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This action was commenced by complaint dated 20th April 2016 & filed 22nd April 2016 wherein the Claimant claimed as follows: a. A Declaration that the stoppage/suspension of the Claimant’s salary by the Defendant through the actions of Mr Ado Yahuza (Director of Human Resources) is unlawful null and void. b. An order voiding and invalidating all the actions of the Defendant and/or Mr Ado Yahuza (Director of Human Resources) touching on and affecting the salary of the Claimant c. An order directing the Defendant to forthwith pay all the outstanding salaries and allowances of the Claimant. By a notice of preliminary objection brought under Section 6 (6) (b), Section 254 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended); Order 17 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 and under the inherent jurisdiction of this honourable court, the Defendant prayed this court for an order dismissing the Claimant's suit on the ground the action is statute barred. The particulars of the ground are that: 1. The actions or proceedings against public/civil servant are regulated by the Public Officers Protection Act 2. The Public Officers Protection Act provides that action against public servant must be commenced within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action. 3. The Claimant in this suit did not institute this suit until after 6 months after the accrual of the cause of action. 4. The right of action of the Claimant has been extinguished by operation of law. The notice of preliminary objection was accompanied with a written address of the counsel for the Defendant, Mr. A. A. Rufai Esq wherein learned counsel formulated a sole issue for determination. The issue is: Whether the Claimant can validly institute this suit after the expiration of the time prescribed by law to do so? Leaned counsel submitted, on this issue, that an action is said to be statute-barred when it is filed after the expiration of the period limited by the relevant statute within which it must be filed. This period of limitation is usually computed from the date the cause of action arose or when specifically provided for in the statute itself. Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act POPA was referred to, and its provision was set out in extenso by learned counsel for the Defendant. Counsel also cited a number of cases on the point that statute of limitation prescribes a period within an action must be brought. An action commenced after the expiration of the period within which an action must be brought as stipulated in a statute of limitation is statute barred and not maintainable, and a plaintiff who might have had a cause of action loses the right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the limitation law for instituting such action has elapsed. See SULE vs. KABIRU (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1232) 504; PLATEAU CONSTRUCTION LIMITED vs. AWARE (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt.1404) 519; PEACEGATE OIL AND GAS LIMITED vs. HYDRIVE (NIG.) LTD. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt.1329) 391; A. G. ADAMAWA STATE vs. A.G. FEDERATION (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1428) 515. Counsel submitted further that where a party's action is statute barred, the following legal consequences will follow: (a) the party would lose his right of action; (b) the party would lose the right of enforcement; (c) the party would also irretrievably lose the right to judicial relief; and (d) the party would only have an empty cause of action which no court will assist him to enforce. Counsel referred to Section 4 (1) of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act, which defines public officer to mean any person who holds or has held any office on or after 31st December, 1983 in- (a) The public service of the Federation or of a State within the meaning assigned thereto by Section 277 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; (b) The service of a body whether corporate or unincorporated established under a Federal or State Law; (c) A company in which any of the Government in the Federation has a controlling interest. It was further submitted that the Defendant is an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria. Its actions are covered by the Public Officers’ Protection Act. As pleaded in paragraph 14 of the statement of facts, the Claimant’s monthly salary was stopped sometime in November 2015 which was the time the cause of action arose. The Claimant however filed this suit One year and Three months after the accrual of the cause of action. The cause of action of the Claimant has been taken away by the limitation law after the expiration of the time prescribed by law for filing of this action against the Defendant. This action is statute-barred and it robs the court of jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The Claimant’s counsel filed a written address to oppose the Notice of Preliminary Objection of the Defendant. Learned counsel for the Claimant, Mr. Max Ogar Esq., submitted the following 2 issues for determination in the NPO: 1. Whether the Claimant/Respondent's suit is competent? 2. Whether this Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this suit as constituted by the Claimant/Respondent? Counsel’s arguments on issue 1 are that the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act and the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act do not constitute any impediment to the Claimant’s suit because these statutes did not impose any time limit on suits against government agencies such as the Defendant. Section 4 (1) of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act defined who a Public Officer is but the definition does not include a government agency. The Act expressly referred to a Public or Civil servant. Similarly, counsel submitted, section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act bars action against "PERSON" of which the defendant in this suit does not fall into. Counsel then argued that the limitation provisions in these enactments are with respect to suit filed against Public or Civil servants who are employees of the defendant. There is no time limit in the enactments within which an action can be bought against the defendant. Therefore, the provisions of the said sections cannot be expanded beyond the intent of the Legislature, counsel stated. Counsel added that the words of the provisions of the sections above are clear and unambiguous and should be given their plain, ordinary, grammatical meaning without qualification. The case of OWENA BANK NIGERIA PLC vs. N.S.E. LIMITED (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt.515) 1 was cited on this point. Counsel further submitted that in the case Sections 4 (1) of the Public Officers (Special) provisions) Act and Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act apply, the right of the Claimant has not been extinguished in that the stoppage of his salary is still active and perpetuated wrongly up till date. On issue 2, learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that by virtue of Section 6 (6) (b) and Section 254 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) this court has the jurisdiction to entertain, hear and determine the suit. Counsel went further that the subject matter of the suit falls within this Court's jurisdiction, the court is also duly composed and the case was initiated following the due process of law. In addition, there is no feature in the case that can be considered a virus. Counsel relied on MADUKOLU vs. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 All NLR and submitted that there is nothing on record depriving this court of the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The court was urged by counsel to dismiss the NPO. COURT’S DECISION From the grounds and particulars of the NPO and the submissions of counsel for the Defendant in the written address in support of the NPO, the objection of the Defendant is premised on the provision of Section 2 (a) of POPA. Therefore, the issue to be determined in this NPO is whether the Claimant’s suit is statute barred. The Claimant’s counsel appeared to have misconceived the statute of limitation which the Defendant relied on in this NPO. The Claimant’s counsel referred to Section 4 (1) of the Public Officers (Special provisions) Act and argued that the provision was taken out of context by the Defendant’s counsel, as the Claimant’s suit is not statute barred under this Act. In his submissions in the written address in support of the NPO, the Defendant’s counsel cited Section 4 (1) of the Public Officers (Special Provisions) Act with respect to the definition of public officer in the section. The section is not a limitation provision neither was there any submission by the Defendant’s counsel to the effect that the Claimant’s suit is barred under the section. It is clear to me that counsel for the Defendant cited the section for the purpose of definition of a public officer and not for the purpose of canvassing that the Claimant’s suit is statute barred under the section. The only limitation provision relied on by the Defendant in this NPO is Section 2 (a) of POPA. The provision of section 2 (a) of POPA is as follows: “2. Where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provision shall have effect: (a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.” The implication of the above provisions is that an action against a public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or law or of public duty or any default in respect of same can only be commenced within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action except in the case of continuance of the damage or injury in which the Claimant must institute the action within 3 months after the cessation of the damage or injury. Where the suit is not commenced within the prescribed period, the Claimant’s right of action in respect of that cause will be statute barred and the court will not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C, KADUNA STATE (1998) 12 SC 20; EGBE vs. ALHAJI (1990) 3 S.C (Pt.1) 63. In PEACEGATE OIL AND GAS LIMITED vs. HYDRIVE (NIG.) LTD. (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1329) at 391. The Court held: "limitation of action is the principle of law which requires a plaintiff as a matter of obligation to seek prompt remedy for breach of his right in a court of law within the time limited by the law, otherwise his right of action or cause of action becomes unenforceable at the expiration of the period allowed for commencing an action by the law. Where a statute provides for the commencement of an action within a giving time or a period, no proceedings can be commenced after the period prescribed by the statute has elapsed. Any action instituted after the period is statute barred and the right of the plaintiff to commence an action is extinguished by operation of law" The Defendant’s contention in the NPO is that the Claimant filed this suit against the Defendant, who is a public officer, outside 3 months from the date her cause of action arose. According to the Defendant’s counsel, the Claimant’s cause of action arose in November 2015 when her salary was stopped but she filed this suit on 22nd April 2016 which is a period of 1 year and 3 months from the time her cause of action arose. It was the Defendant’s case that the suit is statute barred. In response, the Claimant’s counsel did not specifically deny the allegation that the Claimant filed the suit out of time. The contention of the Claimant’s counsel is that POPA does not apply to the Defendant. To counsel, the Defendant is not a “person” referred to in Section 2 (a) of POPA and it is not a public or civil servant. If I understand the Claimant’s counsel well, what he is simply asserting is that Section 2 (a) of POPA applies only to suits against individuals in the public or civil service but does not apply to government agencies or artificial entities like the Defendant. The instant point being canvassed by the Claimant’s counsel has been addressed and settled in several judicial decisions by the superior courts. The issue of who is a “public officer” or “any person” referred to in Section 2 (a) POPA came up before the Supreme Court in IBRAHIM vs. JSC, KADUNA STATE (supra) and the court extensively defined the term to include persons occupying public offices or artificial bodies invested with performance of duties of a public nature. Agencies of the Federal or State Governments come within the latter category and they are entitled to the protection envisaged and contemplated by the Public Officers Protection Act. In NWAOGWUGWU vs. PRESIDENT, F.R.N (2007) 1 All FWLR (Pt. 389) 1327 the term “any person” as used in POPA was explained thus: ''Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act Cap 379 Laws of the Federation Act 1990, is meant to protect any person. Any person in this context covers both natural and artificial person. The words are therefore not limited to natural persons or human beings or to persons sued in their personal names. The words therefore cover official persons, public bodies or body of persons, corporate or incorporate as well as statutory bodies whether sued in their official titles or not as long as they are sued in respect of acts done in pursuance or execution of any law, public duty or authority.” See also OFILI vs. C.S.C. (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 238. It is therefore clear from the authorities that the words “any person” referred to in Section 2 (a) of POPA or the terms “public officer” refer to natural or official persons, public bodies, corporate or incorporate bodies as well as statutory bodies. It is now obvious that the Claimant’s counsel interpreted the words to mean a person in a limited sense when counsel stated that they refer only to natural persons or human beings. Let me also add that Section 18 (1) of the Interpretation Act 2004 defines a Public Officer to mean: “A member of the public service of the Federation within the meaning of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 or of the Public Service of a State". In view of the foregoing, it is apt to mention that the Defendant is established in Section 1 of National Council for Arts and Culture Act 2004 as a body corporate. It is to perform functions of a public nature as an agency of the Federal Government and in the public service of the Federation. It is thus an artificial person and a public officer within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of POPA. I hold that the Defendant comes within the persons covered in Section 2 (a) POPA. Therefore, contrary to the contention of the Claimant’s counsel, Section 2 (a) of POPA has limited the time within which an action is to be instituted against the Defendant. It is 3 months from the date the cause of action arose. The question now is whether the Claimant commenced this action within 3 months from the date her cause of action arose. The Claimant’s claims in this action are: a. A declaration that the stoppage/suspension of the Claimant’s salary by the Defendant through the actions of Mr. Ado Yahuza (Director of Human Resources) is unlawful, null and void b. An order voiding and invalidating all the actions of the Defendants and/or Mr. Ado Yahuza (Director of Human Resources) touching on and affecting the salary of the Claimant. c. An order directing the Defendant to forthwith pay all the outstanding salaries and allowances of the Claimant. It is clear from these reliefs that the Claimant’s cause of action in this suit was the stoppage of her salary. In paragraphs 14, 16 and 17 of the statement of facts, the Claimant pleaded that she was not paid salary in November 2015 and in December 2015 she was informed by staff of the account unit of the Defendant that a confirmation from the from the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation indicated that the Claimant’s salary has been suspended. When the Claimant received this information, she met Mr. Ado Yahuza who confirmed to her that her salary was suspended on the decision of the committee investigating the Claimant for an allegation made against her. These facts reveal that the stoppage of the Claimant’s salary happened in November 2015. In December 2015, the Claimant became aware that her salary was stopped officially from the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation. Upon that information received in December 2015, the Claimant’s cause of action accrued. From that moment, the Claimant’s cause of action in respect of the reliefs she sought in this action against the Defendant had arisen and the time started counting against her from the particular day. The record of this suit reveals that the Claimant filed this suit on 22nd April 2016. From the time the Claimants’ cause of action arose and time this suit was filed is a period of 4 months. The Claimant did not file this suit within the 3 months period limited in Section 2 (a) of POPA within which to file this suit against the Defendant. I find that the suit is statute barred. When an action is statute-barred, it connotes that the Claimant might have a cause of action but loses the right to enforce the cause of action by judicial process because the period of time laid down by the limitation law for instituting such action has elapsed. This action becomes unmaintainable. See A. G. ADAMAWA STATE vs. A.G., FEDERATION (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1428) 515. This court therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Claimant’s case. The suit is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge