court to this case, it will be clear as day light that there was only one notification of retirement vide letter dated 16/7/16 and that is what the Claimant is contesting as per his paragraphs 19 and 31 of the statement of facts. What the claimant termed as continues damage or injury is not as such. Rather, it is continuance of the injurious effect of the act of retirement. In the circumstance thereof there is no continuance of injury in this case as there was only one retirement. The doctrine of continuous injury does not apply in this case. Having dealt with the defences raised by the Claimant, I shall now proceed to consider the issue two on its merit. For the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act to apply, it must be established that: 1. The applicant is a public officer, 2. The act complained of was done by public officer in acting in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority. As earlier pointed out, the Claimant instituted this action for period of more than three Months from the occurrence of the act complained of (Retirement) of the Claimant from the services of the Defendant. The question now to ask is, is the Defendant in this case a Public Officer. The case of IBRAHIM V JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE (1987) comes handy, this case has settled this issue wherein it was held that the word ‘any officer’ in section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act of the Northern Nigeria which is impairi material with section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (federal). The term public officer is not limited to only natural persons or human beings. It admits and includes artificial persons such as corporation sole, company or anybody of persons corporate or incorporate. The Defendant in this case going by the definition of public officer as provided by the Supreme Court is without any fear of contradiction a public officer. I therefore hold that the Defendant is a public Officer. The next question is whether the Defendant was acting in pursuance of or execution or intended execution of any law or of any duty or authority? To answer this question the averments in the statement of claim have to be closely examined to be able to find an answer to this question. For this purpose it suffice to state that the pleadings of the Claimant clearly shows that the action taken in retiring the Claimant from service was in pursuance of execution of public duty by the Defendant as the administrative head of the organization the Claimant is serving. The claimant has stated that sometime in April 2016, he was surprised that his name was included in the list of the staff of the Department of State Service to face medical panel. Claimant stated though his name was wrongly included he never the less attended. That it was after the facing medical panel that the Claimant was retired from service. This is clear from exhibit E attached the complaint filed by the Claimant before the Court as one of the documents to be relied on at the trial. It is clear from the statement of facts that the acts being complained of are acts of public officer in the discharge of his official functions. What remain is to see whether this action was instituted within three months next after the cause of action has arose. The statement of facts and the endorsement on the complaint will now be considered to see whether the action is within the period of limitation or not. The endorsement on the complaint as well as paragraphs 19 and 31 of the statement of facts clearly shows that the retirement from service which the Claimant is seeking this Court to nullify was done on 16th day of July 2016 and this complaint was filed at the Registry of this Court on 25th day of September 2017. This means that this action was instituted fourteen Months after the accrual of the cause of action. This is without any fear of contradiction outside the statutory period allowed by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act for institution of action against a public officer in respect of performance of his official duties. In view of the reasons given above I hold that this suit is statute barred and it is hereby dismissed. I award no cost. Sanusi Kado, Judge.