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The Claimant commenced this action by filing a complaint on the 13th of May 2014. In it, she claims the following: 1. A DECLARATION that the termination of the employment of the Claimant by the Defendant was wrongful and in breach of the terms of contract between the Claimant and the Defendant. 2. A DECLARATION that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant was terminated and not a dismissal from employment. 3. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N67,000 (Sixty Seven Thousand Naira) being payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice upon the termination of her employment with the Defendant. 4. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to immediately pay the Claimant the sum of N67,000 (Sixty Seven Thousand Naira) being payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice upon the termination of her employment with the Defendant. 5. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay immediately the sum of N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira) only as damages for breach of contract of employment between the Defendant and the Claimant. 6. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 10% (Ten percent per annum from the date of the judgment until the judgment is fully and finally liquidated. The writ was accompanied with a Statement of Claim (Facts), a Witness Statement on Oath and a list of documents, and documents front loaded, to be relied on the trial. The Defendants in turn filed a Statement of Defence out of time with the Court’s leave to do so. They also filed a Witness Statement on Oath of the DW1, as well as frontloaded documents to be relied on at the trial. The trial commenced, the Claimant testified as CW1 and tendered exhibits after which she was cross examined. The Defendant testified through one Theresa Gregory Ekpeti the Deputy Head Teacher of the Defendant. She tendered documents which were admitted as exhibits and was cross examined. The case was thereafter adjourned for adoption of written addresses. In the Defendant’s Final Written Address, two issues were formulated for determination. These being: 1. Whether the Claimant’s dismissal from the employment of the Defendant is in breach of the terms of contract between the parties. 2. Whether having regards to the totality of evidence adduced before this Honourable Court the Claimant is entitled to the relief sought in her claim The Claimant in her written address formulated these 4 issues for determination: 1. Whether the express mention of one thing is not the express exclusion of the other in construing statutes or agreements by parties as is the case between the Claimant and the Defendant in this case 2. Whether fair hearing was given to the Claimant in this case considering the evidence laid before this Court. 3. Whether the plea of mistake of counsel can avail a party in all circumstances 4. Whether the Claimant has not proved her case by a preponderance of evidence to entitle her to the reliefs sought in the case. In the argument of the first issue for determination at paragraph S.2 of the Claimant’s written address, counsel posited the view that the express mention of one thing is the exclusion of the other. This being the interpretation of the Latin Maxim “Expressio Unius est. exclusio alterius” which is to the effect that when one thing is mentioned, the other is not intended. That in the case of CONGRESS PROGRESSIVE CHANGE V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & 14 OTHERS (2012) pt. 1280 NWLR pg. 107 & pg. 125 the Court of Appeal stated the meaning of the maxim as being. The express mention of one thing precludes the operation of another.” At 5.3 counsel referred to Exhibit B the Letter of Employment of the Claimant which she duly accepted. States in paragraph 5 a clause that: “Unless dismissed, you or the school may terminate your confirmed appointment by a month’s notice or payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice.” That what this means is that the words termination and dismissal which ordinarily do not have the same meaning is equally used to intend two different situations. That the Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Edition at page 1482 defined termination of employment to mean the complete severance of an employee relationship.” While at page 482 it defined dismissal as “a release or discharge from employment”. The Defendant in the reply on points of law in response to the Claimant’s address maintain that while relying on the content of exhibit DD & DD1 which states in the main that the word “Termination” in the context used in the termination letter for all intents and purposes means dismissal. Now, it is the case of the Claimant that she was employed by the Defendant vide exhibit B the letter of employment as a class teacher in the Defendant School. The exhibit was dated 22nd March 2005 and the appointment took effect from 25th April 2005. That the terms of employment as contained in exhibit B signed by one Maryam Muazu clearly states that unless dismissed you or the school may terminate your confirmed appointment by a month’s notice or payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice. The Claimant states that on the 6th March 2014, the Defendant wrote a letter terminating her employment on the grounds of alleged insubordination and physical and verbal assault of a fellow staff. She maintains that in the termination of the employment of the Claimant the defendant issued the Claimant only with a query letter and without fair hearing. That the response to the query was deliberated upon which the Claimant was terminated from her employment. She maintains that she was not given any notice or payment or a payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice before her employment was terminated, and at no time was she given any opportunity to confront and /or cross examine her accusers on the accusation levied against her and upon which her employment was terminated, and the letter of Termination (Exhibit “B” was immediate and no benefits and/or entitlements were paid to her. She said she briefed her solicitors at paragraph 11 of her Witness Statement on oath who wrote exhibit C1 & C2 dated 24th March 2014 which prompted a reply from the Defendants in exhibit D to D4. The Claimant maintains that by the reason of breach of her rights to fair hearing and the breach of contract as agreed between the Claimant and Defendant, she had suffered loss and damages. On the part of the Defendant they admitted employing the Claimant as a class teacher on 22nd March 2005. They denied paragraph 4 of the Statement of Fact (claim) of the Claimant where she seeks to rely on condition 5 of exhibit “D”. The letter of offer of Employment. The Defendant maintain that the content of the term alluded in the claim (on the requirement of payment of one month’s notice in lieu is not applicable in the circumstance, that prior to her dismissal from the service of the Defendant, the Claimant had been flouting the school rules and regulations which had resulted in the Defendant issuing the Claimant with a suspension letter which was tendered as exhibit “DA” in evidence. The said letter is dated 16th of January, 2014. The Defendant maintained that the Claimants’ appointment was not terminated but rather the Claimant was dismissed from the service of the Defendant as indicated in paragraph 3 of the letter dated March 28, 2014 which was admitted in evidence as exhibit D. The Defendant also denied that the Claimant was not given fair hearing, rather they averred that the Claimant was summoned to a hearing where her conduct was discussed and parties involved were heard including the Claimant, that the Claimant was recalcitrant to the Defendant (school) authority and other staff since she tendered her letter resignation dated February 17, 2014 which was exhibit ‘DB’. In response to the Claimant’s averment that she was not given any notice of payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice before her employment was terminated, the Defendant maintained that the Claimant was dismissed by a letter dated March 28, 2014 Exhibit ‘D’ which cured the defect in the letter dated 6th March 2014. Exhibit C headed: Termination of your Employment. The Defendant went on to deny that the Claimant is not entitled to one month salary in lieu of notice by. The Defendant rather insist that the Claimant was not Terminated from her employment that she was rather dismissed from the services of the Defendant and the letter of termination dated 6th March 2014 which they insisted has already been corrected with another letter dated March 28, 2014 that in view of this the Claimant is not entitled to one month salary for which they relied on rule 17 of exhibit D to D3 which exhibit incorporated the rules and regulations of the Defendant at D2 and D3. In the Defendants written address 2 issues were formulated for determination; these being: (1) Whether the Claimant’s dismissal from the employment of the Defendant is in breach of the terms of the contract between the parties. (2) Whether having regards to the totality of evidence adduced before this Honourable Court the Claimant is entitled to the relief sought in her claim. In the argument in support of issue one the Defendant submit that the Claimant’s dismissal from the employment of the Defendant is not in breach of the terms of contract between the parties. Counsel relied on IBAMA V. S.P.D.C (NIG) LTD (2005) 17 NWLR (pt. 954) pg. 364 at 367, ratio 2 where the Supreme Court held that the contract of service is the pivot of foundation upon which an employee must found his case. He succeeds or fails upon the terms. That in a written contract of service, the Court will not look into any matter outside the terms stipulated and agreed therein between the parties to the contract in determining the respective rights and obligations of the parties. Counsel referred to exhibit DD2 & DD3 the Defendants rules and regulations which the Claimant signed and the Claimants admission in exhibit DC1 which is her reply to query letter dated March 3, 2014, paragraph 4 line 3 that she “forcefully” pushed Miss Ole which led to a chaotic situation. This, the Defendant maintain led to the dismissal of the Claimant for insubordination, physical and verbal assault of a fellow staff as addressed in her dismissal letter. As to whether the Defendant dismissed the Claimant without the Defendant hearing the Claimant’s side counsel at 3.1.1 referred to the Supreme Court case of NDUKAUBA V. KOLOMO (2005) 4 NWLR (PT. 9.15) 415 ratio 3 where it was held that: “A hearing can only be fair when all parties to the dispute are given a hearing or an opportunity of a hearing or not given an opportunity to be heard….” Counsel maintained that in accordance with the evidence of DW1 and CW1 the Claimant wasn’t dismissed from the employment of the Defendant without being heard; that she was given a query to which she replied in Exhibits C and DC where she explained her side of the story and she admitted to have physically and verbally assaulted a staff. That the Claimant’s tendering a resignation letter dated February 17, 2014 (Exhibit DB) is not an excuse for the Claimant to disregard or flaunt the school rules and regulations of the Defendant. In Exhibit DD2 & DD3 that the action of the Claimant warranted her dismissal. The Defendant also maintained that flowing from exhibits C; DD & DD1 the Defendant was not in breach of the terms of the contract, which breach the Claimant must prove to succeed in her claim for declaratory reliefs that is settled law that the principles governing the grant of declaratory reliefs generally include the following: a) Declaration will be granted even when the reliefs have been rendered unnecessary by the lapse of time for the action to be tried, if not the time the action was brought it raised substantial issues of law. b) The claim to which the declaratory reliefs relate must be substantial that is the Claimant must be entitled to the relief in the fullest meaning of the word; c) A Declaration will only be granted where there is a breach. d) The Claimant must establish a right in relation to which the declaration can be made; hence the Court will not generally decide hypothetical questions. e) The relief claimed must not be something which it would not be unlawful or unconstitutional or inequitable for the Court to grant. f) The relief should also not be contrary to the accepted principles upon which the Court exercises its jurisdiction for these principles counsel relied on the Supreme Court case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V. JACOB OLADELE AMO & 2ORS (2010) LPELR – SC. 1868/2007. Counsel also maintained at 3.2.2 that the Court cannot do equity unless there are sufficient facts disclosed in support of the relief sought and these facts are to be presented with utmost sincerity as an equitable relief is not granted as a matter of course but a product of an appeal to conscience and upon principles of equity supported by justifiable and adequate facts for this, reliance was placed on ALADE V. N.B.N LTD (1997) 8 NWLR (pt517) Para. F-g where the Court of Appeal held that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands and must do equity. As to damages counsel cited the Supreme Court in Gambo v. Ikechukwu (2011) 17 NWLR (PT. 1277) 563 Ratio 1 where it was held that it is quite plain that the relief of General Damages not only requires proof of the alleged acts in breach of the contract between the parties, credible evidence is also required to prove the extent of general damages claimed by the plaintiff. On this basis they maintained that the Claimant had not suffered any damages. That the essence of damages is to restore an injured party as far as is monetarily practicable to the position he would have been but for the breach. That there must be a conspicuous relationship between the award made and the injury suffered by the beneficiary of the award as stated in MULTICHOICE (NIG) LTD V. AZEEZ (2010) 15 NWLR (PT. 1215) 40 Ratio 4. The Defendant maintained that the Claimant had not proved her case on the balance of probability as required in Sections 131, 133 and 134 of the Evidence Act 2011 and urged the Court to hold that: 1. The Claimant’s case before the Honourable Court is gold digging, vexations, frivolous. 2. The Claimant has woefully failed to prove her case to be entitled to the relief and judgment sought in this matter 3. The case be dismissed for want of reasonable cause of action. From the summary of evidence in the Claimants written address it is stated at 3.3 that in the course of hearing the suit and as pleaded by the Claimant it was established that paragraph 5 of the letter of offer of employment Exhibit B given to the Claimant by the Defendant contained a clause which reads as follows: “That unless dismissed, you or the school may terminate your confirmed appointment by a months’ notice or payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice.” Counsel referred to the evidence that DW1 averred in paragraph 18 of her witness statement on oath that she reported the Claimant to the school authority and her cross examination where she told the Court she was in the management team that met and decided the fate of the Claimant. Counsel also referred to exhibit ‘C’ of 6th March 2015 the letter terminating the employment of the Claimant and headed: “Termination of Employment Appointment” and stated that there was no evidence on record showing that the Solicitor who drafted exhibit C admitted making a mistake . On this exhibit C counsel submitted at 5.4 that it was the letter with which the Defendant terminated the employment of the Claimant as it is clearly captioned on the face of the document. He referred to UDOH V. ORTHOPAEDIC HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT BOARD (1993) 7 NWLR (part 304) 139 on the principle where a statute mentions specific things or person, those not mentioned are not intended to be included. On the issue of fair hearing at 5.8 counsel contended for the Claimant that fair hearing was not given to the Claimant by the Defendant before her appointment was terminated. Counsel referred to DW1’s Statement on Oath paragraph 18, where she averred that she reported the Claimant to the school authority. That the implication of this was that the DW1 was the complainant to the school authority (management) against the person of the Claimant and referred to her cross examination when she said that the school management is made up of five people including herself met and decided the fate of the Claimant, that it is established that DW1 was both a complainant and a judge in her own cause, thereby rendering every action taken consequent to the decision of the management wrongful as one cannot be a judge in one’s own cause. Counsel referred to Section 36(1) on fair hearing that provides that a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a Court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manners as to ensure its independence and impartiality. Counsel maintained that it goes without saying that the Defendant ought to observe the tenets of fair hearing in making decisions that would generate far reaching consequences on any member of staff and relied on LSPDC V. FAWEHINMI ( 1985) 2 NSCC 998 as follows. Counsel referred to DR ALAKIJA V. MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE (1959) 4 F.S.C 38 @ P. 39 where it was held that the proceedings of the committee offended the principles of natural justice in that the Registrar (though he did not take part in the deliberations) was present and his mere presence offended the principles of natural justice. Counsel then stated that the absence of fair hearing made the termination of the Claimant’s appointment wrongful. As to whether the Defendant could rely on the said mistake of counsel. It was submitted at 5.17 that before the rule against punishing a litigant for the mistake of counsel can avail a litigant, he/she must be able to show that such a mistake is procedural in nature and secondly where the counsel who made the alleged mistake acknowledge the mistake. She referred to UNEGBU V. UNEGBU (2004) 11 NWLR pt. 884 pg. 332 @ 366 Para F-G. Counsel then stated that exhibits C1 & C2, D & D1 and DD & DD. She submitted that the termination of the Claimant is an act which is administrative in nature. It is not a procedural act which occurred in the course of litigation or preparation for litigation and therefore does not pass the 1st test. That the rules and regulations of the Defendant annexed to Exhibits C1 & C2 clearly distinguish between termination and dismissal as well as consequences of each. That the Claimant’s employment was terminated by the Defendant without allowing the consequences to take its course. In the cross examination of the Claimant she said she joined the Defendant in 2005 and the DW1 was the acting head teacher. Asked what happened between the two of them on 27th January 2014 she told the Court: “On 27th February 2014 there was a birthday party in my class the parents of the child brought a crate of malt to class and Miss Ole asked for her own share of the malt which I happily gave to her, she returned it back to me and said I should share all the drinks, I told her I was still busy teaching the children and when I am done I will share the drinks and moreover it is not her duty to tell me when to share the drinks, she went straight to Miss Ekpeti to report the case, being the acting head teacher then, never came to me to ask but rather sent the school secretary to come and collect the drinks I was still teaching at the time, I told the secretary I was busy teaching, not up to 5 minutes the school accountant came in again, he asked me why I had refused to share the malt, I told him he could see am busy, that I could share the drinks when I was done, then he told me: be careful of this people they are planning something for you. She told the Court that Miss Ole is the Exam Officer and was her senior. She said she needed a witness and she went to tell one Miss Amos what happened and when she came out of Miss Amos’ class she saw a nanny called Deborah carrying the drinks behind Mrs. Ekpeti and she collected it from her and took it back to her class and Ekpeti and Ole came in, Claimant sad; I kept my leg on the drinks and Miss Ole pushed me and in Defence I pusher her back and she said” “I promised it you, I will kill you”. She said Mrs. Ekpeti being the Acting Head teacher had the right to give her instructions but it was never her duty to tell teachers when to share drinks. On being invited to management meeting to state her own side of the story; she said after the incident she was told by Mrs. Umar, the school Director, when she got there, that she had heard what happened, she introduced Barrister Obinna as the school corporate Secretary, and she was told by Mrs. Umar, “We have decided to terminate your employment and I said just like that I collected the letter and signed for it. This letter of termination is exhibit ‘C’ dated 6th March, 2014. Earlier, on the 3rd March 2014 she was issued with a query which reads: “On Thursday 27th February 2014, you physically assaulted Miss Ole, the academic supervisor during school (office) hours in the presence of the pupils and some teachers, can you explain before the close of work today why disciplinary action should not be taken against you. The query was signed by DW1, Mrs. Ekpeti, the Acting Head Teacher. Her answer in exhibit DC1 is the same as that she gave in cross examination which I have already reproduced earlier CW1 told the Court she had tendered her resignation earlier on the 17th February 2014 and she said she resigned because the management DW1, Miss Ole, were trying to paint her black and at that time God provided her with a new job which she said she was already doing as a class teacher. She also said she had been suspended earlier on the 16th of January 2014, the said letter had been admitted in evidence as exhibit DA. She said her suspension was due to lies told against her by DW1. Under cross examination the DW1 maintained that it was the duty of nannies to share drinks, and when the drinks were not shared Miss Ole who is next to her was informed and that is how she came into the picture. She said the Claimant never told her she was going to keep the drinks to herself. She said it was not proper to share drinks during classes but the incident happened during break time and it was not part of her duty as acting head teacher to oversee sharing of drinks but when a complaint came to her she had to act. On whether the Claimant gave her reasons for not sharing the drinks she said she had no contact with the Claimant. She maintained that it would be very wrong to suggest that the Claimant’s employment was terminated because of the incident of the birthday celebration; she said the Claimant was not given a month’s notice and there was no payment of one month salary in lieu of notice. She maintained that exhibit D was used to cure the defect in exhibit C of 6th March 2014 and she maintained that the dismissal had already taken place and took effect from 6th March 2014 and the Claimant’s resignation letter had no effect because she was so arrogant and they decided it. DW1 was cross examined further on exhibit DB the letter of resignation dated 17th February 2014. It was written to the Director through the DW1. The minute on it says: AG (HT) the resignation is accepted from 28th March 2014 and it is dated 21st April, 2014. Under cross examination DW1 stated that the signature on the minute was that of the Director of the school, she said the resignation letter was tendered on that 21st April 2014 and that even if it was acknowledge after both sets of solicitors for the parties had exchange the letters in exhibits C1 and C2 (Grays & Gold LLP) and exhibit D to D3 of the Defendant. On 24th March and 28th March 2014 respectively; that nobody was above mistakes that it was supposed to be March. She maintained that the earlier mentioned Miss Ole was also queried over the incident. She admitted also under further cross examination that management of the Defendant met and decided the fate of the Claimant. In the course of the hearing the following were admitted as exhibits. Exhibit A, A1 and A2 is the Witness Statement on Oath of the Claimant dated 13th May 2014. Exhibit B is the letter from Learning springs school with the heading “Offer of Employment” and dated 22nd March 2005. Exhibit C is a letter from Springville International School with the heading “Termination of your Employment” and dated 6th March 2014. Exhibit C1 and C2 is a letter from Grays and Gold LLP headed:”Re Wrongful Termination of the Employment of Chinyere Amaechi Awalite” and dated 24th March 2014. Exhibit D and D1 is a letter from Springville International School headed “RE: Wrongful Termination of the Employment Chinyere Amaechi Awalite” and dated 24th March 2014. Exhibit D2, D3 and D4 are the attached Springsville International School Rules and Regulations and the Claimants Letter of Employment dated 22nd March 2005. The Defendant on their part tendered the following as exhibits. Exhibit DA is a letter headed “Letter of Suspension” and dated 16th January, 2014. Exhibit D is a letter headed “Letter of Resignation” and dated 17th February 2014. Exhibit Dc is a letter headed “Query” and dated 3rd March, 2014. Exhibit DC1 is a letter headed “RE” To Query Letter” and dated 3rd March 2014. Exhibit DD and Dd1 is a copy of the letter headed “RE: Wrongful Termination of Employment etc.” and dated 28th March 2014. Exhibit DD2 and Dd3 is the rules and regulations of Springsville International School. Having stated this much from the case as presented by both sides, from their evidences and addresses. The following facts emerge: 1) The Claimant was employed by the Defendant on 22nd March 2005 and by 16th January 2014 nearly nine years after, the relationship between the employer and employee had become frosty. By that 17th January 2014 Claimant was placed on suspension from being the early years coordinator till further notice 2) The suspension was not expressed to be without pay. The Claimant continued to teach as a class room teacher. See exhibit “DA (letter of suspension dated 16th January 2014). 3) The Claimant put in her letter of resignation on the 17th of February 2014 (Exhibit DB) where she formerly resigned from her position as class room teacher and early years coordinator from the school. The letter was written to the Director who minuted that the resignation is accepted from 28th March 2014 and signed it on the 21st April, 2014. 4) The incident that led definitively to the Claimants sack occurred on the 27th February 2014. There was a squabble, a skirmish and scuffling over sharing of drinks on a pupil’s birthday. 5) The Claimant was queried on the 3rd of March through exhibit DC and she replied through exhibit DC1 on the same day. 6) From the evidence led there was no formal hearing where the Claimant was invited to answer to any allegation, or give her own version of the events of 27 February with those involved. CW1 told the Court that she was invited on the 6th March and the letter of termination was given to her and the school’s solicitor was present. DW1 said they met and determined the fate of the Claimant. 7) The Defendant now seeks to substitute the termination of the Claimant with dismissal stating that to them termination should be taken to mean dismissal. From these facts I hold straight away that by the time exhibit DB (letter of resignation was written and accepted and endorsed by the Directors having come in to effect as from 28th March 2014 the Claimant was no longer the staff of the Defendant. Therefore exhibit D could cure no further defect as the Claimant was not subject to its effect any longer. The Termination could not belatedly be converted to dismissal. The determination of this case turns on the interpretation to be placed on the condition 5 of the offer letter, Exhibit B and the construction of the condition of service exhibit DD2 & DD3” and whether lack of presence of fair hearing in the determination of the Claimants employment with the defendant was observed. I have considered these in some detail which I shall return to when I consider the successes or otherwise of the various heads of claim. But from my review of the evidence I do not readily agree that her right to fair hearing was breached Perse. Because it is a fact that the Claimant was given a query in exhibit ‘D’ and she responded in exhibit DC1 her hand written reply to the query. This leads to the need to consider the issue on the proper procedure and employer must follow before dismissing or terminating an employee see the case of LAWRENCE JIRGBAGH V. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (2000) 17 WRN of Nigeria where the Court of Appeal per Chukwuma – Eneh JCA as he was held that it is not recondite that at common law, the employer is obliged to follow any particular procedure in summarily dismissing his servant. But where, however the dismissal is in breach of a fundamental term of the contract as by summary or by giving insufficient notice to terminate the contract the servant has to accept the fact that the contract is at end and his only remedy lies in suing for wrongful termination of his contract of service. I hold that this enunciation of the law is that which is Applicable to the case at hand. The act of terminating the Claim’s employment is therefore to be seen as completed act in itself. However the contention that the words termination of employment used by the Defendant in exhibit B the letter of termination should be taken to mean dismissal is rejected as held earlier. As to the 1st head of claim for declaration that the termination of the employment of the Claimant by the Defendant was wrongful and in breach of the terms of contract, It is declared that the termination of the contract of the Claimant breached the terms of contract, exhibit B particularly condition of service. The Defendant ought to have let exhibit C the letter of resignation run its course and then pay off the Claimant. As to the second head of claim, it is declared that the Claimant’s employment with the Defendant was terminated. The Claimant was not dismissed, as in labour jurisprudence the terms “Termination” and dismissal tend to connote different meanings and they evoke different consequences. On the third head of claim it is declared that the Claimant is entitled to be paid the sum of N67,000 being payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice upon the termination of her employment with the Defendant. Following from above, the Defendant is hereby ordered to pay the sum of N67,000 (Sixty Seven Thousand naira) being payment for one month’s salary in lieu of notice upon the termination of her employment with the Defendant. On the payment of damages for breach of contract of employment the law is that there is an obligation on the Claimant to mitigate those damages as far as she reasonably can. See Onu JSC in the case of ILODIBIA VS. NIGERIAN CEMENT COMPANY LTD (1997) 7 NWLR pt. 512) 174. The claim for the sum of 5Million Naira is therefore refused lastly, the Defendant is hereby ordered to pay interest to the Claimant on the judgment sum at the rate of 10% (Ten percent per annum from the date of the judgment until judgment sum is fully and finally liquidated. The Order of the Court on the 4th head of claim is to be complied with within 30 days of this judgment. Judgment is entered accordingly. There are no awards as to cost. ___________________________________ HON. JUSTICE E. D. E. ISELE JUDGE