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The Claimant took out a General form of Complaint before this Court on the 7th June, 2016 and claims against the Defendant jointly and severally as follows: (a) A Declaration that the appointment of the Claimant as a staff in the Service of the defendants having been gainfully employed in the year 1998 is valid and subsisting. (b) A Declaration that the termination of the employment of the claimant without following the due process of law and in breach of the right to fair hearing of the claimant is unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect whatsoever. (c) An Order of Honourable Court setting aside the report of the panel committee set up by the defendant which recommended the purported suspension and termination of employment of the claimant from the Ondo State Judiciary. (d) An Order of the Honourable Court setting aside the purported termination of employment of the claimant by the defendants. (e) An Order of the Honourable Court for re-instatement of the employment of the claimant by the defendants with payment of all requisite entitlements due to the claimant as a staff of the Ondo State Judiciary. The claimant filed along with the compliant all her accompany processes, i.e. her statement of facts list of witnesses, list of documents and documents including her witness statement on oath. In response the defendants entered a conditional appearance on the 22nd July, 2016 and filed their defence including their accompanying documents on the 15th August, 2016. Also filed is a Notice of Preliminary Objection wherein the defendants are praying the Court to dismiss this suit for lack of jurisdiction. The grounds upon which the application is sought are as follows- 1. That the suit is statute barred having been instituted outside three months from when the cause of action arose. 2. That the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. And for such further or other orders as this Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. In support of the motion is an eight (8) paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Gabriel Olanipekun, litigation clerk in the office of the Attorney General. Reliance was placed on all the averments in the affidavit. Attached to the affidavit is exhibit A, i.e. a document titled termination of appointment. Filed also is a written address as arguments in support of the preliminary objection, wherein two issues were framed for the determination of this ruling viz- 1. Whether this Honourable Court has the competence to entertain the claimant's suit having failed to bring same within the three months as prescribed by law. 2. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit. It is the submission of learned counsel to the defendants in respect of issue one that jurisdiction is a threshold issue, the determination of which is paramount as whatever, the Court does without jurisdiction will be a nullity no matter how brilliantly. Cited in support of this assertion are the cases of Ajayi v Adebiyi [2012] 5SC (PT.111); Barclays Bank v. CBN (1976) 6SC. 115. It is the contention of the defendants that this case is statute barred. According to counsel, in doing this the Court has to consider the originating processes to ascertain whether or not it has the jurisdiction and thus competence to entertain this case. The case of Abi v. CBN [2012] 3 NWLR (PT. 1286) P1 @ 45; Oladipo v. NCSB [2009] ALL FWLR (PT.498) P 319@ 327 were commended to the Court. It is the further argument of counsel that this case offends Section 2(a) of Public Officers Protection Law, CAP 125, VOL. 3, Laws of Ondo State 2006. which provides that where an action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such law, duty or authority, the following shall take effect- 2(a) The action, prosecution or proceedings shall not lie or be instituted unless its commenced within three months after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of continuance of any damage or injury within three months next after the ceasing thereof. Counsel went on to state that what the Court is to determine is whether the defendants/applicants in the instant case can take advantage of the said provision. She posits that Courts have held that for anyone to be availed of the above protection given by law two conditions are to be fulfilled thus- 1. It must be established that the person against whom the action is commenced is a public officer and then, 2. The act done by the officer in respect of what action was commenced must be an act done in pursuance or execution of any law or any public duty or authority. She commended the case of Ibrahim v. J.S.C Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (pt. 584) pg. 1 @ 32 para b –f. The defendants submitted further that, having met the two condition precedent should be entitled to the defence created under Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Law. In support of this assertion, the case of Elabanjo v. Dawodu (supra) @ 654 paras A-B. was cited. Counsel further argued that, if an action is barred by statute, no amount or resort to the merit of the appellant’s contention will serve to keep the action, and that once a Court comes to the conclusion that an action is statute barred, it goes to the very root of jurisdiction of the Court and thus robs it of jurisdiction. Finally, it is argued that the claims of the claimant as shown in her originating process are stale, dead, a mere shell and statute barred. Adeyemi of counsel, submits that statute of limitation does not indulge the indolent since the claimant had slept over her rights to bring an action within the stipulated three (3) months, she cannot just suddenly wake up from slumber by bringing an action against the defendants now because she has willfully shut her eyes against her right to bring an action promptly. Counsel finally urged the Court to hold that the claimant haven failed to bring this suit within the period allowed by law has extinguished whatever claim she might have against the defendants. Counsel captured the dictum in the Supreme Court case of Egbe v. Adefarasin (No 1) (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 549 of pages 568-569 as it relates to instituting an action within a stipulated period as follows- “The general principle of law is that where the law provided for the bringing of action within a prescribed period, in respect of a cause of action accruing to the plaintiff, proceeding shall not be brought after the time prescribed shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the status, Obiefuna v. Okoye (1961) 1 All NLR 357. An action brought outside the prescribed period offends against the provision of the section and does not give rise to a cause of action. A cause of action means the factual situation stated by the plaintiff: if substantiated, entitles him to a remedy against the defendant: Lantana v. Cooper (1964) 2 All ER 929. The claim must rest on and be supplied by a cause of action…” On whether or not intervening issues like writing a letter of appeal could stop time from running. It is the reaction of the defendants that such could not stop the limitation time from running. Defendants urged the Court to resolve these issues in favour of the defendants/applicants and strike out this suit in its entirety. The claimant in response to the Notice of preliminary objection, filed a 13 paragraph counter affidavit deposed to by one Jide Agboola, counsel to the claimant and attached to it are his letters of suspension, termination of employment and appeal. Reliance was placed on all the averments. Claimant equally filed a written address, in it she distilled a sole issue for the consideration of the Court, i.e. whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit. It is the contention of the claimant that her claims are against wrongful termination of her appointment by the defendants and highlighted certain parts of her statement of facts thus- That the 2nd defendant had on the 10th day of November, 2015, written the claimant and conveyed the recommendations of the panel set up to investigate the activity of the claimant on the purported alleged offence and came out with the suspension of the claimant for three (3) months. That the 1st defendant, in the course of the 2nd defendant’s suspension of the claimant wrote a letter to the claimant through the 2nd defendant on the 23rd day of December, 2015, terminating the claimant’s appointment with effect from the 31st day of December, 2015. That the claimant, on the 7th day of January, 2016 wrote an appeal letter of re- instatement to the Chief Judge of Ondo State and same was received by the Chief Registrar, Ondo State High Court. That on the 30th day of March, 2016, the 1st defendant replied the letter of appeal for re-instatement written to the Chief Judge of Ondo State and received by the Chief Registrar; declined the appeal for re-instatement. In her reaction to the defendants' argument, that the cause of action arose on the 29th day of December, 2015 when she received the letter of termination of employment, She posited that the cause of action in this matter arose on the 30th day of March, 2016 when she received the letter declining her appeal for reinstatement. It is the submission of counsel that the claimant received a letter of suspension for three (3) months from the 2nd defendant, dated 10th day of November, 2015. That the 1st defendant consequently wrote the claimant through the 2nd defendant of the termination of the claimant’s appointment, effective from the 31st day of December, 2015, dated 23rd day of December, 2015. The claimant, on the 7th day of March, 2016, wrote a letter of appeal for re-instatement to the Chief Judge, Ondo State Judiciary and a reply to same by the 1st defendant declining the appeal letter for re-instatement on the 30th day of March, 2016. Consequent upon which she filed a complaint and statement of claim on the 7th of June, 2016. To the claimant a cause of action accrues on the date in which the incident giving rise to the cause of complaint arose. Counsel agrees with the position of the law to the effect that time begins to run from the moment the cause of action accrues. Cited in support is the case of Okenwa v. Military Governor, Imo State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) P. 154 @ 167. She also agreed with the long standing principle of law that in determining the period of limitation, the Court has to look at the time the cause of action arose and compare it with when the Writ of Summons was filed. That this can be done without taking oral evidence from a witness. Claimant continued that where the time of filing the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred. Cited again the case of Okenwa v. Military Governor Imo State (supra). Counsel posed a question, i.e. Can it be said that the cause of action arose from the date of termination of appointment? and he answered in the negative. It is counsel's argument that the claimant’s letter of termination of appointment took effect from the 31st day of December, 2015, and having appeared before the administrative panel of investigation. Claimant is duty bound to exhaust all administrative remedies available before a legal action would be taken. To him, the doctrine of exhaustiveness and ripeness would avail the claimant who had resorted to write a letter of appeal for re-instatement dated 7th day of January, 2016 to the defendants. The case of A.G. Rivers State v. A.G. Bayelsa State & Ors (2012) 10 SCM was commended. According to counsel in A.G. Rivers State v. A.G. Balyesa State & Ors (2012) 10 SCM, it is settled that where the reliefs sought are declaratory in nature, defence of Section of 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law would not avail. He urged the Court to hold that this matter is not statute barred, since the cause of action arose on the 30th day of March, 2016 and the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim were filed on the 7th day of June, 2016; is within the period of three (3) months. After a careful consideration of the Notice of preliminary objection filed by the defendants and the response to same by the claimant, I will adopt the issues framed by both parties and encapsulate it as a sole issue thus; whether or not this suit is statute barred and thus divest this Court of competence to entertain same. The authorities are clear that in determining whether an action is statute-barred, the period of limitation in any limitation statute is determined by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave rise to the cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. If the time on the writ of summons is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, the action is statute-barred. See, for instance, Military Administrator, Ekiti State v. Aladeyelu (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 369) 1195 at 1218-1219; Paras. G-C,SC; Popoola Elabanjo v. Chief (Mrs) Ganiat Dawodu [2006] 6-7,SC; A.G Enugu State v. Ugwu & ANOR [2016] LPELR-40964 CA; Hassan & ORS V. Bornu State Govt. & ORS [2016] LPELR-40250 CA.. It is necessary to also determine in the process when the cause of action in the case arose. A cause of action as the law is trite is the series of facts giving rise to the cause of complaint by a Plaintiff and it accrues on the date on which the incident giving rise to the cause of action arose. A statute of limitation begins to run from the moment the cause of action arose/accrued. Thus, for the purpose of instituting an action in Court, time begins to run from the date the cause of action accrues. The case of Adekoya v. Federal Housing Authority [2008] 4 SC, 167, the court held that a cause of action arises the moment a wrong is done to the plaintiff by the defendant; and the wrong which is the basis of a dispute represents a factual situation which entitles the plaintiff to seek a remedy in a Court of law by way of enforcement. The effect of the limitation law, by Yare v. NSWIC supra, is that any action that is statute-barred removes the right of action, the right of enforcement and the right to judicial relief. It would be necessary, therefore, to ascertain the relevant provisions of Section 2(a) of the Ondo State Public Officers Protection Law, the provision of which has been captured supra. In sum, the provision seeks to protect a Public officer from prosecution after three months preceding the date the cause of action accrues. It is obvious on record, specifically by paragraph 5 of the claimant's statement of facts that she was served with the letter of termination of appointment on the 29th of December, 2015. It is equally plain on record that she filed the complaint in this Court on the 7th of June, 2016. When the two dates are compared, it reveals that claimant took out this complaint exactly 5 months 9 days after the accrual of the cause of action, which is the date she received the letter of termination leading to the filing of this suit. Now, it is the law that the essence of any limitation law is that the legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right but a right generally limited by statute where a statute of limitation as in the Public officers Protection law, prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Therefore a cause of action is statute-barred if legal proceedings cannot be commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the limitation law had lapsed. It is the basic principle of law that an action which is not brought within the prescribed period, offends the provisions of the law and will consequently affect the right of action. See Inec v. Ogbadibo Local Government & Ors[2015] LPELR 24839.SSC. Egbe v. Adefarasin & Anor. (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 at 21, OBA J. A. Aremo II v. Adekanye & 2 ors. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 572, Egbaigbe v. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649, Odubeko v. Fowler (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 308) 637. No wonder the Court in Atunrase v. Sunmola (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.1) 105 at 120, while giving reasons why persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence, stated thus; "In all actions, suits and other proceedings at law and in equity, the diligent and careful actor or suitor is favoured to the prejudice to him who is careless and slothful, who sleeps over his rights. The law may therefore deny relief to a party who by his conduct has acquiesced or assented to the infraction of his rights, or has led the opposite party responsible for or guilty of such infringement to believe that he has lived (sic) or abandon his right." In the case of Board of Trade v. Layser Irvine & CO. LTD (1927) A.C. 610 at 628, Lord Atkinson said: "The whole purpose of the limitation Act is to apply to person who have good causes of action which they could if so disposed, enforced and to deprive them of power of enforcing them after they have lain by for a number of years respectively and omitted to enforce them. They are thus deprived of the remedy which they have omitted to use." See also the case of Addax Petroleum Dev. NIG LTD v. Emef IBT'L Operation & 2 Ors[2012] ALL FWLR(PT621) P1585. It is obvious in all the decisions cited supra that the main purpose of limitation law/ the mischief the legislature intends to cure is to check on a lethargic or slothful litigant who waits for so many years after the accrual of the cause of action before waking up one day and feels that he has a right to enforce against the defendant. Or differently put to protect a Public officer from being distracted by litigation from pursuing his duties. In all limitation /Public officers Protection Laws do not aid the indolent but the vigilant and delay defeats equity. See these cases; A.G Rivers State v Ude [2006] 17 NWLR (Pt.1008) 436; Ogbeide v Osifo [2007] ALL FWLR (Pt. 365) 548 at 566 - 567 Paras. B - C. The Council of Federal Polytechnic, Ede & Ors v Johnson Olowokere [2012] LPELR -7935. This Court have severally held in plethora of cases that question of whether or not an action is statute barred, is one touching on or goes to the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words statute of limitation is imapari materia or a twin brother of jurisdiction. They are inseparable Siamese twins. When a cause of action is statute barred, it affects the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate on same. See Joshua Mnenge v Nig Army Unreported Suit No NICN/IB/22/2012, Delivered on 18th Dec, 2012. Emiatar v Nig Army & 4 Ors [ 1999] 12 NWLR PT 631, 364 @ 372. It was held amongst other things in Mnenge's Case, that all that is required of the applicant in an application of this nature is to show from the originating processes when the cause of action arose and when the action was filed in court. Once this duty has been discharged, it is for the claimant to show that the matter comes within any of the permitted exceptions to the limitation law such as that the injury in question is a continuing injury or that the public officer acted mala fide i.e. outside the colour of his office or employment or outside his statutory or constitutional duty. However, Chigbu v. Tonimas (Nig.) Ltd [2006] 31 WRN 179; [2006] 9 NWLR (Pt. 986) 189 SC at 210, held that the propriety or otherwise of the act of the defendants is not a relevant consideration for the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act. The case continued that if an action against a public officer or public institution and organization is statute-barred having not been brought within the prescribed period of three months, there will be no basis for investigating the conduct of the public officer which gave rise to the action. That the conduct of the defendant as to whether he was malicious or not is irrelevant in determining whether the cause of action is statute-barred under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act. The defence of the claimant that she could not institute this suit earlier because she wrote a letter of appeal for reinstatement and same was refused in March, hence she filed this suit in June is not a tenable defence because it cannot stop time from running. That the Court should consider that period in computing the date the cause of action accrued is discountenanced. It is trite that time runs continually irrespective of intervening acts on behalf of the parties by their counsel or themselves. See Uta French Airlines v Williams [2000] 14 NWLR 271; Kanu & ORS V. A.G & Comm for Justice Cross River & Ors [2013] 32 NLLR(PT.91)63. It is obvious that both defendants being a government body created by law, is a public office and the 2nd defendant is a public officer, within the meaning of the Public Officers Protection law of Ondo State. See Akeem v Unibadan [2003] 10 NWLR (Pt. 829) 584, (2004) ALL FWLR (Pt. 235) 173, they are both protected by the Ondo State Public Officers Protection Law of Ondo State, 2006. It is apparent from both the endorsement on the complaint and the statement of facts that the claimant filed this suit outside of the time prescribed by the Public officers Protection law of Ondo State, as same was filed 5 months 9 days after the accrual of the cause of action. This leaves the claimant who hitherto has a cause of action for which reliefs may be sought and enforced bare without any right of enforcement. In other words this suit is statute barred, the intervening actions or steps taken by the claimant cannot save this suit. She was too late in taking a judicial step to address her grievance. This is fatal to her case, and has thus robbed this court of its jurisdiction to entertain same. Claimant's right to maintain a relief is extinguished. See Nasir v Civil Service Comm. Kano State [2010] 1-2 S.C. 65. It is on the basis of all that I have stated above that I find and hold that this action is stale and thus statute barred. The defendants application succeeds and thus upheld. This Court is consequently divested of its jurisdiction to entertain this suit. Consequently, the claimant's case is dismissed for being caught up by Section 2(a) of Public Officers Protection Law of Ondo State. I make no order as to cost. Judgment is accordingly entered Hon. Justice Oyewumi Oyebiola O. Judge