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This is the Ruling on the Notice of Preliminary Objection, brought pursuant to Order 11 rule 1 of NIC Rules 2007; Section 7 of the NICA 2006, Section 254(C) 1 Chapter 6 of the 3rd Alteration Act 2010 of the 1999 Const. of the FRN (as amended) and under the Inherent Jurisdiction of this Court. The Defendant/Applicant in this Motion through his Counsel is praying the Court for the following: AN ORDER striking out this Suit for lack of jurisdiction whereas the Condition precedent in filing of the Complaint has not been satisfied; AND/OR AN ORDER striking out this suit for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action as well as being malicious, vexatious and thereby constituting a gross abuse of the process of this Honourable Court. Any further or other Orders or Directions as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of the suit in the cause of justice. The Defendants/Applicants through his counsel urged this Court to dismiss the entire suit of the Claimant/Respondent as contained in its Complaint The GROUND for the Application by the Defendants/Applicants is that the entire suit is frivolous and vexatious and constitutes an abuse of Court Process as well as being a perverse use of the instrumentality of the Courts. There was no Affidavit in support, but counsel filed a written address which he adopted as his argument in this case. (Our Arguments are supported by a ... paragraph Affidavit deposed to by one Jachike Ogu, a Senior Manager in the Legal Department of the 3rd Defendant-Company.) Counsel relied on all paragraphs of the Affidavit as well as this Written Address. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION Counsel urged this Honourable Court to consider the following issues for determination. 1. Whether this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this Suit where the Conditions Precedent to its commencement have not been satisfied 2. Whether this action as presently constituted discloses any reasonable cause of action; and is not a gross abuse of court process. ARGUEMENY: ISSUE 1 “WHETHER THIS COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THIS SUIT WHERE THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO ITS CONMMENCEMENT HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFIED” On this Issue, counsel submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit as presently constituted. Jurisdiction of a Court is the lifeline of trials, he submitted, and a trial without jurisdiction is a nullity. It is also of such fundamental importance that it can be raised at any stage of a case. See Fayemi v L. G.S. C Oyo State (2005) 6NWLR (pt 921)280. The issue of jurisdiction cannot be ignored, as stated in the case of N.P.A V Eyamba (2005) 12 NWLR (pt 939) 409 @ 438-439 that: “Where a Court lacks the required jurisdiction to adjudicate in a matter, its proceedings amount to a nullity however well conducted they have been. This is because of the fundamental nature and importance of the issue of jurisdiction, which goes to the root of every adjudication……….. “ He submitted that for a Court to have jurisdiction, the following conditions must be present: - The Proper Parties must be before the Court; - The Subject Matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Court; - The Composition of the Court as to members and qualification; - The suit commenced by the full process of law and upon fulfillment of any conditions precedent to assumption of jurisdiction. He referred to C.B.N V S.A.P. Nig. Ltd (2005) 3 NWLR (pt 911) p152 Ratio 2; Madukolu V Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; Ajao V Obele (2005) 5 NWLR (pt 918) 400@ pp 414-4l5paras H-C Ratio 11. The first two conditions enumerated above and highlighted for emphasis are: (I) Proper Parties and (II) Subject Matter. ON PROPER PARTIES: Counsel submitted that generally only natural and juristic persons in whom alone such rights and obligations can be vested are capable of being parties to a suit. See Management Enterprises Ltd v Otusanya (1987) 2 NWLR 179, Carlen (Nig) Ltd v University of Jos (1994) 1 NWLR pg 63; Fawehinmi v Nigeria Bar Association (No2) (1989) 2 NWLR Pt 105, 558 and Ukpong v C.F.E.D (2007)1MJSC18. A corollary thereto is that the relevant parties in a lawsuit are the Plaintiff(s) and Defendant(s) or as in cases before this Honorable Court, the Claimant(s) and Defendant(s). From the above therefore, for a person to be a Claimant/Plaintiff he/she/it must have legal rights to sue, also known as the LOCUS STANDI which means the legal capacity inherent in the Plaintiff to institute proceedings in a Court of law. Taken further, it refers to the legal interest possessed by the Plaintiff which entitles him to the reliefs claimed in a suit. See Olawoyin V Attorney General of Northern Nigeria (1961) 2 SCNLR 5; Thomas V Olufosoye (1986) 1 NSCC 323. To counsel, LOCUS STANDI is not dependent on the success or merits of a case, but is a CONDITION PRECEDENT and where a Plaintiff is not competent to sue, his case must be struck out. See Buraimoh Oloriode & ors V Simeon Oyebi & ors (1984) 5 SC 1; Sen. Abraham Adesanya V President Federal Republic of Nigeria and anor (1981) 5 SC 112 @28-129. On this issue of Locus standi, counsel drew the attention of this Court to Paragraph 4 of the Claimant’s Amended Statement of Claim where, he admitted that his tenure expired in September 2014. He reproduce Paragraph 4 as follows: “The Claimant was first appointed as the Managing Director of the Company in 2006 for a term of four years which was renewed at the expiry thereof to September2014” This Admission is straightforward, unequivocal and unambiguous, a clear admission and acceptance by the Claimant that his Tenure has an effluxion or terminal date. Indeed, whereas his tenure has expired, it is no longer a right accruing to him to be retained in that position for any hour or day longer. It is trite law that facts which are admitted need no further proof. See Daggash V Bulama (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt 892) 144 Ratio 36. Furthermore, that the legal doctrine of Estoppel prevents the Claimant from suing on the 2nd of November 2014 as “The Managing Director” of the 1st Defendant Company and from seeking Reliefs i-vii as contained in his Statement of Claim. Estoppel by its very nature is so conclusive that the party whom it affects is not allowed to plead against it or adduce evidence to contradict it. We humbly refer the Honourable Court to Ann Okwuchukwu Menakaya V Dr. Timothy N Menakaya (1996) 9 NWLR (pt 472) 256 Ratio 3 (C.A Enugu); Ukaegbu V Ugoji (1991) 6NWLR (pt 196) 127. From the case of Ojukwu V Ojukwu (2600) 11 NWLR (pt 677) 65, a very cogent question at this juncture is whether the person who lacks locus standi can institute this suit and request for the Reliefs claimed? He answered in the negative and cited in support the case of Oluwaniyi V Adewwni (2008) 13 NWLR (pt 1104) @407-408 Counsel therefore urged this Court to so hold and strike out the case accordingly, in the absence of a Locus Standi inuring to the Claimant. ON SUBJECT MATTER: He submitted that Relief viii, which was the basis for the Claimant’s amendment of his Complaint borders on the Tort of Defamation which is comprehensively and totally excluded from the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. A careful consideration of Section 7 of THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT ACT 2006 as well as SECTION 254 (C) 1, CHAPTER 6 OF THE THIRD ALTERATION ACT (2010) CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1999 (AS AMENDED) shows that this Court is a specialized Court with strict jurisdiction which does not include the Tort of Defamation (whether Libel or Slander) as constituted in Relief viii. Its jurisdiction is Exclusive and restricted and in no way Concurrent. See Ministry of Internal Affairs v Shugaba (1982) 3 NCLR (915); Bronik Motors Ltd V Wema Bank Ltd (1983) 1 SCNLR 296; S. 0 Akegbejo & 3 ors v Dr. D. 0. Ataga & 3 ors (1998) I NWLR (pt 534) Ratio 6@ pp 467-468 Counsel submitted that Parties cannot by connivance, acquiescence or collusion confer jurisdiction on a Court where same is lacking; nor can lack of jurisdiction be waived by one or both Parties since parties cannot vest jurisdiction in a Court where there is none. See Okolo V Union Bank; FGN v Adams Oshiomole (supra) and Mobil Production Nig; (Unltd) V Monokpo (2004) All FWLR (pt 195) 575@ 657. Furthermore, this amendment by the Claimant has changed the character of the case which, as presently constituted, has thereby been taken in its entirety outside the purview of the National Industrial Court, since the Court cannot pick and choose which aspects to adjudicate upon. See FGN v Adams Oshiomole (20141) 3NWLR (pt 860) 305; Tukur V Govt of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (pr 117) 517. The Court also cannot entertain some of the Claims while transferring others to the appropriate Court, since the proper order to make at this time is one of Striking out or Dismissal of the entire case. See C. G.G Nig. Ltd V Amaewhule (2006) 3NWLR (pt 967) 282 Ratio 8. He therefore urged this Honourable Court to dismiss or strike out the entire case as presently constituted. 2. “WHETHER THIS ACTION AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED DISCLOSES ANY REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION AND CONSTITUTES ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS” Counsel submitted in the negative for the first limb above and in the positive for the second limb. To him, there is nowhere in the Claimant’s Suit can any justiciable grounds and/or reasonable cause of action for which this suit might be entertained by the Honourable Court it be found. It is trite law and has been held in THOMAS vs. OLUFOSOYE [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt.18) Pg 669@ 682 that where the Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, it is liable to be struck out by the Court and he urged this Honourable Court to dismiss the suit accordingly to avoid the waste of time, energy and resources which its entertainment and consideration shall occasion. Counsel defines the word “reasonable cause of action” and cited cases in support. The case of RINCO CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD vs. VEEPEE INDUSTRIES LTD (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt. 264) Pg. 816@ 822 Paras. F-G is very instructive as follows: “For a statement of claim to disclose a reasonable cause of action, it must set out the legal right of the plaintiff and the obligations of the defendant. It must then go on to set out facts constituting infraction of the plaintiff’s legal rights or failure of the defendant to fulfill the obligation in such a way that if there is no proper defence, the plaintiff will succeed in the relief or remedy he claims”. Having stated all the above, a consideration of the Claimant’s Complaint shall reveal that he had no cause of action, ab initio, to commence this Suit, but is rather on a fishing expedition. It has been the long-held tradition of this Court not to stand aloof and watch the legal rights of persons being plunged into a quagmire and the Claimant owes a strict duty not to plunge this Honourable Court into tedious and unnecessary journey of discovery on his behalf See Dantata & Sawoe Construction V Egbe (l993) 4NWLR pt 335 pg337 and Ukpong v C.F.E.D (2007) 1MJSC 18. Deriving from the Reliefs claimed by the Claimant, it is easy to see that no legal injury was done to the Claimant and he has no reliefs accruing to him from the Defendants as follows: ON RELIEFS i ii, iii, iv and vi: 1. The first point of note is that in the Claimant’s entire pleadings as well as the entire bundle of supportive documents, NOWHERE did he show this Honourable Court any legal, regulatory, contractual and/or constitutional basis why the Defendants should not so exercise this right of administrative oversight over him, to wit, directing him on Indefinite Leave. All the documentary evidence attached and pleaded by him when carefully perused, do not contain any clause granting him Immunity from such Administrative actions, or restraining the Defendants from so acting. Such actions are therefore NOT “ultra vires” since there was no existing limitation against the Defendants; NOT “unconstitutional” since there was no provision of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria being breached; NOT “Illegal” since it did not breach any known laws. To counsel, in the absence of these documents, he is left only with the mere assertions of the Claimant; and it is trite law that Pleadings do not constitute evidence and must not substitute same. See Okeke v A. G Anambra State (1991) 1 NWLR (pt 215)60 @65; Okiri V Ifegha (2001) FWLR (pt 73) 140 Ratio 2; Ojo V Gbaroro (2005) 1O NWLR (pt987) 123 Ratio 9. Secondly, the acts complained of by the Applicant HAD NOT YET OCCURRED BY THE TIME OF COMMENCING THE SUIT. It is imperative to note at this juncture, the fact that the Panel or Body carrying out the Independent Investigation had not been set up and its members had not been chosen by the time of filing this suit. Counsel wondered how the Claimant was then able to determine that he would not receive fair hearing prior to this establishment. To him, it is obvious therefore that the said Independent Forensic Audit exercise was yet to be concluded and determined one way or the other, before the Claimant/Applicant rushed to commence this premature suit, thereby denying himself of an opportunity of a matured crystallized locus standi. Indeed, the Claimant’s Suit amounts to a classic case of “Putting the Cart before the Horse” or of “Crying Wolf, when none is seen”. See Adebayo v Ogun State Sport Council (2005)45 WRN page 172 To this extent, he submitted that mere pedestrian and illusory speculations can never constitute or replace Right of Action and no legal right of the Claimant has been breached for which he is entitled to activate the processes of this Court. ON RELIEFSS v and vii To counsel, it is obvious that despite the Applicant’s claims of continuity up till 2028, facts admitted by him in Paragraph 4 of his Amended Statement of Facts show that HIS TENURE AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF NIGCOMSAT HAS EXPIRED. It is imperative to avoid being dragged into the Applicant’s confusion as to his position as a Public Servant in the Federal Public Service as compared to his position as the Managing Director of the said Company. This is because, while it may be possible (without conceding same that his employment as a public Servant may extend up to 2028 in any capacity. his appointment as the MANAGING DIRECTOR OF NIGCOMSAT expired and became terminated by effluxion of time on the 7th of September 2014, as clearly specified in his Letters of Appointment and Renewal, duly annexed by him to his Statement of Claim. Having stated the above, it is apparent that the Claimant/Applicant’s entire suit as well as this Application is a surreptitious but ill-advised attempt to retain an already expired mandate. Indeed, whereas his tenure has expired, it is no longer a right accruing to him to be retained in that position for any hour or day longer. A corollary of this is that in the absence of such a Right accruing to him, there can be no redress available on the issue. ON RELIEF viii: Counsel further submitted that the Claimant has failed to show a nexus between the proprietors of FACEBOOK (an online social media) and NEWSWIRENGR (an online newspaper) on the one hand, and the Defendants on the other for which these defendants as presently constituted shall become liable for the actions of such publishers of the alleged defamatory materials. Such proprietors were never added as Parties to this suit, or even called as witnesses to the existing Defendants’ responsibility for the said publication. It remains within the realm of conjecture as to the nexus between these existing Defendants and the publishers of the defamatory material and/or the material itself; and the arguments above about the Claimant plunging this Honourable Court into a tedious and unnecessary journey of discovery on his behalf continue to hold. Counsel submitted that the above persons are NECESSARY PARTIES whose presence is so vital and essential as such that their absence will result in an unjust determination of the suit before the Court. It is therefore pertinent to conclude that in their absence, the Claim constituted in Relief viii cannot be judicially and/or judiciously determined against the existing Defendants. See Green V Green (1987) 3 NWLR Pt 6.4 page 480; Babayeju V Ashamu (1998) 9 NWLR Pt 567PP 564; Iyimoga v Gov. of Plateau State (1994) 8BWLRpt369pg 73. To counsel, therefore it is in the interest of justice to strike out this claim as against the current Defendants accordingly since it is apparent that this is another ill-advised attempt at obtaining a judicial relief through an improper use of legal procedure. To counsel, it is trite that the term, ‘abuse of court process’ is a concept that involves circumstances and situations of possible infinite variety. The term generally connotes the improper use of the judicial process by a party to interfere with the due administration of justice or for purposes of causing irritation or annoyance to his opponent. Simply put, it connotes proceedings which are mala fide, frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. See Amaefuna v State (1988) 2 NWLR 75) 156 @177; Saraki V Kotoye [1992] 9NWLR (Pt. 264) 156 at 188 and Seven Up Bottling Coy Ltd v Abiola and Sons Bottling Co. Ltd (1996), 7NWLR (pt463) 714. Counsel referred the Court to the case of African Re. Corporation V JDP Construction Nigeria Limited [2003] 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) 609 at 635- 636 paragraphs G-A, where it was held as follows: “Abuse of Court Process can also mean abuse of legal procedure or improper use of legal process... An abuse of process always involves some bias, malice, some deliberateness, and some desire to misuse or pervert the system... ‘ Also, in the case of C.B.N v ARMED [2001] 11 NWL.R (Pt. 724) 369, the Court held as follows: “No doubt when a Plaintiff uses legal process to harass or irritate an adversary, or employs it to impede the administration of justice, this may be tantamount to abuse of process of court (sic) ……“[Emphasis supplied]. See also Okafor v -. G Anambra State (1991) 6 NWLR (pt 200) 659. He therefore submitted that the Claimant desires to misuse and pervert the system of Justice through the instrumentality of this Complaint, and that same is frivolous, vexatious, and malicious and a gross abuse of Court process which is liable to be struck out accordingly. CONCLUSION: In conclusion he urged the Court to strike out the entire Suit with costs against the Claimant for this gross abuse and misuse of the processes of the Honourable Court. WRITIEN ADRESSS IN OPPOSITION TO THE 2ND AND 3RD DEFENDANTS’ MOTION INTRODUCTION The learned Counsel to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants has filed application to strike out this suit, after the joinder of the 3rd Defendant by an order of Court made on the 28th of November, 2014. It is found expedient to reply to the said application in the terms hereunder. It is noted that the application of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants is supported by an affidavit. To counsel, the Court will easily see that the said affidavit deposed to matters bordering on the merits of this case. The said affidavit is glaringly out of place in the determination of the Preliminary Objection raised by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in limine to the jurisdiction of this case. Hence, there is no need for the Claimant to file a counter-affidavit thereto. See: FOLORUNSO v. SHALOUB (1994) 3 NWLR (PT.333) 413 at 421 paras. A-B The principle is well settled that in the determination of issue of jurisdiction in limine, it is only the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim that must be looked at by the Court. See: OKOROCHA v. UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA (2011) 1 NWLR (PT.1228) 348 at 373 PARA E. In the circumstances, the Court was urged to discountenance the affidavit in support of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ Application. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION WHETHER THIS HONOURABLE COURT IS NOT VESTED WITH JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE. WHETHER THIS CASE DOES NOT DISCLOSE A REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS NOT AN ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS. ON ISSUE ONE Counsel submitted that in view of the circumstances of this case, the contentions of the learned Counsel to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on issue one and the argument canvassed therein are grossly misconceived. That it is beyond peradventure that the issue of locus standi raised by the learned Counsel to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants is inapplicable to the case at hand. The gamut of the case of the Claimant is that the directive by the 1st and 2nd Defendants for him to proceed on indefinite leave was, inter alia, unconstitutional and ultra vires. It is the position of the Claimant also that he is entitled to continue in office and should be reinstated back into office as the Managing Director of the 3rd Defendant. Incontestably, by virtue of Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) , the Claimant is entitled to have this Court determine the issue of the alleged infraction of his rights with respect to his employment as the Managing Director of the 3rd Defendant. Put differently, the alleged breach of his employment rights donated to the Claimant the legal capacity to sue and be heard by this Honourable Court. He further submitted that the apex Court of this Country in AJILOWURA v. DISU (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 333) 1613 at 1630 paras. C-D, relying on the erstwhile decision of the same court in DADA v. OGUNSANYA (1992) 3 NWLR (PT.232) page 754 defined locus standi as: “Legal capacity to institute an action in a court of law” A cursory reading of the 2nd and 3 Defendants’ arguments under this head especially the argument canvassed in respect of paragraph 4 of the Amended Statement of Claim is an invitation to this Honourable Court to determine this matter on its merits at the stage of the Preliminary Objection. Counsel submitted that this is not a matter to be determined at this stage. That for emphasis, what this Honourable Court should concern itself with at this stage is that the Claimant has asserted that he has a right which has been infringed upon by the Defendants. The case of AJILOWURA v. DlSU supra at 1638 -1639 is an authority for the proposition that only the Statement of Claim should be looked at in the determination of locus standi and that where a Defendant challenges in limine the locus standi of a plaintiff, the Defendant is taken to have accepted as correct all the averments in the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim. To counsel, taking the averments in the Statement of Facts in this case into consideration, it is simply obvious that the Claimant has the locus standi to institute this action. Incidentally, the learned Counsel to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants admits in his address that issue of locus standi does not depend on the success or merits of a case. Assuming, without any iota of concession, that the tenure of the Claimant as the Managing Director of the 3rd Defendant expired September 2014, it is pertinent to note that the acts of the Defendants complained of by the Claimant herein were orchestrated before the said September, 2014 and this suit was accordingly filed on the 5th day of March, 2014 as can be gleaned from the General Form of Complaint. The reference by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ learned Counsel to the 28th of November, 2014 on the Amended General Form of Complaint as the date of commencement of this action is borne out of a misconception in law. That the Complaint in this case was amended does not make the filing date on the amended process the date of commencement of the action. It is elementary in law that amendment dates back to the date of first filing. See: UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v. OSAZEE (2011) 7 NWLR (PT.1246) 293 at 311-312 PARAS G-B However, what is of utmost importance is that the paragraph 4 of the Statement of Facts referred to by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants cannot be cognized independent of, inter alia, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Statement of Facts wherein the Claimant is contending that he is entitled to hold the position of the Managing Director till year 2028 when he would be due for retirement as a public servant. For emphasis, it is a settled principle of law that pleadings must be construed wholly and not disjointedly. See: NGIGE v. OBI (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 330) 1041 at 1122 where the Court observed thus: “In dealing with pleadings, a court must read all the paragraphs together to get a flowing story of the parties and not a few paragraphs in isolation. It is the totality of the pleadings, whether it is the statement of claim or the statement of defence that states the case of the party. It will be injustice to invoke only a few paragraphs to come to a conclusion.” The cases of AYOKE v. BELLO and UDE v. A.G. RIVERS STATE cited by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on this issue are debilitating and self-defeating to the submissions made by them and he urged the Court to apply them in favour of the Claimant/Respondent. Counsel submitted further that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ contention that this Honourable Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain this suit because relief viii therein borders on the Tort of Defamation is simply fallacious and badly flawed. That relief viii merely asks for aggravated and exemplary damages with regard to the acts of the Defendants complained against by the Claimant in respect of his employment as Managing Director of the 3rd Defendant. In other words, the damages sought are ancillary and related to the other reliefs in this case which are unquestionably premised on issue of employment and squarely within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The clear and concise wordings on the fine print of Section 254 C (1) (A) of the Constitution of the Federal of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) adroitly point to the fact that any matter arising from Labour disputes, employment relations and matters arising from the workplace is implicitly within the jurisdiction of this Court. For ease of reference, the provision of that Section is reproduced hereunder: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 251, 257, 272, and anything contained in this constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an act of the National assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other courts in civil causes and matters: (a) Relating to or connected with labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from the workplace, conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, workers and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith...” Flowing from the above quoted instrument, it can be succinctly gleaned that the intendment of that section is to vest the Court with jurisdiction to entertain any subject-matter arising from or incidental to the employer/employee relationship. Thus, assuming without conceding that Relief viii is stricty sensu on tort of defamation, once the tort of defamation inextricably revolves around issue of employment, this Honourable Court would be the Court vested with jurisdiction to entertain it. The Claimant’s case on which the said Relief viii is predicated is that he was exposed to public disrepute, opprobrium, loss of self - esteem and untold mental agony on account of the Defendants’ unkind treatment meted to him in respect of his employment. This is, doubtless, connected with the issue of employment raised in this case and it is within the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to award damages to assuage the Claimant for that purpose if found proved. Counsel submitted that since the principal issue in this case has to do with employment, assuming without conceding that Relief viii is outside the jurisdiction of the Court, this Honourable Court is still the proper Court to entertain the said relief which is ancillary to the principal reliefs. See: TUKUR v. GOVT. OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) NWLR (PT.117) 517 at 568 PARAS A-B. To him, without doubt, the submissions of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on this issue are just calculated to becloud and befuddle the issue in this case and he urged the Court to discountenance them and resolve this issue against the Defendants. ON ISSUE TWO It is also the contention of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants that the case of the Claimant does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. He submitted that it is elementary in law that it is the summation of the Statement of Facts and the Reliefs sought that gives rise to what constitutes a reasonable cause of action. Without meaning to be pedantic, it is pertinent to bring into the fore what the phrase “cause of action” means .This phrase is thus defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, Edition: “A group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. A situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a judicial tribunal.” To counsel, Interestingly enough, the cases of RINCO CONSTRUCTION LTD v. VEEPEE INDUSTRIES LTD and EGBE v. ADEFARASIN cited by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ learned Counsel in respect of this issue provide a complete answer to the contention of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. A careful perusal of the Statement of Facts in this case would show that the legal right of the Claimant and the obligations of the Defendants in respect of the employment of the Claimant as Managing Director of the 3rd Defendant have been set out. Moreover, facts constituting infraction of the Claimant’s legal rights or failure of the Defendants to fulfill their own obligations in respect of the employment relationship are equally set out. In sum, there is a discernible wrongful act of the Defendants i.e. the wrongful order of indefinite suspension from office, which Claimant claims to be ultra vires and unconstitutional etc. that gives the Claimant the cause of complaint in this case. The consequent damage is that the Claimant has been wrongfully denied the right to continue in office as the Managing Director coupled with the loss of repute and self - esteem etc. for which the Claimant is claiming order of reinstatement and exemplary damages respectively in this case. On the pains of emphasis, from the averments in the Statement of Facts and the reliefs sought in the instant case, the Claimant is asserting some wrongs on the part of the Defendants for which he demands a remedy. The Legal maxim of ‘ubi jus ubi remedium’ places a burden and duty on the Court to ensure that whenever a party alleges a wrong, opportunity must be given to him to seek remedy in respect thereof. In the present case, the Claimant’s contention is that he was unlawfully sent on an indefinite leave out of malice and spite etc. It, therefore, behooves this Honourable Court, having been invited by the Claimant to adjudicate on this matter, to carefully look into the Claimant’s grievances and come to a decision that would best serve the interest of justice. He further submitted that a perusal of the submissions of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ Counsel under this issue would show that the Counsel is surreptitiously arguing that the substantive case of the Claimant is not meritorious. This is very much out of place at this stage since the Court would not concern itself with the strength or weakness of the case put forward by the Claimant in the determination of the issue of cause of action raised. See: DADA v. OGUNSANYA (1992) 3 NWLR (PT. 232) 754 at 765 where Kawu, JSC of blessed memory had this to say: “It should however be pointed out that when considering the issues of disclosure of action, it is irrelevant to consider the weakness of the Plaintiffs’ claims as the learned trial judge would appear to have done in this case. What is important is to examine the averments in the pleadings and see if they disclose some cause of action or raise some questions fit to be decided by the judge. See Thomas v. Olufosoye (supra).” Again, be it noted that the claims sought by the Claimant in this case are principally declaratory. Therefore, assuming without conceding that there is even no cause of action, it is settled that declaratory reliefs can be granted even where there is no consummate cause of action. See: ADIGUN v. A.G. OYO STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (PT.53) 678 at 741. Howbeit, it is clear as crystal that the Claimant’s case discloses a reasonable cause of action. Furthermore, counsel submitted that the contention of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants that this suit constitutes an abuse of court process is particularly strange and out of place. There is absolutely nothing to buttress the postulation made by them. To him, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are merely engaging in shadow-boxing on this issue. Abuse of Court process has been well defined in the case of ATTAHIRU v. BAGUDU (1998) 3 NWLR (PT.543) 638 at 658 as follows: “....an abuse of court process is a term generally applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bona fide and is frivolous, vexatious, and oppressive. Abuse of court process also means abuse of legal procedure or improper use of legal process. The term abuse of court has an element of malice in it. It has to be malicious perversion of a regularly issued Process civil or criminal for a purpose and to obtain a result not lawfully warranted or properly attainable thereby’ As can be easily discerned from all the processes before this Court, there is nothing which makes this suit an abuse of Court process. In the case of CBN v. AHMED (2001) 11 NWLR (PT. 724) 369, cited by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, the Supreme Court held at pages 409 and 410 that before a party can be accused of abuse of court process, the party must be found to have acted malafide and that the exercise of a constitutional right of appeal by a party would not constitute abuse of court’s process. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants have not established any facts before this Honourable Court to convince this Honourable Court that this suit constitutes an abuse of Court process. The Claimant has merely exercised his constitutional right to fair hearing by filing this action. There is no way, as held by the Supreme Court in CBN v. AHMED supra that can constitute an abuse of the process of the court. All said, the Court was urged to also resolve this issue against the Defendants. CONCLUSION The net-sum of the foregoing submissions is that there is no feature in the case that vitiates the jurisdictional capacity of this Honourable Court. Counsel urges the Court to discountenance the submissions of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants for lacking in merit and being a deliberate attempt to waste the time of this Honourable Court. NOTICE OF PRELIMARY OBJECTION The 1st Defendant raised a Preliminary Objection to the Jurisdiction of the Court and urged the Court to: - a) Strike out the entire Suit for want of Jurisdiction, b) And for such further or other orders the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance, GROUNDS OF OBJECTION: a) Paragraphs 26 and 27 of and Relief 28 (viii) of the claimant’s amended statement of facts disclose a case of libel (defamation of character), b) Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 gives exclusive Jurisdiction only on Labour and labour related majtters and does not contemplate an action in deformation of character WRITTEN ADDRESS IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION INTRODUCTION The Claimant claims various declarations and damages of N2 billion (Two billion naira) for exposing the claimant to public Ridicule, disrepute, opprobrium, loss of self-esteem and untold mental Agony as a consequence of his being sent on indefinite leave by the Defendants to allow for independent investigation into the affairs of the 3rd Defendant (NigComSat). ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION: “Whether from the contents of the Claimant’s claims, the Honourable Court can assume Jurisdiction on same having regard to paragraphs 26, 27 and Relief (viii) of paragraph 28 of the Claimant’s amended Statement of Facts.” ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: To counsel, it is a trite law that Jurisdiction means the Authority which the Court has to decide matters before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for decision. The extent of the Jurisdiction of Court may be circumscribed or restricted by statute. (See Owena Bank Nig. Plc Vs. Michael Ade Ojo. (2003) 17 NWLR Pt 848, 174 at 178 ratio.1, (C.A). ON WHAT DETERMINES THE JURIDICTION OF COURT: The Court (Supra) went further to say that “in determining the Jurisdiction of Court, it is the claims of the Plaintiff that is considered and not the interpretation placed on it by any of the parties on the claim of the Plaintiff (in this case, the claimant)”. Paragraphs 26, 27, and Relief (viii) of paragraph 28 of the amended Statement of Facts discloses a case of libel (defamation of character) of the Claimant by the 1st Defendant. Relief 28 (viii) of the Claimant’s amended statement of the facts states. “The Claimant claims the sum of N2 billion naira (Two billion naira) as aggravated and exemplary damages to atone for the public disrepute, opprobrium, loss of self - esteem and untold mental agony which the Defendants exposed the Claimant to in the circumstances of this case”. This in its self discloses an action predicated on Defamation of the Claimant’s character. Section 7 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act gives exclusive Jurisdiction only on labour and/or labour related matters. He submitted that this Section does not contemplate an action or claim predicated on defamation of character (whether libel or slander). He further submitted that the Court must have either a full Jurisdiction or have none. There is nothing like half Jurisdiction or severance of Jurisdiction to assume jurisdiction on part of the claims. It was his submission that the National Industrial Court is a specialized Court with a Special Jurisdiction not accorded to any other Court. And so the claim of N2 billion for the alleged defamation does not fall within the competence of the Court to assume Jurisdiction over the entire case whether the claim is incidental to the main cause of action or not, it remains that a claim for libel (defamation) has been disclosed. ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES. Counsel submitted that the Court of appeal has this to say. “The essence of interpretation of statute is to discover the intention of the draftsman through the words used in the statute. Where the words of the Statute are not ambiguous, they should be given their natural, grammatical and ordinary meaning” (See RASAKI LAWANI & 3 Others Vs. VOLADORUNA 12 OTHERS (2003) 2 NWLR pt. 804, 271 at 277 ratio 6. To him, under Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 the words used to confer Jurisdiction of this Honourable are clear and unambiguous. CONCLUSION. Counsel finally submitted that this action as constituted is incompetent before this Court as the Court cannot assume Jurisdiction on same and therefore urged the Court to strike out the entire Suit as presently constituted. 2N0 AND 3RD DEFENDANS’ REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW TO CLAIMANT’S WRITTEN ADDRESS AGAINST PRELIMINARY OBJECTION The Claimant had responded by a Written Address dated the 31st of March 2015, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants hereby respond on the following points of Law: ARGUMENTS ON JURISDICTION GENERALLY a. Counsel submitted that there is no specific format for raising the issue of jurisdiction and same must not be contained in any pleading. See S. O Akegbejo & others V Dr. 13.0 Ataga & ors (1998) 1 NWLR (pt 531) 459 paras A-B, Ratio 5. It can even be raised by the Court itself suo motu and exproprio mow? or Orally by Counsel. b. In this present case, it was raised by Motion on Notice supported with Affidavit and address which affords the objector the opportunity of setting out facts upon which he intends to convince the Court that it lacks jurisdiction. See A.G Federation v A.G Abia State (2001) 4 SC (p11). c. On the issue of failure to file a counter-affidavit, he asked the Honourable Court to deem the contents of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ Affidavit as admitted by the Claimant and to act on same. See Best Vision Cont. Ltd V U.A. CN.P.D. CP1C (2003)13 NWLR (pt838) 594 Ratio 8 d. Counsel submitted also that the Court is bound to look at extrinsic evidence when entertaining Objections to its jurisdiction on grounds of abuse of Court process. See Adesokan V Adegwolu (1991) 3 NWLR (pt 179) 293 @305-306. e. He further reiterated that that the issue of jurisdiction cannot be defeated by the provision of Rule of Court. See S.OAkegbejo & others V Dr. D.OAtaga & ors (1998) NWLR (pt531) 469 paras B-C, Ratio 4. f. Counsel submitted that Jurisdiction is a very stringent process and there is indeed no room for a Court to meander when objected to since it either has jurisdiction to entertain a matter or it does not. See Afisi & ors v Lawal & ors 1NWLR (pt217) 350 @366 g. Also, Courts are creatures of statutes and the jurisdiction of each Court is limited and circumscribed by the statute creating them. They indeed have no power to expand this jurisdiction conferred on them as in the present case. See Mudiaga-Erhueh v N.E. C (2003) FWLR (pt 137) 1066@1069 h. He reiterated that the inclusion of the Tort of Defamation by amendment in this suit has pushed it out of the purview of Section 7 of THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT ACT 2006 as well as SECTION 254 (C) 1, CHAPTER 6 OF THE THIRD ALTERATION ACT (2010) CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1999 (AS AMENDED) which jurisdiction is Exclusive and restricted. See Ministry of Internal Affairs v Shugaba (1982) 3 NCLR (915); Bronik Motors Ltd V Wema Bank Ltd (1983) 1 SCNLR 296; S. 0 Akegbejo & 3 ors v Dr. D. 0. Araga & 3 ors (1998) I NWLR (pt 534) Ratio 6@ pp 467-468. On this point, he referred to the case of Nonye V Anyichie (1989) 2 NWLR (pt 101) 110 @115, where while referring to the evergreen case of Madukolu vs Nkemdilim (196 Uwaifo……JCA stated “The discretion of the Court must be exercised upon those grounds already stated above in accordance with settled principles. It has been long stated that the competence of a court, among others depends on whether the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature of the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction” Counsel submitted therefore that the proper order for this Court to make at this time is one of Striking out or Dismissal of the entire case, since it cannot pick and choose which aspects of the Claim to adjudicate upon and also cannot entertain some of the Claims while transferring others. See C. G. G Nig. Ltd V Amaewhule (2006) 3 NWLR (pt 967) 282 Ratio 8; Ali V CBN (1997) 4 NWLR (pt 498)192 CONCLUSION: In conclusion he urged the Court to strike out the entire Suit with costs against the Claimant. WRITTEN ADDRESS IN OPPOSITION TO THE 1ST DEFENDANT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION INTROUCTION: 1SSUE FOR DETERMINATION: “WHETHER HIS HONOURABLE COURT IS NOT VESTED WITH JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE” ARGUMENT ON ISSUE: On the single issue formulated for the determination of this Honourable Court, it is submitted that the 1st Defendant’s contention that the Claimant’s paragraphs 26, 27 and relief (viii) of paragraph 28 of the Amended Statement of Facts disclose a case of libel (defamation of character) of the Claimant by the 1st Defendant and as such robs the Court of jurisdiction to entertain this suit is simply fallacious and badly flawed. Relief (viii) of paragraph 28 referred to above merely asks for aggregated and exemplary damages with regard to the acts of the Defendants complained against by the Claimant in respect of his employment as Managing Director of the 3rd Defendant. In other words, the damages sought for are ancillary and related to the other reliefs in this case which are unquestionably premised on issue of employment and squarely within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The clear wording on the fine print of Section 254C (1)(A) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) as well as Section 7(1) of the National industrial Court Act which adroitly point to the fact that any matter arising from labour disputes, employment relations and matters arising from the workplace are implicitly within the jurisdiction of this Court. For ease of reference, the provisions of the Sections stated above are respectively reproduced here under: 5.254(C)(1)(A) “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other courts in civil causes and matters: (a) Relating to or connected with Labour employment, trade Unions, industrial relations and matters arising from the workplace, conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour employee workers and matters incidental there to or connected there with ....“ And also Section 7(1) “The court shall have and exercise exclusion jurisdiction in civil cause and matters – (a) relating to — i. labour, including trade union and industrial relations; and ii. environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour, and matters incidental thereto;......” Flowing from the above quoted instruments, it can be gleaned that the intendment of the Sections is to vest the court with jurisdiction to entertain any subject-matter arising from or incidental to the employer/employee relationship. Thus, assuming without conceding that Relief (viii) of paragraph 28 is strictu sensu on tort of defamation, once the tort of defamation inextricably revolves around issue of employment, it is submitted, this Honourable Court would be the Court vested with jurisdiction to entertain it. The Claimant’s case on which the said Relief (viii) is predicated, as can be gleaned from the Amended Statement of Facts is that he was exposed to public disrepute, opprobrium, loss of self-esteem and untold mental agony on account of the Defendants’ unkind treatment meted to him in respect of his employment. This is, doubtless, connected with the issue of employment raised in this case and it is within the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to award damages to assuage the Claimant for that purpose if found proved. Counsel further submitted that since the principal issue in this case has to do with employment, assuming without conceding that Relief (viii) of paragraph 28 is outside the jurisdiction of this Court, this Honourable Court is still the proper Court to entertain the said relief which is ancillary to the principal reliefs. See TUKUR V. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) NWLR (PT 117) 517 at 568 Paragraph A-B. The 1st Defendant’s submissions on this issue and the cases cited are just calculated to becloud and befuddle the issues in this case and we urge your lordship to discountenance them and resolve this issue in favour of the Claimant. CONCLUSION: The net-sum of the foregoing submissions is that this Honourable Court is constitutionally imbued with jurisdiction in respect of this case and there is no feature in the case that vitiates that jurisdictional capacity. We consequently urge your lordship to discountenance the submissions of the 1st Defendant for lacking in merit. Having carefully gone through the submissions of counsels to the parties, the Court has distilled a lone issue from those submitted by both counsels for consideration, to wit and ie 1. Whether the Preliminary Objection raised by the Defence counsels ought to be upheld/dismissed. On so doing, a cursory look at the case of the Claimant would show that he only sought Declaratory Reliefs based on the fact that the directive by the 1st and 2nd Defendants for him to proceed on indefinite leave was unconstitutional and ultra vires. He equally sought inter alia, to be reinstated as the Managing Director of the 3rd Defendant. On the issue of Jurisdiction, I agree that in the determination of same, the fact of the case shall be considered in its affect holistically. On non Service of the Originating Processes on the 2nd Defendant, I must say that this is a very deep lacuna in the commencement of an action. However, the Originating Processes later went into the hands of the 2nd Defendant, and he accepted, filed his processes and even allowed, that is did not object to the Claimant amendire his processes, is a situation wherein this Court charged with quick dispensation of justice by completing cases in record time would hold that, having condoned it, the non conformity with the Rules of Court; by the Claimant can now be treated as an irregularity in the interest of Justice: See order 5 rule 1, Rule 3, I rely on it and allow the matter to proceed. 2) The Court notes that from the Originating Processes, the Acts of the Defendant complained by the Claimant were orchestrated before the 24th September, 2014 which the Defendants claims to have been the expiry date of the tenure of the Claimant. It is equally noted that the Claimant filed this suit on 5th March, 2014 and eventually amended it on the 28th November, 2014. The fact that the Claimants case was amended on a later day does not mean that the action as such was and should not be seen as commencing on the date of 1st filing. It is the Law that an amended process dates back to the date of filing, See UBN Plc v Ozaz (2011) 7 NWLR (pt 1246) 293 at 311 – 312 para G – B 3) ISSUE OF CAUSE OF ACTION: Both counsel argued this points (for and against) in extensor. I agree that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction on matters relating to Labour and Trade Union disputes; and or arising from Employer/Employee relationships, their condition of service including health, safety, welfare of labour employee workers and matters incidental thereto or connected there with etc See S254C(1)(A) of the 3rd Alteration Act 2010 and S7(1) of NICN 2006. However, the Claim of the Claimant being Damages relating to issues which arose in the course of his employment with the Defendants, brings this matter within the Jurisdiction of this Court. That objection on the issue of cause of action which is a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more basis for suing, a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in Court from another etc. exists in this case and I so hold. 4) On this case, the Claimants grouse is that the Order mandating him to proceed on indefinite suspension is unconstitutional. All parties are in adidem that the fact that there is a course of action before the Court does not necessarily mean that the case must succeed; I see nothing in the meantime that shows that a claim of an alleged unconstitutional or unreasonable action against the Defendant is not reasonable enough to cloak the Court the firm to try it. Infact at this stage the only thing the Court look out in the determination of cause of action is the stalest facts and reliefs sought. See Dada v Ogunsonye (supra) when the Supreme Court held that “It should however be pointed out that when considering the issues of disclosure of action, it is irrelevant to consider the weakness of Plaintiffs claims as the learned trial Court Judge would appear to have done in this case what is important is to examine the averments in the proceedings and see if they disclose some cause of action or raise some questions fit to be decided by the Judge. See Thomas v Thomas” So I resolve the issue on cause of action in favour of the Claimant 5) Abuse of Court Process To me, the Defendants did not offer any fact to buttress this postulation. The Court finds non and holds as such. Claimant exercising his constitutional right to fair Hearing which the Supreme Court held in CBN v AHMED cannot constitute an abuse of Court Process. The Court shall not consider the other issues argued by counsels in this Application. The Court has held that counsel are actually arguing the substance of this case, which is out of place at this stage, they may fall into error of making the pronouncement on the merit of the case, and not at this stage concern itself on the strength and weakness of the Claimant case. The detailed submissions on this Preliminary Objection would better be done at the Further Written Addresses, whereat the arguments will be apt and apposite. The Preliminary Objection for the above reason fails and is hereby dismissed. He Court orders the commencement of Hearing in this case forthwith. Ruling is entered. ………………………………………… HON. JUSTICE M. N. ESOWE