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Court’s Decision Having carefully summarized the position of both sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in The Claimants commenced this action vide Originating Summons filed on 18th November, 2016 accompanied by a 41 paragraph affidavit deposed to Comrade Joe Ajaero, claiming for the determination of the following questions: 1. Whether by virtue of Articles III (9); V (1)(3) and IX of the lst Claimant’s Constitution (2011), and Rules 18(v) & 190 & 2) of the Constitution of the 2nd Claimant, the Claimants are empowered to raise funds to finance their activities through membership subscriptions and levies in accordance with their constitutions drawn up pursuant to sections 15(1), 17(a), 23(2)(b) & 23(3) of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap T14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 2. Whether by virtue of the Resolution of the National Executive Council of the 1st Claimant at its meeting held at Grace Point Resort Hotel, Abuja, on Friday March, 2013 and the Resolution of the National Executive Council of the 2nd Claimant at its meeting held at Lagos Airport Hotels, Ikeja on 11th-12th April, 2013, respectively, in exercise of their powers under Articles IX and Rule 9 (ii) of the 1st and 2nd Claimant’s Constitution respectively, on the 2% levy on the terminal benefits of the 1st-9th Defendants and other members of the Claimants who were affected by the privatization exercise of PHCN, is valid and binding on the said 1st 9th Defendants and others who were members of the Claimants at the material time. 3. Whether by virtue of the various Statements of Final Claims endorsed by the 1st - 9th Defendants and other members of the Claimants, who were affected by the privatization exercise of PHCN, the said 2% levy was lawfully and validly deducted. 4. Whether by virtue of their Job loss or for any reason whatsoever, the 1st-9th Defendants and other members of the Claimants affected by the privatization exercise of PHCN are entitled to a refund of their union dues and the 2% levy deducted from their final severance benefits negotiated by the Claimants on their behalf or any other deducted levies whilst they were members of the Claimants. 5. Whether by the principle of “generalia specialibus non derogant” the Trade Unions Act (TUA) prevails over the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act in the oversight functions and powers to ensure accountability and transparency in the Claimants. 6. Whether by virtue of Sections 37, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 with regard to the powers of the Registrar of Trade Unions in ensuring accountability in the affairs of the Claimants, the invitation of past and present officers, and/or agents of the Claimants by the 14th Defendant amounts to usurpation of the said powers of the Registrar of Trade Unions. WHEREOF the Claimants pray the Honourable Court for the following reliefs: 1. A DECLARATION that by virtue of Articles III (9); V (1)(3) and IX of the 1st Claimant’s Constitution (2011), and Rules 18(v) & 19(1 & 2) of the Constitution of the 2nd Claimant, the Claimants are empowered to raise funds to finance their activities through membership subscriptions and levies in accordance with their constitutions drawn up pursuant to sections 15(1), 17(a), 23(2)(b) & 23(3) of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap T14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 2. A DECLARATION that by virtue of the Resolution of the National Executive Council of the Claimant at its meeting held at Grace Point Resort Hotel, Abuja, on Friday 1st March, 2013 and the Resolution of the National Executive Council of the 2nd Claimant at its meeting held at Lagos Airport Hotels, on 11th-12th April, 2013, respectively, in exercise of their powers under Articles IX and Rule 9 (ii) of the and 2nd Claimant’s Constitution respectively, on the 2% levy on the terminal benefits of the 1st-9th Defendants and other members of the Claimants who were affected by the privatization exercise of PHCN, is valid and binding on the said 1st-9th Defendants and others who were members of the Claimants at the material time. 3. A DECLARATION that by virtue of the various Statements of Final Claims endorsed by the 1st to 9th Defendants and other members of the Claimants, who were affected by the privatization exercise of PHCN, the said 2% levy was lawfully and validly deducted. 4. A DECLARATION that by virtue of their Job loss or for any reason whatsoever, the 1st - 9thDefendants and other members of the Claimants affected by the privatization exercise of PHCN are not entitled to a refund of their union dues and the 2% levy deducted from their final severance benefits negotiated by the Claimants on their behalf or any other deducted levies whilst they were members of the Claimants. 5. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 1st to 9th Defendants from demanding the 2% levy deducted from their final severance benefits negotiated by the Claimants on their behalf or any other deducted levies whilst they were members of the Claimants. 6. A DECLARATION that by the principle of “generalia specialibus non derogant” the Trade Unions Act (TUA) prevails over the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act in the oversight functions and powers to ensure accountability and transparency in the Claimants. 7. A DECLARATION that by virtue of Sections 37, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the Trade Unions Act with regard to the powers of the Registrar of Trade Unions in ensuring accountability in the affairs of the Claimants, the invitation of past and present officers, and/or agents of the Claimants by the 14th Defendant amounts to usurpation of the said powers of the Registrar of Trade Unions. 8. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 14th Defendant, its servants, operatives, officers, agents or privies from further usurping the powers of the Registrar of Trade Unions with respect to the affairs of the Claimants through invitations to Claimants’ past and present, officials and/or agents and calling for their books of accounts consequent upon the 2% levies deducted from the terminal benefits of disengaged members of the Claimants. 9. AN ORDER directing the lst — 9th Defendants to pay the sum of N10, 000,000 (Ten Million Naira) being cost of this suit. 10. GENERAL DAMAGES of N50, 000,000 (Fifty Million Naira) against the 1st — 9th Defendants both jointly and severally. Together with a WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS The Claimants/Applicants also filed a MOTION ON NOTICE on 18th November, 2016 and dated same day supported by a 44 paragraph affidavit deposed to by Comrade Joe Ajaero, praying the Court for the following orders: 1. AN ORDER of interlocutory injunction restraining the 1st — 9th and 14th Respondents from harassing, disturbing or questioning the Claimants/Applicants on the 2% levy deducted from the terminal benefits of the former members of Claimants/Applicants who were affected by the privatisation exercise of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), until the final determination of the substantive suit. 2. AN ORDER of interlocutory injunction restraining the 14th Respondents from detaining or arresting the Past and Present Executives of the lst and 2nd Claimant until the final determination of the substantive suit. The claimants/Applicant in WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION ON NOTICE their raised one sole ISSUES: Whether or not the Honourable Court ought to exercise its discretion to make an order of interim Injunction in the terms set out in the Motion on Notice pending the determination of the substantive Suit. Learned Counsel to the Claimant Applicant Sola Iji Esq, citing Section 16(1), National Industrial Court Act, 2006, submitted that the Honourable Court has the unimpeded discretion to grant an application for an injunction, which discretion however needs to be exercised judicially and judiciously. Furthermore, that the purpose of an interim or interlocutory injunction is to preserve the subject matter (or res) of the suit in the state in which it was prior to the outbreak of dispute (status quo ante bellum) pending the time when the question at issue between the parties shall be finally determined by the Court. Leasing company (Nigeria) Limited v Tiger Industries Ltd. (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1054) 346 at 324 (B-C). Claimant /Applicants Counsel also submitted that flowing from the line of authorities of Obeya Memorial Hospital V. Attorney General of the Federation (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 325 (with particular reference to the dictum of Obaseki, JSC at page 33]); N.A.B. Kotoye V. Central Bank of Nigeria & Ors. (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 98) 419 (with particular reference to the dictum of Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC at page 441); {1989} 2 S.C. (pt. 1) 1 and Globe Fishing industries V. Coker (1990) 7 NWLR(Pt. 162) 205, it has been established by the Supreme Court of Nigeria while placing heavy reliance in all these cases upon the famed dictum of Diplock, U in the House of Lords’ case of Cyanamid Co. V. Ethicori Limited (1975) A.C. 396, 1 All E.R. 504 that the following three requirements are to be satisfied in the consideration of a grant of an order of interlocutory injunction viz: i) Is there a serious question to be tried? ii) If so, will damages be adequate compensation for the temporary inconvenience? iii) If damages will be inadequate compensation, in whose favour is the balance of convenience? Owerri Municipal Council & Ors. V. Innocent Onuoha & Ors. (2010)All FWLR (Pt. 538) 896, per Mt. Garba, JCA held at pages 914- 915. Submitting that the legal right of the Applicants that was in existence prior to the termination of the 1st—9th Defendants from the employment of the Kaduna Electricity Distribution Company needs the protection of this Honourable Court. F.M. Udo V. Incorporated Trustees of Christian Methodist Episcopal Church (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 507) 79, quoting the dictum of Sankey, JCA, in Adewale V. Governor of Ekiti State (2007) All FWLR (PT, 383) 130, per Orji-Abadua, JCA. He submitted that the conduct of the Applicants in this case or in the circumstances leading up to it, has not been reprehensible as to warrant the Honourable Court declining intervention in their present application and that they have not been guilty of delay nor have they done any other thing to warrant the Honourable Court not exercising its discretion in favour of this application. Kotoye v. C.S.N. (Supra) (1989)2 S.C. (pt. 1) 1 particularly at page 17. The 1st Respondents filed their Motion on notice dated 13th January 2017 filed on the 16th January 2017 together with their Memorandum of Appearance and a Written Address. The FIRST RESPONDENT’S in their’ WRITTEN ADDRESS IN RESPONSE TO THE MOTION ON NOTICE DATED 18TH NOVEMBER, 2016’ (filed on 16th January, 2017 and dated 13th January, 2017). Raised two (2) ISSUES: Whether the application as constituted, is an abuse of court process? Whether the application as canvassed and argued has merit? ON ISSUE 1 Whether the application as constituted, is an abuse of court process? Learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent M. O. Abdul Salam Esq. submitted that an investigation on the issue of 2% levy deducted from the terminal benefit of the former members of the Applicants can be conducted or effected without the need to question the Applicants, assuming that they are capable of being questioned? PLATAEU STATE v. A.G. FEDERATION (2006) 3 NWLR (PT. 967) 346 @ 419, PARAS. G-H; ADEOGUN v. FASHOGBON (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 449) 531 @ 552-553, PARAS. H-E; NWORA v. NWABUEZE (2012) ALL FWLR (PT. 613) 1824 @ 1838-1839. He submitted that it is trite law that a court is not allowed to speculate upon issues not properly placed before it. OGUNLOYE v. ESINKIN (1999) 6 SCNJ 278 @ 290 LINES 19 -21; NDULUE v. ONYEKULUNNE (2002) 5 SC (PT. 2) 124 @ 132-133. It is counsel’s contention that the injunction sought against the 14th Respondent is not in favour of the parties in the record of proceeding, rather, the parties on record are asking the injunction in favour of parties who chose to stand-by and become spectators to their own battle. BADEJO v. MINISTER OF EDUCATION (1996) 9-10 SCNJ 51 @ 68. He submitted that it trite that parties are bound by the prayers of the Applicant and thus join issues on the prayers in the motion paper. C.W.B.S. v. SANTILI (1990) 3 SCNJ 83 @ 127; F.A.T.B. v. UZEGBU (1993) 6 SCNJ (PT. 1) 122 @ 144. Counsel to the 1st Respondent submitted further, that each prayer is a substantive prayer and the general or omnibus prayer does not empower the court to grant a relief not specifically claimed. OWENA BANK v. STOCK EXCHANGE (1997) 7 SCNJ 160 @ 172; EZEONWU v ONYECHI (1996) 2 SCNJ 250. He argued that prayers one and two as couched by the Applicants have incapacitated themselves from favourable exercise of the discretion of this Honorable Court, thus, in effect, it is improper for a court to reform the prayers in a motion paper to facilitate its success. IBWA v. PAVEX INTERNATIONAL (2000) 4 SCNJ 200 @ 223. ON ISSUE 2 Whether the application as canvassed and argued has merit? 1st Respondent’s Counsel submitted that an application of this nature is not granted as a matter of course but upon the judicious and judicial exercise of the discretion of or equitable consideration by this Honorable Court. FALOWO v. BANIGBE (1998) 6 SCNJ 42 @ 57 LINES 21 – 29; ADELEKE v. LAWAL (2013) 2 SCNJ (PT. 3) 1052 @ 1067 LINES 30 36.It is 1st Respondent’s counsel’s contention that an injunction is an equitable remedy usually granted at the discretion of the court. ADELEKE v. LAWAL (SUPRA) 1067 LINES 20 – 22.Furthermore, that one of the key equitable maxim is that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands. OWENA BANK PLC. V. OLATUNJI (1999) 13 NWLR (PT. 634) 218 @ 232, PARAS. F-G; ADEJUMO v. AYANTEGBE (1989) 6 S.C. (PT. 1) 76.He submitted that an undertaking as to damages is requisite and imperative to the success of an application for an injunction and such undertaking must be given by a party to the proceeding as it is trite that a court is not competent to hold a party not before it bound by an order. ADELEKE v. LAWAL (supra) 1068 – 1069; LADOKE v. OLABAYO (1992) 8 NWLR (PT. 261) 605 @ 619, PARAS. G-C. Counsel to the 1st Respondent further argued that it is not correct that no issue had been raised by the Applicants to argue this application as it is trite that in civil proceedings, it is the claimant that nominates the issues for adjudication. ACB LTD. V. OBMIAMI BRICKS & STONES LTD. (1990) 5 NWLR (PT. 149) 230 @ 252, PARAS. C-D. He submitted that the general rule is that the issue for determination must be relevant, if not, the issue is incompetent. ANIMASHAUN v. UCH (1996) 12 SCNJ 179 @ 184. The Claimants Applicants filed a REPLY ON POINT OF LAW TO THE FIRST RESPONDENT’S WRITTEN ADDRESS DATED THE 13TH DAY OF JANUARY 2017 (dated 28th February, 2017 and filed on March 2nd, 2017) Learned Counsel to the Claimants Applicants noted that it is trite that when an issue is formulated, the arguments canvassed by a party must address the issue as formulated. Anodebe & Ors v. Obodo & Ors (2016) LPELR 40933(CA).He submitted that a court shall not at the interlocutory stage determine or make a pronouncement which would be tantamount to a determination of the issue or issues that is/are to be determined at the conclusion of the substantive action. Leasing Company Nigeria Ltd v. Tiger Industries Ltd (2007) 14 NWLR (pt.1 054) 346 @ 384-38; Iguh, JSC in Falomo v Bamigbe (1998) 7 NWLR pt.559) 679; Adeniji v. Tina George Industries Ltd (1998) 6 NWLR (pt.554) 483 @ 49; HAR & ORS. v. T.S.K.J. NIGERIA LTD. & ORS. (1997) LPELR-5492(CA). It is Claimants Applicants counsel’s submission that uncontroverted facts in an affidavit are deemed admitted. lnegbedion v. Selo-Ojemen & Anor (2013) LPELR-19769(SC). ON ISSUE NO. 1: On whether the application, as constituted, is an abuse of court process? Counsel to the Claimants Applicants submitted that the Applicants’ Motion on Notice dated 18th November, 2016 is not an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court as what amounts to an abuse of court process has been judicially decided in a plethora of cases. Umeh & Anor v. Iwu & Ors. (2008) LPELR-3363 (SC); Idris & Anor v. Agumagu & Ors. (2015) LPELR-24504(CA). Referring the Court to paragraphs 26 to 32 of the Affidavit in support of the Applicants’ Motion on Notice dated l8th November, 2016 intending to show the threat sought to be restrained. On what is academic, hypothetical and frolicsome, he cited the case of CPC v. INEC & Ors (2011) LPELR-8257(SC); Ben Electronic Co. Nig. Ltd v. ATS & Sons & Ors (2013) LPELR 20870(CA). Claimants Applicants Counsel maintained that this Honourable Court has variously recognized the right of trade unions to institute actions in protection of their interest and that of their members. Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Association v. Owena Hotels Limited. (2003) 3 NLLR (Pt. 7) 163. See also National Union of Food Beverages and Tobacco Employees v. Cocoa Industries Limited (2005) NLLR (Pt. 8)106. He argued that in a suit commenced by Originating Summons, the Affidavit and /or Counter Affidavit constitute the pleadings where facts can be pleaded and that having chosen not to file a Counter Affidavit, any argument or prognosis dealing with facts in a Written Address is an abnormality and unknown to law. Salzgitter Stahlgmbh v. Tunji Dosunmu Industries Ltd [2010] All FWLR (Pt.529 1024 at 1044. ON ISSUE NO. 2: On whether the application, as canvassed and argued has merit? Learned Counsel to the Claimants Applicants submitted that the Applicant’s Motion on Notice dated 18th November, 2016 has merit, and should be considered on its merit. National Inland Waterways Authority v. SPDC Nigeria Ltd (2008) LPELR-1963(SC). In reaction to paragraphs 2.16 to 2.29 of the 1st Respondent’s Written Address dated 13th January, 2017, counsel submitted that it is an attempt by the 1st Respondent to misdirect and mislead this Honourable Court by firstly delving into the substance of the suit at the interlocutory stage, and by formulating issues for determination outside the questions posed by the Applicants in this suit.Achu V. C_S.C (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1129) 475 CA, per Hon. Justice Omokri, JCA. The Claimants Applicants had adopted their motion on notice of 18th November 2016 on the 16th January 2017, on the 15th February 2017 the date slated for ruling the Court directed the Claimants Applicants to react to the processes filed in the interim by the 1st defendants and the matter further adjourned in line with Order 47 rule 15 (2) NICCPR 2017, for the 1st defendants to adopt their written address and ruling. On the 6th March 2017, the Claimants Applicants were in court while the 1st defendants were absent, the court duly adopted the 1st defendants written address, a process made possible by Order 45 rule 7 NICCPR 2017, the claimant applicants adopted their Reply processes and the matter was adjourned for this ruling. this ruling and specific mention would be made to them where the need arises. The issue for determination in this suit to my mind is whether there is any merit to the claimant applicants’ application. The claimants are seeking from this court 1. AN ORDER of interlocutory injunction restraining the 1st — 9th and 14th Respondents from harassing, disturbing or questioning the Claimants/Applicants on the 2% levy the deducted from the terminal benefits of the former members of Claimants/Applicants who were affected by the privatisation exercise of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), until the final determination of the substantive suit. 2. AN ORDER of interlocutory injunction restraining the 14th Respondents from detaining or arresting the Past and Present Executives of the lst and 2nd Claimant until the final determination of the substantive suit. In making this application the Claimant Applicant considered the power of the court; Section 16(1), National Industrial Court Act, 2006 and the position of the decided cases to argue that the Honourable Court has the unimpeded discretion to grant an injunction; however needs to be exercised judicially and judiciously Contending further that the discretion and the purpose of an interim or interlocutory injunction is to preserve the subject matter (or res) of the suit of a grant of an order of interlocutory injunction viz: i) Is there a serious question to be tried? ii) If so, will damages be adequate compensation for the temporary inconvenience? iii) If damages will be inadequate compensation, in whose favour is the balance of convenience? Owerri Municipal Council & Ors. V. Innocent Onuoha & Ors. (2010)All FWLR (Pt. 538) 896, per Mt. Garba, JCA held at pages 914- 915. To the claimant applicants the legal right of the Applicants that was in existence prior to the termination of the 1st—9th Defendants and that the Claimant’s applicants need and have done nothing to be denied the protection of this Honourable Court. The 1st Respondents on their part consider the claimant applicant’s application lacking merit and an abuse of court process arguing that that an investigation on the issue of 2% levy deducted from the terminal benefit of the former members of the Applicants can be conducted or effected without the need to question the Applicants, assuming that they are capable of being questioned? To the 1st Respondent, an application of this nature is not granted as a matter of course but upon the judicious and judicial exercise of the discretion of or equitable consideration by this Honorable Court and that in the exercise of that discretion the key equitable maxim is that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands arguing further that an undertaking as to damages is requisite and imperative to the success of an application for an injunction and a court is not competent to hold a party not before it is bound by an order. Arguing further that no issue had been raised by the Applicants to argue this application as the issue for determination must be relevant, if not, the issue is incompetent. The Claimant Applicants in their reply on point of law directed the court to the 1st Respondents attempt to misdirect and mislead this Honourable Court by firstly delving into the substance of the suit at the interlocutory stage, and by formulating issues for determination outside the questions posed by the Applicants in this suit. The crux of the claimant applicants application is the continued harassment, disturbance or questioning of the Claimants/Applicants on the 2% levy the deducted from the terminal benefits of the former members of Claimants/Applicants who were affected by the privatization exercise of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN). The Respondents’ contention that an investigation on the issue of 2% levy deducted from the terminal benefit can be conducted or effected without the need to question the Applicants, assuming that they are capable of being questioned raises to my mind the conundrum incidental in this application. The claimant are complaining that the respondents are demanding from them the details of their expenditure of the contributions and in making demands have taken to activities the claimant applicants consider harassment and disturbing, and seek the protection of this Court. the position of the law with regard of all equitable reliefs of this court is that “in considering an application for interlocutory injunction, the following questions should be answered: In considering an application for interlocutory injunction the following questions should be answered: Is there a serious issue to be tried? Are damages an adequate remedy? Where does the balance of convenience lie? Are there any special factors to be considered? The applicant therefore has an unfettered duty to satisfy the court that in the special circumstance of his case, he is entitled on the facts presented by him, to the relief”. DR. TUNJI BRAITHEWAITE V. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK NIGERIA LIMITED [2012] 1 NWLR PT 1280-1284 PG.316-317. The case went on to hold that the purpose of an interlocutory Injunction is to maintain the status quo and thereby preserve the res the subject matter of litigation, from being wasted, damaged or fritted away, ..... 'Interlocutory injunction is concerned principally with the protection of the res and maintaining the status quo. It is only where the subject matter will be permanently destroyed and cannot be recovered or replaced or be completely distorted or defaced that an order of interlocutory injunction will be appropriate to maintain the status quo until the final determination of the substantive suit. The status quo to be maintained by the grant of an order of interlocutory injunction is the status quo ante bellum i.e., the state of affairs before the beginning of hostilities and not the status quo ante litem, which is, the state of affairs before the parties began to litigate FRANCIS EDET EKPENYONG & ANOR HON. OROK OTU DUKE & 5 ORS. CA.' LER[2008]CA/C/NAEA/16/2008 PER THERESA NGOLIKA ORJI-ABADUA, JCA And in the case of the ORJI V. ZARIA INDUSTRIES LTD. & ANOR. (1992) LPELR-2768(SC)Supreme Court held that “An interim or interlocutory injunction is an equitable remedy granted by the court before the substantive question raised in the case is finally determined. Its object is to keep matters in status quo while the case is still pending”. PER WALI JSC Now in the instant case the act being sought to be restrained is the questioning of the claimants. For purposes of determining this aspect I shall segregate the respondents into two groups; the 1st to 9th Respondents on the one hand and the 14th respondent on the other. With regards to the 1st -9th Respondents, the claimant applicants contend that various contributions/ levies were paid following an amicable agreement by the 1st -9th respondents as members of the union, now the trade union Act provides that 5 members or more are entitled to call for an account of the union expenses; Section 19 Trade Union Act Cap 14 LFN empowers 5 five or more members of a Trade Union to apply to the National Industrial Court in situations of unlawful or unauthorized application of funds. See the case of SODAE Vs. IMAGIE [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 250 Digest of Labour and Employment Cases in Nigeria 1960-2012 page 313Furthermore the Learned Labour Law Author Akintunde Emiola LLM PhD, JP in his book Nigerian Labour Law Emiola Publishers 2000 Ogbomosho at page 337 wrote with reference to Union practices in Nigeria, “Union Executives as well as individual members are given power to sue any defaulting financial officer ..” “As well as recover cost of the suit from such an officer”. referring to section 37(5) & (7). And in Section 35 (4) Trade Union Act 2005, a single member is entitled to a copy of the union’s annual account on payment of a fee. Now the 1st to 9th respondents have been described as former members of the union and the question now arises as members of the union they were entitled to an account of union collections does it now mean that the pensioned member have lost that entitlement, are they entitlement to know how their own deductions were spent. Even considering the argument they are no longer members have they lost the right to demand and or request from their former union details of how their own monies were spent. These questions I find create a triable issue begging determination before the application can be properly considered I am well aware of the Supreme Court pronouncement that "Court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction must be seen as a court of conscience. And judges who dispense justice, in this court of law and equity must always be ready to address new problems and even create new doctrines where the justice of the matter so requires." RT. HON. ROTIMI CHIBUIKE AMAECHI V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION LER[2009] SC. 252/2007PER P.O. ADEREMI, J.S.C Now if in making these demands the 1st – 9th respondents were menacing or constituted themselves into nuisance or harassment this being a matter of degree is a factual situation requiring proof and determination as to what would constitute a regular demand and what would be considered harassment or and disturbance. And in any event it is not likely that this court would be the appropriated venue to determine such and that this would be a matter amiable to resolution using labour law. Also the question arises as to whether their report to the EFCC would constitute harassment or whether 1st – 9th respondents were within their legitimate rights as citizens of a democratic country to report to the law enforcement /investigative organization charged with determining such matters what they consider a crime of economic of financial mature? Again, a triable issue. The complaint before the EFCC has not been brought to court. As for the 14th respondent, the claimant applicant have described them as an agency of the Federal Government empowered to investigate suspicions of a general economic and financial crimes and to prosecute suspected offenders in appropriate cases. By Section 1(2) (c) of the EFFC Act 201 is the designated Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in Nigeria, which is charged with the responsibility of coordinating the various institutions involved in the fight against money laundering and enforcement of all laws dealing with economic and financial crimes in Nigeria. With the function of the investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, futures market fraud, fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scam, etc.; Section 6(b) and the special power to cause investigations to be conducted as to whether any person, corporate body or organization has committed an offence under this Act or other law relating to economic and financial crimes; Section 7(a). The position of the law is as was stated in the unreported case of SUIT NO. NIC/LA/117/2011 MR. BABATUNDE OGUNSOWO VDANA MOTORS LIMITED delivered 10th July 2013 where this court held that “This Court cannot gag the process of the administration of justice or due process in the manner prayed for by the claimant in relief. Also see the unreported case of SUIT NO: NICN/IL/04/2013 MR. OLOYEDE SUNDAY V.s. LUBCON LTD & ANOR delivered 12TH November 2014, where this court relied on the English case of DALLISON V CAFFREY [1965] 1 QB 348 Diplock LJ (as he then was) in considering the function of the police’ to arrest’ described it as ‘Ministerial’ as opposed to judicial . See the case of OTERI Vs. OKORODUDU & ANOR NSCQLR [1970] page 303. And this court went on to hold that the Law enforcement agent (2nd defendant) had a statutory duty to apprehend crime, and in so doing reserves the power to arrest, question interview and even detain persons in the course of their duty.. 'It is a well established principle of law that hardship to the Defendant is a relevant consideration in the cases of injunctions. It is particularly of more insignificance and weight in cases of interlocutory injunctions than in those of final or permanent injunctions. Where hardship will be caused to the Defendant or indeed to third parties or to members of the public by the grant of the relief, this consideration will be taken into account by the court in determining whether it is just and convenient that an interlocutory injunction should issue and court of equity will not ordinarily and without special necessity interfere by injunction where this will have the effect of very materially injuring the rights of third persons not before the court. So even if there is no hardship to the defendant, an injunction may be refused if it would prejudice an innocent third party.' PER THERESA NGOLIKA ORJI-ABADUA, JCA. It is also the law that “an interlocutory injunction will be refused if it should appear to be unjust or highly unreasonable to grant having regard to the well-known equitable considerations such as Hardship or balance of convenience or such other matters. DR. TUNJI BRAITHEWAITE V. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK NIGERIA LIMITED I do not agree with the 1st respondent that the claimant applicant’s application is an abuse of the courts process; in FEDERAL AIRPORTS AUTHORITY v. NWOYE (2015) 53 NLLR (PT. 180) 446 CA @ 455 abuse of processes was considered to have occurred where a party improperly uses the judicial process, intentionally in order to irritate and annoy his opponent, it can be said that such amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. AFRICAN REINSURANCE CORP. v. JDP CONSTRUCTION NIG. LTD. (2003) 2-3 S.C. 47; (2003) 13 NWLR (PT. 838) 609 @ 635 The fundamental criteria for determining that a case is an abuse of process is that there must exist a multiplicity of suits and such multiplicity of suits is intended to annoy or harass the opponent by so doing or temper with the judicial process. IKEME v. VC, UNIVERSITY OF NIG. & ORS. (2014) 40 NLLR (PT. 123) 466 NIC @ 470, OGOJEOFOR V. OGOJEOFOR (2006) 3 NWLR (PT. 966) 205 @ 220; KOTOYE v. SARAKI (1992) 9 NWLR (PT. 264) 156 @ 188-189 But I am not satisfied that the application for interlocutory injunction has any bearing on the substantive suit or that it is grantable in the circumstances of this case, not only are there factual concerns to be resolved to found this application the law prohibits the court for determining a substantive issue at the interlocutory stage. The Supreme Court in the case of UNIVERSITY PRESS Vs MARTINS LTD [2000] 2 SCNJ 224 held that “Trial courts as well as intermediate courts should desist from making positive pronouncements touching on the substantive issue while they are only engaged in determination of the interlocutory matter before them”. Furthermore looking at the claimants’ application reliefs in the main suit and the pronouncement of Adamu J.C.A. in NATIONAL UNVERSITY COMMISSION Vs. OLUWO [2001] 3 NWLR (Pt.699) 90 that “Courts are prevented from the predetermination of the substantive suit at the interlocutory stage at p.105 para A. I found this Court cannot grant these orders. For the above reasons this application is hereby refused and struck out. This matter shall proceed to trial. This is the court’s ruling and it is hereby entered. ........................................... Hon. Justice E. N. Agbakoba Judge