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The Applicant filed Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) on 4th May, 2016 for an order granting the following reliefs: A DECLARATION that the Acts of the Respondents: to wit: intimidation and threats of further arrest of the Applicant is illegal, unconstitutional and a gross violation of the Fundamental Rights of the Applicant as enshrined in Sec. 35(1) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right. A DECLARATION that the suspension of the Applicant by the 3rd defendant is illegal, unconstitutional and a gross violation of the Fundamental Rights of the Applicant as enshrined in Sec. 36(1) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right. AN ORDER of this Honorable Court directing the 3rd Respondent to withdraw the suspension letter against the Applicant and to restore the Applicant to the status quo ante. AN ORDER OF INJUNCTION restraining the 3rd defendant from suspending and or terminating the Appointment of the Applicant and to restore the Applicant to status quo. AN ORDER OF INJUNCTION restraining the respondents, their agents or privies from arresting and or detaining the Applicant. AN ORDER OF INJUNCTION restraining the Respondents, their agents or privies from further acts of harassment, intimidation and any other form of infringement of the fundamental rights of the Applicant. AN AWARD of #10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only against the Respondents jointly and severally as exemplary damages for the unbearable hardship and psychological trauma caused to the Applicant and the cost of this suit. The Applicant’s process was accompanied by a WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION wherein the Applicant raised the following ISSUES Whether there was a breach of the Fundamental Right of the Applicant. Whether the Applicant is entitled to the reliefs sought having recourse to the provisions of Order 2 Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights) Reinforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents filed a NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION on 7th June, 2016 and dated 6th June, 2016 urging the Court to strike out the suit for being incompetent and for want of jurisdiction. GROUNDS FOR THE OBJECTION The originating process filed by the applicant is invalid there being no such procedure under the Rules of this Honorable Court. The originating process was not served directly or personally on the 1st, 2nd & 3rd Respondents as envisaged by Order V Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 neither was leave to effect service by substantial means obtained by the Applicant pursuant to Order V Rule 7 of the Rules. The application was not fixed for hearing within 7 days with effect from the date it was filed, to wit, 4th May, 2016 in compliance with Order IV Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 and as such a spent force. Importantly, the case of the applicant is statute barred by virtue of Sec. 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. By reason of grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4 above, this Honorable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this application and/or grant the reliefs sought by the applicant. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents also filed a WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION with the following ISSUES Whether the originating process filed by the applicant in this case on 4th May, 2016 on the basis of master and servant relationship between the applicant and the 3rd respondent was initiated by due process let alone valid and competent such that this Honorable Court has the jurisdiction to entertain it. Whether the claim of the applicant is not statute barred having regard to Sec. 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act such that this Honorable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this case. ON ISSUE 1 Whether the originating process filed by the applicant in this case on 4th May, 2016 on the basis of master and servant relationship between the applicant and the 3rd respondent was initiated by due process let alone valid and competent such that this Honorable Court has the jurisdiction to entertain it. Learned Counsel to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents P. A. Akuba SAN, submitted that a glance at the purported originating process filed by the applicant undoubtedly confirms that the originating process is not only strange but an abuse of court process. He urged the court to take judicial notice of the said originating process pursuant to Sec. 122 (2) (m) of the Evidence Act, 2011. UZODINMA v. IZUNASO (NO. 2) (2011) 17 NWLR (PT. 1275) 28 @ 75. Contending further that the issue of employment is not a fundamental right under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). F.B.N. v. A.G. FED. (2014) 12 NWLR (PT. 1422) 470 @ 503, PARA. F, per AKomolafe-Wilson, JCA; TUKUR v. GOVT. OF TARABA STATE (1997) 6 NWLR (PT. 510) 549 @ 576-577, PARAS. H-A, Ogundare, JSC; AMALE v. SOKOTO LOCAL GOVT. (2012) 5 NWLR (PT. 1292) 181 @ 199, PARA. A, Fabiyi, JSC; GAFAR v. THE GOVT. OF KWARA STATE & 2 ORS. (2007) 4 NWLR (PT. 1024) 375 @ 398, PARAS. E-G, per Muhammed, JSC; EFFIONG v. EBONG (2006) 18 NWLR (PT. 1010) 109N @ 131-132, PARAS. H-C, per Omokri, JCA; DANGOTE v. C.S.C. PLATEAU STATE (2001) 9 NWLR (PT. 717) 132 @ 162, PARA. E, per Karibi-Whyte. The Learned Senior Advocate also submitted that the superior courts have in different cases deprecated inappropriate and arbitrary resort to Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules in matters that are strictly contractual, tortious and/or in which the principal claim transcends breach of fundamental rights. OKECHUKWU v. ETUKOKWO (1998) 8 NWLR (PT. 562) 513 @ 534, PARAS. E-G, per Niki Tobi, JCA (as he then was); OPARA v. S.P.D.C.N. LTD. (2015) 14 NWLR (PT. 1479) 307 @ 357-358, PARAS. G-B, per Adah, JCA; ABDULHAMID v> AKAR (2006) 13 NWLR (PT. 996) 127 @ 147, PARAS. C-F, per Acholonu, JSC. Arguing that the Applicant cannot have the benefit of the Court exercising jurisdiction over his case having miserably failed to meet the condition precedent for the commencement of an action before this Honorable Court, as the law is settled on the importance of validity of originating processes in a proceeding. BRAITHWAITE v. SKYE BANK PLC (2013) 5 NWLR (PT. 1346) 15, PARAS. C-D, per Muhammad, JSC; OKARIKA v. SAMUEL (2013) 7 NWLR (PT. 1352) 37, PARA. C, per I.T. Muhammad, JSC. It is also the contention of Counsel to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendant that failure to effect service of the originating process on the 1st, 2nd & 3rd Respondents directly or personally is fatal as it deprives this Honorable Court of jurisdiction to enter the case, as service of court process is one of the fundamental conditions precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction. SKEN CONSULT & ANOR. V. UKEY (1981) 1 SC 6 @ 26. Defence Counsel submitted that the operative word ‘shall” in Order IV Rule 1 of the Rules (Supra) is settled that it has mandatory connotation. NWANKWO v. YAR’ADUA (2010) 12 NWLR (PT. 1209) 518 @ 588, per Adekeye, JSC. ON ISSUE 2 Whether the claim of the applicant is not statute barred having regard to Sec. 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act such that this Honorable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this case. The Learned SAN submitted that when an action is statute barred, it deprives the litigating party the right of action, the right of enforcement and the right to any judicial relief leaving the claimant with an empty right. FRED EGBE v. THE HON. JUSTICE J.A. ADEFARASIN (1987) ALL NLR 1 @ 21, per Oputa, JSC. He argued that the applicant did not maintain the action within three (3) months when the purported cause of action arose, to wit, June, 2015, thus, this is fatal to this action as failure of the applicant so to do renders his action completely stature barred. IBRAHIM v. JUDICAL SERVICE COMMITTEE, KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 584) 1 @ 32; CRUTECH v. OBETEN (2011) 15 NWLR (PT. 1271) 588 @ 608-609, per Oredola, JCA; YARE v. N.S.W. & I.C. (2013) 12 NWLR (PT. 1367) 173 @ 191-192, per Galadima, JSC; HASSAN v. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (PT. 1223) 547 @ 619, per Adekeye, JSC. Submitting that the law is settled that the issue of jurisdiction is radically fundamental. ELELU-HABEEB v. A.G. FED. (2012) 13 NWLR (PT. 1318) 423 @ 511-512, per Adekeye, JSC; UTIH v. ONOYIVEWE (1991) 1 SCNJ 25 @ 49, per Bello, CJN; ADETAYO v. ADEMOLA (2010) 15 NWLR (PT. 1215) 169 @ 189, PARAS. C-F, per Muhammed, JSC. The applicant in reaction filed a REPLY TO THE NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE 1ST – 3RD RESPONDENTS filed on 27th October, 2016 and dated 24th October, 2016.with the following ISSUES: Whether this Honorable Court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter. Whether the respondents have not misconceived this suit as a labour matter exclusively and not a Fundamental Right Enforcement issue. ON ISSUE 1 Whether this Honorable Court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter. Learned Counsel to the Applicant, Ocheja Esq. submitted that it is trite that jurisdiction is the authority which a court has to decide a matter before it. It connotes the entire basis of taking cognizance of matter presented to the court formally for the purpose of adjudication. ANYANWU v. OGUNUWE (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 738) 1012 @ 1044, PARA. D.And that furthermore that jurisdiction is the live wire of any proceeding in court and everything done in the absence of jurisdiction is simply a nullity. MUSACONI LTD. V. ASPILALL (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 710) 1276 @ 1292-1293, PARAS. D-F. Counsel to the Applicant submitted that the provision of the Rule as to commencement of action in Fundamental Right issues are flexible and prescribed in Order 2 Rules, 2, 3 & 4, urging the Court to hold that the originating process is proper before this Court particularly as the matter was transferred from the Federal High Court, Lokoja. Contending that the 1st – 3rd Respondents are only dwelling on technicalities. OLORUNTOBA-OJU v. ABDUL-RAHEEM (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 497) 1 @ 29, PARAS. G-H. Learned Applicant’s Counsel on the issue of Public Officer’s Protection Act, submitted that the Fundamental Right proceedings enjoys a distinct position in our laws that no limitation law applies, citing Order III of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009. Learned Counsel to the applicant went on to arguing that the process filed on the 4th May 2016 doesn’t constitute a new suit ON ISSUE 2 Whether the respondents have not misconceived this suit as a labour matter exclusively and not a Fundamental Right Enforcement issue. Learned Applicant’s Counsel argued that where a law provides for a procedure for doing a particular thing, it must be followed with all intent and purposes hence, the procedure to be adopted to actualize and activate Rule 030411 (even not applicable in this circumstance) is procedurally provided for in Rules 030305 which the 3rd Respondent woefully neglected. Furthermore, that it re-echoes the provision of Sec. 36 of the 1999 Constitution. On the applicability of the doctrine of fair hearing to proceedings of administrative bodies, counsel relied on the case of J.S.C. CROSS RIVER STATE v. YOUNG (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 714) 40 @ 54, PARAS. C-E. and Applicant’s Counsel cited the case of ORANEZI v. NGIGE (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 760) 1350 @ 1384, PARA. D for the definition of fair hearing. Urging the Court to hold that the question complained of by the Applicant is solely the refusal of the 3rd Respondent to hear him and verify the content of the letter from the 4th Respondent and not any labour matter whatsoever. CADBURY (NIG.) PLC. V. ONI (2013) ALL FWLR (PT. 665) 251, PARAS. A-D. The 1st -3rd defendant filed their reply on point of law tagged ‘1ST – 3RD RESPONDENTS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW TO REPLY OF THE APPLICANT DATED 26TH October, 2016’ (filed on 1st November, 2016). ON ISSUE 1 Whether this Honorable Court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter. The Learned SAN argued that the Applicant’s contention is thoroughly misconceived, submitting that it is settled law that the Enforcement of Fundamental Rights does not fall within the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court and as such, this Court is incompetent to determine this case. S.S.A.U.T.H.R.I.A.I. v. OLOTU (NO. 2) (2016) 14 NWLR (PT. 1531) 1, per Adumein, JCA @ Pp. 17 -19, PARAS. C-A; MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 241. ON ISSUE 2 Whether the respondents have not misconceived this suit as a labour matter exclusively and not a Fundamental Right Enforcement issue. The Learned SAN submitted in rebuttal that it is settled law that courts cannot widen or expand the extent of power expressly defined by the Constitution. ANSA v. R.T.P.C.N. (2008) 7 NWLR (PT. 1086) 421 @ 446, PARA. B, per Omokri, JCA. He submitted that Sec. 36 (1) of the Constitution; Rules 030305, J.S.C. CROSS RIVER STATE v. YOUNG (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 714) 40 @ 54, PARAS. C-E; ORANEZI v. NGIGE (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 760) 1350 @ 1384, PARA. D; CADBURY (NIG.) PLC. V. ONI (2013) ALL FWLR (PT. 665) 251, PARAS. A-D, relied upon by the Applicant are of no moment, urging the Court to discountenance same. The Court’s Decision On the 13th December 2016 parties adopted their written statements on oath and the matter was adjourned for Ruling. Having carefully summarized the position of both sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in this ruling and specific mention would be made to them where the need arises. Before I deal with the merit of this application I need to address a contention of the 1st - 3rd defendants in the 2nd ground of their objection as to personal service. The Learned Authors Offornze D. Amucheazi and Paul U. Abba in their book “THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA – LAW, PRACTICE and PROCEDDURE.”© 2013 Wildfire Publishing House at page128 addressed this very point in their treatment of the manner of Service of origination processes in this court, thus “ The manner of service of originating processes or any other process in the NIC is relatively flexible and less rigid than the requirement for service in the High Court. There is no mandatory requirement for personal service of processes on the defendant and the party is slowed to adopt the easiest means of service of the process on a defendant without the need for leave of court”. Or 7 Rule 1 NICR Rule 2007 provides SERVICE OF ORIGINATING PROCESS (1) Any notice or any other documents required or authorized by these rules to be served or delivered to any person may be served on that person personally or sent by registered post or courier or left at that persons address for service or, where no address for service is given, the registered office, principal place of business or last known address….. (2)…… (3)…… (1)……. (2) Where a party is represented by a Legal Practitioner, service of court process may be made on such Legal Practitioner or person under his or her control. See the case of SUIT NO: NICN/CA/118/2013 MR. OYAMA PIUS Vs. SEAWARD VENTURES LTD & ANOR. The 2017 rules retains these basic provisions: (1) Any process or document required or authorized by these Rules or ordered by the Court to be served on any person who is a party in a matter may be served as follows : (a) by handing a copy of the process or document to the person or to the person’s counsel ; or (b) by leaving a copy of the process or document at the person’s or the person’s counsel’s residence or place of business ; (c) by leaving a copy of the document or process at the person’s place of employment ; (d) by sending a copy of the document or process by registered post or courier to the last known address of the party or the party’s counsel ; or (e) by sending a copy of the document or process to the person concerned or to the person’s counsel through the e-mail address(es) or any electronic mailing device provided by the parties concerned ; (f ) by sending a notification by way of hearing notice through a telephone short message services (SMS) of a process filed before the Court in which the person has been named as a party ; or (g) by leaving at that person’s address for service or, where no address for service has been given, at the registered office, principal place of business or last known address ; All this means is that in this court the National required there is no provision for Personal service I find, The issue for determination in this suit to my mind is :-Whether or not this court has been empowered by law to assume jurisdiction in this present case. I shall first of all address the 2nd area of contention of the defendants whether this suit is indeed statute barred. The issue raised by the 1st – 3rd defendant was weather the applicant suit was of statute barred by virtue of Section 2A of the Public Officer Protection Act arguing that the applicant did not maintain the action within three (3) months when the purported cause of action arose, to wit, June, 2015, thus, this is fatal to this action as failure of the applicant so to do renders his action completely stature barred. The applicant on his part contends that the Fundamental Right proceedings enjoy a distinct position in our laws that no limitation law applies, citing Order III of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009. And that the process filed on the 4th May 2016 doesn’t constitute a new suit. The statute in question is section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004, which provides as follows – Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect. (a) the action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof: Provided that if the action, prosecution or proceeding be at the instance of any person for cause arising while such person was a convict prisoner, it may be commenced within three months after the discharge of such person from prison. I agree with the applicant that Fundamental Right Enforcement suit are not susceptible to limitation laws. Order III states categorically that “An application for the enforcement of Fundamental Right shall not be affected by any limitation law whatsoever” see the case of MRS. ENDURANCE ODUBU V. LIEUTENANT OLORUNDUYILEMI STEPHEN & ORS (2012)LPELR-19792(CA). The position of the law as regards transferred case has been well stated in the case of KJANG Vs, NATIONAL AGENNCY FOR THE CONTROL OF AIDS (NACA) NICN/ ABJ/ 230/ 2012 delivered on the 20th March 2013 held that “in determining whether an action transferred to the court by another court commenced …….the court will take into consideration when the action was first filed and not the date of transfer from the other court.” That being the case the process of 4th May 2016 even if the process were subject to limitation law would not be the process to which the court would rely to determine when the suit was instituted for purposes of determining statute bar. This matter from a perusal of the court’s file was in fact instituted on the 10th June 2015. Now to the question of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement procedure and its propriety in this court Jurisdiction. The position of the law is as was stated in the case of UGBA V. SUSWAM (2013) 4 NWLR (PT. 1345) 427, Held: that “The jurisdiction of a court is granted by statute or the Constitution but not by the court. No court has the jurisdiction to go beyond the provisions of the enabling law; otherwise any action by it will be ultra vires The jurisdiction of this court is as of now and in the main governed by Section 254 C (1), (2), (3), (4) AND (5) of the 1999 CFRN and Section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2016 Section 7 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, Furthermore, section 7 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act, states: “The Court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters- (a) relating to – (i) labour, including trade unions and industrial relations; and (ii) environmental and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour, and matters incidental thereto Section 254(C) of the 1999 Constitution as amended; Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters- relating to or connected with any labor, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labor, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith; relating to, connected with or arising from Factories Act, Trade Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, Labor Act, Employees' Compensation Act or any other Act or Law relating to labor, employment, industrial relations, workplace or any other enactment replacing the Acts or Laws; relating to or connected with the grant of any order restraining any person or body from taking part in any strike, lock-out or any industrial action, or any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike, lock-out or any industrial action and matters Connected therewith or related thereto; relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution as it relates to any employment, labor, industrial relations, trade unionism, employer's association or any other matter which the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine; (j) Relating to or connected with any dispute arising from national minimum wage for the Federation or any part thereof and matters connected therewith or arising there from; relating to or connected with any dispute arising from national minimum wage for the Federation or any part thereof and matters connected therewith or arising there from; trade union dispute or employment dispute as may be recorded in a memorandum of settlement; trade union constitution, the constitution of an association of employers or any association relating to employment, labor, industrial relations or work place; (5) The National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in criminal causes and matters arising from any cause or matter of which jurisdiction is conferred on the National Industrial Court by this section or any other Act of the National Assembly or by any other law. See FEMI BABALOLA Vs. ACCESS BANK NICN/LA/123/2012 (unreported) delivered on the 23rd January 2013. It is also the position of the law that in determining whether a matter falls within the court’s jurisdiction recourse is had to the originating processes. See the case of OLORUNTOBA-OJU V. ABDUL-RAHEEM 2009) LPELR-2596(SC), (2009) 13 NWLR (PT. 1157) 83 S C. The Supreme Court held that “it has now become legally customary through long practice to determine the issue of jurisdiction of court on the reliefs sought by the claimant, in the writ of summons and statement of claim. Also in the case of TRADE BANK PLC V. BENILUX (NIGERIA) LTD (2003) 9 NWLR PT.825 PAGE 416. The Supreme Court held that "It is only on careful examination of the pleadings filed by the parties in a cause or matter namely the statement of claim not the defence that the court can ascertain whether or not the Federal High Court have exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to section 251(1) (p) (q) (r) of the 1999 Constitution. The supreme court in ONUEKWUSI Vs REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE CHRIST METHODIST ZION CHURCH. Held that the law is well settled, that the nature of the claim placed before the court that determines whether the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. ADEYEMEI & ORS Vs OPEYON [1976]10 DC 31 at p51. The court only needs to consider the complaint and the statement of facts A. G. ANAMBRA Vs. A.G. FEDERATION [1993] 6 NWLR (Pt. 302) 692, A.G. FEDERATION Vs. OSHIOMOLE [2004] 3NWLR (Pt.860) 305 Now looking at the claimant applicants reliefs;- A DECLARATION that the Acts of the Respondents: to wit: intimidation and threats of further arrest of the Applicant is illegal, unconstitutional and a gross violation of the Fundamental Rights of the Applicant as enshrined in Sec. 35(1) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right. A DECLARATION that the suspension of the Applicant by the 3rd defendant is illegal, unconstitutional and a gross violation of the Fundamental Rights of the Applicant as enshrined in Sec. 36(1) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right. AN ORDER of this Honorable Court directing the 3rd Respondent to withdraw the suspension letter against the Applicant and to restore the Applicant to the status quo ante. AN ORDER OF INJUNCTION restraining the 3rd defendant from suspending and or terminating the Appointment of the Applicant and to restore the Applicant to status quo. AN ORDER OF INJUNCTION restraining the respondents, their agents or privies from arresting and or detaining the Applicant. AN ORDER OF INJUNCTION restraining the Respondents, their agents or privies from further acts of harassment, intimidation and any other form of infringement of the fundamental rights of the Applicant. AN AWARD of #10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only against the Respondents jointly and severally as exemplary damages for the unbearable hardship and psychological trauma caused to the Applicant and the cost of this suit. The Applicant has argued that his reliefs are solely on the refusal of the 3rd Respondent to hear him and verify the content of the letter from the 4th Respondent and not any labour matter but bordering on abuse of fundamental rights; raising the applicability of the doctrine of fair hearing to proceedings of administrative bodies; -the definition of fair hearing. The question before the court then becomes: whether the Applicant’s suit can be competently determined by this court in view of the originating process adopted by the Applicant in commencing this action or in other words whether the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009, or in fact the Applicant’s Notice of an Application for an Order Enforcing a Fundamental Right can activate this courts originating jurisdiction. It is also necessary to note that the applicants case is required to be considered both as regards the substance the reliefs and the form / procedure adopted The dictum of the Muhammed Bello CJN Supreme court in OGUDU Vs STATE [1994] 9 NWLR (Pt.366) 1 is most apposite at this juncture, I find. ‘It appears to me that upon careful examination of the fundamental rights in chapter IV of the Constitution, they may be classified into two categories for the purpose of their observance and their enforcement. Firstly they are the rights that must be observed whenever the occasion of their observation has arisen. Endorsing the submission of Mr. Agbakoba, they are intrinsic to the occasion and cannot be divorced from the occasion. They are generally procedural rights and are an embodiment of fair trial in courts and tribunals of a democratic society, thus the right to fair trial and the right of an accused to defend himself under section 33 of the constitution are intrinsic to the trial and failure to observe such rights is a valid ground of appeal. The second category of fundamental rights comprises those rights that are enforceable by the High Court under Section 42 of the Constitution. Because the Constitution expressly confers original jurisdiction for their enforcement on the High Courts, this court (referring to the Supreme Court) has no jurisdiction as a court of first instance over them.’ Section 254C(1)(d) CFRN as amended provides that the National Industrial Court shall have jurisdiction……. d) relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of chapter IV of this constitution as it relates to any employment, labour, industrial relation, trade unionism, employer association or any other matter which the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine; As far as the claimants claim relates to a labour dispute and the alleged breach of fundamental right occurred is related or connected to an employment matter or is procedural and an intrinsic part of a substantive claim this court can hear it as an ingredient of a labour issue and as long as the suit has clothed the court with jurisdiction See Unreported ruling NIC/ ABJ/296/2012 GEOFERY Vs SETRACO NIGERIA LTS. & ORS delivered on 4th March 2013. Unreported ruling NIC/ABJ/32/2012 ANICHA Vs. NIGERIAN ARMY 7 ORS delivered on 2nd July 2012. It should be noted that section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, talks of “any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him, may apply to a High Court in that State for redress”. By this provision, the application is to be to a High Court for purposes of section 46 of the Constitution and the Rules made there under. The NIC is not a High Court. An application may nevertheless be made to the NIC given the provision of section 254C(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, but it cannot be an application under the Rules made pursuant to section 46 of the Constitution. Now section S254 C1 (l) gives the National Industrial Court jurisdiction in (ii) appeals from the decisions or recommendations of any administrative body or commission of enquiry, arising from or connected with employment, labour , trade unions or industrial relations’ Such appeals would be required to be commenced in line with the provisions of Order 3 This court has held in several case that the Fundamental enforcement Procedure Rules do not contemplate the National Industrial Court, Unreported NICN/EN/10/2011COMRADE (EVANG) OLOWO PREYE GRACE VS PENGASSAN & 3ORS, and that section 254C(1)(d) cannot be used as the basis of filing claims under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules I this court See Unreported NICN/LA/333/2012 ALHAJI LATEEF AKINSOLA Vs. NURTW & ORS. delivered 20th March 2013. See also THOMAS INEBUI V. FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA [2014] 47 N.L.L.R PT.152 155-315 @P.221, PARAS A-C. In the circumstances the fundamental right issue can only be entertained when evaluating the procedure complained of, i.e. a substantive labour issue, which would be entertained but such a case must be initiated by writ of summons or more appropriately by a complaint where parties will exchange pleadings and adduce evidence on the propriety or otherwise of the claimant’s claims. I find that the Applicant’s case as presently couched and in the procedure adopted squarely pronounces like a case for the enforcement of his fundamental human rights. Now the claimant / applicants have asked this court not to allow technicalities to clogg the wheels of justice but this court has held in the Unreported SUIT NO: NICN/CA/03/2015 EDET AKPAN UMOREN & 13 ORS Vs. UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR & 3 ORS delivered on the 25th June 2015;-that the Fundamental Rights Provisions, unlike when a case is instituted by an Originating summons and the court find that process unsuitable the court can with reliance on Supreme Court direction such as OSANBADE V OYEWUMI [2007] 18 ALL FWLR (PT. 368) 1004 AT 1015 PARA. –E. and ADEYELU II V. AJAGUNGBADE III [2007] 14 NWLR (PT. 1053) PAGES 3-4, and order parties to file pleadings. There exists no such apex court precedent to enable the conversion of a Fundamental Rights Enforcement process to a process capable of activating this court’s jurisdiction. Learned Author of blessed memory B. Aturu in his book “The Law and Practice of National Industrial Court” First Edition 2013 Hebron Publishing Co. Ltd at p30.states that applicants seeking to activate the fundamental rights relating to jurisdiction of this court “must comply with Order 3 of the Rules and not by the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, otherwise the matter would be struck out” See NICN/EN/12/2012 FADIRO Vs. ADEYEMI (unreported). Contrary to the submission of the Claimant Counsel, I find that the case of SSUATHRIAI Vs OLOTU (NO. 2) SUPRA is not only relevant and applicable but also binding as stare decisis. I resolve this issue of jurisdiction for the defendants. The defendants had urged the court to strike out this suit, when the court posed the question in open Court as to the proper order to be made in the event that the court finds itself lacking jurisdiction. The Applicant on the other hand preferred not to make any submission but chose to leave the matter to the Court’s discretion. Now considering the provisions of Section 24 (5) of the NICN Act 2006 the question arises as to the proper order to be made and the questions to be formulated. Section 24(5) provides that “Where the court to which any cause of matter has been transferred pursuant to sub section (2) or (3) of this section, above is of the opinion that the cause or matter ought in law to be delt with by the Court which transferred the cause or matter, the first mentioned Court shall, after hearing Counsel on behalf of the parties, state a case on a point of law for the opinion of the Court of Appeal” Also se Order 62(4) I, in consequence, find and hold that the matter at hand qualifies under section 24(5) of the NIC Act 2006 for the Court to “state a case on a point of law for the opinion of the Court of Appeal”. This being a matter that was a transferred from the Federal High Court of Kogi State sitting at Lokoja and so I cannot sit on appeal over it by striking it out. The prayer of the 1st -3rd defendant counsel that I strike out the matter cannot, therefore, be granted as that would be tantamount to holding that the Federal High Court was wrong in transferring this matter to this court, this I hold does not lie in the mouth of this court so to do; that would mean sitting on appeal over the decision of a judge of coordinate jurisdiction. Section 24(5) of the NIC Act 2006 accordingly enjoins that in the circumstance, the Court makes a case stated to the Court of Appeal for its opinion. In consequence, I most humbly and hereby “state a case on a point of law for the opinion of the Court of Appeal” to wit – Whether, given the facts of this case, the reliefs sought and the statutory jurisdiction of this court is it not the Federal High Court of Kogi State that should hear and determine this case. The Court of Appeal is accordingly and humbly called upon to give its opinion as to whether it is the Federal High Court of Kogi State or this Court that has jurisdiction to hear and determine this case. Ruling is entered accordingly. ………………………………… Hon. Justice E. N. Agbakoba