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The claimant, by a General Form of Complaint filed on 12th October, 2016, with the accompanying frontloaded documents, approached the Court for the following reliefs: 1. A DECLARATION that the purported Letter of Termination of the Claimant’s employment dated 23rd August, 2016 is unconstitutional, illegal, unlawful, irregular, null and void because it was not issued and or signed by the appropriate authority as required under the contract of employment. 2. A DECLARATION that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants unlawfully acted in procuring the breach of the claimant’s contract of Employment with the 1st Defendant by issuing the letter of “Advice” dated 23rd August, 2016 purporting the terminate the employment of the Claimant with the 1st Defendant “effective immediately” when they have no powers under the claimant’s contract of Employment with the 1st Defendant, to do so. 3. A DECLARATION that the purported termination of the Claimant’s Contract of Employment for the stated false specific reasons: “The review of staff performance Bank wide by the appraisal committee and the review of your personal record” by the Defendants is not in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Terms and Conditions of the Claimant’s employment, the rules of natural justice and the Claimant’s right to Fair Hearing and is therefore illegal, unlawful, irregular, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 4. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to continue to enjoy the existing loan facilities granted to him by the 1st Defendant by virtue of being a staff of the 1st Defendant, at the agreed rate and based on the terms and conditions upon which the facility were granted and it shall be unlawful or illegal for the Claimant or its Agents to vary, deny or terminate the running facilities of the Claimant until the final determination of this suit. 5. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court setting aside the purported “Termination of Employment’ of the Claimant from the employment of the 1st Defendant through the 2nd and 3rd Defendants memo dated 23rd August, 2016, based on the false allegation that the Claimant’s performance was adjudged satisfactory and excellent in his latest staff appraisal, prior to the unlawful termination wherein the Claimant scored 19 1.10% out of the possible 210.00 performance measurement rating (Grade A-Excellence Rating). 6. INJUNCTION restraining the 2nd and 3rd Defendants from procuring the breach of Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant. 7. AN ORDER REINSTATING the Claimant to his employment, the office of ASSISTANT MANAGER of the 1st Defendant forth with. 8. AN ORDER compelling the 1st Defendant to pay all outstanding salaries and allowances due to the Claimant from the 23rd August, 2016 to the date of Judgment and thereafter 13% interest per annum until the payment is effected. 9. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court setting aside the “Caution Letter” issued by HadizaBala, Manager, Human Capital Management Department and Zara I. Musa, Head, Human Capital Management of the Defendant an Internal Memo dated 26th September 2014 being a contravention of Section 12 particularly 12.3.2., 12.3, 12.10 and 12.11 (page 68-84) Jaiz Bank PLC Human Capital Management Policy Manual and Employee Handbook as null and void and of no effect whatsoever and cannot form part of any present and future reference or consideration by the Bank or any other party 10. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court setting aside the purported “Final Warning Letter” issued by HadizaBala , Manager, Human Capital Management Department and Zara I. Musa, Head, Human Capital Management Department of the 1st Defendant via an Internal Memo dated 29th February 2016 being a contravention of Sectionsl2 particularly 12.2, ,12.3.2, 12.3.4. , 12.10, 12.11, 12.12, 12.13. 12.4, 12.7, 12.7.1 (pages 64-8 1) 1st Defendant’s Human Capital Management Policy Manual and Employee Handbook as null and void and of no effect whatsoever and cannot form part of any present and future reference or consideration by the Bank or any other party. 11. GENERAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES of N500, 000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million naira) only against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants for procuring the Breach of Claimant’s contract of Employment. 12. N3, 500,000.00 COST of the suit. ALTERNATIVELY 1. A DECLARATION that the purported Letter of Termination of the Claimant’s employment dated 23rd August, 2016 is unconstitutional, illegal, unlawful, irregular, null and void because it was not issued and or signed by the appropriate authority as required under the contract. 2. A DECLARATION that in purporting to terminate the Claimant’s employment for the stated specific reasons: “the review of staff performance Bank wide by the appraisal committee and the review of your personal record”, the Defendants acted in breach of the rules of Natural Justice and the Claimant’s Constitutional Right of Fair Hearing by virtue of the provisions of section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). 3. GENERAL AND SPECIAL DAMAGES of the total sum of N295,956,608.56 (Two Hundred and Ninety Five Mil1ion, Nine Hundred and Fifty Six Thousand, Six Hundred and Eight Naira fifty Six Kobo) for breach of the terms of contract of employment leading to the unlawful Termination (for false and/or nonexistent stated specific reasons) and outstanding entitlements, salaries and allowances due to the Claimant from the 23rd of August, 2016 as contained in the table of emoluments along with the Claimant’s status as Assistant Manager effective 1st January, 2015 to date of Judgment. 4. 13% interest rate per annum on the Judgment sum until the Judgment sum is paid. PARTICULARS OF SPECIFIC DAMAGES The sum of N195, 956,608.56 (One Hundred and Ninety Five Million, Nine Hundred and Fifty Six Thousand, Six Hundred and Eight Naira, Fifty Six Kobo) on the basis of the Claimant’s last salary increment effective 1st January, 2015, being the sum of N8, 164,858.69 (Eight Million, One Hundred and Sixty Four Thousand Naira, Eight Hundred and Fifty Eight Naira Sixty Nine Kobo) multiplied by Twenty Four Years (24) Years from the 23rd August, 2013 till the 23rd August 2041 (being 24 Years) when the Claimant could have lawfully retired and/or disengaged from the employment of the Defendant voluntarily. As 23’ August, 2016 the Claimant is only 35 years old and has about 25 years of unexpired services years under the employment contract with the Claimant. The retirement age of the Claimant is fixed for 60 years as per section 14.7 of the HCMMD. ALTERNATIVELY The sum of N 680,404.10 on monthly basis from the 23rd August, 2016 until the date the final the judgment on this matter is delivered, representing the gross monthly income accruable to the Claimant on monthly basis (net of any statutory deductions, which Defendants had stopped remitting 23rd August, 2016) receivable by the Claimant if he was allowed to continue with his employment with the Defendants as an Assistant Manager. N8, 164,858.69 /l2months = N 680,404.10 x for judgment is delivered every month until 5. 13% Court Judgment interest rate on alternative relief 3 per-annum until the judgment debt is liquidated. 6. N200, 000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) Damages for Libel occasioned the claimant by the Defendants and their servants, agents and privies in the cause of occasioning the breach of contract of employment. 7. RETRACTION AND APOLOGY of the offensive words complained of herein as contained in the purported letter of termination of employment dated 23rd August, 2016, to be published in the Guardian Newspaper and Daily Trust Newspaper, twice with prominent headlines. 8. PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendant whether by itself, servants, privies, agents, whomsoever and however defined from further publishing defamatory words of and concerning the person of the Claimant either by way of his employment and/or generally. 9. N3, 500,000.00 (Three Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only COST of this action. The 2nd and 3rd defendants filed a MOTION ON NOTICE on 6th December, 2016 accompanied by a 16 paragraph affidavit in support deposed to by Abdullah Abdulmumeen Duro, praying the Court for An order of this Honourable Court striking out the names of the 2ndand 3rdDefendants/Applicants from the suit. GROUNDS OF THE APPLICATION i. There is no cause and/or reasonable cause of action disclosed by the Claimant/Respondent against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants. ii. The 2ndand 3rdDefendants/Applicants are improper and unnecessary parties to the Claimant/Respondent’s suit. iii. The Claimant/Respondent’s suit is brought mala fide against the 2ndand 3rd Defendants/Applicants. iv. The suit of the Claimant/Respondent is, in the circumstance, only maintainable against the 1st Defendant as the 1st Defendant is the principal/employer of the 2ndand 3rdDefendants/Applicants who are mere agents of the 1st Defendant. WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION ‘Whether from the totality of the averments of the Claimant/Respondent as contained in his Statement of Facts, this suit is sustainable in law against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants who at all material times are agents of a known and disclosed principal and acted under the authority of the 15th Defendant and in the cause of their duties to the 1st Defendant. Learned Counsel to the Defendants submitted that the suit of the Claimant/Respondent is not sustainable against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants for failure to disclose any cause and/or reasonable cause of action in her thirty one (31) paragraph Statement of Facts that is sustainable against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF ONDO STATE & ORS. VS. JAMES OLUGUNJU KOLAWOLE & ORS. (2008) 35 NSCQR, 506 AT PAGE 534, per Tabai JSC. On the definition of cause of action, counsel relied on the following authorities: AKILU V. FAWEHIMI (NO. 2) (1998) 2 NWLR (PT.102) P122 @169, per Karibi Whyte JSC; AMODU V AMODU (1990)5 NWLR PT 150 P. 356 @367; HERNAMAN V. SMITH (1855) EXCH. 659 @ 666; ABUBAKAR VS. BEBEJI OIL LTD. (2007) 29 NSCQR. P 1634.He submitted that the Claimant/Respondent in his Thirty-One (31) paragraph Statement of Facts admitted that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants are employees of the 1st defendant, thus that the law is trite that admitted fact need no further proof. AYOKE VS. BELLO (1992) 10 NWLR (PT. 218) 380. Arguing that by the averment and admission of the Claimant/Respondent that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants are employees of the 1st Defendant, the provisions of Section 37 and 38 (1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, LFN, 2004 preclude the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants from being sued by the Claimant/Respondent or any other person or entity for that matter for acts and deeds they carried out under the authorization of the 1st Defendant/Applicant in the course of their duties.Furthermore, that by the clear provision of Section 63 (1) the Companies and Allied Matters Act, LFN, 2004the Claimant is allowed in law to proceed against the 1st Defendant only for every perceived, real or imaginary infraction of his contract with the 1st Defendant irrespective of the roles played by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants in the course of discharging their daily duties as employees/agents of theist Defendant. He submitted that the direct import, implication and intendment of the provisions of CAMA particularly, Section 63 (1), is that the fiction of corporate legal personality insulates members, directors and officers from, legal proceedings for the individual role they played towards the attainment of the objective of the corporate entity. SALOMON VS. SALOMON (1897) AC 22. It is counsel’s submission that the 1st Defendant being an abstract but a juristic personality can only act through her officers such as the Managing Director of the 1st Defendant, 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants who are employees, agents and servants of the Defendant. KATE ENTERPRISES LTD VS. DAEWOO (NIG.) LTD (1985) 2 NWLR (PT 5) 116.Furthermore, that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants are improper and unnecessary parties to this suit as they are mere employees, agents and servants of the Defendant. AYODELE JAMES VS. MID-MOTORS LTD (1978) 11-12 SC, 31 AT 68, per Aniogolu, JSC.Defendant Counsel further submitted that the law is settled that there cannot be a cause of action against the agent of a disclosed principal as the Claimant/Respondent in paragraph 15 of his Statement of Facts clearly admitted that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants are agents of the 1st Defendant. Okolo vs. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. (2004) 3NWLR (Pt. 859) 87. Furthermore that where the principal of an agent is known and disclosed, the correct party to sue for anything done or omitted to be done by the agent is the principal. LEVENTIS TECH. LTD. VS. PETROJESSICA ENTERPRISES LTD (1992) 2 NWLR (PT 224) 459 AT 468 PARAS A-B. The Claimant filed a 3 paragraph COUNTER- AFFIDAVIT on 9th January, 2017 deposed to by Esther Michael. Supported by a WRITIEN ADDRESSwherein the claimant raised one sole ISSUE Whether this application is competent, prima-facie and assuming (without conceding) that it is, is it true that the Statement of Claim does not disclose any cause of action against the Applicants and as a result they are not necessary parties to this case? Learned Counsel to the Claimant, submitted that the Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this motion because the purported applicants have not properly appeared before this court as required by the law. ANON &ORS V. ELEMO & ORS (1983) 1 SC P13, Iguh, J.S.C.He submitted that proper appearance before this court as required by Order 8 (1) of NIC Rules is condition precedent that cannot be waived and that by this application they have divested themselves as parties as presumed by the law, even before asking the court to do so. Therefore, that amounts to an abuse of court process. Ajewole V. Adetimo (1994) 3 N.W.L.R (pt. 335) P. 739 at 577, per Mukhtar, J.C.A (as he then was).He argued further that contrary to the instant application, an application must be brought under appropriate rules of court. C.C.B v. M.C.L. (2000) 6 W.R.N. 104 at 112, per Olagunju, J.C. A. It is counsel’s contention that different considerations may arise if what the Applicants are challenging is a defective Originating processes and/or service of same on them, rather, that in the instant application they are attacking the merits of the case against them. Thus, that the options open to a defendant who intends to object to the regularity of proceedings against him was stated in the case of ADEWUNMI V. A.G ONDO STATE (1996) 8 NWLR (PT. 464) P. 73. AT 85 — 86, per Nsofor, J.C.A. Claimant’s Counsel submitted that a cause of action is the entire set of circumstances giving rise to an enforceable claim and is also a combination of the fact or combination of facts which give rise to a right to sue and it consists of two elements; the wrongful act of the defendant which gives the Plaintiff his cause of complaint and the consequent damage. It is every fact that it would be necessary for the Plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. SAVAGE & ORS. V. UWAECHIE (1972) 3 SC 214, 2216.Furthermore, that these facts or circumstances that enables a Plaintiff to make a claim against a defendant can only be garnered from the Plaintiff’s writ of summons, particulars of Claim or Statement of Claim and clearly not from the statement of defence (if any). FADARE V. A.G. OYO STATE (1982) NSCC P. 52 AT 60; THOMAS V. OLUFOSOVE 91986) 1 NWLR (PT. 18) P. 669.Again, that it is immaterial or irrelevant that the claim appears weak or not likely to succeed. S. G.B LTD V. BURAIMOH (1991) 1 N.W.L.R (PT. 168) P. 428 AT 436where Sulu-Gambari J.C.A. Counsel to the Claimant further submitted that at law, procuring a breach of contract which forms part of the allegations against the Applicants is an actionable tort, separate from breach of contract of employment alleged against the 1st Defendant. TORGUAY HOTEL CO. LTD V. COUSINS (1969) 2 CH. 106, 137 — 138 (relied upon by Ogundare J.C.A (as he then was) in T.A.S.A LTD V. I.A.S (ARGO AIRLINES (NIG) LTD (1991) 7 NWLR (PT. 202) P. 156 AT 173, per Lord Denning. Learned Claimant’s Counsel also submitted that the Applicants are both Necessary and Proper parties to this case. OLUJITAN V. OSHATOBA (1992) 5 NWLR (PT 24) P. 326 AT 335, per Musdapher, J.C.A.He submitted that the definition of a party under Order 8 Rule 1(1) (supra) and section 45(1) of NIC Act (supra) by scope and purport are wider than that envisaged in the conventional courts. And that the law and the rules of practice meant for one court, cannot be binding on other court, that Courts must therefore restrict themselves to the express provisions of the specific rules regulating their Courts. NNEII V. CHUKWU (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 81) P.184 AT 204; KOMONIBO V. N.A. (2002) 6 NWLR (PT. 672 P. 94 AT 117. It is Claimant counsel’s submission that master and servant may be joint tort-feasors in cases of recovery of damages. IFEANVICHUKWU OSONDU & CO. LTD V. SOLEH &NEH (NIG) LTD (2000) 5 NWLR (PT. 656 (P. 322 AT 366, per Iguh, J.S.C. Submitting that a person will be joined as a party to an action if his presence before the court is necessary to enable the Court properly determine the matter before it once and for all, or where the person would be bound or is likely to be affected by the result of the decision of the court. Re Ojukwu (1998) 5 N.W.L.R (pt. 551) P. 673 at 683; Onabanjo V. Ewetuga (1993) 4 N.W.L.R (pt 288)445 at 458. The 2ND AND 3RD DEFENDANTS/APPLICANTS’ REPLY ON POINT OF LAW AGAINST THE CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT’S COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT AND WRITTEN ADDRESS OF 9TH JANUARY, 2017 was dated and filed on 30th January, 2017) Replying paragraphs 4.0 to 4.6 of the Claimant/Respondent’s Written Address, the 2 and 3rd Defendants/Applicants submitted that they are not proper and necessary parties to the Claimant/Respondent’s case. Furthermore, that all of paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of the Claimant/Respondent’s Statement of Fact and his reliefs Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, and 11 on his Complaint and specific averments in paragraphs 15 - 28 which the Claimant/Respondent refers to as tort of inducing the’ breach of contract, etc. do not help his case as they are not included in the civil causes and matter upon which this Honourable Court would assume jurisdiction.Submitting that the 2nd and 3’’ Defendants/Applicants are not necessary parties to the dispute between the Claimant/Respondent and the 1st Defendant. OJOKOLO VS. GOVERNOR OF KEBBI STATE (2009) 11 NWLR (PT.1152) 394. Arguing further that the dispute between the Claimant/Respondent and the 1st Defendant can be fairly adjudicated upon by this Honourable Court without the 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Applicants. GREEN vs. GREEN (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt 61) 480. REPLY ON POINT OF LAW AGAINST THE CONTENT OF THE CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT’S COUNTER AFFIDAVIT Counsel submitted that it is trite that an affidavit must not contain legal argument, conclusion or other extraneous matter. SECTION 115 (1) AND (2) of the EVIDENCE ACT, 2011; BAMAIYI VS. STATE (2001) 4 SC PT I AT PAGE 30. And that in the circumstance of breach of the provision of the Evidence Act, the proper order to make by the court would be to strike out the offensive paragraphs. BANQUE DE’ L’AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE VS. ALHAJI BABA SHARFADI ORS. (1963) NRNLR 21. On 6th February 2017parties adopted their respective written addresses and adumbrated their positions accordingly. Court’s Decision Having carefully summarized the position of both sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in this ruling and specific mention would be made to them where the need arises. The issue for determination in this suit to my mind is whether there is any merit to the 2nd and 3rddefendants application. Before I delve in to the merits of the2nd and 3rddefendants application, it is necessary to address some of the questions raised by the counsel on both sides during with their submissions on the application. The claimant counsel raised the contention, as to the competence of the defendants motion on two flanks: The first that the 2nd and 3rd defendants had not entered appearance contrary to Order 8 rule (1) and secondly that the 2nd and 3rd defendants processes were not duly stamped and sealed. Now order 8(1) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 deals with filing a memorandum of appearance. The 2nd and 3rd defendants filed their motion on notice on the16th December 2016, the claimant counter affidavit was filed 9th January 2017. The position of the law as regards Appearance and filing of a memorandum of appearance and the implication of not filling a memorandum of appearance has been long settled in our jurisdiction. See the case of DIKE V. UBN (1987) 4 NWLR 958 AT 963 paras. G-C. per Onnoghen, JSC; Where the Apex Court held that " the purpose of filling Memorandum of Appearance is to let the other side know that the writ of summons had been received but the action may be defended and the address for service of other documents be known to the other side or the address of the solicitor who is appearing for the defendant. Furthermore, the filing of an appearance is the strongest evidence that service has been effected the Defendant. SeeGUINNESS NIGERIA NIG. PLC V. UFOT (2008) 2 NWLR (PT. 2070) 51 (CA), EBE V. COP (2008) 4 NWLR (PT. 1076) 189 AT 211-212. Order 8(1) provides that “Every person served with an originating process shall, within the days stipulated therein or if no day is stipulated within 14 days of the originating process file a Memorandum of Appearance in the Registry of the Court” The law and the rules are clear, I agree with the claimant, the recipient of a complaint is required to file a Memorandum of Appearance within the period specified in the complaint, not filing of a Memorandum of Appearance especially with the non-filing of any other processes I deem to mean that the 2nd and 3rd defendants do not intend to file a defence or defend this action and probably rely on their motion. The law is clear too according to the Court of Appeal: “the party must at least enter a conditional appearance which signals his protest, and then follow up with a preliminary objection”. See Eti-Osa Local Govt vs. Mr. Rufus Jegede (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) @pg. 537. As regards the absence of Stamp and seal, permitted the practice of this court, is that parties who show proof of payment for the NBA stamp and seal would in the registry be to file their processes, furthermore the absence of these endorsement has been held to be voidable. See the cases of NICN/UY/04/2015 INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE WELFARE OF RETIRED LOCAL GOVERNMENT STAFF, AKWA IBOM STATE. Vs. HON. COMMISSIONER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT & 3 Ors Vs. delivered on 16th February 2016 and NICN/AK/22/2015 CHIBUZOR ONYE-NSO Vs. FIRST MAXIMUM POINT INDUSTRIES LIMITEDdelivered on the 9th February 2016, considered that the National Industrial Court is not a court cut out for highly technical preserves especially as the court had taken judicial notice of the fact that many legal practitioners where yet to obtain the said stamp for sealing in line with the rules. This position stems from the practice direction notification issued by the President of this Court that evidence of Nigeria Bar Associations payment should be presented in lieu of the stamp and seal, thus the court has variously held for the time being at least the absence of a stamp and seal is voidable. The court went on in INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE WELFARE OF RETIRED LOCAL GOVERNMENT STAFF, AKWA IBOM STATE. Vs. HON. COMMISSIONER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT & 3 Orsto hold that “the document could be saved and its signing and filing regularized by affixing the approved seal and stamp on it. That failure to affix the stamp does not render the process incompetent but irregular or voidable”. The 2nd and 3rd defendants on their part called on the Court to examine critically the contents of the claimant’s counter-affidavit and to find that, upon the test prescribed in SECTION 115 (1) AND (2) of the EVIDENCE ACT, 2011; BAMAIYI VS. STATE (2001) 4 SC PT I AT PAGE 30. To the 2nd and 3rd defendant the claimant’s counter affidavit contain matters which only counsel may urge upon the Court, being legal conclusions and are not evidence which a witness is competent to place before the Court. I looked through the paragraphs of the claimant’s counter-affidavit, and the deponent had clearly deposed that she had been informed by the Counsel in their chambers of the substance of her averments in i-viii. That being the case the submissions of the 2nd and 3rd defendants, I find are of no moment. The 2nd and 3rd filed their reply on point of law.I want to spare a few moment to look at the 2nd and 3rd defendants reply on point of law. A reply on point of law is required to address only the issues raised by the other party in the counter affidavit /written address on point of law, it is not supposed to join issues with the statement of fact or any other process, neither is it an opportunity for the 2nd and 3rd defendant to introduce new argument ALI v. BAYERO UNIVERSITY (2014) 42 NLLR (PT. 130) 258 NIC @ 266 ,neither does it afford another chance for the re-arguing of beautifying the original written address. A reply on point of law should pin-point the exact point of law been replied to. To reply on points of law, the points of law being replied to must be clearly identified by way of rephrasing and then the reply follows. The reply is to show that that point of law newly raised in the address of the other counsel is misconceived or not applicable to the case at hand or distinguishable or has been overridden by new or later authoritative statement of the law. See the Supreme Court case ofBASINCO MOTORS LTD. V. WOERMANN-LINE & ANOR. [2009] LPELR – 756 [SC] PP. 41 – 42, I have therefore most carefully combed through the so-called reply on points of law in juxtaposition with the claimants’ counter affidavit and written address and cannot find anything that resembles a reply on points of law. I accordingly discountenance the so-called reply on points of law for being otiose. Now to the merit of this application, the 2nd and 3rd defendants are praying the Court to strike out the names of the 2ndand 3rdDefendants/Applicants from the suit, as t no cause and/or reasonable cause of action has been disclosed against them,that they improper and unnecessary parties to this suit, that the suit is brought mal fide and finally, that they are agents of a known principal. The claimant on their parties maintain that the defendants are proper parties to the suit The position of the law is that in determining whether a party is a proper party, the Court will make recourse to the claimant’s claim which gives him the right to initiate the action for the alleged wrongful act and that the purported alleged wrongful act in this case was the purported wrongful termination of the claimant’s employment. OGBEBO v. INEC (2005) 15 NWLR (PT. 948) 376 @ 400, PARAS. A-B.The cause of action is a critical factor that must be considered by the court before joining a party in a suit. See the case of ADIMORA v. AJUFO (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 80) 1 In the case of L.S.B.P.C. v. PURIFICATION TECH. (NIG.) LTD. (2013) 7 NWLR (PT. 1352) 82 @ 87-88 the Supreme Court held that “ A cause of action refers to the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim, comprising of every fact which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove to entitle him to judgment. This consists of two elements: The wrongful act of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint; The consequent damage. When these facts have occurred, a cause of action is said to accrue to the plaintiff because he can then prosecute an action effectively. Thus, the accrual of a cause of action is the event whereby a cause of action becomes complete so that the aggrieved party can begin and maintain his cause of action. A cause of action does not accrue or become due to the plaintiff at the date of judgment but by the time the action is filed in court. EGBE V. ADEFARASIN (NO. 1) (1985) 1 NWLR (PT. 3) 549. In determining whether or not a suit should be struck out due to non-disclosure of cause of action, the court must restrict itself to the facts pleaded in the Statement of Claim without resort to any extraneous facts NNOSIRI & ORS. v. EASTERN BULKCEM CO. LTD. (2014) 44 N.L.L.R. (PT. 138) 113. See also the case of MOHAMMED v. BABALOLA SAN (2011) LPELR-CA, per Tsammani, JCA referred to.] P. 136, paras. B-F. The claimant’s reliefs in this suit are as follows: 1. A DECLARATION that the purported Letter of Termination of the Claimant’s employment dated 23rd August, 2016 is unconstitutional, illegal, unlawful, irregular, null and void because it was not issued and or signed by the appropriate authority as required under the contract of employment. 2. A DECLARATION that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants unlawfully acted in procuring the breach of the claimant’s contract of Employment with the 1st Defendant by issuing the letter of “Advice” dated 23rd August, 2016 purporting to terminate the employment of the Claimant with the 1st Defendant “effective immediately” when they have no powers under the claimant’s contract of Employment with the 1st Defendant, to do so. 3. A DECLARATION that the purported termination of the Claimant’s Contract of Employment for the stated false specific reasons: “The review of staff performance Bank wide by the appraisal committee and the review of your personal record” by the Defendants is not in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Terms and Conditions of the Claimant’s employment, the rules of natural justice and the Claimant’s right to Fair Hearing and is therefore illegal, unlawful, irregular, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 4. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to continue to enjoy the existing loan facilities granted to him by the 1st Defendant by virtue of being a staff of the 1st Defendant, at the agreed rate and based on the terms and conditions upon which the facility were granted and it shall be unlawful or illegal for the Claimant or its Agents to vary, deny or terminate the running facilities of the Claimant until the final determination of this suit. 5. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court setting aside the purported “Termination of Employment’ of the Claimant from the employment of the 1st Defendant through the 2nd and 3rd Defendants memo dated 23rd August, 2016, based on the false allegation that the Claimant’s performance was adjudged satisfactory and excellent in his latest staff appraisal, prior to the unlawful termination wherein the Claimant scored 19 1.10% out of the possible 210.00 performance measurement rating (Grade A-Excellence Rating). 6. INJUNCTION restraining the 2nd and 3rd Defendants from procuring the breach of Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant. 7. AN ORDER REINSTATING the Claimant to his employment, the office of ASSISTANT MANAGER of the 1st Defendant forth with. 8. AN ORDER compelling the 1st Defendant to pay all outstanding salaries and allowances due to the Claimant from the 23rd August, 2016 to the date of Judgment and thereafter 13% interest per annum until the payment is effected. 9. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court setting aside the “Caution Letter” issued by HadizaBala, Manager, Human Capital Management Department and Zara I. Musa, Head, Human Capital Management of the Defendant an Internal Memo dated 26th September 2014 being a contravention of Section 12 particularly 12.3.2., 12.3, 12.10 and 12.11 (page 68-84) Jaiz Bank PLC Human Capital Management Policy Manual and Employee Handbook as null and void and of no effect whatsoever and cannot form part of any present and future reference or consideration by the Bank or any other party 10. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court setting aside the purported “Final Warning Letter” issued by HadizaBala , Manager, Human Capital Management Department and Zara I. Musa, Head, Human Capital Management Department of the 1st Defendant via an Internal Memo dated 29th February 2016 being a contravention of Sectionsl2 particularly 12.2, ,12.3.2, 12.3.4. , 12.10, 12.11, 12.12, 12.13. 12.4, 12.7, 12.7.1 (pages 64-8 1) 1st Defendant’s Human Capital Management Policy Manual and Employee Handbook as null and void and of no effect whatsoever and cannot form part of any present and future reference or consideration by the Bank or any other party. 11. GENERAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES of N500, 000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million naira) only against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants for procuring the Breach of Claimant’s contract of Employment. 12. N3, 500,000.00 COST of the suit. ALTERNATIVELY 1. A DECLARATION that the purported Letter of Termination of the Claimant’s employment dated 23rd August, 2016 is unconstitutional, illegal, unlawful, irregular, null and void because it was not issued and or signed by the appropriate authority as required under the contract. 2. A DECLARATION that in purporting to terminate the Claimant’s employment for the stated specific reasons: “the review of staff performance Bank wide by the appraisal committee and the review of your personal record”, the Defendants acted in breach of the rules of Natural Justice and the Claimant’s Constitutional Right of Fair Hearing by virtue of the provisions of section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). 3. GENERAL AND SPECIAL DAMAGES of the total sum of N295,956,608.56 (Two Hundred and Ninety Five Mil1ion, Nine Hundred and Fifty Six Thousand, Six Hundred and Eight Naira fifty Six Kobo) for breach of the terms of contract of employment leading to the unlawful Termination (for false and/or nonexistent stated specific reasons) and outstanding entitlements, salaries and allowances due to the Claimant from the 23rd of August, 2016 as contained in the table of emoluments along with the Claimant’s status as Assistant Manager effective 1st January, 2015 to date of Judgment. 4. 13% interest rate per annum on the Judgment sum until the Judgment sum is paid. PARTICULARS OF SPECIFIC DAMAGES The sum of N195, 956,608.56 (One Hundred and Ninety Five Million, Nine Hundred and Fifty Six Thousand, Six Hundred and Eight Naira, Fifty Six Kobo) on the basis of the Claimant’s last salary increment effective 1st January, 2015, being the sum of N8, 164,858.69 (Eight Million, One Hundred and Sixty Four Thousand Naira, Eight Hundred and Fifty Eight Naira Sixty Nine Kobo) multiplied by Twenty Four Years (24) Years from the 23rd August, 2013 till the 23rd August 2041 (being 24 Years) when the Claimant could have lawfully retired and/or disengaged from the employment of the Defendant voluntarily. As 23’ August, 2016 the Claimant is only 35 years old and has about 25 years of unexpired services years under the employment contract with the Claimant. The retirement age of the Claimant is fixed for 60 years as per section 14.7 of the HCMMD. ALTERNATIVELY The sum of N 680,404.10 on monthly basis from the 23rd August, 2016 until the date the final judgment on this matter is delivered, representing the gross monthly income accruable to the Claimant on monthly basis (net of any statutory deductions, which Defendants had stopped remitting 23rd August, 2016) receivable by the Claimant if he was allowed to continue with his employment with the Defendants as an Assistant Manager. N8, 164,858.69 /l2months = N 680,404.10 x for judgment is delivered every month until 5. 13% Court Judgment interest rate on alternative relief 3 per-annum until the judgment debt is liquidated. 6. N200, 000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) Damages for Libel occasioned the claimant by the Defendants and their servants, agents and privies in the cause of occasioning the breach of contract of employment. 7. RETRACTION AND APOLOGY of the offensive words complained of herein as contained in the purported letter of termination of employment dated 23rd August, 2016, to be published in the Guardian Newspaper and Daily Trust Newspaper, twice with prominent headlines. 8. PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Defendant whether by itself, servants, privies, agents, whomsoever and however defined from further publishing defamatory words of and concerning the person of the Claimant either by way of his employment and/or generally. 9. N3, 500,000.00 (Three Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only COST of this action. From the foregoing I find that the claimants cause of action is the wrongful termination of his employment with the 1st defendant following the unlawful activities of the 2nd and 3rd defendant and the non-payment of his outstanding salaries, due allowances and entitlements. In law,a party is said to be a proper party though not interested in the claim of the plaintiffs, is nonetheless made a party for some good reason. See the case of ADEBAYO v. ANL & ANOR. (2015) 52 NLLR (PT. 175) 374 NIC @ 377, following the pronouncement in GREEN v. GREEN (1987) NWLR (PT. 61) 481. A necessary party is one who is not only interested in the subject matter of the proceedings but also in whose absence the question to be settled between the existing parties cannot be properly settled. ADEBAYO v. ANL & ANOR. Supra also referring to the case of GREEN v. GREEN (1987) NWLR (PT. 61) 481. In the case of AUPCTRE v. IMO TRANSPORT CO. LTD & ORS. (2014) 45 NLLR (PT. 142) 53 this court classified the meaning of the various types of parties to an action as follows;- “ Parties to an action have been classified into three namely: Proper Parties – proper parties are those who, though not interested in the plaintiff’s claims are made parties for some good reasons. Desirable Parties – Desirable parties are those who may have an interest in the suit or who may be affected by the result thereof. Necessary Parties are those who are not only interested in the subject matter of the proceedings but also who in their absence, the proceedings could not be fairly dealt with. That is to say, the issue or question to be determined in the matter between the existing parties should be one which cannot be properly settled unless they are parties to the action. GREEN v. GREEN (1987) 3 NWLR (PT. 61) 480; BABAYEJU v. ASHAMU (1998) 9 NWLR (PT. 567) 546. Also in EKEUZOR v. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (2014) 42 NLLR (PT. 133) 758 NIC. This court held: that A necessary party to an action is one who will aid the court in the effectual determination of the action. In the instant case the claimant has laid averments of complicity of the 2nd and 3rd defendant in the unlawful and illegal terminationof his employment and by law.In such a situation the claimant is required to prove his case against the 2nd and 3rd defendants,having raised a reasonable cause of action, And especially considering the Supreme Court pronouncement that is the prerogative of the plaintiff to determine the defendant in a suit. CHIEF EMMANUELBELLO Vs. INEC & 2ORS [2010] 2-3 SC (PT. II) 128, I find in the circumstancesthat the 2nd and 3rd defendants are indeed proper and necessary parties to this suit. As regards the suit being brought mal fide I find is a triable issue which the court cannot determine at this stage, See WOHEREM V. EMEREUWA [2004] 13 NWLR (PT. 890) 403and KASANDUBU V. ULTIMATE PETROLEUM LTD. [2008] 7NWLR (Pt. 1086) pg.281 The defendants in support of their argument as to the roles of the 2nd and 3rd defendant sought to lay reliance on certain sections of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2014 particularly sections; 37, Section 38 and Section 63(1) all reproduced below: SECTION 37 CAMA As from the date of incorporation mentioned in the certificate of incorporation, the subscriber of the memorandum together with such other persons as may, from time to time, become members of the company, shall be a body corporate by the name contained in the memorandum, capable forthwith of exercising all the powers and functions of an incorporated company including the power to hold land, and having perpetual succession and a common seal, but with such liability on the part of the members to contribute to the assets of the company in the event of its being wound up as is mentioned in this Act. SECTION 38 (1) Except to the extent that the company's memorandum or any enactment otherwise provides, that every company shall, for the furtherance of its authorised business or objects, have all the powers of a natural person of full capacity. SECTION 38(2) A company shall not have or exercise power either directly or indirectly to make a donation or gift of any of its property or funds to a political party or political association, or for any political purpose; and if any company, in breach of this subsection makes any donation or gift of its property to a political party or association, or for any political purpose, the officers in default and any member who voted for the breach shall be jointly and severally liable to refund to the company the sum or value of the donation or gift and in addition, the company and every such officer or member shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine equal to the amount or value of the donation or gift. SECTION 63 (1) A company shall act through its members in general meeting or its board of directors or through officers or agents, appointed by, or under authority derived from, the members in general meeting or the board of directors. The sections being relied upon I find do not allude to the situation the defendants are seeking to create, Section 37 and 38 especially considering the present stage of this case at this time and that the defendant maintain that the 2nd and 3rd defendants are employees and not members. The argument of Agents of a Disclosed Principal cannot avail the 2nd and 3rd defendants in the light of FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, MINNA & ORS v. DR. (MRS) ADAEZE G.N.C. OKOLI(2011) LPELR-9053(CA) where the Court of Appeal held that“Merely because both a disclosed principal was sued along with his agents in a suit does not render the suit incompetent for the mis-joinder of the agents”. See also SOLID UNIT NIG. LTD & ANOR v. GEOTESS NIG. LTD(2013) LPELR-20724(CA) All in all I find that the2nd and 3rd defendants are necessary and proper parties in the context of this case. The 2nd and 3rd defendants’ application lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. This case shall proceed to trial accordingly. .............................................. Hon. Justice E. N. Agbakoba