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The Claimant instituted this action via a Complaint with the accompanying frontloaded documents filed on 4th June, 2015, against the defendants for the following reliefs: (a) A Declaration that the various letters of dismissal purportedly given by the Defendants to the Claimant without observing the principles of fair hearing as provided for in the constitution, is wrongful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. (b) An Order setting aside the various letters of dismissal purportedly given by the Defendants to the Claimant without observing the principles of fair hearing as provided for in the constitution (c) An order of this Honourable Court to the 1st and 2nd Defendants to reinstate the Claimant into the Service on Salary Grade Level 14 with effect from 1/1/2013 to place him at par with his peers with whom he joined the Service in 1983 (d) An Order for the payment of all arrears of salaries, allowances, emolument due from the Defendants to the Claimant from September 1989 till judgment is entered (e) An Order for damages of fifteen million against the Defendants for all the inconveniences, deprivation and mental/psychological torture that the Claimant is made to pass through by the acts/omissions of the Defendants. The Defendants filed a NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION on 30th October, 2015, praying the Court for AN ORDER dismissing this suit on the ground that it is statute barred. GROUNDS OF APPLICATION 1. The Claimant’s case is pending before this HonourabLe Court. 2. The suit was instituted outside the statutory limitation period of three (3) months as stipulated by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004. The defendants in their WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION raised on sole ISSUE: Whether or not this suit is statute barred having regards to the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004. Learned Counsel to the defendants P. P. Omade Esq. submitted that from the claim and the date on which the cause of action arose against the 1st Defendant/Applicant, the suit is statute barred and as such the court cannot validly assume jurisdiction over this matter as a cause of action is said to be statute-barred if in respect of it, proceedings cannot be brought because the period laid down by the Limitation Law or Act has elapsed. See EGBE V. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1NWLR, PG 3-4. Furthermore, that the Supreme Court had made it clear that there is no distinction between “public offices” and “public officers” under the Public Officer (Protection) Law. IBRAHIM V. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE KADUNA STATE & ANOR. (1997 -1998) All NLR 302, per Iguh JSC. He submitted that it is trite law that in determining whether a particular action is statute barred, the court will seek to know the following: a) When the cause of action arose. b) When the plaintiff filed the action. Relying on BANK OF THE NORTH LTD V. GANA (2006) ALL FWLR (PT 296) Pg. 669 para. 3; BANK OF THE NORTH LTD V. GANA (supra) at par 4. It is Defence counsel’s submission that the purpose of the Public Officer Protection Act is to protect a public officer from detraction and unnecessary litigation, thus, when an action is found to be statute-barred as in the instant case, the court ought to dismiss the suit. In the case of ADEKOYA V. FH.A (2008) 11 NWLR (PT. 1099) 539; BANK OF THE NORTH LTD V. GANA (supra) at para. 9; LAMINA V. IKEJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1993) 8 NWLR (PT.314) 758; OBETA V. OKPE (1996) 9 NWLR (PT. 473) 401 at 429. The 2nd defendant also filed a NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION on 11th December, 2015, praying the Court for An order to strike out or dismiss the suit for incompetency on ground that the condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the Honourable court and the competence of the suit at the time the cause of action arose which is the relevant time to institute this action have been irretrievably removed by the law GROUNDS FOR THE OBJECTION (i) That contrary to the provision of Section 2 (a) Public Officers Protection Act P.41 LFN 2004 the Claimant neither commenced this action within three months envisaged by this statute. (ii) That the 2nd Defendant/Applicant lacks the legal personality of suing or being sued in a Court of law. The 2nd in their WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION Raised the following ISSUES; Whether by the operation of Sec. 2 (A) Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P. 41, LFN, 2004, this action has not become statute barred. Whether the 2nd defendant/applicant herein has juristic personality capable of suing or being sued as was done in this case. ON ISSUE 1 Whether by the operation of Sec. 2 (A) Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P. 41, LFN, 2004, this action has not become statute barred. Learned Counsel for the 2nd defendant, Z. O. Ali Esq. submitted that the claimant’s action is against the 2nd defendant who is an agent of the Federal Government and that the act of the 2nd defendant complained of by the claimant occurred on 31st January, 2013 while the claimant commenced this action on 4th June, 2015, clearly after the 3 months prescribed by the said law. OGUN STATE GOVERNMENT v. DALAMI LTD. (2007) 6 M.J.S.C. 187 @ 198, PARAS G. ON ISSUE 2 Whether the 2nd defendant/applicant herein has juristic personality capable of suing or being sued as was done in this case. 2nd defendant’s Counsel submitted that the 2nd defendant is not a juristic personality, is not a creation of statute neither is it a natural person that can sue and be sued, rather, that the nomenclature attached to the office of the 2nd defendant is for administrative/operational conveniences. Submitting further, that no action can be brought by or against any party other than a natural person or body of persons, unless such a party has been given by a statute, expressly or impliedly either (a) a legal personality under the name by which it sues or is sued or (b) a right to sue or be sued in that name. AGBOOLA v. SAIBU (1991) 2 NWLR (PT. 566) 576, PARA. D. The claimant in reaction to the 1st defendant filed their REPLY TO 1ST DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION DATED 30TH OCTOBER, 2015 (dated 26th January, 2016 and filed on 12th February, 2016). With the sole ISSUE Whether or not this suit is statute barred having regard to the provisions of section 2(a) of Public Officers Protection Act 2004. Learned Counsel to the Claimant F. A. Obateru Esq submitted that the instant case is one of the exceptions where the provision of Section 2 of Public Officers Protection Act will not avail a Defendant as the acts and omissions which constitute the bane of this case were done by the respective officers of the 1st and 2 Defendant arbitrarily. Paragraph 51(i) to (viii).of Claimant’s Statement of Facts; LAGOS CITY COUNCIL (TRADING UNDER THE NAME OF LAGOS CITY TRANSPORT) VS. S. A. J OGUNBIYI ADEMOLA C.JN (1969) AU NLR PG. 287. He argued that the Public Officer Protection Act necessarily will not apply if it is established that the Defendant had abused his position for the purpose of acting maliciously. In that case he had not been acting within the terms of the statutory or other legal authority. He has not been bona-fide endeavoring to carry it out. In such state of facts he has abused his position for the purpose of doing a wrong and this protection of this Act, of course, never could apply to such a case’. NWANKWERE VS ADEWUMI (1966) NLR PG 119 at 120 HOLDEN B; OFFOBOCHE V. OGOJA L.G (2001) 16 NWLR (PT 739) 458 AT 485 A-D; IBETO CEMENT CO. LTD V. A.G FEDERATION (2008) INWLR (PT 1069) 470 AT 499, RATIO 9; EKEOGU V. ALIRI (1990) NWLR (PT 126) PG 345. Claimant’s Counsel urged the Court to look into its record. NUHU V OGALE (2004) 1 MJSC 70 AT 74 Ratio. Regarding the second issue, counsel submitted that a misjoinder or non-joinder of a party cannot defeat a cause or matter. FGN & ORS. V. SHOBU NIGERIA LTD (2013) LPELR- 21457. To Claimant’s Counsel, assuming that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a non-juristic person, the appropriate order for the court to make would be to strike out the name of the wrongly joined party, which will not in any way affect the substantial suit before the court. FGN & ORS V. SHOBU NIGERIA LTD (2013) LPELR- 21457 (SUPRA), PER CHIDI NWAQMA. He submitted that one of the inherent obligations of the court is to take that course which does substantial justice to the parties. ABACHA V. THE STATE (2001) 3NWLR (PT 699) 35 AT 40 RATIO 14; EKPENYONG V. DUKE (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 757). The claimant in response to the 2nd defendant filed a REPLY TO 2ND DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION DATED 11TH DECEMBER, 2015 (dated 26th January, 2016 and filed on 12th February, 2016). And formulated the following ISSUES; Whether or not this suit is statute barred having regard to the provisions of section 2(a) of Public Officers Protection Act 2004? Whether the misjoinder or non-joinder of a party is fatal to proceedings brought before the court? ON ISSUE 1 Whether or not this suit is statute barred having regard to the provisions of section 2(a) of Public Officers Protection Act, 2004? Claimant Counsel submitted that the instant case is one of the exceptions where the provision of Section 2 of Public Officers Protection Act will not avail a Defendant. This is because the acts and omissions which constitute the bane of this case were done by the respective officers of the 1st and 2nd Defendant arbitrarily. Paragraph 51(i) to (viii) of Claimant’s statement of facts; LAGOS CITY COUNCIL (TRADING UNDER THE NAME OF LAGOS CITY TRANSPORT) VS. S. A. J OGUNBIYI ADEMOLA C.JN (1969) ALL NLR PG. 287. He submitted further that the Public Officer Protection Act necessarily will not apply if it is established that the Defendant had abused his position for the purpose of acting maliciously. NWANKWERE VS ADEWUMI (1966) NLR PG 119 AT 120 HOLDEN B; OFFOBOCHE V. OGOJA L.G (2001) 16 NWLR (PT 739) 458 AT 485 A-D; IBETO CEMENT CO. LTD V. A.G FEDERATION (2008) INWLR (PT 1069) 470 AT 499, RATIO 9; EKEOGU V. ALIRI (1990) NWLR (PT 126) PG 345. Claimant’s Counsel urged the Court to look into its record. NUHU V OGALE (2004) 1 MJSC 70 AT 74 Ratio. ON ISSUE 2 Whether the misjoinder or non-joinder of a party is fatal to proceedings brought before the court? Counsel to the Claimant submitted that a misjoinder or non-joinder of a party cannot defeat a cause or matter. FGN & ORS V. SHOBU NIGERIA LTD (2013) LPELR- 21457. Claimant Counsel continued that assuming that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a non-juristic person, the appropriate order for the court to make would be to strike out the name of the wrongly joined party, which will not in any way affect the substantial suit before the court. FGN & ORS V. SHOBU NIGERIA LTD (2013) LPELR- 21457 (SUPRA), per CHIDI NWAQMA. He submitted that one of the inherent obligations of the court is to take that course which does substantial justice to the parties. ABACHA V. THE STATE (2001) 3NWLR (PT 699) 35 AT 40 RATIO 14; EKPENYONG V. DUKE (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 757). The 2nd defendant filed a REPLY ON POINT OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION dated and filed 24th May 2016 Counsel to the 2nd defendant contended that the argument of the Claimant that his dismissal from the employment of the 2nd defendant was actuated by malice is ill conceived and misplaced. He referred the Court to the preliminary letter dated 24th March, attached by the Claimant wherein he was officially queried by the 2nd defendant having absented himself from duty without permission between 1989 to March, 1993 (a period of more than three years). UNILORIN V. ADENIRAN (2006) LPELR (11801) PP45-46 PARAS G-C. He submitted that if such acts stated above result in an injury to a plaintiff, it may be said that they were done maliciously. EGBE V. ADEFARASIN (1985) 1 NWLR (PT3) 560 @ 535 PARAS E-G. Furthermore, the act of issuing a query or preliminary letter to the claimant was permitted by Public Service Rules 03302. It is counsel’s submission that it is very clear and undisputable that the 2nd defendant is a public officer and that the act complained of by the Claimant was performed by the 2nd defendant in the course of his official duties. IBRAHIM V. JSC, KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (PT584) @1. Arguing that by paragraphs 48 and 50 of the Claimant’s statement of claim the cause of action arose on 1st January 2013 while the Claimant instituted this action clearly after the three months’ period envisaged by law. That if the action is brought after 3 months, it will be unmaintainable. OBIFUNA V. OKOYE (1961) 1 SCNLR 144. He further submitted that malice or ultra vires has no role to play in the applicability of Public Officers Protection Act. Egbe v. Yusuf (1992) 6 NWLR (pt. 245) 1, per Kawu, JSC. Learned Counsel to the 2nd defendant maintained that it is a well-established principle of interpretation that if the words used in a legislation are plain unambiguous, they should be given their natural ordinary meaning. OKUMAGBA V. EGBE (1965) 1 ALL NLR 62. Court’s Decision Having carefully summarized the position of both sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in this judgment and specific mention would be made to them where the need arises. The issue for determination in this suit to my mind is whether there is any merit to the defendants’ application. The 1st defendant in their Preliminary objection raised the sole issue; Whether or not this suit is statute barred having regards to the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004. The 2nd defendant on their part raised the following issues Whether by the operation of Sec. 2 (A) Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P. 41, LFN, 2004, this action has not become statute barred. Whether the 2nd defendant/applicant herein has juristic personality capable of suing or being sued as was done in this case. As both the 1st and 2nd defendant raised the issue of the” Section 2 (A) Public Officers Protection Act, Cap. P. 41, LFN, 2004, and whether this this action has not become statute barred” I shall deal with that issue first. The position of the law is as was stated in the case of KANU v. ENUGU BROADCASTING SERVICE & ORS. (2014) 46 NLLR (PT. 148) 243 where it was held in this court that in deciding whether a case is statute barred or not, the court only has to look at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which give rise to the cause of action and comparing that date with the date the writ of summons was filed. If the time on the writ of summons is beyond the period allowed by the Limitation Law, the action is statute barred. Relying on the case of ELABANJO v. DAWODU (2006) 6 – 7 SC 24. The case went on to state that “The Public Officers’ Protection Act applies to both natural and artificial persons”. IBRAHIM v. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 584) 1; ABUBAKAR v. GOVERNOR OF GOMBE STATE (2002) 17 NWLR (PT. 797) 533; NWAOGWUGWU v. PRESIDENT , FRN (2007) 1 ALL FWLR (PT. 389) 1327. Which make the defendants public officers especially as The word Public Officer has been defined in Section 7(1) of the Public Officers (Special provision) LFN2004 (formerly Act No. 10 of 1976) to mean;- “ any person who holds or has held office in (b) the public service of a state or federal government… (c) the service of a body whether corporate or unincorporated established under a Federal or State Law. Section 318(1) of the CFRN 1999 defines “Public service of the Federation to mean service in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation and includes service as (c) any member or staff of any commission or authority established for the Federation by this constitution or by an Act of the National Assembly.” In FGN Vs ZEBRA [2002] LPELR 3172 SC. The Supreme Court held that a public officer as stipulated in Section 2A Public Officers Protection Act not only refers to natural persons sued in their personal names but they extend to public bodies, artificial persons, institutions or persons sued by their official names or titles PER MOHAMMED JSC. Also see the cases of ALHAJI ALIYU IBRAHIM Vs. JSC KADUNA & ANOR [1998]14 NWLR (supra) and SULGRAVE HOLDINGS INC.&19 ORS Vs. FGN & 3ORS[2012]17 NWLR (Pt.1329) p.309 at 338. From the foregoing I find that the defendants are entitled to the protection afforded by the Public Officers Protection Act. In the case of EBETALEYE v. MAINSTREET BANK LTD. & ORS. (2014) 44 NLLR (PT. 141) 596 NIC this court held that ”a cause of action is said to be statute barred if in respect of its proceedings it cannot be brought because the period laid down by the Limitation Law has elapsed referring to EGBE v. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 47) 1 @ 20. The statute in question is Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004, which provides as follows – “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect. (a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof: Provided that if the action, prosecution or proceeding be at the instance of any person for cause arising while such person was a convict prisoner, it may be commenced within three months after the discharge of such person from prison”. From the reliefs endorsed on the Claimant’s General Form of Complaint, particularly reliefs a, b, c, and d, as well as paragraphs 4, 19, 24, 35 and 48 of the Statement of facts and averment 5, 36 and 49 of the Statement on oath the cause of action of this suit I find are the non-payment of the claimants salary since September 1989 and dismissal of the claimant from his employment with the defendants by a letters dated, March 1994, 12th January 1997, 1st January 2013. I am aware that by law once letter of dismissal is written and served, it becomes effective; as such there is no longer an appointment that could be subsequently terminated. By JOMBO V. PEFMB [2005] 14 NWLR (PT. 945) 443 SC, it is elementary that an employee cannot be dismissed from an employment that had ceased to exist. See the unreported case of SUIT NO. NICN/LA/482/2013 ENGINEER IGNATIUS UGWOKE Vs. AEROMARITIME (NIGERIA) LIMITED delivered on 30th November 2016, but as the issue before the court is whether there is any merit to the defendants case the defendants’ arguments are to be determined and the defendants in making this application took stock with the letter of 12th January 2013. A perusal of the case file to this suit reveals that this action was actually instituted on 4th June 2015, by simple calculation I find that the instant suit was instituted (4/6/2015) – (12/1/2013) = Two (2) years, two (2) months and Twenty-four (24) days after the cause of action arose. The Public Officers’ Protection Act provides a 3 month moratorium for the commencement of action against the defendants. From the foregoing I find that the claimant suit is caught up by the limitation law; Public Officers Protection. The claimant have argued that facts leading to this suit where activated by malice and action ultra vires now the position of the law presently has been expounded in the case of , RAHAMANIYYA UNITED (NIG.) LTD V. MINISTRY FOR FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY & ORS [2009] 43 WRN 124 CA at page 146, applying CHIGBU V. TONIMAS (NIG.) LTD [2006] 31 WRN 179; [2006] 9 NWLR (PT. 986) 189 SC at 210, held that the propriety or otherwise of the act of the defendants is not a relevant consideration for the applicability of the Public Officers Protection Act. The case continued that if an action against a public officer or public institution and organization is statute-barred having not been brought within the prescribed period of three months, there will be no basis for investigating the conduct of the public officer which gave rise to the action. That the conduct of the defendant as to whether he was malicious or not is irrelevant in determining whether the cause of action is statute-barred under section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, referring to EGBE V ADEFARASIN [2002] 14 WRN 57 and AREMO II V. ADEKANYE [2004] 42 WRN 1 SC. I[t] is in the attempt to show that the defendant acted mala fide that the claimant posited that the defendant did not act pursuant to the law. This argument turns the principle over its head as it is the very fact of the claimant complaining that his dismissal was not in accordance with the law that brought him to Court in the first place. See the unreported cases of SUIT NO: NICNCA/51/2014 MR. BASSEY OKON ESSIEN & 6 ORS Vs. COLLEGE OF EDUCATION AFAHA NSIT & 3 ORS delivered 3rd March 2015 and SUIT NO: NICN/IB/12/2013 AMOS AYANTOYE Vs. NIGERIA TELECOMMUNICATION LTD Delivered 19th December 2014. What all this means is that the claimant came to court outside of the permitted three months; and hence against the law. The law, by MRS. O. ADEKOYA V. FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY [2008] 4 SC 167 AND EGBE V. ADEFARASIN [1987] 1 NWLR (PT. 47) 1, is that a cause of action is said to be statute-barred if in respect of it proceedings cannot be brought because the period laid down by the Limitation Act or Law has elapsed. In fact where the claimant was dismissed from service on 1st January 2013 but he filed and commenced the suit in question on 4th June 2015 i.e. outside the three month provision required by the Public Officers Protection Act LFN 2004, this suit is therefore statute barred. ALHAJI BELLO NASIR V. CSC, KANO STATE & ORS [2010] 6 NWLR (PT. 1190) 253. The 2nd defendants also raised the issue as to whether ‘the 2nd defendant/applicant herein has juristic personality capable of suing or being sued as was done in this case’. To the 2nd defendants Counsel, the 2nd defendant is not a juristic personality, or a creation of statute neither is it a natural person that can sue and be sued, rather, it is the nomenclature attached to the office of the 2nd defendant for administrative/operational conveniences. Arguing that only a natural person or body of persons, unless such a party has by a statute given, expressly or impliedly either (a) a legal personality or (b) a right to sue or be sued. AGBOOLA v. SAIBU (1991) 2 NWLR (Supra). Whereas the Claimant argued that a misjoinder or non-joinder of a party cannot defeat a cause or matter. FGN & ORS. V. SHOBU NIGERIA LTD (Supra). Assuming that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a non-juristic person, it would be appropriate for the court to by order strike out the name of the wrongly joined party, which will not in any way affect the substantial suit before the court. FGN & ORS V. SHOBU NIGERIA LTD (SUPRA), Contending that the inherent obligation of the court is to take that course which does substantial justice to the parties. ABACHA V. THE STATE (2001) 3NWLR (PT 699) 35 AT 40 RATIO 14; EKPENYONG V. DUKE (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 757). Now the Court of Appeal in the case of S.P.D.C.N. LTD. v. AJUWA (2015) 14 NWLR (PT. 1480) C.A. 403 @ 431 Held that “Whenever the authority of a person to sue is challenged, the onus is on the person suing to satisfy the court…. AGBABIAKA v. SAIBU (1998) 10 NWLR (PT. 571) 534; ADMIN/EXEC. ESTATE OF ABACHA v. EKE-SPIFF (2009) 7 NWLR (PT. 1139) 97. The case went on to define Legal capacity as “the right of a party to appear and be heard on a question before the court. When the legal capacity of a plaintiff is not established, the effect is that there is no plaintiff and no action”. Also in the Court of Appeal case of THE HON. MINISTER OF DEFENCE & ORS v. MRS. ETTA BASSEY EPHRAIM [2014] LPELR CA Suit No: CA/C/109/2011 Delivered on the 6th November 2015 the court held “As earlier on stated in the course of this judgment, it is even the law that the Court can accord the status of a legal personality to an entity or office where the body or office made no provision to that effect, In NKPORINWI VS. EJIRE (2009) ALL FWLR PT. 499 PAGE 450 the Court held that: "It is well a settled principle of Law that the major jural entities or units to which the Law usually ascribes legal personality are: I. Human beings (Natural Persons). II. Companies incorporated under the various companies Acts. III. Corporation sole with perpetual succession. IV. Trade Unions V. Partnerships and VI. Friendly societies Undoubtedly, the list of the said categories of legal personae is not exhaustive. As well, Courts may, in the course of exercise of their interpretative discretionary powers, add to that list if the justice of any given case so dictates”. The case went on .... In the case of FAWEHINMI VS. NBA NO. 2 (2008) ALL FWLR PT 448 PAGE 205 at 307 Oputa JSC (of blessed memory) drew three distinctions from the celebrated case of THOMAS VS. LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE BOARD (1965) 1 NMLR 310 like the Local Government was created by the Customary Law. Secondly, where the body or office is charged with the discharge of public functions and thirdly, where there is a nexus between the statutory functions and the injury complained of. In the instant case I find that the second and third apply to the issue at hand, therefore I find that the 2nd defendant are juristic persons in the circumstances and purposes of this case and are capable to be sued. On the whole, having found that the claimant case is statute barred and, the attempt by the claimant to found his case on malice as an exception to the application of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act fails in the light of the authorities and reasons given, I hold that the preliminary objections of the1st and 2nd defendants, as regards this matter being caught up by Section 2 of the Public Officers’ Protection Act LFN 2004, has merit and therefore succeed. This Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction to entertain the case of the claimant, which is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost. Judgement is entered accordingly. ………………………………………… Hon. Justice E. N. Agbakoba