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The Claimant instituted this action via a Complaint with the accompanying frontloaded documents filed on 5th December, 2012 against the defendants for the following reliefs: A declaration that it is unlawful for the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps to refuse to comply with the provisions of Section 26 of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003, in respect of the employment of the claimants. An Order of court directing the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps to comply with the provisions of Sec. 26 of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003, and allow the claimants who were enlisted under the old Corps to be paid their salaries, allowances an other entitlements that are paid their colleagues who are serving as staff of the Corps. The sum of #1,000,000 (One Million Naira) as general and special damages (arrears of allowances/entitlements) to be paid to the claimants by the defendant for non-compliance with the enabling law and thereby causing the claimants to suffer untold hardship. The Claimants’ Case The Claimants averred that they were recruited and enlisted in the service of the defendant as Regulars and permanent officers between 1993 and 1998 and not as volunteers, before the defendant was given its statutory backing and that they were only paid stipends from donations from Local Government Councils and other corporations in the State and not salaries. They stated that upon the defendant becoming a statutory body in June, 2003, they automatically became regular officers of the defendant, retaining their ranks and position with the attendant benefits in line with the law creating the defendant. Claimants averred that when the defendant started complying with the law in June, 2010, their names were not included in the List that was sent by the Commandant-General of the defendant to Akwa Ibom State Commandant. Consequently, they caused their counsel - Barr. Felix j. Udom to write a letter to the Commandant-General urging him to comply with Sec. 26 of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003. They averred that they are still working for the defendant at their stations as volunteers and not permanent employees and are not paid their salaries and allowances that are normally paid to the employees of the defendant. The Claimants stated that they had earlier filed a case at the Federal high Court in Suit No. FHC/UY/CS/106/10 against the defendant and when the 1999 Constitution was amended in 2011, the Federal High Court was deprived of jurisdiction to entertain employment matters, in consequence of which the Federal high Court, Uyo, on 21st November, 2012 struck out the case to enable the claimants come before this Court. The defendants filed their STATEMENT OF DEFENCE dated 19th June, 2014 on filed on 24th June, 2014. The defendant averred that prior to the passage of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003, the defendant was a voluntary organization where members voluntarily joined without any serious obligation on the part of the defendant as per promotion and other benefits and that she was not responsible for such posting at that time, rather, the State Commands were responsible for postings and promotions. Furthermore, that her governing body which is the Civil Defence, Immigration and Prison Service Board is responsible for the appointment, promotion and discipline of her men and officers. That defendant averred that the claimants after being duly screened, were not issued with letters of appointment after the defendant became a statutory body, thus, they were at no point in time serving officers of defendant and such cannot lay claim to salaries or emoluments. Defendant stated that the claimants are not entitled to any claim, declaration, order or compensation whatsoever as this suit is frivolous, an abuse of court process and a calculated attempt by the claimants to use the instrument of justice to gain employment which they are not qualified for. Furthermore, that the claimnts are not entitled to the claims against the defendant as stated under paragraph 47 (i) – (iii) of their Statement of Facts. WHEREOF the defendant prays this Honorable Court to dismiss the entire claim as lacking in merit, vexatious and a calculated attempt to waste the time of the court and award substantial cost against the claimants. The claimant filed a REPLY TO STATEMENT OF DEFENCE dated and filed on 2nd July, 2014. Wherein the claimants averred that this case is not statute barred; and that the claimants’ case at the Federal High Court was not struck out “for lack of diligent prosecution”, but on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court. Replying paragraph 6 of the of the Statement of Defence, claimants stated that the Committee Report referred to by the defendant was not in existence when the claimants’ case against the defendant was pending at the Federal High Court, but was only recently prepared by the defendant for the purpose of this case. The claimants averred that they are educationally, socially and physically qualified for their ranks/jobs and that when they were screened, they were qualified and had satisfied the conditions that were available as at the time of their screening. After the trial the parties were directed to file and serve their final written addresses in line with the rules of this court The DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS was dated 8th February, 2016 and filed on 11th February, 2016. With the following sole ISSUE: Whether the claimants are entitled to any of the reliefs sought taking the facts of this case into consideration. Learned Counsel submitted that with respect to exhibit C2 – C9 – the claimants’ letters of enlistment, it was noted by defendant counsel that there are significant variations in the signature of the signatory to the document. NASIRU GARBA DANTIYE & ANOR. IBRAHIM YUSHUA’U KANYA & ORS. (2008) LPELR-4021 (CA), per Okoro, JCA. Furthermore, that the claimants tendered some documents referred to as warrants of promotion marked Exhibits C15 – C21, however, it was also noted that the signature in Exhibit C19 when compared to the other exhibits i.e. Exhibits C15 – C18 and C20 – C21, the signature is significantly different and calls into question the genuineness of the documents. MONTAYO v. ELINWA (1994) 19 NWLR (PT. 1120) 246, per Kutigi, JSC. He noted that while the documents have been admitted in evidence, the Court is urged not to attach any weight to the said documents. Counsel pointed out again that Exhibits C22 – C23 are undated and unsigned and that the Law is clear that unsigned and undated documents are of no evidential value. DR. FREDRICK FASEHUN & ORS. V. ATT. GEN. OF THE FEDERATION (2000) LPELR – 5567 9CA); GLOBAL SOAP & DETERGENT IND. LTD. V. NAFDAC (2011) LPELR-4202 (CA), per Hon. Justice West; CHIEF SUNDAY EFFIONG UDO & ORS. V. CHIEF SUNDAY KOFFEE ESSIEN & ORS. (2014) LPELR – 22684 (CA). Counsel assuming but not conceding that Exhibits C22 – C23 emanated from the defendant, for the claimants to be able to tender the documents they must be certified since they are public documents as described by Sec. 102 of the Evidence Act, 2011. However, that the claimants have failed to do this. TABIK INVESTMENT LTD. & ANOR. V. GUARANTY TRUST BANK PLC (2011) LPELR-3131, per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC; BUHARI INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (2008) 19 NWLR (PT. 1120) 246, per Tobi, JSC. Counsel submitted that he who asserts must prove, and if CW 2 is asserting that he was a bona fide volunteer member of the Corps and was duly issued an identity card, the burden of proving same is on him. THE NIGERIAN ARMY v. WARRANT OFFICER BANNI YAKUBU (2013) LPELR-20085 (SC); BUSOLA OYEBODE & ANOR. V. OGUNDELE GABRIEL & ORS. (2011) LPELR-8693 (CA); AHEMBE ADIO v. IORYMA UKAGYE (2013) LPELR-21181 (CA). The claimant filed their final written address which they tagged “REPLY ADDRESS OF THE CLAIMANTS” which was dated and filed on 3rd March, 2016. ISSUES Whether the claimants are entitled to any of the reliefs sought taking the facts of this case into consideration. Whether the claimants became employees/staff of the defendant in 2003 when the defendant was given a statutory backing through the enactment of the Nigeria security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003. Citing Sec. 26 (5) and (6) of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, Cap. N146, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, Learned counsel to the claimants submitted that all the claimants need to do is to show the Court that they held offices if the dissolved corps.Referring the Court to paragraph 33 of the Statement of Facts, Claimant’s Counsel submitted that what the Court will now do after declaring the claimants as automatic employees of the defendant is to determine the amount of money that is being the claimants as arrears of salaries. He argued that these facts have not been denied by the defendant in the Statement of Defence. Counsel to the claimant drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the defendant had not issued any letter of termination to the claimants, that this would have become proper if the defendant does not need the services of the claimants. He contended that the act of the defendant violates Sec. 42 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which frowns at discrimination of any kind. Claimant’s Counsel urged the Court to reprimand the defendant and award all the claims of the claimants with substantial costs. On the 1st July 2016 the court asked parties to file additional addresses to address issues both parties had omitted in their earlier addresses. Mainly, the effect of non joinder of the defendant’s board, nature of discrimination. The defendants filed their additional address in the 22nd of September 2016 while the claimants filed their final written address on the 8th July 2016. On 14th October 2016 parties adopted their final written addresses and additional addresses and adumbrated their respective positions accordingly and this matter was adjourned for judgement. COURT‘S DECISION Having carefully summarized the position of both sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in this ruling and specific mention would be made to them where the need arises. The issues for determination in this suit to my mind are the issues as canvassed by the claimant however in reverse order; Whether the claimants became employees/staff of the defendant in 2003 when the defendant was given a statutory backing through the enactment of the Nigeria security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003. Whether the claimants are entitled to any of the reliefs sought taking the facts of this case into consideration In the course of this trial many sub issues and questions were raised which I wish to address before going into the issues for determination. The question as to whether the Board is a necessary party and or proper party to this suit, this is an issue raised also by the court. The defendants had argued that the Board of the defendant was the person r organ the claimant ought to have sued, while the claimant maintain that by the relevant enabling laws they had sued the proper defendant party. Now, Section 2 (1), 4(1) (a-e) and 4(2) of the NSCDC Act, which refers to the role and function of the board reads as follows: 2(1)-“The Immigration and Prisons Service Board established under the immigration and Prisons Service Board Act, 1986, as amended, shall be the Governing Board of the Corps and shall subject to this Act, Have General control of the Corps” Section 4 provides as follows: (1) The board shall be responsible for(a) Providing the general policies and guidelines relating to major expansion programmes of the Corps. (b) The supervision of management and general administration of the Corps. (c) Recruiting volunteers and regular members of the Corps. (d) Organizing basic development and refresher courses for members of the Corps and (e) Fixing with approval of the minister the terms and condition of service of members and employees of the Corps, including their remuneration. (2) The Board shall have power to do such other thing which in the opinion of the Board are necessary to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of the corps. n or organ with whom the claimants were vexed and in any action were to be taken it would be this person that the court would have to order to take it. From the foregoing I find and agree with the defendants that the power of employment resides solely on the board and I note that this Board is subject to the Act, however not suing or joining the Board does not in any way vitiate the claimants right as the defendants in this suit are, as the claimant rightly pointed out, is the person described by law as the body corporate that can sue and be sued in its own name. The defendants made heavy weather of the fact that the claimant’s exhibit were apparently signed by different persons. Barring that the defendants did no call any witness who denied the document and considering the definition of signature in Blacks Law Dictionary 7th Edition at page 1387 as “a person’s name or mark by that person or at that person’s direction, any name, mark or writing used with the intention of authenticating a document.” I find this point a non -issue and resolve it in favour of the claimant Section 42 1999 Const. as amended, provides for freedom of discrimination form all types and goes on to list, race, religion and sex(gender) as indices from discrimination, Section 42: A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person – Be subjected either expressly by, or in the practical application of any law in force in Nigeria or any executive or administrative action of the government to disabilities or restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religion or political opinions are not made subject to; The claimants have no shown or told the court the nature of the discrimination they claim to have worked against them in appointment so as to fall within this category. Even the submissions as to other workers being employed as a result of graft or undue influence cannot assist the claimant in making their case as a claimant has to prove his case and the only area where what happened to any other employee would require to be substantiated to and only be relevant where the claim is for unfair labour practice which is not what is before the court. The first issue, ; The resolution of this issue is determined by the interpretation of Section 26(5) and (6) of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, Cap N146, LFN 2004 ( subsequently referred to as NSCDC Act) is derived from reading the entire provision together. The section reads: (5)- Notwithstanding the provision of this Act, but subject to such directions as may be issue by the Corps, a person who immediately before the commencement of this Act was a volunteer or regular member of or held office in Dissolved Corps shall be deemed to have been transferred to the corps on terms and condition not less favourable than those obtaining immediately before the commencement of this Act, and service in the Dissolved Corps shall be deemed to be service in the Corps for the purposes of pension. (6)- All regular officers of the Corps before dissolution shall retain their ranks and positions immediately after this Act takes effect”. This court has held in the Unreported SUIT NO: NICN/IB/46/2012 MRS. R. A. AWOFADEJO Vs. THE POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & 2ORS delivered 18th January 2014 that the word Notwithstanding is a term of exclusion See also KLM Airlines vs. Kumzhi (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt. 875) 231 at 258 where the word “notwithstanding” was interpreted to mean a term of exclusion. At page 265 Obadina JSC held thus: “Section 251 of the constitution with a magical phrase” notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the constitution.. By using that opening phrase “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the constitution”, the makers of the constitution had envisaged contradictions and conflicts that may possibly be contained in the constitution or some other Acts of the National Assembly with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction being introduced into the constitution conferring exclusive jurisdiction that of the Federal High Court will prevail over any other conflicting provisions of the constitution.” Also at page 256 of the KLM Airlines’ case (supra) paras. B – D. The phrase “Subject to” was held; “to subordinate the provisions of the subject section to the section referred to, which is intended not be affected by the provisions of the former. In other words, the phrase expression “subject to the provisions of Section 251 and other provisions of this constitution” is an expression of limitation”. Now , the use of the word “notwithstanding” envisaged contradictions and or conflicts in other sections of the Act particularly Section 26(6) which by virtue of the use of the words “notwithstanding” and “subject to the direction which may be issued by the Corps” is not to be applied holistically. In ABIODUN VS. CJ KWARA STATE (2007) 18 NWLR (PT. 1055), PG. 100 @ 149, per Abdullahi JCA referred to the case of DANTOSHO VS. MUHAMMED (2003) FWLR (PT. 15) PG. 1717 @ 1742, wherein it was held as follows: “Furthermore, it is the law that in construing any provision of a statute, a court ought and indeed bound, to consider any other parts of the statute which throws light upon the intention of the legislature and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought to be construed as it would if considered alone without reference to such parts of the statue. I am of the considered view that to find what section 28(5) of Local Govt. Law entails, recourse has to be made to other sections of the law and in particular section 28(7) of the said law.” In ABIODUN’S CASE (SUPRA) per Augie JCA also referring to the case of DANTOSHO (SUPRA) quoted Uwaifo JSC as holding as follows: “Section 11(10) above is an Ouster Clause. In interpreting it, the whole of the section must be taken into account… cannot conceive that a subsection of a section of a statute standing alone can be read with full comprehension. A subsection will usually have a connecting relationship with other subsections of the section. A result contemplated by one subsection may not have occurred at all upon a true consideration of the available facts if other subsections create certain conditions for their result. Not to recognize this, is not only to read that particular subsection in the abstract but also to disregard the preceding or subsequent conditions for a better cohesive understanding of the intention of the lawgiver. Hence, a section of a statute having subsections must be read as a whole and related sections must be read together.” Now in construing any provision of the constitution or any statute for that matter, the other sections of the statute ought to be considered which likely throws more light on the intention of the legislature. And which may serve to show that the particular provision ought to be considered in isolation. Counsel urged the court not to consider section 26(6) in isolation of section 26(5) of the Act. In UBA PLC VS. BTL IND. LTD. (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 904) PG. 180 @ PG. 230 PARAS. E – G the court held thus: “The rule of interpretation of statute is well settled and it is to get to the intention of the legislature to discover the meaning through the words actually used. Where the words are clear and unambiguous, then one applies the literal or grammatical meaning, one may interpret by employment of legal rules or cannons of interpretation of the three most popular: The mischief rule or the rule in Heydon’s case (2) The Golden rule and (3) the literal rule.” With regards to the provision of Section 26(5) of the Act I find that the provisions of section 26(6) is not sacrosanct as the provision of section 26(6) is subject to such directions as may be issued by the corps as provided in the opening words of section 26(5) of the Act. The claimants have argued that there was no such directive, and that the defendants failed to bring to the court any such directive to the effect that they were not to be employed, so to satisfy the requirement for a distinct directive to qualify as to being a directive made pursuant to the Act. While the defendants argue that the direction issued by the Corps is evident in the committee report attached as Exhibit CD11 which they maintain was responsible for the recruitment/absorption of the volunteers who are qualified for appointment. What the claimants failed to consider is that the law had given the defendants the leeway to exercise discretion albeit through a directive, it is this discretion that negates the argument of automatic employment. I find from the above that the provisions of Section 26(5) and Section 26 (6) of NSCDC Act Cap N146, Laws of the Federation 2004, do not create an automatic employment into the corps and that by virtue of being a corps member during the voluntary era does not flow without recourse to the such directives as may be issued by the corps, to permanent employment. Based on the foregoing the claimant’s reliefs thereby fail and the claimant’s suit is hereby dismissed. ………………………………………… Hon. Justice E. N. Agbakoba Judge