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This suit was commenced by way of Complaint dated and filed the 8th day of June 2016, wherein the Claimants claimed against the Defendant as follows: 1. The sum of N35,165,984.04 (Thirty-Five Million, One Hundred and Sixty-Five Thousand, Nine Hundred and Eighty-Four Naira, Four Kobo), being unpaid salaries for the months of May 2011 to July 2012, due and payable to the Claimants as Leaders and Members respectively of the Legislative Council of the Defendant, which the Defendant had failed, refused and/or neglected to pay despite repeated demands. 2. The sum of N55,240,198.4 (Fifty-Five Million, Two Hundred and Forty Thousand, One Hundred and Ninety-Eight Naira, Four Kobo), being unpaid furniture, severance and other allowances and entitlements due and payable to the Claimants as Leaders and Members respectively of the Legislative Council of the Defendant, which the Defendant had failed, refused and/or neglected to pay despite repeated demands. 3. Interest on the aforesaid sums at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of judgment until the judgment is liquidated. Accompanying the Complaint and other originating processes, the Claimants on the same day (8th June 2016), filed a Motion on Notice brought pursuant to Order 10 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, wherein they sought an order entering summary judgment for the Claimants against the Defendants for the claims/reliefs endorsed on the complaint and statement of facts (outlined above). The motion was supported by a 17-paragraph affidavit deposed to by the 1st Claimant along with six Exhibits. In the accompanying written address, Learned Counsel for the Claimants adopted one issue for determination, thus: Whether the Claimants/Applicants are entitled to summary judgment. Counsel submitted that Order 10(1) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007 allows a Claimant as in the extant case, who believes that there is no defence to the claim, to file an application for summary judgment supported with an affidavit alongside the originating processes. It is counsel’s submission that the Claimants have shown by affidavit evidence that on 7/8/2010, they were elected as Councillors of the Defendant’s Legislative Councils and were issued with certificates of return issued by the Imo State Independent Electoral Commission. Also, counsel argued that the sums claimed by the Claimants were fixed by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission in discharge of its power provided for in Part 1 (N) of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution (as amended); as indicated in Exhibit C affixed to the supporting affidavit. Similarly, counsel contended that apart from the fact that Exhibit D showed that the Defendant did not deny the Claimants’ entitlement to the said salaries, gratuity and allowances, the Claimants have also shown that the Defendant has failed to honour the monetary demands of the Claimants. It is the opinion of counsel that from the Claimants’ affidavit, the Defendant has no defence to the claim. Counsel drew the court’s attention to the following cases in support of his opinion: 1. AGRO-MILLERS vs. CMB LTD (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt. 525) 469 at 477 2. UBA PLC vs. JARGABA (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1045) 247 at 272 3. FRANCHAL (NIG) LTD vs. NAB LTD (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 412) 176 In conclusion, counsel urged the court to grant the application and enter summary judgment in favour of the Claimants. In opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant filed a counter-affidavit of 10 paragraphs deposed to by Obodozie Edwin a litigation Officer in the Defendant. In the accompanying written address, Learned Counsel for the Defendant distilled one issue for determination, as follows: Whether the Defendant has a defence in this matter. Arguing this issue, Counsel stated that in a summary judgment procedure, the Defendant is only expected to establish that he has a defence in his counter-affidavit. Counsel further submitted that paragraphs 7 to 9 of the counter-affidavit indicates that the Defendant has a good defence to the suit. Counsel relied on the case of EKPEYONG NTEKIM vs. ORON LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2010) NWLR (Pt. 1219) 209 wherein it was held that the court should be wary to enter summary judgment where a defendant has a defence in a case. See also OKPARA vs. GUSAN (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1151) 4. More so, counsel relying on ENYE vs. OGBU (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 828) 403, argued that where indebtedness is in issue, it is contentious and ought not to be recovered under summary judgment. Again, counsel submitted that a perusal of the Claimants’ application and the counter-affidavit reveal that this suit cannot be heard through the summary judgment procedure and the suit is incompetent on the grounds of non-service on the Defendant, and misjoinder of persons. In conclusion, counsel urged the court to discountenance the application of the Claimants and hear this case on its merits. On the 21st day of February 2017, the Defendant filed a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of this Court. The said Preliminary Objection was predicated upon the following grounds: 1. Section 7 of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended guarantees the establishment of the Local Governments thereunder and enjoins states to provide necessary Statute for their creation. 2. That pursuant to that, the Imo State House of Assembly Administration Law was promulgated, which provides and creates Independent Local Governments in every Local Government of Imo State. 3. The election of the Councillors was frustrated by a supervening event beyond the power of the Local Government. 4. The event was not the act of the Local Government, and so the Local Government cannot be responsible for an act beyond her. 5. The Local Government was not served with the processes of Court. 6. The Claimants were not parties to the suit sought to be relied upon. Claimants have applied to be joined at the Apex Court and this suit constitutes an abuse of court process. 7. The Claimants’ action is statute barred having not been brought within six months as prescribed by the Imo State Local Government Administration Law 2000 (as amended), and as such, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. 8. The suit of the Claimants does not raise any cause of action against the Defendant. 9. The action as constituted is incompetent and without of the conditions precedent. The preliminary objection was supported by an affidavit of 7 paragraphs deposed to by Obodozie Edwin. In the accompanying written address, counsel identified the following four issues for determination: a. Whether the suit is statute barred and therefore incompetent, having regard to Section 163 of the Imo State Local Government Administration Law No. 15 of 2000 (as amended). b. Whether this suit as constituted discloses any reasonable cause of action against the defendant. c. Whether the defendant was properly served with the originating processes in this suit. d. Whether this suit as filed is not incompetent and an abuse of the process of this honourable court. Regarding issue one, counsel submitted that what determines whether an action is caught by the limitation period is to determine when the cause of action arose. Counsel relied amongst others, the cases of BAKARE vs. NRC (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 606 and IKEJA HOTELS vs. L.S.B.I.R (2005) 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 343, and argued that the court is enjoined to consider only the Claimants’ averments in the originating processes and pleadings in determining the cause of action. Similarly, counsel argued that a cause of action is statute barred, if the period for commencing proceedings stipulated by the limitation statute has elapsed. See ELABANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 604 at 653 and EGBE vs. ADEFARASIN (NO.2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1. Counsel referred to Section 163 of the Imo State Local Government Administration Law 2000 (as amended), which stipulates that any suit against any local Government shall be commenced within six months after the cause of action arose. Similarly, counsel referred to the cases of AMEDE vs. UBA (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 469) 479 at 506 and GULF OIL LTD vs. OLUBA (2003) FWLR (Pt. 145) 712; and argued that in order for the court to determine whether an action is statute barred, recourse will be had to the writ of summons and statement of claim. In the same vein, counsel submitted that from the Claimants’ averments in paragraphs 9 and 12 of their statement of claim; the cause of action in the extant suit arose in May 2011, when the incumbent Governor dissolved all Local Government Councils in Imo state and the cessation of salaries that would have been earned if the Councils had remained in place. Consequently, counsel pointed out that this suit was filed on July 1, 2016, a period of five years after the cause of action accrued, outside the six months provided for in Section 163 of the Imo State Local Government Administration Law 2000 (as amended). More so, counsel submitted on the strength of the decisions in OKENWA vs. MILITARY GOVERNOR IMO STATE (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) 154 at 167 and ACCORD PARTY vs. GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 555) 220 at 277; that the period of limitation can be calculated without taking evidence from a witness; by looking at the time the cause of action accrued and comparing it to the date the suit was filed. Counsel further submitted that if the time calculated exceeds that prescribed by the Limitation Statute, the case is statute barred. See the cases of ADIGUN vs. AYORINDE (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 313) 516 at 535 and CROSS RIVER UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY vs. OBETEN (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 641) 1567 at 1583. Again, counsel contended that time began to run for the Claimants the moment they became aware of the dissolution of the Local Government Councils in May 2011, and having not brought their action timeously, their action is statute barred and cannot be maintainable in law. Counsel cited the case of CHIEKWEILO vs. NWALI (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 560) 144, and argued that delay defeats equity and that equity does not aid the indolent but the vigilant. Furthermore, counsel urged the court to distinguish between payment of unpaid salaries for work done, and payment for work not done. Similarly, counsel submitted that the Claimants in the extant case are claiming arrears of salaries for work they did not do, because they vacated their offices immediately the Local Government Councils were dissolved without any protest. It is counsel’s submission that the Claimants cannot claim salaries for work they did not do, under the cover of a judgment obtained by other Councils’ Chairmen in a suit that the Claimants were not parties. It is the argument of Counsel that a statute of limitation removes a Claimant’s right of action, enforcement and judicial relief, leaving the Plaintiff with a bare cause of action that cannot be enforced. See ELABANJO vs. DAWODU (supra). Counsel submitted that since the Claimants’ suit is statute barred, the proper order for the court to make at this juncture is a dismissal. In support of this submission, counsel referred to the case of EGBE vs. ADEFARASIN (supra), and Counsel urged the court to resolve issue one in favour of the defendant/applicant and hold that this case is statute barred. With respect to issue two, counsel referred to the case of SPDC vs. FARAH (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 382) amidst others, and contended that a cause of action consists of facts that give rise to the right to file an action, these facts are necessary for the Claimant to prove to support his right to judgment; and they accrue when there is a party to sue and can be sued. Similarly, counsel argued that where there is no factual situation that if proved will entitle the Claimant to judgment, no cause of action has accrued. On this note, counsel submitted that the present case of the Claimants discloses no cause of action against the Defendant, because if all the facts pleaded in the statement of facts are established, this court cannot grant the reliefs sought in the absence of proper parties to the suit. On issue three, counsel’s submission is that the services of court processes affect the jurisdiction of a court to hear a matter, owing to the fact that service on a Defendant is mandatory for a court to be seised with jurisdiction in a case. Also, counsel argued that failure to effect service by the Imo State Local Government Administration Law is an essential defect that renders a proceeding void, giving an affected party the occasion to have it set aside. It is counsel’s contention that service of originating processes is personal, by service by the bailiff or an officer of the court on the party, unless leave for substituted service is granted. See PDP vs ADEYEMI (2002) FWLR (Pt. 84) 55 at 68-9. Counsel submitted further that the failure to serve the Secretary of the Defendant in this extant case, means that there is no proper service, and the present suit discloses no cause of action against the Defendant. Regarding issue four, counsel cited the case of OWNERS OF MV “MIAMI MAIDEN” vs. NPA (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 583) 1945 at 1962, where the Court of Appeal per Saulawa JCA held thus: “Abuse of court process denotes the improper and rather tortuous use of a legitimately used court process to obtain a result either unlawful or beyond the scope of the process itself… …it may occur when a party improperly uses a judicial process to be issued with a view to harassing, irritating and annoying his opponent, thus resulting in misusing and interfering with the administration of law viz-a-viz the rule of law”. See also OLUWANIYI vs. BWALA (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 565) 336. Counsel argued that the Claimants’ action is an abuse of court process for the reason that the Claimants are seeking to use this action to obtain a back-door remedy against the Defendant, having not challenged the dissolution of the Local Government Councils within the time prescribed by law. Most of counsel’s arguments on this point are a rehash of the arguments he put forward in advancing his issue one and do not need to be repeated again. However, counsel added the reasoning that a judgment does not bind persons who are not parties to it, and the courts do not act in vain. See A. G. FEDERATION vs. ANPP (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 182 at 211 and P. N. UDDOH TRADING COMPANY vs. ABERE (2001) FWLR (Pt. 57) 900. Consequently, counsel submitted that the judgment exhibited by the Claimants cannot bind the Defendant because she was not a party to the suit that produced it. Furthermore, counsel submitted that the Claimants’ suit is incompetent because it does not bear the stamp of the legal practitioner who signed it, in line with Rule 10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 2007. See YAKI vs. BAGUDU (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1491) 288. Counsel argued that the Claimants Counsel’s act in the extant case of affixing an expired stamp on his processes amounts to professional misconduct. In conclusion, counsel urged the court to resolve the issues in this objection in the Defendant’s favour and dismiss this case for being statute barred. On 2/5/2017, the Claimants in opposition to the Defendant’s Preliminary Objection filed a counter affidavit of eight paragraphs deposed to by Kalu Uduma, a legal practitioner in the Claimants counsel’s law office. In the accompanying written address, counsel framed four issues similar to the issues raised by the Defendant’s counsel in his address in support of the preliminary objection as follows: 1. Whether having regard to the complaint and statement of facts the suit is statute barred 2. Whether the Claimants’ action discloses any reasonable cause of action. 3. Whether this suit constitutes an abuse of court process. 4. Whether the Defendant was served with the originating processes in this suit. Regarding issue one, Learned Counsel for the Claimants submitted that Section 163 of the Imo State Local Government Administration Law is not absolute but protects only the Local Government or persons acting within the limits of lawful authority, and does not avail in situations where persons within its contemplation act unlawfully or in bad faith, or abuse of office. Counsel relied on the decisions in HASSAN vs. ALIYU (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547 at 621 and IBRAHIM vs. JSC KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 at 32 in support of his contentions. Further, counsel contended that in Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Statement of Facts, the Claimants averred that they served as members of the Defendant’s legislative Council between 2010 and 2012, that the Defendants failed to pay their salaries and allowances as fixed by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission. Also, counsel argued that the act of failing to pay the Claimants’ entitlements as fixed by a constitutional body cannot be said to be an act in execution of a public duty or authority. Thus, it is counsel’s view that the act of the Defendant in this regard is unconstitutional, and takes away the protection of Section 163 of the Imo State Local Government Administration Law because it is not the intention of the legislature that this law will be used as a tool by the Local Government to evade their financial obligation, or to liquidate legitimate debt. Similarly, counsel argued that a limitation law does not operate in cases bordering on recovery of land, breach of contract, or claims for work done. See FBN vs. ZEBRA ENERGY LIMITED (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 162 at 196-8 and OSUN STATE vs. DALAMI NIGERIA LTD (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 66. At this point, counsel referred the court to the rulings delivered by this court on 19/12/2013 in OWOBE & ORS vs. IKWUANO LOCAL GOVERNMENT (unreported) suit no: NICN/EN/18/2013, AMADI CLINTON & ORS v IMO STATE GOVERNMENT, Suit no: NICN/OW/03/2015 delivered on 24/5/2016, where the court held that claims for salaries and allowances relating to work done are not affected by limitation laws, i.e. Section 114 of the Abia State Local Government Law and Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act respectively. Consequently, counsel argued that the extant case involves entitlements for work and labour done as legislators, and same are not statute barred by the operation of Section 163 of the Imo State Local Government Administration Law. With respect to issue two, counsel submitted that a reasonable cause of action means a bundle or aggregate of facts which the law recognises as giving the Claimant substantive right to make the claim for reliefs; which if established entitles him/her to judicial relief. See UNIJOS vs. IKEGWUOHA (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1360) 478. Counsel further submitted that from the complaint and statement of facts, which the court examines to determine if there is a cause of action is disclosed, the Claimants have clearly set out their substantive right to make a claim and obtain judicial remedy as required by UNIJOS vs. IKEGWUOHA (supra). It is counsel’s contention that since the statement of facts in this case discloses triable issues, it has disclosed a reasonable cause of action; regardless of whether the case set out is weak or unlikely to succeed. See A. G. FEDERATION vs. A. G. ABIA STATE (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 689. Counsel urged the Court to hold that this suit discloses a reasonable cause of action. On issue three, counsel cited the case of UTIH vs. OROBOKO (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 434) 36, and submitted that an abuse of court process exists when a party improperly uses the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent, such as instituting multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter, against the same opponent. Again, counsel argued that the subject matter of this suit is unpaid salaries and entitlements due to the Claimants, which fall in the purview of the jurisdiction of this court as established by the Constitution. It is the submission of counsel that the claim of the Claimants is not about the illegal dissolution of Local Government Councils but for unpaid entitlements. Another argument that counsel put forward considered the deposition of the Defendant in paragraph 4(1) (m) and (n) of the supporting affidavit to the Defendant’s objection; to be in support of the fact that this case is entirely different from the suit in Appeal no: CA/OW/215/2011, and cannot be an abuse of court process. In the same vein, counsel cited the case of DINGYADI vs. INEC (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 347, and submitted that for a suit to constitute an abuse of court process, the parties and subject matter in the previous suit and current suit must be the same. Arguing issue four, counsel submitted that the originating processes in this suit were duly served on the Defendant by the bailiff of this court as evinced by the proof of service affidavit in the court’s file, in compliance with both Section 165 of the Imo State Local Government Administration Law and Order 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007. Furthermore, counsel argued that in the event of irregular service, the Defendant has waived the right to object, because further steps have been taken by filing an extension to file a defence, and the Defendant’s counsel moved the said motion which was granted. It is the opinion of counsel that the court is the custodian of its record and any mistake on the part of the bailiff in effecting service should not be visited on the Claimants. In conclusion, counsel urged the court to hold that the preliminary objection lacks merit and dismiss same. COURT’S DECISION Having heard the submissions of counsels in respect of the applications, let me first examine the Defendant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection. The various grounds of the Preliminary Objection are these: 1. The Defendant was not served with the processes in this suit. 2. The Claimants were not parties to the suit they are relying on, and the extant case constitutes an abuse of court process. 3. The Claimants’ action is statute barred having not been brought within the six months as prescribed by the Imo State Local Government Administration Law 2000 (as amended) and this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. 4. The Claimants’ suit does not raise any cause of action against the Defendant and the action is incompetent because it failed to fulfill certain conditions precedent. 5. None sealing of the originating process with the current NBA stamp of the Claimant’s counsel. In the affidavit filed in support of the Preliminary Objection, it was deposed that the Claimants’ cause of action in this suit is the dissolution of the Local Government Councils by the Governor of Imo State in May 2011. Pursuant to the power granted to states under the Constitution to make laws for the administration of Local Governments, the Imo State Government promulgated the Imo State Local Government Administration Law. The Local Government Councils in Imo State were dissolved by the Imo State Government vide an Executive Act under a Law made by the Imo State House of Assembly. The election of the Claimants as councilors of their Local Government Councils was frustrated by the dissolution of the Councils which event was not the fault of the Defendant. The then Chairmen of the 27 Local Government Councils of Imo State challenged the dissolution of the Councils in Court and lost at the lower court but their appeal to the Court of Appeal was upheld. The Respondents in the Appeal further appealed to the Supreme Court which appeal in still pending. Any decision taken by this court in this matter will pre-empt the decision of the Supreme Court. The Claimants were not parties to the suit neither was the suit instituted in representative capacity. The Defendant was also not a party to the suit. The subject matter of that suit is also different from the subject matter in this suit. The Claimants have filed an application before the Supreme Court to be joined in the appeal. Until the Supreme Court determines the appeal, any action based on the judgment relied upon by the Claimants is premature. The instant suit of the Claimants is statute barred. The suit was filed on 1st July 2016 after 4 years since the dissolution of the Local Government Council by the Governor of Imo State. It was also averred that the suit constitutes an abuse of court process; the Claimants have no reasonable cause of action against the Defendant and the suit was brought to annoy the Defendant. It was further deposed that the Defendant was not served the originating processes in the manner required by Law. The suit is incompetent and the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. The affidavit also contains that counsel who signed the originating process did not affix a current NBA stamp but an expired one. In the counter affidavit of the Claimants, paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Defendant’s affidavit were denied and in response by way of facts, it was averred that the suit is not statute barred because it is a simple debt recovery matter. The Defendant has not denied owing the Claimants their entitlements and has not shown it has paid the Claimants. The Claimants thus have a reasonable cause of action against the Defendant. The issues formulated by the Defendant’s counsel in the written address in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection cover all the grounds of the Preliminary Objection. I will therefore adopt those issues in determining the Preliminary Objection. The issues are: 1. Whether the suit is statute barred and therefore incompetent having regard to Section 163 of the Imo State Local Government Administration Law No. 15 of 2000 (as amended). 2. Whether this suit as constituted discloses any reasonable cause of action against the Defendant. 3. Whether the Defendant was properly served with the originating processes in this suit. 4. Whether this suit as filed is incompetent and an abuse of the process of this honourable court. Let me quickly point out that the issue of the failure of the Claimants’ counsel to affix current NBA stamp to the processes has been resolved in court on 23/6/2017. After hearing the application of the Claimant’s counsel for leave to affix the current stamp to the processes, leave was granted and the stamp was accordingly affixed to the processes. ISSUE 1: The defendant contended in the NPO that the claimants’ suit is statute barred by the effect of Section 163 of the Imo State Local Government Administration Law 2000 (as amended). The said section of the Law limited the time within which action can be commenced against a Local Government. It provides that no action can be commenced against a Local Government for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Law, duty or authority unless it is commenced within 6 months after the act, or neglect or default complained of. The implication of the provision is that where the suit is not commenced within the prescribed period, the Claimants’ right of action in respect of that cause will be statute barred and the court will no longer have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The claims of the Claimants are for salaries from May 2011 to July 2012 and other allowances they were entitled as former Councilors of the Defendant Local Government. In other words, their claim is for outstanding entitlements during their term as councilors. It is now settled that claims for money owed for work done are not affected by limitation statute. This court had made this pronouncement in cases similar to this one. See the rulings of this court in suit no: NICN/EN/18/2013: OWOBE & ORS vs. IKWUANO LOCAL GOVERNMENT delivered on 19/12/2013; Suit no: NICN/OW/03/2015: AMADI CLINTON & ORS vs. IMO STATE GOVERNMENT delivered on 24/5/2016. In my view, the claims of the Claimants fall outside the purview of Section163 of the Imo State Local Government Administration Law 2000. I will therefore not dissipate energy on this ground of the objection but to dismiss it. ISSUE 2: The Defendant contended in the Preliminary Objection that this suit does not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the Defendant. This does not appear to be so; after a thorough look at the facts of the Claimants’ case. The Claimants’ claim against the Defendant is for their unpaid salaries and allowances. Their case is that they were elected Councilors of the Defendant for two years tenure and their salaries and allowances were fixed by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission. However, the Defendant did not pay them their furniture, severance and other allowances in addition to their salaries from May 2011 to July 2012. From the facts, a cause of action is disclosed against the Defendant which entitles the Claimants to sue the Defendant. Whether the cause of action is reasonable or likely to succeed can only be discovered during the determination of the case but not at this stage. This ground of the Preliminary Objection also fails. ISSUE 3: In the affidavit in support of the Preliminary Objection, it was deposed that the Defendant was not served the originating processes in the manner required by Law. The Defendant’s counsel argued that the originating process ought to have been served on the secretary of the Defendant but in this case, it was served on another person by the bailiff of this court. It is trite that the purpose of service of court process is to bring the proceedings to the notice of the party to be served. Although the Defendant alleged that it was not properly served, yet it was aware of the suit such that it entered appearance in the suit, filed a defence and took other steps in the proceedings. The Defendant is deemed to have waived any irregularity arising from service of the originating process. In any case, this court does not dwell on such technical issues as being canvassed by the Defendant. I will therefore dismiss this ground of the objection also. ISSUE 4: Another ground of the Defendant’s Preliminary Objection is that the Claimants’ suit is an abuse of court process. Upon examining the facts and circumstances of the suit, I cannot find any element of abuse of court process in the suit filed by the Claimants. Abuse of court process occurs when there is multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter between the same parties or instituting different actions between same parties simultaneously in different courts. See OPEKUN vs. SADIQ (2003) FWLR (Pt. 150) 1654 at 1661, A.R.C vs. J.D.P CONSTRUCTION NIG. LTD (2003) FWLR (Pt. 153) 251 at 270. The reason advanced by the Defendant for alleging that this suit is an abuse of court process is perhaps the allegation in the affidavit in support of the Preliminary Objection that there is a pending appeal No. SC/537/2016 in the Supreme Court in respect of Appeal No. CA/OW/215/2011 and the Claimants have filed an application before the Supreme Court to be joined in the appeal. First of all, the Defendant did not exhibit the certified copies of the processes filed in the Supreme Court or the application of the Claimants in the Supreme Court to join the appeal. There is nothing to convince me in this application that there was appeal to Supreme Court or that the Claimants filed an application in the Supreme Court to be joined in the appeal. Secondly, it was deposed in the Defendants’ affidavit in support of the Preliminary Objection that the Claimants were not parties to the suit neither was the suit instituted in a representative capacity. The Defendant was also not a party to the suit. The subject matter of that suit is also different from the subject matter in this suit. These depositions of the Defendant show clearly that the subject matter of this suit and the parties are not the same with that in Appeal no: CA/OW/215/2011. This is a clear indication that this suit is different from the Suit in Appeal no: CA/OW/215/2011. The Defendant’s counsel argued that this suit is an abuse of court process because the Claimants are seeking to use this action to obtain a remedy against the Defendant after they failed to challenge the dissolution of the Local Government Councils within the time prescribed by law. I do not agree with that view. The claim of the Claimants in this suit is for their unpaid salaries and entitlements and not about the dissolution of the Local Government Councils. This court does not have jurisdiction on matters concerning dissolution of Local Government Councils but it has exclusive jurisdiction on the nature of claim sought by the Claimants. Therefore, this court is the appropriate and the only court to entertain the case of the Claimants. The fact that the Claimants did not challenge the dissolution of the Councils does not prevent them from suing to claim unpaid entitlement nor does it render their suit for payment of entitlements an abuse of court process. I also find no merit in this ground of the Preliminary Objection. In the result, I find no merit in the Defendant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection and it is hereby dismissed. I will now turn to the Claimants’ motion for summary judgment. The Claimants, in their motion for summary judgment prays this court to enter summary judgment against the Defendants for the following claims: 1. The sum of N35,165,984 being unpaid salaries for the months of May 2011 to July 2012, due and payable to the Claimants as Leaders and Members respectively of the Legislative Council of the Defendant 2. The sum of N55, 240,198 being unpaid furniture, severance and other allowances and entitlements; due and payable to the Claimants as Leaders and Members respectively of the Legislative Council of the Defendant, 3. Interest on the aforesaid sums at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of judgment until the judgment is liquidated. Order 16 Rule 1 of the Rules of this Court 2017 permits a Claimant who believes there is no defence to the claim to bring an application for summary judgment. However, it is provided in Rule 5 (1) and (2) of Order 16 that where a Defendant has filed a defence and counter affidavit to the application and it appears to the court therefore that the Defendant has a good defence and ought to be permitted to defend the claim, he may be granted leave to defend but where it does not appear to the court that there is a good defence, the court may thereupon enter judgment for the Claimant. I have read the affidavit and counter affidavit of the parties in respect of the motion and I find there are issues which ought to be resolved by oral evidence of witnesses if justice is to be done between the parties in this matter. I am of the view that the Defendant ought to be permitted to defend the suit. Therefore, I think this case is a proper one to go to trial. The Defendant is accordingly granted leave to defend the claim. Consequently, the application for summary judgment is dismissed. Since the parties have already filed their pleadings and their witnesses’ statements on oath, this matter will be adjourned for hearing. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge