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This case, (Suit No NICN/OW/93/2014), along with 8 other Suits (Nos 94-101) were originally commenced by complaints filed separately on the 25th day of November 2014. Upon the application of learned counsel for the Claimants, I made an order on the 25th day of February 2015, consolidating the 9 cases (Suit Nos NICN/OW/93/2014 – NICN/OW/101/2014). Upon the application of learned counsel for the Claimants, the court on 18th June 2015, granted leave for the joinder of Hon. Greg Okemili as the 10th Claimant. Consequent upon the consolidation and the joinder, and with the leave of court, the Claimants on 14th October 2015, filed an amended Statement of Facts to reflect the consolidation and the joinder. The Claimants’ claimed against the Defendants jointly and severally as follows: a. An order of the Honourable court directing the Defendants to pay to each Claimant through their counsel, the sum of Thirteen Million, One Hundred and Eighty Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Forty Five Naira only (N13,185,745.00) representing the balance of their salaries for the periods between June 2011 to June 2014. b. 10% monthly interest on the above sum from the month of June 2011 to June 2014 c. 15% monthly interest on the above sum from the month of July 2014 until judgment is delivered and the liquidation thereof. Pleadings were duly exchanged and preliminary applications were taken and resolved. The case proceeded to hearing on the 20th day of October 2015. Hon. Victor Ndunagu the 5th Claimant testified for the Claimants as CW1. Bruno Kizito Ajaegbu, the Imo State co-ordinator of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission was subpoenaed to testify as CW2 to tender the RMAFC Revised Remuneration package dated February 2007. The same Bruno Kizito Ajaegbu was subpoenaed by the 1st to 3rd Defendants to testify as DW1 to tender a CTC of the RMAFC 2009 package. Thereafter, one Onwuneme Chamberlain Uchenna testified for the 4th to 6th Defendants as DW2 while one Maduakolam Alphonsus, a litigation officer in the office of the Attorney General of Imo State, testified for the 1st to 3rd Defendants as DW3. Hearing was concluded on the 5th day of July 2017 and parties were ordered to file their final written addresses in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Claimants filed their final written address on the 19th day of September 2017. The final written address of the 1st to 3rd Defendants was filed on the 14th day of November 2017. The 4th to 6th Defendants’ final address was filed on the 14th day of November 2017. All the addresses were regularized and adopted on the 17th day of November 2017. In the address of the 4th, 5th and 6th Defendants, counsel raised the following issues for determination: a. Which remuneration package is applicable to the Claimants in this suit? i) Is it the 2007 regulation of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission OR ii) The Reviewed Remuneration Package for Political and Judicial Office Holders (State and Local Government Legislature) Volume iv June, 2009. b. Whether the Claimants have proved their entitlement to the reliefs sought in this suit. On Issue 1, it was the submission of learned counsel for the 4th, 5th and 6th Defendants that it is a settled fact that the Claimants served as Legislators in the Imo State House of Assembly from June 2011-May 2015. The Claimants claimed that their outstanding entitlements and salaries are to be paid in accordance with the 2007 remuneration package prepared by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) ("the 2007 package"). According to counsel, the lmo State Co-ordinator of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (a subpoenaed witness) tendered the two documents namely 2007 regulation of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission and the reviewed remuneration package for Political and Judicial Office Holders (State and Local Government Legislature) Volume iv June, 2009 during the trial. The question therefore is between the 2007 package and 2009 package, which of them is applicable. Counsel submitted that it is a clear fact that Section 124(1), 153(1)(n), & (2) and Part 1, 3rd Schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap 121, Vol. 14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 provides for the Office of Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). Counsel then cited and supplied the provisions of Section 124(1)(2) and Section l53(1)(n) & 2 as well as Part 1, Schedule (n) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Counsel also referred the court to Section 32(d) of the 2nd Schedule of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which provides that the power to determine the remuneration appropriate for political office holders which include Legislators is that of RMAFC. Learned counsel submitted that it is clear that the 2009 package came into force in July, 2009 and that the Claimants became the members of the Imo State House of Assembly in June 2011. It therefore means that even before the Claimants became members of the Imo State House of Assembly, 2009 package had come into force. It is also trite that the Claimants during their tenure as members of the Imo State House of Assembly from June 2011 to May 2015 received all their entitlements based on the 2009 package. Counsel therefore urged the Court to resolve Issue No. 1 above by agreeing that the proper remuneration package applicable to the Claimants in this case is the 2009 package, and not the 2007 package. On Issue 2, learned counsel for the 4th, 5th and 6th Defendants restated the reliefs being sought by the Claimants in their statement of facts. According to counsel, some of the claims made by the Claimants in their statement of facts include payment of work done on the month of June, 2011. However from the facts of their claim the Claimants were elected into the Imo State House of Assembly for a 4 year tenure which commenced in June 2011. Invariably their four year tenure elapsed in May 2015. Counsel concluded therefore that the Claimants have no basis or right to claim any emolument or entitlement for the month of June, 2015. Counsel urged the Court to discountenance any claim made by the Claimants in respect of the month of June, 2015. With respect of the claim for N118,671,705 (One Hundred and Eighteen Million, Six Hundred and Seventy One Thousand, Seven Hundred and Five Naira only) which they purportedly claim to be the balance of their salaries for the period between June 2011 to June 2015, counsel submitted that the 2009 structure which is the extant Remuneration package had already stated all the allowances and entitlements which the members of the State House of Assembly are entitled to as determined and fixed by the RMAFC as contained in pages 30 to 40 of the 2009 RMAFC structure. Section 124(1) of the 1999 constitution provides for what the members of the Imo State House of Assembly are entitled as:- "Such remuneration and salaries as may be prescribed by a House of Assembly but not exceeding the amount as shall have been determined by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission" From the foregoing provisions of the law, it is obvious that the claimants have no right to determine what they should be paid. What the House of Assembly may determine or prescribe to pay should not exceed or be greater than the amount to be determined by the Revenue mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, or it may be less. The Claimants are entitled to whatever the House of Assembly prescribes or determines as provided by the constitution provided that the amount so determined or prescribed by the House does not exceed the amount already determined by the RMAFAC as provided by the constitution. According to counsel, the allowances or balance of salaries which the Claimants are claiming summing up to N118,671,705 (One Hundred and Eighteen Million, Six Hundred and Seventy One Thousand, Seven Hundred and Five Naira only) is unlawful. The balance of salaries which the Claimants are claiming are contrary to Section 111 of the 1999 Constitution. So also is the agreement which they purported to have entered with any of the Defendants, without them being prescribed by the RMAFC. Counsel argued that an unlawful and unconstitutional act cannot be corrected by mere agreement of the parties or admission by any of the parties. The Claimants in the instant case have been receiving their entitlement or emolument based on 2009 RMAFC and they did not contest it from June 2011-May 2015 when they left office. The 2009 structure had not been shown to be in excess of the amount prescribed by the RMAFC in any remuneration package. Counsel went on that under the Constitution, there is no obligation or Law that states that the Claimants must be paid what is exactly stated in the RMAFC packages. The Constitution only provides that the House of Assembly prescribes for payment or package that must not exceed the amount required by RMAFC structure. Counsel referred to the position of the Court in a sister case NICN/OW/66/2015, HON. VICTOR NDUNAGU vs. GOVERNOR OF IMO STATE & ORS, at page 15 and 16 of the judgment which held as follows: Section 111 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides thus: "A member of the House of Assembly shall receive such salary and other allowances as the Revenue Mobilization and Fiscal Commission may determine." Counsel also referred the court to section 32(d) of the 2nd Schedule of the 1999 constitution (as amended) which provides that the power to determine the remuneration appropriate for political office holders which include Legislators, is that of RMAFC. According to counsel, members of the State House of Assembly cannot be paid any allowance or salary not prescribed for them by the RMAFC. Therefore, any allowance or salary structure which is not contained or prescribed by the RMAFC cannot be paid to the Claimants. With respect to the claim for the payment of interest by the Claimants, counsel submitted that it is trite Law that interest could only be sustained when the transaction involved is a loan or commercial transaction or debts. It was the argument of counsel that in the instant case, the Claimants were claiming interest against balance of salaries, however there is no Law or Act, or regulation stating that salaries, emoluments and entitlements should attract interest when they are not paid within time or any civil service or public service law stipulating that outstanding remuneration of public servants should attract interest. The Claimants are claiming 10% monthly interest and 15% monthly interest until judgment is delivered and the liquidation thereof. According to counsel, the Claimants never pleaded or deposed on oath, neither was there an agreement that interest must be paid or proved it by evidence in trial. Counsel referred the court to APV ABORISADE & ANOR (2013) LPELR 20362 (A), where Mbaba, JCA, stated: "A Court is barred from making an award or granting a relief outside what was claimed in the pleadings and proved by evidence at trial.” "This is because, being regulated by laws and principle relating to pleadings, and due to the need to be disciplined, predicable and act on evidence before it, the Court cannot afford to play the comic role of a father Christmas, who doles out gifts unsolicited to whoever he delights to please". Mere promise or gratuitous promise to pay the Claimants salaries, allowance, entitlements and emoluments which are not governed by law does not attract any interest. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the Claimants; claim of both 10% and 15% interest, having not been proved. She urged the court to resolve issue 2 against the Claimants. Counsel for the 4th, 5th and 6th Defendants submitted that the Claimants have not proved their case on the preponderance of evidence as required by law and are therefore not entitled to the grant of the reliefs claimed. Counsel urged the court to dismiss this suit. In the final written address of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendant, learned counsel raised a preliminary objection on the ground that the suit of the Claimants as constituted is statute barred for failure to institute the action within three months of the accrual of the act complained of. Counsel formulated three issues for determination of the Court viz: 1. Whether the Claimants’ case is not statute barred, whereby the court is robbed of jurisdiction. 2. Whether the Claimants in the consolidated suit have proved their case as required by law to be entitled to the reliefs sought. 3. Whether the interest components of the claim are valid in law. On Issue 1, learned counsel submitted that the suit is statute barred, the action having been filed three months and twenty four days after the act complained of was done. Section 2 (a), of the Public Officers Protection Act Chapter P41 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria Volume 14, 2004 has provided three months for the institution and commencement of action against the default, act and neglect of public officers in the course of public duties. Citing the case of IBRAHIM vs. JSC (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) per Iguh JSC, counsel submitted that under the public officer’s protection act, artificial persons are included, and not only natural persons. According to counsel, as can be seen from the above Supreme Court case as well as the Court of Appeal case of NWAOGWUGWU vs. THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AND OTHERS (2007) 1 ALL FWLR (Pt. 389) 1327, the Defendants are covered by the Public Officers Protection Act. Counsel went on, citing the case of IKURIE vs. EDJERODE (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446 that in the determination of the issues of jurisdiction, the statement of claim of a Plaintiff or Claimant is the determining factor. Counsel referred the court to paragraph 7 of the Claimant's Statement of Facts wherein it was stated as follows:- "The Claimant served as a member of the Imo State House of Assembly between May 2007 and June 2011” Counsel argued that from the above it can be seen that the Claimant left office in June 2011. It follows that his cause of actions accrued from June 2011 while this suit was filed on the 3rd of May 2014 about 2 years plus some months after the alleged default, act or neglect of the defendants. It is the submission of counsel that this action is statute barred and this affects the jurisdiction of the Court within the context of the well-known case of Madukolum vs. Nkemdilim. Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of NWAOGWUGWU VS PRESIDENT OF FRN (SUPRA) where it held as follows:- “A legal right to enforce in action is not a perpetual right but a right limited by statute. After the date on which the applicable statute provides that legal proceedings cannot be taken, any person having a right of action can no longer competently institute' an action. If the appellant's action is statute barred, it affects the legal competence or jurisdiction of Court. In the instant case, the application of the appellant having been commenced after the period specified under section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act which is three months became statute barred…" Further, it was the submission of counsel that the Jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the claim before that Court and never by the parties. Counsel added that it is the claim that connects the parties against whom there may be a right to the reliefs sought in the claim. See ALHAJI UMARU ABBA TURKUR VS. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1999) 4 NWLR (PT 117) 517 AT 547. Section 90 of the 1999 Constitution provides "There shall be a house of assembly for each of the states of the Federation." According to counsel, the intention of the National Assembly in enacting the Act is to ensure that funds meant for state Houses of Assembly is managed by them. Counsel submitted that the House of Assembly, its administration, finance, or any matter connected therewith are exclusively within the purview and competence of the State House of Assembly. Counsel cited the case of SLB CONSORTIUM LTD vs. N.N.P.C. (2011) 9 NWLR and OKOLO vs. U.B.N. (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 859) 87 referred to. P. 329, paras. D - F and submitted that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. An action which ought to be properly constituted with all the essential parties joined but is instituted without the proper parties is incompetent and robs the court off the jurisdiction to entertain same. See also the case of UWAZIRI vs. STATE 1997 3 NWLR (Pt.496) at 689. Counsel urged the court to strike out the suit for want of jurisdiction. On Issue 2, counsel referred to the pleadings and submitted that the Claimants are not entitled to their claims for unpaid salary and allowances throughout their tenure in office as former Imo State House of Assembly Members. Counsel further affirmed that it is trite that when by a statement of claim or facts, a fact is alleged and the same fact in the statement of defence is denied, an issue arises in the pleadings for determination at the trial. Counsel argued that it was not in contest that the Claimant served as a former member of Imo State House of Assembly between June 2011 and June 2014; and that the Claimants are not entitled to any sum of money as claimed and that if at all they are entitled to any sum of money as alleged it is not the stated sum. Counsel also laid emphasis on the fact that what is in question is which package is the extant remuneration package between the RMAFC 2007 and RMAFC 2009 and that it is the provisions of Sections 124(1), 153(1)(n) & (2) and Pt.I 3rd Schedule to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission Act, cap. R7 Vol. 14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, that it is not in dispute that the salaries, remuneration and entitlements due and payable to the Claimants as members of the House of Assembly of a State shall be prescribed by the House of Assembly but such salaries and remunerations shall not exceed that fixed and determined by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). According to counsel, the 2009 package came into force in July 2009 and the Claimants became Members of the Imo State House of Assembly in June 2011. Thus it is clear that even before the Claimants became Members of the House of Assembly, the 2009 package had come into force. Counsel urged the court to resolve issue No 2 by holding that the extant Remuneration package applicable to the Claimants is RMAFC 2009 and not RMAFC 2007. Severance allowances pursuant to the extant remuneration package, is calculated at the 200% of annual basic salary and not by the 1999 Constitution. It is not for the Claimants to prescribe what they should be paid. The limitation on what the House of Assembly may prescribe as payable is that it should not exceed the amount determined by the RMAFC and it may be less. Whatever the House of Assembly prescribes is what the Claimants are entitled to under the constitution, provided that that amount does not exceed the amount already determined by the RMAFC. In the instant case, Counsel explained that the remuneration of the Claimants is governed by RMAFC 2009 as the same has not been shown to be in excess of the amount prescribed by the RMAFC is any Remuneration package. On whether the 2007 package or the 2009 package is the extant RMAFC Remuneration Package, Counsel submitted that under the Constitution, there is no obligation that the Claimant must be paid what is stated in the RMAFC package and that that Constitution only requires that what the House of Assembly prescribes for payment must not exceed the amount determined by RMAFC at each point in time. Counsel made reference to the decided cases of OLOWU vs. ABOLORE (1993) 6 SCNJ (Pt. 1) 1 @ 1920; IBRAHIM vs. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE KADUNA STATE (1998) 64 LRCN 5044 @ 5075-5076; AROMOLORAN vs. AGORO (201S) 239 LRCN 79 @ 104 to the effect that the provisions of S. 124 (1) of the 1999 Constitution is clear and unambiguous and should be given its ordinary meaning. The Remuneration package for Political and Judicial Office Holders in Nigeria Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission February, 2007 VOLUME 11 OF THE REVIEWED REMUNERATION PACKAGE FOR THE LEGISLATURE AT FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVELS being relied upon by the Claimant does not make any provision for Security Allowance as claimed by the Claimant. Learned counsel also referred the court to page 36 of the aforesaid Document and submitted that documentary evidence is used as a hanger from which to test the veracity of the evidence whether given orally or by deposition. It was the argument of counsel that the Claimant's Documentary evidence cannot therefore be said to have supported oral evidence as the oral evidence of the Claimant is incredible. According to counsel, the basic principle underlying burden of proof is that he who asserts an allegation whether affirmatively or not must in other to succeed, prove same, and not he who denies the allegation. See Sections 135 - 137 of the Evidence Act. See SOKOTO FURNITURE FACTORY LTD vs. SOCIETE GENERALE BANK (NIG) LTD. (2003) FWLR (Pt. 186) 693 AT 706 where the Court of Appeal held thus: "The onus of proof is on the plaintiff being the party who will lose if no further evidence is tendered in Court". See also AMODU VS. AMODE (1990) 5 NWLR (PT 150) P.356 Learned counsel for the 1st to 3rd Defendants also submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought in the purported VOLUME 11 OF THE REVIEWED REMUNERATION PACKAGE FOR THE LEGISLATURE AT FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVELS in the Revenue Mobilization review circular of 2007 which has been amended. Counsel referred the Court to Table B of the 2009 Amended Revenue Mobilization review circular amending that of 2007 being relied upon by the Claimant. With respect to security, counsel submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to any sum of money as security, in that security is to be provided in kind and was so provided. Counsel referred court to page 36 of the said amended document of 2009 where the foresaid provision states. "This is to be provided to all categories of officers in kind. The relevant Government agencies (police, state security service) shall provide security services to the officers concerned." Counsel submitted that the 2007 revised allowance for members of the State House of Assembly issued in 2009 made no provision for security at all; and that the reason for this was that the members of the State House of Assembly, were all provided with police security. According to counsel, Government provided police security to all members of the Imo State House of Assembly and also Imo State vigilante paid by the State Government or Federal Government and for this reason, the revenue mobilization did not provide any security allowance. With respect to accommodation, counsel submitted that there was a reduction of 15 - 20% - 60 - 50 of accommodation allowance in the 2009 document referred herein. With respect to Severance Allowance, counsel submitted that severance allowance of State House of Assembly was reduced by 100% by the 2009 schedule of remunerations as amended in 2009. With respect to severance gratuity, counsel submitted that the severance gratuity as provided in 2007 by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission was reduced to 200% in 2009 with a hundred percent reduction. According to counsel, the 2009 Circular issued By Revenue Mobilization & Fiscal Commission has its Legal implication; and that the Reviewed Remuneration Package for Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders State and Local Government Legislature VOLUME IV a Subsidiary legislation being an instrument issued by Revenue Mobilization Allocation, in law, has the character of subsidiary legislation and counsel urged the Court to take judicial notice of it. Counsel also noted in summary that the Revenue Mobilization & Fiscal Commission is vested with the powers to make subsidiary legislation. In further argument, learned counsel for the 1st to 3rd Defendants submitted that the piece of legislation relied upon i.e. Remuneration package for Political and Judicial Office Holders in Nigeria, VOLUME 11 OF THE REVIEWED REMUNERATION PACKAGE FOR THE LEGISLATURE AT FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVELS, February 2007, upon its repeal is no longer in existence. On this point, Counsel referred the court to the case of SYLVESTER vs. OHIAKWU (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1401) Pg. 467 at 475 RATIO 5 where it was held that: "The legal consequence of the repeal of an enactment is that it ceases to exist from the date the repealing enactment comes into force. Such a repealed enactment is treated as if it never existed. It is completely wiped out (M.N.T (NIG) LTD vs. MIL-ADMIN OSUN STATE (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt. 476))” Counsel went on that Sections 70, 84, 111 & 124 as well as paragraph 31 and (32)(d) of the 3rd schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) vested the power in the Revenue Mobilization to regulate the salaries and allowances of the public office holders including Members of the State Houses of Assembly. By way of subsidiary legislation, the Commission, in the exercise of its powers, issued the Revised Remuneration package for Political, Public and Judicial Officers (States and Local Government Legislation Vol. 4) being a regulation issued in June 2009 which revised the 2007 allowances being relied upon by the Claimant in this case. Citing the case of N.N.P.C vs. FAMFU OIL LTD (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 635) Pg. 204 (Pt. 215) Ratio 13 as well as the case of DIN vs. FED. A. G. (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 87) Pg. 147 at 154 Ratio 22, counsel submitted that it is settled law that such a regulation or even circular issued by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission pursuant to its constitutional powers qualifies as subsidiary legislation. The Court is entitled to take judicial notice of all legislation including the Subsidiary Legislation issued by and emanating from the Federal Government, Legislative arms and Executive agencies on whom such powers have been conferred under the Constitution or other Statute. Referring the Court to Section 122 (2) of the Evidence Act 2011, Counsel submitted that Subsidiary legislations have the force of law. Counsel pointed out that the House of Assembly is an independent body whose finances are under the consolidated funds. Section 120 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vests on the House of Assembly the power to control its finances and even public funds. Counsel added that the Executive has no control over money appropriated for the House of Assembly and therefore cannot be responsible for the payment of House of Assembly Members, otherwise it will be in control which runs contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers and incongruous. Citing the case of MOGAJI vs. ODOFIN BELLO (1978) 3 SC 91, counsel submitted that the Claimants have not proved to the Court that their case is more probable or likely to be true than that of the Defendants, as documentary evidence does not support oral evidence. Counsel urged the Court not to act on the evidence of the Claimants, as it not credible and cogent. They are therefore not entitled to the sum as claimed. On Issue 3, learned counsel for the 1st to 3rd Defendants submitted that the case in hand is not a case of commercial transaction therefore, there is no basis for the award of pre-judgment interest and even post judgment interest (cases on when a court can grant) its either its borne out of evidence or by agreement of parties. With regard to the claims for the payment of interest, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants argued that the amounts being claimed by the Claimants are neither loans nor commercial debts but allowances claimed to be due to the Claimants just like any other person engaged in public service and that there is no law or regulation or agreement stipulating that salaries, emoluments and entitlements of the Claimants should attract interest when they are paid late, neither is there any custom by which public servants are paid their outstanding allowances and/or remunerations with interest. Counsel further argued that on the contrary, DW1's evidence attested to the fact that as a matter of established practice, Government at all levels never pay salaries and emoluments with interest. The piece of evidence was neither contradicted nor challenged by the claimants. According to counsel, the law is settled that the interest is not payable by the mere asking for it and that the legal basis for such interest must be pleaded and proved. In AFRIBANK vs. AKWARA (2006) 136 LRCN 1258 @ 1300 the Supreme Court held as that: "It is now settled that except where parties have agreed on payment of interest it is not right to award interest predating the date of Judgment... there must be express agreement that interest will be charged." In conclusion, counsel submitted that the Claimants had failed to prove their case as to be entitled to judgment and that the 2007 Reviewed Remuneration Package for the Legislature at the Federal, State and Local Government Levels has been amended by the 2009 Reviewed Remuneration Package for the Legislature at the Federal, State and Local Government Levels. The Claimants counsel filed a final written address wherein three issues were raised for determination as follows: 1. Whether the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Defendants was not misconceived and lacks merit. 2. Whether the salary applicable to the Claimants is that stipulated under the 2007 Regulation as published by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission for payment of Public Officers etc. 3. If the answer to (2) above is in the affirmative, whether the Claimants' are not entitled to the reliefs claimed. On Issue 1, Claimants counsel cited the provision of Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act and submitted that the said provisions are unambiguous and should therefore be given its literal and ordinary meaning when the Court is being invited to construe same. He however raised the pertinent question that: at what time can it be said that time has started running against the institution of this action? According to counsel, a look at the statement of facts filed on behalf of the Claimants, particularly paragraph 13 to 15 clearly show some form of discussions between the parties after the payment of the Claimants' full entitlement in the month of June 2014, leaving a balance of unpaid arrears of part of Claimants' salaries for a period of 36 months and that this continued months after, until the institution of this action. This according to counsel was after the 1st Defendant made it clear to the Claimants who are members of opposition parties that for them to benefit and be paid the arrears, they must join the All Progressives Congress (APC) which the 1st Defendant defected to soon after winning the election on the platform of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA). The Claimants refused. Counsel pointed out that it is settled law that time begins to run for the purpose of limitation law when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued and when all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. In other words, a cause of action must have arisen. That is to say it must have accrued and become complete. See the Supreme Court case of OWIE vs. IGHIWI (2005) 3 MJSC Vo1.3 P.82. As at the month of July, 2014, immediately after the Claimants started receiving their full entitlement leaving out the arrears for 36months no cause of action has arisen as they (Defendants) promised to pay up the arrears. The cause of action arose and became complete when the 1st Defendant gave the Claimants the option of joining the APC as the condition for paying them their full entitlements. See FADARE & ORS vs. AG OYO STATE (1983) NSCC 52 at 60; BOARD OF TRADE vs. CAYNER IRVINE & CO. LTD (1927) AC 610. See also ADIMORA vs. AJUFO (1988) 1 NSCC 1005 at 1008. By virtue of section III of the 1999 Constitution a member of a State House of Assembly "shall" receive such salary and other allowance as the Commission may determine. Pursuant to the above provisions, the Commission established under Section 153 (1) (n) of the constitution, in 2007 made Rules fixing the salary of members of the House of Assembly of a state after tax and excluding allowances to over Six Hundred Thousand Naira (600,000) a month. Counsel urged the court, pursuant to Section 122 (2)(a) of the Evidence Act, 2011 as amended, to take judicial notice of this regulation made pursuant to Section 111 of the constitution. Counsel cited the case of UGWU vs. ARARAUME (2007) 7 MJSC 1 to point out the mandatory use of the word "shall" in statutory provisions. Since the Commission which the constitution empowers to fix salaries and allowances of public officers such as the Claimants did so in 2007 which said regulations are still operational till date, counsel submitted that the entitlement of the salary and attendant emoluments by the Claimants is non-negotiable and therefore they are entitled to same as a matter of right. It follows that no one can unilaterally, as done by the Defendants, reduce that amount or short-change them in the payment thereof. Counsel also submitted that such an act if done is without any semblance of legal justification, and accordingly outside the scope of authority of any of the Defendants on record. Counsel urged the court to so hold. Learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that the protection accorded to a public officer by this law is not absolute as stated by the apex court in the case of HASSSAN vs. ALIYU (2010) 7 MJSC 1 PP 30-36 PARAS C-F where the Supreme Court in the captured the exception to the protection offered by that law in the following words: "Where a public officer acts outside the scope of his authority or without a semblance of legal justification, he cannot claim protection of the provision of the Public Officers Protection Act..." By making the payment subject to Claimants joining other parties other than the ones through which they came into office amounts to bad faith. The Defendants ought not to benefit from their own wrong by hiding under the limitation law. Counsel recalled that it had been argued on behalf of the 1st to 3rd Defendants that they are not part of what happened in the 6th Defendant body as according to them the 6th Defendant is an autonomous and independent body from the 1st to 3rd Defendants. Counsel conceded to that argument but contended that same is fanciful in view of circumstance of what obtains in the state and elsewhere, but does not represent the reality on ground. Counsel submitted that by the combined provision of Sections 5(2) (a) and 176 (1) & (2) of the 1999 constitution, the governor of a state is vested with the executive powers of the state for the execution and maintenance of the constitution, among others. Counsel submitted that the 1st Defendant alone exercises the power of issuing directives to all officers of the Government including the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in line with the provisions of the constitution above. According to counsel, the above directive includes directives on payment of salaries and allowances to public officers in line with the regulations made by the Commission pursuant to Section 111 of the constitution and that he swore an oath to do so. Counsel also submitted that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are the Chief Law Officer and Chief Accounting Officer of the state respectively and that by the very nature of their offices, and the functions performed by their respective offices which are available to all arms of government, and that the 1st to 3rd Defendants’ interpretation of the principle of separation of powers is highly misconceived and same is inapplicable in this case. Counsel urged the Court to so hold. It was the submission of counsel, relying on the case of BWACHA vs. IKENYA (2011) All FWLR (Pt.572) 1674 (SC), that the 1st to 3rd Defendants are necessary parties in this case and as such were properly joined in the action. Moreover, a reasonable cause of action lies against them at suit of the Claimants. Counsel submitted that the case of the Claimants revolve round "claim for work and labour done" as members of the 6th Defendant body. They are of the view that they were under-paid and have as a result, applied to this Court to enforce their right to the arrears of salaries owed them by the Defendants. Counsel argued that the law is trite that the limitation law does not apply in an action for claims for work and labour done. The Supreme Court in NIGERIA PORTS AUTHORITY vs. CONSTUZONI GENERAL FASURA LOGETAR SPA & ANOR (1974), All NLR (Pt. 2) P. 463 or (1974) All NLR Pg. 945 @ 957 per IBEKWE JSC cited with approval the statement or dictum of the Court of Appeal per DE COMMARMOND SPJ in SALAKO vs. LEDB & ANOR 20 NLR Pg. 169 to the effect that "… Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Ordinance does not apply in cases of recovery of land, breaches of contract, claims for work and labour done, etc". According to counsel, it is in evidence that the action of the 1st Defendant made it impossible for the Claimants to bring this action as he was having one meeting and the other with them, offering all manner of reasons and urging restraint on the part of the Claimants to the point that by the time Claimants realized that all these gimmicks were aimed at buying time, they had to rush to Court. It was the submission of counsel that allowing the defence raised by the Defendants to hold will amount to encouraging them to benefit from their own wrong and that a party denied the right to bring his action timeously by any means, by the adverse party, cannot be refused access to Court on the basis of the limitations law. See NIGERIA ARMY vs. WARRANT OFFICER YAKUBU (2013) 1-2 KINGS LAW REPORTS (Pt. 323). In OBOT & ORS vs. SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY NIG LTD (2013) LPELR 20704, the Court of Appeal stated the position aptly as follows: "The Act is intended as much as within the limits of the law to protect a public officer from detraction and unnecessary limitation but never intended to deprive a party of legal Capacity to ventilate his grievances on the face of stark injustice". In the same view, counsel referred the court to the case of DUKOKE vs. IGP & ORS (2011) LPELR where the Court of Appeal stated that the protection offered by Act will be refused "When it can be shown that Defendant's action was accompanied with an intervention on his part other than discharging, promoting the discharge of the public duty, or of exercise of the authority and power for public purpose to which it relates". According to counsel, the above judicial pronouncements go to show that the Courts have severally shot down arguments aimed at denying an aggrieved litigant access to Court to ventilate his grievance when same borders on his salary, work or job done, illegal or unlawful actions of public officers, etc. counsel submitted that it is very apparent from the record, that the action of the Defendants being actuated by malice, bad faith, out rightly unconstitutional, cannot enjoy the indulgence of this Court. See POPOOLA vs. A.G. KWARA STATE (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 604) 175. Counsel urged the court to resolve this issue against the Defendants and hold that assume jurisdiction to entertain this matter. Arguing Issues 2 and 3 together, learned counsel for the Claimants submitted that evidence of the CW2 was never impeached even under cross-examination to the effect that between the two (2) Regulations by the Commission namely that of 2007 and 2009, the one operational was that of 2007. Counsel placed reliance on the court’s decision Court in a sister case NICN/OW/66/2015- HON. VICTOR NDUNAGU vs. GOVERNOR OF IMO STATE & ORS at page 14 of the judgment held as follows: "There is no evidence from the Defendants to convince me that the 2009 package was the one in effect at the time the Claimants were members of the Imo State house of Assembly. The evidence of CW2 has however cleared the air as to which of the packages ought to be used to determine the Claimants' claim in this matter. Without further waste of time on this point, I hold that the 2007 package was the one applicable to the Claimants during their tenure as members of the Imo State House of Assembly. Counsel urged the court to hold that the above position remains the law as to which of the two (2) packages, namely 2007 and 2009, is applicable in the case of the Claimants. Also, Counsel submitted that if the court finds that it is the 2007 package that is applicable in the instant case, the Court is invited to note that the case of the Claimants is predicated on the 2007 package. On the other hand, the Defendants contention is that it was the 2009 package that was applicable to the Claimants' case hence the payment of the sum of N238,863.49 to Claimants as their monthly allowance/salary. However, according to the Claimants, their monthly allowance/salary was as provided under the 2007 package as stated in the table appearing in pages 3-4 of the Amended Statement of Facts. That is to say, paragraphs 9 and 9a thereof. Counsel submitted that to lay credence to the case of the Claimants, Defendants started paying Claimants the sum of N605.134.19 each per month from July 2014 up till the end of Claimants’ tenure. Evidence was led to show that this was as a result of the agitations by the Claimants. Counsel argued that the pertinent question that begs for answer in view of the posture of the Defendants as to which package is applicable in the case of claimants is; "On what package between that of 2007 and 2009, did Defendants resort to the payment of N605,134.19 from July 2014 to June 2015, to the Claimants, if the earlier payments of the sum of N238,863.49 for 36 whole months was done pursuant to the 2009 package? According to counsel, the conduct of the Defendants amounted to approbating and reprobating. The law is trite that a party should not be allowed to approbate and reprobate by earlier on through this word or conduct or wilful representation, holding out a particular position and later attempting to decline from or denying such representation. See OYEYEMI vs. COMMISSIONER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, KWARA STATE, (1992) 2 SCNJ (Pt.11) 266, IGA vs. ANAKIRI (1979) 11 SC 1 @ 12-13; ADETORO (Pt. 396) 590. Counsel urged the court to hold that Defendants cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time by ordering them to pay the difference of N366,270.07 (Three Hundred and Sixty Six Thousand, Two Hundred and Seventy Naira Seven kobo) for June 2011 to June 2014, a period of 36 months, to each of the Claimants, amounting to a total sum of N13,185,745.00 (Thirteen Million, One Hundred and Eighty Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Forty Five Naira) to each of the Claimants. Counsel urged the court to resolve issues 2 and 3 in favour of Claimants. In conclusion, counsel submitted that from the totality of pleadings and evidence led on both sides, it is clear that the Claimants have made out a case to warrant this Court to give judgment in their favour and urged the Court to so hold and resolve all issues raised in favour of the Claimants. COURT’S DECISION I have heard the submissions of learned counsels for the parties in the final written addresses. I will briefly review the facts and evidence presented to the court by the parties before determining the issues and claims involved in the case. The case of the Claimants is that they were elected into the Imo State House of Assembly, the 6th Defendant, in the General Election held in April 2011 and they were sworn in as members of the House of Assembly in June 2011 to represent their respective constituencies in the Imo State House of Assembly. As members of the House of Assembly, the Claimants were entitled to salaries and emoluments as fixed by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (Hereinafter referred to as RMAFC) in the Remuneration package of 2007. From the month of June 2011, when the Claimants were inaugurated as members of the House of Assembly, each of them were entitled to be paid a monthly sum of N808,196.63 on the basis of the computation of their entitlements in the 2007 Remuneration package of the RMAFC, but after deduction of tax, VAT and other deductions from the monthly payments totalling the sum of N208,062.44, the sum of N605,134.19 was left to be paid to each of them monthly. But on the direction of the 1st Defendant, each of the Claimants were being paid a monthly sum of N238,863.49 leaving an unpaid balance of N366,270.07 from their monthly entitlements. This shortfall in their monthly payments started in June 2011 and continued until June 2014 when the Claimants started receiving their complete entitlements in the sum of N605,134.19 monthly. The unpaid balances of the entitlements of each of the Claimants from June 2011 to June 2014, a period of 36 months, is the sum of N13,185,745.00. The sum total of the arrears of entitlements of all the Claimants within the period is the sum of N118,671,705.00. The 1st Defendant promised to pay these arrears of allowances of the Claimants but failed to do so. The Claimants were given the option to join the All Progressive Congress (APC) or forget about receiving the arrears of their entitlements. Their counter parts who are members of the All Progressive Congress (APC) have been paid their arrears. The Claimants did not at any time agree with the Defendants for the deduction of any sum from their salaries. Hence, they claim the reliefs contained in the amended statement of facts. In their statement of defence, the 1st to 3rd Defendants first raised an objection to the jurisdiction of this court. It was averred in their statement of defence that the suit is statute barred as it was commenced more than three months after the Claimants’ cause of action arose. Regarding the claims of the Claimants, it is the case of the 1st to 3rd Defendants that the Claimants have not placed any document before the court to show that they are members of the Imo State House of Assembly or that they represent the constituencies they claim to be representing. The Claimants did not also place any document from the RMAFC to show that they are entitled to N605,134.19 as salaries and allowances. The 1st to 3rd Defendants also averred that they are not responsible for payment of full emoluments of public officers including the Claimants. The Claimants are not entitled to the salaries and emoluments fixed by the RMAFC under the RMAFC Act 2006 but they are only entitled to allowances under the reviewed remuneration package of June 2009 by the RMAFC. Thus, their individual entitlements under the 2009 reviewed package is the sum of N238,863.49 monthly and they were being paid pursuant to the 2009 remuneration package. Each of the Claimants is not entitled to the sum of N605,134.19 or N808,196.63. Besides the sum of N238,863.49 being paid to the Claimants monthly, they were also paid monthly sums of N1,666,667.00 as security votes, N1,000,000.00 as legislative expenses and N740,000.00 as Committee allowances. The total sum paid to each of the Claimants monthly was the sum of N3,406,007.00. The sum of N13,185,745.00 does not represent the difference between the monthly sum of N238,863.49 paid to the Claimants and their actual salary of N605,134.19. The 1st to 3rd Defendants are not responsible for payment of the salaries of the Claimants and they are not also indebted to the Claimants, as the Claimants were paid their salaries and allowances as at when due. The Claimants were not pressured to join APC as a condition for payment of their salary arrears. Hence, the Claimants are not entitled to their claims. The defence of the 4th to 6th Defendants is not different from that of the 1st to 3rd Defendant. The only addition made by the 4th to 6th Defendants is their admission that the Claimants are members of the Imo State House of Assembly, and that the 4th to 6th Defendants are not responsible for payment of full emoluments of public officers including the Claimants. They do not pay the salaries of the Claimants, and are not indebted to the Claimants. In view of these facts of the case and the issues canvassed by counsels to the parties in their final written addresses, the issues which this court is to determine in this case are as follows: 1. Whether the suit is statute barred. 2. Whether the Claimants are entitled to the claims they sought in this action. ISSUE 1: The 1st to 3rd Defendants have raised an objection to the competence of the Claimants’ suit and to the jurisdiction of this court to entertain this suit. In paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the statement of defence of the 1st to 3rd Defendants, these Defendants challenged the jurisdiction of this court to entertain this suit on the ground that the suit is statute barred. In his evidence, DW3 stated that the suit is statute barred having been commenced more than 3 months after the act complained of was done. According to DW3, the suit was filed 3 months and 24 days after the act was done. DW3 also stated that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. The learned counsel for the 1st to 3rd Defendant submitted, in issue 1 of his written address, that Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (POPA) 2004 provided for 3 months within which to institute actions against public officers in the course of public duties, but the Claimants whose cause of actions accrued from June 2011, filed this suit on 3rd May 2014 which was a period of more than 2 years after the alleged default, act or neglect of the Defendants. Section 2 (a) of POPA relied on by the 1st to 3rd Defendants in the objection limited the time within which actions can be commenced against a public officer. It provides that no action can be commenced against a public officer in respect of his duties or any default in respect of his duties unless it is commenced within 3 months after the act, or neglect or default complained of. Where the suit is not commenced within the prescribed period, the Claimant’s right of action in respect of that cause will be statute barred and the court will no longer have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. See IBRAHIM vs. J.S.C, KADUNA STATE (1998) 12 SC 20; EGBE vs. ALHAJI (1990) 3 S.C (Pt.1) 63. In the response of the Claimants’ counsel to this objection, counsel did not dispute the fact that the Defendants are public officers. The Claimants counsel however canvassed a number of reasons why the suit is not statute barred. The fact that the Defendants are public officers is therefore not in dispute. It remains to determine whether the suit is statute barred. In his written address, counsel for the 1st to 3rd Defendants alleged that the Claimants’ cause of action arose in June 2011. Counsel referred to the averments of the Claimants in paragraph 7 of the Statement of Facts and stated that the Claimant served in the Imo State House of Assembly from May 2007 and left office in June 2011. There is no such pleading in paragraph 7 of the Claimants’ statement of facts neither did the Claimants plead anywhere that they were in office from 2007 to 2011. Their case is that they were elected members of the Imo State House of Assembly in 2011 for a 4 year term. In addition, contrary to the submissions of counsel for the 1st to 3rd Defendants, the Claimants’ cause of action did not arise in June 2011. From the averments of the Claimants in paragraphs 10, 12 and 13 of their statement of facts, the shortfall in their monthly payments started in June 2011 and continued until June 2014 when the Claimants started receiving their complete monthly entitlements. Each month when a balance is left unpaid from the monthly entitlements of the Claimant raises a fresh cause of action and this continued until the month the incomplete payment was stopped. From June 2011 to June 2014 when complete monthly payments were not paid to the Claimants was a continuing injury. See C.B.N vs. AMAO (2010) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1219) 271. Therefore, the cause of action of the Claimants for the unpaid balance of their monthly entitlements from June 2011 to June 2014 commenced from the moment payment of their complete monthly entitlements was commenced. That was in June 2014. The Claimants filed suit on 25th November 2015. That was a period of about 5 months from the time the cause of action commenced. The Claimants had filed this action more than 3 months from the time their cause of action arose. But that is not the end of the matter however. The Claimants counsel submitted inter alia that the Claimants’ claim is for work and labour done and as such, the case is not affected by POPA. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the Claimants, it has been settled in plethora of judicial authorities that the Public Officers’ Protection Act does not apply to cases of contract, recovery of land, breaches of contract or claims for work and labour done. The Supreme Court, in the case of OSUN STATE GOVERNMENT vs. DALAMI (NIG) LTD. (2007) NWLR (Pt. 1038) 66 held that “the Public Officers’ Protection Act does not apply to cases of contract, recovery of land, breaches of contract or claims for work and labour done”. See also the case of F.G.N vs. ZEBRA ENERGY LTD. (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 891) 162 at 197 where the Supreme Court held that: “The Public Officers’ Protection Act does not apply in cases of recovery of land, breaches of contract and or for claims of work done.” See also UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR TEACHING HOSPITAL vs. JULIET KOKO BASSEY (2008) LPELR-8553(CA); WURO BOGGA NIGERIA LTD & ANOR vs. HON. MINISTER OF FCT & ORS (2009) LPELR-20032. These authorities have created exceptions to the applicability of Section 2 (a) of POPA. This court too, in a number of its decisions, has maintained the position that claims for salaries or gratuity or allowances relating to work or labour performed is not affected by Section 2 (a) of POPA. Once it is shown that the claim is for payment of entitlements for work or labour done, POPA will not operate to bar the action. The Claimants claim in this suit is for payment of their unpaid monthly salaries and allowances from June 2011 to June 2014 due to them as members of the Imo State House of Assembly. Taking into consideration the relief sought by the Claimants in this suit, it is my view that the case of the Claimants clearly falls into the permissible exceptions to Section 2 (a) of POPA. I therefore hold that Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to this case. This suit is not statute barred. ISSUE 2: The Claimants claim for payment of the sum of NI3,185,745.00 to each of them being the balance of their individual salaries from June 2011 to June 2014 when they were members of the Imo State House of Assembly (6th Defendant). The facts of this debt, according to the Claimants, is that as members of the 6th Defendant sworn-in in June 2011, they were entitled to be paid the sum of N605,134.19 monthly salary after deduction of taxes based on the salaries and emoluments as fixed by the RMAFC in the Remuneration package of 2007. However, from June 2011, the Claimants were being paid monthly sums of N238,863.49 leaving an unpaid balance of N366,270.07 from their monthly entitlements. This shortfall in their monthly payments continued until June 2014 when the Claimants started receiving their complete entitlements in the sum of N605,134.19 monthly. The unpaid balances of the entitlements of each of the Claimants from June 2011 to June 2014, a period of 36 months, is the sum of N13,185,745.00 which they claim from the Defendants in this suit. In paragraphs 5 and 11 of the statement of defence of the 1st to 3rd Defendants, they aver that the Claimants have not shown that they were members of the 6th Defendant or that they represent the constituencies they claim to be representing in the 6th Defendant. In order words, the 1st to 3rd Defendants dispute the fact that the Claimants were elected into the 6th Defendant as members thereof. These averments of the 1st to 3rd Defendants bring up the issue whether the Claimants were even members of the 6th Defendant in the first place to enable them seek the relief they claim in this case. CW1, who is the 5th Claimant, has given sufficient evidence establishing the fact that the Claimants were members of the 6th Defendant. I have also seen Exhibits C1 to C10. These are the Certificates of Return of the Claimants as elected members of the Imo State House of Assembly in the April 2011 General Election. There is also Exhibit D2, which is the 6th Defendant’s bank schedule for the month of February 2015 showing the names of the Claimants as members of the 6th Defendant. A further examination of the facts in the statement of facts of the 1st to 3rd Defendants, disclose that these Defendants admit the fact that the Claimants were members of the 6th Defendant. It was pleaded in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the statement of defence of the 1st to 3rd Defendants that the Claimants were entitled to payment as members of the 6th Defendant under the 2009 remuneration package of the RMAFC and their monthly entitlements was the sum of N238,863. It was also averred in paragraphs 17, 18 and 27 of the statement of defence that the Claimant as members of 6th Defendant, received additional payments such as legislative allowances, security vote and committee allowances. DW3 who gave evidence on behalf of the 1st to 3rd Defendants also testified to these facts. These facts I have pointed out in the case of the 1st to 3rd Defendants and the evidence of DW3 contradict the averments in paragraphs 5 and 11 of the statement of defence of these Defendants. Without any doubt, they have admitted that the Claimants were members of the 6th Defendant. On the part of the 4th to 6th Defendants, they admitted in paragraph 1 and in the averments in the subsequent paragraphs of their statement of defence that the Claimants were members of the 6th Defendant. In view of the averments and evidence of the Defendants, I do not think the issue of the Claimants being members of the 6th Defendant is in dispute. This is in addition to the fact that the Claimants have proved that they were members of the 6th Defendant. The Claimants, in computing the sum they claim in this case, averred that they were entitled to the arrears they claim by virtue of the 2007 remuneration package of the RMAFC. In denying the Claimants claim to the sum they claim in this action, the Defendants contended that the Claimants are not entitled to salaries and emoluments fixed by the RMAFC under the 2007 remuneration package but they are only entitled to allowances under the reviewed remuneration package of June 2009 by the RMAFC. The Defendants also stated that the individual entitlements of the Claimants under the 2009 reviewed package is the sum of N238,863.49 monthly and they were being paid these sums pursuant to the 2009 remuneration package. Although the parties agree that the salaries and allowances which the Claimants were entitled to as members of the 6th Defendant were as determined or fixed by the RMAFC, the disagreement however is on the applicable remuneration package. While the Claimants maintained that it is the 2007 package, the Defendants said it is the 2009 package. This division is even more pronounced in the submissions of counsels to the parties in their written addresses. Of course, the remuneration package under which the Claimants are entitled to be paid their salaries and allowances as members of the 6th Defendant goes a long way in determining the claim of the Claimants in this suit. Therefore, it is necessary to resolve the issue of which remuneration packages was applicable to the Claimants when they were members of the 6th Defendant. The Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) is the body with the constitutional power and duty to determine and fix the salaries and allowances payable to political, public and judicial office holders in Nigeria. Pursuant to that responsibility, the RMAFC, from time to time, issue what is simply called Remuneration packages used in the payment of salaries and allowances to political, public and judicial office holders in Nigeria. This court, at the instance of the claimants and the 1st to 3rd Defendants, issued separate subpoenas to Bruno Kizito Ajaelu, the Imo State coordinator of the RMAFC, to produce the 2007 and 2009 remuneration packages of the RMAFC. He was in court on 7th and 23rd February 2017 for that purpose. As a witness for the Claimants, he told the court that he was subpoenaed to produce the 2007 remuneration package of the RMAFC and a table showing the monthly salary of a member of the Imo State House of Assembly. He produced the 2007 package, dated February 2007, and it was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 12. The table showing summary of payments of House of Assembly members was also produced and admitted as Exhibit 13. The witness further stated that the 2007 package was applicable between June 2007 and June 2015. Under cross examination by the counsels to the Defendants, the witness told the court that there is a 2009 remuneration package but it is not in use. The 2007 package is still in use till today and it has not been superceded by any other document or repealed. As witness for the 1st to 3rd Defendants, Bruno Kizito Ajaelu told the court he was subpoenaed to produce the 2009 remuneration package which he could not bring with him to court as a result of the short notice. He however identified a CTC of the 2009 package shown to him by counsel to 1st to 3rd Defendants. The document was admitted in evidence as Exhibit D1. Under cross examination by the Claimants counsel, the witness told the court that the 2009 remuneration package is not in operation and that it is still the 2007 package that is in operation. The evidence of the subpoenaed witness from RMAFC has cleared the controversy as to which of the packages the Claimants were entitled to be paid their salaries and allowances as members of the 6th Defendant. The Defendants wanted this court to believe that the 2009 package was in use that was why they subpoenaed the State Coordinator of RMAFC to produce the document before the court. There is the 2009 package actually but, according to the subpoenaed witness, it was never used. What has been in use since 2007 till date is the 2007 package. In their bid to show that the 2009 package was the one applicable for payment of the Claimants’ salaries, the Defendants said the Claimants were being paid their salaries and allowances as prescribed in the 2009 package since the time of their membership of the 6th Defendant in June 2011. This revelation by the Defendants goes to show that the Claimants were being paid wrong entitlements. It is also an admission by the Defendants that the Claimants were being underpaid their monthly entitlements. It is clear to me, from the evidence of the subpoenaed witness, that the package applicable for the payment of the salaries and allowances of the members of the 6th Defendant is the 2007 package. Invariably, the package to be used to determine the Claimants’ claim in this matter is the 2007 remuneration package of the RMAFC. Now, the Claimants said from June 2011 to June 2014, they were being paid monthly salary of N238,863.49 instead of N605,134.19. According to CW1, each of the Claimants is entitled to the monthly salary of N808,196.63 under the 2007 package but after deduction of the sum of N208,062.44 for tax purposes, the balance payable to each of them monthly is the sum of N605,134.19. As a result of the incomplete monthly payments, the sum of N366,270.07 was usually left unpaid to each of them on monthly basis. This happened for 36 months and the unpaid balance for these period has accrued to the sum of N13,185,745.00 for each of the Claimants. The Claimants have pleaded the computation of their monthly allowances and salaries in paragraphs 9 and 9a of the amended statement of facts. The Claimant also pleaded the amounts of the unpaid balances of their salaries and the total value for the affected months in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the statement of facts. CW1 also gave evidence of these facts. I have also examined the entitlement of the Claimants in Exhibit C12, the 2007 package, and I find that it supports the Claimants’ claim. The Claimants’ allegation in paragraph 10 of the amended statement of facts that from July 2014, the Defendants started paying to them the complete monthly salary of N605,134.19 was not denied or controverted by the Defendants. The effect is that the Claimants’ averment that each of them ought to receive the sum of N605,134.19 monthly is unshaken. The Defendant, by their own admission paid N238,863.49 monthly to each Claimant between June 2011 and June 2014. The unpaid difference in the monthly salaries of the Claimants for this period of 36 months was the sum of N366,270.07. The total unpaid sum for the period is the sum of N13,185,745.00 for each Claimant. I find that the monthly payments due to the Claimants were under-paid to them between June 2011 and June 2014. The Claimants were owed arrears of their salaries in this period. The Defendants have not defended the sum claimed against them. They put their defence only on their claim that the 2009 remuneration package was the applicable package under which the Claimants were entitled to be paid their salaries. I have said it earlier in this judgment that the admission by the Defendants that they used the 2009 package to pay the Claimants show that the Claimants were actually underpaid. Thus, the Claimants are entitled to the balances of their salaries from June 2011 to June 2014. The sum owed to each of the Claimants for this period is the sum of N13,185,745.00. The Defendants’ averment that the Claimants received other payments during the period is not lost to me. The legislative allowance, security vote and committee allowance allegedly being paid to the Claimants were not part of the allowances prescribed by RMAFC in the 2007 package for the Claimants. The additional payments are more or less gratuitous allowances. Therefore, the additional allowances paid to the Claimants do not remove the liability of the Defendants to pay the unpaid balance of the Claimants’ due monthly salaries or entitlements. Again, the Defendants, in their separate statements of defence, stated respectively that they are not responsible for payment of the salaries of the Claimants, and that the Claimants are being paid by the RMAFC. In order words, the Defendants, in their defence of the claim, shifted liability of the claim from themselves when they said they are not the ones to pay the Claimants. The constitutional duties of the RMAFC are as prescribed in Section 32, Part One of the 3rd Schedule of the 1999 Constitution. The duties of the RMAFC, both under the Constitution and in the RMAFC Act do not include payment of the salaries or allowances of members of States Houses of Assembly or any other political office holder for that matter. The duty of the RMAFC with respect to remuneration of political office holders is limited only to determine the remuneration appropriate for political office holders. Thus, Section 111 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides that “a member of the House of Assembly shall receive such salary and other allowances as the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission may determine”. The Defendants’ allegation that it is the duty of RMAFC to pay the Claimants is baseless. In addition, the Defendants did not produce any evidence before this court to substantiate their allegation that the Claimants were being paid their salaries and allowances by the RMAFC. The House of Assembly of a state is the legislative arm of the State Government created for the state in Section 90 of the 1999 Constitution. Payment of the salaries and allowances of members of States Houses of Assembly is the responsibility of the respective States. Constitutionally, the Government of each state in Nigeria has control of its funds, whether internally generated or from the Federation Account. The responsibility for the appropriation and use of the funds, including payment of salaries and allowances of political, public office holders or civil servants also lies with the State Government. The 1st Defendant in this case is the Chief Executive of the state. The 1st Defendant is the office which exercises power or authority on behalf of the Imo State Government. Furthermore, the 6th Defendant is a constitutional creation and the Claimants served as members thereof at the time the debt being claimed in this case accrued. In my view, both the 1st and 6th Defendants are responsible for ensuring that members of the 6th Defendant are paid their allowances prescribed to be paid to them by RMAFC as members of the 6th Defendant. I hold therefore that the 1st and 6th Defendants have the responsibility of paying the debt in question. In the result of all the foregoing, I find that the Claimants are entitled to their claim for arrears of their salaries from June 2011 to June 2014. The Claimants have proved the sum of N13,185,745.00 to be the arrears of salaries and allowances being owed to each of them. The claim for the sum of N13,185,745.00 for each Claimant is granted. As for the Claimants claim for interest in reliefs 2 and 3, I have heard the arguments of counsels to the parties for and against award of interests. I will not belabour the issue. I am inclined to award only post judgment interest on the sum due to the Claimants. I find in favour of the Claimants and make the following orders: 1. The 1st and 6th Defendants are hereby ordered to pay the sum of N13,185,745.00 (Thirteen Million, One Hundred and Eighty Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Forty Five Naira) to each of the Claimants herein, being the balance of their salaries for the months of June 2011 to June 2014. 2. Cost of N300,000.00 (Three Hundred Thousand Naira) is awarded in favour of the Claimants. 3. The above sums must be paid to the Claimants within 30 days from today after which it will begin to attract interest at 10% per annum until it is paid to the Claimants. Judgment is entered accordingly. Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe Judge