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This action was instituted by the applicant vide a motion on notice filed on 13th May 2015. The application, whose object is for judicial review, was brought pursuant to Section 17 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006; Order 22 Rule 1(1) & Rule 3 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007; Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal, Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended), and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. In an amended Originating Motion dated 2nd February 2016 and filed on 11th February 2016, the applicant prayed for the following reliefs: 1. An Order of mandamus directing the 1st Respondent to approve the reinstatement of appointment of the Applicant to her former position as Deputy Manager Production Programming in the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in accordance with the letter of Reinstatement from the Minister of Petroleum Resources dated 28th July, 2009. 2. An Order directing the 3rd Respondent to give effect to the approval for the reinstatement of appointment of the Applicant and the full payment of her salaries and other entitlements from the time of the purported dismissal till date. 3. An Order directing the 5th Respondent to give effect to the 3rd Respondent's letter dated 28th July, 2009 with Ref. No: MPO/2138/S.18/1/158 reinstating the Applicant, and for payment of her full salaries and other entitlements from the time of the dismissal till date. 4. And for such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance. In the course of the proceedings, the Respondents filed various notices of preliminary objection in which they challenged the competence of the applicant’s application and the jurisdiction of this court to entertain and determine the application. The preliminary objections of the Respondents were heard together with the substantive application on 7th November 2017 with a view to rule on all of them today. Since the objections of the Respondents’ border on the issue of the jurisdiction of this court, I will consider and determine them first before looking at the substantive application if the need will still be there. The preliminary objection of the 1st and 2nd Respondents was brought pursuant to Order 22 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007. The 1st and 2nd Respondents prayed the court to strike out the Applicant's application on the grounds that: a. The Applicant was dismissed on the 25th of October 2005 as stated in paragraph 3 (c) of the Applicant's affidavit. b. That the letter of reinstatement which the Applicant places heavy reliance was dated 28th of July, 2009. c. The said letter of GMD, NNPC refusing to comply with the letter of reinstatement was dated 28th November, 2011. d. The motion with which the Applicant commenced this suit was dated and filed on the 13th day of May 2015, about 4 years after the date of occurrence of the subject of complaint in this suit, i.e. the letter refusing to comply with the reinstatement letter. e. The Applicant's suit is statute barred by virtue of Order 22 of the Rules of this court. f. The Applicant's suit is incompetent for non-compliance with a mandatory procedure of this court. g. That Order 22 Rule 3(1) of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 provides that an application for judicial review shall be brought within three months of the date of occurrence of the subject of the application. h. The Applicant commenced this suit by a motion on notice dated 13th of May, 2015. i. Rule 3(2) of Order 22 of the Rules of this court provides that an application for judicial review shall be commenced by an originating process. j. Motion on notice is not an originating process in the Nigerian Legal System. In the written address in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection, counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents, T. D. Agbe Esq., submitted two issues for determination in the NPO. The issues are: 1. Whether the Applicant's suit is not incompetent for failure to comply with mandatory provision of the rules of this court? 2. Whether an application for judicial review can be commenced by a mode other than by an originating process? In counsel’s arguments on issue 1, it was submitted that failure of a Claimant to comply with the rules of court in instituting an action goes to the competency of the court to entertain such action. Counsel cited the case of MADUKOLU vs. NKEMDlLIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341. Counsel argued further that Order 22 Rule 3 (1) of the 2007 Rules of this court provides that an application for judicial review shall be brought within 3 months of the date of the occurrence of the subject of the application but the applicant, whose complaint in this action happened on 28th November 2011 brought this application for judicial review on the 13th May, 2015 which is a period of about 4 years after the 5th Respondent refused to honour the Applicant’s reinstatement. The Applicant has not complied with the rules, having brought the application outside the period within which the court is empowered to entertain same. Counsel submitted that the application is statute barred and urged the court to decline jurisdiction to entertain the application and strike out same for non-compliance with the mandatory provision of Order 22 Rule 3(1) of the Rules of court. In issue 2, the counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents submitted that Order 22 Rule 3 (2) of 2007 Rules requires that an application for judicial review shall be made by originating process but the applicant commenced this action by way of motion on notice which is not an originating process known to law. According to counsel, the 4 modes of commencing action under the rules are the writ of summons, originating summons, originating motion and petition. There is no provision for commencing an action in this court by Motion on Notice. The Applicant's application seeking for judicial review and which was commenced vide a motion on Notice is therefore grossly incompetent and the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same. Counsel further submitted that the Applicant’s motion on notice is not an originating process. Therefore, this action did not come before the court initiated by due process. Counsel relied on KABO AIR LTD vs. INCO BEVERAGES LTD (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt. 816) 323. The Applicant's suit having been initiated by a wrong procedure is incompetent and this court lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate on same. The cases of DANGTOE vs. C.S.C PLATEAU STATE (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 132 and AGIP (NIG) LTD vs. AGIP PETROL INT'L (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1219) 271, among others, were relied on where it was held that where a statute or rules of court provides for a procedure for the commencement of an action, failure to follow that procedure, renders any suit commenced otherwise incompetent. The counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents submitted in conclusion that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Applicant's application for judicial review commenced by a wrong process and urged the court to dismiss the suit. In response to the preliminary objection of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the Applicant’s counsel, Rita Chris-Garuba (Mrs.), filed a reply address on 6th November 2017. In the reply address, counsel submitted two issues for determination in the NPO of the 1st and 2nd Respondents. The issues are: a) Whether the Applicant has satisfied the necessary conditions that would enable the Honourable Court exercise jurisdiction over this matter. b) Whether the suit is stature-barred. Counsel submitted in issue one that the applicant has met all the necessary preconditions that would enable this Court exercise jurisdiction in this matter. Counsel made reference to the caption of the suit and submitted that this proceeding is an application for judicial review. However, titling of the process “motion on notice” was a typographical error and a mistake of counsel which cannot be visited on the applicant. Counsel also entreated that this Court is a court of justice and equity, with power to depart from the rules of the court in the interest of justice. Counsel relied on Order 5 Rule 1 and 3 of the Rules of this court and further submitted that failure to comply with the rules should be treated as a mere irregularity. Counsel for the Applicant argued still that Order 5 Rule 2 (1) of the Rules of this court requires the Respondents to bring this NPO challenging an irregular step taken in the proceeding within a reasonable time. However, the Respondents did not bring the NPO within a reasonable time. They waited for a whole year after they have been served with the originating process. Counsel urged the court to discountenance this ground of objection as it was not raised within a reasonable time. On issue 2, the counsel for the Applicant submitted that although it is true that Order 22 Rule 3(1) of the 2007 Rules of this court made provision for an application for judicial review to be brought within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action, the Applicant has filed this action within time. Contrary to the Respondents’ contention that the Applicant’s cause of action in this matter arose on 25th October 2005 when the Applicant was dismissed from her employment, the cause of action in this matter actually arose after February, 2015 following the letters dated 16th February 2015 and 25th February 2015 written by the Applicant to the 1st and 5th Respondents for approval and confirmation of her reinstatement respectively which letters were not replied. The originating motion was filed on 13th May 2015 which is not up to 3 months since the dates of the letters written to the 1st and 5th Respondents. It was thus the failure of the relevant authorities to reinstate the Applicant that gave her the cause to sue. According to counsel, the Applicant’s cause of action became complete only after February 25th 2015. The Applicant’s counsel further submitted that the cause of action in an Application for a Prerogative remedy of Mandamus does not accrue at the occurrence of the subject-matter of the Application. The Applicant must have demanded for the performance of the duty sought to be performed and there has been deliberate refusal to comply with the demand. Counsel cited these authorities to buttress her point: (i) R vs. WILTS AND BERFS CANAL CO. (1835) 3 AD AND EC477 (ii) R vs. STOKE-ON-TRENT TOWN CLERK (1912) 2 KB 2518 (iii) SHITTA-BEY vs. FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (1981) 1 SC 40. Counsel went further that the subject of this suit is the refusal of the Respondents to reinstate the Applicant. This refusal became apparent from 25th February, 2015 when there was no response to the Applicant’s letters to the 1st and 5th Respondents. It was after February 25th 2015 that all the facts necessary to bring this action became complete. The Applicant did not contravene Order 22 Rule 3(1) of the 2007 Rules and she filed this application on time. The Applicant’s counsel added that an action for Mandamus is not ripe until a demand has been placed on the authority or person who has a duty to perform and the authority or person refuses to perform the duty. In this matter, what is in issue is the neglect of the Respondents to perform their duty to reinstate the Applicant, and this happened after 25th February 2015. Failure to respond to the demand letter gave rise to this suit and it is after February, 2015 that neglect or default of the 1st and 5th Respondents can be imputed. Counsel stated that time begins to run for the purposes of the Limitation Law from the date the cause of action accrues. This suit, which was brought on 13th May 2015, was filed within 3 months of accrual of the cause of action. The Applicant’s counsel also argued that assuming that the Applicant’s cause of action arose at any time earlier than 2015, the complaint of the Applicant is a continuing injury and this constitutes an exception to the application of the law of statute-bar. Counsel submitted that since 28th July, 2009 when the Applicant was issued with a letter of reinstatement, she was deemed to have been reinstated to her office and her emoluments would be counting up till her resignation or retirement. The injury is a continuous one in addition to the fact that the 1st Respondent has not responded to the request to approve the reinstatement of the Applicant which caused a fresh cause of action to accrue in 2015. Counsel cited CHIEF ETEIDUNG RAYMOND OBOT vs. SHELL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY NIGERIA LIMITED (2013) LPELR – 20704; AREMO II vs. ADEKANYE (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 224) 211 in support, and concluded that this action is not statute barred. The 3rd Respondent’s preliminary objection was brought under Order 11 Rule 1, Order 22 Rule 3(1) of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 and Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004. The 3rd Respondent sought that the applicant’s application be dismissed on these grounds: i The suit is incompetent, ii. This Court lacks Jurisdiction to entertain this suit, and iii. The suit is statute-barred. In the written address in support of the preliminary objection, counsel for the 3rd Respondent, U. C. Okoli Esq., formulated the following two issues for determination: i. Whether or not the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit for failure of the requisite condition precedent to the commencement thereof. ii. Whether the suit against the 3rd Respondent is statute barred. Counsel submitted, with respect to issue one, that the Applicant did not fulfil a condition precedent to the commencement of the suit against the 3rd Respondent. Order 22 Rule 3(1) of the NIC Rules 2007 provides that an Application for judicial review shall be brought within three months of the date of occurrence of the subject of the application, and no leave shall be required for that. The cause of action in this matter arose on 25th October, 2005 when the Applicant was dismissed from the service of the 4th Respondent and an approval was given from the 3rd Respondent for her reinstatement to office on 19th August, 2009. The Applicant did not institute an action until 13th May, 2015 which is six years after the cause of action had arisen contrary to Order 22 Rule 3(1) of the 2007 Rules. Counsel also submitted that the Applicant’s cause of action may have arisen from the last official administrative action taken on the matter when the 4th Respondent declined to reinstate the Applicant in a letter dated 28th November 2011. The application is nonetheless brought out of time. Section 12 (2) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act 2004 provide for service of one month pre-action notice before institution of action but the applicant did not serve pre-action notice on the 3rd Respondent before this suit was filed. Service of a pre-action notice where statutorily required is a condition precedent to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, where there has been non-service of a pre-action notice, the action and any suit instituted in contravention of the law is incompetent and the court will lack jurisdiction to entertain it. The cases of GBADAMOSI vs. NIGERIAN RAILWAY CORPORATION (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 367) 835; AMADI vs. NNPC (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 780) 116 and ETI OSA LOCAL GOVERNMENT vs. JEGEDE (2007) 10 NWLR (PT. 1043) 537-623 were cited on this point. Counsel submitted that the applicant has failed to comply with the rules of this Court by not bringing this suit within the stipulated time, and has not fulfilled a condition precedent to the institution of the action. This suit is therefore incompetent and the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. Counsel urged the court to strike out or dismiss the Applicant’s suit against the 3rd Respondent. With respect to issue 2, it was submitted that the suit is statute barred by virtue of Section 12(1) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act 2004 which provides that any suit against the Corporation, a member of the Board or any employee of the Corporation must be filed within 12 months of the cause of action and Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004 which requires that any suit against a public officer must be brought within 3 months of the act or default complained of. The Applicant instituted this suit against the 3rd Respondent, who is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 4th respondent and a public officer, 6 years after the cause of action arose. The suit is statute barred. Learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent relied on EBOIGBE vs. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 649; IBRAHIM vs. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584); EGBE vs. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1 among other authorities and urge the court to strike out or dismiss the suit against the 3rd Respondent. In response to the Notice of Preliminary Objection of the 3rd Respondent, the Applicant’s counsel filed a reply address wherein counsel submitted the same issues argued in the Applicant’s written address in respect of the Preliminary Objection of the 1st and 2nd Respondents for determination in the Preliminary Objection of the 3rd Respondent. The submissions of the Applicant’s counsel in the written address filed in response to the NPO of the 1st and 2nd Respondents are materially the same with those canvassed in the reply to the Notice of Preliminary Objection of the 3rd Respondent. I will therefore limit my task here to reviewing only the aspect in the instant address not covered in the previous address of the Applicant’s counsel. With respect to the issue of non-service of pre-action notice, the Applicant’s counsel submitted that a pre-action notice was served on the 4th Respondent before it was joined to the suit as a party by an order of this court given on 27th January, 2016. The Applicant’s counsel referred the court to a copy of the pre-action notice exhibited to the Applicant’s affidavit in response to the preliminary objection of the 4th and 5th Respondents and urged the court to take judicial notice of the pre-action notice by virtue of Section 122 (2) (m) of the Evidence Act 2011. The 3rd Respondent is properly sued in this case and there is no requirement for pre-action notice before bringing action against the 3rd Respondent. Counsel added that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 3 (1) of the 2007 Rules and Section 12 (2) of the NNPC Act 2004 do not bar this court from exercising its jurisdiction in this matter. On the issue of the suit being statute barred, the learned counsel for the Applicant submitted that the cause of action in this matter accrued after 25th February 2015 and the suit, which was filed on 13th May 2011, was brought within 3 months of accrual of the cause of action. The complaint of the Applicant is also in the nature of continuing injury. This suit is therefore not barred by Section 12 (1) NNPC Act or Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act. On their part, the 4th and 5th Respondents are praying this court to strike out or dismiss the suit as it relates to the 4th and 5th Respondents in their preliminary objection. The grounds of the objection are that the suit is incompetent and this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. The particulars of these grounds, as stated on the notice of objection, are as follows: i. The action is statute-barred. ii. By virtue of Section 12(1) of the NNPC Act, this action should have been brought within 12 months of the accrual of the cause of action, but was brought 10 years after. iii. That the issuance of a mandatory Pre-action notice in compliance with Section 12(2) of the NNPC Act, 2004 is a condition precedent for the institution of this case and failure of complying with same makes the case incompetent. iv. Abuse of court process. In the affidavit in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection of the 4th and 5th Respondents, it was deposed that the cause of action in this case arose on the 25th of October, 2005 but the action was filed on 13th May, 2015 which was about ten years after. The action is statute-barred in addition to the fact that the 4th and 5th Respondents were not served with a pre-action notice before the commencement of this action. This action thus amounts to an abuse of court process. The NPO of the 4th and 5th Respondents was supported with a written address of their counsel. The Counsel, Mr. John Erameh, formulated the following issues in his address: 1. Whether this action as presently constituted is not statute-barred. 2. Whether this suit is competent in the light of the Applicant's failure to comply with the condition precedent before instituting this suit. On issue one, counsel submitted that an action is said to be statute-barred when the action is brought after the expiration of the period provided by statute for the commencement of the action. Section 12 (1) of the NNPC Act prohibits an action from being brought against the Corporation or any member of the Board or employees of the Corporation after the expiration of twelve months commencing from the date of accrual of the cause of action. Counsel cited the case of NNPC vs. ABDULRAHMAN (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 202 and continued that an examination of the writ of summons shows that the suit was filed on the 13th May 2015. The date of the accrual of the cause of action was 25th October, 2005 when the applicant was dismissed from service. By a simple calculation of the difference between the date of the cause of action and the date of filing of the action, it is clear that the action was filed outside the period allowed by law. Thus, this action is statute-barred. In his submissions on issue two of the NPO, the counsel for the 4th and 5th Respondents submitted that Section 12 (2) NNPC Act requires service of pre-action notice on the 4th Respondent at least one month before commencement of a suit against it but the applicants did not serve a pre-action notice on the 4th Respondent before instituting this action on the 14th of October, 2016. This matter is consequently incompetent. Counsel cited the case of PETER vs. NNPC (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1195) 181; N.N.P.C vs. TIJANI (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt.1007) 43 where it was held that where a statutory notice is required before the commencement of an action, failure to give the notice renders such action incompetent, ineffective and liable to be struck out. Learned counsel for the 4th and 5th Respondents added that the purpose of giving a Defendant notice of claim against it in a pre-action notice is for it not to be taken by surprise but to have adequate time to prepare to deal with the claim in its defence or to give room for the Government or its official to consider settlement of the matter. The cases of PETER vs. NNPC (supra); AMADI vs. NNPC (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 76 and N.N.P.C vs. FAWEHINMI (1998) 7 NWLR (Pt. 559) 598 were cited in this regard. The Applicant filed a counter affidavit to oppose the objection of the 4th and 5th Respondents. The counter affidavit contains that although the Applicant was dismissed from her job on 25th October, 2005 following allegations made against her, the cause of action did not arise in that year, but sometime in 2015. Following her dismissal, the Applicant wrote to the Chief of Staff to the President of the Federation. Consequent on that letter, a committee was set up by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources to look into the allegation. The Committee absolved the Applicant of wrong-doing and recommended her for reinstatement in a Letter dated 28th July, 2009. The Applicant was later issued with a letter of Reinstatement of Appointment dated 19th August, 2009. The Minister of Petroleum Resources further ordered the 5th Respondent to pay the Applicant all arrears of her salaries and allowances from the date of her dismissal but the 5th Respondent wrote back in a letter dated 28th November, 2011 stating that since the Applicant’s dismissal was approved by the President, a Presidential approval was also needed for her reinstatement. Based on this, the Applicant’s counsel wrote a letter dated 16th February 2015 to the President of the Federation requesting for approval for the reinstatement of the Applicant. A similar letter dated 25th February, 2015 was also written to the 5th Respondent. Since receiving the letter, the office of the President of the Federation has not issued the required approval. This action is to compel the 1st Respondent to approve the reinstatement of the Applicant. The cause of action in this matter arose in year 2015 when this action was brought and not in year 2005. It was also averred that before the commencement of this action against the 4th and 5th Respondents, they were served with a pre-action notice dated 12th May 2015. A copy of the notice received by the 5th Respondent on 14/5/15 was exhibited to the counter affidavit as Exhibit OP 1. In the written address in support of the counter affidavit, the Applicant’s counsel submitted two issues for determination in the NPO of the 4th and 5th respondents. The issues are: 1. Whether the substantive matter is statute barred. 2. Whether there was service of pre-action notice on the 4th and 5th Respondents prior to the commencement of this action against them. The submissions of the learned counsel for the Applicant are the same as canvassed in response to the NPO of the 3rd Respondent. Briefly, the gist of counsel’s submission on issue one is that the application was filed within time and it is not statute barred. On the 2nd issue of service of pre-action notice, learned counsel for the Applicant submitted that the 4th and 5th Respondents became parties to this action on 27th January 2016 by an order of the court. They were served pre-action notice on the 14th May 2015 which is Exhibit OP 1. COURT’S DECISION Upon reviewing the Notices of Preliminary Objection of the various Respondents and the Applicant’s response to each of them, it is observed that the following are the sum of the grounds upon which the Respondents have challenged the competency of this suit and the jurisdiction of this court: 1. The proceeding was not commenced by an originating process contrary to order 22 Rule 3(2) of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2007 2. The Applicant did not serve pre-action notice before commencement of the action as required in Section 12 (2) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act 2004 3. The action is statute-barred for the reasons that- a. The Application for judicial review was not brought within three months of the date of the occurrence of the subject of the application contrary to order 22 rule 3 of 2007 rules; b. The suit is affected by the provision of Section 12(1) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act 2004 as the suit was not filed within 12 months of the accrual of cause of action, and c. The suit was not filed with 3 months of the cause of action contrary to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004 I will examine each of these grounds of the respondents objections in the manner I have set them out above. NON-COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION BY ORIGINATING PROCESS: In the Notice of Preliminary Objection of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, they raised the point that the Applicant’s suit is incompetent as it was brought under a wrong process. It was argued by the counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents that Order 22 Rule 3 (2) of the 2007 rules of this court provides that an application for judicial review shall be commenced by an originating process but the motion on notice by which the application was commenced is not an originating process under the rules. This action is an application brought under Order 22 of the 2007 Rules of this court. The application is a matter for judicial review, specifically seeking orders of mandamus to compel the Respondents to act in the reinstatement of the Applicant. The originating application, filed on 13th May 2015, was titled “Motion on Notice”. Order 22 Rule 3(2) of the NIC Rules 2007 (under which the action was commenced) provides that an application for judicial review shall be made by originating process. It was on this basis the 1st and 2nd Respondents contended that “Motion on Notice” is not an originating process under the said rules. Originating process is defined in Order 1 Rule 3 (2) of the 2007 rules to mean “a complaint or any other court processes by which a suit is initiated”. This definition of originating process contemplates “any other court process” used in initiating a suit to come within the definition of originating process. The same rule defined “court process or processes” to include motions. An action for judicial review is considered an application under the Rules. See Order 22 Rule 1. Applications are usually made to the court by motions. See Order 11 Rule 1. It is clear to me from the Rules that a motion filed for the purpose of initiating an action is an originating process. That is why, by practice and procedure, they are called originating motions. Since this action is an application, I think it is properly commenced by way of a motion. The grouse of the 1st and 2nd Respondents appears to be that the motion was titled “motion on notice” instead of “originating motion”. The 2007 rules did not require that such a motion originating a suit must be specifically titled “originating motion”. I do not even think it matters if titled motion on notice or originating motion. The form, content and purport of both processes are the same. They are both motions. The mere fact that it was titled motion on notice does not render the process incompetent. Besides, an amended Originating Motion dated 2nd February 2016 was filed on 11th February 2016. Naturally, the amended process supersedes the earlier process, and is deemed to have cured the anomaly complained of. I therefore find no merit in this ground of the NPO of the 1st and 2nd Respondents. NON-SERVICE OF PRE-ACTION NOTICE: The 3rd Respondent and the 4th and 5th Respondents have contended in their separate notices of preliminary objection that the Applicant did not serve pre-action notice on the 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents before commencing this action. Section 12 (2) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act 2004 was relied upon by counsels to these Respondents in their written address to support this ground of the objection. Counsels submitted that service of a pre-action notice, where statutorily required, is a condition precedent to the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction and where it is not served, a condition precedent for the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction has not been met. The action is consequently incompetent and the court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain it. In response to this ground of the objection, the Applicant stated that she served a pre-action notice on the 4th and 5th Respondents. The notice which was dated 12th of May, 2015 was received on the 14th May, 2015 on behalf of the 4th and 5th Respondents. The Applicant exhibited a copy the pre-action noticed served on the 4th and 5th Respondents to the counter affidavit filed in respect of the NPO of the 4th and 5th Respondents. It is marked Exhibit OP 1. Section 12 (2) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act, 2004 provides: “No suit shall be commenced against the corporation before the expiration of a period of one month after written notice of intention to commence the suit shall have been served upon the corporation by the intending Plaintiff or his agent; and the notice shall clearly and explicitly state the cause of action, the Particulars of the claim, the name and place of abode of the intending Plaintiff and the relief which he claims". From this provision of the Act, the applicant is expected to serve pre-action notice on the 4th Respondent at least one month before instituting an action against the 4th Respondent. The notice must contain the cause of action, the particulars of the claim, the name and place of abode of the applicant and the relief which she claims. The 3rd Respondent’s counsel has argued in the written address in support of the NPO of the 3rd Respondent that the Applicant did not serve pre-action notice on the 3rd Respondent and that is fatal to the competence of the action. I do not share this view. The words of the provision are clear as to the body which is entitled to be served a pre-action notice. It is the Corporation, which is the 4th Respondent in this suit, and not the 3rd Respondent. Let me mention that the 4th Respondent was not an original party to this suit. It was joined on 27th of January, 2016 by an order of this court made on that date. The question now is: Did the Applicant serve a pre-action notice on the 4th Respondent not less than one month before the joinder of the 4th Respondent to this action? In paragraph 16 of the Applicant’s counter affidavit to the NPO of the 4th and 5th Respondents, the facts averred therein are that before the commencement of this action against the 4th and 5th Respondents, they were served with a pre-action notice dated 12/5/2015. The notice was received by the 5th Respondent on 14/5/15. This averment was not challenged or disputed by the 4th and 5th Respondents. Exhibit OP 1 is a copy of the pre-action notice referred to by the Applicant. It was addressed to the Group Managing Director of the 4th Respondent, which is the 5th Respondent. The notice was received on 14/5/2015. By the provision of Section 13 of the NNPC Act, the notice was properly addressed and delivered to the 4th Respondent. The 4th Respondent was joined to this action on 27/1/2016 meanwhile the pre-action notice was served since on 14/5/2015. This was a period of about 8 months before the joinder of the 4th and 5th Respondents to this action. In effect, one month had elapsed between the service of the notice and joinder of the 4th and 5th Respondents. Again, the pre-action notice contains the cause of action, particulars of the claim and the relief which the Applicant claims as required in Section 12 (2) of the NNPC Act. I find in the result that the Applicant served a pre-action notice on the 4th Respondent more than one month before joining the 4th and 5th Respondents to this action. The ground of the NPO of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents that the Applicant did not serve pre-action notice has no merit. THE SUIT IS STATUTE BARRED: One common ground of objection in all the Notices of Preliminary Objection is that the Applicant’s application is statute barred. In the NPO of the 1st and 2nd Respondents and that of the 3rd Respondent, it was contended that the application for judicial review was not brought within three months of the date of the occurrence of the subject of the application contrary to Order 22 Rule 3 of the NIC Rules 2007. Similarly, the 3rd Respondent and the 4th and 5th Respondents raised the point that the suit is affected by the provision of Section 12(1) of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act 2004 as the suit was not filed within 12 months of the accrual of cause of action. The 3rd Respondent’s NPO includes the ground that the suit was not filed within 3 months of the cause of action contrary to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004. Counsels to the Respondents argued that the suit is statute barred by the effect of these provisions and should be dismissed. Let me briefly state the provisions of these laws which the Respondents rely upon here. Order 22 Rule 3(1) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2007, now repealed but under which this suit was filed, provides that an application for judicial review must be brought within 3 months of the date of occurrence of the subject of the application. While Section 12(1) of the NNPC Act provides that suit against the Corporation, a member of the Board or any employee of the Corporation in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or law or of public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of same must be instituted within 12 months from the time the cause of action arose, except in the case of continuance of damage or injury, in which case the action must be instituted within 12 months after the cessation of the damage or injury. With respect to Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act (POPA), the effect of the provision is that an action against a public officer in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution of any Act or law or of public duty or any default in respect of same must be commenced within 3 months of the accrual of the cause of action except in the case of continuance of the damage or injury, in which case the Claimant must institute the action within 3 months after the cessation of the damage or injury. These enactments limit time within which applications for judicial review can be brought and also when suits against the 4th Respondent, members of its Board and employees or public officers can be instituted. It is trite that where a statute limits the time for filing of actions, a suit which is not filed within the period is statute barred and can no longer be entertained by the court. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C, KADUNA STATE (1998) 12 SC 20; EGBE vs. ALHAJI (1990) 3 S.C. (Pt.1) 63; NNAMDI AZIKIWE UNIVERSITY, AWKA vs. NWEKE (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 428) 343. In order to resolve the issue whether the applicant filed this action within time, it is necessary to find out what is her cause of action and when it arose. The Respondents have given different dates in their NPOs which they think the Applicant’s cause of action arose. According to the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the Applicant’s cause of action was the refusal of the GMD of NNPC (5th Respondent) in his letter of 28th November 2011 to honour the instruction to reinstate the Applicant. The Applicant’s cause of action therefore arose on 28th November 2011. On the part of the 3rd Respondent, it was contended that the cause of action of the Applicant arose on 25th October 2005 when she was dismissed from the service of the 4th Respondent, and approval was given on 19th August 2009 for her reinstatement. The Applicant’s cause of action therefore accrued either on 19th August 2009 or on 28th November 2011 when the 5th Respondent refused to reinstate the Applicant. The 4th and 5th Respondents, on the other hand, averred that the Applicant’s cause of action arose on 25th October 2005 when she was dismissed from service. From these positions of the various Respondents, they have given 25th October 2005, 19th August 2009 and 28th November 2011 as the possible dates the Applicant’s cause of action arose. But the Applicant’s counsel, in her various responses on this issue, has stated that the Applicant, through her counsel, wrote to the 1st and 5th Respondents, letters dated 16/2/2015 and 25/2/2015 respectively requesting confirmation of the Applicant’s reinstatement, but the 1st and 5th Respondents refused to respond to the letters or effect the Applicant’s reinstatement. It was after these letters that all the facts necessary to bring this action became complete. Thus, the Applicant’s cause of action arose from 25/2/2015. In view of these conflicting dates the parties contend the Applicant’s cause of action arose, I am obligated to examine the facts of the Applicant’s application to find out what her cause of action is and when it arose. It is the law that in order to determine whether a suit is statute barred, the processes which should be examined are the originating processes. See J.S.F. INVESTMENT LTD. vs. BRAWAL LINE LTD. (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 578) 876 at 902; AMEDE vs. UBA (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 469) 479 at 506/507. In this case, they are the originating motion and the affidavit in support of the motion. It is in these processes the cause of action, the date it arose and the date the suit was filed can be found. For the purpose of properly determining this issue, it is necessary at this point to repeat the reliefs the Applicant sought in her motion. They are the following: 1. An order of mandamus directing the 1st Respondent to approve the reinstatement of appointment of the Applicant to her former position as Deputy Manager Production Programming in the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in accordance with the letter of reinstatement from the Minister of Petroleum Resources dated 28th July, 2009. 2. An order directing the 3rd Respondent to give effect to the approval for the reinstatement of appointment of the Applicant and the full payment of her salaries and other entitlements from the time of the purported dismissal till date. 3. An order directing the 5th Respondent to give effect to the 3rd Respondent's letter dated 28th July, 2009 with Ref. No: MPO/2138/S.18/1/158 reinstating the Applicant and for payment of her full salaries and other entitlements from the time of the dismissal till date. The facts upon which she sought these reliefs are as deposed in the affidavit in support of the application. The averments at paragraphs 3 (c) to (r) thereof are material to the determination of the issue at hand. It is averred in these paragraphs that the Applicant was dismissed from the service of the 4th Respondent on 25th October 2005. As a result of her complaints against the dismissal, a committee was set up by the Ministry of Petroleum Resources to look into the allegation against her. She was cleared by the committee after which she was reinstated in a letter from the 3rd Respondent dated 19th August 2009. In a letter dated 28th July 2009 from the 3rd Respondent to the 5th Respondent, the 3rd Respondent directed the reinstatement of the Applicant and payment of all her salaries and allowances from the date of her dismissal. The 5th Respondent refused to comply with the directives but rather wrote back to the 3rd Respondent, insisting that the approval of the 1st Respondent is required before such reinstatement can take effect. The 5th Respondent has refused to reinstate the Applicant till the time of filling this action. In a letter dated 16th February, 2015, the Applicant’s counsel wrote to the 1st Respondent requesting the confirmation of the Applicant's reinstatement. A similar letter dated 25th February, 2015 was written to the 5th Respondent but despite receipt of the letters by these Respondents, no action or confirmation was taken by them. It is the failure to effect reinstatement of the Applicant that prompted this action. This suit is an application for judicial review. The prerogative order of mandamus is an administrative remedy which is meant to compel a particular act or duty to be done or performed. See Section 17 (1) NIC Act 2004. The act which the Applicant sought this court to compel the Respondents to do in this application, as seen in reliefs 1, 2 and 3 of the motion, is the reinstatement of the Applicant to service. Although there was a letter from the 3rd Respondent dated 28th July 2009 to the 5th Respondent wherein the Applicant was directed to be reinstated, the 5th Respondent in a letter dated 28th November 2011 to the 3rd Respondent, refused to reinstate the Applicant on the ground that the 1st Respondent’s approval is required before the Applicant can be reinstated. It was on the basis of the said letter of the 5th Respondent that the Applicant has not been reinstated till the time of this action. Hence, she sought in relief 3 an order to the 5th Respondent to give effect to the 3rd Respondent’s letter of 28th July 2009. Again, the Applicant sought in relief 1, an order of mandamus directing the 1st Respondent to give approval for her reinstatement. From the averments of the Applicant in support of the motion, it is clear to me that the basis for this action is the refusal to reinstate her to the service of the 4th Respondent. This act of refusal occurred on 28th November 2011, by the letter of the 5th Respondent. The Applicant’s counsel submitted that the Applicant’s cause of action commenced after 25th February 2015 when letters were written to the 1st and 5th Respondents but they refused to effect the Applicant’s reinstatement. I do not think so. Before the said letters were written to the 1st and 5th Respondents on 16th February 2015 and 25th February 2016 respectively, the Applicant’s cause of action had already arisen since 28th November 2011. The Applicant wrote the letters which were not replied. Had she been sent a reply to her letters, perhaps, informing her that she cannot be reinstated or that approval cannot be given for her reinstatement, then her cause of action may have been awakened by that response. But in this case, the letters were not replied. The Applicant’s cause of action cannot arise from her own letter neither can the failure of the Respondents to reply the letters. It is only an adverse response or act of the Respondents that could give the Applicant a cause of action. Therefore, the date of the Applicant’s cause of action remains the date of the 5th Respondent’s letter refusing to reinstate the Applicant. That is 28th November 2011. The applicant’s counsel, relying on the concluding provisions of Section 12 (1) of the NNPC Act and Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act (POPA) which is to the effect that in case of a continuance of damage or injury, the suit must be commenced within 12 months and 3 months respectively after the cessation of the damage or injury; contended that the complaint of the Applicant is in the nature of a continuing injury. Counsel submitted that since 28th July 2009 when the Applicant was issued with a Letter of Reinstatement, she was deemed to have been reinstated to her office and her emoluments would be counting up till her resignation or retirement. While I agree with the Applicant’s counsel that continuance of damage or injury is an exception to the application of the limitation provisions in these statutes, I do not think however that the Applicant’s cause of action in this suit is a continuance of damage or injury. I have stated in this ruling that the Applicant’s cause of action arose on the date of the 5th Respondent’s letter refusing the reinstatement of the Applicant. Had the Applicant been reinstated as instructed in the 3rd Respondent’s letter of 18th July 2009 to the 5th Respondent, there would not have been any reason for this suit. The refusal to reinstate the Applicant happened on a particular day and there is no evidence of continuance of the act. From the date of the 5th Respondent’s refusal, all facts have happened which are material to enable the Applicant file a suit to seek an order compelling her reinstatement. Continuance of injury or damage which is contemplated in Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act means a continuance of the act which caused the injury or damage and not merely a continuance of the injurious effect of the act. See OLAOSEBIKAN vs. WILLIAMS (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 449) 437; OBIEFUNA vs. OKOYE (1961) All NLR 357. In this case, the refusal of the Respondents to reinstate the Applicant is not a continuous act. The Applicant filed this suit on 13th May 2015. That is a period of about 3 years and 6 months from when the cause of action arose. By Order 22 Rule 3 (1) of the 2007 Rules of this court, the Applicant ought to have filed this application for judicial review within 3 months from the date her cause of action arose. However, going by the date of her cause of action, she filed the application outside 3 months and she did not seek or obtain the leave of this court to file the application outside the time allowed by the rules. The provisions of Section 12 (1) of the NNPC Act and Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act (POPA) are themselves mandatory. While Section 12 (1) of the NNPC Act limits period for filing of suits against NNPC or Members of its Board or its employees, which include the 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents, Section 2 (a) of POPA protects public officers generally. By the definition assigned to the term public officer within the meaning of POPA, all the Respondents in this action are public officers covered by the provision of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act (POPA). Let me also mention that the cause of action of the Applicant, being the refusal to reinstate her, is a complaint of neglect of the Respondents to perform their duties or authorities. Therefore, the Respondents can seek to take shelter in this action under the limitation statutes. Actions filed outside the statutory limitation periods specified in these enactments are statute barred and cannot be entertained by the courts. In other words, where the law provides for the bringing of an action within a prescribed period of time, proceedings shall not be brought after the time prescribed by the statute. An action brought outside the prescribed period is contrary to the provision of the law and does not give rise to a cause of action. See EBOIGBE vs. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.347) 649 at 659; NNPC vs. ABDULRAHMAN (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 202; ELEBANJO vs. DAWODU (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 328) 604; INEC vs. OKORONKWO (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 488) 227 at 247. I find accordingly that this suit is statute barred. Consequently, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same in the first place. The suit is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost. Ruling is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge