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This action was commenced by a Complaint dated and filed on the 2nd day of May 2017 wherein the Claimant sought the following reliefs: 1) A Declaration that the purported dismissal of the Plaintiff’s appointment conveyed by the Defendants letter dated 26th October 2016 is wrongful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 2) An Order of mandatory injunction directing the Defendants to reinstate, promote and place the Claimant in the same position with his colleagues who are still in the service and which he would have been but for the purported dismissal. 3) An Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant forthwith all his salary, entitlements benefits and perks attaching to his rank from 26th October 2015 during which he was wrongfully and illegally dismissed from service. 4) An Order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants whether by themselves, servants, agents and/or privies from further acting and/or implementing the contents of the letter of dismissal dated 26th October 2015 in any manner whatsoever and howsoever 5) Cost of this suit at N250, 000.00 only By a motion on notice filed on 30th May 2017 and which was brought under Order 17, Rule 1 (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017; Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004; Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act 2004 and the inherent jurisdiction of the Honourable Court, the Defendants sought an order of this court dismissing the Claimant’s suit for want of jurisdiction and competence. The grounds upon which the application was premised are that the suit is statute barred by virtue of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act (POPA) 2004, and it is premature for non-compliance with the condition-precedent in Section 20 of the NYSC Act 2004 before the institution of the suit. The motion was supported with a 5 paragraph affidavit deposed to by Emmanuel Tsamya, a Litigation Secretary with the Legal Unit of the 2nd Defendant. The deponent averred that the 2nd Defendant is established by law while the 1st Defendant is an Office created by the same law in which the 2nd Defendant was established. The Defendants are public officers. The cause of action in this suit arose one year, eight months and seven days prior to the 2nd day of May, 2017 when the suit was filed. The subject matter of this suit is the dismissal of the Claimant from the employment of the 2nd Defendant, and the Claimant is aggrieved by the action of the Defendants. The Claimant ought to have appealed to the Presidency in the first instance before any action may be commenced in any Court in Nigeria. The Claimant did not appeal to the Presidency in respect of his grievance before he instituted this suit against the Defendants. The Defendants’ counsel, Mr O. P. Omuru, in his written address in support of the motion, submitted two issues for determination. The issues are: i. Whether this suit is statute barred, having been filed seven months and nineteen days after the accrual of the cause of action. ii. Whether, in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the National Youth Service Corps Act, Cap. N84, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the suit is premature as the Claimant/Respondent did not comply with the condition-precedent for instituting same. In issue 1, counsel submitted that for the court to exercise jurisdiction in a matter, the subject matter of the case must be within the jurisdiction of the Court and there must be no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. Counsel argued that the Defendants are public officers which makes this action statute barred as same is caught up by Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004. Counsel also referred to Section 19 of the NYSC Act 2004 which makes the provisions of POPA applicable to every member and employee of the 2nd Defendant. The Defendants’ counsel went further to submit that period of limitation of action is determined by looking at the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim with a view to ascertaining the date on which the wrong complained of was committed, and to compare that date with the date on which the suit was filed. If the date in which the suit was filed and the date in which the cause of action arose is beyond the limitation period prescribed in the enactment, the action is statute barred and incompetent. On this point, counsel placed reliance on the case of FRIN vs. Gold (2007) 9 MJSC: 210. The Defendants’ counsel added that the Claimant’s cause of action arose on 26th October 2015 when the Claimant was given a letter of dismissal from service. This suit was filed on 2nd May, 2017 which is a period of one year, eight months and seven days after the accrual of the cause of action. The Claimant filed the suit outside the 3 months prescribed by Section 2 (a) of POPA, and the action is consequently statute barred. In issue 2, the Defendant’s counsel submitted that when the Claimant became aggrieved with his dismissal from service, Section 20 of the NYSC Act laid down a condition precedent for him to observe before seeking redress in court. The section mandates him to first appeal to the Presidency. But there is nothing in the case of the Claimant which shows that he appealed to the Presidency in respect of his grievance before instituting this action. Counsel submitted that the provision of Section 20 of the NYSC Act is clear, unambiguous and mandatory. Non-compliance with same is fatal to the Claimant’s case and robs the court of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Counsel referred to ADESANOYE vs. ADEWOLE (2006) 10 MJSC 1 at 15; AMINU TANKO vs. STATE (2009) 1-2 MJSC 209 at 255. According to counsel, where a statute prescribes a legal line of action for determination of an issue, the aggrieved party must exhaust all the remedies in that law before embarking on litigation in Court. Until the statutory remedy is exhausted, any resort to Court action would be premature. ARIBISALA vs. OGUNYEMI (2005) 6 MJSC 188 at 205 and AKINTEMI & ORS vs. ONWUMECHI & ORS (1985) 1 NSCC Vol. 16, 46 at 61 were also referred to. Counsel finally urged this Court to dismiss the suit for want of competence and jurisdiction. The motion was served on the Claimant’s counsel on 1st June 2017. I have sighted the proof of service and the affidavit of service in the record. The Claimant however did not file any process to indicate that he is opposing the motion. It is necessary also to mention that neither the Claimant nor his counsel has appeared in this matter up to this stage. When the matter came up for mention on 2nd November 2017, the Claimant was absent and his counsel sent in a letter for adjournment. The Defendants’ counsel conceded to it and the matter was adjourned to 29th November 2017, being the date suggested by the Claimant’s counsel. On the return date however, both the Claimant and his counsel were absent and there was no explanatory communication from them to the court. Before then, the instant motion of the Defendants had been served on the Claimant since June 2017. For these reasons, the Defendants’ motion was heard on 29/11/2017. Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004 provides that no action shall be instituted against a public officer in respect any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, unless the action is commenced within three months after the cause of action arose or in case of continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the injury or damage has ceased. The implication of this provision is that a Claimant who is aggrieved by an action of a public officer and intends to file a suit against the public officer must do so within 3 months from the date the cause of action arose. Where the suit is not commenced within the prescribed period, the Claimant’s right of action in respect of that cause will be statute barred and the court will no longer have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C, KADUNA STATE (1998) 12 SC 20; NNAMDI AZIKIWE UNIVERSITY, AWKA vs. NWEKE (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 428) 343. In the affidavit in support of the motion, it is deposed that the Defendants are created in the NYSC Act. Let me observe that the Defendants are public office and institution respectively having statutory recognition. In my view, the Defendants come within the meaning of the term public officer as defined by the Supreme Court in IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C, KADUNA STATE (supra) and they are persons contemplated in the protection of POPA. Furthermore, the cause of action of the Claimant in this suit is his dismissal from the employment of the 2nd Defendant. In his statement of facts, the Claimant complained of irregularity in his dismissal and non-compliance with the Public Service Rules and condition of service. The complaint against the Defendants is therefore that they defaulted in their public duties or authority. The facts clearly show that the Defendants can seek to invoke the protection of POPA in this action. The dismissal of the Claimant happened on 26th October 2015 as pleaded by the Claimant in paragraph 14 of the statement of facts. The time allowed him in Section 2 (a) of POPA to file this action started counting from that day. However, he did not file a suit to challenge his dismissal until on 2nd May 2017. This was a period of 18 months after his dismissal. The facts are clear that this suit was filed more than 3 months from the date the Claimant’s cause of action arose. The action is statute barred and not maintainable by the effect of Section 2 (a) of POPA. This court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case. In the circumstance, the appropriate order to make at this point is to dismiss the Claimant’s suit. Consequently, this suit is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge