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The Claimants instituted this suit via Originating Summons filed on 27th July, 2015 and dated 23rd July, 2015, claiming for the determination of the following questions: Whether the 1st Defendant was correct in relying on the decisions of this Honourable Court in Suits No. NIC/5/93 and NICN/ABJ/4/2010 between the Nigeria Civil Service Union v. Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria, as a basis for compelling its employees on grade level 07 who were members of the 1st Claimant Union to become members of the 2nd Defendant Association, in spite of the fact that those decisions were based on their own peculiar facts and on the state of the law before the enactment of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 2005 which introduced a new sub-section 12(4) to the Trade Unions Act and the principle of voluntarism in determining membership of registered and recognized trade unions in an industry or organization. 2. Whether the action of the 1st Defendant in restricting the membership of the 1st Claimant, in the 1st Defendant’s organization to employees on grade levels 01 to 06 and compelling employees of the 1st Defendant who are on grade level 07 and who had been members of the 1st Claimant to now become members of the 2nd Defendant, is not in breach of the provisions of Section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act (as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005). 3. Whether the action of the 1st Defendant in refusing to pay to the 1st Claimant, the check-off dues deducted from the salaries of employees of the 1st Defendant on grade level 07, who are still subsisting members of the 1st Claimant union, but instead paying over same to the 2nd Defendant, does not amount thereby to a violation of Sub-section 12(4), and Section 16A of the Trade Unions Act, Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, (as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 2005). 4. Whether it is not unlawful and unconstitutional for the 2nd Defendant Association to claim to be unionizing employees of the 1st Defendant on grade level 07 and to be collecting from the 1st Defendant check-off dues deducted from the salaries of the said employees when the 2nd Defendant Association is aware that the said employees have always been members of the lst Claimant union and have not voluntarily relinquished their membership thereof nor opted to become members of the 2nd Defendant Association In the event of the determination of all the questions positively in favour of the Claimants, the Claimants hereby claim the following reliefs: 1) A DECLARATION that by virtue of sub-section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act (as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005), employees of the 1st Defendant on grade level 07 who are members of the 1st Claimant Union and who have not voluntarily opted out of the membership of the said Union, cannot be forced, coerced or compelled by the 1st Defendant and/or the 2nd Defendant Association to join and become members of the 2nd Defendant Association. 2) A DECLARATION that employees of the 1st Defendant on grade level 07 being members, and having not voluntarily opted out of or relinquished their membership of the lst Claimant Union, the 1st Defendant is obliged to deduct check off dues from the salaries of the said employees and pay same to the registered office or the designated bank account of the 1st Claimant Union as statutorily prescribed in section 1 6A of the Trade Unions Act (as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005). 3) A DECLARATION that it is unlawful and unconstitutional for the 2nd Defendant Association to claim the right to unionize forcefully employees of the 1st Defendant on grade level 07 and to be collecting from the 1st Defendant check-off dues deducted from the salaries of the said employees when to the knowledge of the 2nd Defendant Association the said employees have always been members of the 1st Claimant Union and have not voluntarily relinquished their membership of the 1st Claimant Union nor consented or opted to become members of the 2nd Defendant Association. 4) A DECLARATION that the action of the 1st Defendant in restricting the membership of the 1st Claimant to employees of the 1st Defendant on grade levels 01 to 06 is in breach of the provisions of Sub-section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act (as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005). 5) A DECLARATION that it is wrongful for the 1st Defendant to force or coerce its employees on grade level 07 to relinquish their membership of the 1st Claimant Union and join the 2nd Defendant Association by placing reliance on the decision of this Honourable Court in Suit No. NIC/5/93 and Suit No. NICN/ABJ/2010 which were between the Nigeria Civil Service Union and Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria, when the 1st Claimant Union and the 2nd Defendant Association were not parties to the said Suits and when the decision in Suit No. NIC/5/93 was reached prior to the enactment of sub-section 12(4) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005 and the decision in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/2010 merely adopted the earlier decision on the principle of estoppel per rem judicata. 6) AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 1st Defendant hereof jointly and severally, whether by themselves or through their servants, agents, privies or in any other capacity whatsoever, from forcing, coercing or compelling employees of the lst Defendant on grade level 07 to be members of the 2nd Defendant Association without the said employees voluntarily opting to be such members. 7) AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 2nd Defendant hereof from demanding for payment of and/or collecting from the 1st Defendant check-off dues deducted from the salaries of employees of the 1st Defendant on grade level 07 when such employees are members and remain members of the Claimant Union and have not voluntarily opted to become members of the 2nd Defendant Association. 8) AN ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION COMPELLING the 1st Defendant to pay all check-off dues collected from the employees of the Defendant on grade level 07, who are members of the 1st Claimant, to the registered office or designated bank account of the lst Claimant in accordance with the provision of Section 16A of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 2005). 9) AN ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION COMPELLING the Defendants jointly and severally to render an account of all the check off dues so far deducted from the salaries of grade level 07 employees of the 1st Defendant from November 2014 and either paid over to the 2nd Defendant Association or retained by the lst Defendant and pay same over to the Claimant within two months from the date the Judgment of this Honourable Court is delivered. WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS ISSUE Whether or not the Claimants are entitled to have all the questions for determination resolved in their favour and be granted all the reliefs sought by them from the court. Learned Counsel submitted that neither the 1st Claimant Union nor the 2nd Defendant Association were parties to Suit No. NIC/5/93 reported as Nigerian Civil Service Union v. Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria (2004) 1 NLLR (pt.3) 429 and that there is also no evidence before the court that either of them was privy to any of the parties in those suits. Therefore, that they are neither bound nor affected by the result of the cases. Usung v. Nyong (2010) 2 NWLR (pt.1177) 83 @ 114(D-E), per Omokri, JCA. He submitted that unlike the Nigerian Civil Service Union the only cadre of postal and telecommunication services employees excluded from the membership of the Claimant Union are professional and administrative cadres, thus, that the specific mention of professional and administrative cadres in this regard means the exclusion of all other cadres of communication workers. In effect, all these other cadres are within the membership coverage of the 1st Claimant Union. Agbareh v. Mimra (2008) 2 NWLR (pt.1071) 378 @ 437(J)-F) (per Akintan, JSC). It is counsel’s contention that it is not the business of an employer to interfere in trade union membership or determine which union an employee should belong to. Its statutorily prescribed role, once a union is registered and recognized in the industry, is to deduct check off dues from the salary of the employee and pay it to the registered office of the Union. Section 16A of the Trade Unions Act (as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment Act 2005). He argued that although explanatory notes are not generally part of a piece of statute, recourse can be had to it as an aide to the correct interpretation of the statute. UWAIFO V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BENDEL STATE (1982) NSCC 231 @ 242(LINES 15-25) WHERE THE SUPREME COURT, Per Idigbe, JSC. 1st Defendant filed a 22 paragraph COUNTER AFFIDAVIT on 4th March, 2016, deposed to by Caiphas Yahaye. WRITTEN ADDRESS OF THE FIRST DEFENDANT IN RESPONSE TO CLAIMANTS’ ORIGINATING SUMMONS. ISSUES (i) Whether by the provisions of Section 12(4) of the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005, voluntarism and the right of a worker to decide which union to belong is absolute and not subject to the jurisdictional scope of each particular union. (ii) If the answer to the above issue one is in the negative, whether the first defendant has acted unlawfully in remitting the check off dues of her employees on grade level 07 to the second defendant. ON ISSUE 1 Whether by the provisions of Section 12(4) of the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005, voluntarism and the right of a worker to decide which union to belong is absolute and not subject to the jurisdictional scope of each particular union. Counsel submitted that the primary basis for the classification of trade unions in Nigeria is on the categorization of junior and senior staff and that in the Public Service as well as the condition of service between the first defendant and her employees, junior staffs are categorized as employees on grade level 03 — 06 while senior staff are employees on grade level 07 and above. Public Service Rules, Sections 1.9 and 1.10 of the Condition of Service between the 1st defendant and her employees. N.C.S.U. v A.S.C.S.N 2004 1 NLLR 429. Furthermore, that this basic division of unions into junior and senior staff is recognized under the Trade Unions Act CAP T14, LFN 2004 as well as the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 2005. THIRD SCHEDULE to the Trade Union Act 2004. Part b of the schedule to the Act lists all Unions referred to as workers Union. Counsel submitted that the definition of the term “workers” by the Claimants to include senior employees does not hold water as a number of Judicial authority/decisions support the fact that particularly in the Public Sector, junior staff on grade 01 — 06 belong to the workers union while senior staff on grade 07 and above belong to the Senior Staff Association. NIGERIAN UNION OF RAILWAYMEN (NUR) v NIGERIA RAILWAY CORPORATION (NRC) 1984/85 NWLR at Page 95; METALLIC AND NON-METALLIC UNION v METTALIC AND NON-METTALIC SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION 1987 N.I.C.L.R 34. ON ISSUE 2 If the answer to the above issue one is in the negative, whether the first defendant has acted unlawfully in remitting the check off dues of her employees on grade level 07 to the second defendant. It is counsel’s submission that the first defendant has not acted unlawfully in effecting the check off deductions of her employees on grade level 07 and remitting same to the second defendant. He submitted that voluntarism and freedom of employees to decide which trade union to join or not to join not being absolute but subject to the jurisdictional scope of a particular trade union, the 1st defendant has not acted unlawfully. 2nd defendant filed a 17 paragraph COUNTER AFFIDAVIT on 7th March, 2016 deposed to by Aminu Maidanan Suleiman. WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER AFFIDAVIT ISSUE Whether employees/staff on grade level 07 in the public service of federation including the Nigerian postal service are senior staff? If the answer to the above is in the affirmative, whether the 1st defendant was right to deduct check-off dues of its staff on grade level 07 for remittance to the 2nd defendant? ON ISSUE 1 Whether employees/staff on grade level 07 in the public service of federation including the Nigerian postal service are senior staff? Counsel submitted that it is trite that where there is apparent conflict in two conflicting affidavits especially in an action begun by Originating Summons, the court would refer to the exhibits in resolving the conflict. GBILEVE v. ADDINCI (2014) 16 NWLR (PT. 1433) at 417 para. F. He submitted that where affidavit or document is filed supporting a state of facts, the party who desires the court to disbelieve the fact must file a counter affidavit or reply affidavit, failing such rebuttal the facts stand unchallenged and it will be proper for the court to accept thereon. CHAIRMAN, EFCC V LITLECHILD (2016) 3 NWLR [PT. 1498] 72 CA AT 91 PARAS F- H. Furthermore, that it is trite that where a party produces a document and relies on it, it is bound by that document for better or for worse as this is clearly an admission against interest which needs no further prove. WALTER v. SYKYLL (NIG.) LTD. (2001) 3 NWLR (PT. 201) 438 at 462 Paras. B-C; AJIBULU v. AJAYI (2014) 2 NWLR (PT 1392) 483 at 497 paras. B-C. Counsel argued that authoritative case law of this Honourable Court is eloquent in exposition of the schematic restructuring of trade unions in Nigeria over the past three decades and that the outcome of this restructuring was the streamlining of workers, staff and employers unions in the Third Schedule of the Trade Unions Act and the assignment of jurisdictional scope to each recognized trade union in Part 5 of the said schedule. NIG. SEAFARERS COLLABORATING UNIONS v. NUPENG & ANOR. (2013) 31 N.L.L.R. (PT. 88) 84 at 131-132 paras B-B, per Kanyip, J. It is counsel’s submission that there is therefore sound justification in law for the demarcation of unions into workers unions and senior staff associations as illustrated by this Honourable Court in NUPCE v. KWARA STATE UTILITY BOARD (2007) 9 N.L.L.R. (PT. 24) 193 at 243 paras. E-G, per Atilade, J. He maintained that this court has thus remained consistent in its pronouncement on the classification of trade unions into junior and senior staff. NCSU v. ASCSN (2004) 1 N.L.L.R. (PT. 3) 429 at D-G; PERESSA v. SSACGOC (2009) 14 N.L.L.R. (PT. 39)306 at 3241 paras. E-H. Counsel posing the question: “Who then is junior or senior staff in the 1st Defendant, Nigerian Postal Service?” replied with the authority of NCSU v. ASCSN (Supra) at 487 paras. G-H, per Atilade, J. Counsel submitted that staff in public corporation are also public officers and that they are impacted and guided by general rules in the public service. ADEKOYE vs. N.S.P.M.C LTD. (2009) 5 NWLR (PT 1134) 322. He argued that by virtue of Chapter 16 of the Public Service Rules (2008) Edition, Government Notice No. 278, the Rules which is a successor to the Civil Service Rules interpreted in NCSU v. ASCSN (Supra), apply to all Parastatals of Federal Government including the lst Defendant. AKHIOJEMI v. ADMINISTARTIVE STAFF COLLEGE OF NIGERIA (2014) 43 N.L.L.R. (PT. 135) 240 at 311-312 paras. D-F, per Kanyip, J. It is counsel’s submission that it is trite that for every trade union, there is a corresponding senior staff and employers association and while the trade union is entitled to unionize the junior cadre workers in an organization, the senior staff association has responsibility for the Senior Staff. There are however exceptions where the law has specifically declassified emphasis on cadre such as the Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria and National Association of Nigeria Nurses and Midwives. NIG. SEAFARERS COLLABORATING UNIONS v. NUPENG & ANOR. (Supra), per KANYIP, P.J. He contended that the Claimants have not argued that the 2nd Defendant is not a corresponding senior staff association to the 1st Claimant.” They have neither contended that the Third Schedule Part C of the TUA does not specifically denote the associations listed therein including the 2nd Defendant as “Senior Staff and Employers’ Associations”. They have not argued that this Court in NIG. SEAFARERS COLLABORATING UNIONS v. NUPENG & ANOR. (Supra) at page 128-129 paras H-A did not judicially pronounce Parts A and B of the Third Schedule, TUA as dealing with “the industrial or junior staff unions”. Counsel argued that the major thrust of the schematic arrangement of trade unions is the categorization of unions into workers unions and staff associations and that it is for this reason that this Honourable Court has consistently held out bars to membership of junior workers unions by senior staff. METALLIC AND NON-METALLIC MINES SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION v. METALLIC AND NON-METALLIC MINES WORKERS UNION & ANOR. Suit No. NIC/17/1985 reported in DIGEST OF JUDGMENTS OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT (1978-2006). He submitted that this Honourable Court has a duty to consider the history of the Trade Unions Act (as amended) and the rationale for the schematic arrangement of trade unions in Nigeria. UDOH v. 0.H.M.B. (1990) 4 NWL.R (PT. 142) 52 at 65 paras C-G, per Oguntade, J.C.A. (as he then was) at pages 67-68 paras. H-A; ANSALDO (NIG.) LTD. v. N.P.F.M.B. (1991) 2 NWLR (PT. 174) 392 at 405 paras. E-F. and [15]; A.-G., FED. V. A.-G., LAGOS STATE (2013) 16 NWLR (PT. 1380) 249 at 317 paras. C-D. Learned Counsel urged the Honourable Court to adopt the interpretation that preserves the fine lines between the two categories of workers by construing “But excluding Professional and Administrative cadres” used in Item 14 Part B, Third Schedule of TUA (as amended) to mean a mere restatement that that category of staff are always senior staff and never junior workers. AERO CONTRACTORS CO. OF NIGERIA LTD v. NAAPE & ORS (2014) 42 N.L.L.R. (PT. 133) 664 at 719 para. H. ON ISSUE 2 If the answer to the above is in the affirmative, whether the 1st defendant was right to deduct check-off dues of its staff on grade level 07 for remittance to the 2nd defendant? Learned Counsel contended that the 1st Defendant as an employer has the right to grade its staff and limit their membership of trade unions to specific grades and that it is also a statutory duty of an employer to deduct its employees check-off dues and remit same to the appropriate union. NUPCE v. KWARA STATE UTILITY BOARD (Supra); NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY WORKERS UNION v. NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY, Suit No. NIC/4/81 reported in DIGEST OF JUDGMENTS OF NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT (1978- 2006) at page 97; ASSBIFI & ANOR v. AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY NIGERIA LIMITED, Suit No. NIC/1/1985 reported in DIGEST OF JUDGMENTS OF NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT (1978-2006) at page 188. It is counsel’s contention that the 1st defendant merely did its duty under Section 17(a) and (b) of the TUA by deducting check-off dues of grade level 07 in its employment and remitted to the appropriate union which in this case is the 2 Defendant. NASU v. AKWA IBOM STATE UNIVERSITY & ANOR. (2014) 46 N.L.L.R. (PT. 150) 545 at 577 paras. C-F. He argued that contrary to the Claimants’ argument, the 1st Defendant need not be a party to the suit in order to enforce or comply with it or be bound by it. NESTOIL PLC v. NUPENG (2012) 29 N.L.L.R. (PT. 82) 90 at 156 paras. A-C, per KANYIP, J; ASCSN v. HON. MIN. OF WORKS & ORS. (2011) 22 N.L.LSR. (PT. 63) 493 at 539 - 540 paras. H – C; NUPENG v. MWUN (2012) 28 N.L.L.R. (PT. 80) 309; NUSDE v. SEWUN (2013) 35 N.LL.R. (PT. 106) 606 at 647-650 paras. I1-E. 2nd defendant filed a NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION on 7th March, 2016 and dated same day accompanied by a 6 paragraph affidavit in support deposed to by Aminu Maidanan Suleiman, praying the Court for the following reliefs: 1. AN ORDER STRIKING OUT the entire suit for want of jurisdiction. OR in the alternative: 2. AN ORDER SETTING ASIDE the Originating Processes in this suit having been improperly signed and filed. GROUNDS FOR THE APPLICATION: 1. This suit being a trade dispute between a Trade Union and Staff Association ought to go through the mandatory provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act CAP. T8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and saved by Section 254C (1) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). 2. The Originating Summons does not have affixed therein the stamp and seal of the legal practitioner who purportedly signed it in accordance with the mandatory provision of Rule 10 of the Rule of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners and the binding decision of the Supreme Court in SENATOR BELLO SARKIN YAKI (RTD.) & ORS. v. SENATR ATIKU ABUBAKAR BAGUDU & ORS v. GENERAL BELLO SARKIN YARKIN (RTD.) & ORS. (2015) LPELR-25721(SC) decided on Tuesday, 27th October, 2015. 3. This Honourable Court has the powers to strike out any suit otherwise than as provided by law or afflicted by fatal defect competence of the Honourable Court to assume Jurisdiction. WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION ISSUE Whether this suit ought not to be struck out for being incompetent? Learned Counsel submitted that a process or legal document is not executed or signed by counsel after filing. That the execution and signature must precede delivery to the court official for filing as a legal document and that a process of court must carry valid, name signature and seal of counsel. OKAFOR v NWEKE (2007)10 NWL.R (PT. 1043) SC 521. He submitted further that an action founded on. a void Originating Summons robs the court of the jurisdiction to determine the appeal on the merit. AHMED v AHMED (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377) 274 at 324- 325. Counsel submitted that a process of court is only competent if it is endorsed by a Legal Practitioner and the stamp and seal of the said legal Practitioner must be affixed on the said process of court, that this is a statutory imperative- and not just a matter of rules of court. Consequently, that it is not open to courts to “usurp the role of legislature by not interpreting the law as it is but by interpreting it as it ought to be”. FBN PLC v. MAIWADA & ORS. (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1348) 444, per FABIYI JSC at page 488 C-D; BRAITH WAITE v SKYE BANK PLC (2013j 5 NWLR [PT. 1346] 1 SC @ 19 paras G-H, per FABIYI JSC. He argued that the enacted safeguards are not for the protection of one litigant alone, rather they are for the collective protection of the entire public who must make use of the services of Legal practitioners. Thus, one litigant cannot contract out of it or be excused to engage a lawyer who willfully declines to be governed or regulated by the rules of the profession, which gave him the license to practice in the first place. LABIYI V ANRETIOLA (1992) 8 NWLR [PT. 258] SC 139; [7] OLORUNTOBA -OJU V ABDUL RAHEEM &ORS (2009) LPELR 2596 (SCO PG 60 PARAS B-E. It is counsel’s submission that in the instant case, the effective date of stamp and seal requirements on legal documents by courts was 1st June, 2015 as directed by the CJN circular, but effective date for counsel to comply was 1st April, 2015 as directed by NBA. However, the Originating that was filed on 27th July, 2015 is therefore caught by Rule 10 (2) of RCP and should be held incompetent on this note in line with the sanction for default as prescribed under Rule 10(3) of RPC. OKAFOR’s case (supra). He submitted that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied without discrimination, sentiment or obfuscation. SENATOR BELLO SARIUN YAKI (RTD.) & ORS. v. SENATOR ATIKU ABUBAKAR BAGIJDU & ORS v. GENERAL BELLO SARKIN YARKIN (RTD.) & ORS. (2015) LPELR-25721(SC). Counsel argued that the condition precedent to the institution of this suit was not complied with by the Claimants. It follows therefore, that this Honourable Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit. SSAUTHRAIAI v. REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS & ORS. (2013) 33 N.L.L.R. (PT. 94) 67 at 101-102 paras. B-F. Citing Sec. 48 of the Trade Disputes Act, counsel submitted that a long line of judicial decisions have, as expected, followed the above statutory meaning of trade dispute. NUEE v. BPE (2010) 18 N.L.L.R. (PT. 50) 161 at 200 paras C-H. It is counsel’s submission that whilst trade dispute is within the jurisdictional competence of this Honourable Court by virtue of Section 254(C) (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Section 7 (1) (a) and (c) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, it is however, to be exercisable in its appellate jurisdiction as provided in the saving provisions of Section 254(C) (1) (b) and (3) of the Constitution, Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act and Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act. ASSBIFI v. UNION BANK & ORS. (2009) 14 N.L.L.R. (PT. 37) 1 at 22-24 paras. E-A. He argued that once this is apprehended, it is not difficult to conclude that the processes set out in Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act must first be complied with. NUPENG v. OIL & INDUSTRIAL SERVICES LTD. (2010) 21 N.L.L.R. (PT. 58) 67, per B.B. KANYIP, P.J. held at page 9 1-92 paras. B-B; C.R.C. v. A.U.P.C.T.R.E. (2004) 1 N.L.L.R. (PT. 1) 1 at 24 paras. E-H, per ADEJUMO, P. It is counsel’s contention that the amendment under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2011 has now made it possible for trade disputes to be litigable in this Court in its original jurisdiction. UZOARU & ANOR v. DANGOTE CEMENT PLC. & ANOR. (2013) 31 N.L.L.R. (PT. 89) 308 at 323 — 325 paras. C-B, per OBASEKI OSAGHAE, J. Counsel submitted that where a method for doing an act is provided by statute, only that method must be followed, therefore, employment of any other method other than that provided by statute renders the action taken void. APAPA v. I.N.EC. (2012) 8 NWLR (PT. 1303) 409 at 431 paras. B. Claimants filed a 7 paragraph COUNTER AFFIDAVIT on 5th May, 2016 deposed to by Abiodun Anifowose. WRITTEN ADDRESS IN RESPONSE TO APPLICANTS NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION DATED 7TH MARCH 2016 (filed on 5th May, 2016) Non-Compliance with Rule 10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners Learned Counsel submitted that the circular issued by the Chief Justice of Nigeria, is not a binding and mandatory legal instrument. MEGA PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE’S PARTY (MPPP) V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & 3 ORS (NO.1) (2015)18 NWLR (1491)251, where Per I.T. Muhammad held that; This issue of bar stamp raised by Dr. Ayeni is a circular which has been issued by the Hon. Chief Justice of Nigeria to all Heads of Courts for the betterment of Legal Practice in Nigeria. The circular has not metamorphosed into a practice direction. It cannot be said to be compulsory requirement for filing court processes in a court of law as of now. Section 10 of Legal Practitioners Rules of Professional Conduct (Supra) relied upon ... is directory and not mandatory in nature. Failure to affix the NBA stamp cannot in my view invalidate processes filed in a court of law....’ Counsel assuming, without conceding that the Claimants’ processes were not filed in compliance with Rule 10 of the RPCLP, submitted that the said non-compliance is not fatal to the Claimants’ case, as the default is only a voidable defect which may be corrected by the Legal Practitioner. MEGA PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE’S PARTY OF NIGERIA (SUPRA); GENERAL BELLO SARKIN YAKI (RTD) & ANOR V. SENATOR ABUBAKAR ATIKU BAGUDU & 2 ORS (2015) LPELR - 25721 (SC); NYESOM V. PETERSIDE & ORS (2016) LPELR — 40036 (SC) PAGE 32 PARA B-D, Per Kekere-Ekun JSC. Non-Compliance with Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act Counsel submitted that it is a settled principle of practice that what determines the jurisdiction of court in any matter are the principal rather than ancillary reliefs before the court. Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517 @ 564, per Oputa, JCS (as he then was). He submitted that the principal claim of the Claimants in the present case is the interpretative determination of this court on the scope and application of the judgment of this court in Suit Nos. NIC/5/93 and NICN/ABJ/4/2010 between Nigeria Civil Service Union v. Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria (now report2d in (2012) 12 N.L.L.R (Pt. 73) 94). And that the question over the right to collect check-off dues is merely an accessory issue which necessarily flows from the right of an employee to belong to a trade union. UNACHUKWUV. AJUZIE (2009) 4NWLR (PT. 1131) 336 @ 349 A-EJ; P.D.P V. SYLVA (2012) 13 NWLR (1316) 85 @ 138 (A-B & G-H), BABINGTAN-ASHAYE V. E.M.A.G ENTERPRISE (NIG.) LTD (2011) 10 NWLR (PT. 1256) 479 @524 (D-F). Counsel argued that the dispute between the parties herein is not a dispute which must first be submitted to the Industrial Arbitration Panel, as argued by the Applicant, as the issues in this case call for the exercise of the interpretation jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. AFBTE V. FOBTEB (2015)59 NLLR (PT. 207) 798 @ 828 (C-D); LAGOS SHERATON HOTELS & TOWERS V. H.P.S.S.S.A (2011) 22 NNLR (61) 184 @ 222 (G-B. He submitted that it would amount to serious misconstruction of the laws and a dis-service to this Honourable Court, for anyone to argue, as the Applicant has done, that the Industrial Arbitration panel, or any other administrative body must sit in review and construction over the judgment of Superior Court of record established under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. NULGE V. MHWUN (2005) 2 NLLR (PT. 4)166 @ 181 PARES C. Counsel submitted that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010 has settled the issue of the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court and makes provision for the original jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court under Section 254C. MARITIME WORKERS UNION OF NIGERIA V. NLC (2005) 4 NLLR (PT. 10), 270 2 287 (D-F). REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW IN RESPEONSE TO CLAIMANT’S WRITTEN ADDRESS DATED 5TH MAY, 2016 (dated and filed on 18th May, 2016). Non-Compliance with Rule 10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners Learned Counsel submitted that it is trite that where the provisions of a law or regulation have been judicially construed, any other meaning they may have bows to the judicial construction. DAPIANLONG v. DARIYE (2007) 8 NWLR (PT. 1036) 332 at 447 para. F. He submitted that Rule 10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct has been judicially construed by the Supreme Court in the YAKI case, per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. at page 345 paras. G-H, to the effect that the Rule applies to all “legal documents” prepared by a legal practitioner in his capacity as a legal practitioner. Furthermore, that the Court held that the circular of the Chief Justice of Nigeria directing the enforcement of the stamp and seal policy could not be cognized in determining the effective date of the policy, per Onnoghen, JSC. Non-Compliance with Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act Counsel submitted that contrary to the claimants’ argument that the present dispute submitted for resolution by this Honourable Court is a trade dispute, it is not, however, amenable to the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act CAP. T8, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and saved by Section 254C (1) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) as the present suit is brought under the “interpretative jurisdiction” of this Honourable Court; “dispute” has been judicially defined by our Courts as “a conflict or controversy especially one that has given rise to a particular law suit”. NELSON-MOORE & ANOR v. MEDICINE PLUS LTD & ANOR (2014) LPELR-24089(CA) p. 31. Paras. A-B; [4) BENDEX ENGINEERING CORPORATION & ANOR v. EFFICIENT PETROLEUM NIGERIA LTD. (2000) LPELR-10143(CA); LAGOS SHERATON HOTEL & TOWERS v. H.P.S.S.A. (2014) 14 NWLR (PT. 1426), per Oseji, JCA. He submitted that the intention was lost when the Claimants sought eight (8) reliefs with only the 5th relief scantily referring to the previous judgment and that it is trite that where a party employs strategy in litigation which has failed, it can only blame no one for it. INAKOJU v. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT. 1025) 427 at 620 paras. G-H. Counsel maintained that the authorities, particularly that of AFTBE v. FOBTEB (2015) 59 NLLR (PT. 207) 798 cited by the Claimants do not apply in the instant case as those cases do not touch on non-remittance of check off dues which is the subject matter of this case. ADEGOKE MOTORS LTD v. ADESANYA (1989) NWLR (PT. 109) 250 at 275 para. E. Claimants filed a MOTION ON NOTICE on 10th June, 2016 and dated same day supported by a 12 paragraph affidavit deposed to by Abiodun Anifowoshe, praying the Court for the following: 1. AN ORDER restraining the 1st Defendant from paying to the 2nd Defendant any check-off dues collected from the employees of the 1st Defendant who are on grade level 07 pending the determination of this suit. 2. AN ORDER directing the 1st Defendant to pay over to the Chief Registrar of this Honourable Court all check-off dues deducted from the salaries of its employers on grade level 07 to be deposited by the Chief Registrar into an interest-yielding account and for the Chief Registrar to pay over both the principal and interest on such account to the successful party between the l Claimant and the 2nd Defendant at the conclusion of this case. GROUNDS FOR THE APPLICATION 1. The issue between the parties as contained in the substantive Originating Summon bothers on whether the judgment of this Honourable Court in Suit No NICN/ABJ/4/2 010 between Nigeria Civil Service Union v. Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria (now reported in (2012) 12 N.L.L.R (Pt. 73) 94), can be extended to apply to the 1st Claimant and 2nd Defendant herein. 2. While the matter is already before this Honourable Court, the 1st Defendant has been collecting check-off dues from the affected employees who form the subject matter of the substantive suit and paying same to the 2nd Defendant. WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT ISSUE Whether the Applicants are entitled to the exercise of the Court’s discretion in their favour. Counsel submitted that the purpose of this application is to preserve the res in the substantive action and that this Honourable Court has the power to preserve the res as granted Sec. 17 of the National Industrial Court Act; Orders 11 Rule 8 and 14 Rule 2 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 (as amended). The Vessel Saint Roland v. Osinloye (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 500) 387 @ 414 (G-H). He maintained that this application simply seeks the interlocutory injunction of this Honourable Court, which is an exercise of Court discretion, restraining the Respondents from doing an act or at best to continue to do it under the specific direction of the court. Braithwaite v. S.C.B. (Nig.) Ltd (2012) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1281) 301 at 316 (B-C). Counsel submitted that the purpose of interlocutory injunction is to protect a claimant against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the case were resolved in his favour at the trial. ABOSELDEHYDE LABORATORIES PLC. V. UNION MERCHANT BANK LIMITED 7 ANOR (2013) LPELR —20180 (SC). Furthermore, that the principles guiding the grant of an interlocutory injunction and the factors to consider in granting same have long been settled by a plethora cases. FRANCIS MORGAN UDO V. INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF CHRISTIAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH (2008) LPELR — 8548 (CA); AKIPELU V. ADEGHORE (2008) 10 NWLR (PT. 1096) 531 AT 541 (A-G); BUHARI V. OBASANJO (2003) 17 NWLR (PT. 850) 587; OBEYA MEMORIAL SPECIALIST HOSPITAL V. A.G. FEDERATION (1987) 3 NWLR (PT. 60) 325; KOTOYE V. CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (PT. 98) 419; AKINPELU V. ADEGBORE (SUPRA) 556 (A-G). Counsel argued that the position of the law is that once the court has become seized of a matter, parties should refrain from taking any steps which will render any eventual judgment an exercise in futility. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF LAGOS STATE & ORS. V. OJUKWU (1986)2 NWLR (18) 621. He pointed out that the Applicants have therefore shown from the materials before the court that they have satisfied the conditions for the exercise of this Court’s judicial and judicious discretion in their favour to preserve the res by ordering same paid into an account of the court. Oyo Statev. Akin yemi (2003)1 NWLR (Pt. 800)1 @21-22(C), where the Court of Appeal, Per Adekeye; Kigo (Nig.) Ltd. V. Holman Bros. (Nig.) Ltd. (2001) WRN I (SC). 2nd defendant filed a 6 paragraph COUNTER AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO CLAIMANTS/APPLICANTS’ MOTION ON NOTICE on 21st June, 2016 and dated same day, deposed to by Sesan Adebayo. WRITTEN ADDRESS IN OPPOSITION ISSUE Whether this is a proper case for the court to restrain an agency of government from performing its statutory duty? Counsel submitted that the instant application should be decided on the established principles guiding the grant of equitable order of injunction as there are differences between an injunction and preservative order. That although they appear similar, they rest on distinct principles for their application. EMERAH v. CHIEKWE (1996) 7 NWLR (PT. 462) 536 at 547 paras. A-C, per TOBI, J.C.A. (as he then was); OLOJEDE v. OLALEYE (2010) 4 NWLR (PT. 1183) 1 at 40 Paras. D-H. Counsel submitted that like every other discretionary power, the power to grant an order of interlocutory injunction must be exercised judiciously and judicially resting on available facts disclosed before the court. OGBONNAYA v. ADAPALM NIG. LTD. (1993) 5 NWLR (PT. 292) 147. Furthermore, that an injunctive order is not lightly granted as it is punitive in nature and is granted based on an established set of principles which the Claimants have rightly set out at paragraph 4.4 of their written argument. EMERAH V. CHIEKWE (SUPRA) 551 para. A; F.H.A. v. EMELIE (2013) 3 NWLR (1342) 478 at 495 paras. E-A. Legal Right to be Protected Counsel submitted that whoever has possession has an immediate legal or equitable right over the property to be protected. F.H.A. V. EMELIE (SUPRA) AT PAGE 496 PARAS. F-H. He submitted that the Claimants’ application is particularly curious as injunctive order is not available to an applicant who seeks to injunct an exercise of statutory duty to a statutory beneficiary. JOMOH V. ALESHINYOLE II (2014) 15 NWLR (PT. 1430) 277 AT 317 PARAS. C-D. Inadequacy of Damages as Compensation Counsel submitted that where damages will be an adequate remedy and the respondent is in a financial position to pay, an interlocutory injunction will not be granted. However, where damages will not provide an adequate remedy for the applicant in the event of his succeeding at the trial, the court is then obliged to consider whether, should the respondent succeed at trial, he would be sufficiently compensated under an undertaking to be given by the applicant as to damages for the loss the respondent would have sustained by reason of the grant of interlocutory injunction. ADEWALE V. GOV., EKITI STATE (2007) 2 NWLR (PT. 1019) 634 AT 653 PARAS. A-C. Guilty of Delay Counsel submitted that since it is settled that order of injunction is an equitable remedy, it follows that all the incidents of equity are applicable in a consideration whether to grant the injunction or not, as it is a principle of injunction that it must be brought timeously to arrest an act. ABOSELDEHYDE LAB. PLC V. U.M.B. LTD. (2013) 13 NWLR (PT. 1370) 91 AT 130-131 PARAS. H-A. That in other words, an applicant for injunction as the Claimants, must not be indolent in seeking the remedy of injunction because Equity does not aid the indolent. BRAIMAH V. ABASI (1998) 13 NWLR (PT. 581) 167 AT 187 PARAS. E-G. Furthermore, that where an applicant has inordinately delayed in bringing the application for injunction, the court must refuse it as the delay demonstrates the absence of urgency requiring prompt relief. COLITO (NIG.) LIMITED & ANOR V. HONOURABLE JUSTICE TITI DAIBU & ORS (2009) LPELR-8216 (CA); SOLID UNIT NIG. LTD & ANOR V. GEOTESS NIG. LTD (2013) LPELR-20724 (CA); JOSEPH OGUNDELE AJEWOLE V. OBA E.A. ADETIMO & ORS. (1996) LPELR-296 (SC); EZEBIL.O V. CHINWUBA (1997) 7 NWLR (PT. 511) 108 AT 128 PARAS. A-B, per TOBI, J.C.A. (of blessed memory). It is counsel’s submission that if in the unlikely event the 2nd Defendant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection fails, the next logical thing should be to set the Originating Summons down for hearing as pleadings have been settled. Precious judicial time and resources that will be deployed in hearing the Motion for Injunction and writing a Ruling thereon will be appropriately and rightly channeled towards hearing the Originating Summons and writing Judgment. D.P.C.C. LTD. V. B.P.C. LTD. (2008) 4 NWLR (PT. 1077) 376 AT 407-408 PARAS. D-A; SOLUDO V. OSIGBO (2009)18 NWLR (PT. 1173) 290. REPLY ON POINT OF LAW TO 2ND DEFENDANT’S COUNTER AFFIDAVIT AND WRITTEN ADDRESS IN RESPONSE TO THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS DATED 7TH MARCH, 2015 (dated and filed on 22nd June, 2016). Affidavit Offending Against the Evidence Act Counsel submitted that paragraphs 14, 15(a)-(c), 16(a)-(d) of 2 Defendant’s Counter Affidavit offend against the provision of Section 115(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 because the said depositions contain extraneous matters by way of legal argument, legal opinions and conclusions. General and Aviation SERVICES LTD V. CAPTAIN PAUL M. THAHAL (2004) 10 NWLR (PT. 880)50 @ 73 (D-H) & 89 (F-H), Per Uwaifo JSC. Furthermore, that the said offending paragraphs are as such, liable to be struck out or discountenanced. JOSIEN HOLDINGS LTD & ANOR V. LORNAMEAD & ANOR (1995) 1 NWLR (PT. 371) 254 @ 265 (E-G); NIPSS V. OSIGWE (2008) 6 NWLR (PT. 1083) 239 251 (C-F); NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION & AFAR V. EZEKIEL IZUOGU & ORS (1993) 2 NWLR (PT. 275) @ 286- 287. He argued that the position of the law is that affidavit evidence which are clearly arid bare allegations and or conclusions but not supported with facts and or documents needed to establish them are omissions which are fatal to any application or assertion before the Court. CHAIRMAN, EFCC & ANOR V. LITTLECHILD & ANOR. (2015) LPELR25199 (CA); GENERAL & AVIATION SERVICES LTD V. THALIAL (2004) 4 SC M 52; UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC. V. ASTRA BUILDERS (WA) LTD (2010) 2-3 SC (PT. 1)60 @30-31 (E-A). Whether the Defendants are entitled to Raise Fresh Questions for Determination in an Originating Summons Proceedings Counsel submitted that the court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain or answer fresh/new issues that have been formulated by the Defendants in their Counter Affidavit and written Address dated 7th March, 2016 and that any movement away from this settled position of the law renders any such fresh questions or issues for determination baseless and to no issue. They are therefore liable to be ignored by this Honourable Court. ALHAJI MUSA ALUBANKUDI V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (2002) 17 NWLR (PT. 796) 338 @ 357 (F-H), per Chukwuma-Eneh, JCA (as he then was). Court’s Decision I have carefully summarized the respective positions of all sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in this Judgement and specific mention would be made to them where the need arises. The claimant in bringing this action is seeking the following reliefs; 1) A DECLARATION that by virtue of sub-section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act (as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005), employees of the 1st Defendant on grade level 07 who are members of the 1st Claimant Union and who have not voluntarily opted out of the membership of the said Union, cannot be forced, coerced or compelled by the 1st Defendant and/or the 2nd Defendant Association to join and become members of the 2nd Defendant Association. 2) A DECLARATION that employees of the 1st Defendant on grade level 07 being members, and having not voluntarily opted out of or relinquished their membership of the lst Claimant Union, the lst Defendant is obliged to deduct check off dues from the salaries of the said employees and pay same to the registered office or the designated bank account of the 1st Claimant Union as statutorily prescribed in section 1 6A of the Trade Unions Act (as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005). 3) A DECLARATION that it is unlawful and unconstitutional for the 2nd Defendant Association to claim the right to unionize forcefully employees of the 1st Defendant on grade level 07 and to be collecting from the 1st Defendant check-off dues deducted from the salaries of the said employees when to the knowledge of the 2nd Defendant Association the said employees have always been members of the lst Claimant Union and have not voluntarily relinquished their membership of the 1st Claimant Union nor consented or opted to become members of the 2nd Defendant Association. 4) A DECLARATION that the action of the 1st Defendant in restricting the membership of the 1st Claimant to employees of the 1st Defendant on grade levels 01 to 06 is in breach of the provisions of Sub-section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act (as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005). 5) A DECLARATION that it is wrongful for the 1st Defendant to force or coerce its employees on grade level 07 to relinquish their membership of the l Claimant Union and join the 2 Defendant Association by placing reliance on the decision of this HonourabLe Court in Suit No. NIC/5/93 and Suit No. NICN/ABJ/2010 which were between the Nigeria Civil Service Union and Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria, when the 1st Claimant Union and the 2nd Defendant Association were not parties to the said Suits and when the decision in Suit No. NIC/5/93 was reached prior to the enactment of sub-section 12(4) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 2005 and the decision in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/2010 merely adopted the earlier decision on the principle of estoppel per rem judicata. 6) AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 1st Defendant hereof jointly and severally, whether by themselves or through their servants, agents, privies or in any other capacity whatsoever, from forcing, coercing or compelling employees of the 1st Defendant on grade level 07 to be members of the 2nd Defendant Association without the said employees voluntarily opting to be such members. 7) AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 2nd Defendant hereof from demanding for payment of and/or collecting from the 1st Defendant check-off dues deducted from the salaries of employees of the 1st Defendant on grade level 07 when such employees are members and remain members of the Claimant Union and have not voluntarily opted to become members of the 2nd Defendant Association. 8) AN ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION COMPELLING the 1st Defendant to pay all check-off dues collected from the employees of the Defendant on grade level 07, who are members of the 1st Claimant, to the registered office or designated bank account of the lst Claimant in accordance with the provision of Section 16A of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 (as amended by the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, 2005). 9) AN ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION COMPELLING the Defendants jointly and severally to render an account of all the check off dues so far deducted from the salaries of grade level 07 employees of the 1st Defendant from November 2014 and either paid over to the 2nd Defendant Association or retained by the lst Defendant and pay same over to the Claimant within two months from the date the Judgment of this Honourable Court is delivered. I shall deal with the issue of Jurisdiction first as 2nd defendants filed a preliminary objection raising questions as to the competence of this suit on the grounds that the Originating process was not signed, stamp and sealed and that the condition precedent to the institution of this suit Sec. 48 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004, was not complied with. Another bone of contention bordering on jurisdiction was whether the claimant’s action can be properly considered as falling within the interpretative jurisdiction of this court, raised in the defendants reply processes. All these question to my mind aggregate to an issue of competence of the originating process. As regards the objection that the Originating process was not signed, stamp and sealed, I find that a perusal of the court file reveal that the claimants original processes where in fact duly signed, stamped and sealed, this aspect of the 2nd defendants objection I find has not merit. That leaves the aspect as to the condition precedent to the institution of this suit Sec. 48 of the Trade Disputes Act 2004 and the propriety of the originating summons/ interpretive power of the court. Now considering the Court of Appeal pronouncement that Jurisdictional issues can be raised at any time in DAILY TIMES (NIG.) PLC v. D.S.V. LTD (2014) 5 NWLR (PT. 1400) 327 @ 355 C.A. where the Court of Appeal held “that the importance of jurisdiction is why the issue can be raised at any stage of a case, be it at the trial, or on appeal. A court can even raise the issue suo motu. See also IJEBU-ODE L.G. v. ADEDEJI BALOGUN & CO. LTD. (1991) 1 NWLR (PT. 166) 136; OLUTOLA v. UNILORIN (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 905) 416. Also the Supreme Court in OPARA V. AMADI (2013) 12 NWLR (PT. 1369) 512 @ 517 held that “Jurisdiction of court is a threshold issue and so once raised, it must be heard first and resolved one way or the other. Any proceedings conducted without jurisdiction no matter how brilliantly handled would amount to a nullity if the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter”. The Apex Court in ALIMS (NIG.) LTD. V. U.B.A. PLC. (2013) 6 NWLR (PT. 1351) 613 S.C. stated that “Jurisdiction of court is very fundamental. It should be determined at the earliest opportunity when raised. If a court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine a case, the proceedings of the court is a nullity no matter how well conducted and decided. This is because, a defect in competence is not only intrinsic, but extrinsic to the entire process of adjudication”. The position of the law is that An Originating summons is an originating process to determine an issue of law or the interpretation of documents by means of submitting affidavit as evidence. An appropriate procedure only;- for construction of a document or statute or is one of pure law. Arguing that an Originating Summons is not appropriate where there is likely to be any substantial dispute of facts, that would demand the settling of pleadings. DIRECTOR, S.S.S. V. AGBAKOBA (1999) 3 NWLR (PT. 545) 425; OSUAGWU V. EMEZI (1998) 12 NWLR (PT. 574) 640. And are best suited for those actions where facts are not likely to be in dispute and where pleadings are not filed and witnesses not examined. OLLEY V. TUNJI (2013) 10 NWLR (PT. 1362) 275 @ 281; The Supreme Court continued an “Originating summons is an originating process in the High court to determine an issue of law or the interpretation of documents by means of submitting affidavit as evidence. It is the appropriate procedure where the main point of issue is one of construction of a document or statute or is one of pure law. Originating summons is not appropriate where there is likely to be any substantial dispute of facts that the justice of the case would demand the settling of pleadings. Apart from providing sufficient particulars to identify the cause of action, the originating summons must include statement of the question to enable the court to determine or statement of the remedy to which the court can declare. There is the need to formulate and present a question or questions for the court to determine based on Statute, Will etc. in an originating summons. The grant of the reliefs sought in the originating summons is preceded by, and predicated upon, the court’s answer to the question or question’s for determination. The questions for construction of an instrument in question are an integral part and a sine qua non of the originating summons, without which the process is incurably defective and not merely irregular” In the National Industrial Court Rules 2017; provide that matters relating to the interpretation of Section 254 C(1) (d) of the CFRN 1999 (as amended) filed before this court shall be by way of Originating Summons (if it relates to interpretation and application is shall be way of complaint)and by Order 3 rule (3) “Civil proceedings that may commence by Originating Summons include matters relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment, agreement or any other instrument relating employment, labour and industrial relations in respect of which the court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of Section 254C of the CFRN 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or law in force in Nigeria. And Order 3 rule (16) (1) further provides that “Any person claimant to be interested under an enactment, constitution, agreement or any other written instrument may by originating summons apply to the Court for the determination of any question of construction arising from the instrument and for such declaration of the rights of the person(s) interested, in so far as such questions of construction arises from subject matter over which the court has jurisdiction. And sub (2) continues; A party activating the interpretive jurisdiction of his court shall indicate with sufficient particularity the provisions or part of the document to be interpreted. Looking at the originating process in the instant case one finds that the claimants have argued that they seek the court’s interpretation of this Court’s Judgment in NIGERIA CIVIL SERVICE UNION V. ASSOCIATION OF SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS OF NIGERIA (2012) 12 N.L.L.R (Pt. 73) 94), but the claimant have not indicated the portion of the judgment they wish to be interpreted and if the claimant want the court to interpret the whole judgment, does it equate to for a relief for the application. In addition looking at the claimant relief 1 it is clearly seeking a declaration on the application of the judgement. Which itself raises questions of fact, which would in turn require pleadings and evidence as to who did what and when. The case law and the NICN rules both provide for the filing of pleadings in matters where questions of facts are involved. See ATAGO V. NWUCHE (2013) 3 NWLR (PT. 1341) 337 “The form of commencement of an action does not necessarily make it incompetent. It does not matter whether the action was begun by writ of summons or by Originating summons. What is most important is the question of justice of the case. Thus, where a suit is improperly commenced by originating summons, the defect relates to procedure and does not affect the competence of the suit. The legal effect is to order pleadings and not strike out the suit. P.D.P. V. ABUBAKAR (2007) 3 NWLR (PT. 1022) 515 REFERRED TO.] (P. 353, PARAS. C, D, F, 361, PARAS. B-C), NAGOGO V. C.P.C. (2013) 2 NWLR (PT. 1339) 448 AT 451, WILSON V. OKEKE (2011) 3 NWLR (PT. 1235) 456; FAMFA OIL LTD. V. A.-G. FED. (2003) 18 NWLR (PT. 852). If the Court were to take the directive of the above authorities and order pleadings looking at the issue to be joined to my mind are whether it is the claimants or the 2nd defendant that is entitled to unionize the works of the 1st defendant and this court has stated that it lacks jurisdiction when it comes to determining the appr See NATIONAL UNION OF PETROLEUM & ANOR Vs. OIL & INDUSTRIAL SERVICE LTD. NIC/LA/20/2009 delivered on 21st April 2010 where the court held the dispute over unionizing members and payment of check off dues despite claim for declarations and injunctive reliefs was a trade dispute for which this court does not have original jurisdiction. Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act make provisions for the resolution of trade disputes in sections 4,5, 6,7,8,9 and 17 and sections 7(3) and 53(2) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. This in effect means that the dispute resolution processes in part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act which are mediation, conciliation and arbitration are compulsory except otherwise stated. These processes must be exhausted before this court can be approached. Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act provides “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or any other enactment or law, the National Assembly may by an Act prescribe that any matter under subsection (1)(a) of this section may go through the process of conciliation or arbitration before such matter is heard by the court”. Section 2(1) of the Trade Dispute Act provides that: “no person shall commence an action, the subject matter of a trade dispute or any inter or intra-union dispute in a court of law and accordingly, any action which, prior to the commencement of this section is pending shall abate and be null and void”. The jurisdiction of this court in relation to trade disputes is therefore not original. It is an appellate or a referral jurisdiction. The dispute resolution mechanism provide in part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act must be exhausted before the can court assume jurisdiction. See MIX & BAKE FLOUR MILLS INDUSTRIES V NUFBTE (2004) 1 NLLR (PT 2) 247, ASSBIFI V UNION BANK OF NIGERIA (2004) 14 NLLR (PT 37) PG 6, AUWAL ADAMU & ORS V JALA LUDEEN & ORS (2009) 14 NLLR, PT 38, PG 215, NUPENG V OIL AND INDUSTRIAL SERVICE LTD (UNREPORTED) SUIT NO. NIC/LA/20/2009 deliver on April 21, 2010, CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION V AMALGAMATED UNION OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL AND RECREATIONAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES (2004) 1 NLLR (PT 1) 1. This court had held in SUIT NO. LAC/LA/24/2009 HOTEL AND PERSONAL SERVICES SENIOR STAFF ASSOCIATION Vs. THE TOURIST COMPANY NIGERIA delivered on the 4th April 2011, that the interpretation power of this court is not to be used in a trade dispute. In the circumstances I find that this matter is best suited for and that the claimant has not complied with the dispute resolution processes provided in Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act. The National Industrial Court is not a court of first instance in a trade dispute, this action is premature and the court must decline jurisdiction to entertain it. I therefore hold that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this matter at this stage. Having found that this is premature it would be at best academic to approach resolving the other issues contained in the preliminary objection. For all the reasons given above, the preliminary objection has merit and succeed. This action is consequently dismissed. I make no order as to cost at this time. Judgement is entered accordingly. …………………………………….. Hon. Justice E. N. Agbakoba