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By an Order of transfer by the Chief Judge of Imo State on 17/3/2014, this suit was transferred to this court. It was initially filed in the Imo State High Court on 14/4/2011. In their amended statement of facts, the Claimants, 135 of them in number, sought the following reliefs from the court- a. A declaration that the dissolution of the Claimants as the chairmen and members of the five-man Entraco committee for each of the 27 local government areas of Imo State by a radio announcement and the subsequent locking out of the Claimants from their respective offices at each of the Local Government Areas of the state by the Defendants is wrongful and degrading. b. The sum of Twelve Million Naira being total remuneration owed to each of the Claimants as Chairmen and Members of the five man Entraco committee for each of the 27 Local Government Areas of Imo State from March 2008 to August, 2010. c. Three Million and Seven Hundred Thousand Naira being general damages for the wrongful and degrading termination of the Claimant's appointment. The Defendants filed a joint statement of defence where they urged the court to dismiss the suit of the Claimants. After close of pleadings, hearing commenced in the matter on 22/6/2016. Two witnesses testified for the Claimants. These witnesses are the 1st and 120th Claimants respectively. While the Defendants called one witness. The Claimants’ case is that they were appointed in March 2008 by the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants as the Five Man, Imo State Environmental Transformation Commission (ENTRACO) Committee for each of the Twenty Seven (27) Local Government Area of Imo State. While the 1st to 27th Claimants were appointed Chairmen of the 27 Committees, the 28th to 135th Claimants were appointed members of the Committees on remuneration not lower than that of a Supervisory Councilor of a Local Government. On their inauguration, the Claimants were informed by the Defendants that the ENTRACO Bill has been sent to the State House of Assembly for enactment. In a copy shown to the Claimants, their appointment and remuneration were covered in the Bill. The Claimants started work after their inauguration, but on 12th May 2008, the 1st to 27th Claimants were given their letters of appointment as chairmen of the ENTRACO Committees but the 28th to 135th Claimants, being members of the ENTRACO committees were told to await their appointment letters. The ENTRACO Law was passed and signed into law on 11th August 2008. The appointments of the Claimants were protected in the Law, which law also prescribed the remuneration of the Claimants. The remuneration of a Supervisory Councilor in a Local Government in Imo State are monthly salary of N200,000.00, furniture allowance of N2,400,000.00, and severance allowance of N3,600,000.00. The remuneration of the Claimants is stated in Section 3 (4) of the ENTRACO Law and captured in the Revised Remuneration for Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders in Imo State. The Claimants continued to discharge their duties as members of the ENTRACO Committee for each of the 27 Local Government Area of Imo State but the Defendants refused to pay them their salaries and other entitlements. Based on the assurances of the 5th Defendant that their salaries and allowances will be paid, the Claimants continued to discharge their duties without being paid. Although the 1st Defendant directed the Local Government Chairmen to disburse the sum of N500,000.00 for monthly clean up exercise using the ENTRACO Committees in a letter dated 9th May 2008, the Claimants averred that the fund which was accordingly disbursed, was not in any way connected to the Claimants salaries. After waiting for 25 months without salaries, the Claimants wrote a letter to the 1st Defendant on 9th April 2010 to demand payment of their salaries. In August 2010, while the Claimants awaited payment of their salaries as promised, they heard through a radio announcement that the ENTRACO Committees have been dissolved. The Defendants further locked the Claimants out of their respective offices in the 27 Local Government Areas of the State and prevented the Claimants from having access to their offices. Following this development, the Claimants complained to the 1st Defendant and the House of Assembly in letters dated 3rd September 2010 and 8th October 2010 about non-payment of their salaries and wrongful dissolution of the committees. When the demands of the Claimants for their salaries were not still met, they, through their solicitor, gave a month’s pre-action notice to the Defendants. The Claimants aver that they worked for 30 months and the salary, furniture allowance and severance allowance of each of them is the sum of N12,000,000.00 (Twelve Million Naira). The total sum for all the Claimants is the sum of N1,620,000,000.00 (One Billion, Six Hundred and Twenty Million Naira). The defence of the Defendants is that the Claimants were appointed as members of the 5-Man ENTRACO Committee for the Local Government Areas of Imo State but they were not promised to be paid salaries nor did the Defendants tell the Claimants that their salaries will be equivalent to that of a supervisory counselor in the Local Government. Only the Chairmen of the Committees were given appointment letters. The 4 other members of the committees were not given appointment letters and none was promised to them. Although the appointment letters of the Claimants stated that their allowances will be made known to them, the sum of the allowances was never eventually made known to the Claimants. The appointment letters did not state that the Claimants are entitled to furniture or severance allowance. The Claimants were not promised monthly salary of N200,000.00, neither were they public or judicial officers as to be entitled to furniture and severance allowances. The Claimants were appointed as adhoc or taskforce staff of their respective Local Governments. The Claimants can be disbanded at any time. While they operated, the Claimants were unruly in the performance of their duties. This resulted in the disbandment of the Committees. At the time of their appointment, there was no instrument or law backing up the appointments. The appointments of the Claimants were illegal and void. The Claimants were appointed for their respective Local Government. As such, their allowance was the responsibility of their Local Governments in which they operated. The State Government gave the Local Government Councils N500,000.00 grant for each ENTRACO Committee member as arrears of salary for the Committee members. The Claimants’ appointments were temporary for the specific purpose of environmental sanitation within the Local Government. They had the same condition of service with Local Government Vigilante Group and they were paid accordingly. I observed that the basis of the Claimants’ suit against the Defendants and their claim in the suit is the provisions of the Imo State ENTRACO Law. Their case is that their appointment and remuneration were covered and protected in the ENTRACO Law which Law also prescribed the remuneration of the Claimants. They pleaded that their remuneration is stated in Section 3(4) of the ENTRACO Law and captured in the Revised Remuneration for Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders in Imo State. It is also observed that the 4th and 5th Defendants in this suit are the Commission established by the Law and the General Manager of the Commission respectively. While writing the judgment in this suit, Section 61 of the Imo State Environmental Transformation Commission Law No.3 of 2008 caught my attention. Subsection (2) of Section 61 of the Law provides as follows: (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment, no suit against the member of the Board, the General Manager, any officer or employee of the Commission done in pursuance or execution of this law or any other law in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this law or any other enactment or law shall lie or be instituted in any court unless it is commenced- (a) Within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or (b) In the case of continuation of damage or injury, within six months next after the ceasing thereof. It was in view of this provision of the Law in light of the case of the Claimants that the court, on the 7th day of July 2017, suo motu raised the issue whether or not the suit of the Claimants is maintainable, and asked counsels to the parties to address the court on the issue. In the address filed by the Claimants’ counsel on 13/7/2017, learned counsel cleverly avoided dealing with the issue raised by this court for address by counsels. The learned counsel for the Claimants rather went on to argue that the Defendants did not plead limitation statute, as such, they are deemed to have waived the defence and also, that this court is precluded from raising the issue of limitation suo motu. On the other hand, the Defendants’ counsel, in his address filed on 14/7/2017, submitted that the suit of the Claimants’ is statute barred because from the period their cause of action commenced and the time they filed this action was more than 3 months. In determining the issue whether Section 61(2) ENTRACO Law affected the Claimants suit, I will address some of the points canvassed by the counsel to the Claimants in his address. The Claimants counsel submitted that Defendants did not anytime raise or rely on the defence of Limitation of action nor did they plead same as required in Order 30 Rules 8(1) and (2) of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2017. The Defendants are deemed to have waived the defence of Limitation of action neither can it be raised for them by this court. One of the determinants of jurisdiction of a court is when the case comes before the court initiated by due process and upon fulfilling any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See MADUKOLU vs. NKEMDILIM (1962) All NLR (Pt.4) 587; P.T.F vs. FSB INT’L BANK PLC (2008) All FWLR (Pt.399) 496. Where such conditions precedent is not met, the case before the court is not competent and the jurisdiction of the court has not been validly invoked. A statute limiting a period within which an action must be commenced not only goes to the competence of the suit but also touches on the jurisdiction of the court to entertain such suit. Therefore, where a suit is filed outside the statutory period, the suit is incompetent and robs the court of jurisdiction or competence to entertain the suit. It goes to the root of the matter as the case did not come before the court upon fulfilling the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. It is thus trite that limitation of action is a matter that affects the jurisdiction of a court to entertain the matter. See NASIR vs. C.S.C, KANO STATE (2010) All FWLR (Pt.515) 195 at 207; FRIN vs. GOLD (2007) All FWLR (Pt.380) 1444. Now, the issue of limitation of action being an issue of jurisdiction, can it be waived by the parties? I think not. It is now settled that issues of jurisdiction of the court cannot be waived by the parties. In ONYEKWELU BROTHERS LTD vs. OKOYE (2008) All FWLR (Pt.428) 320 at 330-331, it was held as follows: “The competence of a court is a legal condition which cannot be waived by the parties. Where a court lacks competence to entertain a proceeding, the parties to the suit cannot by acquiescence, waiver or even agreement confer jurisdiction or competence upon the court. It is not a mere irregularity which can be cured by consideration of substantial justice but a fundamental defect fatal to the adjudication.” In N.D.C. LTD vs. A.S.W.B (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 422) 1052 at 1076, the Supreme Court further held that where there is a fundamental failure to comply with a mandatory provision of a statute, the issue is not a mere irregularity but a nullity. Therefore, the issue of waiver is not of any consequence. A party cannot waive a situation where the court lacks competence to entertain a matter in the first place. Among several authorities on this point, see LION BANK NIG. PLC vs. AMAIKOM (2008) All FWLR (Pt.417) 85 at 123; AGU vs. ODOFIN (1992) 3 SCNJ 161 at 177; BELOW vs. YAKUBU (2008) All FWLR (Pt.429) 475 at 485. The Claimants counsel has also argued that the court is precluded from raising the issue of limitation suo motu. In NASIR vs. C.S.C, KANO STATE (2010) All FWLR (PT.515) 195 at 207, the Supreme Court while considering an appeal whether the appellant’s suit was statute barred under Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Law of Kano State, held per MUKHTAR JSC, that the statute of limitation is a matter of jurisdiction which can be raised at any stage of litigation or even by the court suo motu. Also, In NZE PET CO. NIG. LTD vs. AMAKEZE (2010) All FWLR (Pt.528) 904 at 924, it was held that: “The issue of jurisdiction is a very fundamental one as it goes to the competence of the court or Tribunal, hence it can be raised at any stage of proceedings in the High court as court of first instance or in the court of appeal, even in the apex court of the land. The issue can also be raised by either of the parties or by the court itself suo motu.” It is trite that the court suo motu or along with any of the parties is entitled to raise and consider the issue of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings. The only legal requirement is that parties are to be given notice thereof and afforded the opportunity to be heard before a decision is taken on the issue by the court. See WILLIAMS vs. IBEJIAKO (2010) All FWLR (Pt.515) 380 AT 392; SENATE PRESIDENT vs. NZERIBE (2004) All FWLR (Pt.215) 359; ABUDU vs. ABDULRAZAQ (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt.713) 669. Where on the face of the proceedings, the court feels it is incompetent, the court should of itself take note of the incompetence and decline to exercise jurisdiction even if the question had not been raised by the parties. Jurisdiction is an important issue which the court can even raise suo motu; that is, on its own volition, although it cannot be resolved suo motu. The parties must be given an opportunity to address the court on it before the court proceeds to resolve it one way or the other. See ALFA vs. ZAKARI (2010) All FWLR (Pt.515) 283 at 305. In my view, statute of limitation being an issue touching on the competence of the court, it can be raised at any time at any stage of the proceeding by any of the parties or even by the court itself or even on appeal. From the foregoing, it is clear that this court can, on its own initiative, raise a question of its jurisdiction even though the parties have failed to do so. This is because mere acquiescence or silence of the parties does not confer jurisdiction. It cannot be canvassed, as the Claimants’ counsel did, that the Defendants have waived their right to raise the issue and that this court cannot raise the issue of its jurisdiction or competence suo motu. Being a question of jurisdiction, the issue can be raised by the court suo motu and hear from the parties as was done in this case. The court gave notice of the limitation provision of the ENTRACO Law to the parties and gave them opportunity to address it on it. The parties did utilize the opportunity and made their submissions. To hearken to the submission of the Claimants’ counsel is to deliberately allow a mandatory provision of a law to be circumvented. I believe that counsel to the Claimants can now see that he is not on firm ground when he made those submissions in his address. I find no merit in the submissions of the Claimants’ counsel in his address and he is accordingly overruled. The provision of Section 61 (2) ENTRACO Law has limited the time within which an action can be commenced against Imo ENTRACO, members of its Board, the General Manager, any officer or employee of the Commission. It provides that no action can be commenced in court against these persons in respect of acts done in pursuance or execution of this law or any other law or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this law or any other enactment or law unless it is commenced within 3 months after the act, or neglect or default complained of. Where the suit is not commenced within the prescribed period, the Claimant’s right of action in respect of that cause will be statute barred and the court will no longer have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. To determine whether the Claimant’s suit is statute barred, all that is required is for the court to examine the complaint and the statement of facts alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the Claimant the cause of action and comparing the date with the date which the complaint was filed. If the date the action was filed is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred. See ELEBANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (Pt.328) 604; NIPOST vs. MORDI (2008) All FWLR (Pt.424) 1544 at 1563. In their claims, the Claimants seek a declaration that the dissolution of their committees was wrongful and they also claim for payment of unpaid salaries. I have stated earlier that the Claimants found their claim on the provisions of the law. They have alleged that the dissolution of their committees and non-payment of their salaries contravened sections of the ENTRACO Law. In effect, their grievance against the Defendants, particularly the 4th and 5th Defendants, is the default of the Defendants in executing the provisions of the Law. From the facts of the Claimants’ case, the cause of action arose in August 2010 when they heard on the radio that their Committees have been dissolved and they were locked out of their offices. From that day, the Claimants had a reason to approach the court to challenge the dissolution and claim for payment of outstanding salaries. The time limited in Section 61 (2) ENTRACO Law started running against the Claimants from that day. The Claimants filed the suit before the Imo State High Court on 14/4/2011 before it was transferred to this court. Between the date the cause of action arose and the date of filing of the suit was a period of 8 months. Limitation of action is a statutory period after which a suit cannot be brought in court. A cause of action is said to be statute barred when no proceeding in respect of same can be initiated because the time specified by the limitation law has expired. After a period set by law for commencing an action, a Claimant with a good cause of action cannot enforce same by judicial process because he has sat over his right as the time stipulated by law for initiating such an action has become extinct. See NASIR vs. C.S.C, KANO STATE (supra) at 212. In this case, the statutorily prescribed time for the Claimants to institute this action had expired at the time they filed this action. The action was filed more than 3 months from the date the cause of action arose. The action is no longer maintainable as it has become statute barred. The consequence is that this court no longer has jurisdiction to entertain same. In the circumstance, the appropriate order to make is to dismiss the suit. With the finding that the suit of the Claimant is Statute barred, it is no longer necessary for the Court to go into the merits of the substantive, as it would be academic. Accordingly, this suit is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge