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1. On 12th May 2017, the claimant filed a complaint also dated 12th May 2017. By the statement of facts, the claimant is praying for the following reliefs: (a) A declaration that consequent upon the judgment of Court of Appeal No. CA/L/544/14 dated 24th February, 2017 - P. C. IBIWOYE ADEOLA v. THE STATE discharging and acquitting the claimant of the offence of manslaughter, the claimant is entitled to a restoration to his office as a member of the Nigeria Police Force together with all the commensurate salaries, benefits and promotions due to him from January 2005 till date of judgment of this Honourable Court. (b) An order that the defendant shall forthwith but not later than 30 (thirty) days from the date of the judgment of this Honourable Court reinstate, restore and/or reabsorb the claimant into the Nigeria Police Force in any of the following ranks in the 2nd defendant depending on when the judgment is delivered as follows: (i) To the rank of Police Sergeant with effect from January, 2015 if the judgment is delivered before January 2018; (ii) To the rank of Police Inspector with effect from January, 2018 if the judgment is delivered before January 2021; (iii) To the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police II with effect from January, 2021 judgment is delivered before January 2024; (iv) To the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police I with effect from January, 2024 judgment is delivered before January 2027; (v) To the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police with effect from January, 2027 if the judgment is delivered before January 2030; (vi) To the rank of Superintendent of Police with effect from January, 2030 if the judgment is delivered before January 2033; (vii) To the rank of Chief Superintendent of Police with effect from January, 2033 if the judgment is delivered before January, 2036; and (viii) To rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police with effect from January 2036 if the judgment is delivered before 1st of July, 2037, his date of retirement. (c) An order that the defendant shall forthwith but not later than 30 (thirty) days from the date of the judgment of this Honourable Court pay the claimant the sum of N4,410,400.00 (Four Million, Four Hundred and Ten Thousand, Four Hundred Naira) being arrears of salaries due to the claimant from January 2005 till May, 2017. (d) An order that the defendant shall forthwith but not later than 30 (thirty) days from the date of the judgment of this Honourable Court pay the claimant the normal salaries for serving Police Officers at the following ranks in the 2nd defendant depending on when the judgment is delivered as follows: (i) The current salaries for a serving Police Sergeant in the 2nd defendant with effect from June, 2017 up till January 2018 if the judgment of the Court is delivered on or before January, 2018; (ii) The current salaries for a serving Police Inspector in the 2nd defendant with effect from January 2018 up till January 2021 if the judgment of the Court is delivered on or before January, 2021; (iii) The current salaries for an Assistant Superintendent of Police II in the 2nd defendant with effect from January, 2021 up till January 2024 if the judgment of the Court is delivered on or before January, 2024; (iv) The current salaries for an Assistant Superintendent of Police I in the 2nd defendant with effect from January, 2024 up till January 2027 if the judgment of the Court is delivered on or before January, 2027; (v) The current salaries for a Deputy Superintendent of Police in the 2nd defendant with effect from January, 2027 up till January 2030 if the judgment of the Court is delivered on or before January, 2030; (vi) The current salaries for a Superintendent of Police in the 2nd defendant with effect from January, 2030 up till January 2033 if the judgment of the Court is delivered on or before January, 2033; (vii) The current salaries for a Chief Superintendent of Police in the 2nd defendant with effect from January, 2033 up till January 2036 if the judgment of the Court is delivered on or before January 2036; and (viii) The current salaries for an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the 2nd defendant with effect from January, 2036 up till 1st July 2037 if the judgment of the Court is delivered on or before 1st July, 2037. (e) The sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) as losses and damages under paragraph 25 above. (f) Costs of this action in the sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira). (g) Interests on the judgment sums at the rate of 25% per annum until the judgment debt is fully liquidated. 2. The defendants did not enter any appearance or file any defence process. At this Court’s sitting of 25th October 2017, the Court noted that the claimant’s case, hinged on the Court of Appeal decision of 24th February 2017 in Adeola v. The State unreported Appeal No. CA/L/544C/2014, is for reinstatement and promotions for the claimant up to year 2037, presumably the retirement year of the claimant. In the concurring judgment of Georgewill, JCA, His Lordship had held that the claimant (appellant in the appeal) deserves “due re-integration into the society and restoration in his office with commensurate promotions”. This Court noted that with this holding, it is doubtful if there is any triable issue in the instant case i.e. whether the instant suit is itself competently before this Court. Parties starting with the claimant were asked to file and serve their respective written addresses on this issue. The claimant’s written address was filed on 18th December 2017, but the defendants did not file any. 3. The claimant summarized the facts of the case. To him, on 13th January 2004 while performing his official duties as a Policeman, he was erroneously arrested for the murder of one Emeka Okoye at Carter Bridge, Lagos. He was subsequently charged and tried for murder before the High Court of Lagos. That even though he pleaded not guilty, he was on 2nd November 2010 found guilty of manslaughter by the High Court and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. He appealed to the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014 - P. C. IBIWOYE ADEOLA v. THE STATE. That the Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and discharged and acquitted him. That in the concurring judgment of Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA, he observed that having been wrongly convicted, the claimant ought to be reintegrated into the society and restored to his office as a Policeman with commensurate promotions. That on 12th May 2017, he commenced this suit against the three defendants herein seeking a restoration to his office as a member of the Nigeria Police Force together with all the salaries, benefits, etc due to him since January 2005 till the judgment of this Court. That despite being served with the originating processes in this suit, the defendants failed to enter appearance or file a defence. Consequently, when the matter came up for the first time before this Court on 25th October 2017, the claimant’s counsel urged the Court to set the matter down for trial; whereupon this Court suo motu raised the issue of whether the Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this suit in view of the observation of Georgewill, JCA in his concurring judgment in the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014 and asked the parties to file written addresses on this issue, hence the instant submissions. 4. The claimant submitted a sole issue for determination, namely: whether in view of the observation of Biobele Abraham Georgewill, JCA in his concurring judgment in Appeal No. CA/L/544/20l4 - P. C. IBIWOYE ADEOLA v. THE STATE, this Court has the jurisdiction and/or competence to entertain the claimant’s claims in this suit. To the claimant, the observation of Georgewill, JCA in his concurring judgment in Appeal No. CA/L/544/20l4, which has given rise to this written address is as follows: The Appellant having been so erroneously convicted and sentenced and having spent almost 11 years both in custody and in prison upon his wrongful conviction deserves, in my view, neither pardon nor amnesty having not committed any offence but rather due re-integration into the society and restoration in his office with commensurate promotions. That it is important to note the context in which this observation was made by the Learned Justice of the Court of Appeal. That the issue before the Court of Appeal, which the parties to the appeal i.e. the claimant herein as the appellant and the State as the respondent contested was whether or not the claimant qua appellant was guilty of manslaughter as found by the trial court. That the claimant’s position was that he was not guilty of the alleged crime of manslaughter as he acted within his powers as a Policeman in pursuing the deceased conductor in order to arrest him being a suspected offender to be brought to justice. That the respondent’s i.e. the State’s position was that the claimant was guilty as it was not within his rights as a Policeman to pursue a suspected fleeing offender. That this legal issue was resolved by the Court of Appeal in favour of the claimant as the Court of Appeal per Georgewill JCA found and held that: “He was and acted within his powers as a policeman in pursuing the deceased conductor in order to arrest him being a suspected offender to be brought to justice and ought to be commended rather than be condemned”. For ease of reference, the claimant reproduced fully the relevant part of what Georgewill, JCA said in his judgment, which is: The Appellant having been so erroneously convicted and sentenced and having spent almost 11 years both in custody and in prison upon his wrongful conviction deserves, in my view, neither pardon nor amnesty having not committed any offence but rather due re-integration into the society and restoration in his office with commensurate promotions. He was and acted within his powers as a policeman in pursuing the deceased conductor in order to arrest him being a suspected offender to be brought to justice and ought to be commended rather than be condemned. 5. To the claimant, in law, the above reproduced statement by Georgewill, JCA encompasses what is known as both the ratio decidendi and also an obiter dictum. That the portion of the statement which says “He was and acted within his powers as a policeman in pursuing the deceased conductor in order to arrest him being a suspected offender to be brought to justice and ought to be commended rather than be condemned” is what constitutes the ratio decidendi as that is the reasoning or the ground upon which the case was decided. In other words, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal or the ground upon which the claimant’s appeal was allowed is that it is within the rights of a Policeman to pursue a fleeing suspected offender for the purpose of arresting him and bringing him to justice. That it is the ratio decidendi that binds the lower court e.g. this Court for the purpose of stare decisis or for the purposes of estoppel per rem judicata. On the other hand, that the portion of the learned and erudite Georgewill, JCA’s statement which says “The Appellant having been so erroneously convicted and sentenced and having spent almost 11 years both in custody and in prison upon his wrongful conviction deserves, in my view, neither pardon nor amnesty having not committed any offence but rather due re-integration into the society and restoration in his office with commensurate promotions” is what constitutes obiter dictum. That this was a statement that was made in passing by the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal. That the said statement was not necessary for determination of the appeal one way or the other as the claimant qua appellant did not at the Court of Appeal raise the issue of restoration to his office as a Policeman with commensurate promotions neither did the parties i.e. the appellant and the respondent join issues on same nor address the Court of Appeal on same. That the learned Georgewill, JCA merely expressed his view on what he believes should happen to the claimant consequent upon his discharge and acquittal for the offence of manslaughter. 6. The claimant went on that in law, this personal view of the learned Justice of the Court of Appeal which constitutes obiter dictum has no legal force to make it binding on this Court. In fact, that that portion of the statement which constitutes obiter dictum is of no moment in law as being bereft of legal force; it cannot be enforced by the claimant in anyway whatsoever. That this is the trite position of the law, citing Clement Odunukure v. Dennis Ofomata & anor [2010] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 404 at 446 and Duke v. Global Excellence Comm. Ltd [2007] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1026) 81 at 115. That the combined effect of these decisions is that an obiter dictum is a side statement, a passing statement that has nothing to do with the determination of a case and as such cannot have a binding effect because it has no legal force. That the fact that an obiter has no legal force further robs it of the ability to constitute a bar to the present claims of the claimant in this suit. Simply put, that the obiter dictum of Georgewill, JCA which necessitated this written address having no legal force, cannot be binding on this Court and, therefore, cannot prevent this Court from entertaining this suit and granting the prayers of the claimant, urging the Court to so hold. 7. The claimant continued that besides the fact that the obiter dictum of Georgewill JCA which gave rise to this written address being ordered by the Court has no legal or binding force in law, there are other legal reasons why this Court has the jurisdiction and/or competence to entertain this suit. Firstly, that it is the constitutional right of the claimant to approach a court of competent jurisdiction to determine his civil rights and obligations under section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution. That it is in the exercise of this fundamental constitutional right that the claimant has commenced this suit before this Court since this Court is the only court in Nigeria with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the claimant’s claims in this suit, which claims are all labour and employment related, referring to section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution. That the Courts in Nigeria with the Supreme Court of Nigeria leading the way have consistently held that this Court is the Court that has the exclusive jurisdiction in law to entertain claims arising from labour and employment matters, referring to Obiuweubi v. CBN [2011] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465 and Pam & ors v. ABU & ors [2013] LPELR-21406(CA). That in the recent Supreme Court decision in Coca-Cola (Nig) Ltd v. Akinsanya [2017] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1593) 74, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s decision to the effect that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction in claims arising from labour and employment matters. That at pages 129 - 130, the Supreme Court per Eko JSC cited with full endorsement and approval this Court’s statement of the law. That a close look at all the claimant’s claims in this suit will reveal that they are all labour and employment related and, therefore, fully within the jurisdiction and competence of this Court to adjudicate on. 8. Secondly, that in law, even though a court may ordinarily have the jurisdiction to entertain a matter, however, there may be features in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction, referring to Madujolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] SCNLR 341; [1962] NSCC 374. That in law, one of the common features that prevent a court from exercising its jurisdiction over a case is where the case is res judicata particularly where a lower court e.g. this Court is being asked to hear and determine a case which had been earlier determined by a superior court e.g. the Court of Appeal. Indeed, that in the instant case, one may be tempted to think that the Court of Appeal by virtue of the obiter dictum of Georgewill, JCA had already determined the claimant’s claims such that this Court cannot entertain the claimant’s present claims as this Court being inferior to the Court of Appeal ought not to assume jurisdiction over claims that the Court of Appeal had already determined so as not to be guilty of judicial impertinence and/or judicial rascality. That perhaps that may have been the reason for this Court ordered written address; but a closer look at the facts and law relating to this case will reveal that such thought is not well founded whether in law or equity. That in the instant case, this Court has the jurisdiction and competence to entertain the claimant’s claims in this suit as the Court of Appeal did not and had not previously determined or pronounced upon the claimant’s claims in this suit. 9. The claimant went on that all the legal features of res judicata which if present in this case, will make it impossible for this Court to assume jurisdiction in this matter are completely absent and, therefore, res judicata does not apply in this case for several reasons. Firstly, it is a fundamental requirement for the application of res judicata that the parties or their privies must be the same in the two suits. In the instant case, the parties are not the same. The parties in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014 were P. C. Ibiwoye Adeola v. The State while in this suit, the parties are P. C. Ibiwoye Adeola and (1) Police Service Commission (2) Nigeria Police Force (3) Inspector general of Police. It is, therefore, clear that the defendants against whom the claimant is seeking several reliefs in this suit were not parties to Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014; res judicata can, therefore, not apply. 10. Secondly, it is also a condition precedent for the application of res judicata that the issues and subject matter must be the same in the previous case as in the present case. In this regard, the issue that was determined in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014 is separate and distinct from the issues this Court is being asked to determine in this suit. That as shown earlier, the issue determined by the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014 was whether or not the claimant qua appellant in the appeal was guilty of the crime of manslaughter for the death on one Emeka Okoye. That issue is totally different from the claims of the claimant in this suit for the payment of his salaries in specific sums, his reinstatement into Nigeria Police Force, his promotions to specific ranks in the Nigeria Police Force depending on when judgment is delivered in this suit, etc. Clearly, that none of the claimant’s claims in this suit was determined or pronounced upon by the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014; res judicata can, therefore, not apply. 11. Thirdly, it is a condition precedent for the application of res judicata that the previous decision must have finally decided the issue between the parties, that is, the rights of the parties must have been finally determined. In the instant case, all the claims of the claimant in this suit were not even made in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014 and consequently, same were not determined by the Court of Appeal. That this is the first and only time the claimant is making the claims in this suit before any court of law in the entire world. That the claimant’s claims, therefore, ought to be determined on their merits for the first time; res judicata, therefore, does not apply. 12. Furthermore, that for res judicata to apply the aforesaid requirements or conditions precedent must be present as the absence of any them will result in the inapplicability of res judicata, referring to The Honda Place Ltd v. Globe Motors Ltd [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 273 at 296 and Oleksandr v. Lodestar Drilling Co. Ltd [2015] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1464) 337 at 378. That in the circumstance, res judicata will not apply as there is nothing in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014 that will prevent this Court from exercising its constitutionally empowered jurisdiction and competence to entertain this suit. It is the further submission of the claimant that by entertaining this suit this Court will not be confronting or attempting to overrule the Court of Appeal’s decision in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014 as none of the claimant’s reliefs in this suit was adjudicated upon by the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014. 13. To the claimant, another reason why this Court has the jurisdiction and competence to entertain this suit is that by the application of the well-known principle of ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right there must be a remedy) this Court has a duty in law to entertain this suit and provide the claimant with the remedies he is entitled to in law in accordance with his established legal rights. To the claimant’s counsel, here is a patriotic Policeman who in the discharge of his duty of apprehending suspected offenders so as to bring them to justice was wrongly arrested, convicted and imprisoned for about 11 years only to be subsequently discharged and acquitted by the Court of Appeal. That in essence, he was wrongly imprisoned, wrongly denied his salaries and promotions and other benefits for over 11 years. That as at today, he is unemployed and unable to fend for himself; whereas, by January 2018, he ought to be a serving Inspector with the Nigeria Police Force with the attendant benefits of being a serving Inspector in the Nigeria Police Force. The claimant’s counsel then asked: is such a patriotic, law abiding, gallant Policeman not supposed to be adequately compensated by payment of all his salaries, benefits, etc and restored to his rightful position as an Inspector in the Nigeria Police Force? In other words, should the law not come to his aid to provide him with remedies for his established rights? That the Court ought to do this speedily bearing in mind that gross injustice has been meted out to the claimant, an innocent man who was wrongly convicted and spent about 11 years in prison since it is universally acknowledge in law that it is better for nine guilty men to go free than for an innocent man to be convicted, citing Ukwunneyi v. State [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 131 at 156, urging the Court to speedily come to the aid of the claimant by not only exercising jurisdiction in this matter but also speedily determining this suit on its merits by granting an order of accelerated hearing for the early trial and conclusion of this matter. That in all civilised jurisdictions of the world including Nigeria, it is a cardinal principle in the administration of justice that the courts will readily and speedily provide remedy to a claimant whose rights have been infringed upon by the application of the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right there must be a remedy), citing Bello v. A.G. Oyp State [1986] NSCC Vol. 17 (Pt. II) 1257 at 1285. The claimant then concluded by urging the Court to resolve the issue for determination in this address in his favour. 14. Like I pointed out earlier, the defendants did not enter any appearance or file and process. COURT’S DECISION 15. I very carefully considered the processes and submissions of the claimant in this matter. The issue calling for determination is simple: given the concurring opinion of His Lordship Georgewill, JCA in the Court of Appeal decision of 24th February 2017 in Adeola v. The State unreported Appeal No. CA/L/544C/2014 to the effect that the claimant (appellant in the appeal) deserves “due re-integration into the society and restoration in his office with commensurate promotions”, whether there is anything left for this Court to hear and determine since the case itself is for reinstatement, promotions and commensurate salaries. The learned Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) strenuously argued that there is plenty left for this Court to hear and determine. The major planks of the learned senior counsel’s argument are that the said statement of His Lordship if taken within its proper context is an obiter dictum and so not binding on this Court; and that it did not qualify as res judicata as to bind this Court. But the learned SAN acknowledged that His Lordship Georgewill, JCA merely expressed his view on what he believes should happen to the claimant consequent upon his discharge and acquittal for the offence of manslaughter; and this is where the problem lies for a court of first instance. 16. To the learned SAN, an obiter dictum is of no moment in law and is bereft of legal force, which cannot be enforced by the claimant in anyway whatsoever, citing Clement Odunukure v. Dennis Ofomata & anor [2010] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 404 SC at 446, where the Supreme Court per Adekeye, JSC stated thus: The lower court’s remarks about the unnecessary attack by the learned Senior Advocate on the learned trial Judge in the judgment amounts to an obiter dictum which cannot form the basis for ground of appeal. An obiter dictum is a statement made in passing which does not reflect the ratio decidendi, that is the reasoning or ground upon which a case is decided. An appeal is usually against a ratio decidendi and generally not against an obiter. The issue the learned SAN did not seem to appreciate even with this decision is that it was the Supreme Court (a higher Court) telling a lower Court (the Court of Appeal) that its remark is obiter. Is the learned SAN expecting that this Court (a lower Court to the Court of Appeal) will tell the Court of Appeal that its remark is obiter when this could be branded as judicial rascality or impertinence? 17. It is the further submission of the learned SAN that by entertaining this suit this Court will not be confronting or attempting to overrule the Court of Appeal’s decision in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014 as none of the claimant’s reliefs in this suit was adjudicated upon by the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014. The problem, however, is whether the statement of His Lordship that the claimant deserves “due re-integration into the society and restoration in his office with commensurate promotions” is not presenting this Court with a fair accompli should this Court hear this suit. Given this statement, and in hearing this suit, can this Court, for instance, come to the conclusion that the claimant cannot be restored in his office; or if he is so restored, cannot be given any promotion? 18. The learned SAN even argued that this Court has a duty in law to entertain this suit and provide the claimant with the remedies he is entitled to in law in accordance with his established legal rights. In this submission, there is an implicit assumption on the part of the learned SAN that his instant suit is a given, more so as the Court of Appeal per Georgewill, JCA’s statement has opined that the claimant ought to be reinstated and promoted; and here lies the crux (a paradox I dare say) of the issue at hand. To the learned SAN, here is a patriotic Policeman who in the discharge of his duty of apprehending suspected offenders so as to bring them to justice was wrongly arrested, convicted and imprisoned for about 11 years only to be subsequently discharged and acquitted by the Court of Appeal. That in essence, he was wrongly imprisoned, wrongly denied his salaries and promotions and other benefits for over 11 years. That as at today, he is unemployed and unable to fend for himself; whereas, by January 2018, he ought to be a serving Inspector with the Nigeria Police Force with the attendant benefits of being a serving Inspector in the Nigeria Police Force. The learned SAN even asked: is such a patriotic, law abiding, gallant Policeman not supposed to be adequately compensated by payment of all his salaries, benefits, etc and restored to his rightful position as an Inspector in the Nigeria Police Force? In other words, should the law not come to his aid to provide him with remedies for his established rights? With this mindset, what will a trial in this Court achieve especially if this Court were to find that the claimant’s case is not even meritorious? Alternatively put, would any adverse finding by this Court not put it on collision course with the opinion of the Court of Appeal? His Lordship Georgewill, JCA talked of the claimant being reintegrated into the society and restored in his office with commensurate promotions. Note should be taken that His Lordship did not use the word “promotion” in the singular, but in the plural i.e. “promotions”. In the instant case and in his reliefs, the claimant is seeking his promotions up to year 2037 should the judgment in this case be delivered before 1st July 2037, the claimant’s date of retirement. Assuming this Court holds that his claim for these promotions fails, would this not be going against the opinion of a Justice of the Court of Appeal? Given the opinion already expressed by His Lordship Georgewill, JCA, can this Court even dare hold that the claimant’s claims for reinstatement, promotions and commensurate salaries fail? Is this Court not being set up by the claimant itself by presenting it with a fair accompli in terms of the opinion of His Lordship Georgewill, JCA? When the claimant wrote to the defendants to reinstate him to his position in the Police Force and pay him his arrears of salary and they refused (see paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of the statement of facts), why didn’t the claimant go back to the Court of Appeal to intimate the Court of Appeal that, following His Lordship’s statement that the claimant deserves to be reinstated and given his promotions, the defendants refused to so do? 19. The argument of the learned SAN is that the opinion of His Lordship Georgewill, JCA is an obiter dictum. But paragraph 13 of the claimant’s statement of facts (as well as paragraph 13 of the statement on oath) states that His Lordship made a finding and a holding. The said paragraphs 13 state thus: [That] in its judgment, the Court of Appeal per Biobele Abraham Georgewill, JCA, inter alia found and held thus (my emphasis): The Appellant having been so erroneously convicted and sentenced and having spent almost 11 years both in custody and in prison upon his wrongful conviction deserves, in my view, neither pardon nor amnesty having not committed any offence but rather due re-integration into the society and restoration in his office with commensurate promotions. Even the manner in which relief (a) is couched speaks volumes; it uses the language of His Lordship i.e. “…the claimant is entitled to a restoration to his office as a member of the Nigeria Police Force together with all the commensurate salaries, benefits and promotions due to him…” The argument of the learned SAN to the effect that the part of His Lordship’s statement dealing with restoration and promotions is an obiter dictum, I think, is an afterthought. Paragraph 13 of the statement of facts as well as relief (a) squarely expect that this Court will simply abide by His Lordship’s opinion, not as an obiter but as one that is binding on this Court. The learned SAN cited a number of case law authorities that state that an obiter dictum is not binding. But this is only one side of the story. 20. Case law authorities abound that caution lower courts as to the persuasiveness of obiter dicta; and I made the point earlier that it is for a higher Court, not a lower Court, to brand a statement obiter. In Buhari & ors v. Obasanjo & ors [2003] LPELR-813(SC); [2003] 17 NWLR (Pt. 850) 587; [2003] 11 SC 74, Edozie, JSC had this to say: Indeed no lower court may treat an obiter of the Supreme Court with careless abandon or disrespect but the Supreme Court could ignore it if it does not firm up or strengthen the real issue in controversy. Sometimes an obiter may have the ungainly characteristic of an unguided missile and counsel appearing in the apex court should exercise due care in allowing it to form or be the bulwark of their case. In Afro-Continental Nigeria Ltd v. Ayantuyi [1995] LPELR-218(SC); [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 411, Iguh, JSC on his part, relying on American International Insurance Co. v. Ceekay Traders Ltd [1981] 5 SC 81 at 110, held thus: An obiter dictum of the Supreme Court is clearly not binding on this court or indeed on the lower courts, for obiter dicta, though they may have considerable weight are not rationes decidendi and are therefore not conclusive authority. Akpata, JSC in Akinbinu v. Oseni [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 215) 110 SC went on to hold thus: Obiter dicta, although not directly upon the question before a judge, and therefore not binding as precedent, are only permissible where the judge is vested with jurisdiction to resolve the question in controversy before him. It seems to me that the fact that a matter appears to be fundamental to the administration of justice will not by itself entitle a judge to pronounce on it when the matter in the first place should not have been before him. Ogbuagu, JSC, in Dairo v. UBN Plc [2007] NWLR (Pt. 1059) 99 SC at 158 - 159; [2007] 7 SC (Pt. II) 97 and relying on 7Up Bottling Co. Ltd v. Abiola & Sons (Nig.) Ltd [1995] 3 NWLR (Pt. 383) 257 and Afro-Continental Nig. Ltd v. Ayamtuyi [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 411, held thus: …An obiter dictum of the Supreme Court is clearly not binding on the court or indeed on the lower courts, for obiter dicta, though they may have considerable weight, are not rationes decidendi and are therefore not conclusive authority. Where, however, an obiter dictum in one case has been adopted and becomes a ratio decidendi in a latter case, such obiter dictum will be taken to have acquired the force of a ratio decidendi and would therefore become binding. The question whether a decision or pronouncement of the Supreme Court is binding on the Court of Appeal depends on whether that decision or pronouncement is an obiter dictum or was made per incuriam. If the pronouncement is a mere obiter dictum then, of course, it cannot be binding, but if it was made per incuriam, it will nevertheless be binding on the Court of Appeal in accordance with the principle of stare decisis until the error in the judgment has been corrected. From these authorities, an obiter has considerable weight, and the pronouncements as to a statement being obiter was made by a higher Court over the decision of a lower Court, not vice versa. I am not accordingly convinced by the argument of the learned SAN that this Court can hear and determine this matter knowing that any such act would be to sit in review of the statement of His Lordship Georgewill, JCA that the claimant be restored in his office with commensurate promotions. 21. The learned SAN also argued that the statement of His Lordship is not res judicata as to bind this Court. In Odeleye v. Adegbanke [2008] 4 WRN 44 at 50 and 64 - 65, Awala, JCA citing the Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition at page 1336, defined the term ‘res judicata’ thus: “An issue that has been definitely settled by judicial decision or judgment is an affirmative defence barring the same parties from litigating a record on the same transaction or series of transactions and that could have been but was not raised in the first suit”. The learned SAN proceeded to give three reasons why res judicata is inapplicable to this suit. The first is that the parties in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014 and this suit are not the same. To the learned SAN, in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014, the State and the claimant herein were the parties, whereas in the instant suit, the State is not the party but the Police Service Commission, Nigeria Police Force and Inspector General of Police (IGP). The learned SAN did not explain to this Court the actual difference between the State and the three defendants in this suit. Are the three defendants in this suit not agents/agencies of the State as to be part of the State? After all, even in the criminal suit that yielded in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014, the 2nd and 3rd defendants in this suit could easily have been substituted for the State. 22. The second reason given by the learned SAN is that the issue in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014 is totally different from the claims of the claimant in this suit, which claims are for the payment of his salaries in specific sums, his reinstatement into Nigeria Police Force, his promotions to specific ranks in the Nigeria Police Force depending on when judgment is delivered in this suit, etc; and that clearly none of the claimant’s claims in this suit was determined or pronounced upon by the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/544/2014. I do not know what to call the statement of His Lordship Georgewill, JCA to the effect that the claimant deserves “due re-integration into the society and restoration in his office with commensurate promotions” if not a pronouncement. Like I pointed out earlier, even the claimant branded this statement in paragraph 13 of his statement of facts (as well as paragraph 13 of the statement on oath) as a finding and holding of His Lordship Georgewill, JCA. 23. The third reason given by the learned SAN is that the decision in Appeal No. CA/LA/544/2014 must have finally decided the issue between the parties i.e. the rights of the parties must have been finally determined. Didn’t His Lordship speak with finality when he said the claimant deserves “due re-integration into the society and restoration in his office with commensurate promotions”? I think so. After this statement, what is there to litigate? 24. On the whole, I am not persuaded by arguments of the learned SAN that there is something left for this Court to hear and determine in this case given the concurring opinion of His Lordship Georgewill, JCA in the Court of Appeal decision of 24th February 2017 in Adeola v. The State unreported Appeal No. CA/L/544C/2014 to the effect that the claimant (appellant in the appeal) deserves “due re-integration into the society and restoration in his office with commensurate promotions”. Accordingly, I find and hold this suit as constituted to be incompetent. It is hereby struck out. 25. Ruling is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost. …………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD